



T e l e g r a m m

(geh.Ch.V.)

Helsinki, den 19. Dezember 1939 - 14.45 Uhr

Ankunft: " 19. " " - 16.10 "

Nr. 428 vom 19. Dezember

C i t i s s i m e

- 1) Hier wird in massgebenden Kreisen behauptet, die deutsche Regierung habe der schwedischen Regierung erklärt, Eingreifen Schwedens an Seite Finnlands würde militärisches Vorgehen Deutschlands gegen Schweden zur Folge haben. Erbitten Drahtanweisung, ob ich Behauptung dementieren kann.
- 2) Höre ich, dass England und Frankreich auf schwedische Regierung drücken zwecks Eingreifen zugunsten Finnlands. Finnischerseits wird vermutet, dass die Westmächte im Norden Nebenkriegsschauplatz schaffen möchten, möglichst mit Flugzeug-Basen in Süd-Schweden.
- 3) Finnische Militärkreise wünschen, dass finnisch-russischer Krieg von grossem Krieg isoliert bleibe und dass Schweden auf finnische Seite tritt.

Bluecher

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Document No. 473

(See p. 558)

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1918–1945

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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME VIII

THE WAR YEARS

September 4, 1939-March 18, 1940

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PREFACE¹

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

In accordance with the understandings on the basis of which the project was originally undertaken, the editors have had complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents.

The eighth volume of this series begins on September 4, 1939, the day following the entrance of the United Kingdom and France into the war; it ends on the eve of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, with a new active phase of the conflict immediately in the offing. Because so many of the main strands of German policy during the war years are intertwined the chronological arrangement of documents begun with volume VI has been continued. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to ease the problem of those who wish to read on selected subjects.

German relations with the Soviet Union bulk largest in this volume. The newly achieved German-Soviet accord was tested severely, first in Poland, and then in the Baltic States and Finland; and the task of working out the details of the new political, military, and economic collaboration presented numerous problems. Many documents heretofore unpublished, particularly on German-Soviet economic discussions, are included in the selection. Next in importance, in terms of

¹ In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction." The editors have not felt it necessary to repeat this introduction in the present and succeeding volumes. Interested readers may wish to refer to it for information on the nature of the German Foreign Ministry archives on which this publication is based, their present condition, and some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

active negotiations on significant matters, were German relations with Italy. Italian readjustment to the new facts of German policy was not easy, and a phase of tension is documented here; but by March 17 that phase was over, and Hitler and Mussolini could anticipate meeting at the Brenner in an atmosphere of cordiality.

Relations with Belgium and the Netherlands were dominated by German military plans for prosecuting the war in the West. In order to give a relatively adequate conception of the interconnection of military planning and foreign policy, all so-called Führer directives for the conduct of the war which fall in the period of this volume are being published, some for the first time. In Norway, not only the Navy, but the Aussenpolitisches Amt as well, shared in the formulation of policy. The topic is therefore noteworthy not only for its intrinsic interest, but because it illustrates the way in which foreign policy in the Third Reich was sometimes shaped by the competing pressures of various State and Party organs.

During this period German policy toward the neutrals had two main objectives: to counteract the workings of the Allied blockade, and to discourage the neutrals from a closer alignment with Britain and France. These objectives are particularly evident in regard to the United States, Turkey, the Middle East, Latin America, and the smaller states of Europe. At the same time Germany sought to strengthen her ties with friendly powers, particularly Japan and Spain, and to overcome their unconcealed misgivings about German-Soviet collaboration.

The various countries occupied by Germany during the war years, beginning in this volume with Poland, present problems of peculiar difficulty to the editors. The amount of documentation on the occupied countries in the files of the Foreign Ministry varies greatly from one case to another, and it is often difficult to determine precisely where to draw the line between occupation policy and foreign policy. In general the editors intend to document where they can aspects of occupation policy which impinge significantly on foreign policy. In this connection, however, they are mindful of the fact that the documents published in connection with the trials at Nuremberg have a wider range. No attempt has therefore been made to duplicate the Nuremberg publications except in the case of documents which appear to be of overriding importance for an understanding of German foreign policy.

The documents in this volume were selected jointly by the American, British, and French editors. For the footnotes and other editorial matter the American editors have entire responsibility. The Division of Language Services of the Department of State produced the translations, which were then reviewed by the American editors, and the

technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch under the direction of Miss Elizabeth A. Vary.

Readers should bear in mind that it is as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history, that these documents are presented. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes and to use them exclusively for the factual elucidation of the text.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

BALTIC STATES

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia</i> Authorizes a formal declaration that Germany would respect the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact during the war.	3	3
Sept. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Ribbentrop has decided to have the Vilna question taken up with Lithuanian officials.	36	34
Sept. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Kleist reported discussing with Škirpa Lithuanian claims and possible Lithuanian action looking to occupation of Vilna.	41	38
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Kleist recommended to the Lithuanian Minister dividing the Vilna question into military and political phases, reserving the latter for later.	57	54
Sept. 13	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Lithuanian Commander in Chief has reiterated his country's interest in the Vilna question but has stated that she is reluctant to give up her neutrality.	58	55
Sept. 14	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Zechlin notified Minister President Černius that the imminent collapse of Poland made a decision on Vilna imperative; Černius replied that Lithuania could not abandon her neutrality but hoped to register her claims to the territory.	65	62
Sept. 16	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Lithuania</i> The Foreign Minister directs that Minister Zechlin drop the subject of Vilna.	76	75
Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann denounced as insolent the alleged Lithuanian complaints to Britain and France about German pressure in the Vilna question; the Lithuanian Minister replied that the story had already been denied in Kaunas.	84	83
Sept. 18	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kotze describes Latvian anxiety about Soviet intentions and requests instructions.	89	91

¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume the analytical list of documents is arranged alphabetically by countries, with the addition of four subject headings: "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Peace Moves," "Propaganda," and "Sea Warfare."

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 19	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Frohwein reports that Estonian Foreign Minister Selter inquired about German support for the Baltic countries against possible Soviet expansion; Frohwein replied that there had been no change in German-Estonian relations as defined in the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact.	98	101
Sept. 20	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Frohwein reports that the Soviet attitude in the incident of the Polish submarine Orzel and the favorable progress of Estonian-Soviet economic negotiations have eased tension in Estonia; he requests instructions as to the German attitude toward the economic talks.	107	107
Sept. 20	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Latvia</i> Authorizes Kotze to make reassuring statements to the Latvian Government and to make reference to Hitler's speech of September 19 and to the communiqué of September 19 by the German and Soviet Governments.	110	110
Sept. 20	<i>Outline of a Defense Treaty Between the German Reich and the Republic of Lithuania</i>	113	112
Sept. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to clarify the Vilna situation in a friendly discussion with Molotov and Stalin; the German view is that this territory is to go to Lithuania.	114	113
Sept. 21	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Frohwein describes the situation arising from the escape of Orzel from Estonian internment; Molotov has stated that the Soviet search for Orzel is not directed against Estonia.	119	119
Sept. 22	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Zechlin reports that Foreign Minister Urbšys has repeated that Lithuania has national aspirations but wishes to achieve them by peaceful means.	121	121
Sept. 22	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg quotes Molotov as saying that the Soviet Government will respect the agreements on the Vilna question but will consider it further in connection with the final Baltic settlement.	123	123
Sept. 25	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Estonian Government is studying the draft of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Estonia as presented by Molotov; an early reply is expected.	130	129
Sept. 27	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Forwards to Ribbentrop a telegram from the Legation in Estonia regarding the Soviet demand for a Soviet-Estonian alliance.	141	147

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 27	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Forwards to Ribbentrop a communication by Selter on the Estonian attitude toward the Soviet demand for a military alliance; Estonia intends to yield as little as possible and to maintain existing good relations with Germany.	142	147
Sept. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union.</i> Hitler has ordered resettlement of the Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia; preliminary measures are being taken but the actual arrangements will depend on Ribbentrop's current negotiations in Moscow.	153	162
Sept. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union.</i> Himmler has suggested a procedure for resettling Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia, with German protection if necessary.	154	162
Sept. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union.</i> Expresses the need for an agreement in Moscow as to the treatment of the Volksdeutsche in case Russian troops march into Estonia.	156	164
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told the Lithuanian Minister he did not know whether negotiations involving Lithuania were proceeding in Moscow; Woermann had reports only of the Soviet-Estonian negotiations, in which Germany had no part.	164	169
Sept. 29	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Estonian officials are expressing gratitude to Germany for a toning down of Soviet demands; Estonia will accept these, but wishes to continue good relations with Germany.	168	174
Oct. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Soviet Government has called for immediate negotiations with Latvia.	174	182
Oct. 3	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions as to how to answer statements that Germany has given up political influence in the area around Latvia.	181	198
Oct. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says he intends to tell the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that the USSR is willing to give Vilna to Lithuania and also that Lithuania must cede a portion of its territory to Germany. Schulenburg fears this will make Germany appear a "robber" while the USSR appears a donor.	182	199
Oct. 3	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania</i> Instructions to make no statements on German-Russian relations and their possible effects on the Baltic States.	184	200
Oct. 4	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Warns that disorders may follow publication of Russian demands on Latvia; requests protection and evacuation of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche	190	206

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to request Molotov not to speak of the strip of Lithuanian territory.	191	207
Oct. 5	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to anxious inquiries by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, Zechlin stated that Germany did not regard German-Lithuanian frontier rectification as pressing.	197	215
Oct. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia</i> Instructions to inform Estonian Government that Germany is assuming protection for Volksdeutsche and plans their orderly evacuation; their property must be safeguarded.	199	218
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Lithuanian Minister express satisfaction that the German Government has withdrawn its claim to frontier rectification.	200	219
Oct. 6	<i>The State Secretary to the Legations in Latvia and Estonia</i> Instructions to proceed with the evacuation and to set up commissions to handle the details, particularly economic.	207	232
Oct. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland</i> In strictest secrecy informs the German Ministers that the Moscow negotiations of September 28 delimited German and Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe; these countries plus Lithuania fall outside the German sphere.	213	238
Oct. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government has expressed surprise at the impending "panicky" emigration of Germans from Latvia and Estonia; this would seriously compromise the action of the Soviet Government.	239	266
Oct. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to reply to the Soviet Government that the evacuation in no way compromises Soviet actions; emigration is being carried out calmly on the basis of the Moscow agreements and will remove a source of possible friction.	252	282
Oct. 14	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Urbšys, just returned from Moscow, quotes Stalin and Molotov as saying the Soviet Union desires no sovietization of Lithuania; Lithuanian troops will enter the Vilna territory on October 16; talks are continuing in Moscow on the Soviet garrison for Lithuania and on economic relations.	254	284
Oct. 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov has asked that German naval operations be confined to the Swedish side of the Baltic, lest they be construed as a demonstration in Finland's favor.	305	347

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Oct. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to notify Molotov that the German Naval Command will defer to Soviet wishes in the Baltic and will notify the Soviet Government of future measures that may affect Russian interests.	309	351
Oct. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov was dissatisfied with a German communication on naval operations in the Baltic; the Soviet Government regards German operations in the Soviet sphere as contrary to the agreement and requests that they be kept west of 20° longitude.	313	357
Nov. 9	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Germany will take an accommodating attitude toward the Soviet request to refrain from naval operations east of 20° longitude but reserves all rights.	341	393

BELGIUM

1939 Sept. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgian popular sentiment is generally anti-German, but will be influenced by military events. The Government's neutrality policy reflects the wishes of the people.	19	18
Oct. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Shift of Belgian defense forces to the northern and eastern frontiers reflects the changed estimate of the situation after the end of the Polish campaign. The neutrality policy will be firmly maintained. A German invasion, the only one believed likely, would meet the resistance of a united nation.	243	270
Oct. 13	<i>The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Chief of the Belgian General Staff inquired about concentrations of German armor and motorized troops around Cologne. He emphasized Belgian determination to maintain neutrality.	251	281
Oct. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium</i> Instruction to state that reports of German troop concentrations around Cologne are false, to express surprise at the transfer of Belgian troops from Belgian-French to Belgian-German border, and to call attention to anti-German tone of Belgian press.	262	292
Oct. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> A member of the Belgian Senate informed Bülow of the proceedings of a secret session of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Senate at which Foreign Minister Spaak had vigorously defended the Government's neutrality policy.	302	344
Nov. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Belgian Ambassador attempted to discuss possible violation of Belgian territory. Weizsäcker evaded this discussion. The Ambassador was further disturbed about German press comments on the Belgian King's visit to The Hague.	331	382

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Nov. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having heard that the visit of King Leopold to The Hague was undertaken because of news received concerning German preparations for attack near the Belgian and Dutch border.	334	386
Nov. [12]	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Spaak asked the reason for Germany's threatening actions toward Belgium in the face of Belgium's correct attitude.	349	400
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> At the opening of economic policy discussions with Belgium the Germans protested against a Belgian policy which might restrict or cut off imports of raw materials from Belgium.	357	409
Nov. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Following the recent panicky excitement caused by fear that a German invasion was imminent public sentiment has calmed down. The press had adopted a moderate tone. Strong suspicions of Germany's intentions still remain.	365	415
Nov. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Belgian economic negotiator is informed that the Belgian conception of neutrality in the economic field was unsatisfactory to Germany and that Germany must reduce exports to Belgium to the extent that shipments of raw materials to Germany had been cut off. Preparation had been made to stop exports of German coal.	370	419
Dec. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Belgian Ambassador discussed the position in the pending economic negotiations, the sincerely neutral attitude of the Belgian King, and the prospects for an end of the war, which he viewed as very slight. Weizsäcker maintained an attitude of reserve.	456	536
1940			
Jan. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> M. Spaak discussed the remarks he had made in the Chamber on December 19, 1939, stressing the unity of the Belgian people in support of the Government's neutrality policy. Any attack on Holland would create a new situation requiring reexamination.	522	645
Jan. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i> The Belgian Counselor of Embassy presented a note verbale protesting against flights of German planes over Belgian territory. He mentioned also the plane which made a forced landing at Mechelen-sur-Meuse on January 10.	528	656
Jan. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium</i> Requests immediate detailed report of the conversation between Major Reinberger, one of the officers on the German courier plane forced down at Mechelen-sur-Meuse, and the German Air Attaché. Requests also details of the destruction of the courier baggage.	529	658

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Major Reinberger informed the Air Attaché that he had burned the courier baggage except for unimportant fragments which he was prevented from destroying. Close watch will be kept to observe any Belgian military measures which might be taken in consequence of this incident.	531	659
Jan. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Belgian Government announced that defense measures had been taken. It has not been possible to learn details of troop movements. It is assumed that measures were taken as a result of alarming reports reaching the Belgian General Staff lately.	532	660
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Belgian Ambassador requested an interview with the State Secretary concerning flights of German aircraft over Belgian territory.	534	662
Jan. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgian Defense Ministry has ordered next to final mobilization step. Defense measures apparently occasioned by German flights over Belgian territory, reports of German troop movements near the frontiers, and the contents of the partly unburned documents carried on the courier plane forced down on Belgian territory.	538	666
Jan. 14	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> By the Foreign Minister's orders the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe was contacted, who stated that there had been no substantial increase in flights over Belgian territory, but that in view of the political considerations such flights would be reduced so far as consistent with military requirements.	540	667
Jan. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Belgian Ambassador discussed flights by German aircraft over Belgian territory, while Weizsäcker asked the reasons for Belgium's defense measures directed against Germany.	541	668
Jan. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Belgian Foreign Minister explained that defensive military measures had been taken because of reports of German troop movements toward the Belgian frontier and because of the nature of the documents found as a result of the German courier plane landing in Belgium on January 10. Belgium had no intention of calling in Britain and France and would adhere to the policy of neutrality.	544	674
Jan. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Belgian Ambassador stated that Belgian defense measures were justified by the documents found when a German plane had made a forced landing in Belgium on January 10. These documents conveyed the impression that Germany had aggressive intentions against Belgium. Weizsäcker disclaimed adequate information for a discussion of the affair.	551	681

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 [Jan. 31]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium</i> Instructions to call on the Belgian Foreign Minister to state that reports of German troop movements against the Belgian frontier are false, that nothing was known in Berlin about the documents which fell into Belgian hands as a result of the forced landing of the courier plane, and to defend German military moves as justified by movements of British, French, and Dutch troops and stationing of Belgian troops on the German frontier.	585	722
Feb. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rexist leader Degrelle requests support for a new newspaper which would advocate Belgian neutrality. The Ambassador favors a subsidy for an initial 3-month trial period.	587	724
Feb. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Called on Belgian Foreign Minister to present German views on Belgian military dispositions. M. Spaak affirmed Belgian intention to pursue a policy of neutrality and denied contact between the Belgian military command and French and British General Staffs.	588	725
Feb. 21	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the National Socialist War Veterans League</i> The Foreign Ministry desires that no support be given to young men from Eupen-Malmédy in escaping Belgian military service by flight to Germany. The flight of any considerable number would weaken the German element there.	632	807

BULGARIA

1939 Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires handed in his Government's neutrality declaration and discussed what attitude Bulgaria should take if Russia should seize Bessarabia and simultaneously offer Dobruja to Bulgaria.	92	93
Oct. 10	<i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Boris is afraid that Yugoslav interference with arms shipments from Germany to Bulgaria might compel him to obtain war material from Russia.	229	252
Oct. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Bulgarian Minister informed Weizsäcker that a proposal for a Russo-Bulgarian assistance pact, recently advanced by Molotov, was rejected by the Bulgarian Government.	247	277
Dec. 4	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Boris expressed concern over Russian aspirations in the Balkans and inquired about Germany's views on that subject, particularly in view of Russia's offer of a mutual assistance pact to Bulgaria; Richt-hofen requests instructions for a reply.	415	484

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Dec. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> In reply to the Bulgarian King's inquiries, Richt-hofen is to state that Germany could not support Bulgaria in a conflict with Russia, but that she did not expect such a conflict.	454	533
1940 Jan. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> During his recent visit in Sofia Menemencioglu tried unsuccessfully to commit Bulgaria to a formula of strict neutrality and had to be satisfied with a reaffirmation of a common determination to maintain neutrality as expressed in the communiqué published.	564	694

DENMARK

1939 Sept. 9	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador von Hassell</i> Describes his official visits to Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland to discuss problems of neutrality.	42	39
Sept. 14	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Danish press argues that the nonaggression treaty with Germany and Hassell's assurances will allow Danish food exports to remain at their normal level.	66	63
Sept. 17	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Denmark</i> Instructions to inform the Danish Government that although Germany recognizes Denmark's neutral rights, she also insists on her own belligerent rights.	83	82
Sept. 26	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Pink told the Danish Government that Germany reserves the right to employ the same measures as Britain toward supplies from neutral countries; he warns Berlin, however, that actually to sink normal Danish transports would do almost irreparable political harm.	136	136
Oct. 10	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the terms of a Danish-German agreement on Danish food and fodder cargoes to and from England; German consent is provisional, and may be revoked on due notice.	234	256

DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1939 Sept. 9	<i>Directive No. 3</i>	43	41
Sept. 25	<i>Directive No. 4</i>	135	135
Sept. 30	<i>Directive No. 5</i>	170	176
Oct. 9	<i>Directive No. 6</i>	224	248
Oct. 18	<i>Directive No. 7</i>	276	316
Nov. 20	<i>Directive No. 8</i>	377	430
Nov. 29	<i>Directive No. 9</i>	399	463

FAR EAST

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 5	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Shiratori told Plessen of Japanese reaction to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and mentioned the possibility of German mediation between Japan and the Soviet Union.	11	8
Sept. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese have handed over a note stating that in view of war conditions, they wish to postpone signing of the trade agreement scheduled for October 1; any political motivation is denied.	27	26
Sept. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Abe says that despite her neutrality and her disappointment over the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Japan wishes to continue to develop friendly relations with Germany; Ott thinks efforts to end the China war are now Japan's main concern.	29	28
Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker suggests the possibility of a return of the German Ambassador to China be kept open in case "Japanese policy proves unreliable"; Ribbentrop refuses.	32	31
Sept. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Japan</i> Ribbentrop expounds the line toward Japan, which is approved by Oshima: vital Japanese interest in German victory; need for Russo-Japanese settlement; combination of these powers with Axis against Britain.	40	36
Sept. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Steps taken by Japan since the outbreak of war indicate an intention to use the war to terminate the China Incident and to drive French and British influence from China; if France and Britain resist, Japan may be drawn into the German camp.	61	57
Sept. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott has obtained assurances that Oshima can remain as Ambassador in Berlin, but he seems to be insisting on his own recall.	75	74
Sept. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott suggests matters on which German influence with Russia might lead to a Russo-Japanese settlement: whether this in turn would result in committing Japan against Britain will depend on development of the military situation in Europe.	77	75
Sept. 16	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> The Ambassador in Moscow gives an account of the efforts of the Japanese Ambassador there to improve Soviet-Japanese relations and of his own encouragement of these efforts.	79	77
Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Belatedly and with some embarrassment Oshima presented Japan's protest against the German-Soviet Pact, suggesting that it "be allowed to disappear in the files."	93	94

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Oshima said that if Russia would abandon Chiang Kai-shek and recognize the new Chinese Government being set up by Japan, it would greatly assist the difficult process of changing the attitude of the Japanese Army toward Russia.	112	111
Sept. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Ribbentrop explained to the visiting Japanese general, Count Terauchi, the advantages of an understanding with Russia to facilitate a move by Japan into Southeast Asia; the Japanese assented to these ideas in general terms.	132	131
Sept. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese General Staff requested some gesture in Japan's behalf during Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, since still closer Russo-German ties would bring a setback to efforts for a settlement between Japan and Russia.	140	146
Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Behind the façade of unity imposed by the Abe Cabinet there is sharp factional struggle in Japan, and far-reaching foreign policy decisions are not to be expected in the near future.	198	216
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> The Chinese Counselor of Embassy suggested German soundings in Japan for peace with China, pointing to the German interest in turning Japan against Britain; Chiang, he said, would also be willing to follow an anti-British course.	201	220
Oct. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The acceptance of Oshima's resignation is related to the decline in the political influence of the pro-German Army group; this situation, the General Staff indicates, is certain to be only temporary.	212	237
Oct. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann opposes taking up the Chinese bid for German mediation in the Sino-Japanese war; there is no sign that Japan would welcome such a move, and so long as Japan's future course is uncertain there is no German interest in freeing her from involvement in China.	217	243
Oct. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The elements favoring agreements with Britain and America are unlikely to retain control of Japanese policy for long against the determined pro-German Army circles; concessions to Japan by Russia or German military successes against Britain would have great influence.	264	298
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Hitler assured Oshima of his continuing belief in close German-Japanese relations based on their parallel interests; in the war against Britain, however, he wanted no military assistance as Germans preferred to deal with their military problems alone.	292	333

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Shiratori, confident of the early collapse of the weak Abe Cabinet's efforts to get an agreement with America, asks for German assistance in promoting a Soviet-Japanese pact on the basis of Soviet abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek.	293	335
Oct. 27	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan</i> The Foreign Minister requests that the Embassy give Oshima every assistance after his return to Japan, including facilities for secret communication with the Foreign Minister.	307	349
Nov. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Ribbentrop authorizes a statement to Shiratori for his confidential use that Germany will continue to exert its influence on Russia for a policy of neutrality by the latter in the China conflict.	325	372
Nov. 11	<i>An Official of the Embassy in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Prime Minister Kung has offered to sell Germany tungsten ore pledged to Britain and other countries, provided it is paid for with arms and munitions, and provided the transaction is kept secret.	345	397
Nov. 17	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> The Foreign Minister refused to consider shipment of any arms to China, but is willing to give other German products in exchange for raw materials from China.	368	418
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Japan's attitude on trade and economic warfare issues since the outbreak of the war has been "very unsatisfactory," although a slight improvement has been noted more recently; representations to the Japanese Ambassador are suggested.	421	490
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol</i> Ribbentrop stressed to the new Japanese Ambassador, Kurusu, his support for many years of German-Japanese collaboration and pointed out that in the present situation Japan's real interest lay in a German victory over Britain.	448	524
Dec. 31	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott reports that the Japanese Cabinet, after failure of its negotiations with America and Russia, is near collapse, but sharp internal divisions will permit no clearer foreign policy line for the present.	496	585
1940			
Jan. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The new Yonai Cabinet, strongly under the influence of high finance and court circles, is expected to resume efforts for an agreement with America; a personal appeal of the Emperor was needed to get Army support for the Cabinet.	546	676

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Jan. —	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> A draft telegram, withheld in favor of a personal statement by the Foreign Minister, asks that the Italians be told to refrain from advising the Japanese against an agreement with Russia and in favor of an agreement with America.	549	678
Jan. 22	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> The Chinese Counselor of Embassy came to inquire whether Germany would follow Italy in giving open support to Wang Ching-wei; Knoll replied that no German decision had been taken and Germany had not been consulted about the Italian move.	558	688
Jan. 24	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Ott</i> Representations made in Rome will soon lead to recall of the troublesome Italian Ambassador in Tokyo; the Italians stress anti-Bolshevism but this attitude represents no danger so long as the Balkans remain quiescent.	567	698
Feb. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Ambassador Kurusu urged that Germany not attack the Netherlands and Belgium or open a land campaign; he argued that in time most of the German aims could be achieved by negotiation and suggested that Japanese mediation would be available.	590	728
Feb. 17	<i>The President of the German-Japanese Society to the State Secretary</i> Kurusu told Admiral Foerster he always urged the Americans to stand aside and await an opportunity for mediating the conflict; Foerster said the Japanese would be well-advised to promote economic rivalry between Britain and America in the Far East.	619	783
Feb. 23	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stahmer finds that although the Japanese Government remains noncommittal toward the European war, the influence of pro-German elements in the Army is on the increase, and popular sentiment is largely pro-German.	630	806
Mar. 1	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is urged that economic concessions to Japan are needed in order to give support to the political line Germany is following toward Japan.	639	820
Mar. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> There are signs that unless economic concessions are made by Germany Japan's attempt to ease her relations with Britain and America may lead to a curtailment of German-Japanese trade.	646	835

FINLAND

1939 Sept. 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Finnish Minister in Moscow attributes Molotov's friendlier attitude toward Finland to the German-Soviet Pact.	12	12
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FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 20	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher reports that the Finnish Foreign Minister apparently would like German aid in settling the Åland question with the Soviet Union.	106	106
Sept. 27	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> The Finnish Foreign Minister states that Finland will never accept demands such as those the USSR has imposed on Estonia.	143	148
Sept. 27	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Political report on Finland and the war; the sudden changes in her position; realistic thinking by Finnish officials; the decline of German popularity.	147	151
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Finnish Minister asks what significance the German-Soviet agreements have for Finland; Weizsäcker replies that Germany wishes friendly relations with Finland.	178	195
Oct. 6	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov has asked that a Finnish plenipotentiary come to Moscow; Blücher remained noncommittal when the Finnish Foreign Minister intimated he would like to know if Germany would support Finland in case of excessive Soviet demands.	206	231
Oct. 7	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland</i> Germany cannot intervene in the impending Russian-Finnish discussions.	215	240
Oct. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Finnish Government wishes to know whether Germany is indifferent to the Soviet advance in the Baltic.	221	246
Oct. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister expresses uneasiness concerning possible Soviet demands on Finland; Weizsäcker replies that Germany claims no interests there.	223	248
Oct. 9	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Germany is not in a position to intervene in the Soviet-Finnish conversations.	225	250
Oct. 10	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Finland is in a state of emergency and anti-German sentiment is increasing; Blücher endorses Finnish requests for some form of support in Moscow.	226	251
Oct. 10	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Finnish Foreign Minister has asked whether Germany will allow Sweden to give military aid to Finland.	227	252
Oct. 10	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that Germany allow Sweden to support Finland only if Sweden guarantees ore shipments to Germany and denies Britain and France access to the Baltic.	228	252

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 10	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Because of her economic interests, Germany should ask the USSR to lessen her demands on Finland.	230	253
Oct. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Instructions to prevent ex-President Svinhufvud's reported visit to Germany to win support against the Soviet Union.	232	255
Oct. 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Instructions to avoid commitments regarding Finland; Germany is limited by the obligations of the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union.	240	267
Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Ribbentrop has agreed to voluntary evacuation of Germans from Finland.	241	268
Oct. 19	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Finnish mobilization is complete and Finland seems to enjoy the moral support of the whole world, except Germany; Finnish sympathy for Germany seems to be evaporating.	278	319
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico advised the Finnish Minister not to seek German mediation in the Russo-Finnish conflict but to take account of realities.	404	469
Dec. 2	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Instructions to avoid any anti-Soviet note in conversations regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict; rather, justify the Soviet action.	411	479
Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Through the good offices of Sweden, Finland has asked the Soviet Union for negotiations to settle the present conflict; Finland requests German support.	416	485
Dec. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Legations in Finland and Sweden</i> Molotov has rejected the Finnish proposal for negotiation; Germany will reject the Finnish request for support; there is no basis for German mediation.	417	486
Dec. 5	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher warns that Germany cannot afford to lose her influence and economic interests in Finland; continuation of the war will make such loss inevitable.	418	488
Dec. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Norwegian Foreign Minister asks (1) whether Germany and the Soviet Union are negotiating, as reported, about Soviet occupation of ports in northern Norway and (2) what attitude Germany would take to shipment of arms through Norway to Finland.	424	495
Dec. 7	<i>Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Warns that Soviet activities in Finland are already injurious to Germany and may become worse.	426	496
Dec. 7	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Again instructs Missions abroad to support the Soviet point of view in the Finnish conflict.	429	501

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Dec. 9	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends granting Soviet request for German ships to supply Soviet submarines in Gulf of Bothnia.	433	507
Dec. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway</i> Instructions to express astonishment at inquiry about alleged German-Soviet negotiations about northern Norway; Germany's naval measures are based not on the Finnish conflict but upon her war with Britain and France.	434	508
Dec. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Hitler and Raeder have agreed to the Soviet request for German ships to supply Soviet submarines in the Gulf of Bothnia.	437	511
Dec. 18	<i>Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Recommends that Germany play the role of "honest broker" in the Russo-Finnish conflict.	471	555
Dec. 19	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests authorization to deny a report that Germany has threatened Sweden with military action if she intervenes in the Russo-Finnish conflict.	473	558
Dec. 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Instructions to avoid discussions of hypothetical cases such as the alleged warning to Sweden; this in fact has not been made.	475	559
Dec. 24	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The difference between the Italian and German attitudes toward Finland is attracting attention.	485	578
1940			
Jan. 2	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Blücher</i> A visit to Berlin by Blücher would be inopportune at present; Germany's situation allows no equivocation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.	500	596
Jan. 4	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher warned Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner of possible complications if Finland accepted aid from Germany's enemies; Tanner seemed to be seeking German mediation.	506	613
Jan. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> A Finnish request that Germany permit transit of war material to Finland has been denied.	507	614
Jan. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite initial reverses there is no doubt of the ultimate victory of the Soviet Union over Finland; the Soviet Union has warned Sweden and Norway against supporting Finland; settlement of the conflict would be advantageous to Germany.	513	629
Jan. 10	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Molotov and Potemkin have spoken of Italian unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union; Potemkin hinted that Germany might use her influence in Rome toward moderation; Molotov has not yet rejected Finnish suggestions for negotiations.	521	643

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 11	<i>Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Now that the Finnish conflict has revealed Soviet military and political weakness, Germany is in a position to change her policy toward the Kremlin and take a stronger line to put an end to the fighting.	526	650
Jan. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Minister in Finland</i> Instructions to reply to Tanner's inquiry of January 4 that the German Government sees no prospects at the moment of ending the Russo-Finnish conflict.	547	677
Jan. 17	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Expresses doubt whether anything can be done in Rome to tone down Italian criticism of the Soviet Union; mediation between Finland and the Soviet Union also appears unlikely at the moment.	548	678
Jan. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The decision not to attempt mediation in the Russo-Finnish conflict was made by the highest authority.	552	682
Jan. 19	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports informing Tanner that the German Government saw no prospects for ending the conflict; Tanner said Finland remained ready to discuss matters.	554	684
Jan. 19	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation with General Laidoner, Estonian Commander in Chief, on the latter's talks with Stalin in December 1939; Laidoner surmises that agreement is still possible and that the Soviet Union does not intend to incorporate Finland.	556	685
Jan. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Tippelskirch assesses advantages and disadvantages for Germany of the Russo-Finnish conflict; Germany is incurring some resentment and some economic losses, and there is danger of spread of war into the North; meanwhile the blow to Soviet prestige is helpful to Germany, and recent events are forcing the Soviet Union closer to her.	574	706
Jan. 25	<i>Memorandum of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov told Schulenburg that the conflict with Finland would not last much longer; the Soviet Government demanded only that Finland fulfill its earlier demands; it did not intend to destroy Finland's independence but could not permit a hostile government to control strategic territories close to its borders.	575	708
Feb. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann denied to the Finnish Minister that Germany was trying to dissuade Sweden from aiding Finland; a different situation would arise if British or French forces arrived in Norway or Sweden en route to Finland.	606	761
Feb. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Finland</i> Ribbentrop authorized Blücher to suggest to Tanner that he ask Ribbentrop to sound out the Soviet Government whether it would be willing to send a representative to talk to a Finn in Berlin.	612	774

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Feb. 17	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher told Tanner that he saw no chance of mediation by Germany or another neutral; he then offered a personal suggestion that Ribbentrop be asked to try to arrange a secret meeting between Paasikivi and a Soviet representative in Berlin.	617	778
Feb. 19	<i>The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Minister in Finland</i> Instructions to be noncommittal in future talks with Tanner so as to arouse no false hopes.	620	784
Feb. 20	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> When Tanner asked about the proposed Russo-Finnish talks in Berlin, Blücher remained noncommittal as instructed; Tanner declined to state whether Finland was seeking military assistance from Germany's enemies; Blücher thinks Finland is wavering between negotiating with the Soviet Union and appealing to the Western Powers.	622	785
Feb. 22	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet forces have scored their first major success against Finland; Finnish officials may be seeking British and French troops; if these came via Narvik they would cut off Germany's supply of Swedish iron ore.	624	802
Mar. 3	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher was informed by former Foreign Minister Hackzell that Finnish-Soviet negotiations through Swedish mediation are well advanced; certain territorial questions are still unsettled.	651	848
Mar. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to notify Molotov that Germany has consistently rejected foreign urgings that she attempt to mediate in the Soviet-Finnish conflict.	661	869
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses a memorandum on a Molotov-Schulenburg conversation of March 5 on the Finnish-Soviet conflict; Schulenburg congratulated the Soviet Government for recent military successes; Molotov stated the demands the Soviet Union had tendered Finland through Swedish mediation; these would be increased if the Finns remained obstinate.	661	880
Mar. 10	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker informs Bohle of Ribbentrop's decision to allow a slow and cautious return of Reichsdeutsche from Finland to Germany; any semblance of an organized movement must be avoided.	666	893
Mar. 13	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher assesses the effects for Northern Europe of the Treaty of Peace of March 12 between Finland and the USSR; the Soviet Union is much stronger in the Baltic area; the spread of the war has been checked; Germany has lost much of her popularity in Finland.	672	914

FRANCE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Ambassador in Paris reports that Bonnet is still trying to find a basis for a peace after completion of the Polish campaign.	25	24
Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Minister in Luxembourg</i> Radowitz reported the call made upon him by Henri Blanche, an old friend now employed in the Quai d'Orsay, regarding a means for terminating the war between France and Germany.	87	88
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico gave Weizsacker a report by the Italian Ambassador in Paris stating that the majority of the French cabinet would be favorably inclined toward a peace proposal that would not appear as submission to a fait accompli.	180	197
Oct. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Fritz Spieser, an Alsatian autonomist, has written a letter to the Führer advocating a plebiscite and eventual union with the Reich; since the Führer in his speech of the previous day renounced all claims to Alsace-Lorraine, a new policy is not feasible as long as there is any hope for a peace with France before the outbreak of major hostilities.	214	239
Nov. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador said that Marshal Pétain is regarded as an advocate of a peace policy in France and will play a role if the question of peace should become acute.	363	414
1940 Jan. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ribbentrop is planning to send an emissary to Moscow on a secret mission with the aim of contacting the Soviets about a possible cooperation between the Germans and the French Communists.	501	597
Jan. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico said that according to reports from the Italian Embassy in Paris Weygand in Syria was urging action against Russia from Rumanian territory and that some Cabinet members were in favor of it; other Ministers, however, as well as General Gamelin and the British Government opposed the plan.	578	711

GREAT BRITAIN

1939 Nov. 3	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses an extract from a letter of October 23 from the Minister in the Netherlands regarding popular sentiment in Britain on the war. Britain would like a peace which would mean an end to German aggression. Failing that continuance of the war is favored.	326	372
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GREAT BRITAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Received from the Italian Ambassador an excerpt from a report of the Italian Ambassador in London describing an interview with Sir Alexander Cadogan on prerequisites for peace. Cadogan was described as concerned over possible Russian gains from a prolongation of the war. Lord Halifax and Vansittart were reported as sharing these concerns.	348	399
Nov. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Received from Italian Ambassador an excerpt from a report of the Italian Ambassador in London to his Government indicating that the British Government was still prepared to consider proposals for ending the war provided these contained guarantees against recurring German aggressions.	375	426
1940 Jan. 23	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Various representatives of British peace movements have attempted to contact the Legation and are interested especially in whether a statement could be made about the future of Poland and Bohemia. The Legation, as instructed, had maintained an attitude of reserve and the Minister had maintained a similar attitude in a talk with De Valera on the possibility of a settlement of the war.	559	690
Jan. 27	<i>Minister Zech to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Zech says that he might have means of communication with the Duke of Windsor, who is reported to be dissatisfied with his present post. He inquires whether it is desired that he should cultivate this relationship further.	580	713
Feb. 19	<i>Minister Zech to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Reports that the Duke of Windsor had stated that at the Allied War Council extended discussions had taken place of the situation which would arise if the Germans should invade Belgium. The military favored making the main resistance behind the Belgian-French border, while this at first was opposed by the political authorities.	621	786
Feb. 21	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Lord Tavistock, Chairman of the British People's Party, had sought an interview, which had been refused.	624	789
Mar. 2	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Zech</i> Has received Zech's letters of January 27 and February 19. Without making reply to Zech's request for directions contained in his letter of January 27, Weizsäcker suggests that any further information of the type given in these letters be forwarded in the form of a report, but addressed to him personally.	648	837

GREECE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano told Mackensen that current Greek-Italian discussions would probably result in a joint communiqué emphasizing the friendly nature of the relations between the two countries; a pact of neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation might follow later on.	96	98
Oct. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece</i> Metaxas is to be told that chartering a considerable portion of the Greek merchant fleet to England would be considered by Germany as a serious departure from neutrality.	310	351
Nov. 1	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> With regard to the chartering of Greek ships by Britain, Prime Minister Metaxas stated that his Government in conformity with its policy of neutrality wanted to stay clear of the matter but that it had no legal means of preventing such transactions by individual ship owners.	319	368
1940 Feb. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker objected to remarks by the Greek Minister criticizing German airplane deliveries to Bulgaria and referring to the fear of Germany which existed in the Balkans; he promised, however, to look into Greek complaints concerning German deliveries.	614	775

THE HOLY SEE

1940 Mar. 11	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> In a conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Pope there was discussed the fundamental relationship between the National Socialist State and the Catholic Church, and the prospects for a basic settlement between them. The Foreign Minister considered that a comprehensive settlement was necessary, but would be possible only at some later date.	668	896
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HUNGARY

1939 Sept. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister impressed on the Hungarian Minister in Berlin that Hungary must not attack Rumania in any circumstances.	8	6
Sept. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Since the Hungarian Minister inquired about the ban on deliveries of war material to Hungary, Woermann asks Ribbentrop to authorize a reply.	9	6
Sept. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> On a journey to Germany which was to remain secret, Csáky promised that Hungary would not take any action against Rumania without first consulting Germany and even offered to conclude a nonaggression pact with Rumania; Csáky is now to be informed that Ribbentrop considers such a pact not to be opportune.	30	29

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 10	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Csáky handed to Erdmannsdorff a Hungarian note stating that national honor as well as fear of an attack compelled Hungary to decline the German request for the transit of German troops over a railway line in Hungarian territory; Csáky said that this request as well as the continued anti-Hungarian propaganda over the Slovak radio had compromised his pro-German policy.	45	42
Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hungary is prepared to permit the transport of German war material over the railway in question in closed cars without military escort.	48	46
Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Csáky, greatly agitated over a Slovak note requesting permission to move military transports through Hungarian territory, stated that Hungary would flatly reject such a demand and would dispatch troops to the Slovak border.	49	46
Sept. 11	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Hungary</i> The matter of the transit of German troops over a Hungarian railway line is now closed but the Foreign Minister wishes to convey to Csáky that Germany's request was reasonable and not in the nature of an ultimatum.	51	48
Sept. 13	<i>Note by the Minister in Hungary</i> Hungary's interpretation of an earlier agreement with Germany on cooperation in the exploitation of oil fields in the Carpatho-Ukraine is not considered satisfactory by State Secretary Keppler.	62	59
Sept. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Ribbentrop is astonished at Hungary's threatening reply to the request for the transit of Slovak cars over the Hungarian railways and wishes to advise Csáky to act cautiously toward Slovakia which is under German protection.	67	63
Sept. 18	<i>Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Csáky, who wishes to visit Mussolini, has asked Erdmannsdorff to find out whether the Foreign Minister would object to such a trip.	95	97
Oct. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> In a conversation with Prime Minister Teleki Clodius reviewed the whole complex of German-Hungarian economic relations.	185	201
Oct. 11	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Csáky told Erdmannsdorff confidentially that Hungary was fortifying her border with Rumania as a defensive measure against a possible Russian attack across that country.	238	265
Oct. 13	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary</i> Erdmannsdorff is to observe greatest possible reserve and to avoid any statements on the subject of Russo-Hungarian relations.	253	283

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Nov. 3	<i>The Regent of Hungary to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Horthy assures Hitler of Hungary's friendship and offers his good offices, in case "confidential negotiations" should be desired; he complains about attempts by "contemptible" Arrow Cross leaders and some members of the German community in Hungary to sow discord between the two countries.	328	376
Dec. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Criticizing Finland's policy, Ribbentrop rejected a Hungarian suggestion that Germany mediate in the Russo-Finnish conflict; furthermore, Germany would consider Hungary's complying with a Turkish request for deliveries of ammunition as aid given to an ally of France and Britain.	450	529
Dec. 18	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Asks for decision by the Foreign Ministry on the importance attached to complying with Hungarian requests for war material deliveries for reasons of foreign policy.	469	549
1940 Jan. 17	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> On signing economic agreements with Hungary including secret protocols concerning German assistance in Hungary's rearmament, Clodius praised that country's economic cooperation with Germany shown especially in the concessions made to Germany in the question of the exchange rate.	545	675
Feb. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Hungarian Minister informed Ribbentrop that the United States had requested Hungary's views on a future peace settlement and inquired about the Sumner Welles visit; Ribbentrop stated that Germany would fight on until her enemies sued for peace.	631	807

IRELAND

1939 Oct. 8	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Irish neutrality is being strictly observed and has wide popular support. It should also be supported by Germany. Caution should be exercised in submarine warfare, in application of the blockade to Ireland, and in treatment of the Irish question in the press and on the radio, while interference in Irish internal conflicts should be avoided.	216	241
Nov. 14	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Again advises against German aid to the Irish Republican Army or any interposition in Irish affairs at the moment. Reports that existence of the Legation is worrying the British and that therefore great care is necessary in its activities and in the conduct of German propaganda.	355	405
Nov. 30	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> No signs of change in British policy with respect to Ireland. Urges special consideration for Ireland in case of intensified sea warfare.	401	466

IRELAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Dec. 16	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Action of other German agencies such as the Fichtebund or the Propaganda Ministry in establishing connections with radical Irish nationalists should be pursued only with utmost care.	465	545
1940 Jan. 24	<i>The Consulate General at Genoa to the Foreign Ministry</i> Inquires whether German Government is prepared to assist in the return to Ireland of John Russell, then in New York.	562	693
Feb. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> It would be technically possible to transport Russell to Ireland by submarine, but the time for such an action has not yet arrived.	605	760

ITALY

1939 Sept. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> On receiving Hitler's message Mussolini denied he had intended to participate in a mediation requiring withdrawal of German troops from Poland; he called the Anglo-French declaration of war "idiotcy" and promised every assistance.	1	1
Sept. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador said he had heard that there was criticism of Italy's attitude among the German public and asked whether it would not be possible to publish Hitler's letter to Mussolini; Ribbentrop refused.	23	22
Sept. 7	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> The Ambassador transmits a German Labor Front official's report on Italian disaffection over the recent developments and urges more care be taken to inform Italy in advance of actions planned by Germany.	24	22
Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It is recommended that talks be undertaken with Italy to revise trade plans made in anticipation of war, since Italy's neutrality will enable her to supply more and Germany should supply less.	33	32
Sept. 9	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini told the German Military Attaché of his gratification over the campaign in Poland, and suggested that an honorable peace offer to a new Polish Government would make a strong impression in France, which had no stomach for the war anyway.	38	35
Sept. 14	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Reichsliter Ley</i> Ribbentrop asks Ley to help combat charges made by an Italian labor official that Germany's action against Poland was contrary to an agreement to postpone war, and that Italy was not kept informed of negotiations with Russia.	68	64
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ambassador Attolico asked about the possibility of a "really magnanimous" peace offer and said that Mussolini felt that the Western Powers might respond; Weizsäcker said he knew nothing of any such intended offer by Germany.	73	72

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said he thought a generous peace offer might end the war, but probably only after France had been exposed to sharp military action by Germany; Franco, he said, was now again solidly aligned with the Axis after his first dismay over the pact with Russia.	97	99
Sept. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> For the third time in recent days Attolico has urged that a peace offer be made before full scale war begins in the West, Weizsäcker has confirmed that this is also Mussolini's view and suggests to Ribbentrop that these ideas should not be ignored.	127	125
Sept. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico inquired whether Germany would object to Italian leadership of a Balkan Mediterranean bloc against British economic pressure; while agreeing in principle, Weizsäcker said the German view would depend on the vigor with which the bloc opposed the British.	128	126
Sept. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico that Germany had nothing against Italian leadership of the Balkan States against Anglo-French blockade measures, but would be interested if the move assumed a political character.	145	150
Sept. 27	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Mackensen forwards a communication from a Labor Front official in Rome indicating that he has had little success in persuading State Secretary Cianetti to abandon his view that Italy had not been kept fully informed of German intentions.	148	154
Sept. 27	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to [State Secretary Weizsäcker]</i> Mackensen urges that transshipment of strategic materials be arranged via Italy even without assurance that they will reach Germany, since if the goods remain in Italy the latter's war economy will benefit.	149	156
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> In a conversation with Ciano, Hitler outlined his ideas for the future of Poland, indicated that he expected no Anglo-French response for peace to his planned Reichstag speech, and stated that in the coming military showdown German victory was certain.	176	184
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Minister Funk agrees that, with the acquisition of Polish mines it will be possible to give Italy 2,000,000 tons more of coal, but transportation remains a problem.	192	207
Oct. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini stated his satisfaction with the line drawn between the Russian and German spheres, declaring that Bolshevism remained Bolshevism and could not be trusted; he expressed himself as well pleased with the progress of Italy's preparations.	205	226

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico said that reaction in enemy countries to the Führer's speech had not been favorable but thought more time should be given; he said Rome had the impression that no move for peace on its part was desired, but would be glad to act if Germany desired it.	222	247
Oct. 10	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano asked that resettlement of South Tirol Germans be speeded because Italian opinion was restive; Clodius in turn pressed Italy to expedite transit shipments to Germany and to resist British blockade measures more vigorously.	231	253
Oct. 10	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius obtained access to a highly secret survey of Italian oil reserves which indicates the Army has only one month's supply, although he is assured that the Navy has other stocks adequate for one year.	236	263
Oct. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano asked for immediate action to get the evacuation of Germans from South Tirol under way; they were provoking incidents in defiance of Italian sovereignty, while the German negotiators were making unreasonable demands on property questions.	244	272
Oct. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that while the Duce still entertained some hope of a peace he himself did not; moreover, he was convinced that Hitler's estimate of Germany's military superiority would prove as accurate as it had in the case of Poland.	245	274
Oct. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said he would recommend to Mussolini that Italy accede to Ribbentrop's urgent request that Italy unequivocally refute Chamberlain's lie that Hitler had refused Mussolini's mediation; Ciano said he expected massive attacks against Britain and France in the immediate future.	249	279
Oct. 16	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italians have withdrawn their promise to transship raw materials to Germany because of the danger of British retaliation against Italy's own vital imports; Clodius has warned of the bad impression this would make in Berlin.	260	290
Oct. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano asked Mackensen to convey to Berlin his denial of press reports that Italy intended to place herself at the head of a bloc of Balkan neutrals and veer away from the Axis.	266	305
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico complained that evacuation of Germans from the South Tirol was still being delayed by trivial objections having to do with the payment of transportation costs.	275	315

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 19	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renewed intervention with Mussolini has won a promise that Italy will give every possible aid to German imports of raw materials to the extent that this can be done without involving Italy prematurely in war with Britain and France.	277	317
Nov. 3	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The Führer's statement of October 6 on repatriation of German minorities has been wilfully misinterpreted; such agreements will be made only where Germany thinks necessary and not at all with regard to the northern and western frontiers; press discussion should be avoided.	327	374
Nov. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> It is learned that the Rumanian initiative for a Balkan bloc now embraces also the idea of a defensive entente with general staff consultations; Ciano should be asked whether the Duce's attitude toward a Balkan bloc has changed.	354	404
Nov. 15	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Rather than merely awaiting a convenient opportunity the Foreign Minister asks that Ciano be approached at once for a statement on the present Italian attitude toward a Balkan neutral bloc.	359	411
Nov. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano replied to questioning about the Balkan neutral bloc project that Italy's attitude was unchanged and that participation in it had not been pressed upon her by any of the Balkan States.	362	414
Nov. [18]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov is to be told in reply to his inquiry about the proposed Balkan neutral bloc that in the German view it would not safeguard neutrality in the area but instead would increase Anglo-French influence there.	372	423
Nov. 21	<i>Memorandum of the Foreign Minister</i> Attolico called to contest the German view that Britain made her alliance with Poland only after Italy's decision to stay out of the war was known; Ribbentrop promised to reexamine the evidence and stated that Germany had full confidence in the Duce.	379	434
Nov. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> In view of the fact that Mussolini has shown himself disturbed over the slowness of the South Tirol evacuation, and because the situation there is tense, Mackensen suggests that the rate of removals be increased temporarily to 100 persons a day.	382	437
Nov. 25	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy</i> It is requested that the Spanish Foreign Minister's intention to oppose the Allied blockade against German exports by neutral convoys be supported in Rome.	388	449

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Nov. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that in order to avoid use of the word "neutrality," which would have had to appear in a formal note, he has made only oral protests to the British and French against their new blockade measures.	389	450
Nov. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> The necessity that Italy join other neutrals in protecting herself against the latest depredations of British blockade warfare, especially in view of the loss of German coal shipments, is to be pointed out to both Ciano and Mussolini.	394	458
Nov. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italian officials appear unworried by the possibility of British interference with seaborne coal shipments from Germany, apparently because the British have given some assurances.	398	462
Nov. 30	<i>The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that there has been offered for sale a number of documents abstracted from the British Embassy in Rome. Suggests that Theo Korit be sent from Bern to evaluate the material.	400	465
Dec. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that Italy would not tolerate interference with coal shipments by sea and that he had warned the British Ambassador sharply; convoys were not planned since there had been no interference thus far and such duty would wear down the fleet.	406	471
Dec. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini expressed anger at British molestation of Italian shipping and promised to sharpen his protests still more if it continued; he stressed the economic value of Italian neutrality to Germany and warned against too intimate ties with Russia.	410	477
Dec. 3	<i>The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kordt reports that the material abstracted from the British Embassy in Rome includes political correspondence of the Embassy from 1933 through 1938 and recommends its purchase. Arrangements are made to conclude the transaction.	414	483
Dec. 8	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Fascist Grand Council has confirmed Italy's nonparticipation in the war, justifying it by a reference to Russian gains in the Baltic region and Poland; the statements on Axis policy and the British blockade are satisfactory.	428	500
Dec. 10	<i>Memorandum of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Ribbentrop instructed Dr. Ley to avoid any discussion of foreign policy in his conversations with Cianetti, Ciano, and the Duce; it was later learned that he had disregarded these directives and made most detailed statements on German policy and military aims.	436	509

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Dec. 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Magistrati argued to Weizsäcker that Ciano's recent speech had had a strong pro-German tone; the State Secretary replied that the British, French, and neutrals seemed to have taken a different view.	478	561
Dec. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Difficulties have arisen with the Italians over coal deliveries by rail because after demanding one million tons per month they have been unable to provide their one-third share of the necessary coal cars.	489	576
Dec. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Attolico that he had had certain apprehensions about Ciano's recent speech but attached no further importance to the matter; he expressed surprise at Italy's anti-Russian attitude since Russia threatened neither Germany nor Italy.	493	581
Dec. 29	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano conveyed confidentially that the Italian Ambassador was being summoned home from Moscow because the Russian Ambassador had left Rome a month earlier on the occasion of demonstrations against the Russian attack on Finland.	494	583
1940 [Jan. 3]	<i>The Duce to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Discusses Ciano's speech of December 16, changes in Spanish opinion, Italy's "correct but cool" relations with Britain and France, her bad relations with the Soviet Union, her sympathy with Finland, and the effectiveness of British propaganda in Italy, especially in regard to the German-Soviet agreement and the present condition of Poland; warns against closer German ties with the Soviet Union and argues that at present Italy is more useful to Germany out of the war than she would be in it.	504	604
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Reviews Italo-German relations since 1935; the Axis is not popular with the Italian people but depends on Mussolini, who is loyal in his conduct toward Germany but hampered by Italy's military unpreparedness, which he seeks to overcome.	505	609
Jan. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Negotiations seem to be in progress between Italian firms and the British and French Governments for large-scale deliveries of goods, excluding war material in the narrow sense which the Italian Government apparently prefers to sell to neutrals.	509	617
Jan. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop expressed to Attolico his astonishment at the strong anti-Bolshevist tone of Mussolini's letter of January 3 and rejected the possibility of a settlement with Britain and France through creation of a Polish state.	518	636

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Jan. 11	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Transmits a warning from a man known to be close to Mussolini about the growing success in Italy of British and French assertions that Germany is on the side of the Bolsheviks; the informant says Italy will not acquiesce in any Soviet advance against Rumania or Hungary.	527	652
Jan. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits translation of an Italian note explaining the delivery of certain items of military equipment to the French; this private trade is necessary to enable Italy to build up her raw material imports and to prevent tightening of the blockade.	542	670
Jan. 18	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen</i> In Weizsäcker's personal opinion Mussolini's letter of January 3 represents a friendly warning, which if disregarded would give the sender freedom of action.	553	683
Jan. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico raised the question of Belgium's alarm over the incident of January 10; Weizsäcker countered by asking what Italy's role had been.	557	688
Jan. 28	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Expecting that the sea route from Holland to Italy will soon be closed, the Italians ask for additional coal cars for deliveries to Italy; they take this very seriously, but no impossible commitments should be made.	581	714
Jan. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico expects that Rome will soon ask about Hitler's reply to Mussolini's letter of January 3; Attolico thinks Mussolini sees a new situation in Europe, with the Western Powers recognizing Bolshevism as the principal enemy; this might lead to an understanding between the Axis and them, without necessarily dividing Moscow and Berlin.	583	717
Feb. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> An interministerial conference on coal deliveries to Italy decided that in present circumstances only 500,000 tons per month could be promised, and this only after winter is over.	589	726
Feb. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> During Magistrati's farewell visit Hitler said that he was not yet ready to reply to Mussolini's letter of January 3; he foresaw no settlement with Britain and France, hoped that the Balkans would remain completely quiet, and expected the Soviet Union to overcome the misguided Finns in May or June.	591	732
Feb. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany can promise only to deliver a minimum of 500,000 tons of coal per month, using 5,000 Italian cars; this is a firm commitment, and will be exceeded if at all possible.	592	736

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Feb. 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> If Italy finds she must trade with Britain and France, Germany at least is entitled to expect that such trade will not materially strengthen these countries against Germany; Germany also expects Italy to go further in economic aid to Germany and in resisting the blockade in the Mediterranean.	593	738
Feb. 6	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Ribbentrop said in a conference in Berlin on the propaganda program in Italy that it was absolutely essential to get Italian understanding for Germany's orientation toward the East; Stalin's aims were primarily revisionist, and there was no danger of the bolshevization of Europe.	596	742
Feb. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The British Ambassador demanded of Ciano that Italy include planes and weapons in her deliveries to Britain, for otherwise Britain could not allow transport by sea of German coal to Italy; Ciano's refusal, on Mussolini's orders, has led to sharp deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations.	599	751
Feb. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to Mackensen's expression of German concern at Italy's handling of various economic questions Ciano stated that Italy would do her utmost to live up to her agreements; he would, however, take up the questions again with Mussolini.	623	786
Feb. 22	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini's order to provide copper and hemp for Germany constitutes a real sacrifice for the Italian economy; Germany should accordingly grant Italy's urgent request for small quantities of certain chemicals.	627	800
Feb. 24	<i>German-Italian Commercial Agreement, Signed in Rome, February 24, 1940</i> Fourth Secret Protocol; lists products to be exchanged in the present abnormal situation; coal deliveries at the rate of 500,000 tons per month by land can be guaranteed only if Italy makes 5,000 coal cars available at all times.	634	809
Mar. 2	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to investigate reports that the British and French have notified Italy that beginning March 1 they will confiscate German coal going from Rotterdam to Italy on Italian or other ships, and to ascertain the Italian attitude.	647	837
Mar. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Confirms that Britain has given notice that German coal will no longer be permitted to go by sea to Italy; Ciano will lodge a sharp protest with the British Chargé d'Affaires today and publish it tomorrow.	652	849
Mar. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says the rumors concerning improvement in Russo-Italian relations are being spread by the Italians.	657	866

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 7	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy</i> Neutral protests against British and French blockade measures having proved ineffective, Germany now contemplates comparable countermeasures, subject to Hitler's final decision; Italy is to be given advance notice but not consulted.	662	870
Mar. 8	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to Benito Mussolini</i> Replies to Mussolini's letter of January 3; defends the decision to act against Poland; discusses Axis economic cooperation in the face of the Allied blockade; contends that a reasonable relationship can now be established between Germany and the Soviet Union; denies any German obligation to support Finland; asserts that Germany will gladly unburden herself of Poland when the time comes; states his view on the Balkans, Turkey, Spain, Japan, and the United States; calls for closer cooperation between Germany and Italy, including a solution of the coal problem.	663	871
Mar. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Ribbentrop delivered Hitler's letter of March 8 to Mussolini and underlined several points; Germany could provide 1 million tons of coal per month and would discuss other economic problems; captured Polish documents showed the "monstrous war guilt of the United States"; Ribbentrop emphasized that the Soviet Union had renounced the idea of world revolution, was turning toward Russian nationalism, and constituted no threat to the Balkans; the Russo-Finnish conflict, Sumner Welles' mission, Poland, and Germany's military readiness were discussed.	665	882
Mar. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop's account of his conversation of March 10 with Mussolini (see document No. 665).	667	894
Mar. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> In a second conversation with Ribbentrop Mussolini commented on Hitler's letter of March 8; the Duce stated his views on Communism, Italo-Soviet relations, the probable entry of Italy into the war, her military and economic position, Japanese policy, the military situation in the Mediterranean, the desire of the United States for neutrality; Ribbentrop stated that Hitler was interested in a permanent understanding with the Catholic Church.	669	898
Mar. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop's summary of his second conversation with Mussolini (see document No. 669); the actual date of Italy's entry into the war is to be discussed at the forthcoming Brenner Pass meeting of Hitler and Mussolini.	670	909
Mar. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov of Ribbentrop's talks in Rome and at the Vatican; German interest in an improvement of Italo-Soviet relations should be emphasized.	675	919

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov denied any Soviet responsibility for the strained relations with Italy; Mussolini's words about desiring better relations were encouraging but the Soviet Government would wait for concrete proof; despite this display of indifference, Schulenburg thinks the Soviet Government would welcome more normal relations with Italy.	684	935

LATIN AMERICA

1939 Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> Political and economic measures taken by Germany with a view to the forthcoming Pan-American Conference at Panama.	86	86
Sept. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sentiment in Argentina is anti-German at present; the country will remain neutral as long as possible because of materialistic considerations.	150	157
Oct. 17	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Instructions to thank the Spanish Government for its efforts to promote neutrality of Latin American states; Spain has much to gain by such efforts.	265	304
Oct. 27	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Establishment of a closed zone around the Americas by the Panama Conference is disadvantageous for Germany; she will allow Great Britain and France to take the lead in rejecting it.	306	347
Dec. 16	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Uruguayan Government has granted <i>Graf Spee</i> only 72 hours for repairs instead of the 14 days requested.	460	541
Dec. 16	<i>The Legation in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> Captain Langsdorff of <i>Graf Spee</i> requests OKM decision on whether to scuttle the ship or accept internment, if a break-through to Buenos Aires is not possible.	461	542
Dec. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Uruguay</i> Instructions to redouble efforts for extension of time limit for repair of <i>Graf Spee</i> .	462	542
Dec. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> OKM has ordered Langsdorff to attempt to extend the time limit, authorized him to try to take <i>Graf Spee</i> to Buenos Aires, and forbidden him to allow her internment in Uruguay; Ribbentrop has ordered further representations to the Uruguayan Government.	463	543

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Dec. 16	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Uruguayan Council of Ministers will not grant more than a 72-hour period for repairs to <i>Graf Spee</i> ; Uruguay is being subjected to great pressure from Great Britain and France; the Legation regards destruction of the ship preferable to internment in Uruguay.	464	548
Dec. 17	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> <i>Graf Spee</i> was blown up outside the 3-mile limit; on the basis of a formal complaint by her Captain to the Minister, the latter is protesting to the Uruguayan Government that its refusal to give more time represented a most flagrant disregard of international law and custom.	467	547
Dec. 22	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> DNB's patently false reports about alleged improper conduct of British sailors here merely impugn the credibility of all DNB reports and plays into the hands of enemy propaganda.	470	582
Dec. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Uruguay</i> Instructions to adopt an aggrieved manner toward the Uruguayan Government but otherwise to negotiate matter-of-factly with it.	492	581
1940 Jan. 25	<i>The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Mexican ex-General has approached the Legation to request financial support for an effort to occupy British Honduras.	570	701

LUXEMBOURG

1939 [Sept. 6]	<i>Memorandum of the Legation in Luxembourg</i> The Luxembourg Minister of State had been informed that Germany was not satisfied with Luxembourg's intention to close down ore and iron industry in case of war. A statement of the German interpretation of economic neutrality was to be made to the Luxembourg Minister of State on September 6.	17	15
Sept. 6	<i>Memorandum of the Legation in Luxembourg</i> Conveyed a statement to the Luxembourg Minister of State indicating that the German interpretation of economic neutrality meant a continuation of normal trade relations.	18	17
Sept. 7	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Luxembourg Government declares that it cannot accept the German view that stoppage of the Luxembourg ore and iron industry would be a unilateral action directed against Germany and inconsistent with neutrality. Such stoppage, however, is not planned and the Government will attempt to maintain the normal interchange of goods so far as possible.	20	19

MIDDLE EAST

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 6	<i>The Legation in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Iran wants to continue and expand her trade with Germany but the Soviets obstruct the transit of goods; the German economic delegation at present in Tehran suggests the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Government to facilitate the transit of German goods to Iran.	14	13
Sept. 13	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> A move to restore the exiled Amanullah dynasty to power in Afghanistan is under consideration; Schulenburg is requested to ascertain the Soviet Government's reaction to such a scheme.	60	56
Oct. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> At a suitable occasion Schulenburg is to feel out Molotov regarding Russia's intentions in Iran and Afghanistan, and he should also ascertain Russian views on Afghan internal affairs.	269	307
Oct. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Iran is greatly concerned over Russia's general intentions toward her as well as over the specific difficulties arising from the transit through Russia of Iran's trade with the outside world which are intensified by a failure to arrive at a new economic agreement with the Soviets; the Iranians request that German influence be brought to bear on Moscow in favor of a settlement of these problems.	312	353
Nov. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg discussed with Molotov the question of Soviet countermeasures against the concentration of British, French, and Turkish forces in the Near East.	353	404
Nov. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov informed Schulenburg that the Soviets intended to increase their troops in Transcaucasia and that Germany was free to exploit this fact in her propaganda; the Soviets had no objection to German plans to utilize ex-King Amanullah.	369	419
Dec. 12	<i>Under State Secretary Habicht to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to arrange contacts with the Russian authorities for Dr. Kleist who is in Moscow on a special mission.	445	521
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt</i> While the Aussenpolitisches Amt favors continued cooperation with the present Afghan Government, the Foreign Ministry has now adopted the view of Minister von Hentig that this Afghan Government must be eliminated by insurrections and the power of ex-King Amanullah restored.	449	527

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Dec. 18	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov told Kleist who had proposed a scheme of joint Russo-German operations in the Middle East that he was favorably disposed toward the idea, but would need more detailed information.	468	548
Dec. 18	<i>Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt</i> Through a policy of cooperation with the present Afghan Government, the Aussenpolitisches Amt has succeeded in establishing a strong German position in Afghanistan which, however, is being jeopardized by the present attempts of the German Foreign Ministry to restore to power former King Amanullah in a revolution which would be supported also by the Soviets; it is suggested that the Foreign Ministry desist from such attempts and that instead Germany ought to persuade the Afghan Government to assist preparations for an invasion of British India.	470	550

NETHERLANDS

1939 Sept. 5	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Netherlands Foreign Minister asked that inquiries be made in Berlin as to whether the Netherlands could secure antiaircraft artillery from Germany. Minister Zech favored granting the request if possible.	7	5
Sept. 10	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in the Netherlands</i> Germany is in principle prepared to supply the Netherlands with antiaircraft artillery. It would be desirable to send personnel for instructional purposes also.	44	42
Sept. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Netherlands Minister presented a note protesting the flight of a German military plane over Dutch territory. Weizsäcker assured him that the flight must have been in error inasmuch as orders had been issued against any violation of Netherlands territory.	47	45
Oct. 7	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Netherlands Foreign Minister thought British reaction to the Führer's speech showed a chance existed for peace. It would be necessary to influence British public opinion, possibly with detailed proposals for disarmament.	210	235
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Netherlands Government was interested in having Germany continue imports from the Netherlands Indies and would encourage shipments via the Siberian railway and facilitate provision of foreign exchange. Possibility of such shipments is to be investigated.	274	314
Oct. 27	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Netherlands defense measures are now primarily directed against Germany. A German attack, however, is believed unlikely as it would be contrary to Germany's own interests, for it would unite the Belgians and French against Germany and antagonize the United States.	308	349

NETHERLANDS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Nov. 2	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumors of German plans to invade the Netherlands have been spread by the British and French. Foreign diplomats have been told by the Netherlands Foreign Ministry that it considers these rumors groundless.	322	370
Nov. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> The Netherlands Minister presented a note protesting German seizure of two Englishmen and two Dutch citizens on Netherlands territory near Venlo on November 9.	344	395
Nov. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> The Führer directed that in future all flights by German aircraft over neutral territory should be denied, unless they could be absolutely proven.	383	438
Nov. 23	<i>Memorandum of a Conference of the Führer With the Principal Military Commanders, November 23, 1939</i> The Führer in a speech outlines his thinking on military matters.	384	439
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Pressure will be put on the Dutch in the course of economic negotiations by a threat to cut off shipments of commodities of importance so long as rubber and tin cannot be secured from the Netherlands Indies. Arms deliveries are to be made only against raw materials.	447	523
1940			
Jan. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Caution in liquidation of credits extended by the Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank in Poland prior to the war is recommended, but retention of the Bank for further use as a camouflaged German corporate agent in other areas is advised.	523	647
Jan. 13	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Information had been received about the visit of former Netherlands Prime Minister Colijn to Rome for the purpose of exploring possibilities of peace.	535	662
Jan. 13	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Netherlands Foreign Minister had expressed the hope that planes and antiaircraft guns under contract could be delivered even though new contracts were out of the question.	536	663
Jan. 14	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> An intelligence report states army leaves canceled. However, no alarm given, and up to 6 p. m. no troop movements from North Holland.	539	667

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NETHERLANDS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Jan. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Netherlands Minister was asked about his Government's defensive measures, which Weizsäcker charged were directed one-sidedly against Germany. M. de With declared Dutch preparations had been made equally toward all directions and his country would defend itself against any attack.	555	685
Feb. 12	<i>The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Minister</i> Forwards a report from a confidential agent acquainted with Netherlands Foreign Minister Kleffens to the effect that the Netherlands Government would not go along with Belgium in seeking British and French aid, and in case of a German march through southern Limburg would offer only local resistance. The informant might be available as a medium of contact with the Netherlands Government.	611	772
Feb. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division II</i> The Netherlands Legation presented a note protesting flights of German planes over Dutch territory and a memorandum listing such violations from September 8, 1939, to February 3, 1940.	633	808
Feb. 25	<i>The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> German economic negotiators are warned of effects of German submarine attacks on Dutch ships on course of economic negotiations. German delay in promised deliveries of armament was also causing annoyance in the Netherlands. Settlement of both of these issues is urged.	635	811

NORWAY

1939 Sept. 25	<i>Note of the Aussepolitisches Amt</i> Quisling plans to visit Germany soon; arrangements have not yet been made with Göring.	133	133
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summary of an interministerial conference on war-time trade relations with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.	165	170
Sept. 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> German successes have impressed Norwegian public opinion; from fear of German and Soviet counter-measures, Norway is unlikely to tolerate British violations of her neutrality.	171	178
Oct. 8	<i>Extract From War Diary of the Naval Staff</i> The Naval Staff is to study the advisability of acquiring bases in Norway and Denmark.	188	204
Dec. 11	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bräuer reports that Quisling is en route to Berlin to talk to German officials there; his visit has been prepared not by the German Legation in Oslo but by an unofficial agent (Noack) who should be reminded of the limitations of his authority.	441	515

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Dec. 12	<i>Report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuhrer, December 12, 1939, at Noon</i> Raeder told Hitler of his conversation the previous day with Quisling and Hagelin; Hitler will consider Quisling's ideas and perhaps speak to him personally; Sweden and the Russo-Finnish conflict were also discussed.	443	519
Dec. 14	<i>Minister Allenburg to Minister Bräuer</i> Noack has been instructed to abstain from "high policy" in Norway; Grundherr has persuaded Quisling to give up his plan to speak to Ribbentrop or Hitler.	452	532
Dec. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway</i> Instructions to make discreet inquiries about Quisling's attitude toward Great Britain and the Soviet Union.	453	533
Dec. 15	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the Russo-Finnish conflict Norway indirectly supports Finland but strives to remain neutral; volunteers are allowed to join Finnish forces; Norway is concerned about Soviet intentions in the North and German in the South; Communist activity is reported in northern Norway.	459	539
Dec. 17	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes Quisling's career and ideas; he now attacks Bolshevism, favors collaboration of the Germanic peoples, and is disconcerted by German-Soviet cooperation.	466	546
Dec. 22	<i>Stabsleiter Schickedanz to Reichsminister Lammers</i> Rosenberg told Hewel that German action in Norway could be explained as a safeguard for the Soviet Union in the Russo-Finnish conflict, and promised to keep Ribbentrop informed.	480	562
Dec. 23	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway</i> Rosenberg has sent Scheidt of the Aussepolitisches Amt to Oslo to consult with Quisling and his associates; Bräuer is instructed to maintain discreet contact with Scheidt and to come soon to Berlin for instructions.	483	569
1940			
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Norway</i> The Norwegian Government's strong will to neutrality might be undermined by aid to Finland but hardly by British proposals for bases on the Norwegian coast; at present strict neutrality is regarded as Norway's only effective armament.	503	603
Jan. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Aussepolitisches Amt</i> Scheidt describes his trip to Norway, December 24-January 2; Swedish and Norwegian public opinion is visibly anxious about events in Finland; pro-British sentiment is strong in Norway and is not being properly countered by Germany; Quisling was alarmed that Bräuer knew of his relations with Germany; a report that the Norwegian Government disavowed certain commitments by Hambro may be a calculated indiscretion.	511	620

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Aussepolitischen Amt</i> Scheidt records various statements by Grundherr minimizing the likelihood of British intervention in Norway and questioning the wisdom of German policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict.	525	650
Jan. 13	<i>Extract From War Diary of the Naval Staff</i> "Study North" is being developed; Raeder thinks British occupation of Norway is imminent, but his Operations Staff does not entirely agree; preliminary planning is necessary in any case.	537	663
Jan. 23	<i>Minister Bräuer to Senior Counselor Grundherr</i> Warns that Scheidt might be compromised by his association with the former Nazi leader in Oslo.	561	692
Jan. 24	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes a conversation with Foreign Minister Koht regarding Churchill's proposal that the European neutrals join Britain and France in war against Germany; Koht dismissed the proposal as provocative and silly, and stated his preference for the ideas expressed by Halifax.	565	695
Jan. 24	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends replying to recent Norwegian notes in such a way as to strengthen Norway's neutral position; Koht stated that Norway was convinced Germany intended to respect her neutrality.	566	697
Jan. 25	<i>An Official of Political Division I to the Legation in Norway</i> Notification that the motor tanker <i>Altmark</i> probably carrying captured seamen, is expected to enter Norwegian waters about January 25, with orders to pass through without stopping.	568	699
Jan. 25	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> There has been no interference with German shipping in Norwegian waters and none is likely; Germany should watch and support Norway's will to neutrality.	571	702
Feb. 17	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Norway</i> Reports that <i>Altmark</i> has been molested in Norwegian waters by a British destroyer; instructs Legation to point out to Norwegian Government at once that Norway's neutrality has been violated and that there is danger of further violations.	615	776
Feb. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Naval Attaché in Norway</i> Chronology of the <i>Altmark</i> incident, February 15-17.	618	779
Feb. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Aussepolitischen Amt</i> Scheidt reports on his activities in Norway from January 20 to February 20; he considers Quisling's views on Anglo-Norwegian relations more cogent than Bräuer's and recommends additional German support for Quisling.	626	791

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIII

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 1	<i>Directive by the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht</i> Directive for <i>Weserübung</i> (occupation of Denmark and Norway).	644	831
Mar. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Norway</i> Argues that Britain will probably abstain from intervention in Norway and that Norway will strive to defend her neutrality; concedes that external events might change this likelihood; proposes continued pressure on Norway but no preventive measures for the present.	650	846
Mar. 17	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Notes Northern skepticism as to proposed British and French support for Finland; finds less concern as to possible Allied landings in Norway now that the Russo-Finnish conflict is settled; questions whether the Allies will violate Norwegian neutrality so long as Germany respects that of the various neutrals.	682	932

PEACE MOVES ¹

1939 Sept. 25	<i>Unsigned Note</i> Rosenberg reports the receipt of a communication from Baron de Ropp, with whom he had had conversations during August, asking whether a meeting could be arranged in Switzerland for the end of September. He requests instructions from the Führer.	134	134
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Dahlerus asked Hitler and Göring about prospects for negotiating with Britain; Hitler was skeptical of a British will to peace, but did not reject Dahlerus' plan for an unofficial meeting in Holland; the question of Poland must be excluded from any talks but otherwise Hitler expressed willingness to join in guaranteeing the status quo in the rest of Europe.	138	140
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Davignon spoke of Belgium's determination to defend her neutrality and possible diplomatic steps toward peace.	179	195
Oct. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador stated his Government's readiness to offer its good offices as mediator, provided promising proposals are made and a Rump Poland is provided for.	186	203
Oct. 5	<i>Unsigned Note</i> A member of the Aussenpolitisches Amt invited Baron de Ropp to come to Berlin for discussions. De Ropp replied that the Air Ministry did not consider it suitable for him to make such a journey.	203	224

¹ Other documents dealing incidentally with peace moves will be found under geographical headings in this table.

PEACE MOVES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No	Page
1939			
Oct. 10	<i>Unsigned Note</i> Memorandum of a conversation between Baron de Ropp and a representative of Rosenberg in which the war aims of Britain and Germany were discussed in general terms. De Ropp declared that the British Air Ministry was not in sympathy with present British policy. Arrangements were made for further contacts.	235	257
[Oct. 11]	<i>Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry</i> Lists official and unofficial offers of mediation from Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Finnish, Swedish, and American sources.	242	268
Oct. 12	<i>Circular of the Acting Director of the Press Department</i> Chamberlain has outrageously rejected Hitler's constructive peace offer; the German people will now know what their enemies are after.	246	275
Oct. 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Scandinavian Kings are reported willing to serve as mediators and would welcome an initiative from one of the belligerents before Soviet pressure on Sweden begins.	255	286
Oct. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> With Chamberlain's rejection of Hitler's peace offer, the subject is closed.	259	289
Oct. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> A Belgian Embassy official, just returned from Brussels, reports some optimism there regarding peace prospects; London and Paris are said to be waiting for a neutral diplomatic initiative, possibly by Roosevelt.	281	321
Oct. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov had informed Schulenburg of a Butler-Maisky conversation in London. Butler is said to have stated British readiness to make peace at once under certain guarantees, and Molotov received the impression that the British might welcome a Russian mediation. Schulenburg asked Molotov to inquire whether Maisky so interpreted Butler's words.	285	325
[Undated]	<i>Unsigned Note</i> Memorandum of a further conversation between Baron de Ropp and a representative of Rosenberg in which de Ropp inquired about German plans for the Baltic States and Poland, spoke of a so-called "English party" opposed to the policies of the present British Government, and indicated his belief that Rosenberg would play an important role in future peace negotiations.	318	363
Nov. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> Text of an offer of good offices by the Sovereigns of Belgium and the Netherlands.	332	383

PEACE MOVES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Nov. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico that Halifax's speech of November 7 was obviously designed to head off the Belgian and Dutch offer of good offices or any similar move; that in Hitler's absence there was as yet no German reaction to the offer; and that the Low Countries must energetically maintain their neutrality.	336	387
Nov. 9	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a message from Dahlerus for Göring requesting no definite action be taken on the Dutch-Belgian mediation offer until Dahlerus has been able to ascertain British opinion.	337	388
Nov. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> The German Government is not interested in Dahlerus' sounding out British opinion, as Britain has already unequivocally rejected the German position.	346	397
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Davignon handed over another note from Queen Wilhelmina and King Leopold, independent of the previous peace effort, whose results Ribbentrop termed "catastrophic"; Ribbentrop warned that a pro-Allied attitude might be dangerous for Belgium.	356	407
Nov. 18	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Instructions for possible conversations about peace moves; Allied intransigence has destroyed any chance of mediation; Germany has accepted the challenge and will fight to final victory.	373	424
Dec. 19	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> On December 17 a Danish merchant, Pless-Schmidt, discussed a peace proposal with Halifax, who showed "lively interest"; the plan entailed partial restoration of Poland and Czechia, return of German colonies, a European alliance excluding the Soviet Union, and a guarantee of Finland and the Baltic States; Pless-Schmidt will be in Berlin shortly.	472	557
1940			
Jan. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Attolico presented a memorandum on opinion in France; he attributed to Mussolini the view that some sort of restoration of Poland would deprive the Allies of their motive for war and thus logically lead to peace.	524	648
Jan. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Bishop Berggrav of Norway has discussed problems of peace with various Protestant clergymen and with Halifax; the Bishop thinks a new initiative by Hitler, going beyond his October 6 speech to offer some hope for a federated Europe, might have fruitful results.	550	679
Mar. 1	<i>Consul General Krauel to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Reports from Geneva on various political matters: Burckhardt's coming visit to Berlin; Allied disappointment that Germany has not taken the offensive in the West; Allied strategic views, etc.	645	833

PROPAGANDA

Date	Subject	Doc. No	Page
1939 Sept. 8	<i>Command of the Führer</i> The Propaganda Ministry is the central agency for propaganda; other agencies shall work in genuine collaboration with it; disputes regarding foreign policy propaganda shall be composed by the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda, and presented to the Führer only by both Ministers.	31	30

PROTECTORATE

1939 Dec. 15	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry</i> A political report points out that German policy in the Protectorate as laid down by the Führer will avoid provoking the Czechs but will crush Czech defiance ruthlessly; the Czech attitude is characterized as "wait and see and take no risks."	458	538
1940 Jan. 31	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry</i> A report on a conversation with Neurath on the problems arising from the recent flight of two Czech members of the Protectorate Government.	586	723

RUMANIA

1939 Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Gafencu told Minister Fabricius that in spite of rumors to the contrary, Polish soldiers and cabinet members who had crossed into Rumania were being interned and prevented from political activities.	50	47
Sept. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Gafencu's statements on the proposed treatment of Polish refugees in Rumania is not completely satisfactory; Germany demands especially that the Polish-Rumanian border be closed, that refugees be interned, and that no armament shipments pass through Rumania.	55	52
Sept. 14	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> On behalf of the Rumanian cabinet, Gafencu assured Fabricius confidentially that in dealing with the various groups of Polish refugees Rumania would maintain strict neutrality.	61	61
Sept. 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Prime Minister Tatarescu offered Germany large scale deliveries of Rumanian products in return for large quantities of war material from the Polish booty.	74	73
Sept. 19	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Rumania</i> The Foreign Minister requests Fabricius to inform the Rumanian Government of Germany's satisfaction that the problem of Polish refugees was being handled in the spirit of neutrality and also to suggest Rumanian cooperation in the seizure of Polish gold.	100	102

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 20	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Germany is prepared to supply Rumania with war material from the Polish booty in return for petroleum and feed grain; the Rumanians may draw up a list of the items desired.	111	111
Sept. 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In connection with the murder of Minister President Calinescu the Rumanian Government asked that members of the Iron Guard be prevented from leaving Germany and that the German press disassociate itself from the Iron Guard.	120	120
Sept. 29	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> German-Rumanian economic negotiations were concluded which provided for an increase of about 100 million RM over the level of 1938 in the trade between the two countries.	166	172
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told the Rumanian Minister of Germany's displeasure at seeing a reference to the Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania included in Turkey's recent pact with Britain and France.	296	337
Nov. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Foreign Minister ought to make it clear to General Keitel that war material from the Polish booty which is now being claimed by the Army must be delivered to Rumania to maintain that country's petroleum exports to Germany.	350	401
Nov. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Although the Army finally agreed to let Rumania have some war material from the Polish booty, it is not enough in Clodius' opinion and the possibility of further concessions to the Rumanians will be discussed with the High Command of the Wehrmacht.	380	435
Nov. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu said that Rumania had abandoned the idea of the neutrality bloc since Germany and Italy were opposed to it.	392	457
Nov. 30	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Concern is felt over the recent drop in Rumanian oil deliveries and the Rumanian Government should be asked to commit itself to deliver 100,000 tons of oil, the minimum required by the German economy; if necessary, certain German armament deliveries ought to be made contingent upon specific Rumanian oil deliveries.	402	467
Dec. 6	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Minister President promised to guarantee the delivery of specific amounts of oil in any event and offered to pay also in petroleum for any additional armament deliveries; however, he remained strongly opposed to any increase in the exchange rate of the reichsmark.	422	493

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Dec. 8	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius remained noncommittal when Gafencu, stating that Rumania would fight for Bessarabia, inquired whether in such an event Germany could at least be counted upon to lend diplomatic support to Rumania and to supply her with arms; Fabricius believes, however, that Germany should play an active part in arranging a territorial settlement between Rumania and her neighbors instead of leaving to Italy the initiative in this matter.	427	498
Dec. 14	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In spite of Anglo-French pressure and the counsels of his advisers, King Carol has agreed to a 15 percent increase in the exchange rate of the reichsmark; though this meets German demands only in part, it would be politically unwise to insist upon a larger increase.	451	530
Dec. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> Fabricius should avoid a direct reply to Gafencu's questions about Germany's attitude in the event of a Russo-Rumanian conflict; instead he should express Germany's hope that suitable Rumanian concessions would lead to a peaceful settlement, without, however, giving the impression of having been instructed to apply pressure or to attempt mediation.	455	535
Dec. 25	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Informed by Gafencu that the Rumanian Government for humanitarian reasons had agreed to the departure for Switzerland of Polish President Moscicki, Fabricius protested and called it an affront.	488	575
Dec. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Ribbentrop approves Fabricius' attitude toward President Moscicki's departure and instructs him to threaten Gafencu with consequences if such a case should occur again.	491	580
Dec. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia</i> Minister Killinger has been assigned the task of watching and counteracting enemy organizations and enemy propaganda in the Balkans; for camouflage purposes he will work on economic and cultural matters.	495	584
1940			
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A meeting under Göring's chairmanship discussed at length economic policies with regard to Rumania and considered, among other things, appointment of a special commissioner to assure delivery and transportation of Rumanian raw materials.	502	598
Jan. 4	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal Göring</i> Ribbentrop objects to Göring's criticism of Foreign Ministry officials at the meeting on Rumania; he intends to send Clodius to Bucharest as special representative for economic and transport questions, but he will be replaced by Neubacher eventually.	508	615

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIX

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Neubacher is being sent to Bucharest as "special representative for economic questions."	533	661
Feb. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Neubacher was authorized by Ribbentrop to state in Bucharest that the Foreign Minister did not anticipate a Russian attack on Rumania.	601	755
Mar. 7	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> An interim agreement has been signed providing for German arms deliveries to Rumania in return for Rumanian oil.	660	868
Mar. 16	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal Göring</i> The recent agreement with Rumania is economically very advantageous since it will provide Germany with large amounts of oil at low pre-war prices.	678	925

SEA WARFARE ¹

1939			
Sept. 11	<i>Circular of the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Authorizes Missions to inform Governments of Oslo States that Germany is prepared to supply coal to replace that received heretofore from Britain and Poland.	52	49
Sept. 15	<i>Circular of the Director of the Political Department</i> Instructions to notify the Governments of the Oslo States that Germany reserves full freedom of action to counter any acceptance by them of the restrictions on trading with Germany now reportedly demanded by Britain.	71	70
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Legation in Denmark has been instructed to deny that Germany has completely changed her position regarding neutral shipping; Germany still favors normal trade but cannot allow Britain to make exceptions in her own interest.	118	117
Sept. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records an agreement with the Navy to warn neutral governments that merchant ships which use their radio when ordered to stop, or which zigzag or proceed without lights, expose themselves to danger; the Navy and Foreign Ministry will confer again before issuing orders to sink enemy merchant ships without warning; the Führer will probably soon order unrestricted submarine warfare in a designated area; United States neutrality laws are being studied.	144	148
Oct. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann has notified the Navy that because of peace efforts now in progress, the Foreign Ministry recommends a cautious policy of submarine warfare at present.	187	203

¹ Other documents dealing incidentally with sea warfare will be found under geographical headings in this table.

SEA WARFARE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Recommends that the OKW be asked certain technical questions regarding unrestricted submarine warfare; technical and political considerations must be balanced.	256	286
Oct. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Summarizes current practice in naval warfare and contemplated additional measures; decisions will come only after further consultations.	270	307
Oct. 19	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Instructions to inform neutral governments that German forces will attack all ships in British and French convoys and that neutral merchant ships running without lights may be mistaken for enemy ships.	279	319
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Describes arrangements for daily consultation between Foreign Ministry and the Wehrmacht.	295	336
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> A conference in Göring's office agreed to request Hitler's permission for air attacks on enemy convoys, including neutral vessels; Weizsäcker recommended that attacks be strong enough to dissuade neutrals once and for all from accepting enemy convoy in the areas involved.	317	362
Nov. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Intensification of submarine warfare is planned in the foreseeable future.	352	403
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Isolation of Great Britain is to be achieved not by proclamation but by gradual intensification of naval measures; Germany can use the danger zone fixed by the United States.	361	413
Nov. 17	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Riller</i> The Navy intends to torpedo without warning, regardless of location, all enemy passenger vessels known to be armed as well as all tankers (except those of the United States, Soviet Union, Italy, Spain, and Japan) in the danger zone fixed by the United States; the Foreign Ministry is inclined to approve this despite certain reservations for reasons of policy and international law.	367	417
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Defines the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry and the OKW in the general conduct of the war.	397	461

SLOVAKIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> In a conversation with the Slovak Minister, Hitler praised Slovakia and criticized the national and social policies of Hungary's rulers; although resettlement of ethnic groups referred to in his recent Reichstag speech applied primarily to the Baltic countries, it was nevertheless one of his long-range objectives.	286	326
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Informed that the Slovak Government was planning a public statement denouncing Anglo-French efforts to restore Czechoslovakia, Ribbentrop urged the Slovak Minister to consult Berlin first.	360	412
Nov. 21	<i>Treaty Signed at Berlin, November 21, 1939</i> The German-Slovak Treaty reuniting with Slovakia territories which had been incorporated into Poland in 1920, 1924, and 1938.	381	436
Dec. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Ribbentrop told Karmasin, the State Secretary in the Slovak Government, that an effort would be made to increase the number of German advisers in the administration and national economy of Slovakia, but that the fact of Germany's influence in Slovakia must be kept secret from the outside world.	409	476

SOUTH AFRICA

1940 Jan. 26	<i>The Consul at Lourenço Marques to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a German agent has had a conversation with Dr. Malan and that General Hertzog was influenced thereby.	577	711
Feb. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> A German agent has gone to South Africa and communicated to Hertzog and Malan a statement that upon conclusion of peace Germany will recognize and guarantee the national territory of the Union of South Africa. It was also stated that Germany recognized the Union of South Africa as the leading white state in the South African area. Upon response from the opposition leaders the statement could be made an official offer.	629	804

SPAIN

1939 Oct. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco expressed to Stohrer his gratification over the German victory in Poland but showed concern over Russia and suggested that a Polish buffer might lessen the danger of a direct contact.	173	181
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SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer reports some details of an alleged conversation between the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Suñer, and the French Ambassador in which Suñer severely criticized France's past policy toward Spain.	204	225
Oct. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Wiehl urges granting of Spain's request for negotiations on the continuation of Spanish-German trade, in spite of the war, particularly since Italy has agreed to facilitate transit through her territory; Wiehl also proposes that Göring's permission be obtained for the sending of Wohlthat to Spain as chief negotiator.	282	322
Oct. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer will transmit information based on reports from Spanish missions abroad which is given to him regularly by the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Under State Secretary as reports coming from "August" or "Wilhelm."	284	324
Dec. 22	<i>Protocol Signed at Madrid on December 22, 1939</i> Germany and Spain reaffirm their desire for mutual trade which was expressed in earlier agreements and express their intention of continued cooperation, even though events have made it impossible to develop German-Spanish economic relations in the manner envisaged in July 1939.	482	568
1940 Jan. 25	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> The Foreign Minister instructs Stohrer to insist on Spain's making the promised deliveries of lead and requests him to make another protest if Spain, on the basis of new agreements with France and Britain, should supply these countries with strategic materials in excess of pre-war shipments.	572	704
Feb. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer asks whether there has been a change of policy, as the Sofindus Company is striving for a monopoly position in Spanish exports to Germany which is in contradiction to present directives and agreements.	604	759
Feb. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to certain reports Johannes Bernhardt will return to Spain equipped with great powers; his powers and responsibilities ought to be strictly defined and limited to avoid recurrence of conditions that existed during the Civil War.	616	777
Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Prussian State Ministry</i> A conference on Spain under Göring's chairmanship discussed problems of German-Spanish economic activities; Göring orders that economic policy matters arising from agreements with Spain be handled by Wohlthat and that Bernhardt be sent to Spain as head of Sofindus; however, he will be subject to directives from State Secretary Jagwitz and must refrain from any political activity, since this will rest exclusively with the German Embassy in Spain.	679	927

SWEDEN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Oct. 16?]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Summary of a conversation between Hitler and Sven Hedlin; Germany's relations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Poland, Finland, and Scandinavia were discussed.	263	293
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department</i> A Foreign Ministry conference decided to take up with the Naval High Command the possibility of postponing notification to Sweden that Germany did not recognize her claim to a 4-mile zone of territorial waters; important economic negotiations with Sweden are pending.	297	338
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department</i> The Naval Staff will consider the Foreign Ministry's views on Swedish territorial waters; the disputed extra mile constitutes a real gap in Germany's control of shipping.	298	340
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> The High Command of the Navy intends to extend operations against merchant shipping into the Åland Sea; the Foreign Ministry wishes to consider the question before the Soviet Government is notified.	300	342
Oct. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department</i> Raeder wishes the Foreign Ministry to approach the Swedish Government immediately to secure a free hand for German Naval Forces outside the 3-mile zone of Swedish territorial waters.	304	346
Nov. 9	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden</i> Instructions to discuss naval operations as well as economic negotiations; Germany recognizes Sweden's neutral commercial rights but to counter British measures she will cut off Swedish exports if they appear destined ultimately for Britain; Germany can recognize only the usual 3-mile limit; the Legation is authorized to break off negotiations temporarily, at its discretion.	340	391
Nov. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Sweden is demanding recognition of the 4-mile limit and easing of German shipping controls; she offers to maintain the 1938 volume of ore shipments, but Germany insists on the 1939 volume; it will be difficult to supply coal to Sweden because of transportation problems.	374	425
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Suggests that Germany release arms and munitions to Sweden, as requested, in return for additional quantities of copper, nickel, tool steel, etc.	446	522
Dec. 22	<i>Special Protocol</i> Conversations between the German and Swedish Government Committees concerning German-Swedish trade in 1940.	481	564

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Jan. 9	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sweden has declined the League of Nations invitation to participate in an action in support of Finland, as irreconcilable with neutrality; Sweden would resist any attempt to send British or French troops or arms through Swedish territory but would allow transit of arms belonging to Finland; Wied warned that this exception might involve dangers.	515	633
Jan. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister, who emphasized Sweden's neutrality in the Soviet-Finnish conflict but feared possible involvement; Weissäcker agreed that Scandinavian neutrality was desirable but saw no room for mediation.	530	658
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Sven Hedin asked Hitler whether Germany could not mediate between the Soviet Union and Finland; Hitler replied that Finnish policy was senseless and that Germany had now reached an understanding with the Soviet Union; Stalin had turned from bolshevism to Russian nationalism and was pursuing understandable ends; Hitler added that Germany would not prevent Sweden from aiding Finland but warned against British duplicity; the Finns should seek an agreement directly with the Soviet Union.	654	862

SWITZERLAND

1939 Nov. 10	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Switzerland</i> Instructions to warn the Swiss Government that the forthcoming League of Nations session must not be used for anti-German demonstrations.	343	394
Dec. 7	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swiss Government has demanded that the League of Nations session deal only with the Russo-Finnish conflict and has reserved freedom of action in case other matters are discussed.	425	495
1940 Feb. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weissäcker gave the President of the Swiss National Council assurances of Germany's strong desire to keep Switzerland out of the war; these assurances could be mentioned privately but must not be quoted as an official "declaration."	610	772

TURKEY

1939 Sept. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says the Soviet Government is using its considerable influence with Turkey in the sense desired by Germany.	6	5
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TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Ribbentrop instructs Papen not to discuss Turkish-Italian relations with the Turks and to note the fact that the Führer and the Duce are in complete agreement on Axis policies.	16	15
Sept. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen states that it was Saracoglu who raised the question of Turkish-Italian relations in a conversation; Papen complains that his efforts to keep Turkey out of the war are not being supported by the Italian Ambassador.	28	27
Sept. 14	<i>Ambassador Papen to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Papen suggests that German policy should attempt to detach Turkey from her commitments to Britain and France by bringing about a guarantee of Turkey's possessions and of the status quo in the Balkans by Russia, Italy, and Germany.	69	66
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico that Turkey showed no inclination to adventure.	72	72
Sept. 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stalin says that an assistance pact with Turkey is being negotiated; he believes the pact advantageous since it would insure Turkish neutrality.	81	80
Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ribbentrop should discuss the proposed Turkish-Soviet agreement with the Italians; Germany should concur only if the USSR is not obligated to action against Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.	91	93
Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Turkish spokesman stated that the alliance treaties between Turkey and the Western Powers now being negotiated would be rather limited in scope and that Turkey would intervene in a Mediterranean conflict only if she herself was attacked; the Turks are worried about Russia and exasperated at Germany.	105	105
Sept. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is to convey orally to Stalin and Molotov Germany's objections to a Russo-Turkish mutual assistance pact; if, nevertheless, such a pact should be concluded, Russia ought to insist on a reservation taking into account the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact and should also put pressure on Turkey to desist from concluding a definitive military alliance with the Western Powers.	116	114
Sept. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Although Turkey's pacts with the Western Powers will enter into effect only if Turkey is attacked, it would be useful if in addition Turkey could promise the Russians not to let the Straits be misused by Britain and France.	126	124

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Sept. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Hitler received the new Turkish Ambassador and told him that good political relations between Germany and Turkey were advisable and offered rich prospects.	146	151
Sept. 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov is to be informed that in Ribbentrop's opinion it would be in the greatest interest of Germany and Russia to obtain assurances from Turkey that she would prevent passage through the Straits of Anglo-French troops or war material.	167	173
Oct. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is to inform Molotov that Ribbentrop was very anxious that the Soviet Government should prevent Turkey from the final conclusion of assistance treaties with the Western Powers.	175	183
Oct. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov stated that although Turkey seemed to have become closely involved with the Western Powers the Soviets would attempt to "neutralize" matters in conformity with Germany's wishes; he also emphasized that they would never tolerate Anglo-French pressure on Bulgaria.	183	200
Oct. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen told the Turkish Minister President that a Turkish pact with the Western Powers would be considered by Germany as sabotage of her peace efforts and asked whether Turkey would change her policy.	189	205
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol</i> On receiving the new Turkish Ambassador, Ribbentrop reviewed German-Turkish relations and criticized Turkish plans for a pact with the Western Powers; he assured Turkey that neither Germany nor Italy had aggressive designs on Turkey.	202	222
Oct. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to emphasize to Molotov that if the USSR concludes an assistance pact with Turkey, any obligation to give assistance against Germany must be expressly and publicly excluded; otherwise the confidence of the German people in the German-Soviet agreements will be shaken.	211	236
Oct. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov does not believe an assistance pact will be concluded with Turkey; the aim of the Soviet Government is to secure the full neutrality of Turkey.	219	244
Oct. 13	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> A Turkish-Russian assistance pact may be signed soon.	250	280
Oct. 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov told Schulenburg that no results had been obtained in the negotiations with the Turkish Foreign Minister who was about to leave Moscow.	268	306

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker asked Attolico to let him know if the Italian Government should decide on a démarche in Ankara on the subject of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact which was directed primarily against Italy.	287	329
Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Foreign Minister has ordered that the members of his Ministry are not to receive Ambassador Papen during his present stay in Berlin nor are they to have political conversations with him.	288	330
Nov. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Turkey</i> Papen is instructed to make a statement to the Turkish Foreign Minister to the effect that Germany considers Turkey's treaty with the Western Powers an intentional affront and reserves the right to take appropriate measures if it should lead to practical consequences affecting Germany.	324	371
Nov. 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu emphasized that the Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara was not conducting negotiations on the Anglo-French-Turkish pact but was trying to get Turkey's agreement to the establishment of a bloc of neutral states.	329	378
Nov. 7	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> In the present economic negotiations with Turkey Germany's policy is to pay for badly needed chromium with industrial deliveries and light military equipment, but not with heavy armament.	330	380
Nov. 8	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Information is requested, as to whether Turkey's dependence on German industrial deliveries, particularly spare parts, might make it possible to obtain more favorable terms in the economic negotiations with Turkey.	333	385
Nov. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The démarche concerning Turkey's pact with the Western Powers has been carried out according to instructions; in view of the opinion expressed by the Russian Ambassador that both countries had an interest in preventing the Allied Near Eastern Forces from operating in the Balkans, it is suggested that joint large scale operations against Britain be started in the spring.	338	389
Nov. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen favors a speedy conclusion of an economic agreement with Turkey rather than waiting until the Turks are more pliable; as Saracoglu indicated that Germany could obtain chromium only in exchange for certain types of military equipment, Papen suggests that submarine motors be included in such deliveries.	339	390
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador Ribbentrop severely criticized Turkey's foreign policy and stated that Turkey had joined the anti-German front.	347	398

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Nov. 11	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> The delivery of submarine motors to Turkey would require a special decision by the Führer which could be requested only if it was a matter of decisive importance for Germany's war economy.	351	403
Nov. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg encloses the copy of a memorandum which the Turkish Ambassador had handed to Molotov and which dealt with the Rumanian proposal for a Balkan neutrality bloc.	358	410
Nov. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Saracoglu told Papen that Turkey agreed to a general settlement of their mutual economic relations on the basis of the German proposals; he also agreed with Papen that a complete defeat of Germany, as desired by Churchill, was not in Turkey's interest.	366	416
Nov. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen told Saracoglu that a Turkish refusal to deliver chromium would be considered an unfriendly act; Saracoglu denied such intentions but said that Turkey could promise deliveries only when the actual size of the chromium output was known.	390	451
[Nov.—]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum of the Economic Policy Department</i> Germany's refusal to deliver heavy guns and Turkey's cutting off chromium ore deliveries have led to a crisis in German-Turkish economic relations; it is suggested that Germany agree to negotiate agreements on trade in other goods, since the Turks are not likely to yield to German economic pressure.	391	452
Dec. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Ribbentrop states that Saracoglu had not given a satisfactory explanation for his unfriendly remarks on Germany in a recent interview and that furthermore his statements on chromium deliveries are unsatisfactory; Papen is to insist on a straight answer as to whether available chromium supplies will be sold to the Allies and the United States.	408	475
1940			
Jan. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> A satisfactory agreement concerning certain Turkish deliveries has been reached; Germany's dilatory tactics are resented by the Turks who suspect Germany of having held up deliveries to put pressure on Turkey; speedy acceptance of the remaining Turkish demands is urged.	512	628
Jan. 9	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Further Turkish demands are also approved but only in order to pave the way for subsequent transactions which would supply Germany with badly needed chromium; it is explained confidentially that Germany is not interested in a large amount of trade but in the best possible distribution of German exports among countries supplying Germany with vital imports.	516	634

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> German chromium needs are estimated to be 12,000 tons a month. There is a possibility of obtaining 40,000 tons of Turkish chromium via Hungary, if permission is granted to export 200,000 Hungarian time fuses to England.	517	635
Feb. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to information received, the French see no other way to win the war than by intensifying the blockade and by drawing the Balkans and Russia into the war, a view not shared by the British; these differences strengthen Turkey's bargaining position.	595	742
Feb. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen reports on the difficulties arising in the economic negotiations with Turkey and requests instruction as to how badly Germany needs Turkish chromium.	625	790
Mar. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The statement of the Turkish Minister President that his country could not be brought into the war by outside influences represents a success for Germany's policy, which, however, might even be enhanced by a Russian statement that would reassure the Turks.	638	819
Mar. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen told Saracoglu he was prepared to ask Berlin to deliver heavy armament to Turkey if the Turkish Government would promise to defend Turkish neutrality against the Western Powers; by forcing Saracoglu to choose between loyalty to his allies and the need to pacify Russia, Germany might be able to precipitate his fall.	674	918
Mar. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Weizsäcker expresses doubts whether the Turks would be willing to make political concessions to Germany of the kind suggested by Papen; he also questions whether Germany has an interest in improved Russo-Turkish relations.	680	930
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Foreign Minister, on the basis of a directive by the Führer, has approved delivery of three ships to Turkey, provided Turkish chromium deliveries form a considerable portion of the payment.	681	931

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1939			
Sept. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov promises speedy reply to the German suggestion of September 3 on military occupation of the Soviet sphere.	2	2

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Sept. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov deprecates premature military occupation of the Soviet sphere.	5	4
Sept. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Schnurre recommends that Göring be reminded that the Foreign Ministry is in charge of economic negotiations with the Soviet Union.	10	7
Sept. 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The sudden shift of Soviet policy toward Germany is reflected in the completely changed tone of organs of public opinion; the population is still bewildered by the shift and fearful of war, but the Soviet Government has always previously been able to direct popular attitudes.	13	12
Sept. 6	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to notify the Soviet Government that Germany intends to have ships discharge cargoes at Murmansk for rail shipment to Leningrad, where other German ships will receive them.	15	14
Sept. 7	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to notify the Soviet Government of German proposal to send Schnurre to conduct economic negotiations with Mikoyan in Moscow.	21	20
Sept. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to suggest again to Molotov the need for information on Soviet military intentions in Poland.	34	33
Sept. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov extends congratulations on the entry of German troops into Warsaw.	35	34
Sept. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says that Soviet military action will take place in the next few days.	37	35
Sept. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes Soviet military preparations.	39	36
Sept. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says the Soviet Government was not prepared for the swift German victory; the Red Army is not yet ready to advance; the Soviet Government, to avoid the appearance of aggression, would justify its military action by saying that Ukrainians and White Russians were threatened by Germany.	46	44
Sept. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Denies rumors of an armistice between Germany and Poland.	59	56

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Sept. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov wishes to know when Warsaw will fall so that he may say Poland has collapsed and Russian minorities require protection.	63	60
Sept. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Warsaw is expected to fall in the next few days; suggests the text for a joint German-Soviet communiqué; states that the justification for Soviet military action suggested by Molotov would expose the two states as enemies before the whole world.	70	68
Sept. 16	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says Soviet military action is imminent; he sees no reason for a joint communiqué; he requests that Germany accept the proposed justification of Soviet action in view of the difficult position of the Soviet Government.	78	76
Sept. 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stalin says the Red Army will cross the frontier today; he alters the text of the note to be handed to the Polish Ambassador so that it is satisfactory to Germany.	80	79
Sept. 17	<i>An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ribbentrop has reserved decision on the timing of Schnurre's trip to Moscow because of the political situation; a larger program of raw material deliveries from the Soviet Union is being considered.	82	81
Sept. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stalin doubts if German High Command will withdraw to the agreed line; Schulenburg requests authority to dispel his doubts.	90	92
Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Describes revision by Stalin of communiqué proposed by Germany; Stalin considered the German version too frank; the German draft and Stalin's draft are appended.	94	95
Sept. 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to tell Stalin that German agreements with the USSR will be kept; they are the foundation of friendly relations between Germany and the USSR.	101	103
Sept. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Göring has asked that an attempt be made to secure some sort of German control of the railway from Breslau to Rumania.	102	103

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> An urgent request for clarification of the demarcation line between German and Soviet spheres; Molotov says that Stalin is astonished at an obvious violation of the Moscow agreement.	103	104
Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov proposes negotiations in Moscow for a definitive Polish settlement.	104	105
Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> A short delay in Schnurre's arrival would probably not offend the Soviet Government; Soviet ability to export raw materials is limited.	108	108
Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government insists that the upper San form part of the demarcation line in Poland; Molotov proposes a communiqué to this effect.	109	109
Sept. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ribbentrop accepts Molotov's proposed communiqué on the demarcation line in Poland; there are still certain details to be worked out, however.	115	113
Sept. 22	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Text of the communiqué to be issued by the Soviet Government on the demarcation line in Poland.	122	122
Sept. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Willingness to come to Moscow to effect a definitive Polish settlement.	124	123
Sept. 23	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government welcomes Ribbentrop's projected visit.	125	124
Sept. 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stalin proposes that Germany waive claim to Lithuania in return for a larger part of Polish territory; Stalin requests assent to immediate solution of the problem of the Baltic countries.	131	130
Sept. 26	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker analyses the situation at the end of the Polish war for the forthcoming Moscow negotiations; he recommends advising Soviet Government not to intervene in the Balkans so long as Britain does not; he considers the question of a Rump Poland.	137	137
[Sept. 28]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop describes his conversation with Stalin and Molotov regarding Poland and Lithuania; he requests Hitler's judgment on two proposed territorial settlements.	152	159

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Sept. 28	<i>German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty</i> The text of the public treaty defining boundaries in the territory of Poland; interference by third powers will be rejected.	157	164
Sept. 28	<i>Confidential Protocol</i> Providing for exchange of nationals residing within the territories under the jurisdiction of the German and USSR Governments.	158	165
Sept. 28	<i>Secret Additional Protocol</i> Lithuania, except for territory in the southwest, is within the Russian sphere of influence; the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw are in the German sphere; economic agreements between Lithuania and Germany will not be affected by Soviet action.	159	166
Sept. 28	<i>Secret Additional Protocol</i> Both Germany and the USSR will suppress any Polish agitation.	160	166
Sept. 28	<i>Declaration of September 28, 1939, by the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR</i> Affirming that peace should be restored in Europe now that the Polish problem is definitively settled.	161	167
Sept. 28	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars</i> An agreement to begin negotiations for a new economic treaty.	162	167
Sept. 28	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars</i> Confirming a Soviet promise to facilitate German transit traffic through the USSR with Rumania, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Far East; confirming also a Soviet agreement on the delivery of oil.	163	168
Sept. 30	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Instructions to describe the German-Soviet agreements of September 28 as having eliminated forever any differences with regard to Poland.	169	175
Oct. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that the Moscow agreements of September 28 have been discussed with Ciano.	177	194
Oct. 4	<i>Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> The new boundary in Poland.	193	208
Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says that he has already told the Lithuanians of the territory which must go to Germany, that the Lithuanians had been dismayed by the news, and that Stalin requests Germany not to insist on cession at this time.	194	212
Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov proposes that Teriberka instead of Murmansk be used for establishment of repair facilities for German ships and submarines.	195	213

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> The German Minister to Lithuania is to state that in the negotiations at Moscow Germany recommended the cession of Vilna to Lithuania, and reserved the right to a small strip of Lithuanian territory; he is to say that the Reich Government does not wish to raise the latter question at this time; Schulenburg is to inform Molotov of the foregoing.	196	213
Oct. 6	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Schedule for negotiations at Moscow.	208	233
Oct. 8	<i>The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> If Soviet troops are stationed in Lithuania, they will not occupy the strip reserved for Germany; Germany will determine when the agreement concerning this territory is to be implemented.	218	244
Oct. 11	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> A progress report on the economic negotiations.	237	263
Oct. 12	<i>The Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Foreign Minister</i> Raeder urges that maximum cooperation with the Soviet Government be achieved to facilitate German naval operations.	248	277
Oct. 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to discuss with Molotov proposed Soviet logistical support and bases for German naval operations.	257	287
Oct. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to invite Molotov to visit Berlin to ratify the Boundary and Friendship Treaty.	258	289
Oct. 16	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government desires ratification of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on October 19.	261	291
Oct. 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov regrets that urgent political business prevents his visiting Berlin at present.	267	306
Oct. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> In a speech soon to be delivered on foreign affairs, Ribbentrop wishes to refute the British claim that in Moscow he had asked for, and had been refused, Soviet military assistance; the text of this portion of the speech is given; it includes a direct quotation of Stalin on the Soviet need for a strong Germany, and on the parallel interests of Germany and the USSR in case of war between Germany and the Western democracies.	271	309
Oct. 18	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports that the economic negotiations are proceeding slowly but not too unfavorably.	272	310

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Oct. 18	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Inquires whether any details are known of reported Anglo-Soviet economic discussions.	273	313
Oct. 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stalin approves the account of the negotiations in Moscow; he requests a modification of the direct quotation so that the community of Soviet-German interests is exclusively related to the need for a strong Germany.	280	320
Oct. 19	<i>Chief of Protocol Dörnberg to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Ribbentrop is disappointed by the hunting to be found in the German share of Poland; can arrangements be made for him in the Soviet share?	283	323
Oct. 26	<i>Ambassador Ritter to Minister Schnurre [in Moscow]</i> German officials in Berlin are well satisfied with the progress of economic talks with the Soviet Government; they are ready for a great effort on deliveries to the Soviet Union.	303	345
Oct. 29	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government will allow transit of foreign raw materials to Germany via Black Sea ports, provided the operations are properly camouflaged.	314	358
Oct. 30	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ritter instructs Schnurre to work for agreement on some tentative round figures for German deliveries to the Soviet Union; the present detailed negotiations are proceeding too slowly.	316	361
Nov. 1	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schnurre requests details on proposed transit shipments of raw materials to Germany through the USSR; Mikoyan has stressed the need for secrecy.	320	368
Nov. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Göring, Raeder, and Keitel complain of the war material demands of the Soviet delegation in Berlin.	321	369
Nov. 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Summarizes conversations between Göring and Soviet officials in Berlin; he assures them that their delegation is being shown the latest German planes and equipment.	335	386
Nov. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov offers various advantages to Germany provided the Russian economic demands are met.	342	394
Nov. 18	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that the Soviet delegation has had unprecedented access to information on German production; the German Government strongly desires rapid completion of the negotiations.	371	422
Nov. 20	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Discusses Molotov's anger toward Finland, details of the boundary in Poland, Soviet support for German peace efforts, a propaganda move against Turkey, and other questions.	376	427

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Nov. 23	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports estimates current among Military Attachés in Moscow as to Soviet troop dispositions and intentions regarding Finland and Rumania.	385	446
Nov. 24	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Germany has protested the change in railroad gauge between Lwów and Przemyśl; transit traffic with Rumania should begin December 1.	386	447
Nov. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to invite Molotov to protest certain proposed British blockade measures.	395	459
Nov. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Cancels earlier instructions for Naval Attaché to inquire privately about possible transfer of submarines from Soviet to German navy.	403	468
Dec. 1	<i>Circular Letter of the Foreign Ministry</i> Schnurre distributes material on Soviet delivery orders in preparation for an interministerial meeting of December 2.	407	472
Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the Economic Delegation to the Soviet Union</i> Action taken by interministerial meeting regarding the Soviet order list of November 30.	412	481
[Dec. 2]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Questions in the German-Soviet economic negotiations requiring decision by Hitler.	413	488
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Keitel complains of friction along the Soviet frontier, particularly in connection with the expulsion of Jews into Soviet territory.	419	489
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Keitel again complains that Soviet demands for the delivery of German products are increasingly voluminous and unreasonable; the Foreign Ministry intends to curb the Soviet demands.	420	490
Dec. 6	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Quotes text of circular telegram instructing principal German Missions to express sympathy for Soviet attitude in Finnish-Soviet conflict and to stress British responsibility.	423	494
Dec. 8	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> To provide 70,000 tons of iron per month to the Soviet Union as planned would necessitate major cuts elsewhere; Ritter states the choices; a Göring letter is appended.	430	502
Dec. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov denounces German complicity in the alleged Italian shipment of planes to Finland; Schulenburg has denied the charges but requests instructions.	432	506

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Dec. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Forwards for Molotov's attention a DNB denial of reports that arms have recently been shipped by or through Germany to Finland.	435	508
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Ribbentrop protests the Tass report of German delivery of munitions to Finland; he also intimates that Soviet demands for military supplies are excessive.	438	512
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Details of Italian planes destined for Finland via Germany and Sweden.	439	514
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov accepts German denials regarding alleged shipments of arms to Finland.	440	514
Dec. 11	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> The demands of the Soviet economic delegation in Berlin far exceed the terms previously agreed upon; Ritter is prepared to make some concessions but proposes to transfer the negotiations back to Moscow.	442	516
Dec. 12	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to withdraw consent to shipment of Italian war material through Germany to Finland.	444	521
Dec. 15	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Raeder is willing to sell the plans of <i>Bismarck</i> to the Soviet Union, provided the price is high enough.	457	537
[Dec. 19]	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter has rejected Mikoyan's demand for German military deliveries as contrary to the Ribbentrop-Molotov exchange of September 28; he will seek to reopen negotiations on the basis of that exchange.	474	558
Dec. 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Expresses approval of Ritter's rejection of Mikoyan's demand of December 19 and authorizes him to take up the matter with Molotov.	476	560
Dec. 20	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> The Governor General of the General Government of Poland was informed of a Soviet complaint that Jews were being deported from the Government General to the Soviet Union by official organs of the Reich. He ordered such practices stopped to avoid disturbing necessary friendly relations with the Soviet Union.	477	560
Dec. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Hilger's summary of a Schulenburg-Molotov conversation regarding unsatisfactory progress of the economic negotiations; conflicting interpretations of "industrial deliveries" were presented; Molotov admitted that Germany's involvement in war restricted her ability to deliver arms but charged that she was setting exorbitant prices; a meeting of Ritter and Schnurre with Molotov and Mikoyan was arranged.	484	570

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 [Dec. 24]	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> In stating that the Soviet Union will not adopt German plane types at present, Molotov refers to "exorbitant" prices; negotiations on other points will be resumed.	487	574
1940 Jan. 2	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Disputes Molotov's interpretation of "industrial deliveries" in the Moscow negotiations.	498	587
[Jan. 2]	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Describes a conference in the Kremlin December 31, 1939, between the German and Soviet economic negotiators; Stalin insisted on the reduced Soviet demands but for the first time used the expression "mutual assistance"; metal production, naval armament, machine tools, and airplanes were the principal issues discussed.	499	588
Jan. 8	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> Keitel sends Ribbentrop a Wehrmacht memorandum on Germany's strategic and political objectives in the Balkans and the Near East, suggesting that Germany encourage Russia's expansion in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East to prevent a clash of Russian and Italian aspirations in the Balkans.	514	631
Jan. 10	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Unknown to the Foreign Ministry, several carloads of war material for Finland were allowed to enter Germany; three of these were inadvertently permitted to continue.	519	640
Jan. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Hilger records Schulenburg's conversation of January 7 with Molotov regarding definition of "a more extended period of time" for German deliveries to the Soviet Union; both sides referred to the political basis of the negotiations; Molotov saw no insurmountable obstacle to agreement.	520	641
Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records Hitler's relatively favorable decisions on the reduced Soviet demands.	543	672
Jan. 25	<i>Unsigned Memorandum From the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg told Molotov that much of the excitement in the Balkans and Near East seemed to arise from fear of Soviet intentions in these regions; Molotov replied that the Soviet Union had done nothing to warrant any anxiety either there or in Italy.	576	709
Jan. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann notes that he answered certain questions by Shkvarsev regarding an alleged Soviet effort to get a North Atlantic outlet, German relations with Italy, Vatican broadcasts, and news about Britain.	579	712

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Jan. 28	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Urges pressure on German firms to accept Soviet orders; the Russians are becoming suspicious of German willingness and ability to make deliveries.	582	715
Jan. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union</i> Describes a conference in the Kremlin in which Ritter presented the German replies to Stalin's questions of December 31; Stalin discussed the conflicting views on deliveries and proposed dividing the projected agreement into separate treaties for 1940 and 1941.	584	718
Feb. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs Ritter to deliver to Stalin a personal communication by Ribbentrop urging the German view on the deliveries question; Stalin is to be reminded of the political basis of the agreements.	594	739
Feb. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union</i> Describes a conference in the Kremlin at which Stalin replied to Ribbentrop's personal message of February 3; Stalin proposed a single treaty calling for Soviet deliveries during 18 months and German deliveries during 27 months after signature; Ritter said that an agreement on this basis might be possible.	600	752
Feb. 9	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports that negotiations for an economic agreement are proceeding favorably and may be completed within a few days.	602	755
Feb. 11	<i>Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>	607	762
Feb. 11	<i>The Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in Germany to the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation</i> Confirming that certain funds provided under the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, may also be used in connection with the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940.	608	769
Feb. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Soviet Union</i> Schnurre summarizes the promised deliveries of Soviet raw materials and emphasizes the sacrifices these deliveries will entail for the USSR; he tells of difficulties which were surmounted in the negotiation of the agreement, and of those which may arise in its execution; he concludes that the Soviet deliveries, and the transit facilities through the USSR, will decisively weaken the effects of the British blockade.	636	814
Mar. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports protesting "intolerable" frontier conditions to Molotov, who agreed to take appropriate action.	658	867
Mar. 14	<i>The International Committee of the Red Cross to the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Inquires about reports that Polish prisoners of war at Kozielek, Russia, will be brought to Germany.	676	922

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 15	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Babarin complained that German firms are not replying to inquiries by his trade mission.	677	923
1941 Jan. 28	<i>Under State Secretary Hencke to Helmuth Lenz</i> Transmits an article based on his experiences while a member of Ribbentrop's party visiting Moscow September 27-29, 1939.	—	939

UNITED STATES

1939 Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker summoned American Chargé d'Affaires Kirk to deny that the passenger ship <i>Athenia</i> was sunk by German naval forces.	4	3
Sept. 7	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> President Roosevelt is preparing American opinion for repeal of the arms embargo; the American people, under a barrage of propaganda, are already overwhelmingly anti-German.	22	21
Sept. 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite the neutrality it stresses the American Government is preparing to seize German funds in case of war, is placing German firms and organizations under surveillance, and has refused asylum to German seamen.	26	25
Sept. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Roosevelt is assured of Congressional support for repeal of the arms embargo; his policy is to insure Allied victory by American material aid, but he would intervene in the war if defeat of the Allies was threatened.	54	51
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In view of the very great German interest in keeping the United States neutral it is suggested that the Ambassador be returned to his post in Washington, even if the Americans do not reciprocate by returning their Ambassador to Berlin.	56	53
Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann shares Dieckhoff's objections to any direct representations against American neutrality policy, as Roosevelt would construe this as interference in American affairs; a statement of readiness to discuss improved relations is proposed instead.	85	84
Sept. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thomsen warns urgently against any German resort to sabotage in America, as this would cut the ground out from under the isolationists whose line is that American interests are not involved in the European war.	88	89

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 24	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> German propaganda should avoid any direct support of the isolationists or any appearance of meddling in American domestic politics, as this would only encourage the will to intervention on the part of an American opinion already overwhelmingly anti-German.	129	127
Sept. 26	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports indicate strong sentiment already exists among American Catholics against involvement in the war; Franco's suggestion that the Vatican be asked to exercise influence in this direction is not supported.	139	145
Sept. 28	<i>The Military Attaché in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Additional information on German operations is requested for use in cultivating contacts with the American General Staff.	151	158
Oct. 1	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Measures taken by the American armed forces since the outbreak of war indicate no intention to prepare an expeditionary army for Europe; General Staff influence is on the side of staying out of the European war and building American hemisphere defense.	172	179
Oct. 7	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thomsen requests guidance on American news service reports from Berlin that semi-official German spokesmen have indicated that Germany would respond to a peace mediation by Roosevelt.	209	234
Oct. 9	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Repeal of the arms embargo would be an unneutral act, reversing the traditional American position that neutrality policy should not be changed after outbreak of war; in considering a protest, however, it should be remembered that repeal will have no practical effect for some time.	220	245
Oct. 10	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> Extreme reserve is to be maintained concerning press reports about the possibility of an American mediation.	233	256
Oct. 21	<i>Chargé d' Affaires Thomsen to Under State Secretary Woermann</i> In response to a query dating from before the outbreak of war Thomsen replies that in his opinion it would be advisable to resume the social relations with American officials which, in both Berlin and Washington, had been cut off for some time.	289	330
Oct. 22	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> A reliable source indicates that Ambassador Kennedy, despite Churchill's expression to him of an expectation of early American entry into the war, has advised against repeal of the arms embargo on the ground that Chamberlain and the Cabinet majority fear intensification of the war.	291	332

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Nov. 28	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to his representations at the State Department Thomsen was informed that the United States would not join other neutrals in protesting against the British blockade, which was regarded as admissible under international law.	396	460
Dec. 1	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> After three months of the European war American military preparations remain inadequate to permit intervention; adequate ground and air forces will not be available before the late summer of 1940.	405	470
Dec. 8	<i>The Consul General at New York to the Foreign Ministry</i> The trial and conviction of German-American Bund Leader Fritz Kuhn for misappropriating funds has alienated German-Americans from the Bund and confirms that official German agencies should have nothing to do with the Bund.	431	504
Dec. 24	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> President Roosevelt's appointment of a special envoy to the Vatican is motivated by his desire for cooperation with the Pope in a possible mediation effort.	486	573
Dec. 27	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Contrary to the view stated in the telegram from Washington, Roosevelt's appointment of an envoy to the Vatican is more likely an election maneuver than an attempt to associate with the Pope in a mediation attempt.	490	579
1940 Jan. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> It is requested that confidential arrangements be made for a visit to the United States by the Duke of Coburg, head of the German Red Cross; he has no official mission, but great importance is attached to having the visit go off smoothly.	510	619
Jan. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> American Ambassador Cudahy said that he would prefer a more neutral American policy than that pursued by President Roosevelt; he intimated, however, that violation of Belgian neutrality was likely to lead to America's entry into the war.	563	693
Jan. 25	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Having learned of the presence in the United States of two agents reported to be on a sabotage mission, Thomsen urges they be relieved of their assignment, warning that such activities are a sure means of bringing the United States into the war.	569	700
Jan. 25	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although the United States has rebuffed Japanese efforts to get an extension of the trade treaty denounced by the United States, further trade reprisals are unlikely in view of the American desire not to disturb the Pacific area during the European war.	573	705

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a private talk with Weizsäcker Welles warned that if Germany pressed for a military victory general ruin would result and the United States could not stand aside; he indicated that his further talks with Mussolini might produce some proposals.	642	829
Mar. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a further record of his conversation with Welles, Weizsäcker notes that Welles has promised to transmit a memorandum on economic relations, a subject which he would also like to discuss with Schacht.	643	830
Mar. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Hitler insisted to Welles that Germany's aim was peace whereas Britain and France were bent on Germany's destruction; after rejection of his peace offers, he now believed the war would have to be fought to a finish in defense of German interests.	649	838
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation between Welles and Göring on March 3. Göring in a broad retrospective survey stressed England's responsibility for the continuation of the war.	653	850
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Welles said that he expected success for his mission if Europe remained quiet 4 or 5 weeks more; he indicated he hoped to see Ambassador Dieckhoff back in Washington soon.	655	864
Mar. 5	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> The American businessman, Mooney, who in a conversation with Hitler spoke of Roosevelt's friendly sentiments toward Germany and his willingness to serve as moderator between Germany and her enemies, seems to be sincere but misled.	656	865
Mar. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Roosevelt, apparently on prestige grounds, has publicly dismissed any thought of returning the American Ambassador to Berlin; the American attitude toward Germany shows no improvement in any way.	659	867
Mar. 12	<i>Memorandum by a Member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> A conversation of the Führer with Colin Ross in which Ross described his travels in the United States and discussed American attitudes toward Germany.	671	910
Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Welles' memorandum on world trade policy is only a restatement of Hull's often-repeated general principles for freeing world trade; the war will increase the trend to autarky, however, and worsen the American trade position.	673	915

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite the cool attitude displayed by American officials the visit of the Duke of Coburg to Washington has been a considerable success.	683	938
YUGOSLAVIA			
1939 Sept. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The signing of the contracts for armament deliveries to Yugoslavia has been put off on specific instructions from Göring; a change in this policy as suggested by Minister Heeren would seem to require a direct intervention by the Foreign Minister with Göring.	53	49
Sept. 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> The Minister is requested to get the text of a recent British note to Yugoslavia and in any case to state explicitly that any commitment by a neutral country to restrict its trade with Germany would be considered as aid to Germany's enemies.	90	102
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Göring has given approval to a plan according to which Germany will deliver to Yugoslavia planes, anti-aircraft and antitank guns in return for Yugoslavia's entire output of copper as well as large shipments of lead and zinc.	117	116
Sept. 28	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a conversation, Prince Paul expressed his concern over Russia's expansion toward the West and the increased influence of Communist Pan-Slavism in South-eastern Europe.	155	163
Oct. 22	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hitler's recent reference to the resettlement of nationalities in Eastern Europe has caused unrest in Yugoslavia; authorization is requested for a statement to the effect that repatriation of German communities in Yugoslavia is by no means an acute issue at the present time.	290	332
Oct. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Repatriation of German communities in Yugoslavia is not an acute issue and a public discussion of this problem in Southeastern Europe is not desirable at the present time.	311	352
1940 Jan. 2	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Yugoslav Foreign Minister assured Germany that German-Yugoslav relations would continue to be based on close political and economic cooperation and that attempts to sabotage them would be foiled.	497	586
Jan. 23	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Göring has just given instructions that in Yugoslavia Consul General Neuhausen shall handle all transactions connected with arms deliveries to that country; jurisdiction of the Legation in this matter is not affected thereby.	560	691

No. 1

1571/380176-78

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 4, 1939—6:40 p. m.

No. 418 of September 4

Received September 4—9:20 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 459 of September 3¹ and my telegram No. 414.²

The Duce remarked on delivery of the Führer's message, which took place in Ciano's presence at 9:40 a. m., that he would state his position in a letter. His comments during the subsequent conversation, lasting half an hour, were somewhat as follows: He had never had even the remotest thought of engaging in any mediation action that was conditioned on the withdrawal of the German troops. No person in the whole world could seriously think it possible to consider proposing such a thing, least of all to a victoriously advancing army. He had rejected such an idea with outright indignation and similarly would have nothing to do with the "token" withdrawal proposed by Paris. He had forwarded the proposal on France's urgent insistence that one last try be made, but had of course taken for granted that it was based on the condition that "the army corps would stay where they were."

On such a condition he thought it possible that the Führer might agree to the proposal. England, however, which was entirely to blame for the course of developments in the German-Polish conflict, apparently was intent on preventing any adjustment from being reached. He seemed to have information that the Polish Ambassador in London had even at the last minute brought decisive influence to bear on the attitude of the British Cabinet.

England's declaration which had brought on the state of war and which France had followed only with hesitation up to the last, was positive "idiocy", hatched by people who evidently had not even studied a map. For, what was to be the form of such a war? Obviously, it could be fought only on land, on the sea, or in the air. On land, breaking out from behind the Maginot Line and overrunning the

¹ This telegram transmitted Hitler's letter of Sept. 3 to Mussolini. It is printed in vol. VII as document No. 565.

² Not printed (52/35543). Mackensen reported in this telegram sent on the evening of Sept. 3 that Mussolini would receive him at 9:30 a. m. the following day at which time he would deliver Hitler's letter.

West Wall was a hopeless undertaking which the French were unlikely to attempt. The navy, even if ours was but a modest fleet, could not in any event undertake anything decisive. The air force would try to drop some bombs, perhaps would even destroy some installation or other, but that, too, would have no bearing on the final outcome, especially if we were to confine ourselves to the defensive also in the air. In short, the Western Powers' challenge to fight was an utterly absurd venture, for there remained only the (group garbled) war, and such a war would also hurt the side that started it.

Where the Führer's message stated that the Führer and the Duce were "now marching on separate paths", he had to disagree quite emphatically. On the contrary, agreement was complete as to the road and the goal, and he had done everything, especially in the military field, that the Führer now wished him to do, and was continuing his preparations in the most intensive manner. September would still be a critical month for him in Libya, but its end would find him prepared for effective defense there also. Already, his measures at the Alpine border and in Africa were containing more than 400,000 men on the enemy side. He would forward to the Führer through the Military Attaché (who has been requested to call on General Pariani today) all particulars of his military measures, together with maps, which he also showed to me and explained in detail. I shall leave it to the Military Attaché to make a report on this. I should only like to underline the Duce's statement that not only had there been no friction at all in carrying through the mobilization measures here, but that the spirit of the newly inducted soldiers was also excellent, as was that of their families, owing to the ample support provided for them.

The Duce, in conclusion, repeated his assurance of whatever assistance we desired, especially with respect to the question of workers and (in response to a remark of mine) to the press. The Duce showed calm confidence.

MACKENSEN

No. 2

127/69851-52

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 4, 1939—8:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 261 of September 4

With reference to your telegram No. 253 of September 3.¹

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 567.

At 5:30 p. m. today I carried out your instruction with Molotov. He promised to take up the question dealt with in the first part with the Soviet Government at once and to give a speedy reply.

Concerning the question of the authority of the Soviet officers in Berlin, M. explained that Military Attaché Purkayev was a man of importance and very considerable military experience, who, like the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador, was acquainted with the essential features of the German-Soviet agreements. Nevertheless, he requested that we continue to handle all of the more important questions directly through him as the final authority.

SCHULENBURG

No. 3

406/214415

The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia

Telegram

No. 149

BERLIN, September 4, 1939.
zu Pol. II 3189.¹

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor von Rintelen.

With reference to your No. 106 of September 2.¹

Please reply to the Foreign Minister there as follows: It is correct that we have given Finland a declaration concerning observance of Finnish neutrality and likewise have given to Sweden and Norway [similar declarations²]. We gave such declarations to neighboring countries first of all, and then also to Scandinavian countries with which we do not have nonaggression pacts. In view of the treaties of June 7 we thought we could refrain from giving such declarations to Estonia and Latvia.³ You are authorized, however, to declare formally that we will of course regard ourselves as bound by the treaty of June 7 during the war which has just broken out.

ST[ATE] S[ECRETARY]

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 548.

² Not printed (52/35448-50).

³ See vol. VI, Editors' Note at June 7.

No. 4

2422/511793

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 676

BERLIN, September 4, 1939.

I asked the American Chargé d'Affaires to see me today at noon in order to deny to him, too, that the British steamer *Athenia* (allegedly with many passengers, including a large number of Ameri-

cans) was torpedoed by German naval units. I told him that there is no German submarine in that particular area, and that, furthermore, our naval forces are under strict orders to refrain from any action contrary to international law and the agreements signed by the German Reich. Mr. Kirk wants to convey my statement to Washington by telephone and cable immediately. Arrangements have been made to place at the disposal of the American Embassy, which has no direct means of communication with Washington, a wire through an American legation in a neutral country.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹At the Nuremberg trial Weizsäcker testified that he gave the above statement to the American Chargé d'Affaires on the basis of information received from the German Navy. The *Athenia* was actually sunk by the German submarine U-30, but this became known to the German command only when the submarine returned to port at the end of September. The facts were not revealed until the end of the war. See *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xiv, pp. 277-278.

No. 5

127/69848-49

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 5, 1939—2:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 264 of September 5

With reference to my telegram No. 261 of September 4.¹

Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12:30 and transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet Government:

"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted."

SCHULENBURG

¹Document No. 2.

No. 6

108/111576

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 266 of September 5

Moscow, September 5, 1939—5:02 p. m.

Received September 5—6 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 262 of September 4.¹

Today at 12:30 p. m. I again asked Molotov to have the Soviet Government continue to work on Turkey with a view to permanent neutrality.² I mentioned that rumors were current to the effect that England was putting pressure on Rumania to take active part and was holding out a prospect of aid from British and French troops. Since this aid might come by sea, it was in the interests of the Soviet Government to prevail upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely.

Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it in the sense desired by us. Molotov added that there was only the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey;³ conversations regarding the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact had, it is true, been carried on at one time but had borne no fruit.

He would have rumors about Rumania looked into through the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (103/111571). On Ribbentrop's instructions, following a suggestion from Papen in Ankara, Weizsäcker had asked Schulenburg to do what he could to have the Soviet Government urge a policy of neutrality upon Turkey.

² Schulenburg had discussed Turkish neutrality with Molotov on Sept. 2; see vol. VII, document No. 551.

³ A nonaggression treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union was signed Dec. 17, 1925. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, pp. 354-357.

No. 7

6783/E518575

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

THE HAGUE, September 5, 1939—6:14 p. m.

No. 109 of September 5

Received September 5—8:10 p. m.

W 1621 g.

The Foreign Minister¹ asked me today to ascertain discreetly in Berlin whether we would possibly be able to supply the Netherlands

¹ Dr. Eelco N. van Kleffens.

with antiaircraft guns with the necessary accessories. Holland had tried to order antiaircraft artillery in a great many places during the past few years, but had not been able to obtain a sufficient quantity because of the long delivery terms. The Government would therefore be very grateful if Germany could send antiaircraft artillery as soon as possible.

In spite of all reservations I should welcome it very much if the wish of the Netherlands could be fulfilled. In view of the repeated flights by the British over the Netherlands it seems that any anti-aircraft artillery we supplied to Holland would amount to a German advance position against England.

ZECH

No. 8

73/52012

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 5, 1939.

Minister Schmidt reports as follows concerning the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Sztójay on the evening of September 4, 1939:

The Foreign Minister again impressed on Minister Sztójay that Hungary must in no circumstances attack Rumania.

The question of a visit to the Foreign Minister by Count Csáky was also discussed.¹

SONNLEITHNER

¹ In a memorandum of the same day Weizsäcker recorded a conversation with the Hungarian Minister who said that special arrangements would have to be made for a flight by Csáky to meet Ribbentrop (73/52008).

No. 9

5571/E399594

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 5, 1939.

W 1685 g.

The Hungarian Minister telephoned today and asked me whether the ban on certain deliveries of war material to Hungary¹ which had been ordered by General Keitel had been lifted. He had asked the Foreign Minister this question yesterday, when the latter received him on the train.² The Foreign Minister said he knew nothing about this whole matter and took some notes about it.

¹ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 489 and 572.

² See document No. 8.

Inquiries made by Pol. I M with the High Command of the Wehrmacht had already shown that, in this regard, the military authorities were only waiting for a directive by the Foreign Ministry which, to be sure, had itself taken up this matter with the Hungarian Minister.

I propose that the enclosed request³ be sent through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Minister.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.⁴

WOERMANN

³ Not printed (5571/E599595). In this document authorization was requested to inform the Hungarian Minister that the ban had been lifted.

⁴ On Sept. 7, Woermann recorded telling the Hungarian Minister that the political explanations previously given for the ban on arms deliveries to Hungary were no longer valid, but that certain difficulties regarding deliveries had arisen which he, Woermann, was not competent to discuss (73/52018). On Sept. 18, Wiehl telegraphed Clodius, who had gone to Bucharest for economic negotiations, that the ban on exports of war material to Hungary still stood and that therefore Hungarian requests should be treated in a dilatory fashion (telegram No. 542, 5571/E399596).

No. 10

4461/E087090

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 5, 1939.

Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer of the Ministry of Economics has just informed me by telephone as follows:

The Reich Defense Council held a session yesterday under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Göring and discussed, among other things, especially the question of the development of our commercial relations with Russia.¹ Field Marshal Göring took the position that further expansion of our economic relations with Russia should be undertaken as quickly as possible. The question of sending someone to Moscow was taken under consideration. A committee consisting of the State Secretaries of the various departments was formed for the purpose of making further decisions. Proposals on the widening of our trade with Russia and the *modus procedendi* are to be submitted to this committee. It was pointed out at the meeting of the Council that the proposals should be cleared with the Foreign Ministry. End of Schlotterer's statement.

¹ The basic secret and open files of the Economic Policy Department on the Soviet Union are missing for the period covered by this volume, as are the economic files of the Embassy in Moscow. The only economic files available to the editors were the personal files of Wiehl, Clodius, and Ritter, which are fragmentary and consist largely of documents on particular problems with which these men were engaged. There is also a State Secretary file dealing with economic negotiations connected with the Non-Aggression Pact.

I should like to refer to my memorandum of September 2, "Program of Work for Russia," which was submitted to the Foreign Minister for his decision.² I consider it urgently necessary to confirm once again my appointment as chief negotiator with Russia and inform Field Marshal Göring accordingly. Otherwise, it can be expected that our Russian effort will be dissipated and the Foreign Ministry will lose control of it.³

SCHNURRE

² See vol. VII, document No. 557.

³ In a telegram of Sept. 7, the German Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to inform Molotov and Mikoyan of the German desire to send Schnurre to Moscow to discuss the execution of the trade treaty and the further development of commercial relations (34/24080-81). Russian assent was given (4461/E087008) and the date of Schnurre's journey was tentatively fixed for Sept. 15 (3781/E041450). But see document No. 82.

No. 11

967/302400-05

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weissäcker

Rome, September 5, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: At the close of his visit on September 2 (reported in my No. 404 of the same day),¹ Shiratori took his farewell with the remark that before he left he would also like to see Plessen. I thereupon suggested to the latter that he get in touch with Shiratori. They met yesterday, and I enclose Plessen's memorandum on the course and content of their conversation. It fills out my telegram in many respects and may be of interest to the Foreign Minister, even if he finds in it much that he already knows.

In view of the overloading of coding facilities here and at your end I am sending this with the courier.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.,

M[ACKENSEN]

P. S. I hope in the next few days to be able to report about your telegram No. 465 of Sept. 4 on the same theme.²

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

Rome, September 4, 1939.

As agreed earlier by telephone, I today visited the Japanese Ambassador here. After Mr. Shiratori, referring to his conversation with

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 556. The copy retained in Mackensen's file (967/302389) bears the number 404, whereas the one in the Berlin file is 403.

² Telegram No. 465 and Mackensen's reply, not printed (967/302390 and 302407).

[our] Ambassador on September 2, told me why he wished to speak to me, he expressed himself during the conversation, which lasted a good half hour, about as follows:

The conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty, as I knew, came as a hard blow to Japan and caused a great sensation there. Since that time Germany's friends have tried to offset this. He himself, as one of them, has always sought to induce the Japanese Government to conclude an alliance with us (and indeed with Italy as well.) This was the purpose of his mission here. Since this purpose has not been achieved, he has handed in his resignation and is now returning to Japan, for he believes that he can be of more use in this connection there than here.

When Shiratori was in Berlin for the Führer's birthday, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop proposed to him that Japan might enter a closer alliance relationship with Germany.³ He had then forwarded this proposal to Tokyo, without receiving any answer, however. When he saw the Foreign Minister again, on June 16, the latter told him that since Japan had not accepted our proposals, Germany would now conclude a nonaggression pact with Russia.⁴ This too he had reported to Tokyo. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, who as a soldier had no understanding of these things, had for his part reported that for Germany to conclude such a pact with Russia was out of the question. The Tokyo Government believed that the Foreign Minister was merely "bluffing." They had also spread this view around Tokyo, adding that he (Shiratori) and Oshima had let themselves be led around by the nose. Two months passed without any reply from Tokyo to Shiratori, and finally we concluded the pact with Russia. Thereupon, the Japanese Government had resigned, and he had offered his resignation four times before it was finally accepted.

Regarding the reported Japanese protest against the Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty, Mr. Shiratori told me that Oshima had indeed received instructions to lodge a protest. He (Shiratori) was notified at the same time, whereupon he had reached the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone in order to prevent the protest if possible. An official—the Counselor of Embassy, if I am not mistaken—told him that Oshima had already gone to the Foreign Ministry. There State Secretary von Weizsäcker did not accept the protest.⁵ On returning to his Embassy, Oshima was told of his (Shiratori's) telephone call and thereupon reported to Tokyo that he

³ See vol. VI, document No. 270.

⁴ Ribbentrop's telegram to the Embassy in Tokyo about this conversation is less explicit than Shiratori's account. It is printed in vol. VI, document No. 538.

⁵ See vol. VII, document No. 329.

regarded a protest as inopportune. He was, nevertheless, instructed by Tokyo to lodge it. So far this has not happened.*

As to the present status of Russo-Japanese relations—here I come to the most important part of the conversation—Mr. Shiratori said that the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow a few days ago had received instructions to make the following proposals to the Russian Government:

(1) to regulate by diplomacy the dispute about the frontier between Mongolia and Manchukuo, where a regular war has been going on for a long time.

(2) to establish a commission to control the frontier questions there as a whole.

(3) to conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of conversations about a trade treaty Russia should let it be known that she wishes to conclude a nonaggression pact with Japan, then Ambassador Togo should immediately ask whether Russia would be inclined to refuse future aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

He (Shiratori) regarded this instruction to the Ambassador in Moscow as unfortunate, even dangerous. Russia has of course never of herself proposed a nonaggression pact. Even the proposal for the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact came from us. In his view the only way to reach a nonaggression pact with Russia—which he too thought thoroughly desirable—was through German mediation. He had therefore, on his own, without instruction from Tokyo, also proposed to General Oshima that he ask for German mediation. All this took place a few days ago. General Oshima has not yet been able to see the Foreign Minister since the latter had had no time to receive him before leaving for the front with the Führer. The Führer before his departure received General Oshima, it is true, but this involved only a very brief visit in which the Führer declared that Germany would keep up the old friendly relations with Japan, but in which Oshima had no opportunity to open the question of a German mediation between Japan and Russia. He (Oshima) would try to speak to the Foreign Minister after the latter's return to Berlin.

Berlin has not yet been officially informed of these latest developments. He (Shiratori) wished to apprise us here and thought it also desirable for us to inform Berlin.

When I observed that, as I understood it, he wished on his return journey to Japan to speak to the Reich Foreign Minister, Mr. Shiratori said that his travel plans were not yet set. Presumably, he will return to Japan and naturally he would be delighted to talk to the

* See document No. 93.

Foreign Minister if he so desired. I had the impression, however, that Mr. Shiratori did not wish to come right out, so to speak, and ask for an interview, also no doubt out of consideration for General Oshima who is, after all, in Berlin.⁷

In the course of the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact, a secret agreement was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that neither party might conclude a nonaggression pact with Russia.⁸ Since that time, however, developments in Europe had completely altered the entire situation, and no one could ask a country to commit suicide for the sake of a treaty. At one time Russia had appeared to us as well as to Japan as the arch-enemy. Now however England had become this for both countries—in the further developments since the Tientsin incident⁹—and must be vanquished unconditionally. Straightening out or improving Russo-Japanese relations is obviously of interest to us too, for in that event America would find a decision to enter the present conflict much harder. The goal of Japanese policy in China remains as before, the establishment of a new order there, and with this is connected the elimination of England from China. To achieve this goal, Japan hopes for financial help from America.

We then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shiratori thought that after Poland is knocked out an opportunity may perhaps offer itself for an understanding with France and England. Germany and Italy are not now in a position, and France and England are not inclined, to conduct war on a really large scale. If there had to be a general conflict, into which Italy, the United States, Russia, and Japan would necessarily be drawn, this would mean a catastrophe of immeasurable proportions.

To a question by Mr. Shiratori about Italy's attitude I emphasized strongly that Italy is proceeding in closest agreement with us and that her attitude conforms in every respect to our intentions.

PLESSEN

⁷ On Sept. 9, Mackensen telegraphed to Berlin that Shiratori had given up the idea of returning by way of Siberia to Japan. "He deeply regrets that he will not be able to see the Reich Foreign Minister again, but intends to ask Ambassador Oshima, who is coming in a few days to Rome, to transmit to the Foreign Minister what he wanted to tell him personally." (174/136114)

⁸ See vol. I, document No. 463.

⁹ For this episode, see vol. VI, documents Nos. 735 and 762, and vol. VII, documents Nos. 25 and 110.

No. 12

4448/E086708

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 272 of September 6

Moscow, September 6, 1939—12: 45 p. m.

A 2034.

The Finnish Minister¹ here expressed himself extremely satisfied by the changed attitude of Molotov, who spoke a few days ago of the Soviet desire for a friendly development of Soviet-Finnish relations and an expansion of trade. The Minister attributes Molotov's friendly attitude to the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

SCHULENBURG

¹ A. S. Yrjö-Koskinen.

No. 13

888/211568-69

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 279 of September 6

Moscow, September 6, 1939—5: 46 p. m.

Received September 6—8: 15 p. m.

Pol. V 8924.

With reference to your telegram No. 267 of September 5.¹

Since anxiety over war, especially the fear of a German attack, has strongly influenced the attitude of the population here in the last few years, the conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Germany has been generally received with great relief and gratification. However, the sudden alteration in the policy of the Soviet Government, after years of propaganda directed expressly against the German aggressors, is still not very well understood by the population. Especially the statements of official agitators to the effect that Germany is no longer an aggressor run up against considerable doubt. The Soviet Government is doing everything to change the attitude of the population here toward Germany. The press is as though transformed. Attacks on the conduct of Germany have not only ceased completely, but the portrayal of events in the field of foreign politics is based to an outstanding degree on German news reports and anti-German literature is being removed from the book trade, etc.

¹ Not printed (127/69824). A telegram by Weizsäcker stating that the Commander in Chief of the Army regarded full current information on the development of Russian opinion toward Germany "as of decisive value for judging the military situation". Weizsäcker asked Schulenburg to cooperate closely with his Military Attaché in keeping Brauchitsch fully informed.

The beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has powerfully affected public opinion here, and aroused new fear in many quarters that the Soviet Union may be drawn into the war. Mistrust sown for years against Germany, in spite of effective counter-propaganda which is being carried on in party and factory and shop meetings, cannot be so quickly removed. The fear is expressed by the population that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against the Soviet Union. The recollection of German strength in the World War is still alive everywhere.

In judging conditions here, it is important to realize that the Soviet Government has always previously been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude of the population in the direction which it has desired, and is not neglecting the necessary propaganda this time either.

SCHULENBURG

No. 14

2122/462449-50

The Legation in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 123 of September 6 TEHRAN, September 6, 1939—9:40 p. m.

Received September 7—8:30 p. m.

1. During the negotiations today, Bader expressed the desire of the Iranian Government to keep trade with Germany on at least the normal level of last year, even in war time, and if possible to expand it. The prerequisite for this, the Iranians agree, is the solution of the transportation problem.

2. Transportation is possible at the present only by way of Russia. On the basis of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921¹ Iran has a claim on² for the transit of Iranian goods. Such transit has for a long time been impracticable because of Russian obstruction. Bader therefore asked that the transit question be solved through a German-Russian agreement. Iran will try to remove existing difficulties at the forthcoming economic negotiations with Russia. Iran is prepared, if necessary, to pay transit freight charges in foreign exchange.

The delegation recommends that the Embassy in Moscow be instructed (a) to seek an agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the transit of German goods; (b) to lend support to the Iranian efforts, in cooperation with the Iranian Embassy at Moscow, which will be instructed by their Government to that effect.³

¹ Signed Feb. 26, 1921. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, pp. 383-413.

² Unsigned marginal note: "Probably 'Russia' missing."

³ See document No. 312.

Ter-Nedden,⁴ who will leave for Berlin via Russia on September 10, will probably be available in Moscow on September 15 for conversations on the subject.

3. Iran requests positive assurance regarding (a) the delivery on the same scale as heretofore of pharmaceutical products, chemicals, especially dyes, spare parts, and paper; (b) the carrying out of orders already contracted for, especially capital goods. Particulars through Ter-Nedden orally.

4. With reference to telegram No. 130 of August 29,⁵ Bader stated in reply to my inquiry that a British credit offer had been made. Iran has not yet announced her attitude on it. Bader stressed that any decision would be made exclusively on economic grounds. We shall be informed of it in advance so that a decision may be reached as to any possible German offer.

5. In the course of conversations about the political situation at a session of the delegation, Bader acknowledged the justice of Germany's claim to Danzig and the Corridor, and characterized England's and France's attitude in regard to it as morally unjustified and unpopular among the neutrals.

6. Please telegraph instruction on points 2-4.⁶

RIPKEN
SMEND

⁴ Oberregierungsrat Ter-Nedden of the Economics Ministry.

⁵ Not printed (probably 2122/462448); this was a telegram from Clodius informing the Legation that the British were said to be negotiating in Tehran a commercial credit for the financing of Iranian purchases in Britain.

⁶ In a telegram of Sept. 9, the Foreign Ministry replied that Germany would attempt to settle the transport problem through an understanding with Russia, and also that everything would be done to maintain the level of German deliveries to Iran (8535/E597663). A subsequent telegram of Sept. 12 expressed basic approval of a credit agreement (8535/E597664).

No. 15

3781/E041444

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 6, 1939.

[No. 279]

zu W 1611 g Ang. II.¹

Please convey the following communication to the Soviet Government without requesting a statement on its position:

We intend to have more German merchant ships call at Murmansk and expect that the Soviet Government will provide facilities for un-

¹ W 1611 g: Not found.

loading and rail transport of the cargoes to Leningrad, where they will be picked up by German ships. Report by wire how the communication was received.²

CLODIUS

² On Sept. 8, Schulenburg reported (4461/E087092) that in answer to his statement the Soviet Government had notified him that German merchant ships could call at Murmansk and that facilities would be provided for transporting their cargoes to Leningrad.

No. 16

96/107974

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 257 of September 7

BERLIN, September 6, 1939.

For the Ambassador personally.

We have received strictly confidential but reliable information that you discussed Turkish-Italian relations also during your conversations with the Turkish Foreign Minister.¹ It appears that the Italians have learned of this and have taken offense at your allegedly anti-Italian talks. Therefore please refrain from any discussion of Italian-Turkish relations in your further conversations there. Furthermore, please note, for the guidance of your conversations, that the Führer and the Duce have reached agreement on all details of Germany's relations with Italy and that the continuation of the policy of the Axis and of friendship for Italy in the future as well is completely clear.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Cf. vol. VII, document No. 553 and *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Sept. 4.

No. 17

2872/565051-53

*Memorandum of the Legation in Luxembourg*¹

[September 6, 1939].

PRO MEMORIA

I. On September 2, 1939, the German Minister by direction of his Government² informed Minister of State Dupong that the German

¹ An entry in the secret diary of the German Minister in Luxembourg, Otto von Radowitz (8302/E589643-44), shows that he delivered this pro memoria to Dupong on Sept. 6, in the presence of Secretary of State Bech and Counselor Wehrer of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry. It was drawn up on instructions conveyed by Wiehl in telegram 75 of Sept. 4 (2872/565045-49).

² Conveyed in telegram No. 53 of Aug. 29; sent from Berlin, Sept. 2, 12:50 p. m., and received at Luxembourg, 2:45 p. m. (vol. VII, document No. 542).

Government could by no means be satisfied with the intention of the Luxembourg Government to close down the entire ore and iron industry in the event of a conflict among the neighboring countries.

Putting this plan into effect would mean not an observance of the strictest neutrality, but on the contrary a unilateral action against German interests, difficult to reconcile with Luxembourg's neutrality, because in normal times Germany absorbs the major portion of the Luxembourg production. The Reich Government feels entitled to expect that even in the event of a conflict Luxembourg will at least ensure maintenance of normal deliveries to Germany.

The Minister also announced that a plenipotentiary of the German Government on special mission would come to Brussels and then to Luxembourg in order to clarify the German position on the continuance of commercial relations.³

II. Ambassador Ritter, as Reich Special Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs, carried out with Premier Pierlot on September 3 the *démarche*⁴ announced under [paragraph] I regarding the continuation of commercial relations with the Belgo-Luxembourg economic union as far as Belgium was concerned, but owing to transportation difficulties he regrets not being able to come to Luxembourg as well. Accordingly, on September 6 the German Minister, by direction of the Reich Government, will convey to Minister of State Dupong the following statement:

"The general neutrality declaration in respect to Luxembourg recently pronounced by Germany also refers to neutrality in the economic field.⁵ Economic neutrality signifies the continuation of normal interchange and transit of goods between the neutral and the belligerent states. Continuation of normal economic relations is not only a right but also an obligation arising from neutrality. Germany will accordingly maintain her normal export of goods to the Belgo-Luxembourg economic union and especially to Luxembourg, and will raise no objection against Luxembourg's continuing her normal interchange and transit of goods with respect to the powers hostile to Germany. Germany must accordingly also demand, however, that Luxembourg maintain the normal interchange and transit of goods with Germany. Should Luxembourg permit any unilateral changes detrimental to Germany to occur in this regard, the German Government would have to view this as a breach of neutrality. If changes

³ German views on economic neutrality were set forth in the course of the special missions of Ambassador Ritter to the Netherlands and Belgium, and of Ambassador von Hassell to Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. For these missions see documents Nos. 18 and 42, *post*, and vol. VII, documents Nos. 402, 542, 545, 552, and 568.

⁴ See vol. VII, document No. 573.

⁵ See vol. VII, document No. 272.

in certain commodity groups should in the future become imperative, such changes could not be effected unilaterally, but only by way of negotiation and by mutual agreement. The conventional procedure for this would be the customary negotiations of the committees.

"The Reich Government has made the above statement to all other neutral Governments, especially Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway."

No. 18

2872/565053

*Memorandum of the Legation in Luxembourg*¹

LUXEMBOURG, September 6, 1939.

With reference to the declaration conveyed today by direction of the Reich Government to Minister of State Dupong, the German Minister added that in the opinion of the Reich Government it followed from the general rules of economic neutrality already elaborated that the stoppage of normal exports of iron and steel to Germany by Luxembourg was not permissible, and that the Reich Government must insist on their continuance.

If Luxembourg should raise the objection that France might perhaps stop the normal iron ore deliveries to Luxembourg, the answer to be given is that this would be a violation of neutrality on the part of France, which Luxembourg would have to settle with France. In any event, Germany was willing to continue the export of coke and other commodities to Luxembourg. If France, contrary to her obligation of neutrality toward Luxembourg, should stop the iron ore exports, Luxembourg would have to fall back on her own ore deposits or obtain the ore in some other way.

Ambassador Ritter also discussed this contingency with Premier Pierlot in Brussels. Pierlot, while conceding on the one hand that Dupong's statements in response to the representations of the Reich Government were not in accord with the rules of economic neutrality, maintained on the other hand that the question of neutrality did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Belgo-Luxembourg economic union, but concerned the national sovereignty of Luxembourg.

¹ This unsigned memorandum is from the files of the German Legation in Luxembourg. Marginal note in Radowitz' handwriting: "Strictly confidential for the Minister of State." The entry in Radowitz' diary (8302/E589643-44) shows that he gave this memorandum to Dupong for "his personal and confidential use" on Sept. 6, together with document No. 17.

No. 19

141/127271-78

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BRUSSELS, September 7, 1939—12:56 a. m.

No. 139 of September 6

Received September 7—2:45 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 206 of September 5.¹

The mood of the Belgian people is heavily charged with memories of the war period; sympathies are predominantly on the side of the British and the French. The community of language and also of culture between the Walloons, who are still the dominant element in the state, and the French is very close. The Flemish element, which has long been under Walloon-French influence, is in comparison not sufficiently independent or strong.

Pro-German sentiment among the Flemings is limited, moreover, to rather small groups of Flemish nationalists, while large segments of the Flemish element likewise take a negative attitude toward Germany, though without having any great sympathies with France. It may therefore be said that more than 90 percent of the Belgian people have no understanding for Germany and take an unfriendly or even hostile attitude toward her.

Enemy propaganda will try more and more to stir up hatred against Germany. In view of the attitude of the Belgian people it will be easy to achieve successes in this direction. German counteraction will be extremely difficult, since the people have a strong distrust of us and show no readiness whatever to accept German propaganda.

Sentiment will be decisively influenced by military events. German successes will not, to be sure, bring about any change for the better, but reverses will undoubtedly lead to further deterioration. In this connection the Western theater of war is decisive.

The members of the present Government are probably without exception on the side of the enemy in their sympathies. The neutrality policy is nothing more than a consideration of expediency with any of the Ministers.

The King is said to have sympathies with Germany; whether they will survive the outbreak of war, is difficult to say. It is said, however, that at the French Embassy here he is still called a "Boche".

In spite of the unfavorable situation so far as the public mood is concerned, the policy of neutrality, whose strongest support comes from the King, is, nevertheless, sincere and corresponds to the wishes of the people who despite all their aversion to Germany would like

¹ Not printed (1602/385296).

to live in peace. There are already indications that the Government is determined to carry out the neutrality policy. The Belgians the day before yesterday forced down two French fighter planes which had happened to cross the border at Mons, and interned the fliers. Last night they also fired on planes of unknown origin over Louvain.

In spite of the unfavorable sentiment, therefore, any pressure on the part of England and France would at present meet with firm opposition, and the passage of troops could only be forced by military measures. This may change, however, if enemy propaganda becomes stronger, if the enemy achieves successes in the West, and if the economic situation of the country deteriorates as a result of inadequate imports.

The Military Attaché is of the same opinion.

BÜLOW

No. 20

1496/370182-83

The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

LUXEMBOURG, September 7, 1939—10:45 p. m.

No. 37 of September 7

Received September 8—1:25 a. m.

W 1600 g Rs.

With reference to your telegram No. 75 (W 1541 g Rs.)¹ and my telegram No. 34.²

Minister of State Dupong has just conveyed to me the following statement of the Luxembourg Government:

"The Grand-Ducal Government has expressed its firm determination to maintain the strictest neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the conflict which has broken out in Europe. It will most scrupulously fulfill the international obligations undertaken by it.

"In this spirit, the Grand-Ducal Government cannot agree with the view of the Reich Government that stoppage of the ore and iron industry in the Grand Duchy, if it should occur, 'would mean not an observance of the strictest neutrality, but on the contrary a unilateral action against German interests, difficult to reconcile with Luxembourg's neutrality.'

"However, it is not planned at the moment to close down the ore and iron industry of Luxembourg.

"The Grand-Ducal Government is animated by the firm desire as a neutral state to maintain as far as possible the normal interchange

¹ Of Sept. 4, 1939 (2872/565045-49). See document No. 17, footnote 1.

² In this telegram Radowitz reported that representations had been made to Minister of State Dupong as directed in telegram No. 75 at 11 a. m. on Sept. 6 and that an answer was promised for the morning of Sept. 7 (2872/565054).

of goods with foreign countries even during the hostilities. It cannot be the purpose of the Grand-Ducal Government to effect unilateral changes in this situation detrimental to Germany.

"The Grand-Ducal Government accordingly gives the Reich Government the general assurance that it will maintain the interchange of goods between the two countries as far as possible, an assurance which, according to the reports, has already been given Germany by the two Oslo States, Sweden and Denmark."

"The Grand-Ducal Government is in accord with the view of the Reich Government that the changes which inevitably become necessary with respect to nearly all commodity groups should be submitted to the existing government committees established between Germany and the Belgo-Luxembourg customs union.

"It must be noted here that the export of goods from the Grand Duchy is determined on the one hand by state treaties existing between Belgium and Luxembourg, which unite the two countries in a customs union, and on the other hand by the economic conditions which will now necessarily result in Europe from the existing war situation in respect to the supplying of domestic requirements and the export potentialities of the countries of the economic union."

I would suggest that the entire problem be lifted out of the domain of theory, and that the mixed commission be convened at the earliest possible date for action on the practical issues, since it can be taken for granted that Luxembourg will comply with our wishes as far as the practical significance of the situation in any way allows."

RADOWITZ

* Concerning the mission of Ambassador von Hassell to the Scandinavian capitals to discuss trade relations of those countries with Germany, such assurances as he received there, and the statements published following his visits, see document No. 42, *post*, and vol. VII, documents Nos. 402, 552, and 568.

"The Foreign Ministry replied in a telegram from Ministerialdirektor Wiehl on Sept. 9 (2874/565104), that Germany still considered that a reduction of the Luxembourg iron and steel industry to such a level as was required for the country's own needs would be an act directed against Germany unilaterally and inconsistent with Luxembourg's neutrality. German protests led to no results (8351/E590896-98), and it was not until the Germans stopped their exports of coal and coke that Luxembourg agreed to increase its iron and steel shipments (8354/E590518-28).

No. 21

84/24080-81

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 283

BERLIN, September 7, 1939.

e. o. W IV 8362.

For the Ambassador.

If you have no objections, please inform the Government there, specifically MM. Molotov and Mikoyan, of the following:

During the Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow, it was unfortunately impossible, owing to the lack of time, for the German delegation to

make personal contacts with the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and in particular with People's Commissar Mikoyan, which we should greatly have liked to do, for both technical and personal reasons, in view of the newly-concluded Trade and Credit Agreement of August 19.¹ We would like to make up for this and therefore intend to send Schnurre to Moscow to discuss with the authorities there the question of implementing the Trade Agreement and further expanding commercial relations. Schnurre is scheduled to leave at the beginning of next week after the preliminary work here has been completed.

For your information:

We should like to have Schnurre's trip actually take place so that we can try at that time to get the Soviet deliveries of raw materials off to a quick start and, if possible, have them increased. We should therefore wish to avoid being referred again to Babarin, who is totally unsuited as a partner for such negotiations. Hence it might be advisable to convey the above communication without requesting a statement on the matter.

I request a telegraphic report on the execution of this instruction.²

WEIZSÄCKER
SCHNURRE

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 131.

² Schulenburg replied on Sept. 9 (4461/E087093) that the Soviet Government agreed "willingly" to Schnurre's trip and had notified its Embassy in Berlin accordingly.

No. 22

B21/B005092

*Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff*¹

BERLIN, September 7, 1939.

With reference to Washington telegram No. 317 of September 5.²

I fully concur with the opinion of the Chargé d'Affaires in Washington. The President doubtless intends to repeal the arms embargo³ as soon as possible in order to be able to assist England and France with arms deliveries as well. He is only waiting until he can be sure of the support of Congress, which he will recall at the opportune moment, and is meanwhile preparing public opinion in the United States for it. Anyone who knows the President and his attitude cannot doubt that he is working toward this goal with all his energy.

¹ Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, named Ambassador in Washington in March 1937, was recalled after the American Ambassador in Berlin was summoned home for consultations following outbreaks against Jews in Germany in November 1938. Neither man had returned to his post.

² Not printed (B21/B005090-91).

³ American legislation embargoing the shipment of arms to nations at war was first enacted in February 1934. It was amended and expanded with related provisions designed to prevent American involvement in war by further laws of Aug. 31, 1935; Feb. 29, 1936; and May 1, 1937.

From all available reports the American people, who are being continuously bombarded with anti-German propaganda by radio, press, lectures, and motion pictures, are overwhelmingly anti-German even now, so that the time is presumably not far away when the President will be able to come out in the open.

Meantime we must expect that the American Government will do everything to circumvent the present neutrality regulations and facilitate, especially through Canada, the delivery of arms, etc., to our enemies.*

DIECKHOFF

* Thomsen had reported that the proclamation putting the Neutrality Act into operation had not named Canada as a belligerent.

No. 23

588/242181

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 695

BERLIN, September 7, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador remarked to me today that he had heard from several sources that the German public was criticizing Italy's attitude. He wanted my personal advice as to whether it might not be well to publish the Führer's telegram to the Duce after all, so as to forestall such sentiment.¹ Perhaps it would also be possible to accomplish what is necessary by word-of-mouth propaganda or by a consideration of Italy's attitude in the press.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The message to which Ambassador Attolico referred was apparently one sent on Sept. 1 in which Hitler told Mussolini that Germany would not need Italian military assistance. It is published in vol. VII as document No. 500.

² The memorandum is marked "F[ührer]" in Ribbentrop's handwriting, indicating that the subject was to be taken up with Hitler. On Sept. 10, Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat returned the memorandum to Weizsäcker with a cover note (588/242180) which read: "The Foreign Minister requests you to calm Attolico and to state that the feeling toward Italy in Germany is good, and that the criticism of the Italian attitude, of which Attolico has heard, has appeared only in isolated instances. The moment is not appropriate for publication of the Führer's telegram to the Duce."

No. 24

472/228644-45;
472/228648-49

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

ROME, September 7, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: In my letter of August 29,¹ by which I sent you certain information provided by my confidential informant, I spoke of

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 498.

my apprehensions concerning relations with our Axis partner. How well-founded these apprehensions are, is borne out by the statements made to me by Dr. Rust, the Executive Secretary of the Liaison Office in Italy of the Foreign Section, German Labor Front, regarding a conversation he had yesterday with Under State Secretary Tullio Cianetti, whom you undoubtedly know personally from his frequent visits to Germany. Dr. Rust has communicated the substance of his conversation in a letter to his chief, Dr. Ley, a copy of which I enclose for your confidential information. Cianetti, according to my own observations, is right in stating that, for reasons explained by him, recent events have caused far-reaching disaffection among the Italian people, and especially in those circles in a position to be better informed.

I believe that it is a matter of urgency to give thought to what may be done to counteract this. One way might be to give the Italians, particularly the Duce and Ciano, more advanced information on our plans than we have in the past. I am fully aware that this will always be practicable only to a limited extent; but we ought regularly to go *up to that limit*.²

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.,

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

September 7, 1939.

To: Reichsorganisationsleiter of the NSDAP and Director of the German Labor Front, Party Comrade Dr. Ley.

Submitted via the German Embassy at the Quirinal, Rome.

GENERAL RELATIONS WITH ITALY

REICHSLEITER: Upon request of His Excellency, State Secretary Tullio Cianetti, I am bringing the following to your attention:

In a talk which I had with him yesterday on some other subjects, His Excellency mentioned the general political situation and German-Italian relations. He expressed very plainly and frankly his great pain and disappointment over Germany's failure during the recent political developments to treat Italy as loyally as she had a right to expect.

His Excellency's specific allegations were substantially as follows:

1. The current action against Poland was contrary to an agreement between the two Governments, to the effect that the conflict, which

² Weizsäcker initialed this letter, which shows no date of receipt, on Sept. 11, and referred it to Ribbentrop. The latter marked it "Führer!", indicating that it was to be taken up with Hitler. The result was Ribbentrop's letter to Ley printed as document No. 68.

Italy, too, of course realized was in fact inevitable, should not be set off as yet on account of the Danzig question.

2. Italy had been left in total ignorance of the impending conclusion of the nonaggression pact with Russia. The Italian Government was not notified until after the pact was concluded.

Nor had Italy been informed of the impending conclusion of the pact on the occasion of the negotiations between Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano in Salzburg, although far-reaching agreement between the German and Russian Governments must have existed already at that time.

Cianetti further stated that, for his part, he had for years anticipated the pact and had welcomed it, but that this did not diminish the bitterness which Germany's slighting treatment of Italy had aroused in many Italians, and especially those who with the deepest conviction believed in the common destiny of Germany and Italy. This situation was particularly distressing for him, as he was one of the best known and most fanatical champions of the Axis. Even though German armament had already substantially outstripped the Italian, so that Germany believed she was no longer dependent on Italy, Italian pride was most deeply hurt.

As a result of these events, widespread disaffection was to be noted among the Italian people, and especially in those circles in a position to be better informed.

Cianetti further emphasized that these developments naturally did not critically affect the Axis and its policy and that personally he believed in a happy outcome. He would ask me, however, to inform you, Reichsleiter Dr. Ley, of these matters and to stress at the same time that he would also in the future remain Germany's loyal friend, as he had been in the past.

Heil Hitler!

DR. RUST

No. 25

136/73850

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 977 of September 8

SAN SEBASTIAN, September 8, 1939.

Received September 9—9:45 a. m.

The Spanish Embassy in Paris has reported to its Government that Bonnet, in view of the great unpopularity of the war in France, is still endeavoring to bring about an understanding as soon as the operations in Poland are concluded. There are certain indications that he is in contact with Mussolini to that end.

STOHRER

No. 26

B21/B005097-98

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1939—12:11 p. m.

No. 331 of September 8

Received September 9—10:10 a. m.

For your confidential information only:

With all the outward stress on neutrality, the attitude of this Government is characterized by the following measures directed exclusively against Germany:

a) The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission has, with a large force of agents, begun to take an inventory of all the German assets invested in the United States with a view to seizure in the event of war, and is attempting to attain this goal by rigorous use of its right of subpoena with respect to banks, brokers, trustees, etc. Agents have intimated that in the event of war there would be no attachment, as in 1917, but expropriation. The campaign is not likely to be too successful, as for months already the Embassy has been pointing out to interested German parties the advisability of liquidating or transferring their assets to neutrals. Such action should be given urgent attention there also.

b) The Federal Department of Justice is preparing a list of all German firms, representatives, and organizations, as well as of their American agents, lawyers, etc., and is already placing them under postal, telegraph, and telephone surveillance.

Aside from these measures, ascertained from dependable sources, it is also noteworthy that the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York courts are participating in the private attachment of local German assets on the basis of a 25 million dollar claim, as reported by the New York Consulate General, in order to get hold of as many German assets as possible.

c) Moreover, 23 German crew members of the Dutch liner *Rotterdam* who wanted to obtain temporary asylum here for fear of British internment on the return voyage have, on flimsy pretexts, been refused permission by the Department of Labor to remain here, after initial approval by the State Department. They are forced to return to Holland on the Dutch liner *Veendam*, sailing tomorrow. Despite the most energetic representations by the Embassy and the reasonable State Department, the Department of Labor has refused to make the slightest concession.

THOMSEN

No. 27

174/186107-08

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 416 of September 8

Tokyo, September 8, 1939.

Received September 8, 1939—1:40 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 309 of September 5.¹

The Foreign Ministry on September 7 handed me the following note verbale in the matter of the signing of the trade agreement between Japan and Germany:

The trade agreement between Japan and Germany, initialed on July 28, 1939, in Berlin, was, in accordance with the exchange of notes of the same day, to be signed by October 1, and was to enter into effect on the latter date.² Accordingly, the Imperial Japanese Government had already made various preparations with the intention of carrying it out; thus, for example, since August 15, a portion of the import permits had been issued as a preparatory measure.

The Imperial Japanese Government unfortunately finds itself compelled to state that as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe, the present European situation makes it impossible to put the agreement into effect on October 1 as intended, despite the firm intention of the Imperial Japanese Government already mentioned.

For this reason, the Imperial Japanese Government is compelled to express the desire that the signing of the trade agreement be postponed until it can be determined that the actual circumstances have developed in such a way as to make execution of the agreement again possible. This desire of the Imperial Japanese Government has resulted entirely from the realization that the present situation in Europe is by no means calculated to permit the agreement to enter into force and springs from no other considerations. The Imperial Japanese Government is ready at all times to proceed with the signing as soon as existing circumstances make possible the smooth execution of the agreement.

I referred in the representations I twice made with the Ministerial Counselor of the Economic Division to the possible political consequences of the note verbale. The Ministerial Counselor stressed the fact that the Japanese Government at any rate had no political motives. The Japanese Government was constitutionally not in a position to obtain Imperial sanction as long as the implementation of

¹ Not found.

² For this period the working files of the Economic Policy Department relating to the Far East are missing. Although a number of papers on economic matters are to be found in the files of the State Secretary and other high officials, particularly Clodius, the documentation on German-Japanese economic relations during the war years remains fragmentary. There is an incomplete draft of the July 28 economic agreement in the files (198/140764-79).

the agreement was made questionable by the war in Europe. I pointed to the conclusion of the note verbale, which, contrary to the usual practice, contained a guarantee by the Japanese Government that it would sign the agreement as soon as its practical execution was assured from the standpoint of payments and shipping facilities. The Foreign Ministry will, as a result of my representations, instruct the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to make a statement again to this effect. Request telegraphic instructions.

OTT

No. 28

96/107977

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, September 8, 1939.

No. 276 of September 8

Received September 8—5:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 257 of September 7.¹

As stated in my telegram No. 257 of September 2,² Saracoglu spoke to me of the need to clarify Turco-Italian relations, and in this connection mentioned the question of the uninhabited islands located in the 3-mile zone of the Dodecanese, on which it had never been possible to reach any agreement with Italy. Since I inform the Italian Ambassador³ very loyally about all my conversations and all the information I receive, I also immediately informed him of this conversation,⁴ adding that it was not I who had raised the question and that I had, of course, not entered into any detailed discussion of it. In my constant efforts to keep Turkey neutral I merely called attention to a Turkish error in judgment, which had driven her into the British coalition for fear of an Italian attack.

I have furthermore emphasized throughout that Italy's present attitude was most gratefully appreciated by Germany. I regret to state, however, that the Italian Ambassador is not lifting a finger to support in any way my efforts to keep Turkey out of the war; for if there is danger that Turkey will nevertheless yield to the very strong British pressure—as the Swiss Minister again told me yesterday—it is caused only by fear of an Italian attack or an Italian-British (group garbled) on Mediterranean questions. There is also no doubt that

¹ Document No. 16.

² Vol. VII, document No. 553.

³ Octavio de Peppo.

⁴ For the Italian Ambassador's report of the conversation, see *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, series 8 (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1953), vol. XIII, document No. 590.

the Italian Ambassador looks most skeptically upon my efforts to maintain Germany's position in Turkey. A written report will follow.⁵

In the future I shall naturally reject any attempt by the Foreign Minister to discuss Turkish-Italian relations.

PAPEN

⁵ Not printed (3494/E019843-44).

No. 29

8189/E582179-80

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Тоkyo, September 8, 1939—9:10 p. m.

No. 419 of September 8

Received September 8—8:45 p. m.

Pol. VIII 1478.

At my first reception by the Foreign Minister yesterday General Abe told me twice that Japan was forced to remain neutral in the European conflict but would like to continue the development of friendly relations with Germany in spite of the disappointment over the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. I said that Germany, too, adhered to the cultivation of Japanese-German friendship, as had repeatedly been pointed out.

Japan's attitude toward the world situation reveals the following: Japan's main aim is necessarily an early conclusion of the China conflict. The power that aids her in that has the best prospect of a benevolent attitude on the part of Japan, and might even obtain the abandonment of her neutrality at a later phase of the war. The old supporters of a policy oriented toward Germany, especially the Army, therefore see the possibility of further cooperation against England if we can dissuade the Soviet Union from supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Sentiment in this circle is inclining toward Germany again in consequence of admiration for her military successes. Recognition of the British as the common enemy is growing in military and activist circles. I am told by leading officials of the Foreign Ministry that the Government is determined to continue its China policy without consideration for England and is hoping soon to force the troops of the warring powers out of the Settlements.¹ It is said that so far England has not made any new compromise proposals for the China conflict.

¹ The word is "settlement" in the original. This apparently refers to the concessions in certain Chinese cities held by the British and French, or possibly to the Shanghai International Settlement.

The forces hostile to England are increasingly opposed by business circles, which expect a tremendous increase in exports to Anglo-Saxon countries as a result of the European conflict. With the accrual of war profits their influence will be strengthened. There are already indications that the expected exports, the market prospects, and the hope of easy profits through war deliveries are threatening to undermine the willingness of the people to make sacrifices for the hard China campaign.

Ambassador Togo is conducting negotiations with Russia (apparently concerning an easing of tension in the Manchurian area) which are said to be proceeding rather favorably. In conversations in political circles on the possibility of a Russian-Japanese nonaggression pact, the idea of making Manchukuo instead of Japan the treaty partner has recently emerged.

In view of the decisive importance of the China conflict for Japan I see in a possible German offer to influence Russia in a sense favorable to Japan's China policy a promising means of committing Japan to an anti-British attitude.

OTT

No. 30

73/52020

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

No. 303 of September 8

BERLIN, September 8, 1939.

For the Minister personally.

My conversation with Csáky¹ was strictly confidential. The journey must not become known. So please do not speak of it. The object of the conversation was to clarify Hungary's attitude toward Rumania, since certain rumors were abroad that Hungary intended to attack Rumania. Csáky gave positive assurances and his personal word that Hungary had no designs on Rumania and would undertake nothing without first reaching an understanding with Germany. He went so far as to declare that if we considered it opportune he would be prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact with Rumania at any time. I replied that I would think the matter over and if I considered the conclusion of a nonaggression pact opportune I would so advise him. Please call on Csáky and tell him that on further consideration I do not believe the conclusion of a nonaggression pact opportune and that I ask him to leave matters as they now stand. On this occasion please

¹ See document No. 8.

tell Count Csáky that I am glad to see that Hungary, who is joined to us in a common destiny, is showing such a realistic attitude toward the situation.

RIBBENTROP

No. 31

419/216295-97

Command of the Führer

BERLIN, September 8, 1939.
zu Rk. 24578 A.¹

1. Propaganda is an important instrument of the Leadership for forwarding and strengthening the will to victory and for destroying the enemies' morale and will to victory. In a war there are no jurisdictional problems. What counts is the efficient use of the propaganda instrument. Compared with this, all other issues are inconsequential.

2. The propaganda apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry, which has been built up over a period of years, is the central agency for the practical application of propaganda. Breaking it up during the war would be comparable to breaking up certain components of the Wehrmacht.

3. In cases where practical developments have caused analogous bodies with like purposes to grow up, such agencies shall be coordinated and shall carry out their tasks, however much alike, in genuine collaboration.

4. The conduct of propaganda at home, i. e., its psychological orientation, is the responsibility of the authorities entrusted with the administration of internal policies, except in cases where I reserve the right to give personal directives. The coordination of these directives in their practical application to propaganda is the responsibility of the Propaganda Minister.

5. In the domain of foreign policy propaganda, i. e., that propaganda which is aimed directly or indirectly at foreign countries, the general policy and the directives are issued by the Foreign Minister, unless I see occasion for giving personal directions. The entire propaganda apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry is available for the practical application of these directives. In so far as similar facilities already exist in the Foreign Ministry, their continued functioning shall not be impaired. Their further expansion, however, is undesirable; rather, the tendency should be to recognize in all circumstances the value of the central propaganda machinery which is now in existence and to utilize it for the given propaganda tasks.

¹Rk 24578 A: Not printed (419/216294); a cover letter for the document printed here, from Lammers to Weizsäcker, dated Sept. 10.

6. To insure full coordination of the foreign propaganda effort through pamphlets, films, radio, press, etc., the Foreign Minister shall—in person, if possible—communicate his wishes and his directives to the Propaganda Minister. Any propaganda articles, pamphlets, radio addresses, etc., signed by the Foreign Minister himself or in his name, shall be accepted and used in unchanged form by the apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry in so far as the Foreign Ministry does not attend to the necessary dissemination through its own channels.

7. In order to insure the practical collaboration outlined here, the Foreign Minister shall assign the necessary, qualified officers from the apparatus of the Foreign Ministry as liaison to the Propaganda Ministry.²

Conflicts arising in the course of the actual work shall be clarified and settled exclusively between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda. I forbid once and for all that I be approached on such differences of opinion or disputes at any time in the future unless the two Ministers come to see me together to present the case.

By the same token I forbid that directives be put before me for signature unless they have been discussed jointly and the points of difference are brought to my attention. Therefore, I shall in the future not sign any submissions which have not previously been countersigned by the two Ministers. They are then laid before me by Minister Lammers who is being instructed in this sense. The Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda shall make the required arrangements and report to me not later than 9 p. m. on September 8, 1939, the actual agreement reached regarding the execution of this directive.

ADOLF HITLER

² Those named by the Foreign Minister are listed in a note of Sept. 13 (419/216299).

No. 32

191/138580

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 697a

BERLIN, September 8, 1939.

The Chinese Ambassador informed me this morning that he had been summoned home by his Government to make a report and would probably leave Berlin next Tuesday. In case any suggestions for his report were to be made, he would until then be entirely at our disposal. The Ambassador expressed the hope that he would in a very short time return to his post.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister together with another copy of the memorandum of my last conversation with the Chinese Ambassador,¹ and with the request that I be provided with instructions as to our present political line. Naturally it would be very encouraging to the Chinese Government if it was given to understand that a return of Ambassador Trautmann to his post at a later date is not altogether out of the question.² Of course, this would actually be possible only if Japanese policy proves unreliable in the near future. Such information might also be conveyed at the proper moment by telegram through our Chargé d'Affaires in China, instead of through the Chinese Ambassador.³

WEIZSÄCKER ⁴

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 327.

² The German Ambassador to China was recalled in June 1934 because of Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to agree to the release of German military advisers employed by him. See vol. I, ch. IV.

³ On Sept. 9, the Chinese Ambassador informed Weizsäcker that his Government had instructed him to postpone his return to China (191/138581). Subsequent documents show that his return was postponed indefinitely (174/138592, 138598, 138612).

⁴ A memorandum (191/138582) from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the State Secretary dated Sept. 10 stated: "The Foreign Minister has decided that Ambassador Trautmann is to remain in Germany and that no change in our present line toward China can be considered."

No. 33

583/242184-85

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 8, 1939.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY

It is necessary to adapt German-Italian trade relations to the present situation as speedily as possible. The German and Italian Inter-governmental Committees for the regulation of German-Italian economic relations some years ago reached, and later continually supplemented, comprehensive agreements as to the extent to which deliveries of vital supplies could be effected between the two countries in the event of war.¹ In view of Italy's neutrality these agreements now require a supplement to the effect that Italy must now be called upon to supply Germany with vital goods to a greater extent than she would have been if she were in the war herself. Conversely, exports to Italy of products which we can ill afford to spare must be

¹ This refers to the Secret Protocol of May 14, 1937 (7190/E529736-41) and to the subsequent Protocols of Dec. 18, 1937 (vol. I, document No. 84) and Feb. 13, 1939 (vol. IV, document No. 451).

curtailed as far as possible. We must, furthermore, in conjunction with the Italian Government, explore the means by which the most can be made of Italy's neutrality for importing to Germany, via Italy, goods from those neutral countries whose direct connections with Germany have been broken by the blockade.

Since these questions are of extreme urgency for Germany's supply of raw materials, I recommend that Herr Clodius, as chairman of the German Inter-Governmental Committee, should be sent to Rome immediately to conduct the necessary conversations.

Since the Rumanian Government has requested that the opening of the negotiations in Bucharest, which has already been approved by the Foreign Minister, should be postponed until September 15 on account of the inability of the Economics Minister to be present, Herr Clodius could hold the first conversations in Rome as early as September 11 to 14.²

Submitted herewith, via the State Secretary, to the Foreign Minister with the request for approval.

WIEHL

² See document No. 149.

No. 34

127/69816

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 9, 1939—12:50 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 9—12:10 p. m.

No. 300 of September 8

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 261.¹

We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is more or less in a state of dissolution. In these circumstances, I consider it advisable that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attaché to Moscow

¹ Document No. 2.

indicates that decisions are in preparation there.* I would therefore ask you to speak to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and to wire result.

RIBBENTROP

*In a memorandum of Sept. 7 (103/111582), Woermann recorded that the Soviet Embassy in Berlin had asked that a plane be provided for General Maxim Purkayev who had been called to Moscow, presumably for several days. Woermann promised to take the necessary steps, and noted that it was clear in the conversation that the general was not being recalled.

No. 35

388/211562

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 9, 1939—12:56 a. m.

No. 300 of September 8

Received September 9—5 a. m.

I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov:

"I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov."

SCHULENBURG

No. 36

321/193121

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 9, 1939.

At 2:45 p. m. Minister Schmidt transmitted the following by telephone from the special train:

The Foreign Minister, after consultation with the Führer, has decided that Just, the German Military Attaché in Kaunas, shall be empowered to broach the Vilna question to the Lithuanian army commanders.

Simultaneously, Minister Zechlin should get in touch with those members of the Government who favor the matter.

Respectively transmitted through the State Secretary and Under State Secretary to the Head of Political Division I Mil. Because of need for haste Pol. I Mil was notified directly.

V. SONNLEITHNER

No. 37

127/69815

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 9, 1939—4:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 308 of September 9

With reference to your telegram No. 300 of September 8.¹

Molotov told me today at 3 p. m. that a Soviet military action would take place "within the next few days." The summoning of the Military Attaché to Moscow is in fact connected with it. Numerous reservists would also be called.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 34.

No. 38

52/35762-63

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 455 of September 9

ROME, September 9, 1939—4:35 p. m.

Received September 9—6:10 p. m.

For Attaché Group, Army High Command.

On the forenoon of September 9, in the presence of General Pariani, I conveyed to the Duce the Führer's thanks for the data on [Italian] troop movements forwarded to him.¹ The Duce expressed his deep gratification over the development of operations in Poland and declared that Polish resistance was crushed. The Polish Colonels' Government, which had pursued the wrong policy, had to resign. With a new government it would be possible to conclude a peace if an honorable offer were extended. This would impress the French people, who were undoubtedly prepared to defend their own soil but had no war objective unless they were attacked.² Germany's attitude and propaganda with respect to France were good and would not fail to make an impression. France could not afford to make a great sacrifice

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 507.

² On Sept. 11 (456/223867), Mackensen reported a conversation with Ciano in which the latter also stressed the favorable effects, especially in France, which would follow from a "generous settlement" by Hitler in Poland.

of blood. The Duce showed me a telegram from Burgos stating that 1,000 French deserters had crossed the Spanish border in the past week. The British, to be sure, were set for a 10-year war, but alone their situation was unfavorable.

The Duce promised regular information on all intelligence about the enemy. As many as 500,000 to 600,000 Frenchmen were contained from Somaliland, through Tunisia and Corsica, to the Alps. If Italy were to intervene in the war now, the Turks and, in their train, the Greeks, the Jugoslavs, and the Egyptians would come to the aid of England. Such an extension of the contest would only benefit England and therefore must be avoided.

RINTELEN²
MACKENSEN

²Enno von Rintelen was German Military Attaché in Rome 1936-1943.

No. 39

84/23360

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 9, 1939—9:16 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 9—10:15 p. m.

No. 310 of September 9

With reference to my telegram No. 308 of September 9.¹

The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General Köstring that the Soviet Union will intervene. Moreover, external evidence is multiplying of imminent Soviet military action: the calling of a large number of reservists up to 45 years of age, in particular technicians and physicians, sudden disappearance of important foods, preparation of schoolrooms as hospitals, curtailment in issuance of gasoline, and the like.

SCHULENBURG

¹Document No. 37.

No. 40

174/186111-13

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Japan

Telegram

No. 335

September 9, 1939.

For the Ambassador personally and exclusively.

Within the last few days I have had a long confidential discussion with Ambassador Oshima on the future development of German-Japanese relations. I explained our position and our aims as follows:

The fate of Japan was now as in the past closely bound up with the fate of Germany. If Germany should be defeated in the present war, the Western democracies would quickly form an extensive world coalition which would oppose any expansion by Japan and, in particular, would again wrest from her her position in China. On the other hand, in the event of the German victory that we confidently expected, Japan's position, too, would be definitively assured, assuming that Japan maintained and further strengthened her present relations with Germany.

Since our settlement and our understanding with Russia constituted an important factor in the present contest of forces, this rapprochement was also, properly understood, in the interest of Japan, to whom any strengthening of the German position should be welcome. This was all the more true since we were entirely in a position, and on request also prepared, to mediate a settlement between Japan and Russia. If this succeeded, Japan would be able freely to extend her strength in East Asia toward the south and could penetrate further there. We were firmly convinced that this was the direction in which Japan's vital interests lay. It was fully in harmony with our rapprochement with Russia, and had been openly emphasized by me in Moscow, that for our part we would strive to cultivate our relations with Japan in the future, too.

The idea of close cooperation between Germany, Italy, and Japan was therefore by no means dead. Such cooperation in conjunction with a Japanese-Russian settlement would, in keeping with the world situation, be exclusively directed against England and would thus bring the policy of the three Powers as well as of Russia into a uniform line corresponding to the real interests of all concerned. In this connection it was to be noted that the present attitude of Italy was determined in every detail and in complete agreement by the Führer and the Duce.

It was my intention to work vigorously and with the utmost speed to bring about, first of all, a settlement between Japan and Russia, and I hoped that the same political concept would now prevail in Japan as well. It was naturally important that this should come about soon, in order that the impact of the said combination of powers might still be felt during our present struggle with England, which was so decisive for the whole world policy of the future.

Oshima agreed with my statements on every point. He said that the Japanese Army was doubtless well disposed toward the idea of a settlement with Russia and that there was a definite prospect that this idea would soon assert itself in Japanese foreign policy. Shiratori, who would soon return to Tokyo from his post as Ambassador in Rome, would also work toward this end.

I request that in your conversations there you, too, advocate the above ideas in a suitable manner and that in particular you speak quite frankly and in my name with Prince Kanin.

I further request that you bring out appropriately that it seemed of great importance to me, for the policy contemplated by me, that Oshima remain as Ambassador in Berlin; that in past years I had collaborated very closely with Oshima and had always informed him frankly of the aims of our policy, so that he is in a better position to represent Japanese interests in Berlin than a new ambassador. He also enjoys, as he has in the past, the full confidence of the Führer and the German Army.

RIBBENTROP

No. 41

115/117309

*Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop*¹

BERLIN, September 9, 1939.

I went to see Škirpa this evening and told him that his ideas interested me very much and that I would especially like to pass along the map² which he had given to me, but that I would first have to know what and who is behind these ideas. Škirpa said that he had submitted proposals to his Government, by telegraph and by telephone, to attack immediately under the slogan: "Hurl the Zeligowski³ gangs from the Lithuanian capital."

These proposals are at present the subject of discussions by the Government. Škirpa is of the view that the Government will accede to his proposals.

In a speech to the military the head of the army, General Raštikis, has already spoken of the supreme challenge which the next day could bring.

Škirpa asked whether, in view of the difficulties of communication, an airplane to Kaunas could be put at his disposal if need arose. I told him I would look into the matter.

After the conversation with me Škirpa gave an account of this talk to the Minister President, in order to alert him to the urgency of the Lithuanian decision.

Škirpa has agreed to inform me immediately of any decision in Kaunas. He would be particularly grateful if there could be clarifi-

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Not found.

³ Lucian Zeligowski, the Polish general commanding the forces which seized Vilna in 1920.

cation over the delimitation of Lithuanian claims, as well as over the German and Soviet Russian position.⁴

KLEIST

⁴ Marginal note: "I have had Škirpa told that Lithuania should immediately take Vilna but not anything more. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 42

2901/565800-02

*Memorandum by Ambassador von Hassell*¹

BERLIN, September 9, 1939.

My visits in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki are described in the four telegrams² already received here as well as the four official communiqués³ which likewise are here. As for the latter, I want to point out that the Danish communiqué was written by us, the Norwegian one was composed jointly, and the Swedish and Finnish communiqués were drafted by them and approved by us with slight changes. Since the Minister Presidents in Stockholm and Oslo do not know any foreign languages I carried on the discussions at those places mainly in Danish. Our reception was friendly everywhere. The nuances in reception can be characterized as follows: The Danes stressed strongly and unmistakably the desire to continue our economic relations on an intensive scale. Their main concern seemed to be the supply of fodder by sea, especially in the latter part of the year. In Sweden I had a stronger impression of a certain reserve and very great caution in formulation. This was confirmed by the fact that shortly thereafter an article was published by the former Minister, Undén; though he is no longer in the Government, the article is not without significance because Undén still plays a certain role. The *Times* immediately drew attention to this article. The article includes statements difficult to reconcile with the Swedish assertions regarding the maintenance of commercial traffic with Germany. After conferring with me our Minister, Prince Wied, spoke about this article to the head of the Cabinet. The latter said the Government had nothing to do with the article, but indicated that naturally Sweden is a sovereign state that could not be forced to regulate its economy according to instructions from outside. The idea behind this was that Sweden must retain her freedom of movement according

¹ See document No. 17, footnote 3.

² See vol. VII, documents Nos. 552 and 568. Telegrams No. 114 of Sept. 4 from the Legation in Norway (22/13679), and No. 167 of Sept. 5 from the Legation in Finland (51/33839-40) are not printed.

³ The Norwegian and Swedish communiqués are not printed: (Oslo 22/13681/1-81/2); (Stockholm 8281/E588291). File copies of those from Copenhagen and Helsinki have not been found.

to her own needs. It also seems to have been hinted that a reduction of the total volume of trade might be applied proportionately to the separate categories of goods. In reply the Germans took the position that good will to maintain trade as far as possible in its full volume must mean to do as much as possible in each category of goods. Care must therefore be taken that the concept of what is proportionate does not acquire a false meaning. Nevertheless, I should in general prefer to believe that on the Swedish side as well there exists the earnest desire to continue economic relations with Germany as much as possible on the previous basis.

In Oslo, understandably, the impression of dependence on England was the most pronounced. Both Ministers⁴ stressed in a thoroughly convincing way the good will to continue intensive trade with Germany, but time and again nevertheless, the dependence on England resulting from Norway's geographic position made itself felt.

Both for Oslo and for Stockholm the coal problem doubtless plays a decisive role, and we hold the trumps since the latest events in Poland. The news about German deliveries of coal which arrived while I was still in Stockholm is making a very good impression and has been given much publicity in the press; it was also immediately connected with the explanations which I gave.

In Helsinki my reception was definitely of an officially friendly character. This was evident in all external things as well as in the fact that at the desire of the Finns two conferences were held, one with the Foreign Minister and the other with the Minister President, who had called in the Minister of Finance. The Foreign Minister also gave an improvised dinner in the evening, to which leading figures from industry were invited. Primarily, of course, this attitude reflects, aside from a certain still-existent sympathy for Germany, Finland's geographic situation. On the other hand, the Finns showed a lively interest in maintaining Finnish trade through the Öresund, a question on which I expressed myself with reserve, whereas the [German] Minister pointed out that we had given the exact location of the mined zones and had given notification of the available pilot ships. In Helsinki I spoke expressly not only of the full volume of German-Finnish trade but of *at least* the full volume.

In all four capitals I gave special emphasis to the statements about possible conduct in violation of neutrality and about tolerating supervision of trade by the enemy. The other side did not go into these matters.

The visit was given a good deal of publicity in the press everywhere, received favorable comment and was evaluated as a welcome gesture.

VON HASSELL

⁴Minister President Johan Nygaardsvold and Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht.

No. 43

8589/E602566-87

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, September 9, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFA No. 200/39 g.K. Chefs. LI

By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. Operations in strength against the Polish army and air force are to be continued until it is safe to assume that the Poles can no longer succeed in establishing a continuous front which would tie down the German forces.

2. When it becomes apparent that parts of the Eastern Army and of the Luftwaffe are no longer required for this mission and for crushing resistance in the occupied territories, arrangements are to be made for their transfer to the West. Additional air defense units may be assigned for operation against our enemy in the West as the Polish air force loses more and more of its effectiveness.

3. Even after the irresolute opening of hostilities by Great Britain at sea and in the air, and by France on land and in the air, my express consent must be obtained in each of the following cases:

a. Every time our ground forces cross the western borders of Germany.

b. Every time one of our planes crosses the western borders of Germany, unless this is required to repulse enemy air attacks in force.

c. For every air attack on Britain.

The Luftwaffe may, however, be employed in the German Bight, over the declared mine area in the West, and in direct support of naval operations.

d. For the Navy the regulations laid down in Directive No. 2,¹ paragraphs 3a and 3b, remain in force. No offensive actions at sea are to be undertaken against France.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 576.

No. 44

6783/E513579

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in
the Netherlands*

Telegram

No. 234

BERLIN, September 10, 1939—4:20 p. m.
W 1688 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 109 of September 5.¹

We are in principle prepared to supply the Netherlands Government with antiaircraft artillery in a quantity to be determined later. Please ascertain the specific wishes of the Netherlands Government and inquire whether the sending of accompanying factory personnel is desired for instructional purposes.

For your information: We should like to have the Netherlands Government avail itself of our offer to send accompanying personnel. In case there should be any objections to this, we would as a special concession consider training Netherlands personnel on the guns in Germany.²

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 7.

² On Sept. 11, Zech telephoned to say that the Netherlands Government wished to send a commission of three officers to Germany (6783/E513585). The German Government agreed to this (6783/E513589) and negotiations with the Reich Air Ministry were thereupon scheduled to begin on Sept. 17 (6783/E513593). No record of these negotiations has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 45

73/52021-23

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUDAPEST, September 10, 1939—7:35 p. m.

SECRET¹

Received September 10—11:00 p. m.

No. 296 of September 10

The Foreign Minister delivered to me the following text of the reply which he had just transmitted by telephone to the Reich Foreign Minister:

"The Royal Hungarian Government sincerely regrets that it is compelled to beg Your Excellency to desist from the request for the use

¹ Unsigned marginal note: "To be kept strictly secret on special instruction by the State Secretary."

of Hungarian railway lines for the purpose of transporting German troops toward Poland.²

"Consent to this action, as we have had the honor of explaining to Your Excellency on several previous occasions, could not, in the opinion of the Hungarian Government, be reconciled with Hungary's national honor.

"At the same time the Hungarian Government has the honor to call Your Excellency's attention to the circumstance that one may anticipate with all but certainty that compliance with this request would result in an immediate declaration of war by three powers—a circumstance which would lessen the possibility of our giving assistance to the German Reich in its bitter struggle; on the contrary, within the foreseeable future Hungary would have to depend on the German Reich for assistance.

"In the opinion of the Royal Hungarian Government the risk is much greater than the advantage to be gained, since the German troops could reach their objective in a short march without violating Hungary's territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the transit of German troops via Košice would be altogether impossible, if only in view of the well-known Slovak irredentist sentiment.

"As in the past, so Hungary will strive in the future, too, to prove her friendship toward the German Reich by deeds as well. Should (group garbled) German Reich appear endangered in its vital interests, or should she become aware of an intended attack from the rear, she [Hungary] would most earnestly consider the question of whether, by virtue of the existing community of interests, she (group garbled) would have to assume the most far-reaching risk.

"The Royal Hungarian Government requests Your Excellency to inform His Excellency the Reich Chancellor of its standpoint, as it is convinced that he will understand it, since it is generally known that the Reich Chancellor places the question of national honor on the same level with the question of being or not being." End of the reply.

The Foreign Minister added that he felt that the German request had compromised him vis-à-vis the other ministers because of the pro-German line of policy which he had previously followed; they were reproaching him for the fact that they had first learned of his trip to Germany through the British radio, and they were violently attacking his German policy. Yesterday's sudden request, coupled with the request for a reply within one hour, was viewed by several ministers as an ultimatum. They were also astonished that, despite the statement made some time ago by the German military authorities that they were now responsible for the broadcasts of the

² According to *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Sept. 9, Ribbentrop had on that day made this request by telephone. No memorandum of the conversation has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

Slovak radio stations, the Slovak Propaganda Chief Mach had raised revisionist demands against Hungary only a few days ago.

I tried to reassure Csáky, who claimed that he had handed in his resignation.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 46

127/69811-13

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 10, 1939—9:40 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 317 of September 10

With reference to my telegram No. 310 of September 9¹ and to telephone conversation of today with the Reich Foreign Minister.*

In today's conference at 4 p. m., Molotov modified his statement of yesterday by saying that the Soviet Government was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid German military successes. In accordance with our first communication, the Red Army had counted on several weeks, which had now shrunk to a few days. The Soviet military authorities were therefore in a difficult situation, since, in view of conditions here, they required possibly 2 to 3 weeks more for their preparations. Over 3 million men were already mobilized.

I explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial speedy action of the Red Army was at this juncture.

Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done to expedite matters. I got the impression that Molotov promised more yesterday than the Red Army can live up to.

Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened" by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor.

This course was blocked for the Soviet Government by a DNB report yesterday to the effect that, in accordance with a statement by

¹ Document No. 39.

* No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

Colonel General Brauchitsch, military action was no longer necessary on the German eastern border. The report created the impression that a German-Polish armistice was imminent. If, however, Germany concluded an armistice, the Soviet Union could not start a "new war."

I stated that I was unacquainted with this report, which was not in accordance with the facts.³ I would make inquiries at once.

SCHULENBURG

³ In telegram No. 334, dispatched at 10:10 p. m., Sept. 12, and supplementing the telegram printed here, Schulenburg reported: "After I had found out from the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry that the DNB dispatch cited by Molotov had been totally misinterpreted by the Soviets and in particular that there is no question of an armistice, I explained this to Molotov on the very same day. Since then, I have heard no more about it from Molotov." (127/69809)

No. 47

173/83946

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 700

BERLIN, September 10, 1939.

The Netherlands Minister handed me today the attached note verbale¹ in regard to the alleged violation of the Dutch border by a German airplane described in detail.

The Minister added orally that Holland had been lodging very energetic protests with the British Government and that it felt compelled in this instance to call our attention to the protest set forth in the Annex.

I replied to the Minister that nothing was of greater interest to us than that the Netherlands Government should maintain and defend its neutrality with all its power. In this light I was also prepared to receive from the Netherlands Legation representations of the nature of the one in the Annex, in order that the facts in the case might be clarified. I would of course have to state even now that we had ordered the most scrupulous regard for the Dutch border. The whole matter therefore was probably a mistake. If however a German plane had actually by mistake crossed the Dutch border, the Minister could rest assured that anything of this nature was not at all in accord with our intentions.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The Netherlands note of protest (173/83947) is not printed. It was the first of numerous protests of violations of Netherlands territory by German aircraft.

No. 48

73/52026

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUDAPEST, September 11, 1939—1:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received September 11—2:45 p. m.

No. 298 of September 11

With reference to my telegram No. 296 of September 10.¹

The Foreign Minister told me that the Hungarian Government was prepared to permit transportation of German war material on the railway line mentioned by the Reich Foreign Minister, provided it took place in closed cars and without military escort.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Document No. 45.

No. 49

73/52027-28

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUDAPEST, September 11, 1939—6:50 p. m.

No. 302 of September 11

Received September 12—3:00 a. m.

The Foreign Minister showed me with very great agitation a note verbale handed him by the Slovak Legation and described as very urgent.

The Slovak note states that the Slovak army, in view of its close relations with the German army, had to carry out certain security measures in eastern Slovakia. The Slovak Government therefore requested the Hungarian Government to permit the movement of military transports through Hungarian territory. The transports would be carried out over the railway line from . . . lan . . . (two groups garbled) . . . via Hernadon-Košice to Slanec in Slovak trains with sealed cars and Slovak personnel, and without stopping on Hungarian territory. The Slovak military personnel would receive instructions to observe scrupulously all Hungarian regulations regarding the movement of this transport. In view of the good and friendly relations between Hungary and Germany the representative of the Slovak Government is convinced that the Hungarian Government will permit the transport of Slovak troops through Hungarian territory.

The Foreign Minister told me that the Slovak Legation would be notified curtly of the rejection of the proposal by note verbale with the added statement that the Hungarian Government would consider

any (group garbled) of the Slovak action an act of military aggression, and would react accordingly. Hungarian troops would now be dispatched to the Slovak border. The Slovak action, coming one day after the rejection of the similar German request regarding the same railway line, was but grist for the mill of the French Embassy, which was saying that the Slovak Propaganda Chief's recent irredentist address which was quoted in part in the German press, too, and which predicts the very early recovery of the territory given Hungary by the Vienna award but claimed by Slovakia, was made by previous agreement with German authorities.

Csáky remarked that he did not know whether Hungary's acquiescence to the transport of German war material on the said railway line, mentioned in telegraphic report No. 298,¹ could be maintained under these circumstances.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Document No. 48.

No. 50

456/223853

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 11, 1939—8:00 p. m.

No. 504 of September 11

Received September 12—1:30 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 494 of September 10.¹

The Foreign Minister² reiterated to me today the principles guiding the handling of refugees from Poland. Polish military personnel are being disarmed and interned far in the interior of the country. Members of the Government were being prohibited from engaging in any activity, including the use of the radio or the international telephone.

He affirmed once more that he had not received a Polish request. Radio report of Rumanian transmitters was an invention.³ If there had been any démarche with the Rumanian Government, it would not in any case have been by the Chargé, but by the Ambassador there. But no démarche had been made.

¹ Not printed (52/35784).

² Grigore Gafencu.

³ On Sept. 9, Weizsäcker had telegraphed Bucharest, the Scandinavian and Baltic capitals: "Alleged announcement of Rumanian radio that Polish Government has asked for right of asylum in Bucharest gives occasion for the following instruction: Please let the Government there know, in a way which seems most fitting but which cannot be misunderstood, that we would regard the granting of the right of asylum to the Polish Government as an act completely contrary to neutrality. If the present Polish Government wants to leave the country, it can in no circumstances remain in a neutral country." (52/35757-58)

He then requested that no credence be given to the numerous rumors. The following, in particular, were false:

1. Landing of troops, either to remain in Rumania or for transit to Poland. If necessary such landings will be prevented by force.
2. The presence of Polish officers in the country.
3. The presence or passage of General Weygand.
4. The landing of large quantities of war material for Poland. (To prevent large-scale shipments, he had the right to order that such material must not be stored in existing customs sheds and that ships unloading war material must not remain in port for more than 24 hours).
5. Passage of British aircraft destined for Poland over Rumanian territory.

Our Military Attaché, who talked with the Chief of the General Staff, has received similar information. He requests that this telegram be passed on to the High Command of the Army, Attaché Group.

Our well-functioning intelligence service has also found only negative evidence.

FABRICIUS

No. 51

73/52025

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation
in Hungary*

Telegram

No. 322

BERLIN, September 11, 1939.
Büro RAM No. 465.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to telegram No. 296 of September 10¹ from Budapest.

The Foreign Minister requests you to point out to Count Csáky that he had not presented Csáky with an ultimatum or a request for a reply "within an hour," but had merely asked Hungary for a favor and for as early a reply as possible. Thereupon Count Csáky on his own initiative had set the time of between 7 and 8 in the evening, and later between 12 and 1 o'clock Sunday. Furthermore, the German request was not unreasonable and it should not be forgotten in Hungary that it was Germany who had seen to it that the railway in question went to Hungary. The Reich Foreign Minister requests that no further special step be taken in the matter, as the affair was closed as far as he was concerned, but that the foregoing comments be mentioned casually in a conversation.

SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ Document No. 45.

No. 52

456/223847-48

*Circular of the Director of the Economic Policy Department*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 11, 1939.

e. o. W 1711 g.

As you know, the representatives of the Oslo States are meeting today or Tuesday in Brussels to confer on their attitude toward the British blockade demands. In order to strengthen these States' power of resistance in this respect, you are authorized to tell the Government there that we are willing and in a position—provided temporary transportation difficulties, where they exist, are overcome—to replace such British coal deliveries to that country as may be discontinued, as well as the previous Polish coal deliveries.

A telegraphic report is requested.

WIEHL

¹ Copies were sent to the Missions in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These countries with Luxembourg comprised the so-called Oslo States, which conferred periodically on matters of common concern. See vol. v, ch. iv. An annex to the telegram sent to the Embassy in Brussels suggested that the representatives of the Oslo States there be informed in a suitable manner.

No. 53

5570/E399050-51

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 11, 1939.

With reference to telegram No. 283 of September 10¹ from Belgrade concerning Yugoslav complaints about the delay in closing the contracts for armament material.

The credit agreement regarding the delivery of military aviation and artillery material to Yugoslavia was signed by our Minister in Belgrade on July 5, 1939,² after a long delay. The signing of the already prepared separate delivery contracts with the German supplier firms, which the Yugoslavs expected would follow, has since been delayed on instruction of the Field Marshal. Furthermore, no answer has yet been given to the Yugoslav Government in response to its insistent request that it be at least apprised of the total amount of the deliveries to be carried out under the credit agreement. The preliminary negotiations on the credit agreement envisaged 80 mil-

¹ Not printed (230/152033).

² See vol. vi, document No. 620.

lion reichsmarks for military aviation material, and 120 million reichsmarks for artillery material. Accordingly, a total amount of 200 million reichsmarks was mentioned on the occasion of the visit here of the Prince Regent and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister.³

During the two months which have passed since the signing of the credit agreement, the Yugoslavs have applied pressure continuously through all channels at their command (Legations and Air Attachés here and in Belgrade). The Field Marshal, however, has persisted in his refusal. To appease them, however, five modern Heinkel and Messerschmitt planes were delivered about August 20, although the delivery contracts for these had not yet been signed either. The only reasons given the Yugoslavs, as far as could be learned here, and conveyed by the German Air Attaché was that difficulties had arisen which the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin knew about.

Toward the end of August Consul General Neuhausen, on instruction of the Field Marshal, told the Yugoslavs that the armament contracts could now be signed,⁴ but pursuant to another instruction from the Field Marshal they have to date not yet been signed.

The Air Ministry stated with regard to the telegram received today that the Field Marshal's attitude was still entirely negative. Only yesterday the Yugoslav Air Attaché was told at the Air Ministry that delivery of a few training and Fieseler Storch planes might possibly be considered, but modern combat planes could not be supplied under any circumstances.

In view of the Field Marshal's attitude I have refrained so far from requesting the Air Ministry to be more accommodating about the Yugoslav wishes, as urgently recommended now by the Minister, in agreement with the Air Attaché and Consul General Neuhausen, particularly since the reports on Yugoslavia's stand did not seem to justify such action. If the Field Marshal is to be approached once more in the sense of the Minister's recommendation, there would have to be an express instruction by the Foreign Minister to do so, or, still better, it ought to be done by the Foreign Minister himself. It could be pointed out at that time, as the Minister correctly emphasizes, that the possibility of dilatory treatment of the delivery remained open, even if the delivery contracts were to be signed now.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions.⁵

WIEHL

³ June 1-8, 1939; see vol. vi, document No. 474.

⁴ See vol. vii, document No. 240.

⁵ Marginal notes: "[For] F[ührer]."

"Treatment of Yugoslavia should for the present continue to be dilatory. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 54

B21/B005107-09

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1939—4:40 a. m.

No. 343 of September 12, 1939 Received September 13—4:50 a. m.

Since Roosevelt, by inquiries in Congressional circles, has allegedly already made sure of a two-thirds majority for the repeal of the arms embargo, an early recall of Congress may be expected, although the decision is constantly being postponed.¹ Roosevelt desires a brief session in which the embargo alone will be dealt with. Congress, however, would like to remain in permanent session in order not to part with its control over Roosevelt's dictatorial ambitions.

The reversal of Congressional sentiment in the embargo question, even among many isolationists, is mainly due to the impression which Roosevelt made in predicting the danger of war. This did away with the main argument of the isolationists, that Roosevelt was seeing ghosts. Despite the resistance pledged by a group of determined isolationists led by Borah, it is very probable that the arms embargo will be lifted. Roosevelt's argument that the arms embargo constituted an unneutral act because it favored Germany one-sidedly has made a strong impression.

For the time being Roosevelt believes himself able to keep the United States out of the war by strengthening the Allies' chances of winning the war through unlimited exportation of arms, military equipment, and essential raw materials. But if defeat should threaten the Allies, Roosevelt is determined to go to war against Germany, even in the face of resistance in his own country. As a preliminary step, the Presidential powers from 1917 to 1919 are now being closely scrutinized in order to ascertain whether they are still in force and can simply be proclaimed by Roosevelt when an unlimited state of emergency is declared.

The likelihood that the embargo would be lifted probably influenced Canada's declaration of war.

The repeal of the embargo has two more immediate aims:

1. By means of expanded production for Allied requirements to step up the capacity of America's armament industry for her own mobilization.

¹ On Sept. 13 the President summoned a special session of Congress to meet on Sept. 21. On that date he delivered to it a message asking for repeal of the arms embargo. The text is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 275-280. Legislation to this effect was introduced immediately in both houses of Congress. See also document No. 294, footnote 1.

2. To meet the urgent needs of the Allies for aircraft in order to attain air parity. Otherwise, owing to the inadequacy of British and French air armament, it is expected here that the Allies will be defeated. However, as the Air Attaché has reported, the capacity to supply is limited.

Both of these aims are being pursued with the utmost vigor by both Britain and France and also by the armament industry.

THOMSEN

No. 55

456/223856-57

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 482

BERLIN, September 12, 1939.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegram No. 504 of September 12 [11].¹

All indications here point to the fact that the remnants of the Polish Army, the Polish Government, and the High Command of the Polish Army intend crossing into Rumania. The statements made to you by the Rumanian Foreign Minister regarding Rumania's proposed treatment of the Polish refugees do not yet meet in all particulars the demands which we must make on Rumania in this respect on the basis of the Rumanian neutrality obligations. Our demands are that the Rumanian Government shall:

(1) not grant asylum in Rumania to the Polish Government and the High Command of the Polish Army but shall intern under strict confinement any members of these two groups who should nevertheless manage to reach Rumanian territory;

(2) close the border by military means to the entry of any Polish agencies, civilian or military;

(3) immediately disarm and intern troop formations and individual soldiers who have crossed the border;

(4) prevent the transit shipment of war material of any kind to Poland, because in the circumstances, as has already been emphasized, such shipments would unilaterally favor Poland and consequently be incompatible with the obligation of neutrality.

I ask that you immediately and vigorously demand that the Government there commit itself by a binding declaration in this regard and telegraph the outcome at once.

¹ Document No. 50.

Telegraphic instruction No. 479 of September 12² is hereby superseded.

RIBBENTROP

² Not printed (456/223854-55). This earlier instruction on the same subject had been sent over Weizsäcker's signature.

No. 56

B21/B005128-29

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, September 12, 1939.

Owing to the outbreak of the war with Poland, the British Empire, and France, our relationship with the United States of America has assumed still greater importance than before. We have a great interest in preventing the United States from throwing her weight into the scales on the side of our foes, and we must do everything to keep her in the group of the neutral powers, of which she, despite her hostile sentiments, has hitherto constituted one of the strongest and most important members. We are working along those lines by propaganda and publicity, but it should be considered whether we could not do still more in the field of diplomacy. This poses the question whether we might not in the near future return to his post our Ambassador to Washington, who has been in Germany since last December. As things now stand, the American Government will hardly be willing at this time to fill the ambassadorial post in Berlin, but will presumably wish to continue the present situation for the time being. We, however, have in my opinion so great an interest in sending our Ambassador to Washington that—in view of the new situation—we might depart from the condition of reciprocity which we have insisted upon heretofore. The great difficulties encountered by any representative of Germany in Washington, whether ambassador or chargé d'affaires, are obvious. Nevertheless, an ambassador always has an easier time than a chargé. To be represented in Washington by an ambassador would therefore be to our advantage, particularly in view of our position in Latin America. It would demonstrate that we are not willing to be brushed aside or to eliminate ourselves. The German Ambassador's return to Washington would strengthen the position of those groups in the United States which are against a break with Germany; other circles would also feel and appreciate such a decision by the German Government as proof of its good intentions.

If the foregoing considerations should meet with the approval of the Foreign Minister, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, a man of tact, might be the most suitable channel for a statement to the effect that Herr Dieckhoff would shortly return to his post.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER¹

¹ A handwritten note added by Weizsäcker reads: "Ambassador Dieckhoff, whose views correspond with the foregoing, knows that his position in Washington would be very difficult at present. But he would, of course, gladly do everything within his power."

It appears likely that the suggestion that he should return to Washington originated with Dieckhoff himself, since a first draft of the above memorandum (B21/B005101-04) is in his handwriting. That draft also included the suggestion that upon his return the Ambassador carry a letter from Hitler to Roosevelt stressing Germany's efforts to preserve peace and to localize the war. This passage was struck out, however, and Weizsäcker later made other changes of wording in a second draft (B21/B005105-06).

On Sept. 23 the Foreign Minister's Secretariat returned the memorandum to Weizsäcker with a cover note (B21/B005127) which read: "The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that at present it is out of the question for us to send our Ambassador and that for the immediate future the further development of the situation in America must be observed."

No. 57

821/198124-25

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

[BERLIN,] September 12, 1939.

For the Foreign Minister.

I called upon Lithuanian Minister Škirpa in the evening of September 11, 1939, as directed¹ and told him in the course of a lengthy conversation that Lithuania's claims indicated by him on the map² submitted must indeed be regarded as very far-reaching and that there were doubts as to whether Lithuania would be able to achieve them:

1. from the political viewpoint and, more particularly,
2. from the military viewpoint.

When Škirpa then asked with some concern whether my objection signified rejection of all claims, I replied: "No, not at all, but it is my belief that it would be better for Lithuania to divide her move into two phases:

1. A military move, aimed at Vilna and the surrounding country, i. e., a small objective, which would be 100 percent certain of success.
2. A political move, in which Lithuania could register her final claims in political conversations with Germany or also with the Soviet Union.

¹ See document No. 41, footnote 4.

² Not found.

Škirpa declared that the delay of his Government—apart from the commitment to the common neutrality of the three Baltic States was chiefly to be explained by the uncertainty about Russian intentions. I replied that in my opinion no opposition need be anticipated on the part of Russia to this limited military objective.

Škirpa inquired about our relationship to the Ukrainians in Poland. In reply I referred him to the fact that so far we have not stirred up the Ukrainian element in Poland at all.

When he asked whether Russia and Germany had agreed upon a military line of demarcation that might affect the further actions of the German troops in Poland, I replied that to my knowledge only political and no military conversations had been held with the Russians in Moscow and that I was not informed as to the present status of the relations.³

KLEIST

³ In a teletype message of Sept. 14 from Ribbentrop's special train, Schmidt instructed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat as follows: "3. Please instruct Dr. Kleist not to undertake anything further with the Lithuanians at the moment." (456/223921)

No. 58

321/193128

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 130 of September 13

KAUNAS, September 13, 1939—3:35 p. m.

Received September 13—5:35 p. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 177¹ and 189.²

The Military Attaché talked to Commander in Chief Raštikis again this morning, after having tried several times to approach him. Commander in Chief Raštikis apologized in the first place for the fact that a conversation between the President and me had not yet taken place. However, the Polish Minister here had for several days been pressing for an interview with the President,³ which the latter had refused up to now. Therefore he, Raštikis, asked me to refrain from calling on the President and instead to call on Minister President Černius privately. I will see the Minister President tomorrow.⁴ Regarding the Vilna question, the Commander in Chief stated that

¹ Not printed (321/193122). An instruction of Sept. 9 by Weizsäcker for Zechlin to deal personally with the Lithuanian Government on the Vilna question; his Military Attaché had been instructed the previous day by Woermann to take up this question with the Lithuanian army commander (321/193120).

² Not printed (115/117610). An instruction of Sept. 11 requiring an immediate report to Ribbentrop as soon as an answer was forthcoming from the Lithuanian Government on the Vilna question.

³ Antanas Smetona.

⁴ See document No. 65.

Lithuania's interest in the Vilna territory was as great as ever and that Lithuania still considered it Lithuanian territory today from both juridical and ethnic points of view. However, if Lithuania should openly abandon her neutrality at the present time this would greatly handicap her. He indicated that strong pressure was also being placed on Lithuania by England and France not to give up her neutrality in any circumstances. Moreover, as I have heard from other sources, the Soviet Union also seems to be working here in the same direction.

ZECHLIN

No. 59

127/69805

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 13, 1939—5 : 50 p. m.

No. 336 of September 13

Received September 14—1 : 10 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

As soon as the exact outcome is known in the great battle in Poland, now approaching its end, we shall be in a position to give the Red Army the information it asked for regarding the various parts of the Polish Army. But even now, I would ask you to inform M. Molotov that his remark regarding Colonel General Brauchitsch's statement¹ was based on a complete misunderstanding. This statement referred exclusively to the exercise of executive power in the old territory of the Reich as regulated before the beginning of the German action against Poland, and had nothing whatever to do with a limitation of our military operations toward the east on former Polish territory. There can be no question of imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland.

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 46.

No. 60

456/223887

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft telegram

BERLIN, September 13, 1939.

Pol. VII 2058 g Rs.

In order to tie down large forces in India, a plan is under consideration to support a move designed to help the former Amanullah dynasty

to power, as happened once before from the Afghan side in 1929.¹ In 1929, Stalin and Voroshilov gave extensive support to the undertaking, supplied arms and horses, and offered airplanes. Please ascertain cautiously what the reaction there would be to a similar undertaking by the Afghans, which is naturally viewed with interest here.²

WOERMANN

¹ Amanullah, who had ruled Afghanistan since 1919, was forced to abdicate in January 1929. He then made an attempt to regain control, but was defeated in May 1929, and went into exile.

² On Sept. 18, the German Minister in Kabul, Pilger, telegraphed that the British were spreading rumors that Germany intended to support the return to power of Amanullah and other enemies of the present Afghan government. Pilger requested authorization to give assurance that Germany's attitude toward the present Afghan government had not changed (617/249871). On Sept. 20, Pilger was instructed to deny all such rumors as unfounded without, however, making a special *démarche* in the matter (617/249872).

No. 61

2898/565759-62

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, September 13, 1939.
e. o. Pol. VIII 1504.

POSITION OF JAPAN IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT

1. The Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister on September 5 handed the Ambassadors of Germany, France, England, and Poland a memorandum, which

a) announces the intention of the Japanese Government not to become involved in the European war;

b) expresses the desire of the Japanese Government that the German (or French, etc.) Government refrain from all measures which might be prejudicial to the position of Japan in the China conflict;

c) gives the belligerent powers the friendly advice to withdraw their troops and warships from the parts of China occupied by Japan, in which case the Japanese Government will do everything in its power to protect the lives and property of the nationals of the belligerent powers.

Copies of the memorandum have been handed to the Ambassadors of Italy and the United States by way of information.

The text of the memorandum has not been published.¹

2. The chief of the Japanese China squadron has requested the commanders of the British and French warships in Shanghai to follow the advice of the Japanese Government and either withdraw their warships or disarm them.

¹ The copy handed to the American Ambassador is published in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. II, p. 9.

3. The new Minister of War (Hata) and the previous Minister of War (Itagaki) received the German Military and Air Attachés on September 5. The former Minister of War referred to his very sincere efforts to bring about close German-Japanese ties, which unfortunately had failed, and stated that his successor in office held exactly the same view. The new Minister of War made reference to the nonintervention declaration of the Japanese Government and emphasized that as a soldier he fully understood the action of the German Government.

4. The Foreign Minister (Abe) told the German Ambassador on September 7 that Japan was forced to remain neutral in the European conflict, but desired further friendly development of her relations with Germany.

5. The composition of the new Government indicates that Japanese foreign policy in the near future will not attempt new advances, but will strive to consolidate what has been achieved thus far. Japan will, as has repeatedly been stated officially, concentrate on an early termination of the China conflict. In that connection an easing of Japanese relations with the Soviet Union is necessary and probably also possible. The influence of the group of activist officers, who advocate on the one hand closer German-Japanese cooperation and on the other a war against the Soviet Union, has doubtless been curbed. The leading officers belonging to this group in the Kwantung Army, which for months has been engaged in violent battles with the Soviet Army on the Mongolian frontier, have been recalled. This seems to point to preparations for the settlement of the Mongolian incident.

6. From the memorandum mentioned under [paragraph] 1 it is evident that Japan would like to use the European war to remove the British and French troops and warships from China. If this is successful the French and British concessions in China would lose their practical significance and Japan would be rid of the "enemy behind her back" in her struggle against China. It is to be assumed that in the event of an easing of tension on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier Japan will not hesitate to give effect by force to her friendly advice to the belligerent powers. If England and France do not accept the Japanese advice, developments in China would virtually force Japan over to the side of Germany. If England and France accept the Japanese advice, the termination of the China incident will be made considerably easier for Japan, and she will be in a position to maintain a very profitable neutrality in the European conflict. Since England and France must have realized long ago that the surrender of their concessions in China is only a question of time, it must be feared that in return for surrender of the con-

cessions they will try to obtain Japanese guarantees in such matters as trade with China, shipping in Chinese waters, and recognition of their capital investments in China. With the present Japanese Government such guarantees seem all the more possible since in this field England will presumably have the full support of the United States, which through the denunciation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty² has obtained a weapon in the fight for these interests. It is to be assumed that there will be British-French-Japanese negotiations; these will presumably last for some time and their outcome will determine the future attitude of Japan toward Germany.

Submitted herewith to the Director of the Political Department through the Deputy Director.

KNOLL

² On July 26, 1939.

No. 62

8503/E597257-58

Note by the Minister in Hungary

September 13, 1939.

W III 8060.

On August 14 of this year State Secretary Keppler informed me that he was ready to abandon the agreement on mineral resources generally, but that he attached the greatest importance to reviving the agreement in its previous form in so far as it applied to oil.

On August 24 I replied to State Secretary Keppler that, according to information from Count Csáky, Minister President Teleki was ready to cooperate with us on the exploitation of oil but in a form not in conflict with Hungarian laws, and in particular, with the provision that rights to extract minerals are not transferable except by law. The Hungarian Government was ready to cooperate with us in exploiting the oil field of Jasiňa in the northeastern tip of the Carpatho-Ukraine. This could be done without asking the parliament since the Czechs had already started preliminary work there; so the provision about extraction rights would not thereby be violated.

On August 31 State Secretary Keppler wrote me that it was incomprehensible to him that, according to Csáky's statement, the fulfillment of Minister President Teleki's promise would be in conflict with the laws. After all, it was generally known that Hungary had granted to foreign firms oil concessions covering very large areas. Why should this not be possible with respect to Germany as well? Cooperation in the oil field near Jasiňa was pointless. Although the Czechs had undertaken drilling operations there, no evidence for the

existence of an oil field had as yet been supplied. The whole geological structure of the Carpatho-Ukraine (fissured Flysch formation) really permitted sensible efforts of exploitation only if large areas were involved. Some time ago Professor Loci, head of the Hungarian National Geological Institute, expressed the opinion to State Secretary Keppler that the Carpatho-Ukraine was rather poor in mineral wealth. He, Keppler, was planning to approach the problem by entirely new geo-physical methods in order to make experimental study of the possibilities for exploiting Flysch areas, although in doing so he had to run a considerable risk. Cooperation with Hungary could be considered only if the rights were not limited to the Carpatho-Ukraine but included at least the territory extending to the south of the Carpatho-Ukraine.¹

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Attached to this document was the following note dated Budapest, Mar. 11, 1939: "The German Government proceeds from the assumption that in case certain Hungarian actions in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine become necessary, the Royal Hungarian Government will take into account the following necessities:

"(1) During or after any occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine German requirements with regard to transportation shall be taken into account to a large extent.

"(2) The economic interests of the Reich and its citizens in the Carpatho-Ukraine will not be affected by the action. The Royal Hungarian Government will recognize treaties and agreements of an economic nature which were concluded with the Government of the Carpatho-Ukraine by German official and private institutions.

"(3) The Royal Hungarian Government will recognize the duly acquired rights of Volksdeutsche in the Carpatho-Ukraine.

"(4) The members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, former Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers and other leading personages in the political life of the Carpatho-Ukraine, such as, for instance, the leaders of the Defense Corps *Nitsch* shall not face criminal prosecution or be persecuted in any other way on account of their political beliefs."

Cf. vol. IV, documents Nos. 146, 198, and 199.

No. 63

127/69806-08

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 14, 1939—6 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 350 of September 14

With reference to your telegram No. 336 of September 13.¹

Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. m. and stated that the Red Army had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10).²

¹ Document No. 59.

² Document No. 46.

For the political motivation of Soviet action (the disintegration of Poland and protection of "Russian" minorities), it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.

Please send instructions.

I would direct your attention to today's article in *Pravda*, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in *Izvestia* tomorrow. The purpose of the articles is to provide the political justification mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention.

SCHULENBURG

No. 64

456/223933-34

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 14, 1939—7:00 p. m.

No. 534 of September 14

Received September 15—1:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 482 of September 12¹ and to my telegram No. 398² of September 14.

On the basis of decisions of the inner council of the Rumanian cabinet, the Foreign Minister has given me the following declaration which, by explicit request, he designates as confidential:

Regarding point 1. In case the Polish Government and the Army High Command should cross over into Rumania, (a) military personnel will be disarmed and interned; (b) civilians, like other "political refugees," will be brought to prepared reception centers near Jassy and will be interned there; if, however, any of these civilians should desire to go to a foreign country, this could not be denied them because the moment they cross the border they are private individuals and no longer "members of a government" and will not be permitted to engage in any kind of political activity in Rumania. Travel in Rumania, visiting Bucharest, in particular, is strictly forbidden. The same treatment also applies to other Polish civilians, in so far as they are admitted at all as political refugees. In any case, precautions have been taken to prevent Polish officers or soldiers in civilian clothing from possibly coming here as refugees and then continuing on to France.

¹ Document No. 55.

² *Sic*, not found.

Points 2 and 3 have been reported on.³ In regard to point 4: The Foreign Minister remarked that Rumania would have to comply with the general provisions of international law. Germany was equally free to obtain war material from and through Rumania. However, (group garbled) precautions had been taken so that no considerable quantity of war material passed in transit to Poland; in actual fact practically nothing except petroleum had left the country to date. (This was confirmed to me by the Consul at Cernăuți, who reported today that no war material whatever had gone to Poland in the past few days.

A few civilian airplanes arrived in Cernăuți and Bucharest from Poland yesterday (a total of 17 was reported to me). They were taken into custody; the pilots and the Polish passengers will be interned in Moldavia, near Jassy, and have already been shipped off.

In conclusion, Gafencu stated that Rumania was doing everything to maintain strict neutrality, and he reiterated his assurance in this regard.

FABRICIUS

³ Fabricius wired on Sept. 13 that the Rumanian Government had promised to disarm and intern Polish troops and that Rumanian troops had been concentrated along the Polish border (169/82750).

No. 65

321/193129

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

KAUNAS, September 14, 1939—9:00 p. m.

No. 133 of September 14

Received September 14—11:25 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 130 of September 13.¹

I again explained our viewpoint in the Vilna question to Minister President Černius (several groups apparently missing) which was of a private nature, and pointed out that the rapidly approaching collapse of Poland made a decision imperative. Moreover, an advance of German troops could lead to an early occupation of the Vilna territory by us.

Černius, similar to Raštikis, declared that Lithuania could not emerge from her neutrality at the moment, but that she regarded the Vilna region as a territory "occupied" by Poland, which juridically and ethnically belonged to Lithuania. Armed action by Lithuania was not being considered at the moment. He hoped to arrive at a solution of the problem by registering Lithuanian claims at a possible

¹ Document No. 58.

peace conference or by having the Lithuanian population of the Vilna territory declare for joining Lithuania. He himself admitted, however, that the Lithuanians in the Vilna territory were still oppressed by Poland and were hardly in a position for that, while apparently nothing is being done here in this direction. I will continue my efforts to influence the Government.

ZECHLIN

No. 66

51/33858

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

COPENHAGEN, September 14, 1939—10:45 p. m.

No. 133 of September 14

Received September 15—12:15 a. m.

With regard to the expansion of the German contraband list,¹ the Danish press, at official instance, has adopted a unified attitude to the effect that the inclusion of foods as conditional contraband does not mean any change in the present situation for Denmark, on the one hand because of the applicable clause² in the Non-Aggression Pact, and on the other hand, because of Herr von Hassell's solemn assurance that the normal volume of Denmark's agricultural exports will be maintained.³

RENTHE-FINK

¹ New German prize rules and a wider definition of contraband were promulgated on Sept. 12. See *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, Sept.-Oct. 1939 (Essen, 1939), pp. 917-918.

² See vol. vi, document No. 461, additional protocol.

³ See document No. 42.

No. 67

73/52047-48

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

[No. 345]¹

BERLIN, September 14, 1939.

Büro RAM 474.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 302.²

Please communicate the following to Count Csáky in my name:

I gather from the telegram that the Hungarian Government takes the stand that it would regard the transit of sealed Slovak cars over

¹ This number has been taken from the Budapest reply (73/52059).

² Document No. 49.

the Hungarian railway system an act of military aggression and would act accordingly. At the same time Hungarian troops are being dispatched to the Slovak border. This Hungarian reply to the Slovak request, which was unknown to the Reich Government, has caused great astonishment here. I would therefore advise Count Csáky to be very circumspect in his actions toward Slovakia, which is under our protection. Any unfriendly act whatever toward Slovakia would cause a corresponding reaction in Germany. With reference to Csáky's remark to the effect that he did not know whether Hungary's acquiescence to the transport of German war material on the railway line mentioned could be maintained under these conditions, please inform the Hungarian Government that the Reich Government has chosen not to take advantage of the offer for the transit of war material.³

RIBBENTROP

³ Erdmannsdorff reported on Sept. 16 that he had carried out these instructions. Csáky had explained that he had reacted so strongly against the Slovak request because "shortly before the Slovakian Foreign Minister and the Propaganda Director had raised publicly the claim to Hungarian territory and the Slovakian Government intended soon to expropriate landed property of Hungarians as well as that of Czechs and Jews." Csáky had added, however, that he had changed his mind about dispatching troops to the Slovak border and none had been sent (73/52059).

No. 68

472/228650-54

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Reichsleiter Ley

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 14, 1939.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR PARTY COMRADE LEY: Ambassador von Mackensen has informed me of the letter in which Dr. Rust, the head of your liaison office in Rome, reported to you a conversation with State Secretary Cianetti.¹ According to this letter Signor Cianetti asserted that Germany had not conducted herself loyally toward her Axis partner, first, because the operation against Poland was contradictory to the agreements made between the two Governments, and, second, because the Italian Government was not informed of the plan for a nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia until after conclusion of this pact.

Both assertions are completely incorrect.

1. In the continuing exchange of views between Rome and Berlin, Germany never gave a binding promise and did not even state the opinion that we would in all circumstances avoid a military conflict over Danzig and the Corridor. Germany could not possibly have

¹ Document No. 24. Weizsäcker sent a copy of the Ribbentrop-Ley letter to Ambassador Mackensen in Rome on Sept. 18 (100/64586).

given any such promise. For a great power can never commit itself patiently and quietly to tolerate the conduct of another power, like Poland, in all circumstances, especially when this conduct becomes the worst type of provocation. On the contrary, we have always told the Italians that we hoped, to be sure, that the Polish Government might still come to its senses in the end and agree to a satisfactory settlement, but that we could, of course, not tolerate continued provocations. Even the possibility that the Western Powers might intervene in a German-Polish conflict could not change this. The Italians, especially the Duce himself, have always recognized this standpoint and emphasized the fact that the final decision as to one or another form for the solution in the German-Polish question was, of course, the prerogative of the Führer alone.

Even if we had made an agreement in all circumstances to maintain peace this year—which was not actually the case, however—such an agreement would have been voided by the facts which became manifest during the last phase of the German-Polish crisis. For during the last days prior to the beginning of the German campaign, it became fully evident that England did not desire peaceful understanding but war. The final proof for this was when England simply rejected Mussolini's last offer of mediation, which had been accepted by Germany and France.² All of this shows that it is completely wrong to say that our operation against Poland ran counter to a German-Italian agreement.

2. The Italians were informed about the idea of a rapprochement with Russia from the very moment of its conception. I discussed the possibility of such a rapprochement confidentially with Ambassador Attolico before we ever took any steps in this direction vis-à-vis the Russians. The entire preliminaries to the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact then actually took place in a very short period. However, the Italians were always informed about the various phases, which followed one another in rapid succession. Thus, on the occasion of the visits of Attolico and Ciano at Salzburg I discussed with both of them the status of our contacts with Moscow at that time; the Führer did likewise when he received Ciano at the Obersalzberg.³ To be sure, at that time it was by no means certain that an understanding with Moscow would really be reached. This was actually not decided until the last few days prior to my departure for Moscow. Then, however, immediately after receiving the message from Moscow that the Soviet Government approved of my trip, I informed Ciano by telephone. Moreover, from the very beginning the Italians greatly wel-

² See vol. VII, documents Nos. 535, 563, and 565.

³ See vol. VII, Editors' Note at date of Aug. 11 and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

came an understanding between Berlin and Moscow, and indeed so unambiguously that in the course of the conversations on the Polish question they even said that such an understanding might create an entirely new situation in European politics.

In these circumstances it is completely incomprehensible to me how Signor Cianetti can make these assertions and how he can say in this connection that many of the Italians who believe in a common destiny between Germany and Italy considered that Germany's present action disregarded Italy and that their pride had been injured. There is really not the slightest basis for such feelings on Italy's part. On the contrary, when Italy finally informed us of her decision not to participate actively in the war at the present time, the Führer showed such broad understanding for Italy's situation, and conveyed it to the Duce, that no more loyal or more friendly conduct is conceivable. Indeed, this attitude on the part of the Führer is compelling proof that he is determined to remain faithful to Axis policy in the future, too.

For obvious reasons I consider it very important that assertions such as those made to your representative by Signor Cianetti are not left unrefuted and that no legend becomes firmly rooted in Italy that is false and injurious to our future relations. Therefore I would welcome your finding an opportunity in the near future to enlighten Cianetti along these lines. This, of course, should be done only orally. It would therefore be best if you would arrange a personal meeting with Cianetti for this purpose and at that time would confidentially inform him of my above statements, suggesting to him that he have Count Ciano himself confirm the accuracy of this account.

I should appreciate your keeping me informed of further developments in the matter.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

RIBBENTROP

No. 69

F11/302-04

Ambassador Papen to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, September 14, 1939.

DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: The fact that the principles and objectives of Turkey's foreign policy have been shaken by the revolutionary events of the past few weeks suggests that we, too, should consider assisting in its reorientation—even though from a long-range point of view. Please permit me to submit to you my ideas on the subject, which I would like to preface with the remark that I have, of course, not discussed them with anyone and shall not do so.

Turkey's decision made in May¹ to ally herself with the Western Powers in order to protect her European possessions was based on the assumption that the encirclement of Germany planned at that time under British leadership would lead to active participation by Russia and would thus be rather sure to prevent a conflict. The conclusion of the German-Russian pact and the declaration of Italy's neutrality after the beginning of the conflict, have completely upset these assumptions. On the one hand Turkey would not at the present time like to renounce her far-reaching commitments made to England and France, because she does not want to expose herself to the loss of prestige attached to breaking her word, and because she does not know whether Italy might not intervene in the conflict after all. On the other hand it is clear that Turkey's commitment, which is not limited only to the protection of her own frontiers but envisages participation in any conflict breaking out in the Mediterranean, is so far-reaching that it is subject to very sharp criticism—even though not openly—within the Turkish camp itself. Quite aside from this, they are ignorant as to the scope of the German-Russian agreements. Only one thing is known: that Russia in no circumstances desires the appearance of the Western Powers in the Straits, and certainly not in the Black Sea.

Between these possibilities Turkey is at present forced to engage in a seesaw policy of neutrality.

The interests of Germany and the Axis in their struggle against England have always demanded a strong, independent, and neutral Turkey. Italian policy has perhaps not always correctly evaluated the importance of this position, because there exists between the two countries a deeply rooted antipathy of many years' standing. Nevertheless it is true in my opinion that—as M. Gafencu said—Albania is only a moderate compensation for the loss of Turkey.

It should therefore be considered—and this becomes imperative if the German-British war continues—how Turkey can in the long run be detached from her present commitments and be brought within a framework of natural relations with the powers with whose interests she is also geographically connected. A Turkey whose possessions were equally guaranteed by Russia, Germany and Italy—provided that these same powers would also defend the status quo in the Balkans—would have no further reason to look to the Western Powers for protection of her existence.

If such a combination could be realized and proposed to Turkey, no Turkish government, no matter how pro-British or pro-French

¹ This refers to the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations of mutual assistance of May 12 and June 23, 1939, respectively; *Documents on International Affairs, 1939-46* (London, 1951), vol. I, pp. 202-204.

it was, would, in my opinion, be in a position to reject such an offer. The Turkish people and the majority of the Turkish intelligentsia desire nothing but peace and security for the economic development which has been undertaken. At the same time such a combination would be a moral setback of the first order to Anglo-French interests.

It is interesting in this connection to observe how certain quarters in the Turkish press which are completely unknown to us constantly raise the subject of safeguarding German-Turkish interests. A case in point was the news of the conclusion of a German-Turkish treaty of nonaggression, published the day before yesterday, which then had to be denied by the Government.

I would be grateful if you would let me know some time how you feel about the possibility of putting my ideas into practice and whether you believe that Italy might be won over to such a policy—always provided that in the future, too, we pursue only economic aims in Turkey, and that this “policy of security” would not mean interference in Italy’s interests in the Mediterranean.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

PAPEN

P. S. The Dutch Minister,² who is a friend of mine, told me today: “My Government, and especially the Queen, would be ready at any moment to put out feelers or act as intermediaries vis-à-vis England, if the Reich should so desire.” Holland was hoping that after Poland’s military defeat the peace of Europe might still be saved by a far-reaching German offer.

² See document No. 242, footnote 5.

No. 70

127/69788-90

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 15, 1939—8:20 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 16—7:15 a. m.

No. 360 of September 15

For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you communicate the following to M. Molotov at once:

1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you.¹ We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.

¹ Not found.

2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow,² entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies, of course, to the future as well.

3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14,³ we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of whether, in the absence of a Russian intervention, a political vacuum might not occur in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence.⁴ Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention by the Soviet Government, new states might possibly be formed there.

4) For the political support of the advance of the Soviet Army, we propose the publication of a joint communiqué of the following content:

"In view of the obvious splitting apart of the nationalities living in the former Polish state, the Reich Government and the Government of the USSR consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint task to restore peace and order in these, their natural spheres of influence, and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations."

5) We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action.⁵ The assignment of a motive of that sort would indeed be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-known German vital interests. It would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, finally, would—in opposition to the desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides—make the two States appear as enemies before the whole world.

6) Since the military operations must be concluded as soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year, we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would now set a day and hour on which their Army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern

² See document No. 34.

³ See document No. 63.

⁴ Ribbentrop had already prepared a message for Molotov on Sept. 11 (34/23356-59) in which he envisaged the possibility of a political vacuum in eastern Poland in case the Soviet Army did not occupy the Russian sphere of influence. To avoid such an undesirable situation for Germany, Ribbentrop suggested the creation of new states in eastern Poland which Russia could take over as a protectorate or in any other form.

⁵ See document No. 46.

ourselves accordingly. For the necessary coordination of military operations on both sides, a representative of each Government, along with German and Russian officers, should fly to some meeting place in the operations zone—we propose Bialystok—to agree on what must be done.

I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in text discussed by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken care of.

RIBBENTROP

No. 71

456/223949-51

*Circular of the Director of the Political Department*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 15, 1939.

e. o. W V 2368.

I. According to available reports² the extensive note addressed by England to the Oslo States regarding trade with Germany contained essentially the following:

1. An increase in the normal volume of exports to Germany, i. e., the equivalent of the average for the last 3 years, would be considered by England as a violation of neutrality.

2. The neutrals may no longer supply Germany with any raw materials at all that are important for warfare, such as petroleum, metals, coal, and others. The decrease in total exports occasioned by their elimination must not be compensated by an increase in other exports.

3. England will not tolerate the transit of goods for Germany through neutral countries and will, if necessary, put a stop to it by capturing such goods imported by sea into these neutral countries.

II. According to a report from our Embassy at Brussels,³ the Belgian note in reply stipulated four demands as a prerequisite for any kind of negotiations: freedom of the harbors, protection of the food supply, continuation of current trade relations with all countries, and

¹ The telegram as printed here was sent to the Missions in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Luxembourg. Pars. iv and v were sent to the Embassy in Belgium "with reference to your No. 171 of September 12 and No. 179 [178] of September 13" (see footnotes 2 and 3). Pars. i, ii, and iii were sent to the Legation in Switzerland, i and ii to the Legations in Rumania and Yugoslavia. The markings showing the distribution of the various paragraphs appear on another copy (51/33851-53).

² In telegram No. 171 of Sept. 12 (456/223872-73), Bülow-Schwante transmitted extracts in French of an alleged British note to Belgium which had been given to him by the Chilean Chargé d' Affaires.

³ Telegram No. 178 of Sept. 13 (456/223917-18). The Belgian Foreign Minister had informed Bülow-Schwante, without going into details, that the British note to Belgium contained impossible demands. According to Spaak, a similar note had also been sent to the other Oslo States, and they intended to answer along the same lines as Belgium.

release of the ships and cargoes retained by the British. At the outcome of the conference of the Oslo States in Brussels, Belgium and Holland wanted to answer with identical notes, Sweden in the same sense but with a different text, and the other Oslo States in a similar vein. The Swiss reply is said to deviate somewhat, since the British note was worded differently.

III. Please try to determine the text of the note which the government there received from England and also that of its reply thereto.*

IV. You are requested to make the following communication to the Foreign Minister there in view of the new meeting of the Oslo States planned in Copenhagen on Monday:

From what has become known about the British demands on the neutral states for the restriction and control of their trade with Germany, there can be no doubt that we are here dealing with an attempt by England to force the neutral states into active participation in the economic field on the side of England and France. As may be recalled, immediately at the beginning of the conflict we for our part had informed the Government there of our opinion on the significance and scope of economic neutrality and felt obligated once more formally to call the attention of the neutral governments to the fact that we had to consider as support for the enemy countries and consequently as a violation of neutrality any commitment made by a neutral government with reference to England that would affect the normal exchange and transit of goods between Germany and the country concerned. By agreeing that we would not consider the continuation of normal trade with enemy countries incompatible with neutrality, we ourselves had shown that we were ready to respect the neutrality of the countries in question also in the economic sphere, and had for this reason refrained so far from making any demands for any kind of control measures and the like. Should the neutral governments in any way comply with the British demands, we would have to reserve for ourselves complete freedom of action to counter with all possible means such participation by the neutral countries in economic warfare against us.

* The Chargé at Oslo telegraphed that he had learned confidentially that the Norwegian Foreign Office had received the British note, although this was denied by the Director of its Political Department. The Norwegian Government was said to be still considering what reply to make (3518/E021056). The Swedish Foreign Minister had refused to talk about the matter with the German Minister, remarking that as the representative of a sovereign state he discussed Swedish-German relations with the German Minister, not Swedish-British relations (205/141866). From the other states addressed came more conciliatory replies, but none of them confirmed the existence of a British note of the character described in the Brussels report. These replies, not printed, are reported in the following telegrams: (The Hague 2862/563091); (Copenhagen 3447/E017265-66); (Helsinki B18/B003042-43); Luxembourg 8285/E588315-16).

V. An identical communication is being sent to all Missions in the Oslo States and Bern.⁵ A telegraphic report is requested.

WOERMANN

Addendum for The Hague alone :

VI. According to a confidential report from Brussels, the Dutch attitude at the conference of the Oslo States is said to have been very pro-British.

[Substitute paragraph III for Bucharest and Belgrade:] ⁶ Please send telegraphic report in case any similar British note has been sent to the Government there.⁷

⁵ The reply from Bern is not printed (4031/E004552). The Swiss said they had not received a British note on the exchange of goods "like that received by the Oslo States."

⁶ In the copy of the document printed here, this paragraph was incorrectly addressed to Stockholm and Helsinki; the correct addresses are taken from another earlier draft (51/33851-53).

⁷ From Bucharest came the reply that, according to assurances from the Foreign Minister, no British note had been given to Rumania (8282/E544206). For the Yugoslav reply see document No. 99, and footnote 2.

No. 72

96/107989

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 717

BERLIN, September 15, 1939.

I told the Italian Ambassador today in reply to his question regarding the Turkish attitude that the Turks seemed to have calmed down a little and, in response to a distinct Russian influence, exhibited no inclination for adventures.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 73

456/223945

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 719

BERLIN, September 15, 1939.

During his visit today, the first since his trip to Italy, the Italian Ambassador also raised the question of peace. He first wished me to tell him whether there was any possibility that the idea going around about a German peace offer after the elimination of the Polish army might be realized.

When I told Attolico that I knew nothing of this, he himself volunteered the following:

From conversations with the Duce he, Attolico, knew that Mussolini nourished the hope that a really magnanimous offer of peace made

now, after the defeat of the Polish armed forces, might still have prospects of success with the Western Powers. Attolico did not give any detailed definition of what Mussolini meant by "really magnanimous"; he only said he thought it would have to be a proposal which appeared tenable and did not bear the character of far-reaching intentions of conquest. When I interjected that we practically had England's answer to such a proposal even now, before it was made, Attolico implied that Mussolini would nevertheless, and probably independent of possible direct results, consider such an offer politically useful and effective.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 74

5556/E395418-14

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 16, 1939—2:40 a. m.

No. 549 of September 15

Received September 16—9:35 a. m.

W 1827 g.

I. The Minister President¹ asked me to see him and inquired, referring to previous purchases from the Czechoslovak stocks, whether Germany could not supply Rumania with really large quantities of war material from either the new booty or any other surplus stocks. On the basis of such a preliminary arrangement, Rumania could, in addition to the current short-term delivery contracts, supply us with petroleum, grain, and other products of special interest to us on an even larger scale than heretofore and with commitment for a period of several years, thereby contributing decisively towards meeting our needs in the event of a war of even several years' duration. He stressed the political importance of such agreements at times like these and added that he wished by this offer to give Germany a token of his good will. The offer represents an extension of the large-scale economic agreement in the conclusion of which he had been instrumental.² I availed myself of the opportunity to call the Minister President's attention to the necessity for strict observance of the neutrality provisions and to outline to him the seriousness of the situation in the case of any violation.³ He again promised compliance with the assurances given.

¹ Armand Calinescu.

² See vol. vi, document No. 78.

³ The word *Vorstoss* ("advance") used here probably is a typographical error for *Verstoss* ("violation").

II. I have talked over with Minister Clodius the question of such long-term delivery contracts. Although it is reasonably certain, in view of the orderly development of the economic treaty during the past few years and the present attitude of the Rumanian Government, that the negotiations currently conducted here by Clodius would ensure the supply of large quantities of raw materials and grain by Rumania even in the absence of any such long-term obligation, still the long-term commitment proposed by the Minister President—provided that war material deliveries from the booty are possible at all—(group garbled) still be of great economic advantage because it would provide us with the necessary funds to pay for even increased deliveries over a prolonged period. I need not particularly point out the political importance of such an agreement at the present moment.

I request telegraphic instructions.⁴

FABRICIUS

⁴ See document No. 111.

No. 75

174/136127

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, September 16, 1939—5:45 p. m.

No. 460 of September 16

Received September 16—12:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 335 of September 9,¹ and my telegram No. 417 of September 8.²

Key officials of the Foreign Ministry and Army have again confirmed to me that Ambassador Oshima will for the present remain in Berlin. The Cabinet, they say, has so decided at the insistence of the Army. Danger of his departure comes only from Oshima himself, who, from a Japanese (group garbled) responsibility, has repeatedly requested his recall. I shall request Prince Kanin in the forthcoming audience to use his high authority personally to calm Oshima.

OTT

¹ Document No. 40.

² Not printed (174/136059).

No. 76

321/193130

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Lithuania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[BERLIN,] September 16, 1939—7:45 p. m.

No. 219 of September 16

e. o. RM 480.

Teletype from special train Heinrich, September 16 (received 2 p. m.).

For Minister Zechlin.

The Foreign Minister asks that you now drop the subject of Vilna; please do not respond should it be taken up again by Lithuania, but rather cut short any conversation on the subject.

SCHMIDT

No. 77

174/136123-29

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, September 16, 1939—8:25 p. m.

SECRET

Received September 16—5:45 p. m.

No. 463 of September 16

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 335 of September 9.¹

In numerous conversations this week with leading personalities of the Foreign Ministry, the armed forces, commerce, political groups, and the press I have made extensive use of the Foreign Minister's line of thought and found increasing appreciation of the necessity for a settlement between Japan and Russia. Today's agreement over Nomonhan represents the first practical step.² From this I expect a far-reaching effect on Japanese sentiment in the direction of our policy. To impel Japan along this road against the opposition of the pro-British group, which is not to be underestimated, I see the following

¹ Document No. 40.

² On Sept. 16, following conversations in Moscow between the Japanese Ambassador and M. Molotov, it was announced that an armistice had been reached in the Manchukuo-Mongolia border fighting in which Soviet and Japanese as well as local troops had been engaged throughout the summer of 1939. Both sides were to retain the positions held on Sept. 15 and a mixed commission was to delimit the disputed frontier.

possibilities for German influence on the basis of the aforesaid conversations:

1. Influencing Russia to give up her support of Chiang Kai-shek. My informants indicate that in return Japan might possibly recognize Russian Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, as Russian spheres of interest.

2. Influencing Russia to meet Japanese wishes with regard to oil fields in Sakhalin through a long-term agreement. Thereby the Navy's misgivings regarding a conflict with England would be substantially weakened.

3. For the development of Russian-Japanese relations I consider it urgently necessary to send an influential Russian ambassador to the Russian Embassy here, which for months has been entrusted to an ineffective chargé.

If and when such a settlement with Russia will result in committing Japan against England will to a large extent depend on the development of the military situation in Europe.

The idea of joint action with Russia against India is, to be sure, beginning to have a suggestive effect on activist circles and prominent representatives of the Navy. However, since Japan has to carry on her struggle with England in China for the time being and since there are increasing indications that England and France are ready to make tactical concessions there, I consider an unequivocal and unreserved support of the tenacious Japanese efforts toward the creation and recognition of a Central Chinese government, extending even to the severance of our relations with Chiang Kai-shek, as an effective weapon of our Japanese policy that is denied other powers.

OTT

No. 78

800/274086-87

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 16, 1939—10:20 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 17—6:00 a. m.

No. 371 of September 16

With reference to your telegram No. 360 of September 15.¹

I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent—perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this

¹ Document No. 70.

very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.

Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to justify its procedure as follows: The Polish State had disintegrated and no longer existed; therefore, all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.

The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here.

Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked us in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government not to stumble over this piece of straw. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had heretofore not bothered about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention.

In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would therefore like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city.

SCHULENBURG

No. 79

472/228756:
472/228759-61

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weissäcker

Moscow, September 16, 1939.

DEAR MR. STATE SECRETARY: I have the honor to send you herewith various memoranda of conversations I have had here, which are perhaps not without interest.

I hope that I have conducted myself correctly toward Mr. Togo. I have had no detailed instructions in this regard. I have proceeded

on the basis of my judgment that it is more advantageous for us if during the war Japan favors our group rather than our enemies.¹

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

F. W. SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure 1]

MEMORANDUM

Moscow, September 7, 1939.

Yesterday and today I had two lengthy conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Togo, on Japanese-Soviet relations. From the statements of the Ambassador, it seemed to me that the following could be inferred:

Mr. Togo is personally of the opinion that an improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations is desirable from the Japanese standpoint "although Japan has now got rid of England and France in the Far East and has a free hand in China." (I interjected: "Another service, therefore, that we have rendered Japan.") In Tokyo itself they seem to incline toward Mr. Togo's opinion but they have obviously not yet made a definite decision; at any rate, the Ambassador has as yet no instructions that would permit him to approach the Soviet Government. Mr. Togo realizes that the first step toward an improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations must be the settlement of the border incidents on the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier, which, it is said, are still fraught with great dangers. He has already spoken about the subject with Deputy Foreign Commissar Lozovsky, so that the theoretical question as to whether these matters are to be negotiated by Japan and the Soviet Union or only by Outer Mongolia and Manchuria has already been decided in favor of the former view.

I urged Mr. Togo to work earnestly for improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations and particularly the settlement of the Manchurian-Mongolian border incidents. The adjustment of existing differences would doubtless be very advantageous to both countries; I was convinced that he would not meet with a refusal on the part of the Soviets. I added that I was at his disposal if I could be useful in the matter in any way. A condition for this was, however, as I saw it, the assurance that Tokyo shared the views and opinions of Mr. Togo.

Mr. Togo thanked me very much for my helpful attitude but said that at present the inclusion of a third party could only complicate the matter. He would be grateful if I would, when the occasion presented itself, draw M. Molotov's attention to the advantages that an

¹In his reply of Sept. 29 (472/228763) Welzslücker said: "The line you have taken with Ambassador Togo corresponds to our intentions here. We would welcome further progress toward a Russo-Japanese settlement, and would be prepared to assist the Japanese to that end, insofar as they desire our assistance."

improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations would entail for the Soviet Union also.

In conclusion I pointed out to Mr. Togo that in my experience it was pointless to discuss important political matters, such as those in question, with anyone but M. Molotov himself.

SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure 2]

Moscow, September 13, 1939.

This afternoon I spoke to the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Togo. He informed me "in strict confidence" and "only for my own information" that he had spoken with M. Molotov regarding a settlement of the border incident of Buir Nor. M. Molotov had shown complete good will, but had requested recognition of the boundary demanded by Outer Mongolia. To this, Japan could not accede since she would thereby admit that she had been at fault in the conflict. A formula was now being sought that would save the honor of both parties.

In conclusion, Mr. Togo asked me not to communicate the above to Berlin. He feared interference by Berlin (read: *by Oshima!!*), which could only be harmful.

SCHULENBURG

No. 80

127/69774-76

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow,] September 17, 1939—5:20 a. m.

SECRET

No. 372 of September 17

With reference to my telegram No. 371 of September 16.¹

Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polotsk to Kamenets-Podolsk.

In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Białystok-Brest Litovsk-Lwów Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lwów.

I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force, but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.

The Soviet commission will arrive in Białystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.

¹Document No. 78.

Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us.² Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before 2 or 3 days.

In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.

SCHULENBURG

² At 9:45 a. m. on Sept. 17, Hilger telephoned (34/23308 69) to the Foreign Ministry the text (released to the various missions in Moscow) of Molotov's note to the Polish Ambassador. The text was also made available to the world press.

No. 81

103/111596

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, September 17, 1939—8:23 a. m.

No. 374 of September 17

Received September 17—8:45 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 358 of September 16.¹

On the occasion of my visit of today, Stalin informed me that the Turkish Government had proposed to the Soviet Government the conclusion of an assistance pact that was to apply to the Straits and the Balkans. The Turkish Government desires a pact with a restrictive clause whereby Turkey in rendering aid to the Soviet Union would be obligated only to such actions as are not directed against England and France.

The Soviet Government is not greatly edified by the Turkish proposal, and is considering proposing a clause to the Turkish Government to the effect that the Soviet Union on its part would not be obligated to any action directed against Germany. Stalin requested our reaction to this idea, but made it clearly evident that he considered the conclusion of the assistance pact in suitable form as very advantageous, since Turkey would in that case surely remain neutral. Voroshilov, who was present, added that such a pact would be a "hook" by which Turkey could be pulled away from France. Request instructions.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (370/207851). This telegram informed Schulenburg of a statement by the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara that a visit by Saracoglu to Moscow was likely to take place.

² See document No. 116.

No. 82

2092/452681-82

*An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

No. [372]¹BERLIN, September 17, 1939.
e. o. W IV 3500.

1. In consideration of the political situation the Foreign Minister, after an oral report by me, has reserved decision regarding the date of my trip.² As a result it is probable that a few more days will pass before I leave. The time will be used to supplement the material for the Moscow discussions. Naturally, we must avoid offending the sensibilities of the Soviet Government again by postponing the trip.

¹ The number is evident from the reply to this telegram, document No. 108.

² It is recorded in Schnurre's personal file that he talked with Ribbentrop at Oppeln on Sept. 14 and 15 concerning relations with Russia. The program for his negotiations in Moscow was outlined in the following undated memorandum (1369/357061-62): "1) The Credit and Trade Treaty of August 19 of this year is not to be tampered with from either side. However, for our benefit, we must attempt to obtain a more expeditious delivery of raw materials (180 million RM)."

"2) My principal task in the negotiations will be to find out whether Russia, over and above the Treaty of August 19, 1939, could and would compensate for the loss in imports by sea, and to what extent this might be done. The military and civil agencies have handed me a schedule of requirements totaling about 70 million RM of immediate additional supplies. (Enclosure 1.) [Not printed: 1369/357063]. The requests which I shall present in Moscow will go far beyond this schedule, as the German war needs are several times as great as the proposal of the Departments for the negotiations. (See enclosure 2.) [Not printed: 1369/357064]. But the relatively modest schedule of departmental requirements shows how low the actual capacity of Russia for supplying raw materials is estimated. The reasons are inadequacies of transportation, of organization, of production methods, etc.

"3) The plan to be proposed to the Russians would be as follows:

"Apart from the Treaty of August 19, 1939, the Soviet Union shall supply us X millions worth of raw materials, both such as are produced in Russia and such as Russia buys for us from other neutrals. The German compensatory deliveries for these raw materials could not follow at once, but would have to take the form of a supply and investment program, to extend over a period of about 5 years. Within this time we would be prepared, in order to meet our obligations arising from Russian deliveries of raw material, to set up plants in Russia in accordance with a large scale program to be agreed upon. (See enclosure 3.) [Not printed: 1369/357064-65].

"4) Within the framework of purely economic negotiations, the difficulties actually existing in Russia cannot be overcome, especially as we demand of the Russians performance in advance. A positive achievement can really only be expected, if an appropriate directive is issued by the highest Russian authorities, in the spirit of the political attitude toward us. In that respect these negotiations will be a test of whether and how far Stalin is prepared to draw practical conclusions from the new political course. The raw materials deliveries requested by us can only be carried out, in view of the unsatisfactory domestic supply situation of Russia, at the expense of their own Russian consumption.

"5) Depending on the result of my conversations, it will be necessary that the raw materials program be taken up again from the strictly political point of view by a qualified personage.

"6) In the Moscow negotiations it should furthermore be ascertained to what extent our imports heretofore made from Iran, Afghanistan, Manchukuo, and Japan can be transmitted via Russia. Schnurre"

Should the Government there bring up the subject of the trip, I recommend that you point out the need for thoroughgoing, technical preparation. If occasion arises, please report by wire.

2. A large-scale program for raw material deliveries, exceeding many times the figures of the Agreement of August 19,² is being considered here for submission to the Russians. This program contemplates also the delivery of raw materials which the Soviet Union must in turn purchase in other countries, particularly non-ferrous metals. Please telegraph your opinion on the extent of the Soviet Union's export capacity at the present moment in view of her intervention in Poland, and what schedule the Embassy thinks could be proposed as the basis for negotiations. In doing so it should be kept in mind that compensation in the form of additional machine tool deliveries is out of the question.

3. The question of transport is particularly important for the agreements with the Soviet Union and the transit shipments. Please give your opinion on this point, too.

SCHNURRE

² See vol. VII, document No. 131.

No. 83

51/33857

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Denmark*

Telegram

No. 270

BERLIN, September 17, 1939.

W V 2389.

With reference to your No. 133 of September 14.¹

From the previous telegram it is evident that even official Danish circles are unclear about the relationship between the applicable clause in the Non-Aggression Pact and Hassell's statements concerning economic neutrality on the one hand and the rules of naval warfare on the other. The clause in the Non-Aggression Pact represents merely an assurance to Denmark that we do not consider the continuation of normal deliveries to an enemy country as conduct violating neutrality nor would we apply any such interpretation to our relations with Denmark. Hassell, too, merely stressed the principle of the maintenance of the normal exchange of goods by neutral countries with countries at war and gave assurance that we would observe this principle in relation to Denmark. Both of these assurances, however,

¹ See document No. 66.

naturally have nothing whatever to do with the right obtaining in the relations between enemy countries to cut off from one another certain supplies in accordance with the rules of naval warfare, even supplies coming from neutral countries. Naturally we cannot waive this right, particularly since England is known to be employing it to the fullest extent against us. It never even occurred to us to renounce tacitly this right by means of the two assurances, and Denmark could never assume that this was so. Any attempts on the part of Denmark to accord to the two statements such a far-reaching and disproportionate significance should therefore hardly be taken seriously.

Please make use of the above ideas at some convenient opportunity vis-à-vis the Government there, but not until after the pending meeting of the Oslo countries in Copenhagen.²

WIEHL

² In a telegram of Sept. 18 (247/163926-27), Renthe-Fink reported that he and Walter had seen Foreign Minister Munch that day and had carried out the instruction printed above. Munch, "deeply impressed," argued that in the circumstances there was no occasion for Germany to extend her anti-blockade measures to normal Danish food exports to Britain, and also that this would not be in the spirit of the Danish-German agreement or of Hassell's statements. Then in telegram No. 149 of Sept. 19 (51/33887-68), Renthe-Fink reported that Secretary-General Mohr of the Danish Foreign Ministry had that day told Walter that the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, and Finland agreed with Munch that the latest German statement constituted a complete change of position. The four Governments, whose Foreign Ministers were now meeting in Copenhagen, had interpreted Hassell's utterances as indicating German approval for *normal* exports, but now the whole system seemed to collapse. The Danes also explained the catastrophic effect on Danish economy should Germany cut Danish exports to England. Renthe-Fink reported that he and Walter agreed that the Danish anxieties were justified, and pointed out that such a situation would also increase Germany's economic burdens.

No. 84

115/117619-20

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 17, 1939.

As directed, I informed the Lithuanian Minister of the following today:

We had learned from a reliable source that the Lithuanian Ministers in the countries which are at war with us—France and England—had been told to communicate with them regarding certain confidential German-Lithuanian conversations on the Vilna question, adding—and there was not a grain of truth in this—that in these conversations we had subjected the Lithuanian Government to the strongest possible pressure. We could only term insolent the mere

fact of the communication, and especially the statements which were completely contrary to the truth. It was completely immaterial to us whether Lithuania received Vilna or not. If the Lithuanian Government took the stand which was indicated by this communication, then they should understand that we would have to draw our own conclusions.

I added that our Minister in Kaunas had been instructed to make a communication of the same content to the Lithuanian Government and by that time had probably already carried out his instructions.

M. Škirpa listened with smiling courtesy to this communication, which was made in a very grave tone, and then explained that he had just been informed by his Government that Minister Zechlin had made the following statement in Kaunas:

The Reich Foreign Minister was very indignant about the information he had received to the effect that he had exerted pressure on Lithuania to break her neutrality and march into Vilna. Minister Zechlin had received the answer that this information could not come from a Lithuanian source and was completely incorrect. The Lithuanian missions abroad had not even been informed on the Vilna question. He himself could add that he, for his part, had also not received any information that Lithuanian Ministers abroad had been concerned with the matter.

M. Škirpa said that the statement which I made went even further than the one given in Kaunas, to which I replied that in content the statements were no doubt identical. In addition, the explanation given in Kaunas did not seem to me correct, because I was sure that our source was incontestable.

The Minister then requested information on the demarcation line between Germany and the Soviet Union. I told him curtly that I could not answer that question. I termed his further question whether there was not danger of a German-Russian clash completely misdirected [*abwegig*] and broke off the conversation at that point.

As he left, I told the Minister that the communication was not directed against his person.

WOERMANN

No. 85

2418/511278-80

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 17, 1939.

Immediately to Under State Secretary Gaus.¹

The question of a *démarche* with the United States before Congress convenes has been discussed here with Ambassador Dieckhoff. He

¹ A marginal note states that the memorandum was transmitted by courier to Gaus, who was with the Foreign Minister on the latter's special train near Hitler's headquarters at the Polish front.

has the following objections, which are shared here, against a *démarche* especially concerned with the American neutrality policy:

"President Roosevelt and the American Administration are advancing quite systematically toward their goal of aiding Britain and France. In view of the attitude of the President it cannot be expected that even the most impressive elucidation of the German point of view and of the threat to American-German relations resulting from a modification of the Neutrality Act would divert him from his policy. He has been pursuing his course consistently for years; through his attitude he bears the main responsibility for the stiffening of British policy in recent months, and in view of this man's determination and stubbornness, a change in his stand is not to be expected. On the contrary, at this very moment when the British position appears endangered he will redouble his efforts to make United States assistance available to Britain as far as possible.

"In view of the President's lack of scruples it may be expected that he would misuse such a friendly step by Germany, publicize it, and give it the character of German interference in internal American affairs, a German warning, or even a threat. A man such as Roosevelt would not find it difficult to misrepresent a step of ours in that direction. He would then be in a position to arouse his people against such German interference and thereby intensify the animosity against Germany already prevalent in broad sectors of the population. Furthermore, he would accuse his opponents in Congress of making common cause with Germany and thus compromise as pro-German men such as Borah, Nye, etc."

This concludes Ambassador Dieckhoff's remarks.

On the other hand it would be unnatural simply to let the relations between Germany and the United States deteriorate without at least making an attempt to check such a development. A *démarche* with the United States should therefore not deal with the neutrality policy, but should be of a more general character. Considering the conditions in Washington and especially the publicity the Americans would give to a step taken by Thomsen with Hull, it would be preferable to make the *démarche* in Berlin with the American *Chargé d'Affaires*. A conversation with him, approved in this form by Ambassador Dieckhoff, might contain something like the following:²

1. We have no war aims which threaten the United States, the American continent, or any other American interests in any way whatsoever.

2. With respect to the war at sea which, as experienced in previous wars, can play a decisive part in impairing relations between neutral and belligerent countries, the German intentions have already been stated before the whole world. We are conducting cruiser warfare in accordance with generally recognized international rules. Our original contraband list could not have been more favorable for the neutrals. Changes in the contraband list were effected by us only

² No documents have been found to indicate that such a conversation took place.

when absolutely necessary and will also be made henceforth only when absolutely necessary in order to keep pace with measures taken by the enemy. We have already declared that we are willing to revoke orders issued in retaliation for British measures, if the enemy does the same.

3. We therefore see no reason why German-American relations should deteriorate, or even remain in their present unsatisfactory state. The way to prevent that would be an open and friendly discussion of all the differences of opinion that might arise in the course of the war. The German Government is prepared to engage in such a discussion, provided the American Government also desires to follow a policy not aimed at aggravating the political situation between the United States and Germany.

WOERMANN

No. 86

4497/E105434-37

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX

BERLIN, September 17, 1939.

Subject: Pan American Conference at Panama.

Following an invitation from President Roosevelt, the representatives of all American governments will meet for a Pan American Conference at Panama on September 21 or, according to Chilean reports, on the 23rd. According to the draft program, which has been communicated by the Legation in Guatemala, the conference is to deal with measures to ensure the neutrality and the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere, to guarantee legitimate international trade and the communications of the American republics, and to protect their commercial and financial interests as well as their economic cooperation.

It is to be anticipated, however, that the United States of America will greatly enlarge the program and emphatically promote the policy which it initiated at previous Pan American Conferences. This policy aims at uniting North and South America as to military policy through a military defense pact, and at coordinating the foreign policy of the Ibero-American countries with that of North America in respect to the European conflict.

The ABC states, especially Argentina, will in all probability oppose this because they do not want the conclusion of any agreements that would debase the neutrality of the Ibero-American countries into some sort of preliminary state of war. It is therefore believed in Ibero-American circles that the wishes of the United States will meet with considerable opposition at the Panama Conference. Nevertheless, it may be expected in view of the far-reaching economic depend-

ency of the Central American countries on the USA that they are more likely to yield to North American pressure than are the economically stronger ABC states.

The following measures have been taken on our part:

I. Political:

a. Our Missions in the Ibero-American countries have been instructed ¹ to use all their connections to prevail upon the governments to insist on absolute neutrality even in the event that the United States should enter the war.

b. A long article by Megerle in the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, which expounds the German position on the neutrality question in relation to the Pan American Conference, has been circulated in Latin America by radio and cable.

c. The Missions have been instructed ² to make every possible use of Franco's radio address of September 4 in order to strengthen the neutral attitude.

d. Démarches ³ have been made with the Italian and Spanish Governments to induce them to bring their influence to bear on the Ibero-American Governments in opposition to Anglo-American imperialism and any departure from strict neutrality.

e. Minister Reinebeck and Secretary of Legation Leisewitz have been ordered to Panama for the duration of the conference. The Press Division has arranged to send Herr Zapp and Herr Sell.

II. Economic:

a. Argentina, as reported, ⁴ has reiterated her declaration, made at various Pan American conferences, that the supply of foodstuffs, etc. for the civilian populations of the belligerent states must not be interfered with. Our Missions in Latin America have been instructed ⁵ to give their full support to this Argentine stand and to induce the Governments in question to issue similar declarations.

b. We have furthermore instructed ⁶ our Missions to declare to the Ibero-American countries that we are determined to continue our trade as much as possible.

c. After our circular telegram ⁷ on the publication of the German contraband list our Missions in Latin America were advised that until we are compelled by England to adopt a different practice, we shall stop goods listed as conditional contraband only if they are destined for enemy armed forces or governmental agencies; that is, we are taking exactly the same stand as that which Argentina is attempting.

¹ Not printed: Circular Pol. IX 1893 of Sept. 13 (456/223903-05).

² Not printed (8525/E597504-05).

³ Not printed (4497/E105438-40).

⁴ Telegram No. 347 of Sept. 9: Not printed (8524/E597486).

⁵ Not printed (8524/E597489-92).

⁶ Not printed (8524/E597480-82, E597484).

⁷ Not printed (8518/E597426-31).

d. The missions will again be comprehensively instructed, through an additional cablegram² with reference to the Panama Conference, to encourage the Ibero-American countries to a strong stand against any possible conduct by England contrary to international law.

Submitted herewith to the Under State Secretary.

FREYTAG

² Not printed (8524/E597497-99).

No. 87

115/117942-43

Memorandum by the Minister in Luxembourg¹

LUXEMBOURG, September 17, 1939.

On Sunday, September 17, 1939, after first telephoning me, the French citizen Henri Blanche, son of Blanche, the former French Minister in Colombia, visited me. M. Blanche's wife is the eldest daughter of our Consul General in Calcutta, the former Minister in Colombia, Count Podewils. He worked a few months in Luxembourg with Solpée, a subsidiary of AEG,² and also with AEG in Stuttgart and Berlin. In this period there began very friendly relations with me and my family. He and his wife were to us like our own children.

M. Blanche first showed me his passport, which by a diplomatic stamp of the Quai d'Orsay identified him as a diplomatic courier, and stated to me the following:

After war broke out between Germany and France, he was released from military service and employed as an interpreter in the Quai d'Orsay at the instance of his father, who had meanwhile returned to service as deputy director of the Trade Department there. A few days ago someone asked him in the Quai d'Orsay whether through his connections by marriage to the daughter of a German diplomat he could come in contact with a German Chief of Mission in some foreign country. He had replied that he was a close friend of mine and thought he would be received by me at any time. Accordingly, he was sent Saturday, September 16, as courier to Luxembourg, with instructions to find out if he could establish contact with me. At the same time he was strictly forbidden to tell Cambon, the French Minister here, of these instructions.

I told Blanche that I would always receive him, since our friendly relations justified this even in the present situation. I would notify

¹ This memorandum is evidently part of the report which Radowitz' secret diary (see footnote 3) states was sent to Weizsäcker on Sept. 17. This copy is from a file of the Foreign Minister.

² Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft.

the Foreign Ministry immediately and act according to its instructions should he come to me again in behalf of the Quai d'Orsay.

In response to a question by me, Blanche said in strictest confidence that many people in France believed that England had dragged France into the most calamitous [*fatale*] situation, and these people were beginning to exert pressure on the Quai d'Orsay to find an honorable way out of it, since they would regard intensification of the war between France and Germany as a catastrophe. Naturally at the moment, it was strongly desired in the Quai d'Orsay that such views not be expressed publicly and also that his mission be kept entirely confidential.

I replied to Blanche that I would keep his visit strictly confidential and merely report it to the Foreign Ministry at once. I also told him I was not authorized to make any statements to him regarding our policy toward France going beyond what the Führer has repeatedly declared, namely, that we want nothing from France and would be very sorry if the youth of France were to smash their heads against our West Wall.

Blanche left me with the remark that he would presumably return in a week.³

RADOWITZ

³ The secret diary of Radowitz in the files of the Luxembourg Mission has the following entries:

Sept. 17: " 'Weisse' comes to see me at 5. Then a most urgent report to State Secretary von Weizsäcker is taken to Trier by Kurt Bauer and leaves Trier at 1:00 a. m." (8302/E589651)

The entry for Sept. 25 states: "About 2:30 today 'Weisse' visited me again. Record of this visit goes to State Secretary von Weizsäcker at 8:00 this evening through K[urt] B[aue]r. By special delivery letter from Trier. In my sealed private file in the money safe. . . . At 10:50 p. m. K[urt] B[aue]r brings official mail from Trier. There is a letter from State Secretary Weizsäcker (Weisse). Put in my private file." (8302/E589659)

Neither this letter nor anything further on the incident has been found.

No. 88

B21/B005114-15

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1939—8:18 a. m.

No. 382 of September 18

Received September 19—8:15 a. m.

In addition to the sinking of American ships, it was the alleged German acts of sabotage in the United States of America which largely contributed to the entry of the United States into the World War. Through British and American propaganda it has become axiomatic with the American people to regard those acts of sabotage as dangerous German attacks upon American sovereignty in violation of

international law, regardless of any overriding interests of belligerent powers, and such acts are still fresh in their memory owing to the damage suits which until quite recently have constantly been in the public eye.¹

If Germany should permit the sabotage idea to revive in any form whatsoever, this would be promptly and extensively exploited by Roosevelt, interventionist circles, and enemy propaganda as a fervently desired German provocation and a dangerous act of aggression by Germany against the United States of America. Roosevelt could thereby not only completely silence his domestic opposition, but the latter would even support his anti-German policy. The New York espionage trial ² has already shown how the anti-German propaganda in this country makes use of sabotage arguments.

In view of the hostility toward Germany we alone would be blamed by the entire American people for any such attacks on American sovereignty, and they would not be considered the result of Roosevelt's policies. This would only render American public opinion the more responsive to the need urged by Roosevelt for vigorous assistance, also of a military nature, to Britain and France.

In agreement with our armed forces attachés I therefore request that the possibility of German sabotage in the United States of America not be used either politically or for propaganda purposes in any manner whatsoever.

I have instructed the Consuls to caution German nationals in their districts very emphatically against any ill-advised actions, should this be necessary.

For the purposes of German policy on the arms embargo, the following basic observations can be made:

The sympathies of the overwhelming majority of the American people are with our enemies, and America is convinced of Germany's war guilt.

The isolationists can therefore defend the arms embargo only if Roosevelt and their other opponents cannot accuse them of supporting the German disturbers of the peace in opposition to general American opinion. The isolationists are avoiding the question of war guilt and concentrating their propaganda on the fact that America has

¹ On June 15, 1939, after some 15 years of litigation, the German-American Mixed Claims Commission, following the withdrawal of the German Commissioner earlier in the year and charges of false testimony by Germans, found Germany responsible for sabotage in the Black Tom Dock and Kingsland ammunition plant explosions of 1916 and 1917. On Oct. 30 the claimants were awarded damages then valued at about 50 million dollars.

² Four Germans were convicted in a New York Federal District Court on Dec. 2, 1938, on charges of military espionage and sentenced to 2-6 year terms of imprisonment.

no vital interests in Europe, is not directly threatened by anybody, thanks to her geographic position, and therefore is able to keep out of the European conflict.

We must thus avoid everything which might disturb this policy of the isolationists and create the impression that our interests are identical with those of the isolationists. Our radio and press should also bear this constantly in mind. This is especially necessary at present, since experienced political observers are convinced that Roosevelt will succeed in abolishing the arms embargo, although the effect on this question of Russia's invasion of Poland cannot yet be foreseen. As matters stand today, any strengthening of our position whereby the defeat of Britain and France is made to seem a real possibility will not diminish but rather will markedly increase America's desire and determination to intervene. It would therefore be regrettable if the possible defeat of the isolationists in the arms embargo question were to be exploited in this country as a defeat of our policy.

THOMSEN

No. 89

8514/E597401

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 174 of September 18

RIGA, September 18, 1939—1: 57 p. m.

Received September 18—4: 15 p. m.

Pol. V 8961.

Immediately after the Russian invasion [of Poland] was announced Munters called me to find out the position of the German Government. Excitement in official circles and the public is extraordinarily strong. Munters took it for granted that the Russians had made a previous agreement with Germany and asked whether I knew to what point it had been agreed the Russians would advance and whether "unintentional" violations of the Latvian and Lithuanian borders were to be expected. I tried to calm him by referring to the mutual nonaggression pacts and the Russian declaration to the Latvian Minister, but otherwise had to refuse to answer his questions because of lack of official instructions. He urgently requested further information in case I should learn more from my Government. Please send instructions, if possible, for guidance of my conversations.

KOTZE

No. 90

108/111604

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 18, 1939—3:59 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 18—5:45 p. m.

No. 385 of September 18

In the course of the conversation which I had last night with Stalin about the dispatch of a Soviet commission to Białystok, as well as the publication of a joint communiqué, Stalin said, somewhat suddenly, that on the Soviet side there were certain doubts as to whether the German High Command at the appropriate time would stand by the Moscow agreements and would withdraw to the line that had been agreed upon (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San). I replied with emphasis that of course Germany was firmly determined to fulfill the terms of the Moscow agreements precisely, and I referred to point 2 of the communication made by me to Molotov on September 16 in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Minister (see your telegram No. 360 of September 15).¹ I declared that it would be suitable for the High Command to withdraw to the line which had been agreed upon since, in this way, troops could be made available for the Western Front. Stalin replied that he had no doubt at all of the good faith of the German Government. His concern was based on the well-known fact that all military men are loath to give up occupied territories. At this point the German Military Attaché, Lieutenant General Köstring, who was present, interjected that the German armed forces would do just as the Führer ordered. In view of Stalin's well-known attitude of mistrust, I would be gratified if I were authorized to make a further declaration of such a nature as to remove his last doubts.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 70.

² The draft (644/254854-56) of this telegram found in the files of the Moscow Embassy contained two sentences deleted before dispatch. The first preceded and the second followed the last sentence of the document as printed here: "Stalin declared he was reassured on this score. . . . Indicative of Stalin's mistrust is his comment that there may be people in Germany who thought that the Soviet Union might make common cause with the defeated Poles against Germany."

No. 91

108/111597

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, September 18, 1939.

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request to transmit the following to the train for the Foreign Minister:

Reaction to telegram No. 374 from Moscow regarding Turko-Russian assistance pact:¹

The matter should be discussed openly with the Italians. If they agree, the Soviet Government could be told that we concur in the basic idea, but parity would be preserved only if the Soviet Government were not obligated to action against Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 81.

No. 92

585/242483

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 18, 1939.

The Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires, by the enclosed communication ¹ to the Foreign Minister, gave notice today of the neutrality declaration of the Bulgarian Government.

I thanked the Chargé for the communication and told him we naturally assumed that Bulgaria would maintain an altogether benevolent neutrality toward us. The Chargé replied that nothing further need be said on that subject.

In the conversation that followed, M. Karastoyanov asked what attitude Bulgaria ought to take if the Soviet Union should occupy Bessarabia and at the same time offered Bulgaria Dobruja. He assumed that Rumania would then be wise enough not to imitate Poland's example and on the contrary would yield without a struggle. I replied that I did not see any indication of an imminent occupation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union and that if such a contingency should arise, I believed the only right course for Bulgaria would be to trust us and get in touch with us.

WOERMANN

¹ Not printed (585/242484).

No. 93

84/24084-86

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 734

BERLIN, September 18, 1939.

The Japanese Ambassador today inquired of me at length about the situation, spoke of the visit of Take Ushi [*sic*]¹ congratulated us on the progress of the Polish campaign, etc. Finally, somewhat embarrassed, he produced the annexed document, dated August 26, regarding which he made the following statement:

As I would recall, I had at the end of August dissuaded him (Oshima) from the idea of lodging the strong protest of the Japanese Government which he had been instructed to make because of the incompatibility between the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the secret agreement between Germany and Japan.² Out of consideration for the German Government at that critical stage he had followed my advice. However, he could not act directly contrary to his Government. He had therefore simply wired his Government that its instruction had been carried out. In reality, however, he—Oshima—had postponed the *démarche* until now. He had waited until after the conclusion of the Polish campaign and was of the opinion that the step was now no longer of such gravity, especially since he had on his own authority toned down the instruction from Tokyo. He requested that the annexed note be understood in this light.

I read the note, which in fact is no longer very significant, but accepted it for study only personally, and not officially. When he calls on the Foreign Minister in the near future, Oshima will himself explain the matter further. He will then add that, if we see fit, this paper may be allowed to disappear in the files. A discussion, especially of a legalistic nature, he would consider unwise and untimely.

I told the Ambassador in conclusion that, as he knew, his view was not in agreement with ours, and I had hoped that the matter was finally disposed of. However, I was willing to prepare the Foreign Minister for the fact that he (Oshima) considered himself obligated to bring the matter somehow to a formal conclusion.

¹ Colonel General Terauchi; see document No. 132.

² The conversation took place on Aug. 26. Weizsäcker's memorandum is printed in vol. VII, document No. 329. The "secret agreement" was the secret annex to the Anti-Comintern Pact of Nov. 25, 1936. It included a clause that the two parties would "conclude no political treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contrary to the spirit of this Agreement without mutual consent." For the full text see vol. I, p. 734. See also document No. 11, *ante*.

I did not consider it proper to refuse the Ambassador a study of the note, since Oshima is obviously trying sincerely to bring the matter to an end.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

The Japanese Embassy has the honor, on instructions from the Japanese Government, to inform the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese Government's view of the recently concluded Non-Aggression and Consultative Pact between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as follows:

"The Japanese Government considers the recently concluded Non-Aggression and Consultative Pact between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be contrary to the Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International."

No. 94

127/69766-70

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, September 18, 1939.

Subject: Publication of joint Soviet-German communiqué.

On September 17 at 3 p. m., the draft of a joint German-Soviet communiqué was transmitted by telephone with instructions to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to the publication of such a communiqué on September 18. The text of this draft is enclosed (enclosure 1).

On September 17 at 11:30 p. m., the Ambassador submitted the draft to M. Molotov for approval. The latter stated that he would have to consult with M. Stalin on the matter. M. Stalin, who was called to the meeting by telephone by M. Molotov, declared that in his opinion, too, a joint communiqué had to be issued, but that he could not entirely agree to the text proposed by us since it presented the facts all too frankly. [*da es den Tatbestand mit allem grosser Offenheit darlege.*] Thereupon, M. Stalin wrote out a new draft in his own hand and asked that the consent of the German Government be obtained to this new draft. (See enclosure 2.)

On September 18 at 12:30 a. m., I communicated to Under State Secretary Gaus the text of the Soviet draft. Herr Gaus stated that he could not take a stand himself on the matter and had to ascertain the decision of the Reich Foreign Minister.

On September 18 at 12 o'clock noon, the Head of the Minister's Secretariat, Herr Kordt, telephoned and informed me as follows:

"We agree to the Russian proposal concerning the communiqué and shall publish the communiqué in this form Tuesday in the morning papers. Ribbentrop."

I immediately transmitted the above communication by telephone to M. Molotov's secretary.

On September 18 at 2:05 p. m., Herr Kordt called up again and informed Counselor of Embassy von Tippelskirch as follows:

"The communiqué will be published by us in some of the evening papers. Please advise the offices concerned."

I immediately apprised M. Molotov's secretary of the above-mentioned communication also.

Two hours later the text of the communiqué appeared on the teletype and was also broadcast over the German short-wave radio.

Respectfully submitted to the Ambassador; to the Counselor of Embassy.

HILGER

[Note:¹]: On September 18 at 7:15 p. m., Herr Gaus called up and asked whether the communiqué would be published today in the Russian evening papers. If not, it should be broadcast today over the Soviet radio. The Reich Foreign Minister was very much interested that this be done. I told Herr Gaus that today, because it was the Russian Sunday, no evening papers had appeared; that I would inform them further regarding the radio. At 8:00 p. m. I was able to let Herr Gaus know that the Soviet radio had broadcast the communiqué several times since 4:00 p. m.

HI[LGER]

[Enclosure 1]

DRAFT OF A JOINT GERMAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUÉ

In view of the internal incapacity of the Polish State and of the splitting apart of the nationalities living in its former territory, the Reich Government and the Government of the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint task to restore peace and order in these, their natural spheres of interest, and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations.

¹ A handwritten postscript.

[Enclosure 2] ²

In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumors concerning the respective aims of the German and Soviet forces which are operating in Poland, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U. S. S. R. declare that the operations of these forces do not involve any aims which are contrary to the interests of Germany and of the Soviet Union, or to the spirit or the letter of the Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and the U. S. S. R. On the contrary, the aim of these forces is to restore peace and order in Poland, which had been destroyed by the disintegration of the Polish State, and to help the Polish population to establish new conditions for its political life [*die Bedingungen seines staatlichen Daseins neu zu regeln*].

² A note in Schulenburg's hand reads: "Stalin draft. September 18, 1939."

No. 95

2196/473616-17

Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weissäcker

CONFIDENTIAL

BUDAPEST, September 18, 1939.

DEAR HERR VON WEISSÄCKER: Count Csáky told me today, on the occasion of a visit, that the Hungarian Minister to the Quirinal, who was here at present, had informed him that Mussolini seemed rather depressed during his latest conversation with him. He was not certain whether this was due to ill health, as had repeatedly been asserted, or to the fact that Mussolini felt isolated in Italy by his policy of unconditional collaboration with Germany.

Count Csáky expressed concern that if Rumania should persist in her opposition to a landing in Constanța,¹ the troops standing by for embarkation in France might be landed in Salonika or even on the Dalmatian coast, in case Italy carried her neutral attitude to extremes. In this connection he was also concerned over the continuing army inductions in Yugoslavia, where close to 800,000 men were at present already under arms, as well as over the spirit of the memorandum by fifteen Yugoslav generals, which Count Csáky gave me and which is being sent to the Foreign Ministry by the same courier.²

For all these reasons Count Csáky, who has for a long time been personally very close to Mussolini, is considering going to Italy some time soon in order to orient himself. But being most anxious to avoid any possible misinterpretation of such a trip in Germany, he has asked

¹ This refers to rumors about an impending landing in Rumania of Anglo-French forces. See document No. 50.

² Not printed (3082/613360-63).

me to make unofficial soundings as to whether the Foreign Minister had any objections to such a trip.

I would therefore request that you send me telegraphic instructions with regard to this matter.³

Incidentally, Count Csáky told me that he had been called a German satellite by the Leftist Opposition in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Deputies and "German dog" by a section of the British press.

When we discussed Hungarian-Rumanian relations he emphasized that he would rather die than break his word given to the Foreign Minister that Hungary would in no circumstances attack Rumania without Germany's concurrence. In accordance with the wish of the Reich Foreign Minister for the friendliest possible development of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations he had said especially conciliatory things with reference to Yugoslavia in the Foreign Committees of Parliament.⁴

With cordial greetings,

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

ERDMANNSDORFF

³ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

⁴ In a memorandum of Sept. 23, Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat recorded the following: "The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that no answer should be made to Count Csáky's inquiry as to whether there might be objections to such a trip since an affirmative reply might easily be misused by Count Csáky in Rome to justify certain steps not desired by Germany (2196/473618)"

No. 96

1571/880183-84

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 19, 1939—2:50 p. m.

No. 527 of September 19

Received September 19—4:50 p. m.

During this morning's conversation Count Ciano held forth at some length on Italo-Greek relations. Because of its very grave concern over Italian troop concentrations at the Albanian frontier—recently confirmed to me also by the Greek Minister here—the Greek Government had some time ago approached the Italian Minister here for a talk on Greek-Italian relations, prompted by the desire to clarify and ease the situation. In doing so, Greece was obviously influenced to some extent by the realization of England's declining prestige. Discussions conducted in Athens had led to the result that a joint communiqué which had been drafted by the Greeks and still required the Duce's approval will probably be issued tomorrow along somewhat

these lines: the Greeks acknowledge that in withdrawing troop units from the Albanian-Greek border (which troops, as Ciano added, will remain in Albania but be moved further north) the Italians had furnished proof that Italy's repeated assurances of her desire to live in peace with her neighbors need not be doubted, while the Italians take notice of the fact that the Greeks for their part are rescinding certain military countermeasures. Thus at the present moment of high political tension both countries are confirming the friendly character of their relations. This should not preclude further development, however; on the contrary a pact of neutrality, nonaggression and consultation should follow in the near future. Some preparatory work had also been done in this regard. Since Italy did not wish to take the initiative, however, the Greeks had asked him to supply them with a draft of a treaty which they would then submit to the Italians. Ciano expects this move to have favorable effects, not least on Turkey's attitude. Italy could afford to accept a settlement of this sort because Greece was set not across Italy's course, but apart from her objectives in the Balkans, which were to be found rather in the direction of Yugoslavia. Besides, Greece was such a poor country that nothing was to be gained there. He added, smiling, that things might perhaps be different if that were not the case.¹

MACKENSEN

¹ In a telegram sent on Sept. 20 (583/242198), Woermann inquired of Mackensen whether the Italo-Greek neutrality pact under consideration was to apply to the present war or to a future case in which either country should become involved in a war with a third power. Mackensen replied in a telegram of Sept. 22 (1848/421079), that Ciano's aim was a Greek commitment to preserve neutrality not only in the present war but also in any future war between Italy and a third power.

No. 97

583/242193-94

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 19, 1939—4:05 p. m.

No. 528 of September 19

Received September 19—6:25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Count Ciano expressed himself in today's conversation with evident pleasure over the Foreign Minister's telephone call the day before yesterday.¹ He was particularly gratified to learn that Russia's action was entirely within the program agreed upon. The conclusion of the first phase of the war now was to be expected at any moment.

¹ No record of this telephone conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry; but see *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Sept. 17.

The second phase, which would open shortly, would soon decide whether there would be an early peace, through a generous gesture by the Führer, or an otherwise inevitable general conflagration. The former appeared to him possible only after France had once been exposed to sharp German military action.² For the rest, he added, we are working and will unremittingly continue to work toward providing against all contingencies. Transports to Libya were moving unhampered and Italy would have 185,000 men there by the end of this month, while she would be adequately prepared also in Albania and the Dodecanese. Talks with the British and French Ambassadors, who were calling on him frequently of late under pretexts of every kind, had furnished no information of any consequence on further developments.³ Daladier was intent on treating Rome in the most considerate manner. Count Ciano cited as an instance that Daladier had promptly complied with his request to leave unmolested our Ambassadors and Ministers who had departed on Italian ships calling at Cannes, and furthermore had without delay returned Italian and German diplomatic pouches and mail bags recently found on Italian ships stopped by the French, this latter, however, with the explicit request that the matter be treated as strictly secret, since France could not make similar concessions to ships of other nations.

As regards Franco's attitude, Ambassador Gambara had recently made a very affirmative report. The Caudillo apparently had recovered from his initial dismay over German-Russian cooperation, which at first had caused him grave concern because of its impact on the Spanish people, whose memory of the war against the Reds was still too fresh and whose church circles, moreover, always saw in Moscow the Antichrist, with whom there could be no compromise. Franco now was again solidly aligned with the Axis. This was evidenced also by the reinforcements ordered by him on the Pyrenees border and, to the great distress of the British, before Gibraltar. Moreover, he had assured Gambara that he had concentrated so many troops in Morocco today that his strength there was equal to that of the French.

MACKENSEN

² Attolico, however, in a conversation with Weizsäcker on Sept. 21, expressed the view that "concrete peace plans" would find a hearing in France. Weizsäcker recorded that he did not know whether the Ambassador, in these and other remarks suggesting a move for peace, was speaking on specific instructions from Rome, but thought it likely that they expressed the Italian Government's views. Attolico also argued that to have given the Soviet Union half of Poland robbed Germany of much of her bargaining power in a peace settlement (495/-233416-17).

³ Weizsäcker wrote in a memorandum of Sept. 19 (453/224075) that Attolico had taken occasion, without any inquiry on Weizsäcker's part, to explain that the visits of the French and British Ambassadors to Ciano were purely routine and that "there existed not the shadow of diplomatic negotiations." Weizsäcker noted that these assurances "apparently seemed necessary to the Italians."

No. 98

406/214427-28

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 147 of September 19 TALLINN, September 19 [1939]—11:48 p. m.

Received September 20—2:45 a. m.

The Foreign Minister¹ expressed great concern today over Soviet Russia's invasion of Poland. Considering the unpredictable nature of the Soviet Russians, one could not foresee whether that country's expansion in Europe would not likewise be directed against the Baltic countries. It was important to know whether Germany would still be willing and able to assist these countries in a given case. The Minister then read me a press report from Turkey, according to which Moscow circles had stated that Germany had recognized the need for annexing the Baltic countries and their ports to Soviet Russia. I immediately replied that the report surely emanated from British agents and was pure provocation, and pointed out, as I was authorized to do, that the recent events had not effected any change in Germany's relationship to Estonia as defined by the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact. Following instructions, the Soviet Military Attaché here declared to the Estonian General Staff that the Soviet operation in Poland would have no consequences whatsoever for Estonia, with which the Soviet Union wanted to continue to cultivate good relations. Through diplomatic channels, on the other hand, Estonia received only the familiar circular note to all of the governments with diplomatic missions in Moscow. The General Staff takes a positive view of the declaration itself of the Soviet Attaché, but points out that in spite of this, Soviet propaganda in Estonia has been intensified of late. The Military Attaché reports that for the last few days the General Staff has strongly entertained the fear that Germany had given the Soviet Union a free hand in the Baltic States, and [in spite of this] was looking for a pretext to exploit this opportunity.² In particular, the sharp Soviet declarations in the press concerning the escape of the interned Polish submarine are construed in this sense.

The Foreign Minister informed me that for several days now economic negotiations have been going on in Moscow concerning a great increase in the Estonian-Soviet exchange of goods, with transit through Estonia likewise under discussion; so far the negotiations have gone well.

FROHWEIN

¹ Karl Selter.² The words enclosed in brackets were garbled in transmission. In the Tallinn draft (8511/E597373), this passage reads: "that the latter."

No. 99

2312/484365

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Yugoslavia*

Telegram

MOST URGENT
[No. 381]

BERLIN, September 19, 1939.
e. o. W 1855 g.

With reference to our telegram No. 361 of September 16.¹

According to reliable information, England had made a démarche also to the Yugoslav Government. If possible please obtain the text or contents of the note as well as the reply made by the Yugoslav Government. If it appears advisable tell the responsible authorities that we would have to consider any commitment entered into by a neutral country with England restricting normal trade and transit of goods between Germany and that country as aid to enemy countries and thereby as a violation of neutrality against which we reserve the fullest freedom of action.²

WIEHL

¹ See the circular printed as document No. 71. No. 361 was the version of this circular sent to Belgrade.

² On Sept. 23, Heeren reported that British and French notes concerning Yugoslavia's trade with Germany had indeed been presented (2312/484368); a summary of these notes and of Yugoslavia's reply would be given to Heeren soon. On Sept. 28, Heeren reported that he had received the promised information about the British note (8283/E588302-03). It had expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would not increase her "normal" exports to Germany and announced that Britain would check Yugoslavia's exports closely and would blacklist those firms whose exports to Germany were above normal. Yugoslavia's note in reply, according to her Foreign Minister, had emphasized in general terms the vital importance for Yugoslavia of trade with Germany. The Foreign Minister then added that Yugoslavia was not afraid of a British check and blacklists and that she had made no commitments to Britain.

No. 100

169/82772

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in
Rumania*

Telegram

No. 547

BERLIN, September 19, 1939.
Büro RAM No. 486.

For the Minister personally.

The Foreign Minister requests you to inform the Rumanian Government that we welcome the clear-cut application of Rumanian neutrality in interning the members of the Polish Government and preventing their departure. It will now be necessary also, particularly

in view of the formation of a new Polish Government, to have the Polish gold sequestered, an action in which Rumania could perhaps cooperate. You are requested to suggest the latter idea informally, without mentioning the Foreign Minister.¹

SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ Germany continued to press for an interpretation of Rumanian neutrality which would prevent Polish Government members from leaving Rumania. Ribbentrop instructed Fabricius on Sept. 22 to inform Gafencu that Rumanian permission for such a departure would be considered an unfriendly act and a violation of neutrality; the continued existence of a Polish Government would delay pacification and stabilization in this region and would thereby run counter to the interests of Germany and Russia (169/82797). On Oct. 11, a Bucharest telegram reported that King Carol had requested, as a personal favor, Germany's consent to his permitting Polish President Moscicki to go to Switzerland (1828/352230). A Berlin telegram of Oct. 14 made it clear that Germany remained unalterably opposed to Moscicki's departure (1328/352231).

No. 101

103/111605

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 386

BERLIN, September 19, 1939.¹

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 385.²

I request that you tell M. Stalin that you reported to Berlin about your conference with him, and that you are now expressly directed by me to inform him that the agreements which I made on the authorization of the Führer at Moscow will, of course, be kept, and that they are regarded by us as the foundation stone of the new friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

RIBBENTROP

¹ The telegram was sent to the Foreign Ministry from Ribbentrop's special train at 4:37 p. m. on Sept. 19.

² Document No. 90.

No. 102

169/82774

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 19, 1939.

During today's conference with Field Marshal Göring, the discussion came around to the serious difficulties of transportation in bringing Rumanian petroleum to Germany and the critical importance of the Cernăuți-Lwów-Kraków-Breslau railroad line from this point of view. The Field Marshal requested that Ambassador Ritter and

I lay this matter before the Foreign Minister especially, although it was probably already being taken into consideration in the course of the current deliberations. If we did not succeed in establishing a common German-Rumanian boundary along the course of this railroad line, all possible arrangements ought nevertheless to be made—no matter under whose sovereignty any intervening territory might fall—to bring the line under our administration, perhaps through an extraterritorial arrangement.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.¹

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 237, footnote 4.

No. 103

108/111606-07

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 20, 1939—2:22 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 20—8:10 a. m.

No. 394 of September 19

With reference to my telegram No. 385 of September 18.¹

Molotov asked me to call on him today at 7:00 p. m. and with evident agitation told me the following: Warlimont, Chief of Operations Branch [*Chef Operationsabteilung*], yesterday showed the Soviet Deputy Military Attaché in Berlin a map on which the future German "Reich border" was drawn. It ran along the Vistula and passed through Warsaw, but then was plotted in such a way as to leave Lwów on the German side. This line contradicted the agreements in Moscow made in the presence of the Foreign Minister, according to which the San had been decided upon as the southern boundary of the two spheres of interest, with Lwów falling into the Soviet sphere. The Soviet Government and Stalin personally were astonished at this obvious violation of the Moscow agreement. He asked me to clarify the matter as soon as possible since it had caused great consternation here.

I replied to Molotov emphatically that this could only be a misunderstanding and what the Soviet Deputy Military Attaché had seen on the map shown him was surely not the Reich border but at most a tentatively contemplated line of demarcation regarding which the German officer sent to Moscow was now to negotiate.

¹ Document No. 90.

In view of the extraordinary import of the matter, I urgently request that I be authorized to relieve the Soviet apprehensions immediately.

SCHULENBURG

No. 104

103/111608

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

Moscow, September 20, 1939—2:23 a. m.

No. 395 of September 19

Received September 20—4:55 a. m.

Molotov stated to me today that the Soviet Government now considered the time has come to establish definitively, jointly with the German Government, the structure of the Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by the Soviet Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. The Soviet Government wishes to commence negotiations on this matter at once, and to conduct them in Moscow, since such negotiations must be conducted on the Soviet side by persons in the highest positions of authority who cannot leave the Soviet Union. Request telegraphic instructions.

SCHULENBURG

No. 105

96/107997-98

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

ANKARA, September 20, 1939—5:55 p. m.

No. 316 of September 20

Received September 20—9:30 p. m.

Saracoglu stated yesterday to the Party committee that negotiations for the conclusion of definitive alliance treaties were progressing. Minister Ali Fuad today told our informant that their scope was substantially limited as compared with the declaration in the Chamber on May 12.¹ In case of a Mediterranean conflict between Italy on the one side and England and France on the other, Turkey would remain neutral and the *casus foederis* would enter into operation only if Turkey were herself attacked. England is pressing hard for sign-

¹ See document No. 69, footnote 1.

ing before the trip to Moscow because she is afraid that additional commitments might be imposed on Saracoglu there.

The excitement here over the Russian attitude is as great as ever. At the same time the Foreign Ministry is greatly exasperated at us because we have spoiled Turkey's plan and Saracoglu is now sitting between all chairs. The urgent necessity of replacing him could be supported in Moscow by pointing out the fact that this Anglophile Minister offers little security for Russia as well.

Rumania's neutrality with respect to Russia has made things much easier here. One can already hear from Foreign Ministry circles that if Russia should occupy Bessarabia the mutual assistance obligation arising out of the Balkan Pact² would not apply because Bessarabia is not part of the Balkans.

I have heard on good authority that England sent Turkey a note demanding that she limit her foreign trade to her own immediate needs. The desire for a revision of the economic relations with Germany prevailing among many people will in any case not be realized until after Saracoglu's return and after Turkey's position in relation to England and Russia has been defined precisely.

Saracoglu is leaving Thursday night. The agreement between Italy and Greece³ will greatly strengthen our position in the future.

PAPEN

² Signed by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania on Feb. 9, 1934. For the text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937* (London, 1950), vol. CXXI, pp. 712-714.

³ See document No. 96.

No. 106

B18/B003047

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

HELSINKI, September 20, 1939—8:41 p. m.

Received September 20—12 midnight.

No. 228 of September 20

Pol. VI 2125.

The Finnish Foreign Minister¹ told me that Molotov had ordered the Russian Ministry of Economics to begin Finnish-Russian economic negotiations. In doing so Molotov had stated, however, that he did not wish to bring up the Åland question² at present; he merely took cognizance of the fact that the island had not as yet been fortified.

¹ J. Eljas Erkkö.

² See vol. v, ch. iv, and vols. vi and vii.

The Foreign Minister was very desirous that the Åland question be settled. It was not necessary to have the consent of Russia, since she was not a signatory power; but Russia would have to drop her objections, especially the demand for participation in the fortification. Finland did not wish to make a Gibraltar out of Åland. The question had less military than psychological significance.

I have the impression that the Foreign Minister would appreciate it if Germany used her influence in Moscow toward a settlement of the question, and I believe that it would also be in the German interest if this point of difference between Finland and Russia were eliminated.³

BLÜCHER

* In telegram No. 284 of Sept. 22, Weizsäcker replied as follows: "We do not intend at present to intervene actively in this question and must leave it to the Finnish Government itself to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government. If necessary, please explain that this attitude is based on the present circumstances." (B18/B003048)

No. 107

1751/404002-03

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TALLINN, September 20, 1939—[11:05 p. m.]

No. 152 of September 20

[Received September 21—2:10 a. m.]¹

With reference to my telegram report No. 147 of September 19.²

I have learned from the Foreign Minister that Molotov informed the Estonian Minister to Moscow in a friendly manner yesterday that Soviet-Russian naval forces had received orders to track down and liquidate [*liquidieren*] the escaped Polish submarine—even in waters near Tallinn—because of the menace it represented to Soviet Russian shipping; the measure was in no way directed against Estonia. Thereupon the Minister had been instructed to give Molotov an exact account of the submarine's escape, which refuted yesterday's Tass report that Estonian authorities had intentionally permitted the submarine to escape. He had likewise been told to state that the Estonian Government was agreeable to the action of the Soviet fleet against the submarine and would support this action with its own naval craft; it considered the submarine as an armed vessel without a government sailing on its own responsibility. The Foreign Minister added that

¹ The information in brackets is from another copy (116/66632).

² Document No. 98.

Estonia would treat the Soviet Russian naval forces as belonging to a neutral power, so that their entry into Estonian territorial waters was admissible under existing regulations.

On the basis of this feeler and the favorable reports from Moscow concerning the progress in the Estonian-Soviet economic and transit negotiations, the frame of mind here is somewhat less uneasy as to the designs which Russia is feared to have on Estonia. I hear quite confidentially that in their transit negotiations the Russians had expressed a wish for extensive use of the port of Tallinn as a transshipment center for Soviet export goods, with repair facilities for Soviet vessels. Great significance was attached here to the effect of these plans on Estonian-Soviet relations. The wish to cooperate with the Russians did exist, but on the other hand there was also the fear that if they first gained a foothold this might be followed by the further extension of Soviet Russian influence and an intensification of Communist propaganda. I would be grateful for instructions on whether and in what sense I should exert influence on the attitude of the Estonian government toward the Soviet demands.¹ As the matter is treated here with strict secrecy, please do not inform the Estonian Minister there.

FROHWEIN

¹ In a telegram of Sept. 24, Schmidt of Ribbentrop's Secretariat replied as follows: "The Foreign Minister asks you to take an attitude dictated essentially by the new German-Soviet collaboration, which is of great value to Germany. If questions come up, as in the telegram in question [the document printed here], be as reserved as possible." (116/66634)

No. 108

1369/357059-60

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 401 of September 20 Moscow, September 20, 1939—11:20 p. m.
 Received September 21—12:20 p. m.
 W IV 3574.

With reference to your telegram No. 372 of September 17 (W IV 3500).¹

1. Herr Schnurre's presence is desirable for technical reasons; a short delay is unimportant. It is not likely that the Soviet Government will be offended.

2. The export capacity of the Soviet Union is in itself limited since the increase in production has failed for years to keep pace with the increased requirements at home. The Soviet Union has probably reached nearly the limit of its capacity in promising us raw materials

¹ Document No. 82.

deliveries to a value of 180 million RM within 2 years. Owing to the recent developments, the Soviet Union's deliveries to some countries have ceased or become impracticable (e. g., lumber to England, ores and cotton to Poland, petroleum to Italy, etc.). Thus, additional quantities of raw materials are available for German needs; but the military intervention of the Soviet Union has probably greatly increased her own requirements.

3. The transportation situation is more strained than ever as a result of military requirements. Passenger traffic is already severely curtailed. At this moment it is extremely difficult to give any conclusive judgment on the probable development in the transportation question.

SCHULENBURG

No. 109

108/111613-14

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 20, 1939—11:46 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 21—4:10 a. m.

No. 402 of September 20

With reference to your telegram [386] of September 19.¹

I spoke with Molotov this afternoon at 6:30. Our intention to withdraw to the agreed demarcation line between the two spheres of interest is no longer doubted. Molotov declared on the other hand, after he had talked with Stalin several times, and although I had taken the greatest pains to convince him, that the Soviet Government could not agree to the Przemyśl-Turka-Użok Pass line which we proposed,² but had to insist on the line of the upper San. The reason given was consideration for the Ukrainians, who claimed the entire area as far as the San as national territory and must not be disappointed by the Soviet Government.

In return the Soviet Government was willing to let us have Suwałki and the surrounding country, together with the railroad, but not Augustów.

¹ Document No. 101. The number is taken from the final draft of the telegram in the files of the Moscow Embassy (127/69739-41).

² The files of the Moscow Embassy contain the following unsigned notation of a telephone conversation between Ribbentrop and Köstring at 11:45 a. m. Sept. 20: "The German and Russian Governments have jointly determined the demarcation line between the German and Russian spheres of influence. This line runs along the rivers Pissa, Narew, Vistula, [and] San up to and including Przemyśl and from there in a southerly direction through Turka to the Użok Pass. Przemyśl and Turka, including the railroad and roads, are in the German sphere of interest." (127/69716)

Molotov accordingly suggested the following communiqué: "The German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have established the line of demarcation between the German Army and the Red Army. The line of demarcation runs along the Pissa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers." I thereupon pointed out that our proposal was concerned mainly with a line of demarcation and that the final determination of the political boundary had not yet been made and was reserved for further negotiations. Molotov nevertheless insisted that the military line of demarcation, too, must follow the upper San.

Please send telegraphic instructions as to whether and, if so, when the communiqué proposed by Molotov should be published.

SCHULENBURG

No. 110

323/193753-54

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Latvia

Telegram

No. 274

BERLIN, September 20, 1939.
zu Pol. V 8961.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 174 of September 18.¹

For guidance of your conversation.

I refer you to the Führer's speech of today ² and the communiqué of the Reich and Soviet Governments published yesterday,³ as well as the comments on them in the entire German press.

We are of the opinion that the question asked you by Munters primarily concerns the Soviet Government.

Latvian fears based on recent developments seem to us unfounded, particularly as long as the conduct of that Government remains correct and friendly toward Germany.⁴ We are convinced that, in accordance with the Russian nonaggression treaties with the Baltic countries and in accordance with the Russian statement to the Latvian Minister, the Soviet Government does not intend to violate the borders of Latvia or of Estonia and Lithuania either, so long as by their actions these states give no occasion for this.

The Latvian Minister here was merely told, in answer to the question he asked officially today about the demarcation line between German and Russian troops, that according to yesterday's German Army

¹ Document No. 89.

² Hitler's speech of Sept. 19 at Danzig is printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, Sept.-Oct. 1939, pp. 929-944.

³ See document No. 94.

⁴ The passages scored through were deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

communiqué the German troops were now approximately at the line Lwów Brest Litovsk Bialystok.⁵

WIEHLSACKER

⁵ Further expressions of Latvian alarm about Russian intentions and of desire for reassurance from Germany were conveyed in telegrams from Riga on Sept. 20 (115/117848-49; 323/193758). Kotze was thereupon informed that Ribbentrop wished him to "remain aloof" if such questions were raised in the future "and simply to refer to the Non-Aggression Pact." (Telegram No. 278 of Sept. 21, 323/193759)

No. 111

5556/E395415-16

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 560

BERLIN, September 20, 1939.
zu W 1827 g.¹

We are willing in principle to turn over to Rumania captured Polish war material in exchange for long term delivery contracts.²

The weapons involved would for the most part be those of French, Polish, and Russian make, and a smaller amount of Skoda and Bofors material.

Nothing can be said for the time being regarding the types and quantities of weapons, since so far there are no particulars available.

Therefore please continue the discussions with the Minister President and suggest that he draw up a list of desiderata.

Rumanian payment should consist principally of petroleum and feed grain deliveries on as long-term a basis as possible; negotiations concerning the details should be held immediately.³

WIEHL

¹ W 1827 g: Document No. 74

² A preliminary list was sent by Fabricius in telegram No. 623 of Sept. 24 (5556/E595427).

³ According to a memorandum by Wiehl of the previous day (2117/460843-44), acceptance of the Rumanian proposal had been urged by Göring in a conference with Wiehl and Ritter.

No. 112

111/116237

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 20, 1939.

Ambassador Oshima told me yesterday evening that the most important point which he wished to discuss personally with the Foreign Minister today was the following:

It was still to be expected that within the next few days a new Chinese Central Government would be formed with the support of the Japanese. The psychological reorientation of the Japanese Army toward cooperation with the Soviet Union, which had not yet been effected and which was very difficult to effect, would be made considerably easier if the Soviet Government would recognize the new Chinese Central Government and thereby abandon Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador did not discuss the question of recognition by Germany.

WOERMANN

No. 113

115/117621-22

Outline of a Defense Treaty Between the German Reich and the Republic of Lithuania

September 20, 1939.

The Government of the German Reich and the Lithuanian Government, in view of the general political situation in Europe and in order to guarantee the interests of the two countries, which complement each other in every respect, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Without prejudice to her independence as a state, Lithuania stands under the protection of the German Reich.

Article II

In order that this protection may be realized, Germany and Lithuania are concluding a military convention with each other.

Article III

The two Governments shall enter into negotiations with each other at once for the purpose of establishing a close and comprehensive economic relationship between the two countries.

Substance of the Military Agreement

1. The strength, distribution, and equipment of the Lithuanian Army shall be regularly determined in close agreement with the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

2. For the practical execution of provision 1, a permanent German military commission shall be dispatched to Kaunas.

No. 114

321/193141

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 399 of September 21

BERLIN, September 21, 1939.

RAM 487.

According to a Russian Army communiqué Vilna has been occupied by Russian troops. In our agreement, Lithuania's interest in this area was recognized by both sides. We therefore assume that it is understood that in the final territorial reorganization in the East the Vilna area will be awarded to Lithuania in a form still to be arranged between us. I answered an informal inquiry by the Lithuanian Government a few days ago to the effect that we had no objection to an incorporation of the Vilna area into the Lithuanian national territory and that we had reason to believe that Russia took the same position. Naturally I did not hint in any way at the existence of secret agreements with Russia.

In your next conversation with MM. Molotov and Stalin please bring up this point in a friendly way and clarify it.

RIBBENTROP

No. 115

103/111615

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 21, 1939.

No. 401

RAM No. 488.

With reference to your telegram No. 402.¹

1. We agree to the communiqué in the form suggested by the Soviet Government and shall publish the communiqué in this form in the Friday morning press.

2. According to the Moscow agreements the four-river line was meant only as the "approximate" boundary of the two spheres of interest. From the standpoint of a simplified border line it is not easy for us to accept the western bend of the upper San as a boundary. But we are willing to do so in consideration of the reasons stated by M. Molotov. In the interest of a practicable boundary, however, we

¹ Document No. 109.

in turn lay stress on having the sharp northern corner of Russian territory projecting between Lithuania and East Prussia eliminated by an appropriately clear line. We should accordingly welcome it if Russia would give up Augustów and the surrounding forest. If this cannot be obtained, it would be desirable at least to have the border run east along the lake and river line just north of Augustów.

Please discuss this there at once in a friendly way and secure Augustów and the forest for Germany if possible.

RIBBENTROP

No. 116

103/111599-602

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 407¹

Zoppot,² September 21, 1939.

[Sent September 22—5:08 a. m.]

With reference to your telegram No. 374.³

We view the question of the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey as follows:

1. If the Soviet Union concludes such a pact with Turkey it is a foregone conclusion that she must make the reservation in Germany's favor mentioned by Stalin. A Russo-Turkish mutual assistance pact without such a reservation would be in direct contradiction to the new Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty. For according to this treaty Russia may not attack us in any war, whatever its nature, in which we are involved with a third power, and thus may not conclude any alliance with a third power which would commit Russia to lending assistance against Germany.

2. But even if the Soviet Government should make the reservation in favor of Germany, a Turko-Russian mutual assistance pact in our opinion is still a questionable matter, politically. As matters stand, it would tend to make it easier for Turkey, covered on the east by such a pact with Russia, to strengthen further her political ties with England and France, if this should be Turkey's intention, which seems probable in view of the commitments to France and England already entered into, though not yet completed. Nor can the Soviet Government, from the standpoint of its interests, desire or wish to promote

¹ A note from Minister Schmidt instructed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to send to Ambassador Papen personally copies of this telegram and of Moscow telegram No. 374.

² A Baltic resort near Danzig where Ribbentrop's staff was located for a few days during the Polish campaign.

³ Document No. 81.

this. For Russia's enemy in the Straits is and always will be England. This, in my opinion, is the decisive consideration for Russia. Furthermore, the treaty, if it contains the reservation in Germany's favor, would in practice be exclusively directed against Italy and Bulgaria. This would be undesirable for Germany, who is a friend of these two powers, nor would it make sense from the Soviet point of view. In our opinion it is in the interest of both Russia and Germany to bring influence to bear on Turkey with all available means to abandon her plans for an alliance with England and France and to align herself politically with Germany and Russia. Should Turkey be unable at this time to decide on detaching herself openly from England and France, there remains for her the course of neutrality toward the various groups of powers. In order, however, to bring Turkey back to this neutral course and to block the road to the definitive conclusion of her mutual assistance pact with England and France, the Soviet Government ought to make it unmistakably clear to Turkey that it would be considered an unfriendly act if Turkey should consent to the definitive conclusion of an alliance with France and England and that the Soviet Government is, in fact, counting on a reduction of Turkish commitments toward England and France. Such a condition of continuous Russian pressure on Turkey would be most desirable for the common German-Russian interests at the present time.

4. [*sic*] Should the Soviet Government, in spite of the above-mentioned objections, be unable to avoid a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, then it is our opinion that in addition to making the reservation in Germany's favor mentioned under 1 it must insist at least that in concluding such a pact Turkey engage to refrain once and for all from definitely concluding a mutual assistance pact with England and France; such a pact, after all, has so far only been envisaged in a declaration.

5. The Soviet Government will perhaps also base its demand that Turkey refrain from concluding alliances with the two western democracies on the Russo-Turkish Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact of 1925,⁴ which is still in force, as far as we know. Under this treaty Turkey may not, for instance, conclude any alliance or agreement with a third country or group of countries if it is directed against the military and maritime security of the Soviet Union. Surely the Soviet Union will be able to take the stand that in the present political circumstances Turkish military and maritime cooperation with England in the Straits would be a threat to Russia's security.

Please convey these viewpoints to MM. Stalin and Molotov, and possibly also M. Voroshilov, orally (do not read them), and ask these

⁴ See document No. 6, footnote 3.

gentlemen to continue to remain in contact with us in the matter. Please do not, of course, give out anything in writing on this subject. I am expecting a report on further developments.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In a telegram of Sept. 23, Schulenburg reported that he had carried out these instructions. Molotov had replied "that the Soviet Government was not in principle disinclined to conclude a new treaty with Turkey. In so doing it would naturally take full account of the spirit and letter of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. He understood the points which I brought forward, but it was difficult to make any concrete promises before the Soviet Government had talked with the Turkish Foreign Minister who was due to arrive in a few days. He would keep me informed on the progress of the matter." (103/111618)

No. 117

5570/E399059-60

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 21, 1939.

Minister von Heeren, Consul General Neuhausen, and Dr. Voss, the director of the Hermann Goering Works and the new director of the Skoda Works, have meanwhile negotiated with the Yugoslav Government concerning arms deliveries to Yugoslavia in return for delivery of copper, lead, zinc, tin, and hemp. The Yugoslav Minister President and Foreign Minister¹ have promised to deliver the raw materials so vitally important to us simultaneously with the delivery of German arms and, above all, to seize and ship to us the entire Yugoslav output of copper.

After Messrs. Neuhausen and Voss had made their report the Field Marshal agreed to such simultaneous delivery of 100 Messerschmitt planes, 120 Skoda antiaircraft guns, and 250 Skoda antitank guns, amounting to some 34 million reichsmarks in all. The Yugoslavs will probably be able to deliver about 4 million reichsmarks worth of the said raw materials per month, so that the delivery of the above-mentioned arms would also extend over a period of about eight months.

To this extent the credit and payment treaties concluded with regard to these arms deliveries are amended in our favor. As regards the remaining deliveries on credit, dilatory tactics are to be used in the forthcoming negotiations of the governmental committees in October.

We recently told the Italians, who had likewise shown interest in the Skoda antiaircraft guns, that in the present circumstances we needed them ourselves.² Any possible Italian representations that

¹ Dragisha Cvetkovich and Aleksander Cincar-Markovich.

² See also vol. VII, document No. 240.

deliveries were now being made to Yugoslavia in spite of this could be met by stating that the copper deliveries, etc., were of vital importance to us and that in the last few days the Italians had made the Yugoslavs an offer of the same number of antiaircraft guns in competition with Skoda.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request that he approve the simultaneous transaction.³ The signing is to take place in Belgrade early next week, if possible.⁴

The High Command of the Wehrmacht (General Thomas) has approved the arrangement.

This arrangement would also have the political advantage that Yugoslavia must seize the output of the French copper mine and of the British lead and zinc mine—which heretofore went preponderantly to France and England—in order to be able to deliver it to us, thereby unequivocally adopting *benevolent* neutrality toward us.

WIEHL

³ Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

⁴ An agreement of this kind in the form of a secret protocol, followed by an exchange of letters between the German and Yugoslav delegates, was signed in Belgrade on Oct. 5, 1939 (8498/E597109-18). On Oct. 13, however, Weizsäcker informed Heeren that this agreement, in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, was not in accordance with instructions and therefore Heeren should come to Berlin (8500/E597139). A conference was held in the Economics Ministry on Oct. 17 which was attended by representatives of the agencies concerned (5570/E399120-23). One of the principal decisions of this conference was to accept the view held by the Wehrmacht, that no more than 100 Skoda antitank guns could be delivered to Yugoslavia. This change in the agreement of Oct. 5 was formally recognized by an exchange of letters between Heeren and Yugoslav State Secretary Pilja on Nov. 8, reported by the former in a telegram of the same day (5570/E399156-57).

No. 118

456/224148-50

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 21, 1939.

In reply to telegram 149 of September 19 from Copenhagen,¹ I communicated the following to Minister von Renthe-Fink for his imminent conversation with the Danish Foreign Minister:

1. There could be no talk of a complete change in position on the part of Germany, nor could we understand that all Northern countries should have been of a different opinion. As early as September 12 our Minister in Helsinki had informed the Finnish Foreign Minister²

¹ See document No. 83, footnote 2. Wiehl's reply to Renthe-Fink was apparently by telephone.

² No record of this conversation has been found. See, however, document No. 42.

concerning our stand regarding the communications of Herr von Hassell and the conduct of sea warfare.

2. We welcome the fact that Minister Mohr told Herr Walter that Denmark was hoping to enforce the system of normal exports vis-à-vis England and that it would then be possible for the other neutral countries, too, to demand of England maintenance of their normal trade. We hope in particular that the countries overseas will be successful in this with reference to their deliveries to Germany.

3. We assume the Danes have already been told during the conversations in Copenhagen that we still intend in principle to stand by Herr von Hassell's statements. They were made on the assumption, of course, that the neutrality rule, "continuation of normal exchange and transit of goods", is valid all over the world (see paragraph 2 above); Germany cannot tolerate England's applying this neutrality rule only where it is advantageous for England and disregarding it where it would be advantageous for Germany. For this reason we must basically reserve to ourselves the right to deviate at any time from our own intentions vis-à-vis the neutral countries and to adopt the practices which England has previously used vis-à-vis other neutral countries. The responsibility for such a development would be England's, not Germany's.

Herr von Renthe-Fink remarked that his conversation with the Danish Foreign Minister had already taken place yesterday afternoon; he was having another conversation with him tonight, however, during which he would utilize the above. The essential point in the matter was actually whether we wished to make our attitude toward Denmark dependent on British concessions for our overseas imports.

In this respect I referred to the above communication just transmitted.

In this connection I also mentioned the Panama Conference which begins today, adding that it would probably be of interest for the stand to be taken by the neutrals in South America to hear more about the views and intentions of Denmark and the Northern neutrals.³

WIEHL

Addendum: Herr von Renthe-Fink telephoned again tonight and reported that he had had opportunity to make use of the ideas communicated by telephone this morning vis-à-vis the Danish Foreign Minister and had in general met with understanding. He believed that the Danes would approach Argentina and perhaps induce the Belgians and Dutch to do likewise. WIEHL.

³ See document No. 86.

No. 119

1751/403973-75

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

No. 4859

TALLINN, September 21, 1939.

Received September 29.

Pol. VI 2177.

Subject: Political relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union.

With reference to my telegram No. 152.¹

Foreign Minister Selter expressed to me his regret that the Polish submarine *Orzel* had succeeded in escaping from the internment imposed by the Government, despite the Estonian guard put over her. There would be a close investigation of this most embarrassing incident, and any person entrusted with guarding the submarine who might be guilty would be court-martialed. Unfortunately the Polish Legation here was evidently not entirely innocent of this escape.

Minister Selter then put at my disposal for my confidential information the text of the instructions—a translation of which is enclosed ²—which directed the Estonian Minister in Moscow to answer Molotov's communication on the action taken by the Soviet Navy against the Polish submarine that escaped from internment.

The statement in the instructions that the Polish Legation claimed the vessel had suffered damage relates to the fact that according to the Estonian neutrality law (Section 2, Paragraph 5), with which the Foreign Ministry is acquainted, and which is based on the so-called Scandinavian neutrality regulations, a submarine of a belligerent state may put into an Estonian port if forced to do so by damage or heavy seas, on condition that she leave immediately on removal of the impediment. The investigation by the Estonian Government prior to internment accordingly had the purpose of ascertaining whether any damage had actually occurred which would definitely interfere with the use of the ship. The Commission answered this question in the negative, and internment was consequently imposed. The vessel broke internment during the disarmament operations which were carried out by her own crew under Estonian supervision. Of the Estonian guards, one non-commissioned officer and a sailor were overpowered and carried off aboard the vessel; as was learned last night, these two

¹ Document No. 107.² Not printed (8512/E597373-79).

men have meanwhile been put ashore on Gotland by the submarine's boat.

As already stated in my telegraphic report, Molotov's communication to the Estonian Minister, which was answered in accordance with the enclosed instructions, was in a friendly tone; it contained the explicit statement that the Soviet Union intended no action that was directed against Estonia; if a unit of the Soviet Navy should by chance enter Estonian territorial waters in search of the submarine the Estonian Government should therefore not regard this as an intentional unfriendly act. On the part of Estonia the fact is appreciated that Molotov's statement and the Estonian answer have clarified the solidarity of the two Navies regarding the Polish submarine and that the tension between the two countries, which was originally feared on the basis of the Tass report, thus did not materialize.

The Estonian Navy actually spent considerable time searching for the submarine, which was, moreover, during her escape fired upon by a coastal battery; the Estonian naval vessels were then recalled, however, in order to avoid any incidents with the Soviet Navy. The Soviet naval forces have now returned to their base, according to a report received today; only patrol vessels are still believed to be in the vicinity of the Estonian coast.

I enclose a clipping from the *Revalsche Zeitung* of September 21, containing a German translation of the Tass report in question and the semiofficial reply published by the Estonian press bureau ETA, together with a denial of the assertion published by a Finnish newspaper that the Soviet fleet was blockading the Estonian ports.²

FROHWEIN

² Enclosures not reprinted.

No. 120

8028/599607

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Radlogram

URGENT

Unnumbered, September 22

BUCHAREST, September 22, 1939.

Received September 22—10:50 a. m.

Pol. IV 5214

The Court Minister¹ told me that the Rumanian Government was doing everything possible to stop rumors now being circulated in Rumania regarding German relations with the Iron Guard and the assassins of the Minister President.² Yesterday's

¹ Ernest Urdareanu.

² Armand Calinescu was assassinated by members of the Iron Guard on Sept. 21, 1939.

radio announcement also served this purpose. Meanwhile the principal assassin, Dimitrescu, had stated that he had left Germany with the aid of a member of the Iron Guard by the name of Popovici; he had crossed the Rumanian border from Hungary on September 17. The other assassins were well-known members of the Iron Guard here who had not been so closely watched of late.

He asked us to take measures to keep a very close watch on any members of the Iron Guard who were still in Germany and to prevent their departure.³ He named Horia (?), Voghen, and Popovici. Furthermore, he expected it would have a particularly good effect on public opinion if the German press would dissociate itself from the Iron Guard, or if the measures taken were publicized. I referred him to today's statements in the German press, which could be made public here.

At any rate, it appears expedient for the German press not to criticize the severe measures which the police here will certainly resort to once more against members of the Iron Guard.

FABRICIUS

³ On Sept. 26, the Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the Office of the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police, and requested, with reference to this Bucharest telegram, an investigation into recent departures from Germany of Iron Guard members which might reveal the identity of Calinescu's assassins; the Foreign Ministry also asked that Iron Guard members still in Germany be watched closely and prevented from leaving (3028/599608-09). A letter by the Gestapo sent on Dec. 16 in reply to this communication admitted the possibility that a certain Dumitru Dumitrescu might have left Germany to commit the murder but expressed doubts that two other Rumanians identified as Alexandro Popovici and Victor Ion Voien had been involved in the assassination. According to the Gestapo, close surveillance of Guardists residing in Germany was impractical but they had been summoned individually by the police and warned not to engage in political activities directed against Rumania. (3028/599632-34)

No. 121

321/198148

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, September 22, 1939—8:45 p. m.

No. 157 of September 22

Received September 22—11:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 155 of September 21.¹

Along with Urbšys' reply that he was extremely grateful for the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to come to Danzig and would accept it, he also made political statements, obviously the result of the previous deliberations, as follows: Lithuania in the present situation wished to continue to cultivate friendly relations with her

¹ Not printed (321/198142): Notification that Zechlin had spoken to Foreign Minister Urbšys about a proposed visit to Danzig to take place possibly on Sept. 23.

neighbors and particularly with Germany. She also wished to continue her policy of neutrality, and to emerge free and independent from the present difficult international situation. Her goal was to enjoy good relations with all other states, too, but she gave primary emphasis to her relations with her neighbors. Lithuania had national aspirations, but, as Minister President Černius had recently declared (see telegram No. 150),² she wished to achieve them by peaceful means.

Finally he asked that the thanks of the Lithuanian Government be conveyed to the German Government for the understanding that it had recently shown for Lithuania's national demands.

Presumably these are also the (group garbled) that Urbšys received for tomorrow's visit to Danzig.³

ZECHLIN

² Not printed (321/193133-34). A short summary of Černius' radio address of Sept. 17.

³ On Sept. 22, Erich Kordt noted that at 9:00 p. m. at Ribbentrop's behest he telephoned instructions for Zechlin to ask Urbšys to delay his visit for a few days (115/117626). On Sept. 28, Urbšys was still willing to make the trip (321/193149), but on Oct. 2 he accepted Molotov's invitation to come to Moscow and did not return until Oct. 14 (321/193169). The project fell through when Urbšys was summoned to Moscow.

No. 122

800/274051

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, September 22, 1939—11:02 p. m.

No. 411 of September 22

Received September 22[23?]-2:15 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 401 of September 21.¹

1. The Soviet Government will issue a communiqué worded as shown below, and requests that the identical text be published afterwards in Germany, too:²

"The German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have defined the demarcation line between the German Army and the Red Army. It follows the course of the Pissa to its junction with the Narew, thence along the Narew to its junction with the Bug, thence along the Bug to its junction with the Vistula, thence along the Vistula to its junction with the San and thence to the source of the San."

¹ Document No. 115.

² The *Völkischer Beobachter* of Sept. 23, printed the following announcement of the previous day: "The German Government and the Government of the USSR have defined the demarcation line between the German Army and the Red Army. The demarcation line runs along the Pissa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers." *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1941), vol. VII, pt. I, p. 325.

2. I presented to Molotov our wishes regarding Augustów and the forest, forcibly and with detailed justification, emphasizing in particular the value attached by the Reich Government to the border line proposed by us.

Molotov reserved decision until consultation with Stalin.

SCHULENBURG

No. 123

821/193144

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, September 22, 1939—11:03 p. m.

No. 412 of September 22

Received September 23—2:15 a. m.

With reference to telegram No. 399 of September 21.¹

Molotov told me today that the Soviet Government will adhere to the agreements reached on the Vilna question but does not believe that the time is ripe for discussing details. He had made a statement to the same effect to the Lithuanian Minister, too, adding that the Soviet Union would not be forgetful of Lithuania.

Molotov indicated that the Vilna question was part of the entire Baltic-complex, and that it would have to be taken into account in the final settlement.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 114.

No. 124

127/69721-22

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, September 23, 1939—3:40 a. m.

No. 417 of September 22 Received Moscow September 23—11:05 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 295 [395].¹

We, too, consider the time now ripe to establish by treaty jointly with the Soviet Government the definitive structure of the Polish area. The Russian idea of a border line along the well-known four-river line coincides in general with the view of the Reich Government. It was my original intention to invite M. Molotov to Germany in

¹ Document No. 104.

order to formulate this treaty. In view of your report that the leading personages there cannot leave the Soviet Union, we agree to negotiations in Moscow. Contrary to my original purpose of entrusting you with these negotiations, I have decided to fly to Moscow myself. This particularly because—in view of the full powers granted me by the Führer, thus making it possible to dispense with further consultations, etc.—negotiations can be brought to a speedier conclusion. In view of the general situation, my sojourn in Moscow will have to be limited to 1 or 2 days at the most. Please call on MM. Stalin and Molotov and wire me earliest proposed date.

RIBBENTROP

No. 125

34/23390

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 23, 1939—8:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 23—9:35 p. m.

No. 427 of September 23

With reference to your telegram No. 417 of September 22.¹

Instruction carried out. Completed at 6 p. m. today at Molotov's office. The Soviet Government welcomes the projected visit of the Reich Foreign Minister. In view of the great significance and extreme importance of the question, the Soviet Government feels several days would be needed for consultation and preparation. Molotov will advise me the day after tomorrow at the latest (tomorrow is the day of rest here) when the visit should take place.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 124.

² At 10:15 p. m., Sept. 23, Molotov summoned Schulenburg to inform him that Sept. 27 or 28 would be agreeable to the Soviet Government (34/23391).

No. 126

103/111803

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 753

BERLIN, September 23, 1939.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

I have read the telegraphic instruction to Moscow regarding the assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey,¹ and state my views according to instructions as follows:

¹ Document No. 116.

Our most recent reports from Ankara² indicate that the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish assistance pacts are to enter into effect only in the event that Turkey should be attacked. If this information is correct, then Turkey has already withdrawn as far as we could desire.

It would be useful, however, if Turkey were to promise the Russians in addition not to allow either her territory or the Straits to be misused by England and France.

Such a promise would be equally in the interest of Russia and of Germany.

The opportunity for a conversation with M. Molotov in this connection could in my opinion also be used for ascertaining whether the Russians [will] talk about Bessarabia with the Turkish Foreign Minister. We ought to make sure that we will not be taken by surprise by a Russian action against Bessarabia.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 105.

No. 127

495/288418-19

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 754

BERLIN, September 23, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called my attention today to the well-known recent article in *Popolo d'Italia*, which, although not written by Mussolini, is entirely in accordance with his views. It also presents the idea repeatedly brought forward here by Attolico that a peace effort should now still be made in order not to miss the political turning-point marked by the transition of the war from the East to the West. Attolico now spoke for the third time about a generous gesture, which obviously would consist in our setting up a residual Poland.

When I asked the Ambassador whether these ideas were really those of the Duce—saying that Mackensen had not reported anything to us about this for a long time—Attolico stated that the Duce and Ciano were somewhat wary after the various fruitless suggestions of the past weeks and did not wish to call forth any more refusals from us. It was clear, however, that time is pressing, that the French people were still receptive to peace proposals, and that the chance would be gone once the war really began in earnest in the West.

By chance I had the opportunity to ask the German Military Attaché in Rome, General von Rintelen, what he knew about these sentiments of the Italians. The General called on the Duce a week ago and heard from him almost word for word the same observations as Attolico presented to me again and again during his last visits.

It should also be added that Attolico recommends a generous offer even in case we could not count on a favorable response from the enemy governments. The psychological effect in France would in any case remain and continue to promote peace.

I believe that this thought, which is urged upon us so strongly by Italy, should not be disregarded.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. (Please transmit by telephone and also send a copy.)

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 128

456/224182

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 755

BERLIN, September 23, 1939.

During an earlier visit I had casually remarked to the Italian Ambassador that Italy could set a good example in dealing with British attempts to apply pressure to the economic policy of the neutrals and could in a sense act as the leader of the neutrals.

Today Attolico reverted to this idea and said that the formation of neutral blocs as a defense against the British attempts was becoming a necessity. The Oslo States already had such a bloc. The Pan-American Conference showed similar intentions. Italy could probably assume leadership in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Attolico wished me to tell him whether we favored such an idea, which was becoming all the more urgent as the maintenance of as large an element of real neutrals as possible might be important at the moment of the conclusion of peace. Italy wished to act only in the economic field, however, and wanted to know whether we had any objections.

I told Attolico that our opinion concerning such action would depend on what opposition such a group of states would actually put up against the British acts of violence. Basically, in my opinion, there were no objections to the formation of such an economic group by the neutrals. I would, however, like to consult the Foreign Minister once more in the matter.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for instructions.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On Sept. 29, Ciano informed Mackensen that he had had a "very favorable" reaction from Ribbentrop as well as from Weizsäcker (Rome telegram No. 597 of Sept. 29: 96/108027).

No. 129

B21/B005123-25

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1939—1:53 a. m.

No. 416 of September 24

Received September 25—8:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 363 (P. 12147) of September 23.¹

1. The American isolationists, who for well-considered patriotic reasons advocate the retention of the arms embargo, are being attacked with telling arguments by the opposite party. It is said that they are working for Hitler and the establishment of world domination by Germany, which will one day threaten America, too. We should therefore avoid anything that could be interpreted through the German [*American?*] press as a backing of the isolationists and German interference in America's day-to-day politics. Any conspicuous interest taken in the fate of the arms embargo plays into the hands of the British.

2. The American people as a whole are today a good deal more hostile toward Germany and also more united than in 1917. Their convictions are altogether unneutral; they want Britain and France to win the war and us to lose it. The great rift existing among the people involves only the method by which America can give all-out assistance to the Allies without being drawn into the war or having to send an expeditionary force. The isolationists hold the view that the retention of the arms embargo would diminish the risk of war for America. Their main argument is the unrestricted delivery of arms in the World War, as a result of which America became involved in the war. They are inconsistent—and the opposite party is taking advantage of this—in that they do not object to the delivery of raw materials and semi-finished goods essential for warfare, owing to their concern for agriculture and industry. The interventionists believe in helping the Allies to gain superiority by supplying armaments, especially aircraft, thereby shortening the war and forestalling active participation by America in the war through an early victory of the Allies. Forces frankly urging war are as yet working only behind the scenes, and in view of the basic attitude of the American people do not appear in the open.

3. In view of the vivid recollection in this country of the (group garbled) blunders committed through participation in the World

¹ Not found.

War, which is kept alive especially by the veteran's organizations, we should operate only with the following historical arguments in this contest of opinions over the ways of preventing America's entry into the war: The senseless and useless sacrifice of lives and national wealth in the World War; the vast burden of public debt due to participation in the war; the economic disintegration in the post-war period; the munitions industry as a war profiteer; Britain's cynical role as a debtor; Britain's outrageous chicanery with regard to American trade and shipping; Britain's double-dealing in 1916 (concealment of secret treaties); the results of the lying slogan "make the world safe for democracy"; America's refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty.

4. It would be a mistake, on the other hand, to offer advice to the Americans as to how they should act in the present situation, which in view of the coming Presidential elections is also deeply involved with domestic politics. Any intrusion by Germany into the Congressional contest by means of press or radio polemics weakens the prospects of the isolationists, which are poor in any case. Under the existing circumstances there is little probability that the isolationists will succeed in retaining the arms embargo. Isolationist petitions swamping the Congress, particularly from the Middle West, cannot conceal the true relation of forces. As matters stand today, a majority for the retention of the arms embargo cannot be obtained either in the Senate or the House of Representatives. The sympathies for Britain and France and for Roosevelt's popular foreign policy are far too great for that. The defeat of the isolationists would amount to an outright setback for Germany, if we should have involved ourselves too deeply in Poland.² All the effective arguments will be advanced by the isolationists themselves.

5. In whatever shape, whether with or without the arms embargo, and with the cash-and-carry clause, the Neutrality Act works to Germany's disadvantage in any event and was deliberately drawn up in that way from the beginning. Even if the arms embargo should be retained, public opinion would only permit it to be effective as long as Britain and France are not in danger of being defeated. For it is not possible to deceive oneself about the fact that in that event the will to intervene would gain the upper hand.

6. We can fight this latent will to intervene with some prospect of effectiveness only by repeating over and over again, if possible also in interviews by the highest authorities, that we have no intention of attacking America, that we respect the Monroe Doctrine just as we expect the Americans to recognize our sphere of influence, and that we have no territorial aims whatever on the American continent, and

² An error in decoding appears to have been made here.

do not intend to meddle in the form of government in the American countries.

7. On this occasion I should like to point out that a too crude type of anti-British propaganda in the newscasts by German shortwave transmitters may easily produce in the pro-British majority of the American listeners the opposite reaction from that which is intended. In enlightening America with respect to Britain's true character, we should use principally American sources, of which there is an ample supply. The slogan coined in America, "England expects every American to do his duty," might be particularly effective.

THOMSEN

No. 130

406/214433-34

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TALLINN, September 25, 1939—9:36 p. m.

No. 162 of September 25

Received September 26—12:30 a. m.

The Foreign Minister, who returned from Moscow this afternoon by plane,¹ has told me the following: Molotov presented to him the draft of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Estonia. It provided that both countries obligate themselves to give each other military assistance in the event of an attack by a third country. To this end Estonia is to place naval bases and airfields at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Both countries further pledge themselves not to support a third country in an attack on one of the contracting parties. The treaty is to be for a duration of ten years, with the possibility of an extension for another five years. A supplementary protocol is to contain a pledge not to interfere in the internal situation of the other contracting party.

The Minister explained that Molotov had insisted on an early answer, but did not set a definite date, adding, however, that the Soviet Union would find other means if the treaty were rejected. Estonia should not think that she would get any aid from Germany or England. In fact, he was convinced that Germany would approve of the agreement proposed by him.

¹ On Sept. 25, Grundherr noted that Frohwein had telephoned him at midday to report that although Foreign Minister Selter had gone to Moscow to sign an Estonian-Soviet trade agreement, the signing had not taken place and Selter was already returning to Tallinn. The Estonian Foreign Ministry was accordingly "nervous" about Soviet intentions, and there were moreover a few incidents involving a Soviet ship and Soviet planes (406/214437).

I asked the Minister whether the talk with Molotov contained any intimation that the Soviet Union was going to make similar proposals to the other Baltic States. His reply was negative.

I took note of the information received and said that I would convey it to my Government. The Estonian Government, the Minister told me, will confer on the matter today and tomorrow and make a reply at the earliest possible moment.²

FROHWEIN

* On the morning of Sept. 26, Woermann's office received a telephone message from the Legation in Estonia that the Foreign Minister had told Frohwein the following: "A decision is wanted today. We are inclined to accept." (406/214435)

No. 131

103/111625

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 25, 1939—10:58 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 26—12:30 a. m.

No. 442 of September 25

Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin at 8 p. m. today. Stalin stated the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent residual Poland. He proposed the following: From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania.

Stalin designated this suggestion as a subject for the forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and added that, if we consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the Protocol of August 23,¹ and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German Government. Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but did not mention Finland.

I replied to Stalin that I would report to my Government.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 229.

No. 132

174/136148-51

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, September 25, 1939.

The Japanese General, Count Terauchi, was received in Zoppot on September 20 by the Reich Foreign Minister at 6:00 p. m. and by the Führer at 6:30 p. m.¹

I. Conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Terauchi first expressed his gratitude for the invitation to Germany and for permission to visit the front, and then conveyed the thanks of the Japanese Army for Germany's understanding attitude toward the conflict in China. Then he expressed his warm congratulations on the German military successes in Poland. The Foreign Minister regretted his inability to welcome the Count in Berlin and Nuremberg, and gave a short account of the course of military events since September 1.

Passing on to German-Japanese relations, the Foreign Minister said that he had discussed these questions yesterday evening with the Führer and the Führer had said the following:

1. Germany and Japan were the only two Great Powers between which there were no conflicts of political interest.

2. In addition, the two states and also Italy were young, aspiring nations of whose rise England was envious. The Foreign Minister added that he was firmly convinced that Japan would be very deeply affected by the fate of Germany. If Germany fared well in Europe Japan would also fare well in East Asia; but if things went wrong for Germany, they would go wrong for Japan, too. On the other hand, Germany was in like manner interested in the success of Japan in East Asia. He was convinced of this now and had been for a long time.

¹ Colonel General Terauchi and Admiral Osumi were nominated by the Japanese Army and Navy Ministries respectively as heads of the Japanese delegation invited as honored guests of the Führer to the annual Nazi Party Rally at Nuremberg (8135/E582106, E582107). After they had landed at Naples, they were informed that although the Party Rally had been canceled, the Führer's invitation to visit Germany remained valid (8135/E582120; 174/136104, 136116). Ott ascribed their refusal of this invitation to advice given by the Japanese military and naval attachés in Berlin, and stated that their decision was much regretted by the parent ministries (174/136131). On Sept. 15 the Japanese Embassy in Berlin informed the Germans that Terauchi had decided to come to Germany after all, but requested that all festivities that had been planned in his honor be avoided and that he be allowed to visit the eastern and western fronts (174/136130).

3. Both were martial peoples and the bond of the soldierly spirit made understanding easier.

Terauchi confined himself mainly to listening and to remarking that this was also his opinion.

The Japanese Ambassador, the Japanese Military Attaché, Herr Stahmer, and the undersigned were present.

II. *Conversation with the Führer.*

The conversation with the Führer went off in a way very similar to that with the Foreign Minister. In response to Terauchi's congratulations, the Führer spoke at length of the reasons for the German invasion of Poland, the coordination of the various weapons in the Polish war, and the successes of the German Army. In regard to German-Japanese relations the Führer used almost exactly the same words as the Foreign Minister.

The Reich Foreign Minister and the persons mentioned in [section] I were present.

III. *Conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister after Dinner.*

At 7:30 p. m. the Foreign Minister gave a dinner in honor of Count Terauchi, which was also attended by General Keitel. After the dinner the Foreign Minister resumed the political conversation with Terauchi. He expanded on the statements given above under [section] I and then spoke of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. He said that for a long time he had been convinced of the necessity of German and Japanese agreements with Russia and that he would have worked for this even if a German-Japanese-Italian alliance had been achieved.² He had told Ambassador Oshima this more than a year ago, and the latter had probably reported it to Tokyo. Meanwhile he as well as Oshima had exerted great efforts to bring about a German-Japanese-Italian alliance. It was regrettable that they had not succeeded, but nothing could be done about this now. Germany for her part had been obliged to seek an understanding with Russia alone, but he was of the opinion that this would also work out well for Japan. He had already told that to the press in Moscow. He had also discussed the question with Stalin, who had replied: "If the Japanese want war they can have war, but if they desire a settlement they can also have that." The factors affecting Japanese interests, which the Foreign Minister again described as in section I, remained the same. Terauchi reiterated that he was quite of the same opinion. Ambassador Oshima, who before dinner and up to this point had only listened, now said that he believed Japan, and in particular the Japanese Navy, would be fully prepared to make an advance in Southeastern

² On the negotiations for such an alliance in the spring and summer of 1939, see vol. vi.

Asia, also in fact, against Hong Kong. He himself had also proposed this by telegram. The Foreign Minister asked him: "How far can you go?" Oshima replied that he believed Japan was in a position to go quite far in Southern Asia. He did not go into detail regarding a military advance, however. He was of the opinion that an attempt should be made to draw Holland away from England and propose a nonaggression pact to her. Then at the same time an agreement could be made with Holland which would permit Japan to exploit the raw materials of the Netherlands Indies "in an entirely legitimate way." Japan needed tin and rubber and oil from the Netherlands Indies, cotton from British India, and wool from Australia. If she obtained all these things she would be self-sufficient and very strong. Oshima's statements were very vague and uncertain. They were also merely his own personal opinion. The Foreign Minister took cognizance of these statements, without commenting on them. He made no proposals on his part, but let it be known in his subsequent statements that Germany was fully prepared and willing to cooperate with Japan against England.

Oshima did not bring the formation of a new Chinese central government into the discussion.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary in accordance with instructions.

KNOLL

No. 133

4469/E087787

Note of the Aussenpolitisches Amt

Subject: Norway.

BERLIN, September 25, 1939.

According to a communication from his deputy for Germany,¹ Quisling is planning to come to Germany in the near future.

Bürgermeister Dr. Winkler,² who was charged by the Field Marshal [Göring] through State Secretary Körner with pursuing this matter further and working out the financial aspect, has had no opportunity so far to consult with the Field Marshal.³

¹ Wiljam Hagelin, a Norwegian residing in Germany.

² Bürgermeister Max Winkler, a director of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G. m. b. H. of Berlin. See document No. 523.

³ Quisling had already been in Berlin in June 1939, and had talked to Rosenberg and Scheidt of the Aussenpolitisches Amt. Quisling had explained that he was "in a position to change decisively in a short time the political situation of Norway, provided he had the necessary money." He mentioned a loan of 6½ million RM. A meeting was then arranged with Körner who showed "great understanding" and gave the impression that he intended to take the matter up at a higher level. On June 26 a memorandum from the Aussenpolitisches Amt was sent to Lammers, evidently for Hitler's attention, analyzing the Scandinavian situation in terms of a possible European war and telling of Quisling's request for a loan of "around 6 million RM." The originals of these documents are at the German Military Documents Section, The Adjutant General's Office, U. S. Army, file No. 250-d 18-42/4, and are filmed on APA Reel No. 290.

Consequently, nothing has been done as yet in the matter itself.⁴

⁴Particulars of financial arrangements subsequently made between Quisling and German officials have been found only in part. See document No. 626; Rosenberg's report to Hess, "Political preparation of the Norway action," dated June 15, 1940, published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxv, document No. 004-PS, exhibit GB-140, pp. 26-34; and "Short report on the activities of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP from 1933 to 1943," *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxv, document No. 007-PS, exhibit GB-84, pp. 34-47. English translations of documents Nos. 004-PS and 007-PS, which also describe earlier contacts between Quisling and the APA, are printed in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. III, pp. 19-40.

No. 134

7433/E539977-79

*Unsigned Note*¹

BERLIN, September 25, 1939.

In the note of August 16, 1939, to the Führer,² I stated that the British Baronet [*sic*] de Ropp, was intended in case of war to take over the post of political adviser to the British Air Ministry on German problems. Ropp declared on a later visit prior to his departure that in his opinion the World War had lasted so long partly because all personal contacts had been broken off. Therefore he considered it to be in the best interests of both countries if, after the disposal of Poland, which was assumed to be likely, ways and means should be sought to prevent a European struggle from finally breaking out. He stated that he might be located in Switzerland as well as in London.

On Saturday, September 23, I received by the roundabout channel of a private address a card from Switzerland from Baronet de Ropp, now Squadron Leader [*Fliegermajor*], in which he asked whether at the end of September there might take place a visit to Switzerland from our side, meaning, that is, a visit by a person known to him personally. There would be involved here, therefore, a private exchange of views, which, however, would have the purpose of setting forth in very broad outlines the views of the Führer with regard to England and France and countering on the other hand with the views, also in broad outline, of the Air Ministry, now become of extreme importance as a result of the war situation and those of other important British circles as well. I might note in this connection that the personalities who are especially close to Chamberlain are fellow club-members of Baron [*sic*] de Ropp.

I request instructions from the Führer about what is to be done in this case.³

¹ This document is presumably by Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

² See vol. VII, documents Nos. 74 and 151.

³ Instructions have not been found.

No. 135

8589/E602571/1-73

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER HEADQUARTERS, September 25, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW No. 205/39 g. Kdos. WFA/LI

By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 4 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. No final decision has yet been made regarding the *political future* of the erstwhile Polish territory between the line of demarcation and the German frontier.

After the conclusion of the battles around Warsaw and Modlin, the line of demarcation is to be safeguarded adequately by less heavily equipped units.

Sufficient Army and Luftwaffe units are to be left in the East *to put a quick end to Polish resistance continuing* behind the line of demarcation (San-Vistula-Narew-Pissa). I request a report regarding the strength of forces earmarked for both of these tasks.

2. I shall decide later, in accordance with the results of local attacks and attrition warfare, on whether *Modlin* and the part of *Warsaw* west of the Vistula are to be taken by a general attack before October 3. However, this attack is to be prepared.

3. *The flow of refugees* from the east to the west across the line of demarcation is to be stopped immediately, with the exception of Volksdeutsch elements and Ukrainian activists.

4. The decision regarding the *future strategy of the war* will be made shortly.

Up to that time the measures of the Wehrmacht with regard to organization and armament are to be such as will not conflict with any possible decision. The possibility must be kept open for an offensive in the West at any time.

In East Prussia sufficient forces must be kept in readiness to occupy Lithuania quickly, even in the case of armed resistance.

5. a. *On land* the directives already given for the war in the West will, for the time being, remain in effect.

b.¹ *At sea* the former limitations are cancelled, and warfare on merchant shipping is to be conducted against France as well as Britain in accordance with prize law.

¹ Marginal note: "Paragraph 5, figures (b) and (c) superseded by Directive No. 5 [Document No. 170] figures 4 and 5."

In addition the following operations may be carried out: Attacks upon French naval and air forces, French merchant vessels in convoy, and all troop transports; mining operations off the North African coast (embarkation points); ² war on merchant shipping by naval air units, in accordance with prize law.

As heretofore, no attacks are to be made on liners or large steamers which are evidently carrying passengers in large numbers in addition to goods.

c. *In the air*, in the West, the limitations hitherto prevailing remain in force. Flights beyond the German border are permitted only for short-range or combat reconnaissance and for attacks upon artillery fire-control planes and captive balloons. The Luftwaffe may also carry out operations in the German Bight, in the western declared mine areas, and in direct support of naval operations against British or French naval units.

Permission for long-range reconnaissance will be given at a later date.

6. *With regard to submarine warfare*, from now on only the following designations are to be used:

For submarine warfare in compliance with prize law: Warfare against merchant shipping [*Handelskrieg*].

For unrestricted submarine warfare: Naval siege of the British Isles [*Belagerung Englands zur See*].

7. *British merchant vessels* ³ which are armed beyond any doubt may be attacked by submarines without warning.

ADOLF HITLER

² Marginal note: "Should read: North French coast (debarkation points)."

³ Marginal note: "Superseded by Directive No. 5."

No. 136

51/33880

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

COPENHAGEN, September 26, 1939—7:36 p.m.

No. 168 of September 26

Received September 26—8:45 p. m.

With reference to the telephone instructions of September 21 from Ministerialdirektor Wiehl¹ and our telegraphic report No. 167 of September 25.²

The sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarine has occasioned lively concern here for the Danish food transports to England. Although the reports of the Government circles here are re-

¹ See document No. 118.

² Not found.

served, this reserve by no means reflects the actual attitude; rather it is due to directives of the Government dictated by considerations of foreign policy. The Foreign Minister told me of his serious alarm yesterday. As instructed, I pointed out to him once more that we must reserve the right at all times to employ the same measures against British supplies from the neutral countries as the British themselves use against our supplies from neutral countries. But I believe that at the present stage at least almost irreparable damage would be done to our interests politically if normal Danish transports should actually be sunk by German forces.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 137

34/23396-400

Minute by the State Secretary

BERLIN, September 26, 1939.

THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

I. The war with Poland is concluded; in the West, German offensive plans are not yet ready; thus foreign policy again comes to the fore.

Our political interests are:

- (a) to keep the theater of war as small as possible,
- (b) to stimulate the desire for peace in the enemy and among the neutrals. The enemy has no concrete peace ideas. We, however, are in possession of conquered territories and able to announce war aims. Particularly, we should give the French food for thought through real hopes for peace and should promote the process of their inner detachment from the English.

II. In Moscow, in my opinion, two things should therefore be said:

(a) Russia should not disturb the peace in the Balkans and not take action in Bessarabia as long as England does not interfere militarily in the Balkans.

(b) In order to aid the peace party in France, we wish to inject the following program into the discussion:

Essentially, Germany claims the boundaries of 1914. Beyond that, the future of Rump Poland¹ depends on whether the Western Powers should now say they are willing to come around.

Should the Russians prove obdurate against a Rump Poland [including territory] on both sides of the present demarcation line, we would then have a free hand in our territory and could announce a separate solution for it.

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Concerning Rump Poland see enclosed memorandum by Ambassador von Moltke."

(c) Specific subjects for negotiation:

1. Exchange of populations between the areas east and west of the line of the rivers, especially transfer of Volksdeutsche from Russian to German territory.

2. Safeguarding the fate of the Volksdeutsche in further areas possibly to be occupied by Russia.

3. Exact delimitation of the boundary along the line of the rivers (e. g., the middle of the principal channels of navigation and the middle of the bridges) and also definition of the demarcation line from the headwaters of the San to the Użok Pass (the San has several sources).

4. Availability of the railroad from Cernăuți to Lwów for our shipments from Rumania.

5. Preparation for German-Russian trade negotiations on a larger scale.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, September 25, 1939.

MEMORANDUM BY AMBASSADOR VON MOLTKE

The question as to whether a government qualified to negotiate can be found in occupied Poland will depend on the territory that can be made available for setting up a new Polish state structure.

I. If it is possible to utilize for this purpose the wholly Polish areas situated east of the demarcation line as well and thereby confine the Soviet Union to the White Russian and Ukrainian portions of the country—to about the Grodno-Przemyśl line—the question might be answered in the affirmative. Sensible Poles ought, after all, to realize that they can regain the territories occupied by the Red Army only if we aid them in this, while otherwise these regions are lost to Poland for good. The consideration that this is the last chance to save these Polish provinces might well eliminate present objections to accepting a government dependent on Germany. In these circumstances it seems by no means impossible to establish a government which would have sufficient authority internally to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and which at the same time would be strong enough, by deposing the government which has fled to Rumania, to release the Western Powers from the treaty of guaranty concluded with that government.

For this task perhaps might be considered General Sosnkowski, who is one of the strongest personalities in Poland and who because of personal irritations and setbacks in a sense represents the opposition to Marshal Rydz-Smigly and to the President of the Republic.²

² This evidently refers to Ignacy Mościcki who had, however, resigned as President on Sept. 19.

A Polish state extending to the Grodno-Przemyśl line in the east would include only areas settled wholly by Poles and, depending on how the western boundary is drawn, should have from 12 to 15 million inhabitants. It would prevent the emergence of a common border with the Soviet Union and be strong enough to serve as a buffer state. If this state has as its western boundary the old border of the Reich and if the areas left within Germany should, by a thoroughgoing exchange of population, attain a wholly German composition, one might even count on the growth of Irredentism's being prevented and on Poland's being more or less satisfied with this national territory. Still, it would be necessary to impose firm restraint upon the new state, in order to keep its foreign policy permanently amenable toward us.

II. If the residual state which is to be created must be confined in the East to the Vistula-San line, the formation of a government able to negotiate will not be possible. There would no longer be the incentive of a last chance to save the territories in the East. Instead of accepting such a sweeping dismemberment of the country, the Poles would prefer to wait and see whether final victory will not yet fall to the Western Powers. If, for all that, certain elements were prepared to form a government under such conditions it would only be a sham government; it would not have sufficient authority either at home or abroad and could not hope to be recognized as the successor of the old government. Foreign policy actions which might lead to a basis for peace negotiations with the Western Powers could not be expected of it.

Moreover, we must recognize the impossibility of Poland's being altogether satisfied with such a territory—reduced to 9 or 10 million inhabitants.

After the resurgence of Polish nationalism during the last 20 years of independence and the quickening of chauvinism in this era, the struggle for the restoration of a state comprising all the Poles will burst forth more ardently than after the partitions in the eighteenth century, although it is possible that the Irredentist movement will turn more toward the East in accordance with the far greater losses of territory which occurred there. In view of this nationalist mentality it is not likely that politicians of standing would make themselves available for the formation of a government. This will be even more pronounced if the restraints to be imposed to guide the foreign policy of the Polish residual state should give it the character of a protectorate.

Herewith submitted to State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker.

VON MOLTKE

No. 138

66/46603-19

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 26, 1939.

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND M.
DAHLEBUS¹ IN THE PRESENCE OF FIELD MARSHAL GÖRING

M. Dahlerus pointed out, by way of introduction, that the British were such great egoists that they were now deliberating, in view of the difficulties of the present situation, how they could extricate themselves from the whole affair. He had told Forbes² in Stockholm that, after the speeches of Churchill and Chamberlain, negotiations between the British and the German Governments were probably out of the question. Forbes denied this and, on the contrary, took the view that the British Government could very well conduct such negotiations with Germany if only a formula were found which assured to the peoples of Europe their territorial integrity and their freedom by means of a treaty among the great European Powers. Poland was considered lost, so they took the position that it was now a matter of at least saving their own skins.

The Führer replied that the worst of it was that the British had always considered everything pure bluff and immediately interpreted all restraint and patience on his part as weakness. Because he (the Führer) had for years put up with certain things from the Poles, because there was not always immediate resort to shooting, England had come to the false conclusion of mistaking for weakness the considerateness and forbearance of the Führer. The British were now trying something similar with their declaration of a 3-year war. If Germany declared that this threat was a matter of indifference to her, that, too, would be considered bluffing. But they should not let themselves be deceived about the Führer; he would soon wage the war toward the West, also, in such a way as to stun the British. He had destroyed Poland in 3 weeks. The British should stop and think what could happen to them in 3 months.

¹ Birger Dahlerus, a Swedish civil engineer and manufacturer, whose efforts as an unofficial intermediary between Britain and Germany during the weeks before the outbreak of war are described in his *Sista försöket, London-Berlin, sommaren 1939* (Stockholm, 1945), translated as *The Last Attempt* (London, 1947). See also vol. vi, document No. 783, and vol. vii, document No. 312.

² Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Counselor, British Legation in Norway, September 1939-February 1940. Dahlerus testified Mar. 19, 1946, before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that his meeting with Ogilvie-Forbes took place in Oslo, not Stockholm, on Sept. 24, 1939. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. ix, p. 473. Dahlerus had been in contact in Berlin with Ogilvie-Forbes, who was Counselor of the British Embassy until the outbreak of war.

The Führer then stressed the fact that he had always come out for friendship with England, but that today an abysmal hatred for England was gradually spreading among the German people. The British were now foolishly also dropping leaflets which bore witness to their absolute ignorance of the German frame of mind. Particularly when they attacked a person like the Führer, to whom Germany looked up full of gratitude, this produced a state of mind in the German people which made agreement with England more and more difficult. The British would by this method finally drive things so far that a rapprochement with England would be impossible because the people would not want it. If the British, instead of a 3-year war, contemplated a 7-year war, or one even longer, Germany would survive it, too, and in the end turn England completely into a heap of ruins.

M. Dahlerus again spoke of the possibility of peace arising out of the egoism of the British.

The Führer replied that the British, if they wanted peace, would certainly have to be absolutely clear about the actual facts. Germany had won a victory in Poland which was without precedent in history. In 14 days he had completely destroyed a country of 36 million inhabitants which had an army of 45 divisions, in part well equipped, and whose soldiers had fought bravely. In these circumstances, the Führer had no intention of allowing anyone to interfere in the solution of the Polish question. Moreover, the Russians also had a weighty word to say in the matter. They, too, had occupied large portions of Poland.

The Führer pointed out in this connection that in view of the campaign of lies directed against him and Germany because of an alleged German lust for conquest, he was now completely disinteresting himself in all regions that did not affect Germany's interests. It was a matter of complete indifference to him whether another country appropriated territory anywhere outside the German sphere of interest.

M. Dahlerus then inquired whether in the opinion of the Germans there would be any object at all in the British declaring themselves ready for peace discussions.

The Führer replied that a condition for peace discussions would be to allow him an entirely free hand with regard to Poland. If the British still wanted to salvage something of Poland he could only advise them to hasten the peace discussions. Beyond this he was entirely prepared to join in guaranteeing the status quo of the rest of Europe. He had at the time not joined in guaranteeing Czechoslovakia because he had intended to do so only when all her neighbors were prepared to do so. At that time Poland had herself appropriated areas of Czechoslovakia. If the British desired peace in Europe they should make it clearly understood. Germany would in any case be

prepared for it, for she needed peace in order to cultivate the newly acquired areas in the East that had formerly belonged to the German cultural sphere. This would require at least 50 years. The Führer intended to reincorporate into the Reich the former German and former Austrian sections of Poland, as well as strategically important territories. Besides this there was to be a "reshuffling" not only by reuniting once more inside the Reich by large-scale resettlement the scattered Germany minority groups, but also by effecting an adjustment between the thickly populated west, with a population density of 140 persons per square kilometer—a condition that could not last—and the thinly populated east with a density of only 35 people per square kilometer. To carry out these great plans would require 50 to 100 years, particularly if one considered the tremendous backwardness and demoralization of Poland, in comparison with which Czechia looked like a veritable paradise. It was insolence for such a debased country as Poland to dare to turn against a country like Germany.

M. Dahlerus mentioned in this connection a statement of Lipski, who had declared that the Poles would not yield to Germany, for he knew Germany very well and within a week a revolution would surely break out and force Germany to back down.

The Führer then described further his awful impressions of Poland during his trips to the front. The Vistula, supposed to be Poland's great river, was silted up everywhere and navigable only by rowboat. And now for this wretched country millions of Englishmen and Germans were to lay down their lives!

M. Dahlerus stated in this connection that it depended on only one thing: how the British could save face.

The Führer pointed out that the Poles had deceived the British, that they had had absolutely no basis for opposing Germany, as they had led the British to believe.

M. Dahlerus then brought up the question of the Jews. The British were considering where the Jews were to stay, whereupon the Führer replied that if he should reorganize the Polish state, an asylum could also be created for the Jews. Someone had to see that there was order in the East [*Ostraum*] and convert the condition of complete disorganization into an orderly one. In addition to this there would be the above-mentioned reshuffling of peoples: Germans would be settled in the thinly populated areas in order at least to increase the population density from 35 persons per square kilometer to 80. The aim was to create a sensible regional distribution of nationalities as well as a sensible economic structure in the Polish area.

M. Dahlerus again brought up the question of peace and said that the main problem for the British was to find a formula by which peace would be assured in the future. At the Führer's suggestion that the

British should then send somebody to Germany who took him, the Führer, seriously and did not believe that he was only bluffing, M. Dahlerus replied that the dispatching of an Englishman would probably require an armistice. He could imagine, for example, that General Ironside³ might be sent from England on a strictly secret mission.

The Führer replied that before an armistice could be concluded, an unofficial exchange of views must first have taken place in order to examine the prospects of its conclusion. Moreover, everything depended on whether the British actually desired peace. If the British actually wanted peace, the Führer continued, they could have it in 2 weeks without losing face. A prerequisite for this, to be sure, was that they reconcile themselves to the fact that Poland could not again arise. Russia, too, had something to say about the matter and was not inclined to give up again the areas she occupied. The fate of Poland would not be decided at the conference table, for the decision had already fallen elsewhere. It was now a question of the future of Europe, which could only be assured if the Polish problem, which had already been decided, were completely set aside and thought given only to Europe. The question arose as to what the British wanted in Europe. He, the Führer, was prepared to guarantee them security for their own country, as he had previously done when he had concluded the Naval Treaty with England, which he had not terminated until the British took a hostile attitude.⁴ For France he was prepared to give a guarantee forthwith. The West Wall was the unalterable western border of Germany. He had repeatedly offered guarantees for Belgium and Holland. He was prepared to incorporate all these things in a European treaty. He could only repeat once more that Germany did not wish any conquests in the west or in the Balkans; in the Balkans she had only commercial interests.

M. Dahlerus again asked about the preliminaries for an armistice in the event that somebody from England came to Berlin.

The Führer expressed himself very skeptically regarding England's real desire for peace as well as the possibilities of sending somebody to Germany. Perhaps it would be best, on the whole, for France, or else a neutral, to take the first step. The Duce, for instance, could take over this role.

M. Dahlerus replied that the Duce was not considered sufficiently neutral; the Queen of the Netherlands had been thought of.

Field Marshal Göring summed up the possibilities for an exchange of views, saying that a representative of Germany and a representa-

³ Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

⁴ See vol. VI, document No. 277.

tive of England should first meet in Holland and probe the possibility of agreement. Only if such possibilities became evident should the Queen of the Netherlands be approached, who would then officially invite the representatives of both countries to armistice discussions. It would not be a bad idea if an officer, such as General Ironside, were selected by the British for the first unofficial conference.

The Führer again brought up the question of whether the British really desired peace or whether they were not again indulging in some vain hopes of a German defeat, now that things in Poland had turned out so very differently from what they had imagined. Germany did not want to "swallow any Poles"; she wanted only security for the Reich, and borders which would provide the necessary possibilities for her provisioning and for the reshuffling of peoples.

The Field Marshal pointed out that the question of Poland was now settled in any case, not only by Germany but also by Russia and that, in his opinion, some way could be found to prevent the whole of Europe from being destroyed because of so backward a nation. He believed, moreover, that the experience of the past weeks did not fail to make an impression on the British and that many of them were now much more reasonable than formerly, before the commencement of hostilities with Poland.

The Führer expressed doubts as to whether the meeting in Holland could be kept secret and asked whether Chamberlain could undertake anything like that at all, since the British Parliament wanted war. Of course, if the British reflected that Germany, with a bad government and only 87 divisions had held out against the whole world for 4½ years, they would have to realize the hopelessness of vanquishing the Germany of today, with her good, energetic government, and 156 divisions. Thus far, to be sure, neither France nor England had made any really serious attack.

M. Dahlerus interjected here that that was precisely the proof that the British no longer wanted war. The best hope of peace was British egoism.

The Führer replied that the British could have peace if they wanted it, but they would have to hurry, for not for long would leaflets alone be dropped. The mood of the German troops in the west, particularly after contact with the victorious troops coming from the east, was one of extraordinary eagerness for combat, and the Field Marshal had already had to give very strict orders in order to impose a certain restraint on the operations of the victory-conscious air arm in the west. A dangerous eagerness had appeared.

In this connection the Field Marshal also referred to the economic side of the German preparations. The Führer supplemented his

remarks by saying that he was referring to the complete conversion of the economy to wartime requirements. The world would be amazed when once it perceived what Germany was producing in the way of airplanes, arms, ammunition, submarines, and E-boats. So if peace was wanted, one would have to hurry somewhat. A way could then perhaps be found. At the same time, of course, the honor of a victorious army would by all means have to be respected. He, the Führer, could simply not expect certain things of his generals and of the German nation, which was a nation of soldiers, and had to repeat that he was skeptical with regard to the British will to peace and the possibilities of realizing the will.

M. Dahlerus replied in conclusion that he would nevertheless do his best and would go to England the very next day in order to send out feelers in the direction indicated.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 139

2422/511808

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

No. 182

ROME, September 26, 1939.

Received September 30.

Pol. IX 2034.

Subject: Anti-war sentiment of leading Catholic circles in the United States.

With reference to the instruction of August 19—Pol. IX 1565.¹

I have the honor to transmit the enclosed copies of several reports²—brought to my attention by clerical circles—emanating from the National Catholic Welfare Conference, which, as you know, supplies news to the entire Catholic press in the United States. They are characteristic of the anti-war sentiment of the leading Catholic circles of the country. Worthy of particular note is the report from Brooklyn, dated September 8, regarding mass meetings which the International Catholic Truth Society organized in the larger cities of the United States under the slogan: "What can *you* do to keep the United States out of the war?" Worth noting among the proposals put forward by the Society is a bill before the American Congress stipulating that any declaration of war would first have to be decided by a plebiscite.

¹ Vol. VII, document No. 129.

² Not printed (8107/E579533-37).

The reports of the N. C. W. C. indicate the large extent to which sentiment against involvement in the war already exists among American Catholics and is promoted by influential individuals in these circles. Under these circumstances and in consideration of the present situation it therefore seems to me neither necessary nor profitable to bring influence to bear on the Vatican in the sense suggested by Generalissimo Franco. This is all the more true since under the present circumstances the Vatican will most scrupulously avoid exercising a political influence with respect to the re-election of Roosevelt.

BERGEN

No. 140

174/136154

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, September 27, 1939—9:00 a. m.

No. 512 of September 27

Received September 27—3:50 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

In response to the news of the Reich Foreign Minister's Moscow trip,¹ the General Staff requested in a démarche, made today to the Military Attaché and twice repeated, that in the course of the Moscow negotiations an appropriate gesture in favor of Japan be made by the Germans² and, if possible, also by the Russians, since in case of still closer ties between Germany and Russia, the stubborn fight for a settlement between Japan and Russia, which the Army is determined to continue in all circumstances, would experience a serious setback.

The chief argument of the opponents of Russia was that Russia was supporting Chiang Kai-shek and was thus an enemy of Japanese policy in China.

The instruction I received from the Foreign Minister in telegram No. 335 of September 9,³ to work for an agreement between Japan and Russia, prompts me to transmit this request from the General Staff for favorable consideration.

OTT

¹ See document No. 152, footnote 3.

² A copy of this document in a secret file of the Moscow Embassy carries Schulenburg's comment of Sept. 30: "No! There is no action to be taken." (166/131761)

³ Document No. 40.

No. 141

108/111637

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 435

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
Büro RAM 500.

For Reich Foreign Minister personally.

Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of September 26 for High Command of the Army, Attaché Section :

The Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the Russian demand for an alliance. He stated that a naval base at Baltiski and an air base on Estonian islands were demanded by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance of the demands as German aid was quite out of the question, hence the situation could only become worse. On September 25 and 26, Russian aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian territory. The General Staff gave orders not to fire on aircraft in any circumstances in order not to prejudice the situation. Rössing. Frohwein.

BRÜCKLMEIER

No. 142

103/111639-40

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 437

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
Büro RAM 498.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

Telegram from Tallinn No. 164 of September 26 :

The Foreign Minister conveyed a request to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of the following, if possible before his departure for Moscow :

The Estonian Government, under the gravest threat of imminent attack, is prepared perforce to accept a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter with staff will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. The aim of the negotiation : to frame a treaty in such a manner that the sovereignty and internal security of the country are preserved and the Estonian Non-Aggression Pact is kept intact. Hence they intended to propose a mutual assistance obligation of the contracting parties without prejudice to existing nonaggression pacts with third countries. Furthermore they will

attempt to have naval and air bases made available only in case of war, when the assistance obligation comes into play; in peacetime so far as possible preparation of the bases only. The Russians first demanded Tallinn as a naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltiski or a port on Ösel [Saare]. The Estonians wish if possible to grant air bases only on an island. The general tendency is to meet the demands only as far as necessary to prevent an attack, and to maintain existing good relations with Germany. Frohwein.

BRÜCKLMEIER

No. 143

108/111638

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 436

Büro RAM 499.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

Telegram from Helsinki No. 245 of September 26:

The Foreign Minister notified me of demands made by Russia on Estonia¹ and observed that Finland was prepared to improve her relations with Russia, but would never accept such demands and would rather let it come to the worst.

I pointed to the difference between the position of Estonia and that of Finland and advised the Foreign Minister to seek the security of his country in good relations with Germany and Russia.

The Foreign Minister agreed and emphasized complete elimination of English influence from the Baltic area. Blücher.

BRÜCKLMEIER

¹ See documents Nos. 130 and 141.

No. 144

1182/323298-300

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

I

As instructed, I took up with Admiral Schniewind today the questions pertaining to naval warfare discussed in the letter of the Naval Staff of September 26.¹ He had called in Captain Fricke,

¹ Not found.

Captain Neubauer, Marineoberkriegsgerichtsrat Eckhardt and Captain²

The Naval Staff will draw up a memorandum of the conversation. Agreement was reached on the following points:

1. Enemy and neutral merchant vessels which use their radio after steps have been instituted to stop them, as well as such vessels which zig-zag or proceed without lights, can be sunk without warning.

All neutral countries will be notified to this effect. The text will be drawn up in the Foreign Ministry and will be telegraphed to all our Missions today,³ following approval by the Naval Staff (Eckhardt).

The notification will not mention torpedoings but serve only as a warning that ships will expose themselves to dangers by certain actions.

I did not discuss the question of limiting these measures to definite zones, as was provided in annex 1⁴ of the Naval Staff communication for one of the cases. It would be desirable to incorporate such a restriction so that the Americans cannot say that we are engaging in such activities off their coasts. This might be taken into consideration in drafting the notification.

2. After a date still to be fixed, British and French merchant vessels can be sunk without warning since they can be assumed to be armed. No notification is to be given. To begin with, an intensive propaganda campaign lasting about 4 days is to be carried on concerning the arming of enemy merchant vessels. Before the final orders are issued the Naval Staff and the Foreign Ministry will once more consult with one another.

The Naval Staff as well as the Foreign Ministry is to investigate at once whether in the present legal situation in the United States American citizens can travel on enemy merchant vessels only at their own risk or whether they are entirely forbidden to do so. If no such legislation exists, I have reported the desire of the Foreign Ministry that the measure be postponed until such American legislation is concluded, but did not put this wish in the form of a condition.

3. Agreement was reached that neutral merchant vessels should if possible not be torpedoed in the Baltic Sea and the eastern portion of the North Sea. Admiral Schniewind said that in view of the commitment of submarines no absolutely binding promise can be given in this respect.

4. There was agreement that food, with the exception of fruits and vegetables, should in practice be treated the same as absolute contraband. This will be done in the expectation that by the time the prize-court decisions are issued more unequivocal information concerning the British and French attitude in the matter will be available.

5. The question of the Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Soviet Russian merchant vessels was not discussed. At any rate, the notification

² The name was left blank in the original.

³ A circular telegram en clair by Weizsäcker, dated Sept. 29 (S280/E588280-66), contained instructions drawn up along these lines.

⁴ Not found.

mentioned in point 1 is also to be given to the Governments of these countries. Moreover, I shall make sure that, as has already been proposed, there will be a further discussion on this question.

II

The Naval Staff again held out the prospect that the Führer would probably order unrestricted submarine warfare in the prohibited area in the near future. Previous consultation with the Foreign Ministry is guaranteed. On this point I made particular reference to the United States of America, and demanded that the measure not be instituted until appropriate legislation in the United States was assured.

In the discussion of this point the following was brought up. In the conference on Monday Ministerialdirektor Wiehl reserved the right to make further exceptions for trade warfare at sea in the case of treaty agreements especially with the Northern countries. Captain Neubauer pointed out, with the concurrence of Admiral Schniewind, that these agreements could not be permitted to affect the unrestricted submarine warfare that might be instituted, so that it would perhaps be better not to enter into agreements that might subsequently have to be broken.

III

With reference to the contemplated belt of 30 to 500 nautical miles around the American nations, it was agreed that more exact information on American intentions should be awaited.

WOERMANN

No. 145

456/224227

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 761

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador asked me again today about our stand on the Italian intentions to assume the leadership of the economic resistance to Anglo-French encroachments against neutrals.

I told Attolico that we had nothing against Italy's assuming leadership of the resistance against Anglo-French economic pressure in the countries of Southeastern Europe. However, we would be interested if this activity went outside this field, especially if it touched upon the political. At this point Attolico immediately spoke up with the assurance that there was nothing involved other than the defense against economic blockade measures.

The Ambassador was aware that certain activities were in progress to establish a new unified front in the Balkans, which was also to be

joined by Bulgaria in return for political concessions.¹ These endeavors had nothing to do with the above-mentioned Italian project; on the contrary, Italy intended to forestall them by her activity in the said economic field.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In a circular telegram of Sept. 28, Weizsäcker furnished further information on this subject: The Bulgarian Minister President had informed the German Minister in Bulgaria that Turkey, supported by Rumania and Yugoslavia, was proposing a Balkan bloc for joint defense of neutrality "toward the north." The Legation in Sofia had been instructed that such a move would be counter to the German interest, but that a bloc to preserve economic neutrality would be useful.

This circular telegram went to Rome, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens, and Ankara: (96/108026).

No. 146

96/108022

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 763

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

At today's reception of the new Turkish Ambassador¹ the Führer in a friendly manner spoke at length about German-Turkish relations. To be sure, he twice brought up certain unfriendly tendencies in the Turkish press, but explained to the new Ambassador, by referring to historic events and certain ideological parallels, that good political and especially economic relations between us were advisable and rich in prospects.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ R. Hüsrev Gerede.

No. 147

1793/408527-30

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

No. 2653

HELSINKI, September 27, 1939.

Received September 30.

Pol. VI 2184.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Finland and the War.

The last few weeks have brought with them changes of such extensive scope and such rapid tempo for Finnish foreign policy as the Finnish people have never before experienced since the beginning of their independence. The factors which Finnish foreign policy has

for the last few years been counting on as constants have almost all collapsed.

The dominant position of England in Finnish economic life disappeared from one day to the next. The undeniable economic prosperity of Finland, which was based on exports, has suddenly been jeopardized. Through the collapse of Poland the system of eastern buffer states has disintegrated at the point where it was seemingly strongest. The security which was sought through alignment with Scandinavia has become more than doubtful, since a country which has almost three times as many inhabitants as all Scandinavia was overrun in less than three weeks. The antagonism between Germany and Russia, which created a sort of equilibrium in the region of the Baltic, has disappeared from the political arena. Russia, which people liked to regard as a sleeping bear, has awakened, and her urge for expansion has been directed toward the West. As a result of the military striking power which Germany showed in the Polish campaign, the power relations on the Continent have been completely altered.

It is no wonder that the significance and the extent of this political earthquake has penetrated only slowly into the comprehension of the Finnish people. Many still allow themselves to be guided in foreign policy by their personal opinion on the war guilt question and by ideological convictions. Many still think along the lines of the past and believe that by maintaining a strictly neutral policy Finland can remain completely aloof from the earthquake. But its vibrations are becoming noticeable even in this country. Trade with the countries outside the Baltic region has been cut off. A noticeable lack of gasoline, coal, and sugar has set in. Foreign exchange is becoming scarce. Large factories are limiting their production. The fear of Russia, which is deeply embedded in the subconscious mind of every Finn, has been aroused since the penetration of the Red Army into Poland, and a nervousness is evident which is quite out of keeping with the calm nature of the Finns. This nervousness extends even to the military command, where Field Marshal Mannerheim is its exponent.

From my numerous conversations with the Foreign Minister I have obtained the impression that he understands the meaning of the present hour. If I may be permitted to reduce the previous attitude of M. Erkkö to a very brief formula, he was, upon assuming office, an Anglophile and Russophobe at heart. He knows now that in the face of the present situation there is no room in Finnish foreign policy for either Anglomania or Russophobia, that the ideological affinities with the Western Democracies as well as the economic relations with these countries are at the moment unproductive, and that Finland cannot at the present time afford an anti-Russian policy.

Obviously he is also taking into particular account the fact that Finland is situated on a sea which is dominated by Germany, that Germany has become the strongest military power in Europe, and that the German influence is no longer counterbalanced by the Russians. M. Erkko, in my opinion, realizes that in these circumstances Finnish policy is no longer free to maneuver between the three great powers, Germany, England, and Russia, that it must now deal only with Germany and Russia, and that these two powers can no longer be played off against each other.

Moreover, I have the impression that M. Erkko is prepared to draw the necessary conclusions from this. He has told me that he wishes to improve relations with Russia. He hopes that the Finnish-Russian economic relations inaugurated in Moscow may lead to a positive result. He is also thinking of the possibility that Finland might offer to serve as a transit country for German-Russian trade during the period when the Leningrad harbor is frozen over. He would like very much to settle the Åland question and, in the event that the Russians offer an acceptable equivalent, he is not even averse to meeting the Russian wishes for the acquisition of the islands of Seiskari and Lavansaari.¹

As for relations with Germany, M. Erkko has since the beginning of the war personally seen to it that the press follows a neutral policy in its editorials and in the selection and arrangement of news reports. He is doing his part to keep up and stimulate commercial intercourse with Germany, and vis-à-vis England he courageously maintains the position that "Finland will keep up its normal trade with belligerent nations."²

In conclusion I should like to say: There can be no doubt that in the war against Poland the sympathies of the Finnish people were not on our side. But the official attitude of the Finnish Government and the attitude of those in authority in the country give evidence of realistic political thinking [*realpolitischem Denken*] and on the whole have not given us any cause for complaint. We should utilize the favorable position we have automatically won vis-à-vis Finland through international political developments so as to make full use of the economic potentialities of the country and develop our position so that it will be maintained even after the war. In this connection we must, however, always take into account that influential Finnish economic groups will do their utmost not to encumber their relations with England in such a way as to impede, after the conclusion of peace, the resumption of exports to England, which are indispensable

¹ See vol. VI, document No. 257, footnote 3.

² This sentence is in English in the original.

for the prosperity of Finland. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that since the German-Russian Pact the Finnish public has been more or less inclined to hold German policy responsible for the attitude of Russia toward Finland.

BLÜCHER

No. 148

472/228646-47 ;
228656-58

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

Rome, September 27, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: With reference to your letter of September 18,¹ I am enclosing a communication pertaining to the Ley-Cianetti affair, addressed to Dr. Ley's office at the German Labor Front by Dr. Rust, the head of the Liaison Office of the German Labor Front in Italy. For your use I am also enclosing a copy thereof, which was made here. Dr. Rust personally gave me this communication today, with the request that it be transmitted. I would be grateful if you would see that it reaches its destination.

From my conversation with Dr. Rust, I should only like to mention that I gained the impression that Cianetti would like to avoid the discussion with Ley that was suggested. At the same time, however, I gathered that Rust took the opportunity of using our arguments vis-à-vis Cianetti; he was acquainted with them, since, as he told me, he had been orally informed in Berlin of the content of the Foreign Minister's communication to Dr. Ley by the latter.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

Rome, September 27, 1939.

To: The German Labor Front, Adjutancy of Dr. Ley, through the Foreign Section.

Submitted via the German Embassy at the Quirinal, Rome.

Herewith I confirm the following message which was communicated to you by telephone yesterday via the Foreign Section:

On the basis of the conversation with Reichsleiter Dr. Ley and Party Comrade Marrenbach, I had ordered my co-worker, Party Comrade Kirn, to contact Cianetti's private secretary that same day and to arrange for a conference in Constance. Party Comrade Kirn received the reply relatively quickly that C. could not leave Italy under the

¹ See document No. 68, footnote 1.

present circumstances. Thereupon, while still in Berlin, I ordered Party Comrade Kirn to inquire of C. once more whether in that case a meeting could at least be arranged in Northern Italy. Party Comrade Kirn immediately contacted C. again in this matter, but received no answer during the entire past week. Not until Monday, September 25, did the following communication dated September 24 from C.'s private secretary arrive at the office:

"I beg you to excuse the delay with which I am answering your telephone communication with reference to Dr. Ley's proposal concerning a meeting with His Excellency C. in Bolzano. Until this morning His Excellency C. was endeavoring to investigate every possibility in order to be able to accept Dr. Ley's friendly invitation, as he sincerely desires. Under the present circumstance, however, his official duties in the Ministry make it impossible for him to absent himself. Please inform Dr. Ley, however, that His Excellency C. is still very much interested in meeting him and will therefore take the liberty of writing him directly as soon as the circumstances are more favorable.

Respectfully yours,

Luigi Guerriero"

I myself went to Guerriero on Monday immediately upon my arrival in Rome; I requested a personal conference with C. for Monday evening at 6 o'clock and was received. In this conversation C. confirmed the fact that it was entirely impossible for him to leave the Ministry for at least 2 weeks. He would notify me, however, as soon as he saw the possibility of doing so.

I transmitted Dr. Ley's greetings to C. and expressed his great interest in this conference. We then discussed briefly once more the controversial points in question and C. told me in this connection that it was really beside the point to discuss these matters at all before the conclusion of the present conflict. Neither he nor Dr. Ley were authorized to do anything on their own in the field of foreign policy. Both were only supposed to carry out the orders of their leaders. After the latter had now, however, issued as the official line the statement that Germany had acted in all instances in closest agreement with Italy, any further discussion was useless. Thus if he met with Dr. Ley this would mean that they were once again seeing each other and spending a day together as good friends. He was personally also very much interested in this, for it seemed almost like an eternity since he had last seen Dr. Ley. No clarification of the questions involved, however, was to be expected from this conversation.

In reply I emphasized once more that, contrary to C.'s assumption, Dr. Ley would nevertheless be in a position—on the basis of the information obtained by him in the meantime—to convince C. of the error of his views and of the lack of foundation for his alleged complaints.

Heil Hitler!

DR. RUST

No. 149

2290/483419-21

Ambassador Mackensen to [State Secretary Weissäcker]

ROME, September 27, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: I am sending you the enclosed carbon copy of a report of September 26—No. 7531¹—dealing with the importation of foreign goods via Italy. I am directing your attention to this matter because the decision requested by me also has political implications. The question involved is the following:

Large quantities of goods important for the war effort, which are already German property, are still warehoused in neutral ports or the country of origin. We have the understandable desire to get them to Germany in so far as possible through Italy. This can be done only in case they are bought by an Italian firm and shipped to Italy in Italian or neutral vessels for forwarding from here to Germany. The Italian Government declared orally to Herr Clodius in the trade negotiations of September 11 to 13 that it would support such transactions as far as possible.²

The procedure described above can be carried through only as long as Italy's imports by and large continue unhampered. This would change if England, some day, should prevent Italy from any large-scale importation of goods in excess of her own needs. In this case Italy would no longer be able to lend herself to importing certain commodities for Germany with the obligation to forward them, because Italy would otherwise jeopardize the supplying of her own needs and perhaps become involved in serious trouble with the British; that, if I judge the situation correctly, is far from being in our interest at this time. Even then, however, Italy might be willing to accept and keep such commodities, although perhaps not all of them, for the Italian economy.

At this point arises the question—which to my mind is important—whether we should undertake transactions of this kind only on condition that transfer to Germany is assured, or whether we should let Italy have these goods if it should no longer be possible to forward them to us. I think that the latter solution is the correct one. If strategic commodities originally destined for us cannot be shipped to Germany, they should at least bring some benefit to the economy of our ally. I am convinced that Italy would be glad if Germany were to give this kind of support to her increasingly apparent resolution to

¹ Not printed (2290/483422-24).

² See document No. 33.

get the country ready for war economically, too, within the shortest possible time. I recommend this solution all the more because it entails no economic drawbacks whatsoever for Germany.

With cordial regards,

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

V. MACKENSEN

No. 150

283/156148-40

The Chargé d'Affaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BUENOS AIRES, September 28, 1939—12:35 a. m.

No. 488 of September 27

Received September 28—8:30 a. m.

From numerous talks which I initiated with leading figures in Argentine politics and business, the following may be useful for an evaluation of Argentine neutrality: Very large groups stress the wish for maintaining and defending neutrality as well as continuing trade with Germany; in doing so they are thinking primarily of Argentina's own economic interests. In this connection an alleged statement by President Ortiz is cited, which indicates that Argentina's neutral position in relation to contraband questions will be brought out clearly at the Panama Conference; it also makes reference to the intensified diplomatic exchange between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay during the past few days which is said to point to joint action especially in respect to the export of foodstuffs to belligerents and neutrals. The great majority of these same groups and of the public, which has long been worked upon by the local press and radio, are, however, politically opposed to us notwithstanding the outwardly correct observance of the principles of neutrality. One frequently encounters here the foolish but accepted notion that expansionist ambitions would make Germany a territorial and general threat to South America after the victorious conclusion of the war. There is general failure to understand Germany's policy, which usually is represented as disruptive of peace, except among a few intellectuals in the army and in business who are reasonably familiar with European issues. In particular the anti-British sentiment of the younger generation must not be construed as being pro-German. The great sympathy for France, which is expressed almost without exception, is the fruit of clever cultural propaganda carried on for many years. German culture continues to be highly regarded by its friends, but it is not identified with the new Germany which is viewed as anti-cultural if only because of its supposed threat to the Catholic Church; it must be

remembered in this connection that the leading intellectual layer is strictly Catholic. Many officers admire Germany's military achievement in Poland quite frankly or in anonymous articles in the press. By order of the Minister of War, however, all active officers are prohibited from expressing opinions on military questions involving the belligerents as being inconsistent with neutrality; and in general the Government, especially the Foreign Ministry, is endeavoring to maintain a rigorously neutral attitude in all outward manifestations, and is prohibiting all demonstrations bearing on war issues. These efforts were also clearly evident in my talk with the Foreign Minister yesterday (cf. telegraphic reports Nos. 480¹ and 482 of September 26),² although it is known that both Foreign Minister Cantilo and the present Under State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry have always been markedly pro-French. Overall sentiment in Argentina is at present anti-German for ideological reasons and as a result of enemy propaganda, but [the country] will remain neutral as long as possible because of materialistic considerations. Identical text to Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, and Panama.

MEYNEN

¹ Not printed (8520/E597448-51).

² Not printed (8524/E597500).

No. 151

B21/B005130-81

The Military Attaché in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1939—2:04 a. m.

No. 427 of September 27

Received September 28—1:10 p. m.

Top Secret. Top Secret Military. For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and Attaché Section, Army General Staff Officer for Intelligence.

In agreement with the Chargé d'Affaires I have frequent conversations with the General Staff, where my visits are all the more welcome since the Allied Powers obviously inform them only from the propaganda standpoint and therefore very inadequately from the military standpoint, and since my previous statements have been confirmed by the outcome of the Polish campaign. I have based the conversations on German radio reports and utilization of the newspapers here. It would be of considerable help in the cultivation of these relations if I could get reports of an operational nature and information going beyond our public announcements or anticipating them—information which should or could be brought to the attention of the General Staff and, through the Staff, to the Administration. It is not a question of

reports broadcast by the German radio which are received here at once anyway. They were especially grateful for detailed information on the German generals mentioned in our reports, all of whom I know personally. This is all the more important since British influence is directed toward disparaging the quality of German leadership, the German Army, and the German will to fight, despite or precisely because of our successes, and also toward circulating the assertion that there is antagonism between the political and military leaders in Germany.

The General Staff reports directly to Roosevelt and the State Department on the war situation and is consulted on the political and strategic evaluation of the world situation. While the influence of the American General Staff, our contacts with it, or the possibility of obtaining intelligence should not be overestimated, the experience of the past few years has shown that it is advisable to make use of and cultivate these relations, which have proved their value.¹

I hear from a very good source that Lindbergh's important radio address against America's entry into the war² was influenced by a high-ranking General Staff officer.

BÖTTICHER

¹ On Nov. 22, Bötticher telegraphed a similar appeal to the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe for information on German air operations "which can be used confidentially." (B21/B005282)

² Charles A. Lindbergh, the American aviator, took a prominent role in the discussion of American foreign policy at this time. The speech referred to was delivered on Sept. 16.

No. 152

34/28401-05

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*¹

[Moscow, September 28, 1939].

For the State Secretary: Please submit immediately to the Führer.

The conversation with Stalin and Molotov, lasting 3 hours, was friendly throughout in tone. As a result, the following possibilities for a solution have emerged:

(1) The river lines of the Pissa, Narew, Vistula, San, as agreed upon, are to stand. Furthermore, Lithuania is to remain in the German sphere of influence in accordance with the Moscow Protocol.

¹ According to a retrospective account by Hencke entitled "With the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow," the text of this document was dictated by Ribbentrop and taken by Hencke at 4 o'clock on the morning of Sept. 28, 1939, to the code room of the Embassy. (See Appendix I.) After the document was put in code it appears that it was then transmitted by telephone in code to the Foreign Ministry. (Oral statement of Jan. 23, 1953, to the editors, by Gustav Hilger, who further states that no other record was made of the Stalin-Molotov-Ribbentrop conversation.)

(2) We are to yield Lithuania to the Russian sphere of influence and receive in return an area east of the Vistula, bounded on the north and east by the Bug River to about Krylow and from there westward, crossing approximately at Tomaszów, to the San River. The Soviet Union would further cede to us from its present sphere of influence the tip around Suwałki to the line just north of Augustów, approximately in the line of the Seepplatte-Augustów Canal.

Stubborn efforts on my part to improve the second proposal by establishing a line from Brest Litovsk westward past Grodno to the Memel [Niemen] River, west of Kaunas, in a straight line up to the southern tip of Latvia, failed because of even more stubborn resistance on the part of Stalin. Nevertheless, a certain improvement on the second proposal, first by drawing the boundary from Krylow, via Tomaszów, to Przemyśl, and further from Małkinia on the Bug River through Ostrów-Ostrołęka to the East Prussian border, seems to me difficult but not entirely out of the question.

Furthermore, I insisted in advance of the discussion on an extension, even though limited, of the border of East Prussia into Lithuanian territory, approximately on a line from the eastern boundary of the Suwałki tip, via Marijampolė, and on in an arc to the southern tip of Latvia. In the end Stalin did not appear to oppose this so much as my first suggestion for expansion, but it is questionable whether even this boundary correction can be obtained in view of Stalin's great obstinacy.

Stalin argued in favor of his second proposal that splitting the territory with a purely Polish population appeared to him a dubious procedure. History has proved that the Polish people continually struggle for unification. To partition the Polish population would therefore easily create sources of unrest from which discord between Germany and the Soviet Union might possibly arise.

To my proposal that the oil district of Drohobycz and Borysław be relinquished to Germany, since Russia already had rich oil resources, while Germany lacked them, Stalin replied that he could not accept this. The Ukrainian people had strongly pressed their claim to this area. He was willing, however, to promise us as compensation deliveries of oil to the extent of the whole annual production, amounting today to 300,000 tons, but which he hoped to increase to 500,000 tons. In return for this, Germany could supply coal and steel tubing.

I also made certain proposals to Stalin aimed at strengthening German-Russian friendship, to which he will reply tomorrow. My suggestion that the definitive treaty establishing the future boundary of Poland be concluded tomorrow was accepted by Stalin and Molotov.

The question as to whether solution (1) or (2) is the one we should strive for is hard to decide. Solution (1), in my opinion, would have the advantage that, Lithuania being ours, the area of German

settlement would be extended towards the northeast. Furthermore, a clear four-river line would mean the shortest possible military frontier and relieve us of the necessity of supplying a few million [tons] of coal. The argument against solution (1), however, is the fact that the partition of the Polish settlement area might possibly lead to friction between Germany and Russia. Besides, under solution (1), Germany might be forced, in view of the Russian action impending in Estonia and Latvia, to conclude, in her turn, a treaty of protection with Lithuania in the next few weeks which the world would interpret as veiled annexation. This very night an Estonian-Russian mutual assistance pact seems about to be concluded, which will provide for the posting of one Russian infantry division, one cavalry brigade, one armored brigade, and one air brigade on Estonian territory, without, however, abolishing the Estonian system of government at this time. A similar pact will be concluded with Latvia shortly. Even if the objections that can be made to a corresponding German-Lithuanian protective relationship are not decisive, the reproach that Germany is pursuing an imperialistic policy cannot be used against us as propaganda.

The argument in favor of the second proposal is that, by the incorporation of the entire Polish population, Polish intrigues for disturbing German-Russian relations might possibly be eliminated, and, further, that the Polish national problem might be dealt with as Germany saw fit. Finally, the territories east of the Vistula falling to Germany in the event of solution (2) are according to expert opinion more valuable agriculturally than the territories west of the Vistula. The argument might be made against solution (2) that in world opinion Russia would so to speak be relieved of the Polish problem.

I said I would take time to think it over until 12 o'clock German time on Thursday when I would give Stalin my reaction to proposal (1) or (2), and thereupon proceed to the drafting of the treaty. I would appreciate it if the Führer would let me know by telephone before this time whether he prefers proposal (1) or (2), since it is impossible from here to be fully cognizant of details, such as military and other considerations, with their full implications.²

RIBBENTROP *

² No record of Hitler's reply has been found. See Hencke's notes printed as Appendix I. The agreement actually reached is printed as document No. 159.

³ The timetable of Ribbentrop's visit in Moscow is set forth in the following unsigned and undated memorandum found in the papers of Hencke (838/281527): "September 27, 1939: Arrival at airport 6 p. m. First meeting 10 p. m. to 1 a. m. September 28, 1939: Meeting resumed 3 to 6:30 p. m. Dinner at Kremlin. One act of ballet (Swan Lake); Stalin meanwhile negotiated with the Latvians. Meeting resumed at midnight. Signing at 5 a. m. Afterwards reception for the delegation at Ambassador's till about 6:30 a. m. September 29, 1939: Departure by air 12:40 p. m."

No. 153

215/146580

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 28, 1939.

No. 443 of September 27

Transmitted in code by telephone.

For the Foreign Minister.

Gruppenführer Heydrich informed me that the Führer and Chancellor has ordered that evacuation of the Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia be taken up at once. Heydrich and I agreed that preparations within Germany, such as arranging for shipping space, shall be started right away in conjunction with the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, but that nothing shall be divulged outwardly and in no case shall any initiative be taken in Estonia and Latvia without the Foreign Ministry. I told H. that carrying out of these measures at all and, if occasion arises, the actual time must depend on the course of the Foreign Minister's negotiations in Moscow. In that case it would be desirable to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on an orderly evacuation with safeguards for property interests. The Volksdeutsche in Estonia are estimated at 16,000, in Latvia 70,000.

If haste is indicated, please wire instructions.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 154

215/146578

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[BERLIN, September 28, 1939].

No. 456 of September 28

Received September 28—6:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegram No. 443 of September 27.¹

The Reichsführer-SS suggests, by way of Behrends, that the question of the resettlement of Volksdeutsche from Estonia be handled as follows:

1) In case of a quiet development concerning resettlement, agreements with guarantee of property rights.

2) In case of anarchy in Estonia (a) immediate declaring of Volksdeutsche to be Reichsdeutsche, with their persons and property under

¹ Document No. 153.

German protection; (b) immediate taking of Volksdeutsche without exceptions on German transports, which will be accompanied by naval vessels to ensure safe passage.

In case of need corresponding steps for Latvia.

Request further agreement that the Legation in Riga be instructed to demand of the Latvian Government martial law and every protection for Volksdeutsche in case disorders threaten to occur.

The property of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Estonia is estimated at one and a half million reichsmarks.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 155

5570/E399065-66

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 362 of September 28

BELGRADE, September 28, 1939—9:15 p. m.

Received September 29—12:30 a. m.

W 2081 g.

Following a luncheon in a small circle today the Prince Regent expressed keen satisfaction at the fact that the German armament deliveries were getting under way. He had now ordered that every available means should be utilized to bring the Bor copper mines and Trepcza lead mines under state management. The exchange of goods with Germany must be promoted in every way. Whatever the outcome of the war, Yugoslavia would always remain a neighbor of Germany and never be a neighbor of England.

Then the Prince Regent spoke of Russian expansion toward the west, which caused him concern. As I knew, he was an enemy not only of Bolshevism but also of Pan-Slavism.

On that account he feared a strengthening of Soviet Russian influence in Southeast Europe, which might operate here, in Yugoslavia, in the guise of Pan-Slavism. He felt the profoundest distrust for Stalin's policy and was convinced that in the last analysis it was directed toward promoting the world revolution through touching off a world war. He was well aware that Germany had been driven into Russia's arms by British policy. In any case, however, the cheap laurels which Stalin had now been able to pluck in Poland signified a further strengthening of the Bolshevik regime. He hoped that he was too pessimistic about this, but he could not dismiss these fears.

At the close the Prince Regent inquired about the health of the Führer and the Field Marshal.

HERRN

No. 156

456/224241

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*Telephone Message en clair¹

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 28, 1939.

Extremely urgent, to be given to the Reich Foreign Minister immediately.

With reference to our telegrams.

I assume that in case Russian troops march into Estonia an agreement could be reached there [in Moscow] with the Soviet Union regarding the treatment of the Volksdeutsche, including protection of their property rights. Resettlement of the Volksdeutsche should probably be considered in any case. It would perhaps be best if a three-sided agreement could be reached there, in which a date would be set in the not too distant future when German ships could begin to remove the Volksdeutsche.

It is impossible to judge from here whether similar negotiations should be initiated for Latvia at this time.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Marginal notes: "Dictated over telephone by Under State Secretary Woermann." "Original given to Herr Brücklmeier [of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat] at 3:50 p. m. Sept. 28."

² The copy of this document in the files of the Moscow Embassy (215/146577) records that this message had been given the telegram number 461, and was received in Moscow at 6:30 p. m. A marginal note by von Tippelskirch states: "The Ambassador talked to Herr von Weizsäcker around midnight and asked him to await the return of the Foreign Minister, since the matter does not appear to be so urgent as was assumed."

No. 157

F2/0332-0331

German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR consider it as exclusively their task, after the disintegration of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:

Article I.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the

attached map,¹ which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.²

Article II.

Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests established in article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement.

Article III.

The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the USSR.

Article IV.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the friendly relations between their peoples.

Article V.

This treaty shall be ratified and the ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
v. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

¹ See Appendix VI.
² Document No. 193.

No. 158

F2/0819

Confidential Protocol

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The Government of the USSR shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in its sphere of influence if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the German sphere of influence. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.

A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or White Russian descent residing in its sphere of influence.¹

For the Government
of the German Reich:
v. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

¹ An agreement implementing this Protocol was signed in Moscow on Nov. 16, 1939 (6314/E470970-90).

No. 159

F2/0826-25

Secret Additional Protocol

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR upon the following:

The Secret Additional Protocol signed on August 23, 1939,¹ shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today).² As soon as the Government of the USSR shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map falls to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
v. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 229.

² See Appendix VI.

No. 160

F2/0829

Secret Additional Protocol

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following:

Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
v. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

No. 161

F2/0380

*Declaration of September 28, 1939, by the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR*¹

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR have, by means of the treaty signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from the disintegration of the Polish state and have thereby created a firm foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.

Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the USSR shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

¹ This statement was released to the press.

No. 162

388/211596-97

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter¹ of today in which you communicate to me the following:

"With reference to our conversations, I have the honor to confirm herewith that the Government of the USSR is willing, on the basis and in the sense of the general political understanding reached by us, to promote by all means the trade relations and the exchange of goods between Germany and the USSR. To this end an economic program will be drawn up by both parties, under which the Soviet Union will supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through deliveries of manufactured goods over

¹ Not printed (F2/0320).

a more extended period of time [*auf längere Zeit*]. Both parties shall frame this economic program in such a manner that the German-Soviet exchange of goods will again reach the highest volume attained in the past.

"Both Governments will at once issue the necessary directives for the implementation of the measures mentioned and arrange that the negotiations are begun and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible."

In the name and by authority of the Government of the German Reich, I am in accord with this communication and inform you that the Government of the German Reich in turn will take the necessary steps for this purpose.

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

VON RIBBENTROP

No. 163

F2/0322-21

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter¹ of today, wherein you communicate to me the following:

"Implementing my letter of today about the formulation of a common economic program, the Government of the USSR will see to it that German transit traffic to and from Rumania by way of the Upper Silesia-Lwów-Kołomyja railroad line shall be facilitated in every respect. The two Governments will, in the framework of the proposed trade negotiations, make arrangements without delay for the operation of this transit traffic. The same will apply to the German transit traffic to and from Iran, to and from Afghanistan, as well as to and from the countries of the Far East.

"Furthermore, the Government of the USSR declares that it is willing, in addition to the quantity of oil previously agreed upon or to be agreed upon hereafter, to supply a further quantity of oil commensurate with the annual production of the oil district of Drohobycz and Boryslaw, with the proviso that one half of this quantity shall be supplied to Germany from the oil fields of the aforesaid oil district and the other half from other oil districts of the USSR. As compensation for these supplies of oil, the USSR would accept German supplies of hard coal and steel piping."

I take note of this communication with satisfaction and concur in it in the name of the Government of the German Reich.

¹ Not printed (F2/0324-23).

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

VON RIBBENTROP

[EDITORS' NOTE. The texts of the Soviet-Estonian Pact of Mutual Assistance of September 28, 1939, and the Soviet-Latvian Pact of Mutual Assistance of October 5, 1939, are printed in English translation in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, volume I, pages 542-544. Similarly, an English text of the Treaty on the Transfer of the City of Vilna and Vilna Province to the Lithuanian Republic and on Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, signed October 10, 1939, appears on pages 705-707 of the *Bulletin*. German texts of the Estonian and Lithuanian treaties, plus a short summary of the Latvian treaty, are printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, November 1939, pages 992-995.]

No. 164

115/117630

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 28, 1939.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today in considerable anxiety and wished to know whether negotiations were being conducted in Moscow regarding Lithuania or any of the Baltic states. He referred to the conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, in which the latter had promised him that Germany would take a sympathetic attitude toward Lithuanian aspirations, and he referred also to the willingness of Foreign Minister Urbšys to come to Germany in response to the invitation addressed to him.¹ I told the Minister that I did not know whether Lithuania was being discussed in Moscow. I had reports only on the negotiations between Estonia and the Soviet Union, that would doubtless lead to certain military privileges for the Soviet Union in Estonia. In reply to a further question on this point, I said that I did not know whether the Soviet Union was contemplating something similar for Latvia. I told M. Škirpa, as I did other envoys, that Germany had no part in the negotiations of the Soviet Union with Estonia, but, that, on the contrary, this was a purely Soviet-Estonian matter.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 121.

No. 165

3072/612881-84

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

No. 32

BERLIN, September 28, 1939.

No. W. H. A. 738.

SESSION OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE SEPTEMBER 28, 1939¹1. *Norway*

Reichsbankdirektor Ludwig² reported on his negotiations in Oslo. The Norwegians believe that they will be able to keep up their trade with both sides and are prepared to maintain the volume of their exports to Germany, including the German imports of whale oil from the Norwegian catch, at the average level of the years 1936-38. Herr Ludwig has rejected this for the time being as unsatisfactory, but thinks that the over-all ceiling could perhaps be raised by barter transactions (e. g., coal for fish). A Norwegian steamship company believes that it will be able to maintain the movement of goods in both directions. The negotiations are to be continued in Oslo on October 8 or 10. Herr Ludwig will then make written agreements, if possible on the basis of the imports of the past few years.

The Commercial Policy Committee declares itself in agreement with this procedure.

2. *Denmark and Sweden*

Ministerialdirektor Walter³ reported on his negotiations in Copenhagen and Stockholm. The basic orientation of both the Danish and the Swedish viewpoint is this: "If you (Germany) interfere with our trade with England, it will be impossible for us, because of the internal structure of our economy, to maintain our exports to Germany on the normal level." They consider that the measures taken by our naval vessels against the maritime trade of the Scandinavian countries with England represent a change in the German position as expressed in the statement by Ambassador von Hassell.⁴ At the outset, Sweden's attitude with regard to the maintenance of normal exports was positive, although Herr Walter's question, how much ore we would get and whether we could count on getting the same quantities as in

¹ In addition to Wiehl, those present included representatives of the principal departments concerned with economic affairs and the Ministers to Sweden and Denmark.

² Ludwig was present as a representative of the Ministry of Economics.

³ Ministry of Food.

⁴ A reference to Hassell's statements of Sept. 2 about maintaining the normal volume of Danish agricultural exports. See documents Nos. 42, 66, and 83, *ante*, and vol. VII, document No. 552.

the treaty year which has just expired, met with a "wishy-washy" [*pflaumenweich*] answer. The torpedoing of the two Swedish ships,⁵ however, had drastically affected Swedish sentiment; for Sweden this means the loss of exports which bring her foreign currency, while for England it does not mean any appreciable damage. The Swedes stressed that they had prevailed on their press to refrain from attacks on Germany, but if the torpedoings continued in this way, they would no longer be able to do so. Public opinion is perhaps also of critical importance in the ore question: "Not only must the ores be sold, they also have to be dug and shipped," and for that reason the mood of the workers in the mines and loading ports must also be considered. The negotiations with Sweden are to be continued on October 17; the Swedish delegation, which left for England last Sunday, will be back by then. The result in Denmark was largely the same: "I have never seen Moor⁶ as desperate as at that talk." If we obstruct Denmark's trade with England, the Danes will no longer be able to import fodder and will thus largely cease to be a source of imports for us. Our present rationing system assures our butter supply for 15 months, taking into consideration stocks on hand, production, and a cautious estimate of imports; the imports from Denmark amount to 10 percent of our entire butter supply, and if they were to stop it would therefore become necessary to reduce our weekly butter ration by 7 or 8 grams.

Minister Prinz zu Wied corroborated the statements made by Ministerialdirektor Walter with reference to Sweden. "The seriousness of the situation relating to the maintenance of the ore deliveries simply cannot be overrated."

Minister von Renthe-Fink endorsed the statements of Herr Walter with reference to Denmark, and added that the Danes thought that they were covered by the statement of Herr von Hassell, who, when asked by the Danes about the conduct of our naval forces, had referred to the "spirit of the nonaggression pact." Denmark wants to continue her exports to Germany to the extent agreed upon in the export program and has secured England's consent to this arrangement for a period extending to the end of 1939. They are now waiting for our reply as to whether we would act likewise, i. e., not interfere with Denmark's trade with England for the same period.

⁵ In a memorandum of Sept. 26 (205/141868-69), Woermann recorded a conversation with the Swedish Minister, who lodged a protest of his Government (205/141870) against the torpedoing of the Swedish ship *Gertrud Bratt* 2 days previously by a German submarine, and referred to reports of a second torpedoing.

⁶ Presumably Otto Carl Mohr, Director in the Danish Foreign Ministry.

Ministerialdirektor Wiehl presented a survey of the development of the stand taken by the Foreign Ministry and its practical effect on our naval operations. The discussion was then suspended pending clarification of the position of the political and military authorities.

WIEHL

No. 166

169/82818-19

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 29, 1939—8:00 p. m.

No. 673 of September 29

Received September 30—1:40 a. m.

The negotiations have just been concluded.¹ The most important results are as follows:

1. Grain deliveries. 1,000,000 tons of corn, 400,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of barley. In regard to corn there is the reservation that returns of the harvest make possible delivery of this amount while maintaining the most urgent deliveries to other countries necessary to ensure that Rumania's own requirements of raw materials are met. Furthermore, the delivery of 200,000 hogs and 30,000 cattle is provided for, among other things.

2. Petroleum deliveries have been assured for the foreseeable future to the utmost limits of transportation facilities.

3. The contract for the deliveries of Polish war materials has still to be concluded. The term of payment is to be from 2 to 4 years, depending on the amount involved. Deliveries by the other party are to be made exclusively in petroleum and grain.

4. In order to facilitate further purchases in Rumania and above all to assure petroleum purchases, the Rumanian Government has promised at our suggestion to assume a state guarantee to the banks for the period of one year amounting to the equivalent of 40 million RM in lei. After the conclusion of the purchase contracts in accordance with the war materials agreement on the basis of point 3, (group garbled) guarantee in the amount of this annual installment of the payments from the war materials agreement will be granted.

5. The total volume of exports and imports has been fixed at 300 million RM in round figures, i. e., an increase of 50 million RM as compared to the plan for 1938, and an increase of about 100 million RM in each direction as compared with the exchange of commodities in 1938. The interests of finished-goods export are protected by maintaining the previous ratio between exports of finished goods and capital goods, as well as by the recently-established schedule of minimum quotas.

6. Rate of exchange. Insistence upon an increase in the rate of exchange of the reichsmark is not feasible at the moment because the

¹ The protocols and exchanges of notes signed on Sept. 29 at the end of the sixth session of the Government Committees were in two sections: Secret (5558/E395432-39) and Confidential (8496/E597034-074). The former dealt with the principles which would govern the delivery of captured Polish equipment.

Rumanian Government attaches extreme importance to awaiting at least for a short time the result of the new foreign exchange regulations beginning October 1. Insistence on an increase in the rate of exchange is also not advantageous at the present moment for political reasons, because the government of Minister President Argetoianu,² who has been known for years as a friend of Germany, cannot begin its activity with an increase in the rate of exchange of German currency. Argetoianu told me definitely this morning that he would set about finding a solution for the problem in the very near future and would see that there was an appropriate increase in the rate of exchange. A corresponding agreement was reached with the Court Minister and the Minister of Economics to the effect that this matter should be regulated as soon as possible; the Court Minister promised his vigorous support.

7. Our old demand, which is of particular importance for the Reich Germans here, to the effect, that Reich Germans who have been residing here since January 1, 1932, shall be granted residence and work permits, has been fulfilled by an exchange of letters with the Minister of Labor.

8. The contract for the lease of forests has been signed.

9. Agreement regarding the issuance of Rumanian treasury notes in connection with the war materials transaction has been signed.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

² Constantine Argetoianu had been appointed Minister President on Sept. 28, 1939.

No. 167

103/111654

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 467 of September 29 BERLIN, September 29, 1939—[8:47 p. m.]
e. o. RM 505.

For the Ambassador.

Please inform Molotov immediately that in the last few days, according to very accurate reports received in Berlin, Turkey initialed the pact with France; consequently Saracoglu misinformed Stalin.¹ The correctness of the reports is supported by indubitable evidence.

Foreign Minister Saracoglu furthermore expressed the view to foreign diplomats that the passage of war material and troops in merchant vessels through the Straits is permissible and authorized under the terms of the Montreux Convention.²

¹ Saracoglu had arrived in Moscow on Sept. 25.

² For the official text of the Convention, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, pp. 213-241. See also vol. v, ch. VII.

Please inform Molotov that in my opinion it is in Germany's and Russia's greatest common interest to obtain the assurance from Turkey in the form of a treaty that she will prevent any passage of Anglo-French war material or troops.

RIBBENTROP

No. 168

406/214456-57

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 180 of September 29 TALLINN, September 29, 1939—9:05 p. m.
Received September 30—1:45 a. m.

The military agreement between Estonia and Soviet Russia, the main points of which became known here last night, has caused immense relief in Government circles. Soviet Russia's (group garbled) to put a garrison of 25,000 troops into Estonia had been felt to be an extremely grave threat to the very existence of the whole State. Government circles attribute the sudden toning down of Soviet Russia's demands, which became apparent yesterday, to the Reich Foreign Minister's intercession with Molotov and Stalin; this has awakened a deep sense of gratitude toward Germany, manifesting itself, among other ways, in a call which the Deputy Foreign Minister paid me this morning at the Legation in order to give expression to this sentiment. Talks with him and with other personages in the Government and the armed forces indicate that Estonia signed the military alliance only under great pressure in order to avert the threat of obliteration, and that despite the resulting one-sided commitment to the Soviet Union the country still attaches the greatest value to good (group missing, probably "relations") with Germany. Informed persons—the public does not know the Soviet Russian demand made the day before yesterday—regard Germany as the only power which by its weight saved the country from Soviet Russian pressure and which is alone capable of giving this protection in the future as well. Nonetheless, some are afraid that Russia might soon impose additional demands, particularly if Germany should be tied up or weakened in the West.

A supplementary agreement fixes at a maximum of 25,000 the total number of troops which Soviet Russia can maintain at the military bases. It is doubted, however, that this maximum will ever be reached, because of housing difficulties alone. The areas for the Russian bases are to be clearly demarcated and evacuated by Estonian residents. No concern is felt here about the possibility of communistic contami-

nation of the adjoining Estonian population, because the districts concerned, especially Taga Bay on Ösel [Saare] Island and Dagerort on Dagö [Hiiumaa] are scarcely inhabited.

The press is giving the agreement the greatest publicity with the comment that it was impossible [not] to take account of the old Russian desire to have the Soviet fleet released from being bottled up in the farthest corner of the Gulf of Finland; the important thing was the full preservation of the sovereignty of the Estonian State.

FROHWEIN

No. 169

103/111657-58

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 30, 1939.

For guidance in your discussions of the German-Soviet Russian agreements you will note the following in addition to the four points² which the Reich Foreign Minister gave the Tass Agency and which were telegraphed to most of the missions:

The German-Russian agreements are a permanent settlement of the relations between the two countries in the sense of a definitive resumption of their historical friendship. The ideologies of the two countries remain unchanged and are in no wise affected by the agreements.

The territorial delimitation of the state interests of the respective Governments leaves the national-Polish area entirely within the German sphere of interest, with the task, as defined in the preamble to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty, of assuring to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their political character. This settlement eliminates once and for all any future differences between Germany and the Soviet Union with regard to Poland.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹The list of addressees has not been found.

²The four points as listed in a DNB Moscow despatch in Woermann's file (34/23411) were as follows: (1) German-Soviet friendship is now conclusively established; (2) the two nations will allow no further interference in Eastern European questions; (3) both states desire that peace will be restored and that England and France will cease the utterly senseless and hopeless war against Germany; (4) but if the warmongers in these countries retain the upper hand, Germany and the Soviet Union will know how to deal with them. See also document No. 161.

No. 170

8589/E602574-77

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, September 30, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW No. 171/39 g. K. Chefs. WFA/LI

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 5

1. After concluding the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, with Russia, it is intended to regulate the political organization of the former Polish territories within the German sphere of interest according to the following guiding principles:

a. The new *political* frontier of the Reich in the East will, in general, include the former German-colonized area and, in addition, those territories which are especially valuable for reasons of military expediency, war economy, or communications.

The final demarcation line has not yet been settled in detail. I request that suggestions on this subject be submitted to me through the OKW.

b. The present line of demarcation (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San) will be constantly strengthened as a *military security belt* towards the East. The required garrisons are also to be permanently located beyond the German political frontier.

I likewise request suggestions regarding location of this security line in detail, to be submitted to me through the OKW.

c. The line laid down according to the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, the details of which are expected to be settled by a supplementary protocol, is to be considered *the limit of the German sphere of interest* as far as Russia is concerned.

d. I myself shall set up the *political organization* of the territory between this line and the new political boundary of the German Reich.

2. First of all, the entire territory of the former Polish state, up to the line established in the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty and including the Suwałki triangle, will be organized under a *Military Government* controlled by the Commander in Chief, Army.

I request the *Commander in Chief, Army* to submit to me at an early date the measures required for bringing about the following:

a. The pacification of the territories to be occupied. The time will be settled after the conclusion of the Moscow agreements.

b. The occupation of the security line along the former line of demarcation.

c. The occupation of the entire territory by occupation troops. This mission is to be accomplished east of the military security line with minimum forces after pacification has been completed.

The Commander in Chief, Air will leave in the East the forces required by the Commander in Chief, Army for this mission.

d. The subdivision of the military government territory into districts or else the extension of existing military government districts to include the newly acquired territories.

3. On the basis of the latest political developments, the troops intended for East Prussia in accordance with Directive No. 4,¹ paragraph 4, last sentence, do not need to be held in readiness.

4. The restrictions hitherto prevailing for *naval warfare* against France are cancelled. The war at sea is to be fought against France just as against Britain.

The war against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to prize law, with the following exceptions:

Merchantmen and troop ships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be attacked without warning.

The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the British Isles.

Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio transmitters when stopped.

As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large steamships that appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers as well as goods.

5. *For air warfare in the West* the restrictions in force until now will remain in effect. Flights across the Reich border are permitted for short-range and combat reconnaissance, for attacks upon artillery fire-control planes and captive balloons, and, to a limited degree, for long-range reconnaissance for the Commander in Chief, Air. The Army's requests for long-range reconnaissance are to be handled through direct cooperation between Army and Luftwaffe.

Furthermore, the Luftwaffe is authorized to carry out offensive actions in the North Sea against British and French naval forces at sea, and to carry on the war against merchant shipping according to prize law.

6. The orders under paragraphs 4 and 5 will replace paragraphs 5b, 5c, and 7 of Directive No. 4 for the Conduct of the War.

ADOLF HITLER

countersigned: KEITTEL

Chief of Staff, OKW

¹ Document No. 135.

No. 171

352/202871-73

The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Oslo, September 30, 1939.

Pol. VI 2199.

Subject: Public sentiment in Norway.

The profound difference between public sentiment in Norway in this war and the World War has already been reported.¹ It goes without saying that Norway is not wholeheartedly on the side of the Reich even today, but the country has cast off its former bondage to England to a degree that should be heartening to us. Norway no longer believes in the omnipotence of British prestige.

The total crushing of Poland, which is here acknowledged as a masterpiece of strategy, especially by the military, has opened Norway's eyes not only to Germany's might but also to England's impotence, and there is the tendency to recognize the justice of Germany's demand that the Western Powers, England in particular, keep out of Eastern European affairs. Even the Labor Party no longer talks of the "rape of the weak nations," as it did at the time of the Czechoslovak affair; on the contrary, its representatives, in private, express unqualified pleasure that with Poland the last "feudalistic state" has disappeared from Europe.

There is full recognition of the political significance of the negotiations between the German Foreign Minister and the Russian Foreign Commissar in Moscow, but it should not be concealed that here and there a certain fear is creeping into the hearts of the Norwegians that the Northern States, too, might be drawn into the orbit of power radiating from Berlin and Moscow. But apart from this the negotiations in Moscow are here taken for what they are: an agreement between the Reich and Russia on the order in Eastern Europe, which is to form the sound foundation of the peace. It is hoped that England and France will accede to the peace proposals made by Berlin and Moscow so as to put an end to this "senseless war of prestige", but no one believes that England is as yet ready to recognize her obvious defeat. Should war go on, however, people are convinced that in no case will it end in defeat for the Reich. The blockade, with which England in 1918 finally brought Germany to her knees—a Germany without political leadership—has in Norwegian opinion lost a good deal of its force owing to the fact that Germany can now draw on Russia for a large proportion of her raw materials and other needs.

¹ Neuhaus had telegraphed in this sense on Sept. 17 and 18 (22/13683, 13684).

German submarine warfare is, of course, not popular in this maritime nation, but people are honest enough to admit that the intensification of German submarine warfare is merely a reply to the English blockade measures so that the responsibility accordingly falls back upon England. Unfortunately, indications are not lacking that the Norwegian shipowners, just as in 1914-18, do not hesitate to endanger their ships and crews to gamble for profits or squeeze out high insurance rates.

After the consolidation of the bloc of Oslo States and the tremendous decline in England's prestige, there is little likelihood that Norway will tolerate British violations of her neutrality. It is recognized that any toleration of British violations of neutrality would immediately call forth reactions not only from Germany, but probably also from Russia; that is a risk no one wants to incur in any circumstances.

VON NEUHAUS

No. 172

B21/B004939-42

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1939—10:48 a. m.

No. 453 of October 1

Received October 2—11:15 a. m.

Subject: Opinions and measures of the American General Staff after the first month of war.

For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and Attaché Sections, Army and Air.

1. The Pacific Ocean and the need of adequate defense preparations occupy the foreground. The question of organizing expeditionary troops for Europe has been shelved entirely. The previously reported uncertainty with regard to Japan and possible developments in Japanese-Russian relations led to a setting up of the American system of defense in the Pacific in deep echelon. Strengthening of the long-range reconnaissance units, which have been advanced to Manila, with 14 long-range reconnaissance bombers. Transfer to Hawaii of an "advance guard" of the fleet and strengthening of defenses, particularly of the air bases there. In California, concentration of the striking power of the fleet. Some preparations for the establishment of the long-contemplated air base near Fairbanks as a requisite for the defense of Alaska. Strengthening of the garrison at Panama. On the American continent, speedy organization of a small highly mobile land force of five infantry divisions which can be rapidly mobilized

and sent to threatened points, such as Alaska, Hawaii, Newfoundland and can be used as a basis for the policy of defense of the Western Hemisphere. Finally, pressure upon industry in order that the proposed goal of increasing the Army Air Force to 5,500 planes by the middle of 1941 may be reached by the end of 1940. All of these are defense measures.

The General Staff, which seems to be prevailing more and more against the politicians, is thinking now neither of preparing an expeditionary army for Europe nor of shelving its own armaments requirements for the purpose of making priority deliveries of military equipment and raw materials to the Allies. In the General Staff it is now considered that the picture of the fighting will become clearer toward the end of June. The possibilities of German-Italian-Russian-Japanese operations are being studied. British power is seen as menaced and, in contrast to some politicians, the conclusion is being drawn that America must avoid any alliance and keep out of the war, but must as soon as possible provide for a defense force corresponding to her own position as a Great Power. Lindbergh and the famous flyer Rickenbacker are advocating this.

Over against the vicious propaganda of hatred for Germany, nurtured by England and France, there is admiration for German leadership and operations which the General Staff regularly discusses with me. The General Staff is doing its best to counteract this foolish propaganda. There is annoyance with England and France, from whom inadequate information regarding military measures and details is received.

Particulars: Both published and confidential reports confirm the inadequate military preparations of the Army and the inability of the Navy to launch an attack against Japan. I refer to earlier reports, according to which the organization of an expeditionary army would require a long time.

2. Pressure upon the aviation industry to speed up deliveries does not alter the previously reported fact that before the late summer of 1940 the employment of appreciable numbers of Air Force units in Europe would not be possible.

3. So far, as a basis for the formation of an army of millions, the standard field army is to be completely reorganized, namely in troops of the army command (mechanized cavalry brigade, tank regiment, etc.) a corps headquarters staff with corps troops (three artillery regiments, 155 mm. howitzers or 155 mm. guns, a motor-transport group, a signal battalion, engineers, etc.). Also, five infantry divisions (each consisting of three infantry regiments, a light artillery regiment with three battalions armed with 75 mm. guns, a heavy artillery regiment with two battalions armed with 155 mm. howitzers,

one engineer battalion, one signal company, etc.). Peacetime strength of the division, 365 officers, 7,600 men. Wartime strength, 548 officers, 10,837 men. Organization of the troops in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and in the National Guard remains (group garbled) unchanged. Strengthening the Army to 280,000, increasing as well the National Guard, and further requests of money for arms are in preparation.

The date for the conclusion of the reorganization is not yet set. Recruiting is proceeding slowly. The youth are little inclined to war service. The production of necessary war material requires considerable time.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 173

138/73899-900

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1385 of October 1

MADRID, October 1, 1939.

Received October 2—12:00 noon.

I had a prolonged conversation with Franco today on the occasion of the third anniversary of his appointment as Generalissimo. Franco first expressed his gratification over Germany's brilliant military successes and told me that he had foreseen the swift annihilation of the Polish Army already on the second day of our advance. For that reason he had made still another personal attempt in Paris and London to prevent the spread of the war, unfortunately, in vain. Franco then immediately spoke of the menace that in his opinion was threatening from Russia, a menace that was becoming acute for Europe because of the westward advance of Russian influence. I availed myself of the opportunity to explain to the Generalissimo in detail what changes Stalin's regime had recently undergone and how it was that national, and not international-revolutionary, motivations had been decisive for the present Russian attitude. I further told Franco that our attitude toward Communism had not changed in any way, and that on the contrary we had made this plain to Stalin at all stages of the German-Russian negotiations. My emphatic explanations seemed to give some reassurance to Franco. Still greatly interested in the Russian question, he inquired, however, whether we would set up a Polish buffer state, which would lessen the danger of a direct contact with Russia. I replied that I had not yet been informed as to what our plans were in this regard, but that we could

assume that further development would depend on the attitude of the friends of Poland, England in particular, which had driven that country to disaster.

In reply to my question as to how he judged the prospects of our peace offer,¹ Franco answered in a vague and doubtful manner. He stated that according to the report of the Duke of Alba from London, America, and in particular American Jewish circles, were agitating in England for continuance of the war and were meeting with response. In England's present situation, a moderating influence by America would on the other hand greatly enhance the prospects for peace.

In regard to our peace move, the Foreign Minister declared that he did not consider the prospects for immediate success to be very great, but that he was firmly convinced that France would at most be able to sustain the "futile attack" on the walls only a few months longer and then would have to give in.

STOHRER

¹ This refers to the Ribbentrop-Molotov declaration of Sept. 28, 1939. See document No. 161.

No. 174

115/117853

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 1, 1939.

Minister von Kotze telephoned from Riga at 6:45 p. m. and said the following:

The Soviet Government informed the Latvian Minister in Moscow during the night of September 30 that it wished to enter into immediate negotiations with plenipotentiaries of the Latvian Government. Nothing was said about the subject of the negotiations, nor is it known to the Latvian Government. Foreign Minister Munters will accordingly fly to Moscow on October 2.¹

The news is to be announced by radio tonight and will appear in the morning papers tomorrow (October 2). However, the Latvian Government wished to give advance notice thereof to Germany, her partner in the Non-Aggression Pact. Minister von Kotze asked the Latvian

¹ Similarly on Oct. 2, Zechlin sent to the Foreign Ministry a telegram (321/193150) stating that Urbšys had just told him that he had received an invitation the previous day to visit Moscow, and would fly to Moscow via Riga Oct. 3. He added that Molotov said Russia did not contemplate sovietizing the border states.

Government whether it planned to take special measures for maintaining law and order. The Foreign Ministry answered in the negative, stating that no disturbances are anticipated.

Minister von Kotze will postpone the projected official trip to Berlin until the situation has been clarified.

WOERMANN

No. 175

103/111659-60

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 475

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

[Sent October 3—2:52 a. m.]

Büro RAM 508.

For the Ambassador.

Please inform Molotov at once that according to reports I have received the Turkish Government would hesitate to conclude the assistance pact with France and England if the Soviet Union emphatically opposed it. In my opinion, as I already stated several times, it would also be in the Russian interest on account of the question of the Straits to forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France. I therefore attach especial value to the Russian Government's taking action to that effect in order to dissuade Turkey from the conclusion of the assistance pacts with the Western Powers, and to having this settled in Moscow at once. No doubt, the best solution at the moment would be the return of Turkey to a policy of absolute neutrality, while confirming existing Russo-Turkish agreements.

Final and prompt diversion of Turkey from the projected Anglo-French treaty, said to have been recently initialed, would also be wholly in line with the peace offensive agreed upon in Moscow, as thereby another country would withdraw from the Anglo-French camp.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ A copy of this telegram was also sent to the Embassy in Turkey as No. 352 (103/111660) with the following additional instruction: "I request that you, for your part, likewise do your best to forestall the final conclusion of the assistance pact between Turkey and the Western Powers. In this matter you might also point to the strong Russian aversion to a onesided commitment by Turkey and explain that the conclusion of the assistance pact under present war conditions would necessarily be viewed differently by Germany than before the outbreak of the war."

No. 176

F18/043-010

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON OCTOBER 1, 1939, AT THE REICH CHANCELLERY ¹

The Führer expressed his pleasure over the opportunity to have a personal conversation with Count Ciano. It would not have been possible for him to leave Berlin during the few days that he was spending in the capital, and he was therefore grateful to Count Ciano for having come to Berlin.

Count Ciano in turn thanked the Führer for the opportunity for this conversation. Difficulties similar to those experienced by the Führer prevented the Duce from leaving the capital. The Italian Government had scheduled a number of Cabinet meetings at which important economic and military measures were to be adopted and the presence of the Duce was required. Moreover, a meeting between the Führer and the Duce at the present moment would be a sensation which might better be reserved for an occasion when definitive and conclusive decisions would be taken.

The Führer replied that he wished, through Count Ciano, to give the Duce a picture of the past development of events and of the present situation. He had put this conversation off until the conclusion of the first phase of the present conflict, that is, until the annihilation of the Polish forces. Only now was it possible to form a conclusive picture of his future plans and of the disposition of his forces. Much as he (the Führer) had been convinced that Poland would be defeated in very short order, a war always contained certain unpredictable elements, and he (the Führer) had therefore waited for the end of the first act of the conflict to inform the Duce of the plans for the future.

Militarily, as he had said, the first act of the conflict was ended as of this day; German troops had begun marching into Warsaw last night and thus were occupying Poland's capital. The fortress of Modlin had likewise surrendered, and surrender negotiations had been in progress with Admiral von Unruh on the Hela Peninsula since this evening. From the military standpoint, therefore, the Polish question had been conclusively settled.

¹ Ciano's own memorandum of this conversation is printed in English translation in *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, edited by M. Muggeridge (London, 1948), pp. 309-316. The original Italian version appears in *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 466-477.

Poland could have been conquered even more swiftly if Germany had been willing to sacrifice more lives. But there had been no intention of sacrificing even a single man unnecessarily in the East, since there was better use for every one in the West.

Warsaw had not made the heroic stand that was being spoken of everywhere. The first bombardment of the city and the first attack had taken place on September 25. On the 26th this attack had been carried further, and on the 27th the city had capitulated. There had been no bombardment before September 25, only a siege of the city. One could not speak, therefore, of any heroic stand. The Warsaw garrison was already demoralized after a short time, just as was true of the Polish Army in general.

The Führer then gave a summary of the relative numerical strength of the forces and of the losses sustained. Germany had entered the battle with 121 divisions, to which must be added a certain number of border defense divisions. Of the 70 divisions allocated to the East, only a part had been actually committed against the enemy.

The combat and operational losses of matériel were extremely moderate and amount to only one eighth of the advance estimate. Casualties were far fewer than had been expected. As of September 26, 5,200 dead, 22,000 wounded, and a few thousand missing had been counted. Of the latter, strayed groups had turned up again at various places. It had to be assumed, however, that some had been ambushed and massacred by the Poles. It could be expected that the total of fatal casualties would reach 6,000.

In consequence of these relatively light losses, it had been possible to form immediately a great number of replacement divisions, the activation of which had been scheduled for later on, so that Germany could at the moment count on 152 divisions of 20 to 22,000 men each, to which a large number of corps troops must be added.

Even as early as September 10, while the operations in Poland were in full progress, the transfer of troops back to the West had begun.

The reason for the light German losses was to be found in the new and modern individual training of the infantry. The favorable results of the campaign were attributable not only to the new infantry tactics but also to the use of heavy infantry weapons, as well as to the effective employment of armor and the Luftwaffe. Poland, by the way, seemed to have received operational advice from the French, but it had been far from convincing and effective. The bravery of some elements of the Polish Army could not be denied. The Poles had been poorly equipped and led, however, and the non-Polish contingents had gone into battle very unwillingly, falling back as soon as they had lost their leaders. Nevertheless, the Polish Army must be described as a modernly equipped Army which, given better leader-

ship and training, would doubtless have accomplished more. Poland had had 35 regular divisions. In addition to this, there were 36 regiments of cavalry (about 11 cavalry divisions) which had in some instances undertaken very foolish attacks. Poland, moreover, also had at her disposal 15 second-line reserve divisions with relatively good equipment. Then there were supposed to have been another 15 third-line divisions which probably had for the most part fought in civilian clothing.

What happened on the Western front was a farce. The attacks of the French which received so much sensational publicity in the enemy press were solely of token character. Nowhere had the enemy come near the German defense lines. Patrols had pushed forward only in areas where the German fortifications were 15 to 20 kilometers behind the border. At no point had the German combat outposts been pushed back.

Artillery fire had also been extremely moderate. Valuable installations and open cities had been bombarded by neither side. Today was the first time that a shell had fallen on a German bunker, without, however, causing any appreciable damage. Thus Germany could regard the battle in the West so far as of no consequence whatsoever. It had been easy for her to hold her combat outposts. Moreover, neither France nor England had either the manpower or the matériel for any large-scale attack on the Western front. To be sure, the state of relative quiet there would not last forever.

The war on the seas had in the main consisted of the so-called blockade, to which Germany had replied with submarine warfare. Notwithstanding the "chivalrous methods" she had pursued, Germany had by September 28 sunk 290,000 tons. The moment Germany gave the submarine war a more serious character, enemy losses would, of course, mount very considerably. The German submarines would then no longer consent to first stopping the enemy ships, then searching them carefully, and finally even assuring themselves that the lifeboats were in order, as they were now doing, but they would simply torpedo the ships without warning. Nevertheless, even with the present methods they had sunk the aircraft carrier *Courageous* and, from our observations, another one, the *Ark Royal*, the sinking of which Churchill would not admit only because no neutral ships had been present as witnesses, as there had been in the former instance. In addition, two destroyers had also been sunk.

In the air war in the West, the British had thus far made a bombing attack on Wilhelmshaven. Of 24 bombers, 11 had been shot down. The day before yesterday the British had attacked two German destroyers. Of six attackers, five were shot down. Otherwise, Germany had been spared any bombing attacks. Merely leaflets had been

dropped—at night, from an altitude of 5 to 6 thousand meters—which were remarkable for their stupidity and innocuousness. They were stupid because their authors had believed that they could precisely at this present moment incite the German people to defection from their government; if dropped in larger quantities, they could at most be regarded as additional paper supply.

Count Ciano observed at this point that the people would never allow themselves to be separated from a leader who was always the winner.

The Führer continued that on the Western front itself everything was being shot down that came into view. Thus 14 planes, 12 British and 2 French, had been shot down yesterday. The ratio of total losses of planes was 1 to 9 in favor of Germany. One German fighter wing alone had brought down 44 planes, while losing only 4 of its own.

In principle, therefore, Germany was in a position to withdraw her troops from the East, allow them a short rehabilitation period, richly deserved after the formidable long-distance marches; the time could also be used for the reconditioning of matériel, and then they could be shipped to the West. Germany was therefore prepared and able at all times to become active in the West.

This announcement by the Führer made an obvious impression on Count Ciano. He inquired once more to make sure he had understood correctly that Germany was prepared at all times to become active in the West, and the Führer confirmed this.

The Führer further remarked that Germany was not in fact interested in forcing a war in the West if such a war could be avoided. After the Polish victories it was unnecessary to continue the war for reasons of military prestige. Nor were there other reasons for doing so. But if peace was not attainable, then Germany would give the war in the West another character.

On the subject of the agreements with Russia, the Führer observed that their purpose was to define the spheres of interest in the newly acquired territories. In a generally difficult time it was not in Germany's interest to have a hostile neighbor at her back, and so she had reached agreements with Russia that were absolutely clear-cut and completely ruled out any possibility of misunderstanding or conflict in the future. In the territory east of the line which was known to Count Ciano, the shaping of the political and economic organization was an exclusively Russian matter, while west of the line Germany pursued her own interests with the same exclusiveness. It was important for the Duce to know that Germany had two things in mind in this territory west of the line: first, to wipe out the Versailles Treaty boundaries and establish a new boundary that was acceptable to Ger-

many from the ethnographic, historical, and economic standpoint; and second, to give the remaining territory of Polish nationality a political organization that would rule out for all time to come any threat to the Reich from that direction.

Furthermore, both Russia and Germany wanted to prevent any element of intrigue apt to sow discord between Germany and Russia from arising out of this settlement at any time in the future. The Führer declared that in every other respect he wanted the German Reich to be encumbered as little as possible with the responsibility for the existence of the Polish residual state. The permanent form that this residual state was to have would be wholly determined by the effort of pacification and of restoring orderly political and economic conditions. The timing of the execution of this plan depended on whether the war was ended or would go on now. Naturally, no final decisions on this matter could be taken until hostilities were concluded.

Count Ciano asked for a more precise definition of the form envisaged by the Führer for organizing the Polish residual state.

The Führer declared that the Polish residual state had to be so organized that it would no longer constitute a military threat to Germany, could not engage in political intrigues between Germany and Russia, and would absolutely ensure protection of Germany's economic and political interests.

Count Ciano asked whether it would be a sovereign state or a protectorate controlled by Germany.

The Führer replied that he could not yet say anything final on that point. In principle, he wished to burden Germany as little as possible with the Polish residual state. On his visits to the front he had found Poland in so run-down and rotten a condition that he wanted to have as little to do with it as possible. He believed that the Western nations, if they could see it with their own eyes, would not fight another day for this totally bankrupt country. It would take from 50 to 100 years to colonize the areas that were to be annexed to Germany.

Finally, Germany was pursuing the additional objective of a thorough cleanup of the nationality problem in the course of which the various ethnic elements scattered over the entire territory would be consolidated into larger nationality groups. In this connection, a climatically and topographically suited area was to be set aside for the resettlement of the Southern Tirolese. Similarly, he planned to settle German minority groups from Hungary and the entire East in this new territory, in order to put an end, for all time, to any friction that might arise from the existence of German minorities.

Count Ciano asked how large the Polish residual state was likely to be.

The Führer replied that this was difficult to say at the moment, because much depended on the ethnographic reorganization and because there were still many national minorities on Polish territory which had preserved their identity in the face of all oppression. Thus there was still a German minority of 370,000 in the country around Lodz.

Count Ciano thereupon asked what the probable population of the Polish rump state would be.

The Führer gave an estimate of a minimum of 8 to 10 millions. He remarked in conclusion that the ideas which he had just expressed could, of course, be carried out only after peace was restored.

Count Ciano asked whether the Führer would mention these ideas in his speech before the Reichstag as the conditions for peace.

The Führer replied that as a matter of fact he did intend to state them before the Reichstag with all appropriate caution. He had told them to Count Ciano at this time so that the Duce could be informed in advance, but for the rest would ask that they be treated in strict confidence.

Apart from this, the Führer continued, there were also other important European problems which had emerged in connection with the present conflict and which could not be settled unilaterally, but only in a generally calm atmosphere by means of a conference or by general agreements. In his Reichstag speech in the coming week he would emphasize Germany's readiness for such solutions but did not believe that this would make a deep impression on the enemy. He was doing it only in order to place the enemy in the wrong. If the enemy obstinately rejected any thought of a peaceful settlement, he (the Führer) was determined to settle the score with him in another way. He would then conduct the war in an entirely different manner from that imagined by the British and French.

He believed, moreover, that the Duce could accomplish an important mission by rallying the neutral world, which was suffering great hardship by reason of the present state of war, and desired peace. If the Duce assumed the leadership of the neutral world, its influence would thereby be greatly increased.

Apart from this, however, it was necessary to realize that not only the future of Germany, but also that of Italy, would be at stake in a final showdown between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other. The Führer expressed his unshakable conviction that in this showdown Germany would emerge triumphant, since the military situation today was quite different from that 25 years ago. A defeat of Germany, however, would at the same time mean the end of Italy's great aspirations in the Mediterranean.

The German Foreign Minister referred in this connection to the Moscow agreements and their economic advantages for Germany. He said that he wondered whether, in these circumstances, it was not perhaps better, on the whole, if the showdown with the Western Powers took place now, since it was bound to happen some time in any event.

The Führer elaborated this by saying that many people in Germany were of the opinion that it would be best coldly to settle accounts with the British and French right now, and added that if Italy were at Germany's side now as a military ally he would not doubt for a second that the present moment was the most favorable for the showdown with the Western Powers: for he was convinced that if Germany and Italy went into the battle together, England and France would be so completely crushed that many of the still unsettled problems would be solved once and for all.

The Führer in this connection came to speak of the dangers of the air war, stating that the best protection from enemy air attacks lay not so much in the anti-aircraft guns, which could not, of course, be very effective at night, as in the enemy's fear of reprisals.

Count Ciano asked whether the Führer would confine himself to a cautious expression in his Reichstag speech of the ideas he had just presented or whether he would in addition undertake an initiative for peace, or have others, Italy, for instance, do so.

The Führer replied that he would confine himself to his Reichstag speech and await what Mussolini had to say after the speech, in the light of the reaction to it in other countries.

Count Ciano, referring to the Führer's suggestion that the Duce could accomplish a great mission if he put himself at the head of the neutral world, replied that Italy had not hitherto undertaken anything of the kind. Nor had she taken any outright neutral position, having merely declared that she would not take any military initiative in the West. This had been done at a time when Germany wanted to go to war in the East and the Führer had announced his intention of localizing the conflict. Had Italy resorted to armed intervention at once, she would have thwarted this intention because the conflict would then immediately have become generalized. Italy had never made a neutrality declaration and had no intention of doing so. She was, however, convinced that it would be advantageous to rally those countries that were the chief targets of British and French propaganda. Because of the close tie between Germany and Italy, these countries would thereby be drawn away from England and France and automatically brought closer to the Axis. Italy was of the opinion, moreover, that her present attitude was more advantageous to Germany than direct military intervention would have been. If she had taken such a step, Italy would have exposed herself to direct

attacks from the air and the sea by the French and British, especially in the colonies.

The Führer replied that, in his opinion, England would not have signed her final treaty with Poland if she had not previously learned what Italy's attitude would be. However, this had not in any way altered the military situation in Poland and besides it must be admitted that Italy's attitude had in point of fact worked out favorably.

Count Ciano denied that England had had previous information on Italy's attitude, but did not go into the matter further; he merely pointed once more to the advantages that had resulted for Germany from Italy's attitude. At the close of the first phase of the conflict, the score was 1:0 in favor of Germany. If Italy had intervened actively, the result would not have been as favorable, for even if Italy had not been dealt a mortal blow by England and France, she would, nevertheless, have been struck very severely. This would have entailed serious psychological disadvantages.

Count Ciano then went on to speak of the formation of the neutral bloc, and stated that Italy, if she was not to tie her own hands for all time, could not easily, for geographic and other reasons, take a neutral position. It was difficult for Italy to remain neutral to the end, and an effort was therefore being made in Italy to be prepared against all eventualities. At the Alpine border, in Africa and elsewhere in the Empire, Italy was already tying down 800,000 French troops, 300,000 in Tunisia alone. The Italian forces in Libya had been increased by 150,000 men, and Italy no longer had to fear a French attack there. Italy's weak point was the deficiency in anti-aircraft artillery, coupled with the fact that the armament industry was concentrated on the Tyrrhenian coast, in Genoa, Spezzia, and Livorno, and could therefore be reached in 30 to 40 minutes flying time by French bombers from Corsica. Italy, however, had not reconciled herself to remaining neutral if the war should go on (*l'Italie ne s'est pas adaptée à rester neutre, si la guerre continue*). She had, as he had said before, worked extremely hard to build up her preparedness. Moreover, her relations with England and France could hardly be called correct. All rumors to the contrary were made up entirely of thin air. To be sure, he (Ciano) had on several occasions before the crisis talked to the French and British Ambassadors on the subject of Italian mediation. Since then, however, their meetings had become considerably less frequent. Only current "administrative" matters were taken up in them. There had been no political consultation of any kind with the Western Powers.

The Führer replied that it was quite clear to him personally that Italy's attitude, considering the course which events had taken, had worked out to advantage. It induced the French to proceed with caution. The Duce's last speech, which had been addressed to Party

representatives near Bologna, had by its veiled threats caused Paris to exercise even greater caution.

Count Ciano mentioned in this connection that wide circles in France, including many generals, for example, General Colson, would greatly welcome Italy's active intervention and considered the Duce's attitude vis-à-vis France a clever move.

The Führer remarked that the German people also looked upon the whole matter as a very subtle bit of teamwork between Italy and Germany.

The conversation then turned to the reception that the Italian mediation proposal had had in France. It turned out that Daladier had not expressed himself at all on the Italian proposal. Only Bonnet, Foreign Minister at the time, took a more positive attitude. To be sure, he too stated that the British would on no account agree to the Italian proposal for an armistice that left the German troops where they were, and that France could therefore not accede to this proposal either. Bonnet, however, did inform Rome at 2 o'clock in the morning, through the Italian Ambassador in Paris, that he believed that France could agree to the Italian proposal if the German troops were withdrawn, at least symbolically, by the withdrawal of a single "flag or gun."

In the further course of the conversation the Führer came back once more to the subject of Russia. Germany wanted to live in peace with Russia, as she had often done in the past for a hundred years at a time. The realization of this wish would be aided by Russia's traditional fear of too close a contact with the West and its superior culture and standard of living. Thus, in this instance again, Russia, because of her old, traditional attitude, had been willing to limit her own advance to the West. Poland, on the contrary, had persisted in striking at Germany on every possible occasion. Already in the years 1936-1937, Poland had been active in this way.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that the Polish Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the occupation of the Rhineland, had counseled a preventive war against Germany and had offered Poland's participation.

In the further course of the conversation, Count Ciano inquired about the situation in the Balkans and spoke of the possibility of forming a group of neutral Balkan countries. He showed concern about Rumania.

The Führer replied that Rumania was in no danger so long as she remained really neutral. Should she, however, compromise her neutrality, she would probably be attacked from all directions.

The Führer then spoke of his endeavor always to create clear-cut relationships. It was for that reason that he had clearly defined Germany's interests to both France and England. In his conversa-

tions with the Duce also, he always had been governed by this desire for clarity and had made it plain that the Mediterranean was exclusively Italy's sphere of interest. He had similarly pursued a policy of a clear-cut demarcation of spheres of interest with respect to Russia. This was the only way to restore stability and peace. The result had been concretely demonstrated by the relationship between Germany and Italy, which had indeed been possible only because of the clear-cut separation of interests. The Duce had recognized Germany's interests in Austria and Czechoslovakia, while Germany most liberally left the Mediterranean to Italy as her exclusive domain. Germany had rejoiced over all of Italy's successes, because each one, in the last analysis, also benefited the Axis as a whole.

The Führer then stated once more that if the conflict should be continued, both air and submarine warfare would be waged by Germany in an entirely different manner. Moreover, Germany did not believe that the Maginot Line, which consisted of groups of installations with large gaps in between, was invincible.

In reply to Count Ciano's question regarding America's role, the Führer replied that America could only come to the aid of the West if she had sufficient tonnage at her disposal. Submarine warfare would here play an important role.

Replying to Ciano's question as to whether Japan also should be included in the neutral bloc under the leadership of the Duce, the Führer said that Japan was surely waiting for England to receive the first severe blow, when she would be able, free and without hindrance, to gain her objectives in East Asia.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that Japan at the moment had a middle-of-the-road government, but that in the event of German victories the spirit of the Japanese Army would come to the fore and establish a new government which, with the backing of the Japanese Navy, would enable Japan to take advantage of the greatest opportunity of her political existence.

Referring to the announcements of the British that they would wage a 3-year war, the Führer declared that he was preparing for a 5-year war. Germany had shown in Poland how she waged war in practice, and he was certain that France and England would suffer severe blows from Germany.

Count Ciano replied that the armament of Germany's enemies obviously had a rather weak basis, because Italy, through a variety of devious channels had received requests for delivery of even the most elementary articles of equipment, such as field glasses and the like. Italy had, of course, refused to make such deliveries.

The Führer stated that this information was corroborated by recently discovered documents which showed how trifling were the de-

liveries that England and France intended to make to Poland in October. Thus Poland was to receive twelve 48mm anti-tank guns, twenty 25mm guns and six tanks.

Count Ciano also mentioned a conversation he had had with François-Poncet, to whom, wishing to frighten him, he had pointed out the fatal risks incurred by France. François-Poncet had admitted that the situation was difficult at the moment with respect to matériel. Referring to America, however, he had added that in the spring France would receive enormous deliveries of airplanes from America. France was counting on several thousand planes. Besides, France always lost in the first 6 months, to win the more resoundingly in the succeeding 6 months. To that Count Ciano had replied that there was no telling whether the war would last more than 6 months, **and perhaps there would be no time left at all for any winning.**

In reply to another question by Ciano, the Führer declared that in his Reichstag speech he would not only speak of Poland in the manner previously stated, but would also present his ideas regarding the settlement of general problems at a conference. The Führer explained in reply to another question from Ciano that he had no detailed program for this as yet. He would only speak of disarmament, general security, and removal of trade barriers.

In reply to a further question by Ciano, the Führer stated that the date for the Reichstag session was not yet fixed, as he wanted to visit Warsaw first.²

After a duration of 2½ hours, the conversation ended at about 9:15 p. m.

Submitted herewith, in accordance with instructions, to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.

SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ Hitler delivered his Reichstag speech on Oct. 6. See Editors' Note, p. 227.

No. 177

463/225813

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 478

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.
Büro RAM 509.

For the Ambassador.

Please inform Molotov that, in keeping with the existing German-Italian Alliance, we have discussed with Ciano¹ the world situation

¹ See document No. 176.

as modified by the Moscow Agreements. The possibilities of restoring peace as a result of the joint German-Soviet peace declaration were also discussed in this connection.

RIBBENTROP

No. 178

B18/B003055

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 769

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

The Finnish Minister today requested me to clarify the significance of the arrangement of spheres of influence between Germany and Russia; he was particularly interested in knowing what effect the Moscow agreements might have on Finland.

I reminded the Minister that a short time ago Finland, as is well known, had rejected our proposal to conclude a nonaggression pact.¹ Perhaps this was now regretted in Helsinki. For the rest, now as then it is the wish of Germany to live with Finland on the best and most friendly terms and, particularly in the economic sphere, to effect as extensive an exchange of goods as possible. If M. Wuorimaa felt uneasy about Finland because of the Estonian incident and M. Munters' trip to Moscow, announced today, I would have to tell him that I was not informed as to Moscow's policies vis-à-vis Finland. But I felt that worries over Finland at this time are not warranted.

The Minister then spoke of the Ciano visit.² In this connection I remarked that after liquidating the Polish campaign we had undoubtedly arrived at an important juncture in the war. The announced convocation of the Reichstag pointed to a statement from the Government in which the idea would surely be expressed that we regarded as senseless any opening of real hostilities in the West. Of course, should the Western Powers fail to seize the opportunity for peace, one would probably have to resign oneself to a bitter struggle.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See vol. VI, document No. 391.

² See document No. 176.

No. 179

2177/471598-600

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 770

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

The Belgian Ambassador called on me today after having reported to the Belgian Minister President¹ and the King in Brussels.

¹ M. Hubert Pierlot.

In his usual manner, Davignon had neatly prepared in advance what he was going to say. He introduced his talk with the assurance that Belgium was more determined than ever to defend her independence and neutrality and had used plain language vis-à-vis English pressure, with success. Belgium was on that account not at all popular in France at present; Paris had the idea that in 1914 Belgium had joined France for France's sake, a fallacy from which the French could not be dissuaded. Then the Ambassador discussed two problems:

1. *The peace question.*

Speaking apparently on the basis of official information, Davignon stated that England is obstinate but that in France the Cabinet even now still contains a number of pronounced friends of peace. But France is unable to assert herself vis-à-vis England. Nothing makes any impression on London but what Washington says. In Washington, in turn, only Mussolini can raise his voice successfully. If there is any chance at all it is only through the diplomatic channel Rome-Washington-London, and perhaps parallel with it the direct channel Rome-London. A public peace appeal, which apparently is impending here, would escape being harmful only if it were not worded so bluntly as to block England's possibility of withdrawal. The Ambassador, whose words clearly showed Belgium's desire for peace, thought it would be best if the public appeal were preceded by a diplomatic step sufficiently far in advance.

2. *The subsequent prosecution of the war if the peace effort should fail.*

If a peace is not realized now, Count Davignon visualizes two different possibilities for the prosecution of the war: either a delaying action such as that on the Western front to date, which proves increasingly, the longer it lasts, the senselessness of this state of war and must eventually dispel France's determination to fight; or else all-out war. In case of the latter, which worries Davignon especially, the Ambassador obviously sought to make me realize what a fateful mistake it would be if Germany launched an offensive through Belgian territory. Davignon, however, clothed his arguments in a description of the misfortune that would overcome France if she for her part should invade Belgium. The terrific moral shock of such a treaty violation would cost France the sympathy of the entire world, especially America. As was generally known, the French military leaders would like a wider theater of operations to enable them to make their superiority in material felt and so as not to be wedged in at our West Wall as they were at present. However, France would find herself confronted by the well-equipped Belgian

Army of three-quarters of a million men, determined to give battle, and a series of fortifications. The moral and physical factors would cause France to lose the war should she venture a forced passage through Belgium.

I did not contradict Count Davignon's statements. I referred him, however, to certain reports launched by the Western Powers, from which one might infer such intentions on the part of France. I told him at the end that while the Western Powers had an interest in widening the theater of operations, we, as was well known, wanted to preserve the circle of neutrals. It would of course be a serious matter if the chance of peace existing today were wantonly thrown away by the Western Powers, because then the soldier would again have the initiative.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 180

2177/471595-97

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 772

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador repeated to me today in the automobile the telegraphic report from the Italian Ambassador in Paris¹ about the peace inclinations within the French Cabinet. Attolico later sent me the text of the Paris report which is enclosed.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

The Royal Italian Ambassador in Paris has sent the following information:

Minister Ciano's visit to Berlin² has excited great interest and expectation in Paris. Any proposal regarding peace negotiations which Italy might make to France would be received with sympathy provided it was not a mere communication of "decisions already definitely taken."

One of the most distinguished members of the French Government has confirmed to me that the question of form is the most important consideration. France and England would at first insist on Poland's presence at any proposed conference, but would in the end be content with a discussion of the Polish question at the conference.

¹ Raffaele Guariglia, November 1938-May 1940.

² See document No. 176.

It is earnestly hoped here, however, that a peace conference would lead to the resurrection of a Polish state, even if only on a modest scale and of a more or less symbolic character.

The argument about the nullification of the so-called moral purpose of the war, advanced by Mussolini in his speech,³ has made a deep impression here since Russia's entry upon the scene.

It would now be a question of enabling France and England to save face. On that account the success of any peace appeal that we might undertake would depend primarily on the form in which it is presented.

The foregoing are the views of the majority of the Cabinet members. Up to this evening, however, Daladier had not yet gotten in touch with Chamberlain; he will probably do so Monday morning before the British Minister delivers his speech.

³ In Bologna on Sept. 23. See *Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini* (Milan, 1939), xii, pp. 224-226.

No. 181

828/198764

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

RIGA, October 3, 1939—1:04 p. m.

No. 206 of October 13 [sic]

Received October 3—2:20 p. m.

Munters informed me the day he left that the Estonian Foreign Minister had told him that the great concessions made to Russia were unavoidable because Germany had refrained from exercising any political influence on the negotiations and had not replied to the Estonian request made on the basis of the Estonian-German Non-Aggression Pact that she state her position. This is contrary to the statement of the American Minister,¹ who returned from Tallinn yesterday. According to him, Tallinn had been prepared for the worst after Selter's first trip because of the lack of clarity in the Russian demands, and had welcomed the later agreement, in which limits had been set to the demands through the efforts of the Reich Foreign Minister, with a certain sense of relief and even of gratitude towards Germany. In high, pronouncedly Latvian circles here there are signs of growing mistrust of the "half-Latvian" Munters, who before his departure yesterday received rather broad powers to conclude an immediate agreement. Munters will in turn probably try to render tolerable the concessions which he makes by stating to the local public that Germany had given up all political influence in this

¹ John C. Wiley.

part of the Baltic and had thereby exposed the little country of Latvia to seizure by the Russians. In order to be able to oppose this in time, it seems to me that authentic instructions are necessary on whether and how Germany has exerted or will exert influence upon the present Russo-Latvian settlement. Please send telegraphic instructions.

KOTZB

No. 182

103/111663-64

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 3, 1939—7:04 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 3—11:10 p. m.

No. 463 of October 3

Molotov summoned me to his office at 2 p. m. today, in order to communicate to me the following:

The Soviet Government would tell the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, who arrives today, that, within the framework of an amicable settlement of mutual relations (probably similar to the one with Estonia), the Soviet Government was willing to cede the city of Vilna and its environs to Lithuania, while at the same time the Soviet Government would let Lithuania understand that it must cede the indicated portion of its territory to Germany.¹ M. inquired what formal procedure we had in mind for carrying this out. His idea was the simultaneous signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian protocol on Vilna and a German-Lithuanian protocol on the Lithuanian area to be ceded to us.

I replied that this suggestion did not appeal to me. It seemed to me more logical that the Soviet Government should exchange Vilna for the strip to be ceded to us and then hand this strip over to us. M. did not seem quite in accord with my proposal but was willing to let me ask for the viewpoint of my Government and give him a reply by tomorrow noon.

Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, as in the eyes of the world it would make us appear as "robbers" of Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet Government figures as the donor. As I see it, only my suggestion can be considered at all. However, I would ask you to consider whether it might not be advisable for us, by a separate secret German-Soviet protocol, to forego the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory until the Soviet Union actually incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 159.

No. 183

96/108036

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, October 3, 1939—8:08 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 3—11:10 p. m.

No. 464 of October 3, 1939

With reference to your telegram No. 475 of October 2.¹

I explained in detail to Molotov the contents of your instruction. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government shared our trend of thought and was proceeding in that direction. However, it appeared that Turkey had already become rather closely involved with England and France. The Soviet Government would continue to try to rectify or "neutralize" matters in our sense.

The Afghan Ambassador, with whom I spoke today, claimed to know that the Soviet Government was demanding of Turkey absolute neutrality and the closing of the Straits.

Molotov himself said that the negotiations were still under way.

When I mentioned the rumors that England and France intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to set up a Balkan front, Molotov asserted spontaneously that the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on Bulgaria.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 175.

No. 184

4143/E071651

The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 3, 1939.

e. o. Pol. VI 2210.

To Tallinn, No. 241. With reference to your No. 180 of September 29¹

To Riga, No. 303. With reference to your No. 206 of October 3²

To Kaunas, No. 249

For the Minister.

The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to be most discreet in dealing with German-Russian relations and their possible effects on the Baltic States and to make no statement on this subject.

¹ Document No. 168.

² Document No. 181.

Supplement for Riga only:

This answers the question asked at the end of your telegraphic report No. 206.

WOERMANN

No. 185

73/52077-80

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

Berlin, October 3, 1939.

CONVERSATION WITH HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT COUNT TELEKI
IN BUDAPEST ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1939

After a general discussion of the political situation Count Teleki expressed the urgent wish that Germany might continue in the future as she has in the past to expedite the delivery of war material to Hungary and especially to speed up as much as possible the shipment of the orders already contracted for.¹

I in turn gave Count Teleki a broad outline of the status of the German-Hungarian economic negotiations and specifically raised the following three questions:

I. Mineral resources in the Carpathian area.

The German Government had to insist that the Hungarian Government keep the promises, made prior to the restoration to Hungary of the Carpathian region, to safeguard the German economic interests in that area.² This held especially for the exploitation of mineral resources. We were willing to waive full exploitation of the concessions granted us but wished at least to obtain control of exploration and exploitation in regard to petroleum.

Count Teleki reiterated his view, previously explained to Minister von Erdmannsdorff, that the statement he had made at the time to the Minister and Herr Altenburg had referred only to actually existing economic interests and not to extensive concessions of this kind, which would apply a partial renunciation of sovereignty. Moreover, he had not been aware of these concessions at the time he made the statement. Actually there was no reason for bringing in German specialists and German firms, since the Hungarian geologists were particularly well trained and able to solve the problems in question themselves. The most Hungary could do was to promise Germany participation in the eventual exploitation of any petroleum deposits that might actually exist.

Not until I declared very definitely that the German Government could not be satisfied with this did Count Teleki promise to reconsider whether the Hungarian Government could make us other proposals which went further.

¹ See document No. 9.

² See document No. 62 and footnote 1.

II. Economic aid for Slovakia.

I pointed out that Hungary had continuously denied our repeated requests to normalize economic relations with Slovakia and especially to send to Slovakia large-scale shipments of farm products, particularly fats. Count Teleki justified this refusal on the ground that it was impossible for Hungary to enter into closer relations with Slovakia unless the latter changed her political attitude toward Hungary and above all ceased persecuting the Hungarians in Slovakia. I replied that we were concerned not with the adjustment of political relations between Hungary and Slovakia, but, as we saw it, with Hungary's obvious duty to aid Germany by doing everything in her power to supply Slovakia, which was Germany's friend, had fought against Poland at the side of Germany, and constituted the hinterland for the German troops.

After a prolonged discussion Count Teleki stated that they would find a way to meet the German wish by furnishing food and even fats to Slovakia through individual compensation transactions. As for the rest, Hungary was already supplying Germany to the limits of her capacity and there was nothing to keep Germany from passing these supplies on to Slovakia.

Following this conversation Minister von Nickl³ promised me that thirty to forty carloads of fats would be made available for direct delivery to Slovakia through a compensation arrangement in the near future. He made a point, however, of asking that the Slovaks not be informed of this as yet.

III. The question of the rate of exchange.

I told the Minister President that Germany positively could not resign herself to the devaluation of the reichsmark by about 11 percent, as effected indirectly through the increase in the rate of exchange of free foreign currencies, especially not at the very moment of the outbreak of war. Count Teleki said that he recognized our political interest in this question but that he could not judge its technical aspect. He would discuss the question at once with the president of the bank of issue and then inform us of the position of the Hungarian Government.

In the Minister President's waiting room I met the president of the bank of issue and discussed the question directly with him. He reiterated his familiar argument that the increase in the rate of exchange of the free currencies had been imperative in order to provide an incentive for export to the countries concerned. When I kept insisting, he even went so far as to tell me that I could, to be sure, demand his resignation, and also obtain it, but that I could not force him to follow a different exchange rate policy.

The Governmental Committee Protocol⁴ signed the next day accordingly stated that no agreement could be reached in this question and that the German Government would soon discuss the matter again.⁵

CLODIUS

³ Of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Not printed (8502/E597157-65).

⁵ Clodius submitted this memorandum to the State Secretary with a cover note of the same date (73/52076). Clodius said that he had recommended to Ribbentrop that war material deliveries to Hungary be resumed on a full scale basis. Ribbentrop said he intended to submit the question to the Führer.

No. 186

186/73902-08

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 773

BERLIN, October 3, 1939.

The Spanish Ambassador made the following statement to me today with respect to the peace question: The Spanish Government believes that the present moment offers a measure of promise for concluding peace. The Spanish Government is prepared, if the German Government so desires, to offer its good offices as mediator. There are, however, certain substantial prerequisites to this.

a. The proposals made must be worthy of respect and calculated to ensure peace for a long time to come.

b. Without provision for a rump-Poland nothing can be done, because France and especially England must be given the chance to save face.

As regards the methods used, he said that in public discussion it is essential to spare the domestic prestige of the English and French Governments to such an extent that they are able to come down from their present intransigent theses. The substantive discussions proper would be reserved to the diplomatic mediation.

I thanked the Ambassador for his démarche and referred him to the imminent session of the Reichstag,¹ naturally making no comment on the matter at hand. But since the Ambassador was speaking by instruction of his Government and otherwise calls on me very seldom, it is a step to which I believe we ought to react in some way for courtesy's sake. Incidentally, it is striking how closely the ideas of the Franco Government parallel statements which have reached us through other channels.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 227.

No. 187

51/88895

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 3, 1939.

With reference to the enclosed communication of the Naval High Command of October 2, 1939 (1/Skl. 9592/39 geh.).¹

¹ Not found.

I communicated the following to Admiral Schniewind today:

1. We were still of the opinion that the order to attack all merchant vessels definitely identified as enemy ships should not be given at the present time, especially in consideration of the peace efforts now in progress.

2. We had no objection to the order communicated [to us] permitting the immediate use of arms against merchant vessels definitely recognized to be armed or against merchant ships which on the basis of reliable information are known to be armed. We believed, however, that the submarine commanders still might consider the above formulation as an instruction to take action against all enemy merchant vessels, and asked that this point of view be taken into account in making another formulation. Furthermore, it might be well to make it clear that the previous order not to attack passenger ships is not affected by the present order.

Admiral Schniewind showed understanding for these statements and promised to look into the matter.

Submitted to 1) the State Secretary, 2) the Deputy Director of the Political Department, 3) the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, and 4) Herr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch.

WOERMANN

No. 188

Nuremberg document No. 122-C
Exhibit GB-82

*Extract From War Diary of the Naval Staff*¹

[Extract]

CHEFSACHE

[BERLIN,] October 3, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

By officer only

5. The Chief of the Naval Staff² considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration.

- a. What places in Norway can be considered for bases?
- b. Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

¹ The German text of this document is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 422-424.

² Grand Admiral Raeder.

- c. What are the possibilities for defense after occupying?
- d. Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly decisive advantages already as supply positions? (Commanding Officer, Submarines, already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic submarines to call at temporarily.)³
- e. What decisive advantage would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, e. g., Skagen?

³In a memorandum of Oct. 9 to the OKM, Dönitz designated Trondheim as the Norwegian port best suited for use as a German naval base, and recommended that a base be secured there; *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 005-C, exhibit GB-83, pp. 159-161. On Oct. 10, Raeder carried this recommendation to Hitler who decided to consider the matter; "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 45-47. See also Raeder's retrospective memorandum of Jan. 30, 1944, the German text of which is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 066-C, exhibit GB-81, pp. 276-282. An English translation is given in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. vi, pp. 887-892.

No. 189

96/108037-38

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 361 of October 4

ANKARA, October 4, 1939—3:47 p. m.

Received October 4—8:00 p. m.

In pursuance of instructions in your telegram 352 of October 2¹ I had an hour-long discussion with the Minister President² who is acting as a substitute for the Foreign Minister. All arguments which favor Turkey's return to a policy of absolute neutrality were received by him with obvious understanding. I emphasized most strongly that the conclusion of any pact with the Western Powers would be considered an open sabotaging of our peace efforts and that we expected from Turkey, on the contrary, that she would lend active support to the German Government's efforts to achieve peace, which were in her own interest. The Minister President received with special interest my statements on the re-establishment of historical German-Russian cooperation. I also suggested to him how Turkey could, in our opinion, get rid of her obligations under the Assembly declaration of May 12. When I asked whether I could inform the Reich Government that Turkey was willing to support the peace offensive by an appropriate adjustment of her policy, the Minister President answered that he could not reply until after Saracoglu's return and a new consultation on the situation as it would then exist. In his opin-

¹ See document No. 175, footnote 1.

² Refik Saydam.

ion Chamberlain's speech³ left the door open for negotiations, provided that the German peace proposal contained guarantees, in a psychologically acceptable form, for the preservation of the Polish and Czech nations. Turkey, at any rate, had a very great interest in the establishment of peace. I further asked him to arrange a meeting for me with the President, so that I might explain to him this German view of the situation.

With reference to the attitude of the press the Minister President said that the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin had reported on the Führer's protests⁴ and that he was continuing his effort to make the reporting more objective by means of the new commission set up in the office of the Minister President.

From a démarche by the Iranian Ambassador here I have learned that Russian troop concentration on the Caucasian border has been confirmed. The Iranian Ambassador has instructions to demand a Turkish policy aimed at establishing peace, since Persia might otherwise become the battlefield for a Russo-British conflict.

PAPEN

³ In a speech in the House of Commons on Oct. 3, Chamberlain had given the British position on the Russo-German declaration of Sept. 28 about the "liquidation of the war." For the text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, vol. 351, pp. 1855-1861.

⁴ See document No. 146.

No. 190

1807/411596

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 209 of October 4

RIGA, October 4, 1939—7:00 p.m.

Received October 4—8:00 p. m.

Pol. VI 2225.

It is known to the Latvian Government that the Russian demands (naval bases at Libau and Windau—Riga is questionable—plus 50,000 troops distributed throughout the country) have to be accepted by this evening. Since the effect upon the public of the terms, which are so far kept secret, is unpredictable, and outright paralysis of the government appears imminent, 60,000 Volksdeutsche and 3,000 Reichsdeutsche are in immediate danger of their lives. Please send detailed information regarding the promised assistance as soon as possible. As for the date, I take the liberty of reserving this for a later telegraphic report. Adequate tonnage is desired, 75 percent of which should be directed to Riga, the rest to Libau. Provision of

armed protection for unhindered embarkation and also food and surgical dressings seems necessary.

KOTZE

No. 191

103/111685

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, October 4, 1939.

No. 488

With reference to your telegram No. 463.¹

I, too, consider inopportune the method Molotov suggested for the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory. On the contrary, please ask Molotov not to discuss this cession of territory with the Lithuanians at present, but rather to have the Soviet Government assume the obligation *toward Germany* to leave this strip of territory unoccupied in the event of a posting of Soviet forces in Lithuania, which may possibly be contemplated, and furthermore to leave it to Germany to determine the date on which the cession of the territory should be formally effected. An understanding to this effect should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.

REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

[Notes:] As directed by the Reich Foreign Minister, this telegram is being dispatched *at once* with his signature. GAUS, October 4.

I telephoned the contents of the telegram in veiled language at 11 a. m. to Count Schulenburg. He fully understood the instruction. G[AUS], October 4.

¹ Document No. 182.

No. 192

583/242217

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 4, 1939.

Minister Funk has agreed vis-à-vis Minister Clodius to an increase of at least 2,000,000 tons a year in coal deliveries to Italy. The quantity previously agreed upon amounts to approximately 9,200,000 tons.

Since the acquisition of the mines in the former Polish part of Upper Silesia, the satisfaction of Italian coal requirements by Ger-

many is no longer a question of production but merely a question of transportation. In this respect everything possible to assure delivery is being done in cooperation with the Reich Economics Ministry and the Reich Transportation Ministry.

WIEHL

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister via the State Secretary.

WIEHL

No. 193

F15/024-021

*Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*¹

October 4, 1939.

The undersigned, being duly empowered thereto by the German Government and the Government of the USSR, pursuant to article I of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty concluded in Moscow on September 28, 1939, between Germany and the USSR,² have agreed upon the following:

I

The boundary line between the respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state shall have the following course:

Beginning at the point located on the Igorka River at the mouth of a nameless brook which comes before the village of Pschetok and which flows into the Igorka River at a distance of about 2,300 meters northeast of the intersection of this river with the Shondowy-Kopzewo road, the boundary shall run in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the point located on the Tschernaja Gantscha River opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Shondowy.

Thence the boundary ascends along the Tschernaja Gantscha River to the mouth of the Marycha River. From this mouth the boundary shall follow a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the northern shore of Jedryno Lake. Thence the boundary shall follow a straight line to be determined to the point located opposite the mouth of the Wolkushanka River on the Tschernaja Gantscha River, and further, ascending this latter river, to the point lying south of the village of Ostrynske. Thence the boundary shall run at first in a southwesterly and then in a northwesterly direction along the ravine to its northwestern end and then, on a straight line

¹ The spellings of all Polish place names in this document are those used in the printed German text.

² Document No. 157, and Appendix VI.

to be determined, running in a northwesterly direction to the point lying at the northeastern edge of the village of Tscharny Brud. From here the boundary shall run in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the railroad bridge across the Blisna River at the northern edge of the village of Schtschebra so that the village of Schtschebra shall be on the USSR side and the village of Blisna on the German side. Continuing, the boundary shall descend the Blisna River to the junction of the roads Suwałki-Schtschebra II and Ratschki Schtschebra II, so that the fork of the road and the village of Schtschebra II shall remain on the German side and the village of Schtschebra I on the USSR side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located north of the village of Topilowka and then shall bend slightly in a southwesterly direction and run, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the former Russo-German Reich border, which is located at a distance of about 900 meters southwest of the village of Pruska Mala, which shall remain on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue generally in a southwesterly direction along the former Russo-German border up to the point where the latter intersects the Pissa River.

Thence the aforesaid boundary shall descend along the Pissa River to its confluence with the Narew River and then descend this river to the mouth of a nameless brook which flows into the Narew River between the town of Ostrolenka and the village of Ostrowa. Thence the boundary shall ascend the brook to the eastern edge of the village of Lawy (South). From the eastern edge of the village of Lawy (South), the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of Sussk, and continue, also on a straight line to be determined, to a point situated on the Troschyn-Rabendy road approximately 400 meters southwest of the edge of the village of Troschyn. Thence the boundary runs in a south-southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the crossroads south of the village of Stylengi and then shall turn towards the southeast and continue, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Osh River south of the village of Butschin, so that this village shall remain on the USSR side, and the village of Saoshe on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the Osh River to a tributary on the left which flows into the Osh River between the villages of Sokolowo and Rogowek, then along this tributary to a point located 1,200 meters east of the village of Malinowa-Stare. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Ostruw-Masowezka-Schabi-

kowo road, approximately 700 meters south of the brick works, so that the Salesze estate, the village of Lubejewo-Nowe and the aforesaid brick works shall be on the USSR side; the village of Salesze, the village of Pshiimy and the village of Lubejewo on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to a point on the Brotschisko River, approximately 500 meters northwest of the western edge of the village of Nowa Zolotorija, so that the village of Ugnewo shall remain on the German side.

Thence, the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the road, approximately 350 meters south of the village of Petzki.

Thence the boundary shall run in a southeasterly direction to a point on the Sapadnyi Bug River approximately 1,500 meters east of the edge of the village of Nadbushne.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the Sapadnyi Bug River to the mouth of the Solokija River.

From the mouth of the Solokija River, the boundary shall run along this river to a point located opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Ugnuw.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of Chodywantze, so that the village of Pschedno and the village of Nowossjulki shall remain on the USSR side and the village of Mysljatin and Chodywantze on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located approximately 1,300 metres north of the northeast edge of the village of Shurawze.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the Krinitza Brook, opposite the southeastern edge of the village of Shilka.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of Bshesina, then the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point approximately 800 meters northwest of the village of Pisuny.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to Luwtscha Brook and shall reach this brook opposite the southwestern edge of the village of Garby and thence shall ascend along this brook up to the Sigly farm.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwestern direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Gnoinik Brook

opposite the southeastern edge of the village of Gorajetz and shall then descend this brook to its intersection with the Gorajetz-Zetschanuw road.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the eastern edge of the village of Zetschanuw.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the western edge of the village of Dachnuw, so that the Novy farm shall remain on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of Futory and thence approximately westward, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the northwestern edge of the village of Sabjala, so that the Ljatoschin farm and the village of Ushkowitz shall remain on the USSR side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Pschikopa Brook opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Dobtscha, so that the village of Milkuw shall remain on the USSR side and the village of Degelnja on the German side.

Thence the boundary descends the course of the Pschikopa Brook to its confluence with the Pschiluben River and then follows this river downstream to its confluence with the San River.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the course of the San River to its source, so that the Sjanke and Ushok railroad stations shall remain on the USSR side.

Note 1: At nonnavigable rivers and brooks the boundary line shall be the middle of the main branch of such rivers and brooks. At navigable rivers, the boundary line shall be the middle of the main channel of navigation.

Note 2: Those portions of the boundary which have been determined by lines to be agreed upon, shall be defined in detail at the demarcation of the boundary.

Note 3: The boundary line determined by this protocol has been entered in black upon the attached Russian map to the scale of 1:100,000.

II

The boundary line determined in section I of this Protocol shall be marked on the ground by a mixed German-Russian commission.

The commission shall erect boundary monuments, prepare a detailed description of this line and enter it on a map to the scale of 1:25,000.

The commission shall commence its work on October 9 of this year.

The description of the course of the boundary prepared by the foregoing commission and a map of this line shall be confirmed by both Governments.³

III

This Protocol, which is subject to ratification, takes effect immediately upon signature. The exchange of ratifications shall take place in Berlin within the shortest time possible.

This Protocol has been done in four copies, of which two are in the German and two in the Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

Signed in Moscow, on October 4, 1939.

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
W. MOLOTOW

For the Government
of the German Reich:
F. SCHULENBURG

³ In a note verbale of Oct. 8, the Embassy in Moscow informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that Germany would be represented by a delegation headed by Hencke and including three other officials representing the OKW and the Ministries of Interior and Transport (2426/512656). On Oct. 10 the People's Commissariat replied that the director of its Central European Department, A. M. Alexandrov, would head the Soviet delegation which would include three other members, all officers (2426/512657). The commission held its first session Oct. 10, 1939, and continued to meet until Aug. 17, 1940, when agreement on the main points was reached (2362/488025-28), even though some details remained to be worked out (see vol. xi). The files of Political Division V relating to the Central Boundary Commission, its six subcommissions, proposed changes in the boundary line, and various questions and disagreements connected with establishing its exact course on the ground have been filmed in serials 2426-2430 inclusive, 8426, 8427, 8430, 8431, and 8432.

No. 194

34/28486

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 5, 1939—12:10 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 5—4:55 a. m.

No. 470 of October 4

With reference to my telegram No. 463 of October 3.¹

Immediately after Under State Secretary Gaus' first telephone call,² I transmitted to Molotov this morning the request not to divulge to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister anything regarding the German-Soviet understanding concerning Lithuania. M. asked me to see him at 5 p. m. and told me, that, unfortunately, he had been obliged yesterday to inform the Lithuanian Foreign Minister of this understand-

¹ Document No. 182.

² See document No. 191.

ing, since he could not, out of loyalty to us, act otherwise. The Lithuanian delegation had been extremely dismayed and sad; they had declared that the loss of this area in particular would be especially hard to bear since many prominent leaders of the Lithuanian people came from that part of Lithuania. This morning at 8 a. m., the Lithuanian Foreign Minister had flown back to Kaunas, intending to return to Moscow in 1 or 2 days.

I said that I would immediately notify my Government by telephone, whereupon I called Herr Gaus.³ An hour later Molotov informed me that Stalin *personally* requested the German Government *not to insist for the moment* upon the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory.

SCHULENBURG

³ No record of this call has been found. See, however, document No. 196.

No. 195

84/23441

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, October 5, 1939—3:30 a. m.

No. 471 of October 4

Received October 5—6:05 a. m.

Today Molotov brought up again the wish expressed by the Foreign Minister for establishment of repair facilities for German ships and submarines at Murmansk. Molotov stated that Murmansk was not isolated enough for that purpose. The Soviet Government considered the port of Teriberka, east of Murmansk, more suited because it was more remote and not visited by foreign ships. The particulars of its utilization, the shipment of war material there, etc., could be discussed with Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ According to Ritter's penciled notes, the question of the submarine base at Teriberka was discussed with Mikoyan on Oct. 10 (8435/E593980-84).

No. 196

127/69687-89

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 5, 1939—3:43 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 5—11:55 a. m.

No. 497 of October 4

With reference to today's telephonic communication from the Ambassador.¹

¹ See document No. 194, footnote 3.

The Legation in Kaunas is being instructed as follows:²

1) Solely for your personal information, I am apprising you of the following: At the time of the signing of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, a strictly secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith, Lithuania was to belong to the German sphere of influence, while in the territory of the former Polish state, the so-called four-river line, Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San, was to constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district of Vilna go to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government consented. At the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended to the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilna area, was included in the Russian sphere of influence, for which in turn, in the Polish area, the province of Lublin and large portions of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket of territory of Suwałki, fell within the German sphere of influence. Since, by the inclusion of the Suwałki tract in the German sphere of influence a difficulty in drawing the border line resulted, we agreed that in case the Soviets should take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip of territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on the map, should fall to Germany.

2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports³ that Molotov, contrary to our own intentions, notified the Lithuanian Foreign Minister last night of the confidential arrangement. Please now, on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government, orally and in strict confidence, of the matter, as follows:

As early as at the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications in Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves and the Soviet Government concerning the delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence. In these conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilna district to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government gave me its consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, as is apparent from the German-Soviet boundary demarcation which was published, the pocket of territory of Suwałki jutting out between Germany and Lithuania had fallen to Germany. As this created an intricate and impractical boundary, I had reserved for Germany a border correction in this area, whereby a small strip of Lithuanian territory would fall to Germany. The award of Vilna to Lithuania was maintained in these negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to the Lithuanian Government that the Reich Government does not consider the question of this border revision timely at this moment. We make the proviso, however, that the Lithuanian Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of instruction for Kaunas.

I request you to inform M. Molotov of our communication to the Lithuanian Government. Further, please request of him, as already

²The text of telegram No. 252 of Oct. 4 to Kaunas is quoted verbatim here (115/117631-82).

³See document No. 194.

indicated in the preceding telegram,⁴ that the border strip of Lithuanian territory involved be left free in the event of a possible posting of Soviet troops in Lithuania and also that it be left to Germany to determine the date of the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the territory involved. Both of these points at issue should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁴ Document No. 191.

⁵ In a telegram of Oct. 5 (127/69685), Schulenburg replied as follows: "Instruction carried out. Molotov promised to submit our proposal to his Government and indicated that it would surely be agreed to." For the resulting exchange of letters see document No. 218.

No. 197

821/193159-60

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, October 5, [1939]—7:55 p. m.

No. 175 of October 5

Received October 5—10:30 p. m.

With reference to telegram No. 252 of October 5 [4].¹

Bizauskas² sent for me today even before I could ask for an appointment with the Foreign Minister as instructed in telegram No. 252; he first made excuses for M. Urbšys, who was completely occupied today with continuous discussions in the Cabinet and therefore unfortunately could not speak with me himself. He then informed me that Molotov had told Urbšys that Germany had laid claim to a strip of Lithuanian territory, the limits of which included the city and district of Naumiėstis and continued on past the vicinity of Mariampolė. This had made a deep and painful impression on Lithuania, and Urbšys had flown back to Kaunas partly because of this information, which he had not wished to transmit by telephone.

The Lithuanian Government has instructed Škirpa to make inquiries in Berlin.³

I told him that in the Moscow discussions on the delimitation of the German and Soviet spheres of interest, the Reich Foreign Minister had advocated giving the Vilna area to Lithuania and had also ob-

¹ See document No. 196, footnote 2.

² K. Bizauskas, a senior official of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.

³ See document No. 200.

tained the Soviet Government's agreement in the matter.⁴ While Lithuania had the prospect of such a great increase in territory a difficult and impracticable boundary in the vicinity of the Suwałki tip had come into existence because of the German-Soviet border division. Therefore the idea of a small border rectification at the German-Lithuanian frontier had also emerged in the course of these negotiations; but I could inform him that the German Government did not consider the question pressing. Bizauskas received this information with visible relief and asked me to transmit the thanks of the Lithuanian Government on this score to the Reich Government. Furthermore he asked on his part that the matter be kept strictly secret, which I promised him.

I might add that since the fixing of the German-Soviet frontier became known, political quarters here have had great hopes of obtaining the Suwałki tip from Germany.

ZECHLIN

⁴In a later telegram of the same evening (321/193161), Zechlin added that Bizauskas had stated that the Soviet Government had further informed Urbšys of its willingness to cede to Lithuania the city of Vilna and the part of the territory actually inhabited by Lithuanians, but not the entire so-called occupied territory. The Lithuanian Government expressed its gratitude to Ribbentrop for the Vilna arrangement. The Soviet Government had also proposed a mutual assistance pact with Lithuania, similar to the Soviet-Estonian pact.

No. 198

8141/E582190-91

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 550 of October 5

Tokyo, October 5, 1939—8: 40 p. m.

Received October 5—5: 55 p. m.

Pol. VIII 1590.

(Group garbled) The Abe Cabinet's formula for agreement, according to which Japan intends to keep absolutely out of the European conflict and to concentrate on ending the China enterprise, could not prevent the old conflicts between political power groups from reappearing, first of all in the struggle for position in domestic politics. The opponents of the course pursued by the Army are seeking to weaken further the Army's influence, which has already been impaired by the effects of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact here. The foreign policy success of General Abe and of the Army in regard to the armistice at Nomonhan ¹ is not sufficient to paralyze

¹ See document No. 77, footnote 2.

the opposition forces. The strengthened position of the Minister President in the Cabinet, which the Army has been demanding for a long time and which has now been brought about by imperial decree on the basis of the mobilization law, should serve to increase the influence of Abe, exponent of the Army, on the decisions of the Cabinet. A State Councilor who had been by-passed in the matter and who was obviously under pressure from opponents of the Army, reproached the Government with having violated the Constitution. In the argument which ensued the Minister President himself was forced to minimize the practical importance of his increased power in order to avert a grave Cabinet crisis. The decision of the Cabinet in the last few days to establish a Ministry of Foreign Trade, which has likewise been favored by the Army for a long time, aroused similar tensions. Foreign Minister Nomura² approved the plan in spite of the most violent opposition by the Foreign Ministry against the further decrease in its sphere of authority inherent in the plan. The action of the Foreign Minister aroused deep dissension in the Foreign Ministry. The greater part of the officials there are opposed to the Foreign Minister. The Director of the Economic Department and a number of division heads have decided to resign.³ These difficulties doubtless mean a serious weakening of the policy of the Foreign Minister. Since his appointment was put through in order to divert Japanese policy in the direction of an adjustment of Japanese and American interests in China, this development can be advantageous to us and might provide further points of departure for my continued efforts to effect a Japanese-Russian agreement. In any event, far-reaching foreign policy decisions in one direction or another are not to be expected in the near future, in view of the evidences of internal Japanese weakness described.

OTT

² On Sept. 23, Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura was appointed Foreign Minister in the Abe Cabinet. Abe had assumed office on Aug. 30, 1939, in the wake of the Cabinet crisis brought on by the German-Soviet Pact. In a telegram of Sept. 24 (174/136145-46), Ott commented that the Nomura appointment was the result of a compromise between pro-British circles which wanted to name Shigemitsu, former Ambassador in London; pro-German circles, especially in the Army, who wanted the Minister President to keep the post; and a small group which wanted Shiratori, former Ambassador in Rome.

³ On Oct. 16, Ott telegraphed that not only the Director of the Economic Department but Masayuki Tani, the Deputy Foreign Minister, as well had so decided (8141/E582195). In a subsequent telegram of Oct. 28, however, Ott reported that Court circles had successfully interposed against Tani's resignation and he had been reinstated in his post (8142/E582199).

No. 199

116/66648-48

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.

No. 246

I. Please inform the Government there emphatically as follows:

1. In view of the development of the situation, we find ourselves compelled to place Volksdeutsche under the special protection of the German Reich.

2. We expect that the Government there will take all necessary measures at once in order to protect the lives and property of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche.

3. We expect that the Government there will permit all Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche who intend to leave Estonia to leave at once and will without further ado also act generously in its administration of the customs and foreign exchange regulations.

II. With regard to the fate of the Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche, the following line should be adopted:

We want, if possible, to avoid panic and see that property does not have to be abandoned or liquidated in a precipitate way. If the situation becomes more critical, however, those who remain in the country will do so at their own risk. We shall send a number of transport ships to Tallinn.

III. For your personal information: We intend to send warships into the waters of Estonia and Latvia for the protection of the entire operation; another telegraphic instruction will follow regarding ports to be visited, number of ships, and when they are to be announced. I wish to point out as a matter of precaution that Germany has not recognized the 24-hour clause for warships in neutral ports.

Further instructions will be sent regarding the general organization of the return transport. For the present there will be an increase in personnel for the work of the Legation. The Head of the Auslandsorganisation will make available to you suitable persons from the Landesgruppe. The Landesgruppenleiter is being given a similar instruction.

Since we have arranged with the Russians that in the Russian sphere of interest the property rights of the emigrating Volks-

¹ A similar instruction, almost identical in wording, was sent to the Legation in Latvia (407/215024-25).

deutsche shall be protected, please take organizational measures for the safeguarding of the property left behind.

We are in touch with Moscow on these questions.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² In telegram No. 499 of Oct. 5, Weizsäcker told Schulenburg to inform the Soviet Government of the measures being taken to protect and evacuate Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Latvia and Estonia. The telegram concluded with these sentences: "We shall hold the Estonian and Latvian Governments responsible for the safety of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche. We expect that the Red Army will respect our special interest in the Volksdeutsche in the areas assigned to it. Please report by wire concerning a promise to this effect." (406/214470)

No. 200

506/235040-41

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.

St.S. No. 786

The Lithuanian Minister called on me this evening in order, as was expected, to inquire about German claims to a strip of land in south-western Lithuania. M. Škirpa, however, even when he entered, had a friendlier appearance than was to be expected. For Minister Zechlin had in the meantime delivered information in Kaunas as instructed,¹ so that I did not need to go any further into the questions put by M. Škirpa. I restricted myself to a brief mention of today's telegraphic instructions to Herr Zechlin. Since M. Škirpa expressed to me the satisfaction of his Government that we had withdrawn our claim, I stressed that the announcement of our needs was "not at the moment pressing." (It is noteworthy that M. Škirpa knew and traced exactly on the map of Poland that happened to be spread out before us the line agreed upon by us in our secret protocol with the Russians.)

The Minister then gave the further information that the Russians expected to get an assistance pact with Lithuania as well as permission to station Russian garrisons, at the same time agreeing in principle to the joining of Vilna and environs to Lithuania. M. Škirpa asked me if I had any ideas or suggestions to give in this regard. I stated that I was not informed and added that in connection with our negotiations in Moscow German interests had not been claimed beyond the Russo-German boundary line in the east known to M. Škirpa.

¹ See document No. 196.

In conclusion the Minister asked to be given any possible suggestions. M. Urbšys was still remaining in Kaunas today and tomorrow; he himself—Škirpa—was at the disposal of the Reich Foreign Minister at any time.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 201

2931/566989-92

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.
Pol. VIII 1645.

CONVERSATION WITH THE CHINESE COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY

Mr. Ting stated at the outset that he was setting forth his own personal opinions and proposals, but that they were shared by his Ambassador. He also had reason to believe that the Chinese Government in Chungking was in agreement with what he had to say. For the present, therefore, it was a question of a confidential feeler, the result of which should be to enable the Embassy to take further steps in Chungking. So far the Embassy had been successful in Chungking in having the Ambassador retained in Berlin; at the present time there was a very friendly attitude toward Germany in Chungking.

Then Mr. Ting again elucidated his mediation project. He explained that Japan could not expect to gain anything from further warfare in China. Under war conditions it was not even possible to exploit the Japanese-occupied territory economically. There were doubtless many sensible Japanese who were of the opinion that it was now advisable to conclude a face-saving peace with China. The Japanese could save face by eliminating British and French influence from China. It would probably be possible to obtain recognition of Manchukuo by China, as well as special economic rights for cooperation in North China. If Chinese sovereignty were fully respected, China was prepared for sincere friendship with Japan. The Marshal was not at all anti-Japanese; he had been forced into the fight with Japan against his will. He would welcome any reasonable solution. If, however, proposals were made to Japan by the Chinese it was certain that they would be rejected. Consequently, they must come from a third party. To him, Ting, it seemed better by far if they came from Germany, rather than from the Americans or the Russians. Germany was also interested in the reestablishment of peace in the Far East, for then Japan's attitude would become unequivocally anti-British. The Japanese wanted to get Australia and British Borneo. These territories were not only easier to conquer, but, above all, easier to hold and to exploit than China. German mediation would also give Germany a

strong position in Chinese economic life in the future. This was all the more true as the Marshal had remained very pro-German, which had also been shown by his attitude at the time of the withdrawal of the German military advisers. He, Ting, could imagine that efforts at mediation, which would retain for Germany the friendship of both the Japanese and the Chinese, would be in line with German policy. He also believed that the influence of Oshima was still strong enough, and that if Germany sounded him out or put forth a feeler in Tokyo the cause of peace in the Far East could be promoted. What he asked of us was that we declare, without any obligation on our part, that we were prepared in principle to sound out the Japanese discreetly so that he could inform Chungking accordingly.

It was possible that he might fly to Chungking later and bring back a negotiator with full powers.

I asked him whether in his opinion one condition for concluding peace would be the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China. He replied that they would have to evacuate the Yangtze Valley, but perhaps not necessarily North China.

I asked him further whether he considered the present moment favorable, when the Japanese Government obviously was staking its hopes on Wang Ching-wei.¹ He replied that for the present it was only a question of soundings, that 2 or 3 months would probably elapse before any such plans could be set in motion and that by that time the whole Wang Ching-wei bubble would have burst for good.

I also pointed out to him that the Chinese Foreign Minister had recently indicated to the press that he would welcome American mediation. Ting replied that the Embassy had found out the true facts; the Foreign Minister had been questioned by an American journalist and had merely answered the question in the affirmative. That did not mean much. But he, Ting, was trying to bring about German mediation precisely because he did not think much of the Americans.

Finally, I also asked him whether the Marshal was not morally obligated to England, and whether he was prepared, if necessary, to take a stand against England. Ting replied that there were no ties of any sort with England. The Anglo-Japanese negotiations at Tientsin² had annoyed the Marshal very much and it could certainly be anticipated that he was prepared to carry on an anti-British policy together with Germany and Japan. Regarding Russia, Ting stated that the

¹ See vol. VI, document No. 526, and vol. VII, document No. 368. In furtherance of his ends, Wang Ching-wei had held a secessionist "Kuomintang" Congress in Shanghai in August and September. The German Consulate in Shanghai had reported on Wang's difficulties with the provincial governments in Nanking and Peking as well as with the Japanese because of his tendencies toward centralization and his attempts to secure some degree of independence for his government (226/154006-15; 8137/E582153, E582154).

² See document No. 11, footnote 9.

attitude of the Russian Ambassador had always been pro-Chinese. Russia was supporting China by means of volunteer aviators. He believed that Russia would welcome peace on the basis set forth by Ting, because Russia did not wish to see Japan become too powerful on the continent.

Ting requested that a reply be given to him as soon as possible, stating whether we were willing in principle to sound out Japan.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary, with reference to the oral instruction of October 4.

KNOLL

No. 202

F18/045-49

Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.

THE FIRST VISIT OF THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR, M. GEREDE, WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON OCTOBER 5, 1939

Today the Foreign Minister received the newly appointed Turkish Ambassador, M. Gerede, on the latter's first visit. At the beginning of the conversation the Foreign Minister inquired about the Ambassador's personal affairs and asked him where he had acquired his good knowledge of German. M. Gerede explained to the Foreign Minister that he had lived in Germany for some time and that his wedding had even been held in the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin. Therefore he was especially happy to have come to Germany, for which he had a special liking. He considered it his task to contribute to the further consolidation of good German-Turkish relations. The Foreign Minister remarked that he was happy to take cognizance of this statement of good will; he had already heard in the presence of the Führer that the Ambassador interpreted his mission in this manner. The Foreign Minister then asked whether the Ambassador had not been a soldier. When M. Gerede answered in the affirmative, the Foreign Minister continued as follows:

I myself am a former soldier and went through the war. I can discuss German-Turkish relations more frankly with a soldier than I would with another diplomat. Frankness is very useful for our relations. German-Turkish relations have not developed evenly of late. I understand that Turkey initialed a pact with England and France during the past few days. I was somewhat astonished when I heard of these negotiations some time ago, without the former Turkish Ambassador having informed us thereof in any manner. The first I learned of it was through the papers. Moreover, I cannot understand

why Turkey wishes to conclude a pact with the Western Powers, a pact which was bound to be directed against Germany also. I should like to discuss it with you even more frankly. I know that the pact is primarily directed against Italy. Several times during my various visits to Italy I discussed Italian-Turkish relations with the Duce, who assured me that Italy had no interests whatsoever in Turkey and that consequently Italy was far from having any intentions to attack. Germany has no wishes or demands of any kind vis-à-vis Turkey. If certain statesmen of the Western Powers have asserted something to this effect, then it is pure invention, for Germany does not even have the possibility of getting into a conflict with Turkey.

The world is now facing great decisions. In a very brief thrust Germany ended the war that was forced upon her in the East. She is ready to make peace if the Western Powers so desire. The mood in Germany is calm and confident. The nation has boundless confidence in its leaders. It does not desire war but is firmly resolved to wage this war with all its strength if forced to continue. The German army that was in Poland is itching to measure its strength with the Western Powers. But this victorious army at the Eastern front is only a small part of the whole German Army. By far the greater part was stationed at the Western front from the very beginning. If peace were concluded today, many people in Germany would be disappointed. The feeling is growing more and more in the German people that the score with England must be settled sooner or later.

Behind Germany stands the big Russian nation; our relations with it have been unequivocally clarified. For a while I myself did not believe it possible that National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union could get together. But I have seen that it is altogether possible. The Soviet State is for the Russians and National Socialism is for Germany. Neither of the two systems can be transferred to the other country. The leader of the Soviet Government, M. Stalin, is an outstanding personality. He did not permit the British and the French to lead him around by the nose; he did not fall into the same error which Russia committed in 1914 by going to war against Germany. As far as the difference between the systems is concerned, it was Turkey herself, after all, which gave the first proof that friendly relations are possible between a state committed to the idea of the nation and the Soviet Union. Turkey's position at the entrance to the Black Sea requires an especially well-planned and resolute policy; it will be assured by absolute neutrality. I do not at all wish to appeal to our former comradeship in arms, for I know very well that the relationship of two countries cannot always be the same and cannot be guided by sentiment. I am convinced, however, that the relationship between Turkey and Germany can be a most friendly one

and that an alignment with the Western Powers, for which there is no inner motivation, must disturb this relationship. Unfortunately there was frequent news of unfriendly remarks made about Germany in the Turkish press.

Here the Ambassador interrupted the Foreign Minister by saying that he had already made representations to his Government on account of the unfriendly attitude of the Turkish press. The Turkish people harbored very friendly feelings toward the German people. He, the Ambassador, was not fully informed of the latest developments; he could only give the assurance that Turkey did not intend to take any action against Germany. On the contrary, it was his Government's desire to cooperate with Germany on a friendly basis. He would do everything to support this policy. The Foreign Minister replied to this that he was happy to hear this statement and that he himself, too, hoped for good cooperation with the Ambassador.

Then the Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador a few personal questions. M. Gerede mentioned in this connection that he had last held a post in Japan. He had great admiration for the Japanese people. The Foreign Minister agreed with M. Gerede, saying that Germany, too, had had especially friendly relations with Japan for some time past. The German people were watching with admiration the heroic determination and national energy of the Japanese nation.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister dismissed the Turkish Ambassador.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

DÖRNBERG ¹

¹ Marginal note: "I told the Ambassador that we would judge the Turk [word illegible] actions. If they concluded an alliance with our enemies England and France, then friendly German-Turkish relations would hardly be conceivable. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 203

7433/E539980-81

Unsigned Note

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.

In accordance with instructions a member of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP went to Montreux to invite Baronet [*sic*] W. de Ropp ¹ to Berlin.

Surprised by this far-reaching possibility, on which he had not counted at all, de Ropp declared that in this extraordinary situation he must first make inquiry of his own Ministry.

¹ See document No. 134.

The Ministry informed him that in the present situation, it did not believe that in the interest of the matter it ought to sponsor such a journey with the reception which would be involved. Because of the war psychology prevailing in England and the weak position of Chamberlain it was beyond the power of the Ministry at the moment to make use, in the desired direction of a termination of hostilities, of the opportunity which had thus been offered. It requested, however, that the opportunity be postponed to a more suitable time. It considered that this moment would only come about through considerable losses on the part of the British air forces and the related effects on the unity of the Empire. It believed that then the views represented by the Air Ministry would have to be taken more into account, since the Empire could not permit its air strength to be reduced beyond a certain point. For these reasons the gentlemen in the Air Ministry believe that it would be only then that they could make use of an authoritative statement on Germany's intentions. A corresponding request would be made at the appropriate time.

No. 204

8471/E017942-43

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

No. 6641

MADRID, October 5, 1939.

Received October 8.

Pol. II 3960.

Subject: The Spanish Minister of the Interior and Marshal Pétain on Spain's attitude in the war.

Geheimrat Schlosser, the Embassy's liaison officer at Burgos, has reported as follows:

"The Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Suñer, is reported to have had a rather long talk with the French Ambassador on the occasion of the swearing-in ceremonies at Las Huelgas. Marshal Pétain is said to have made some allusion to Spain's position in the present international conflict, to which Señor Serrano Suñer replied that Spain's course was traced for her by the developments of the past 3 years and that she could not depart from the direction she had taken. Moreover, he believed that the Government of France had embarked on a wrong course and had done so against the will of a large portion of the population—which carried with it the threat of a popular uprising against the Government. The Ambassador then asked what attitude Spain would take in such an event, and Señor Serrano Suñer replied: Spain would then be just as "sincerely" non-interventionist as France had been during the Spanish civil war.

"As a sequel to this conversation, Pétain stayed away from the celebration in honor of Franco on October 1, chiefly at the insistence

of the Counselor of Embassy, M. Armand Gazel. His alleged indisposition, which was given as an excuse, was a fiction.

"M. Gazel, moreover, reproached his chief for having greeted the German Ambassador without embarrassment and in a friendly way that day at Las Huelgas.

"I present this account with every reservation. The source which supplied it is usually reliable. The story was told me quite spontaneously."

V. STÖHRER

No. 205

2290/483385-86

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 6, 1939—1:00 p. m.

No. 637 of October 6

With reference to your telegram No. 697 of October 4.¹

The Duce, to whom, in Ciano's presence, I gave the text of today's speech by the Führer, asked me to transmit his thanks. He would study the speech at once and also, of course, listen to it on the radio.

In the subsequent conversation he mentioned the Eastern question in passing, remarking that he had been especially happy about the drawing of the frontier between the German and Russian spheres of interest, which contained the Russians behind the Bug River and did not permit them to advance, for instance, to the Vistula. Like the Führer he realized that Bolshevik remained Bolshevik and one could therefore not trust them too far. The aim of Bolshevism always remained the same. Stalin, who had begun his career as a bank robber, did not differ in this respect from the others. This did not exclude playing politics with Russia, however, as he himself had done even before us.

Turning to Italy's situation, he remarked that it had already considerably strengthened as compared to September 1. Every additional 24 hours was a gain, for he was utilizing not only every day but every hour for increasing Italy's preparedness. The armament factories were working at full speed; according to the report made only yesterday by the Chief of the Forest Militia, the lumber requirement was covered more than adequately; even the darkest point, the question of the gasoline supply, was developing favorably. In Libya, where the picture had been rather dark on September 1, with only 100,000 inadequately equipped men available, the critical point had

¹ Not printed (2290/483383). The telegram informed Mackensen that a copy of Hitler's speech to be delivered on Oct. 6 would reach Rome by plane Oct. 5. He was to hand it to Mussolini only on the evening of that day with the request that the contents be kept secret. A following telegram (2290/483384) ordered that delivery of the text to Mussolini be postponed until Oct. 6 at 8:30 a. m.

been passed, because 183,000 men with full equipment were now there. Transports to Libya had been made completely undisturbed, and to save fuel he had recently even waived naval escort for the transports. At times the amount of war material shipped had been so great that Marshal Balbo had had to request slowing down in order not to jeopardize orderly unloading.

With reference to the general situation the Duce finally remarked that the change in British sentiment in the past few days was considerable; for the British it was today a question of saving face in some manner or other. The inclusion of the Polish problem in a comprehensive general settlement might serve this purpose.

MACKENSEN

[EDITORS' NOTE. On October 6, 1939, Hitler delivered an address before a special session of the Reichstag. He dealt with the Polish campaign, the problems of Eastern Europe and other aspects of German policy, and the question of whether the war in the West need be continued. With regard to the possibilities of peace he said:

"Two problems are ripe for discussion today.

"1. The settlement of the problems arising from the disintegration of Poland, and,

"2. The problem of eliminating those international difficulties which endanger the political and economic existence of the nations.

"What then are the aims of the Reich Government as regards the adjustment of conditions within the territory to the west of the German-Soviet line of demarcation which has been recognized as Germany's sphere of influence?

"1. The creation of a Reich frontier which, as has already been emphasized, shall be in accordance with existing historical, ethnographical, and economic conditions.

"2. The disposition of the entire living-space according to the various nationalities; that is to say, a solution of the problems affecting minorities which concern not only this area but nearly all the States in the south and southeast of Europe.

"3. In this connection: an attempt to reach a solution and settlement of the Jewish problem.

"4. The reconstruction of transport facilities and economic life in the interest of all those living in this area.

"5. A guarantee for the security of this entire territory, and

"6. The formation of a Polish State, so constituted and governed as to prevent its becoming once again either a hotbed of anti-German activity, or a centre of intrigue against Germany and Russia.

"In addition to this, an attempt must immediately be made to wipe out or at least to mitigate the ill-effects of the war, that is to say, the

adoption of practical measures for the alleviation of the terrible distress prevailing there. These problems can, as I have already emphasized, perhaps be discussed but never solved at a conference table. If Europe is really sincere in her desire for peace, then the states in Europe ought to be grateful that Russia and Germany are prepared to transform this hotbed into a zone of peaceful development, and that these two countries will assume the responsibility and bear the burdens inevitably involved. For the Reich, this project, since it cannot be undertaken in an imperialistic spirit, is a task which it will take from fifty to one hundred years to perform. The justification for this activity on Germany's part lies in the political organizing of this territory as well as in its economic development. In the long run, of course, all Europe will benefit from it.

"The second, and in my opinion, by far the most important task, is the creation of not only a belief in, but also a sense of European security.

"For this it is necessary

"1. that the aims in the foreign policy of the European States should be made perfectly clear. As far as Germany is concerned, the Reich Government is ready to give a thorough and exhaustive exposition of the aims of its foreign policy. In so doing, they begin by stating that the Treaty of Versailles is now regarded by them as obsolete, in other words, that the Government of the German Reich and with them the whole German people no longer see cause or reason for any further revision of the Treaty, apart from the demand for adequate colonial possessions justly due to the Reich—namely, in the first instance, for a return of the German colonies.

"This demand for colonies is based not only on Germany's historical claim to the German colonies, but above all on her elementary right to a share of the world's resources of raw materials. This demand does not take the form of an ultimatum, nor is it a demand which is backed by force, but a demand based on political justice and sane economic principles.

"2. The demand for a real revival of international economic life coupled with an extension of trade and commerce presupposes a reorganization of the internal economic system, in other words, of production in the individual states. In order to facilitate the exchange of the goods thus produced, however, markets must be organised and a final currency regulation arrived at so that the obstacles in the way of unrestricted trade can be gradually removed.

"3. The most important condition, however, for a real revival of economic life in and outside of Europe is the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace and of a sense of security on the part of the individual nations. This security will not only be rendered possible by the final sanctioning of the European status, but above all by the reduction of armaments to a reasonable and economically tolerable level. An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which can, at any given moment have such a devastating effect on

the pulsating life of every nation and hence create a permanent sense of insecurity. In my previous speeches in the Reichstag I made proposals with this end in view. At that time they were rejected—maybe for the simple reason that they were made by me. I believe, however, that a sense of national security will not return to Europe until clear and binding international agreements have provided a comprehensive definition of the legitimate and illegitimate use of armaments.

"The Geneva Convention once succeeded in prohibiting, in civilized countries at least, the killing of wounded, the ill-treatment of prisoners, war against non-combatants, etc., and just as it was possible gradually to achieve the universal observance of this statute, a way must surely be found to regulate aerial warfare, the use of poison gas, of submarines, etc., and also so to define contraband that war will lose its terrible character of a conflict waged against women and children and against non-combatants in general. The growing horror of certain methods of modern warfare will, of its own accord, lead to their abolition and thus they will become obsolete.

"In the war with Poland I endeavoured to restrict aerial warfare to objectives of so-called military importance, or only to employ it to combat active resistance at a given point. But it must surely be possible to emulate the Red Cross and to draw up some universally valid international regulation. It is only when this is achieved that peace can reign, particularly in our densely populated continent—a peace which, uncontaminated by suspicion and fear, will provide the only possible condition for real economic prosperity.

"I do not believe that there is any responsible statesman in Europe who does not in his heart desire prosperity for his people. But such a desire can only be realized if all the nations inhabiting this continent decide to work together. To assist in ensuring this, co-operation must be the aim of every man who is sincerely struggling for the future of his own people.

"To achieve this great end, the leading nations of this continent will one day have to come together in order to draw up, accept, and guarantee a statute on a comprehensive basis which will ensure for them all a sense of security, of calm—in short, of peace. Such a conference could not possibly be held without the most thorough preparation, i. e. without exact elucidation of every point at issue. It is equally impossible that such a conference, which is to determine the fate of this continent for many years to come, could carry on its deliberations while cannons are thundering or mobilized armies are bringing pressure to bear upon it.

"If, however, these problems must be solved sooner or later, then it would be more sensible to tackle the solution before millions of men are first uselessly sent to their death, and milliards in property destroyed. The continuation of the present state of affairs in the West is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifice. Perhaps the day will come when France will begin to bombard and demolish Saarbrücken. The German artillery will in turn lay Mülhausen in ruins. France will retaliate by bombarding Carlsruhe and Germany in her turn shell Strassburg.

"Then the French artillery will fire at Freiburg, and the German at Kolmar or Schlettstadt. Long range guns will then be set up, and from both sides destruction will strike deeper and deeper, and whatever cannot be reached by the long distance guns, will be destroyed from the air. And that will be very interesting for certain international journalists, and very profitable for the aeroplane, arms, and munition manufacturers, etc., but appalling for the victims. And this battle of destruction will not be confined to the land. No, it will reach far out over the sea.

"Today there are no longer any islands. And the national wealth of Europe will be scattered in the form of shells, and the vigour of every nation will be sapped on the battle fields. One day, however, there will again be a frontier between Germany and France, but instead of flourishing towns there will be ruins and endless graveyards. Mr. Churchill and his companions may interpret these opinions of mine as weakness or cowardice, if they like. I need not occupy myself with what they think; I make these statements, simply because it goes without saying that I wish to spare my own people these sufferings. If, however, the opinions of Messrs. Churchill and followers should prevail, this statement will have been my last. Then we shall fight. Neither the force of arms nor the lapse of time will conquer Germany. There will never be another November, 1918, in German history. It is infantile to hope for the disintegration of our people. Mr. Churchill may be convinced that Great Britain will win. I do not doubt for a single moment that Germany will be victorious. Destiny will decide who is right. One thing only is certain. In the course of world history, there have never been two victors, but very often only losers. This seems to me to have been the case in the last war.

"May those peoples and their Leaders who are of the same mind now make their reply. And let those who consider war to be the better solution reject my outstretched hand.

"As Führer of the German people and Chancellor of the Reich, I can only thank God at this moment that He has so wonderfully blessed us in our hard struggle for what is our Right, and beg Him that we and all the other nations may find the right way, so that not only the German people but all Europe may once more be granted the blessing of peace."

Text of the speech is in *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, volume 460, pages 51-63. The translation into English which is given above is the official translation as released by the German Ministry of Propaganda. A translation transmitted by the Associated Press and differing in minor particulars was published in the *New York Times*, October 7, 1939. The same translation appears in *International Conciliation*, No. 354 (New York, November 1939), pages 495-524.]

No. 206

B18/B002068-69

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, October 6, 1939—6:44 p. m.

No. 270 of October 6

Received October 6—10 p. m.

[Pol. VI 2251].

The Foreign Minister informed me most confidentially that Molotov had told the Finnish Minister in Moscow yesterday that, considering the situation which had arisen as a result of the war, the Russian Government would like to exchange views with the Finnish Government on political questions. The Russian Government hoped that the Foreign Minister or some other plenipotentiary of the Finnish Government would come to Moscow as soon as possible.

After what had occurred in the Baltic states the Finnish Government was alarmed and completely in the dark concerning Molotov's plans. The Foreign Minister remarked that if the Russian plans were directed toward Viipuri or Åland, as rumors had it, the Finnish Government would have to reject them and prepare for the worst. The frontier guard had already been mobilized since last night. If the Russians had in mind only the islands of Seiskari and Lavansaari and were prepared to give adequate compensation, the matter could be discussed.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that if Russia should occupy Åland or some important Finnish harbor [*Anlegeplatz*], the strategic situation in the Baltic would change basically, to the disadvantage of Germany. He discreetly intimated that he would like to know whether Finland would find any support from Germany in the event of excessive Russian demands. In this connection he repeated a previous statement of mine that there were now only two great powers in the Baltic: Germany and Russia.

The Foreign Minister is not going to Moscow himself but will send the Finnish Minister in Stockholm, Paasikivi, at present staying here, who was the chairman of the Finnish delegation at the Dorpat peace negotiations.¹

I remained noncommittal and request telegraphic instructions for guidance in my conversations.²

BLÜCHER

¹The Treaty of Dorpat was signed June 8, 1920, between Finland and the Soviet Union. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London, 1925), pp. 245-258.

²Marginal note in Weissäcker's handwriting: "We must leave it to Finland to come to terms with the Russians. We recommend an amicable settlement, if at all possible."

No. 207

34/24102-03

The State Secretary to the Legations in Latvia and Estonia

Telegram

To Riga, No. 319

BERLIN, October 6, 1939.

To Tallinn, No. 251

The move to resettle the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche from the Baltic countries is not due to the arrangements of these countries with the Soviet Union; it is based on the desire of the Reich to utilize the valuable German element in Reich territory proper (see the Führer's speech of today).¹ Consequently the action is to be carried out with all energy, without regard to the current internal vacillations in the Baltic countries. You are requested to contact the Government at once and transmit the wish of the Reich Government that the speedy emigration of the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche be facilitated:

- a. by granting the right of free departure, relaxing police and customs regulations, and affording protection in case of need;
- b. by making possible a sensible liquidation of the assets to be left behind.

The wish of the Reich that the resettlement should be initiated and carried out with the greatest dispatch should at once be communicated to the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in a suitable manner. For handling the technical aspects of the emigration and the liquidation of assets, a commission is to be formed under your chairmanship, which will be composed of representatives of the Auslandsorganisation and representatives of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or the Volksgruppenführung. At the same time it should be investigated to what extent certain individuals should be urged to remain for the time being in order to preserve important German economic assets, especially those of importance to the war effort. In so far as Volksdeutsche are involved in this, they are, if possible, to be given special protection by being issued German passports; it is recommended that they request naturalization for this purpose.

The transport vessels will enter the harbors there within the next few days. The Government there should be informed to this effect. Immediately after loading, the ships are to head for Germany.

For your personal information: German naval units are lying in readiness at Danzig in order to protect the operation if necessary.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Editors' Note, p. 227.

² Much of the substance of this telegram was also transmitted to Moscow on Oct. 6 with instructions that Molotov was to be informed (406/214477).

No. 208

1369/357050-51

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 6, 1939.

SCHEDULE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT MOSCOW

New version.

I. We shall ask the Russians for additional raw material deliveries valued at ca. 1,300 million RM during the first year. These 1,300 million RM fall into the following categories:

1. Industrial materials (iron ore, chromium ore, raw phosphate, wool, cotton, platinum, flax, hemp, raw skins and hides, industrial oils and fats, asbestos, etc.)	ca. 530 million RM
2. Foods (Feed grains, vegetable oils and fats, oil seed, oil cake, legumes, seeds, foodstuffs in moderate quantities, etc.)	ca. 330 million RM
3. Lumber	120 million RM
4. Non-Russian raw materials to be bought via Russia in other countries (tin, copper, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, rubber, etc.)	100 million RM
5. Crude oil (2 million tons) (30 to 50 million RM of the total coming from Drohobycz and Boryslaw)	200 million RM
Total	<hr/> 1,280 million RM

II. Payment and German compensatory deliveries:

1. Additional immediate delivery of industrial products in the first year	330 million RM
2. Compensatory deliveries for crude oil	
a) Hydrogenation plant, to be delivered immediately	150 million RM
b) Compensation for the Galician crude oil: hard coal and tubing	50 million RM
3. Liquidation of German credits to Russia before maturity	180 million RM
4. Payment for non-Russian raw materials:	
a) Gold to the value of	30 million RM
b) High-quality armament material to the value of	50 million RM
c) Czech bonds to the value of	20 million RM
Total	<hr/> 810 million RM

5. The remaining balance of ca. 500 million RM would be liquidated by capital goods deliveries over a period of several years. A plan for large-scale capital goods deliveries has been drafted.¹

III. Joint German-Soviet economic planning. German technical assistance in raw material production and industrial expansion, agricultural conversion (soybeans), forest leases, fisheries at Murmansk, etc.

IV. Transport and transit questions.

V. Execution of the agreement of August 19, 1939.

SCHNURRE

¹ This may refer to enclosure 3 (not printed: 1369/357065-66) to the document printed in footnote 2 of document No. 82. In this draft the following items were listed: railroad rolling stock (deliveries beginning 1943), railroad installations, extension of other forms of transportation, road building machinery, locomotive and automobile factories (deliveries beginning 1943), equipment for port development, mining and metallurgical facilities, chemical plants, war materials and planes, synthetic rubber factories, telephone and telegraph installations, technically-equipped clinics, irrigation systems for cotton, sheep for breeding, etc.

No. 209

463/225862

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

No. 482 of October 7

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1939—1:38 a. m.

Received October 7—11:59 p. m.

The press and radio here are giving wide circulation to Associated Press and United Press reports from Berlin stating that semi-official German spokesmen indicated the German Government's willingness to accept a truce proposal by Roosevelt and, if need be, even participate in a peace conference at Washington. In the event that Roosevelt should be prepared to mediate, the German Government would submit additional peace proposals.

Without indicating any connection with these reports, Pittman, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that Roosevelt would not be disposed to undertake such mediation until the belligerent powers have shown a sincere desire for coming to an understanding. Roosevelt was not very likely to undertake anything at the present moment, since an unsuccessful intervention might possibly be interpreted so as to place upon him part of the responsibility for the continuation of the war.

I would appreciate guidance for my conversations.

THOMSEN

No. 210

173/88975

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 332 of October 7

THE HAGUE, October 7, 1939—2:57 p. m.

Received October 7—4:15 p. m.

The Foreign Minister said to me today that British comment on the Führer's speech, both because of its careful formulation and because of the fact that Poland was not mentioned, seemed to him to be leaving the door open for a peaceful settlement. In his opinion it was now a question of easing the way for a possible shift in the position of the British Government by conditioning British public opinion. The large British newspapers were more intransigent than (group garbled) and it would be difficult to induce them to change their attitude. In his opinion the best way to alter public opinion in England would be to push the disarmament question quite prominently into the foreground, making detailed proposals as early as possible, and thereby dispel the strong British suspicions of the ultimate objectives of German policy. He could imagine that if an adroit person sent by Germany were to appear in London with disarmament proposals, such a step would make a great impression on public opinion in England and also facilitate a change of attitude on the part of the British Government in the Polish question, which he believed caused the greatest difficulty at present. He did not wish to make any proposal regarding the person to be entrusted with such a mission. He did not know of anyone in Holland suitable for it. Under present conditions it might perhaps be best to choose an Italian. At any rate he considered it of crucial importance that something be done as soon as possible along the line he had suggested in order to keep matters in flux and not let them first become solidified.

ZECH

No. 211

103/111680-81

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 7, 1939—[9:25 p. m.]

MOST URGENT

No. 518

I am receiving reliable reports from Istanbul¹ to the effect that Russo-Turkish negotiations apparently are leading to the signing of a mutual assistance pact. Hence I request you to call on M. Molotov immediately and to emphasize strongly once more² how much we would regret it if the Soviet Government were unable to dissuade Turkey from concluding a treaty with England and France and to induce her to adopt an unequivocal neutrality. In the event that the Soviet Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, we would regard it as quite obvious that she would make a reservation in the pact whereby the pact would not obligate the Soviet Government to any kind of assistance aimed directly or indirectly against Germany. Indeed, Stalin himself promised this.³ Without such a reservation, the Soviet Government, as has been previously stressed, would commit an outright breach of the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with Germany. It would, moreover, not suffice to make this reservation only tacitly or confidentially. On the contrary, we must insist that it be formally stipulated in such a manner that *the public will notice it*. Otherwise a very undesirable impression would be created on the public, and such an act would be apt to shake the confidence of the German public in the effectiveness of the new German-Russian agreements.

Please take this opportunity to inform yourself on the other details concerning the status of the Russo-Turkish negotiations and to find out what is to be agreed upon between the two Governments in regard to the question of the Straits.⁴

Report by wire.

(FOREIGN MINISTER)

¹ In telegram No. 362 sent to Ribbentrop personally on Oct. 4 by Albert Jenke, his brother-in-law, who was assigned to the Embassy (96/108039-40). Jenke reported on the basis of conversations he had with influential Turkish personages that Saracoglu was expected to bring back from Moscow a nonaggression pact.

² Cf. document No. 116.

³ See document No. 81.

⁴ Unsigned note: "I communicated the contents of the foregoing instruction to Count Schulenburg this afternoon by telephone. The transmission was very good. Count Schulenburg said he had just come from Molotov, who had told him that he had not talked with the Turkish delegation since Sunday. Hence our warning certainly arrived in time. I replied that Count Schulenburg should nevertheless lose no time, as it was a matter of decisive importance, and the reports received here pointed to a rather advanced stage in the negotiations. Accordingly, Count Schulenburg is to call on Molotov again tomorrow morning."

No. 212

8141/E582192-93

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 558 of October 7

Tokyo, October 7, 1939—10:15 p. m.

Received October 7—6:55 p. m.

Pol. VIII 1616.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 550 of October 5.¹

The following reasons contributed to the granting of Ambassador Oshima's repeatedly submitted requests to be allowed to resign.

The increasing influence of the new pro-British Deputy Foreign Minister² (group garbled) has intensified the effort to remove supporters of the policy of German-Japanese alliance from key positions. This development has been accelerated by the revolt in the Foreign Ministry reported in the telegram cited above, which gave the Foreign Minister the further pretext, under the guise of "maintaining the authority of the Government," to undertake sweeping personnel changes.

The Army could not maintain its previous opposition to Oshima's desire to resign, because its political influence has decreased considerably as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the military reverse at Nomonhan. The publication which the Army was forced to make of the high casualties at Nomonhan (18,000) made a deep impression on the public.

The Army is at present in the process of being removed from politics, in which connection all leading and politically active officers are being shifted to new assignments, as, for example, General Machijiri, who has been very active in working for the alliance.

The recall of the Berlin Military Attaché is likewise imminent (see telegram No. 559 of October 7 from the Military Attaché).³ Finally, the General Staff expressed the opinion that Oshima, embittered by the events, would hardly be able to do any fruitful work between Tokyo and Berlin in reorienting friendly German-Japanese relations. This would remain the unaltered objective of the Army and could be carried out when the Foreign Minister's attempt at a settle-

¹ Document No. 198.

² Masayuki Tani.

³ Not found.

ment with America failed. The Army expects this all the more since the present revolt of about 300 officials in the Foreign Ministry must in the long run impair the Foreign Minister's power of action.

OTT

No. 213

406/214482

The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 7, 1939.

(1) To Tallinn, No. 257

(2) To Riga, No. 328

(3) To Helsinki, No. 318

Exclusively for the Minister personally.

Supplementing our telegrams No. 241 to (1),¹ No. 303¹ to (2) and No. 305 to (3),² I am communicating the following to you in strict secrecy and for your personal information only:

During the Moscow negotiations with the Soviet Government the question of delimiting the spheres of interest of both countries in Eastern Europe was discussed in strict confidence, not only with reference to the area of the former Polish state, but also with reference to the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. At the same time the delimitation of the spheres of interest was agreed upon for the eventuality of a territorial and political reorganization in these areas. The borderline fixed for this purpose for the territory of the former Polish state is the line designated in article 1 of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28 and publicly announced. Otherwise, the line is identical with the German-Lithuanian frontier. Thus it follows that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland do not belong to the German sphere of interest in the sense indicated above.

You are requested to refrain, as heretofore, from any explanations on this subject.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER

¹ Document No. 184.

² Not printed (1569/379910).

No. 214

121/119558-54

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 7, 1939.

The author of the letter to the Führer,¹ Dr. Fritz Spieser, is one of the leading personalities of the so-called autonomist movement and the consciously Volksdeutsch elements in Alsace-Lorraine. His views seem to be backed by a numerically not very strong but still notable and, above all, very active portion of the Alsatians and the Alsatian youth movement. His address to the Führer ought to be given some weight because it represents the first initiative of this kind coming from the population of Alsace, which today holds French citizenship. As the address shows, however, Dr. Spieser, as do a number of other very prominent Alsatian autonomists, resides at present outside the borders of France, i. e., in Germany.²

As regards the substance of the address, it must be noted that to accept his proposals would be out of the question. After the Führer's exceedingly categorical statement on the problem of Alsace-Lorraine in his speech yesterday,³ this problem cannot be opened up if there should still be any chance of putting an end to the present state of war between Germany and France before the outbreak of serious hostilities. It is impossible to tell today how the Alsace-Lorraine problem will appear if the war should develop into a life-and-death struggle between Germany and France.

Herewith to the Director of the Political Department through the Deputy Director.

v. RINTELEN *

¹Not printed (121/119557-64). The author of this letter, after presenting a long indictment of French rule in Alsace-Lorraine, requested Hitler's protection for "this hard-pressed ancient German border province." In case of a German victory, Alsace-Lorraine ought to be returned to Germany outright; even if France, under the impact of the German victories in the East, should decide to withdraw from the war, Germany at least ought to insist that a plebiscite be held on the question whether Alsace-Lorraine should remain under France or become independent, "perhaps in the shape of a Protectorate like Bohemia and Moravia or merely like Slovakia, e. g., strongly dependent on Germany economically. . . ."

²The letterhead indicates that the letter was sent from an address in East Prussia.

³In his Reichstag speech of Oct. 6 (see Editor's Note, p. 227), Hitler had made the statement that ever since France had returned the Saar Territory to Germany there had been no further German demands on France, nor would there be any in the future. "I have refused even to raise the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, not on account of any pressure brought to bear on me, but for the reason that this is not at all a problem that could ever again interfere with Franco-German relations."

⁴Marginal note: "Please postpone the matter. The Foreign Minister requests that it be submitted again in the event that full-scale hostilities with France are resumed in the near future." (W[eizsäcker], [October] 12.

No. 215

1793/408541-42

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

URGENT

No. 322

BERLIN, October 7, 1939.

Sent October 8—1:00 a. m.

zu Pol. VI 2250¹ and 2251.²

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 270² and 271.

I. For guidance in conversations:

The Finnish Minister called on me today and in accordance with his instructions expressed apprehension regarding the impending Soviet Russian-Finnish negotiations, asking whether we knew the Russian demands on Finland. I replied that we had no information whatever about them. The meaning of the invitation to Moscow could probably only be that the Soviet Union had certain wishes vis-à-vis Finland. I did not believe, however, that there was any occasion for serious anxiety. The Minister said in conclusion that we should maintain our good will toward Finland, whereupon I wished him a happy outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Finnish Minister also inquired, on instructions, about the significance of the fact that Finland was not mentioned in the Führer's speech. I replied that Finland was in very good company, since for example, Rumania, Bulgaria, Japan, Spain, and Luxembourg were not mentioned either. Therefore, no significance could be attributed to the fact that Finland was not mentioned.

II. For your information:

In view of the present situation we cannot possibly intervene in the impending Russian-Finnish arguments.

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VI 2250 (telegram No. 271): Not printed (1793/408538). In this telegram Blücher reported that immediately after Hitler's speech of Oct. 6, Erkkö had asked him why Finland had not been mentioned and whether Finland had been discussed during Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow the previous week.

² Document No. 206.

No. 216

91/100078-79

*The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry*Radio Telegram¹

SECRET

DUBLIN, October 8, 1939.

No. 85 of October 7

Received October 8—12:50 p. m.

The declaration of Irish neutrality and, according to past observation, the careful, consistent adherence to it, have the support of the great majority of the Irish population, despite the undermining efforts of certain pro-English circles. It has visibly strengthened Irish national self-consciousness. It has also caused the Irish Republican Army,² without basically changing its attitude, to recognize the danger of premature activity and to stand by inactive for the time being, although supposedly determined to intervene if the neutral attitude is abandoned. The IRA is said to be continuing acts of sabotage in England, but otherwise to be confining its cooperation exclusively to the Irish in America. The arrest of nearly 100 of its members in Ireland went off without incident. The Irish Army is supposedly ready to defend neutrality in all directions, in spite of the presence of pro-British elements. The feeling with reference to our pact with Russia, especially in view of the sympathy for Catholic Poland which has had a fate similar to Ireland's, is to a large extent anti-German but at the same time strongly anti-British; certain pro-German trends exist particularly in the country, where the German radio is especially effective. The Irish press is strictly controlled, but the British press gets through. The Catholic Church is obeying the Government's appeal for a neutral stand. The personal attitude of the Government toward me is definitely friendly.

The leading British statesmen and officials, probably Eden too, are said not to have any objections to Irish neutrality; other British groups with a certain amount of influence do object, however, so that the position of the Irish Government has become somewhat more difficult in London. Previous bad experience on the part of the British in British-Irish conflicts, as well as regard for America and the Dominions, may impede the consideration of possible steps against

¹ The telegrams from the German Legation in Dublin during this period, besides being written in extremely condensed telegraphic style, contain many garbled words and groups.

² The Irish Republican Army, a secret, semi-military organization having as its object the union of Northern Ireland with Eire and the separation of Ireland from the British Commonwealth. It had engaged in widespread terrorist activities both in Ireland and in Great Britain and in June 1939 the Government of Eire had declared the IRA an unlawful organization.

Ireland. However, there is fear of British demands for Irish harbors and airports—especially if the war situation should become more acute—although there do not appear to be any concrete indications to that effect so far. The further danger of possible utilization of economic difficulties, especially as regards raw materials intended for important Irish industries (group garbled) negotiations with England are in progress on this score at the present time.³ John Maffey, who has just been named the first British diplomatic representative to Ireland,⁴ was educated partly in Germany, is a former Under Secretary of State for the Colonies and Governor General of the Sudan, and the author of reports on the Ethiopian conflict that were favorable to Italy. The first impression is good; thus there is hope of useful mediation, but on the other hand there is concern on the part of nationalist circles. The Government is hoping that he will be appointed Minister, which would signify the recognition sought by Ireland of her special position with reference to the Commonwealth. Irish neutrality is said to be watched very closely in the United States of America; conversely, a possible abandoning of American neutrality would constitute a threat to Irish neutrality. We should continue to support consolidation of Irish neutrality and independence on a broad national basis, which is also important in its effect on the Dominions, India, and America as symptom of the loosening of the ties of Empire. Consequently:

1. Any active interference in Irish internal conflicts, which could only do harm at the present time, should be avoided.

2. Submarines should avoid Irish territorial waters, or at least where this is avoidable [*unavoidable?*] the greatest caution should be exercised.

3. The greatest possible consideration should be accorded Ireland in the blockade even with reference to imports of raw materials from countries other than England, if necessary in return for the assurance that they will not be re-exported. I am reserving the details on this point.

4. The Irish question should be handled very carefully by the radio and the press; that is, in so far as possible, only facts should be given without direct exploitation for propaganda against England. It should be kept in mind that Ireland strictly rejects (2 groups garbled) belonging to the Empire and recognizes only a loose connection with it in matters of foreign policy.

I confirm reports 1830, 1845, and 1868⁵ of September 12, (group garbled) and September 25, which were sent via America.

HEMPEL

³ Because of the garbled state of the text the meaning here is uncertain.

⁴ Sir John Maffey's title was "British Representative in Ireland."

⁵ These dispatches have not been found.

No. 217

2931/566993-94

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 8, 1939.

zu Pol. VIII 1645.¹

My view regarding the Chinese suggestion for German mediation in the Japanese-Chinese conflict is as follows:

1. The preliminary question is whether at the present time it is in the interest of Germany to bring about peace between China and Japan. As long as there was hope of getting Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany, the question could be answered in the affirmative without further ado. There was then an immediate possibility that, after the adjustment with the Soviet Union which we sought, Japan would turn resolutely against England. The present attitude of Japan does not indicate that this objective will be attained in the near future. As things stand today there is no very clear danger, to be sure, but nevertheless there is a possibility that in the course of a long German-British-French war Japan might also line up on the other side. From this viewpoint it would be to our interests for Japan to continue to tie up her forces in China.

Naturally Japan will be further weakened by Chinese entanglements, so that her value as a possible ally will thereby be reduced. As long as Japan's attitude is as ambiguous as it is today, however, this consideration could scarcely be decisive.

2. If the mediation or the "good offices" of a third party come into question, then German action would be better for us than that of a third power, for example the United States. Such action should, of course, never assume the aspect of an interference in Japanese policy. But this possibility is eliminated from the very start.

3. The essential question regarding mediation or any similar action is whether Japan is prepared to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek or not. Parallel with this is the question whether the Soviet Union will abandon Chiang Kai-shek or continue to support him. There are no indications either that Japan will come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek or that the Soviet Union is abandoning him.

Consequently, at the moment the only questions on which Japan could be sounded out would be:

(a) Whether Japan is willing to come to an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek at all, and

(b) Whether she would welcome our good offices.

I believe that at the present time the answer from Tokyo would be in the negative, which would then bring the entire action to a standstill. In the present situation, such a step by Germany would only cause annoyance in Japan. I therefore believe that for the present we should refrain even from a cautious feeler on this point.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary.²

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VIII 1645: Document No. 201.

² Marginal note: "Director Political Department: It is my view also that we ought to let this matter rest. W[eizsäcker], Oct. 10."

No. 218

F2/0318

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

SECRET

Moscow, October 8, 1939.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor hereby to confirm¹ that in connection with the Secret Additional Protocol,² concluded on September 29 [28], 1939, between the U. S. S. R. and Germany, concerning Lithuania, the following understanding exists between us:

1) The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the Protocol and marked on the map attached to the Protocol shall not be occupied in case forces of the Red Army should be stationed [in Lithuania];

2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration.

W. MOLOTOV

¹ See document No. 196. The letter printed here repeats verbatim, except for the customary formal differences, Schulenburg's letter of the same date to Molotov (F2/0317).

² Document No. 159.

No. 219

103/111684

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 9, 1939—12:30 a. m.

No. 493 of October 8

Received October 9—3 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 518 of October 7.¹

Molotov stated this evening at 9 p. m. that since October 1 no meeting had taken place² with the Turkish Foreign Minister and that the outcome of the negotiations cannot as yet be surmised. Molotov expressed the view that in all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would not be concluded. But under all circumstances the interests of Germany and the special nature of German-Soviet relations would be taken into account. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government was pursuing the aim of inducing Turkey to adopt full neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in maintaining peace in the Balkans.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 211.

² The words "taken place" were garbled in transmission. They are taken from the draft in the Moscow Embassy files (370/207803-04).

No. 220

8129/E582031-32

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 491 of October 9

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1939—4:35 a. m.

Received October 10—6:30 a. m.

Pol. IX 2106.

Official circles here expect that in the event the arms embargo is repealed by Congress Germany will lodge a protest against this unneutral act committed after the outbreak of war. The probable American reply to such a protest is being anticipated in the inspired press as follows:

1. Under international law neutrals have the same right as belligerents to modify their laws during a war in order to adapt them to a new situation.

2. Repeal of the arms embargo was, as a matter of fact, introduced in Congress before the outbreak of war. The decision to repeal after the outbreak of war therefore constitutes a confirmatory act.

3. Germany herself set a precedent (note of April 4, 1915)¹ when she asked the United States 8 months after the outbreak of the World War to abandon its position and change its neutrality policy.

What matters for the immediate appraisal of the situation is primarily the spirit in which the arms embargo is repealed. If the advocates of repeal were confronted with the clear-cut question whether the embargo would also be repealed if such a step were to benefit Germany, they would have to answer "no." The debates in Congress between isolationists and interventionists actually evade the real issue, since the interventionists, out of regard for public opinion, are still reluctant to admit openly that they let themselves be guided less by a concern for American interests than by a desire to assist England.

Every American argument to validate the repeal of the embargo is weakened by the fact that prior to the time the threat of a war between Germany and England arose, the same Administration and the same Congressmen who are now fighting the embargo with all possible means, time and again gave unqualified praise to the existing law and the arms embargo in particular and described it in superlatives as the surest means for keeping America out of a European war. In August 1936 (Chautauqua speech) Roosevelt pointed out, recalling the experiences of the World War, that the export of arms with all its possible consequences was delusive economically and a

¹ The note is printed in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement: The World War* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 157-158.

threat to America's peace politically. Hull and Pittman publicly stated only this year that any change in the neutrality law after the outbreak of war "would be against the rules of the game." The overwhelming majority in Congress considered that fixing American neutrality policy in peacetime was the surest means for averting America's involvement in a European war. These same statesmen and politicians now show no compunction about abandoning their former principles when it is a question of helping England.

We are undoubtedly justified in regarding a repeal of the embargo as an unfriendly and unneutral act, because it contradicts traditional American policy in all points. In its reply ² to the note referred to under [paragraph] 3, as also in the instruction to the American Embassy in Vienna,³ the American Government during the World War explicitly took the position that from the standpoint of international law it could not be asked or expected to change its neutrality policy after the outbreak of war.

With respect to any steps that might be undertaken by us it should be borne in mind that, after the creation of additional production facilities and provision for American armament requirements, it will in actual practice take considerable time for a repeal of the arms embargo for the benefit of the Allies to take *full* effect; moreover, the wide circulation given by press and radio to the report cited above about the anticipated German protest is obviously calculated to prove the correctness of the American argument that the effect of the embargo would be to discriminate in favor of Germany, with her supposedly superior armament industry, against the Allies.

THOMSEN

² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement: The World War*, pp. 160-162.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 794-798.

No. 221

405/238368

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S No. 793

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.

The Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the Foreign Minister. On the latter's instructions I received M. Wuorimaa this afternoon. He presented the following facts:

By virtue of the developments in the Baltic States, Russia had now penetrated so far into the Baltic that the balance of power there had been upset, and predominance threatened to pass to Russia. Germany's *désintéressement* had attracted attention in Finland, since there was reason there to assume that Russia intended to make demands on Finland identical with those made on the Baltic States.

The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorimaa that he find out whether Germany remains indifferent to Russia's forward thrust in this direction and, should that prove not to be the case, to learn what stand Germany intends to take.

The Minister added that, on her part, Finland had tried her best during the last few weeks to regulate her commercial relations with Germany and maintain them on a normal basis and to carry out the policy of neutrality desired also by Germany.

I answered the Minister in the sense of the enclosed instructions to Helsinki.¹ Wuorimaa asked me to call him if we had anything further to add.

From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that the Finnish Government was rather disturbed over the Russian demands and would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and Latvia.

As regards this attitude on the part of the Minister I merely said that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle matters with Russia in a peaceful manner.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 225.

No. 222

588/242223

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 794

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me this afternoon and inquired about the status of the peace action.

I returned the question and asked to hear his opinion.

Attolico stated the following: The reaction of the enemy countries up to now was not very favorable. One should not become impatient, however, but should let time have its effect. First, Chamberlain would have to make a public statement. This statement would probably not be purely negative. Then the moment would have arrived for further diplomatic efforts in order to prepare the ground more thoroughly.

Attolico did not have any sort of instructions. He also told me clearly that Rome would not make a move so long as we did not express a wish to that effect, for Ciano had left here with the impression that an initiative by Rome was not desired here for the time being. Furthermore, it had been arranged here that the reaction of other countries to the Führer's speech would first be awaited, and not until then would Berlin and Rome confer once more. Thus Rome was waiting for us, but would surely be glad to act if we wished it.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 223

1793/408557

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 795

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
Pol. VI 2303.

The Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that a very serious situation would arise in the Baltic region if Russia were to make demands on Finland which threatened the independence and autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished to inform me of the preceding with reference to the close relations between Sweden and Finland. It should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, strong and vigorous forces were in power in Finland, who would not submit to Russian oppression.

I replied to the Minister that nothing was known to me about the probable Russian demands on Finland. To my knowledge the word Finland had not been mentioned during the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow. The situation was that we had not put forth any claims to any interests east of the known line. I should suppose, however, that Russia would not set forth any too far-reaching requests regarding Finland and that, therefore, a peaceable solution could be found.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 224

Nuremberg document 062-C
Exhibit GB-106*Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

OKM AI Op. 283/39.

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW No. 172/39 g. K. Chefs. WFA/L

By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 6 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and, under England's leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively without great delay.

2. If we wait much longer, not only will Belgium and perhaps also Dutch neutrality be lost, to the advantage of the Western Powers,

but the military strength of our enemies will grow on an increasing scale, the neutrals' confidence in a final German victory will dwindle, and Italy will not be encouraged to join us as a military ally.

3. Therefore I give the following orders for further military operations:

a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation on the northern wing of the Western Front through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out with as much strength and at as early a date as possible.

b. The purpose of this attacking operation will be to defeat as strong a part of the French operational army as possible, as well as the allies fighting by its side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war¹ against England and as a protective zone for the vital Ruhr area.

c. The timing of the attack depends on the readiness of tanks and motorized units for use—this must be speeded up by every possible effort, also on the weather conditions then prevailing and the weather prospects ahead.

4. The Luftwaffe is to prevent the Anglo-French air force from attacking our own Army, and, if necessary, to give direct support to the Army's advance. In this connection, it will also be essential to prevent the establishment of the Anglo-French air force in Belgium and Holland, as well as British troop landings there.²

5. The Naval Command must concentrate for the duration of this attack entirely in giving direct and indirect support to the operations of the Army and Luftwaffe.

6. Apart from these preparations for starting the attack in the West according to plan, Army and Luftwaffe must be ready at any time and with increasing strength, to meet an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium as far forward on Belgian territory as possible, and to occupy as much of Holland as possible in the direction of the West Coast.³

7. The camouflage used for these preparations must be that they are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration of French and English forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Franco-Belgian borders.

8. I request the Commanders in Chief to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their plans on the basis of this directive and

¹ Marginal note in Raeder's handwriting: "No" [*Nicht*].

² Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "It will also be up to the Luftwaffe to cut the supply lines of those English troops which have already landed. The employment of U-boats in the Channel will soon cease because of heavy losses."

³ Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "This kind of procedure would be more desirable in every respect."

to keep me currently informed, via the OKW, of the state of the preparations.⁴

ADOLF HITLER

* Gen. Keitel on Oct. 15, recorded that certain questions of OKH regarding plans for war in the West had been discussed with the Führer. It had been decided that protection of the Ruhr through air defenses as far forward as possible in Netherlands territory was of importance for the conduct of the war as a whole and that this consideration should be taken into account by the Army in its planning. Such planning would be based on proposed occupation of Netherlands territory to the Grebbe-Maas line with additional areas as necessary (Nuremberg document 062-C, exhibit GB-106).

No. 225

3537/E021872-73

The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

No. 326

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
Sent October 10—12:00 noon.
Pol. VI 2327.

With reference to our telegram No. 322.¹

The Finnish Minister, who will call today at the Foreign Ministry, is to receive the following answer:

Our relationship to the three Baltic States rests, as is known, on the nonaggression pacts; our relationship to Denmark likewise. Norway and Sweden have declined nonaggression pacts with us, since they do not feel endangered by us and since they have hitherto not concluded any nonaggression pacts at all. Finland, to be sure, has such a pact with Russia, but declined our offer nevertheless. We regretted this circumstance, but were and are of the opinion that our traditionally good and friendly relations with Finland do not require any special political agreements.

Given this absence of problems in German-Finnish relations it is very easy to understand why in his utterances of October 6th—concerned for the greater part with our neighbors—the Führer did not mention Finland at all, just as he did not mention many other greater and smaller states. From this it only follows that between us there are no points of difference.

In Moscow, where in the negotiations of the Reich Foreign Minister German-Russian relations were discussed in broad political outline and where a treaty of friendship came into being, the definitive line of demarcation was fixed, as you know. West of this line lie the German interests, east of it we have registered no interests. We are

¹ Document No. 215.

therefore not informed as to what requests Russia intends to make of Finland. We presume, however, that these requests will not be too far-reaching. For this reason alone a German stand on the question becomes unnecessary. But in view of the developments described earlier, we would hardly be in a position, in any case, to intervene in the Russo-Finnish conversations.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 226

1798/408553

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, October 10, 1939—5:31 p. m.

No. 284 of October 10

Received October 10—7:30 p. m.

Pol. VI 2300.

The excitement which has prevailed here for a week in connection with further developments in Finnish-Russian relations has greatly increased during the last few days. After Russia's action in the Baltic countries they are preparing for the worst. Mobilization is continuing on an increasing scale. Evacuation of hospitals and schools for military purposes has begun. The German school will be closed tomorrow and be used as quarters for the military. The public is in a state of panic; many are leaving Helsinki and going to West Finland. The banks are having difficulty in coping with mass withdrawals. Partly as a result of encouragement through Anglo-French propaganda by word of mouth, the conviction has already become nearly universal that Germany has sold Finland to Russia. Anti-German sentiment is steadily increasing. The excitement (group garbled) [has] already led to hostile acts by individuals against Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche; in numerous cases it has resulted in dismissals.

Appeals for help are being pressed on me from all sides. Political and military leaders understand that we cannot give any armed assistance as in 1918; they only desire that we may not leave them entirely without support and counsel in Moscow. I request that the possibility be considered of granting this wish in one way or another, without departing from our basic policy.

It is said that American and Swedish official démarches in Moscow in behalf of Finland are impending.

BLÜCHER

No. 227

8485/E596830

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 285 of October 10

HELSINKI, Oct

1—5:31 p. m.

Received October 10—6:30 p. m.

Pol. VI 2289.

The Foreign Minister submitted to me a question formulated as follows: "Will Germany refrain from disturbing Sweden if Sweden should come to the aid of Finland militarily?"

Please send a telegraphic reply immediately.

BLÜCHER

No. 228

8485/E596833

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 286 of October 10

HELSINKI, October 10, 1939—7:47 p. m.

Received October 10—8:20 p. m.

Pol. VI 2293.

Any promise not to prevent Sweden from supporting Finland militarily should, in my personal opinion, be made only on the condition that Sweden guarantee the continuation of ore deliveries and refrain from any measures giving the British and French access to the Baltic.

BLÜCHER

No. 229

585/242495

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 271 of October 10

SOFIA, October 10, 1939—9:00 p. m.

Received October 11—2:00 a. m.

For the Air Ministry, Attaché Group.

I am telegraphing in advance the following important points from my two-hour conversation with the King:

There is extreme concern over difficulties in connection with the transport through Yugoslavia of the promised war material,¹ and also over the possibility of obtaining supplies later.

¹ On Sept. 9, Richthofen had telegraphed that transports of war material from Germany to Bulgaria had been "sabotaged" in transit through Yugoslavia (585/242478).

The general political situation in the Balkans calls urgently for military strengthening of Bulgaria. In my opinion this is the only way the peace here can be maintained if the war should be prolonged.

The King proposed that further transports and later deliveries of supplies be routed via Rumania, since interference is less likely to be expected there.

The King is afraid that if it should be impossible to eliminate the difficulties very soon he would be compelled to obtain the most urgently needed war material from Russia, a step that the King would like to avoid on account of the danger of becoming exposed to political influences.

SCHOENEBECK ²
RICHTHOFEN

² Lt. Col. von Schoenebeck, German Air Attaché in Bulgaria.

No. 230

1793/408550

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 287 of October 10

HELSINKI, October 10, 1939—9:30 p. m.

Received October 10—12 midnight.

Pol. VI 2291.

All indications are that if Russia does not confine her demands to islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer armed resistance. The consequences for our war economy would be grave. Not only food and timber exports, but also indispensable copper and molybdenum exports from Finland to Germany would cease. For this reason I suggest you intercede with the Russian Government to the effect that it should not go beyond a demand for the islands.



BLÜCHER

No. 231

583/242225-26

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 663 of October 10

ROME, October 10, 1939—11:50 p. m.

Received October 11—5:45 a. m.

The following is worth noting from today's conversation with Ciano:

1. Ciano asked once again that the negotiations on the South Tirol be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible.¹ For political reasons the Duce attached great importance to having a final agreement reached during my present stay in Rome and having the agreement signed before my departure. Ciano pointed out in this connection the impression which the prospective swift resettlement of Germans from Latvia made on public opinion in Italy. I rejected this comparison, stressing the entirely different circumstances. I emphasized that a swift settlement of the South Tirol question depended mainly on the Italian authorities concerned abandoning their petty treatment of justified German wishes with regard to the implementation of the transaction. Ciano promised to exert his influence in this sense.

2. After conversations with Ambassador Giannini and the appropriate Ministers, I asked Ciano once more to do his utmost to ensure a maximum increase of Italian raw material deliveries to Germany and to have the Italian Government expedite in all possible ways the transit of foreign ship cargoes through Italy to Germany, without exaggerated legalistic considerations or exaggerated demands for foreign exchange from us. I pointed out what a bad impression it would make in authoritative quarters in Germany if just at the critical moment at the beginning of the war the Italian deliveries of raw materials should decrease or we received the impression that Italy was not doing everything that was in her power to facilitate transit. Ciano promised to make his political influence felt with regard to these points, too. Because of its particular importance for the German war economy, I have also simultaneously had the question brought directly to the attention of the Duce by other Ministers concerned in a more unofficial form, especially with regard to transit deliveries of copper, tin, nickel, rubber, and fats.

3. Moreover, I carried out with Ciano the Foreign Minister's instructions to request that Italy adopt a more energetic attitude vis-à-vis England with regard to ship searches and control points, drawing up of black lists, etc. I pointed out that it was not possible to carry through the above-mentioned transit deliveries without vigorous political defense against British encroachments. Furthermore, the attitude of other countries on the European continent not involved in the war would be decisively influenced by Italy's conduct. After all, the Italian Government itself had already suggested via Attolico that it assume somewhat the role of a leader in this fight against British

¹ The technical and financial arrangements for implementing the German-Italian agreement of June 23, 1939, on South Tirol (see vol. VI, document No. 562) had run into difficulties; on Oct. 4 conversations had been resumed in Rome on this subject, with Clodius charged with their conduct on the German side. See also document No. 275 and footnote.

encroachments. Ciano answered that the Duce and he were willing in principle to stiffen the Italian stand against the British conduct of naval warfare and to exert their influence in the same direction on the neutral states. He only wished to await for a few more days the development of the political situation after the Führer's speech, and would then continue the discussion with me. He added that naturally one must avoid permitting Italy herself to be stamped as a neutral by virtue of joint action with the neutrals. As in the past, the Duce laid great emphasis on the fact that Italy was not a neutral power. He himself, Ciano, was fully convinced that sooner or later the moment would come for Italy herself to enter the war.

I answered that in our deliberations about more vigorous steps by Italy against the British blockade we, too, naturally proceeded on the supposition that these would not take such a form as to underline Italy's neutrality, but on the contrary would give proof of Italy's resolve not to submit to the blockade, but to combat it with all possible political and economic means.

4. During the conversation Ciano mentioned the fact that England and France had tried at first to place large orders in Italy for war equipment, including guns, tanks, and more than 1,000 airplanes. Italy had naturally refused.

CLODIUS
MACKENSEN

No. 232

B18/B008090

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

No. 328

BERLIN, October 10, 1939.
Büro RAM 522.

For the Minister.

According to a report received here, [former] President Svinhufvud is said to be planning to come to Germany on his own initiative in order to win support for Finnish policy against Soviet Russia.

Please take appropriate steps to prevent any trip by the President, pointing out that Germany is not concerned with Russo-Finnish problems; Germany can only recommend a direct Russo-Finnish understanding.

RIBBENTROP

No. 233

B21/B005138

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 428

BERLIN, October 10, 1939.
zu Pol. II 3950.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 482 of October 7.²

You are requested to maintain extreme reserve with respect to press reports there about the possibility of an American mediation and, if necessary, to say that you have no instructions. The German press also will express no opinion on the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. II 3950: Not found.

² Document No. 209.

No. 234

51/83898-900

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*¹October 10, 1939.
W V 2766 II.

With reference to our letter W V 2580 of October 4, 1939.²

In the course of the negotiations carried on with the Danish Government by the German Legation in Copenhagen according to instructions, an agreement concerning the treatment of Danish food ships sailing to England has been reached on the basis of the German proposals; it is to go into force on Wednesday, October 11, at 6:00 a. m. The following can be said on the various points of the settlement reached:

1. Denmark has accepted our basic standpoint, which is that we are dealing with a de facto situation that can be abrogated at any time. We ourselves merely agreed that, subject to emergency measures which we might be forced to take because of action by the enemy, we would give the Danes sufficient notice before ending the present arrangement, but that we could not at this time bind ourselves to any definite period.

2. The Danes assured us that full agreement has been reached with England regarding the question of fodder imports to Denmark. The Danish-English negotiations now going on regarding this point are concerned only with questions of formulation relating to the period for giving notice. They say England has accepted the Danish standpoint according to which even now, during the Anglo-Danish ne-

¹ Copies were sent to the principal military and economic offices concerned with economic warfare.

² Not found.

gotiations, England is releasing all goods destined for Denmark, in particular fodder.

3. At the request of the Danes we agreed that the term "food" should include not only the usual staples but also certain luxury goods such as canned food, condensed milk, meat, and beer; on the other hand, Denmark agreed to see that only foods are shipped in one cargo.

4. The Danes promised to submit a general list of the ships which are available for transporting foods, and to inform us immediately of any change in this list; they also promised to mark the ships in a special way. The Danes have in the meantime informed us of the markings and the information has been passed on to the Naval High Command. Moreover, the Danes will inform the German Legation in time of the names, cargoes, and dates of departure.

5. At Danish request we abandoned our stipulation that the ships in question leave from only *one* port of departure.

6. It was agreed with regard to the three Danish food ships already brought to Hamburg that these ships will be released as a special German favor. The cargoes are to remain in Germany, however, and will be paid for by us via the German-Danish clearing account. In return the Danes gave the assurance that food acquired by Germany in this way will not be counted as part of the normal food exports from Denmark to Germany, so that the acquisition of these foods has the effect of an increase in our food imports from Denmark.

By order :
WIEHL

No. 235

7433/E589982-88

Unsigned Note

October 10, 1939.

Subject: Conversation with B[aron] d[e] R[opp].¹

B[aron] d[e] R[opp] first took the position that the outbreak of war between England and Germany was inevitable because of the chauvinistic attitude of the English people. He was convinced that the result would be only the decline of the West, of the Aryan race, and the era of the bolshevization of Europe, including England.

I thereupon asked him first just to let me express my purely personal opinion and then later to explain my mission. In my opinion, the question was an entirely different one, namely, whether the Aryan race would in future be represented by the two nations jointly or only by Germany. The German nation was determined to accept the fight forced upon it by England.

B. d. R. was amazed to learn that all the hatred was directed against England.

I told him that the German people were now convinced that, while invoking God, freedom, and otherwise prostituting ethical questions,

¹ See document No. 203.

England thought only of money and that for this reason Germany had for decades not been able to find peace. In the German view, there was no question at all as to whether Germany or England would triumph, but simply of the time that would be needed to force the British Empire to its knees. They were of the opinion that the attempts to reach an understanding with England had finally come to an end after six years of interminable effort. Although I was now speaking with him at the direction of Christian,² in order to make one more attempt to save the British Empire, I was convinced that this step on the part of Germany was completely unpopular. It was being taken only from the very broad perspective of the preservation of the strength of the Aryan race and the general significance of Europe. It was fortunate for the Aryan race and for Europe that we had the Führer, who was in a position and had the power to guide the will of the people in Germany. The question was only whether the British nation has already become too old to realize its duties.

B. d. R. declared that the Germans were making a mistake if they considered the English nation superannuated.

I told him that British policy was undeniably superannuated and that I, too, hoped and believed that the English nation would still prove to have vitality. But it had to give the answer to this now, for, if blood really started flowing, the die would finally have been cast. I sincerely desired the preservation of the British Empire because in the European area the German nation had such tasks to fulfill as the representative of the Aryan race, that I did not wish it to my children and grandchildren, to these generations, namely, to have to assume also the tasks of the English nation.

His anxiety concerning the bolshevization of Europe was entirely unfounded. I was convinced that, just as Poland had fallen much more rapidly than I had expected, so the British Empire would also collapse very much more rapidly than the world considered possible today, because of our new weapons, with which England would very soon become acquainted. Germany, even after several years of war with England, was still strong enough to meet any danger she feared from the East. The Vistula-San line was actually predestined to create an even stronger eastern wall than our present West Wall; from there it would be possible to advance offensively at any time. I believed, however, that we were so strong that we did not even need to go to the trouble of constructing an eastern wall. He must also not forget that, after the collapse of England, France would fall in line very quickly. She was today being only artificially goaded on by England to assume the tasks of her previous history, and for this she was much too tired already.

² This refers apparently to Rosenberg.

B.d.R. thought he perceived difficulties in Germany in the fact that the political swing in German policy toward Russia could not be made comprehensible to the German people. He still recalled how last year at Nuremberg Bolshevik Russia had been called the seat of infection that had to be eradicated.

I told him that many of our foes are getting themselves worked up about this. That was probably because they could not understand that the German nation had through National Socialism obtained a new ideology and a new faith. A person who believed, in a way that was comparable only to belief in a religion, needed no explanation, but rested in this belief. He must also not forget that the Führer had not achieved power through the entire German people, but through a minority, though a fanatical one, which did not even comprise all party members. This minority had believed in the Führer and continued to follow and believe in him. Those of them who also reasoned it out clearly were convinced that we were no longer the nation of the so-called "*Deutsche Michels*," who pursued a goal just to give the opponent every opportunity to set traps for him on the way. It was first only a matter of finally breaking the power of the rootless forces which managed the democracies. He must also not forget that Stalin had now ousted the Jews from all posts. I know from our negotiators in Moscow that, to their amazement, they found only non-Jews still acting as negotiations partners while in previous years only Jews functioned as such. Also he must not forget that the German people had always had great sympathy for the Russian people and that Christian had therefore been bitterly assailed by many Germans outside the movement as the exponent of the irreconcilable attitude toward Soviet Russia.

It was also incomprehensible to me why the British believed they could conquer us by economic means. In order not to create unnecessary tension—since I spoke very strongly—I emphasized the fact that I was a citizen of Hamburg and therefore believed that I knew England well also through my trips abroad. I had always known the Englishman to be a careful calculator, but now I was always reading that the world with its raw materials was open to England and France and also that Germany had no gold. Well, what was the actual situation?! In 1914, Germany's industrial capacity was a third less than that of England and France combined. Today she was stronger than the two countries—and even without Poland and Moravia—in the ratio of 33 to 37. Germany did not lack even 20 percent of her supplies. It was also to be taken into account that as of September 1 of this year the tremendous peacetime projects, construction, etc., were stopped and that the raw materials needed for them from abroad therefore no longer needed to be imported. All deliveries to countries overseas, moreover, were stopping. Germany could therefore

concentrate on the countries of Europe that were important to her and within easy reach in making deliveries in payment of raw materials. Also, Germany's great anxiety about the shortage of labor was relieved for the same reasons. Surprisingly small forces were needed for the Army. It had to be remembered that in 1914 we had had over 3400 kilometers of front, while today we had in the West only 250 kilometers, which, moreover, were so strongly fortified that they required a correspondingly smaller number of troops. As a result, even on September 1, when the armies still had to be employed in Poland, no mobilization had been necessary. He would be able to convince himself in Germany itself that the best age classes, between 25 and 35, were still entirely civilians in the Reserve.

In the matter of raw materials we were also in a position to start exporting on a large scale because we had what was worth much more than gold—the raw materials from which the most important raw materials could be derived, whether it was gasoline, rubber, or other things. I mentioned coal and our gain through Poland, lumber in connection with Poland, Finland, and Russia, potatoes as feed. We were therefore not only in a position to feed our people adequately for years to come, but would also be able to supply the neutral countries with the raw materials vital to them, and thereby create a bloc in Europe that would be able to supply itself adequately. The industrial capacity of Germany was also very great and the requirements of the Army, because of the small front, were by no means comparable to those of the World War, so that as a result, Germany was already in a position now to concentrate her entire industry on exports. It was therefore not surprising that now, since the 1st of September of this year, instead of offering delivery terms up to two years as heretofore, we could, to the amazement of the neutrals, make immediate deliveries. Moreover, all the conditions now exist that will make it possible to develop the Four Year Plan at an entirely different tempo, since the stoppage of the peace-time construction projects.

What, on the other hand, is England's situation? England had to import nearly 70 percent. The pound was not backed by gold. B. d. R. shared my view on this entirely. Credits, as in the World War, were also entirely unlikely. England, like Germany, therefore, had to pay for her imports in counter-deliveries. But the trouble here was the lack of self-sufficiency and the small industrial capacity of England. I therefore failed to understand how the sensible Englishman could think that the blockade of Germany would be successful, instead of merely considering whether or not the blockade of Germany with its new weapons would enable England economically to wage war any longer.

It must therefore become clearer and clearer to the sensible Englishman that in view of all the difficulties already existing in the way of the preservation of the British Empire, he was committing suicide if he risked his whole Empire for the sake of Poland. The distribution of forces was also so unequal that even for the average Englishman it must now become clear that this was, indeed, not an English policy at all, but the policy of the rootless elements which alone could profit by a war even if the Empire fell in the process. Poland surely must be a serious warning.

B. d. R. thereupon stated that he could now say frankly that in England it had only been expected that Poland would resist for three weeks.

I then stated that the policy of England had thereby become even more incomprehensible to me. I would like to wish that, for the sake of the strength of the Aryan race, the English nation at the very last moment would come to its senses. It had to realize, however, that it was in Germany's power to decide whether the British Empire was to be preserved or not and that—with the exception of Christian and the F.—she considered it a settled fact that the end of the British Empire had now come. On the streets of Berlin people were, indeed, saying that China was falling to Japan, British India to Russia, Africa to Germany, etc. The only hope, therefore, was Christian, who from very broad perspectives was advocating the preservation of the Empire.

B. d. R. stated that he realized this fully and continued, saying that he expected nothing of Ribbentrop, whose name I had never mentioned.

Meanwhile the telegram had arrived from Fred in London saying that he considered a talk with leading Germans premature at present. Although I had stated at the first conversation that if the die had now been cast, the last word had been spoken, I stated that I naturally did not wish to assert that it would never again be possible.

B. d. R. therefore gave me the following statement which I should like to present to Christian:

The British Air Ministry was of the same view as we had discussed it. It by no means wished to be a party to the present policy of England of waging the war to the finish. There were too many British Empire experts in the Ministry not to know the dangers to the Empire itself. It [the Ministry] was not yet strong enough today, however, to assert itself. There was no practical value in convincing Chamberlain alone, since he was dependent upon the exponents who today wished a war to the finish. But the Air Ministry believed that it would constantly gain in political power at home. It was convinced that the war would be decided by the Luftwaffe. It therefore depended on the Air Ministry to explain to the British Government that, in view of the losses it had sustained, it no longer

found itself in a position of being able to continue the war. But it was necessary first to await the first clash and the resulting losses. He hoped that in the interest of the Aryan race, Germany's Luftwaffe would be so victorious as to create this basis. It was horrible to think that on both sides it was just the most valuable forces that would be lost in the process. He thought, however, that it would be desirable, if the war began now, to review the contact in four to six weeks. He also asked that contact continue to be maintained. He wished to remain in Switzerland for the following reason:

Mr. Daniels, the former *Times* correspondent, whom Christian knew, had, since September 1 of this year, assumed the post of Press Attaché at the British Legation in Bern, in order in this way to participate again in politics. Daniels was of the same opinion as we, even if he could not say so officially. He was, therefore, also of the opinion that the war was madness for England and had to be ended in shortest order. Daniels had excellent connections with the Foreign Office and was now, as Press Attaché, also constantly posted as to present developments.

It was arranged that if E. d. R. considered a new discussion of the situation expedient, he should write to the previously used address about "excursions" [*"Ausflügen"*]. If Fred wired him, however, that the Air Ministry now felt strong enough to be justified in hoping that it would prevail and the conditions were therefore created for his going to Berlin, he would write about "snow."

As far as he personally was concerned, he was prepared to go to Berlin at once. But he took the position that he could come only if he had prospects of success in London.

He also advised that German propaganda should hit England in her weakest spot. It was, indeed, not so much the question of inconsistency in England's proclaiming that she wished to raise Poland up again without declaring war on Russia. The English nation could be persuaded that Russia had taken only non-Polish territory. England, however, now declared as her war aim the destruction of the regime in Germany. If England attained this goal, however, it would be necessary to ask the Englishman whether, then, it was Kaiser Wilhelm II or Brüning who would return? This thought was totally absurd. The successor could only be Bolshevism. If Germany became Bolshevik, however, so would, in short order, Europe and the whole of England. Therefore even if the war aim were completely achieved at tremendous sacrifice on the part of England, she would only accomplish her own downfall.

I took cognizance of this without mentioning that probably out of consideration for Russia we could not employ such propaganda at all.

In conclusion, B. d. R. told me the following:

You may be right, indeed, in saying that this war of the rootless

elements against Germany is in reality not at all a war between English and German interests. I too believe now that the question is still only whether or not the British Empire can be preserved in the interest of the Aryan race.

No. 236

2290/483388

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 664

ROME, October 10, 1939.

Sent October 11—12:20 a. m.

Also for the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Today I had a look into the secret survey of Italy's reserves of liquid fuels, which is accessible only to the Ministers concerned and the military chiefs. The total stocks including residues amounted to 980,000 metric tons on October 8. Of this 25,000 tons is aviation gasoline, 119,000 tons is automobile gasoline, and 260,000 tons is heavy oil for Diesel engines. The Navy is not included in the figures; it has its own stocks, and according to trustworthy assurances by a member of the Government has sufficient supplies for a year. However, the supply of the Army from the above-mentioned stocks is assured for a month at the most, in the opinion of experts.

CLODIUS

MACKENSEN

No. 237

84/24105-06

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 509 of October 11

Moscow, October 11, 1939—5:31 p. m.

Received October 11—11:10 p. m.

The following is a comprehensive report on the negotiations so far and on the current situation:¹

¹In telegram No. 498 of Oct. 4 (1369/357067-68), Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to inform Molotov of his decision to send Ambassador Ritter to be present with Schnurre at the opening of the economic negotiations. Schulenburg was also instructed to notify Molotov of the German desire for prompt agreement on an immediate program to last about 6 months.

An economic delegation headed by Ritter and Schnurre arrived in Moscow on Oct. 7. A list of Oct. 17 showed it to include 37 members, representing the Foreign Ministry, the Ministries of Transport, Food, and Economics, the Reichsbahn, the Chief of Transportation for the Wehrmacht, the Hamburg-America Line, the Reichsgruppe Industrie, I. G. Farben, the Benzolverband, the Otto Wolff firm, the Reich Grain Office, the Deutsche Werft at Hamburg, the Ruhrchemie, the Gutehoffnung iron works, the Stahlunion-Export, the Flachshandel, the Theodor Thorer firm, and the Wotirag Company (1369/357054).

1. We submitted our proposals in general form and with more emphasis on the political aspect to Molotov Sunday night, and in all detail to Mikoyan, on Monday night. Mikoyan gave us a tentative and partial reply Tuesday night.² The over-all impression left by this initial response is that the other side is willing on the whole to make a serious effort to meet our proposals, but their attitude with respect to the total volume is not yet satisfactory.

2. As regards the listed metals and the rubber, the other side is prepared to buy the specified quantities for us abroad. Preliminary instructions concerning the purchases and the chartering of the required cargo space in Japanese, American, and Dutch vessels have already gone out. The other side is to be told that purchases from America should be shipped via Murmansk. They believe that some caution must be exercised here. The payment for the purchases abroad, however, will necessitate sharp discussions.

3. As regards the purchases of raw materials and foods in Russia proper, during the first phase of the agreement the other side wants to maintain the level of maximum Russian deliveries in the past, but has intimated that the question of larger deliveries in a subsequent phase is open. The other side explains this on the grounds that they want to avoid promises they are not absolutely sure at present they will be able to keep. We have indicated that the past maximum is insufficient and have reserved the right to maintain our proposals in further discussions of separate points.

4. As regards particular points, the tentative reply shows that we can probably count on approximate fulfillment of our demands for feed grains. With respect to the delivery of Russian ores, the other side wants to study their own requirements before making any statement regarding our proposals. Platinum will be delivered in the full quantity requested. No statement has yet been made regarding our proposals for German compensatory deliveries. There seems to be interest in the hydrogenation plant.

5. Concerning transit shipments from Iran, Afghanistan, and the Far East, all necessary instructions have already been issued to the competent local Russian agencies that the quantities specified by us must be forwarded without delay. The other side has again stressed that this transit is being permitted only as an exception and only to Germany. Therefore please bring this to the attention of the interested German firms once more and [have them] desist from further circular letters regarding transit. Our first inquiries indicate that the shipment of soybeans on the trans-Siberian railroad will cause no particular difficulties.³

² Detailed memoranda of these conversations have not been found.

³ According to a memorandum of Oct. 31, the German delegation in Moscow sought at first to arrange for a margarine factory in Manchuria in order to reduce freight charges by shipping only the finished product, but gave up this project when it appeared that satisfactory freight rates on soybeans could be obtained (1369/357015-16). In an exchange of letters between Schnurre and Mikoyan on Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1939 (1369/356980-81), the Soviet Government agreed to grant until Dec. 1, 1940, a 50 percent reduction in freight rates on all soybean shipments from the Far East.

6. The connecting railroad Rumania Cernăuți [*Verbindungsbahn Rumänien Czernowitz*] will not be converted to a different gauge for the time being.⁴

7. The experts who have arrived here have been put in touch with the competent Russian authorities for commercial negotiations.

8. A separate telegraphic report concerning several secret points will follow.⁵

RITTER
SCHULENBURG

⁴On Oct. 3, Clodius had noted the following: "The Foreign Minister requests that care be taken in the negotiations at Moscow to insure that the tracks of the railway line to Rumania via Lwów are not changed over to the Russian gauge." (1869/357058)

⁵Not found.

No. 238

73/52085-86

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 421 of October 11

BUDAPEST, October 11, 1939—6:25 p. m.

Received October 11—11:10 p. m.

The Foreign Minister told me confidentially that the inner Cabinet Council, composed of the Regent, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, and the Chief of the General Staff, had decided to fortify the Hungarian frontier against Russia and Rumania by three lines [of fortifications], the third to run along the Tisza River. For political reasons the fortifications were to be built as covertly as possible and they were a defensive measure against the Russians. The frontier with Rumania was to be fortified in order to conceal the true purpose and also [to guard] against the eventuality that the Russians might overrun Rumania and then attack Hungary from the East.

At this session of the Cabinet Council the Regent had gravely emphasized that Hungary had the greatest interest in an early German victory, which would avert chaos.

The Foreign Minister asked me to point out to the Reich Foreign Minister that he had kept the promise given to him to bring about a détente in Hungarian-Rumanian relations.¹ The Hungarian Minister to Berlin being ill, Csáky repeats herewith once more the request of the Chief of the General Staff² regarding the release of German arms shipments to Hungary.

¹ See document No. 30.

² General Henrik Werth.

The Foreign Minister further requests that the Polish soldiers and civilians interned here, at least the women and children, be taken over as soon as possible, in so far as their homes are in the German sphere of interest. Such removal of propagandists injurious to us is also in our interest (cf. dispatch No. 1404 of October 7).³

The Hungarian Minister to Moscow would present the same request with reference to Poles from the Russian sphere of interest.

The Foreign Minister added that the Hungarian Minister in Moscow would shortly propose the conclusion of a good-neighbor agreement between the Soviet Union and Hungary for the purpose of regulating border traffic and similar questions. So far the Soviet Union had not requested the *agrément* for the Minister to Budapest.

ERDMANNSDORFF

³ Not found.

No. 239

406/214504

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 11, 1939—6:43 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 11—11:20 p. m.

No. 510 of October 11

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Potemkin told me today that he was instructed to express to me the astonishment of Stalin and Molotov at the fact that we were evidently promoting a panicky emigration of the Germans from Latvia and Estonia. Such a "flight" by the Germans would of necessity seriously compromise the action of the Soviet Government. There was no occasion for precipitating the matter, since the Germans were threatened neither economically nor in any other way.

Potemkin asked me to communicate this to my Government at once.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ In a further telegram of Oct. 13, Schulenburg reported: "Potemkin has just approached me again with the urgent instruction to tell me that the concern of the Soviet Government because of the evacuation of the Germans from Latvia and Estonia is becoming ever greater; in the harbor of Riga there are at least ten German ships, German schools are being closed, German physicians are leaving in droves, etc. Potemkin reminded me of his *démarche* of the day before yesterday, and requested me to learn the attitude of the Reich Government." (406/214509)

No. 240

1859/422691-92

The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, October 11, 1939.

Sent October 12—6:15 a. m.

zu Pol. VI 2322.¹

No. 330

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegrams 284, 285, 286, 287.²

1. We have no indications that the Soviet Union will make demands on Finland that would necessarily result in military complications. We are therefore of the opinion that it is first necessary to wait and see what demands Moscow will make. The suggestion made in Helsinki that we bring influence to bear on the Russian Government to keep it from going beyond a demand on Finland for islands, cannot, therefore be followed.

2. We request that you avoid, as in the past, any commitments such as would be involved in a reply to the question put by the Finnish Foreign Minister regarding our attitude toward Sweden. You are therefore requested not to return to the matter of your own accord; if the Foreign Minister should speak to you about the matter again, please confine yourself to pointing out that we do not consider that any basis for such a question exists.

3. For your information: As you know, our obligations under the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union preclude any kind of support of a third power in the event that the Soviet Union should become the object of military action on the part of this power. If we should now make a declaration such as desired with respect to Sweden it would amount to a stiffening of Finnish and Swedish resistance against the Soviet Union, which would disturb German-Soviet relations.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. VI 2322: 8485/596831.² Documents Nos. 226, 227, 228, and 230.

No. 241

B18/B008097

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, October 11, 1939.

The Foreign Minister has agreed to the evacuation of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche from Finland, in so far as they themselves wish it.¹

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.

SCHMIDT

¹ A telephone message from the Legation in Finland at 4:30 p. m., Oct. 11, summarized in a memorandum of that date by Hügel of Political Division VI (B18/B008092-93), stated that the situation in Finland had suddenly become much more tense. Evacuation of Swedish nationals had begun; the Finnish Government intended to leave Helsinki; and there was danger of attack upon German nationals by Finnish Communists. Blücher therefore requested instructions as to possible evacuation of Germans from Finland should this be necessary.

No. 242

463/225930-81

*Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry*¹

1. On October 3 the Spanish Ambassador expressed the willingness of the Spanish Government to offer its good offices as mediator.² The Spanish Foreign Minister announced to our Ambassador on October 10 that the Spanish Government is completely and entirely at our disposal in respect to the peace question.³

2. The Italian Ambassador stated again on October 9 that Rome would certainly be glad to act if we so desired.⁴

3. The Dutch Minister in Ankara told Herr von Papen as early as October 1 that his Government was prepared to mediate in case an official request to that effect was put forward. In that event the Queen of the Netherlands would act jointly with the King of the Belgians.⁵

¹ At the top of this unsigned and undated document Siegfried added, in handwriting, the title "Offers of mediation by neutrals, as of October 11, 1939." In the margin Weizsäcker wrote "Attolico" opposite paragraph (2), "Zech" opposite "our Minister" in (3), and "Andresen" opposite (4).

² See document No. 186.

³ Not printed (463/225919).

⁴ See document No. 222.

⁵ Papen telegraphed on Oct. 1 (463/225787) that the Netherlands Minister, Dr. Philips C. Visser, had asked him to inform Ribbentrop "that it was psychologically of the greatest importance to make a peace offer through a third party, but that the Führer ought to avoid for the time being a declaration, having the character of finality, in the Reichstag." Later on the same day Papen sent another telegram (463/225788) saying that Visser had just visited him again to announce that he had now received more detailed instructions: "His Govern-

On October 7 the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested to our Minister⁶ that a skillful person be sent as mediator (preferably an Italian); it is of decisive importance, he believes, that something in this direction be done as quickly as possible. The Dutch Foreign Minister told Professor Bruns at about the same time that the Netherlands Government would at any time be glad to render services in initiation of negotiations.⁷

4. According to confidential information from Oslo on October 6 the King of Norway would be interested in having his good offices employed as mediator.⁸

5. The former President of Finland, Svinhufvud, has told our Minister in Helsinki that he is working for a peace appeal by the Northern states, and that he believes the King of Sweden would be most suited to head such an effort.⁹ According to the report from Oslo referred to under [paragraph] 4, such a disposition to act as mediator apparently exists in Sweden, too.

6. It appears that still more feelers are being put out by way of Sweden, the details of which are not known to the Foreign Ministry.

ment was willing to mediate in case an official wish was expressed. In this circumstance the Queen would act in conjunction with the King of the Belgians. The Minister added that he would certainly not have received this instruction if his Government had not first made soundings to see if England were prepared to negotiate." In a telegram of Oct. 3 (463/225827), Papen reported another conversation with Visser on the same subject. Visser said he had had comprehensive talks with the British Ambassador concerning the Dutch peace démarche. Knatchbull-Hugessen had told him "that, since British public opinion would regard any peace offers publicly proposed by us [the Germans] as a capitulation and would reject them, only a confidential diplomatic démarche by way of a third power could lead to success. For tactical reasons the first offer should be put in general terms without details, so that concessions which Germany was prepared to make could be used psychologically for the influencing of public opinion." The British Ambassador said that he was in touch with London on these questions.

⁶ Document No. 210.

⁷ Viktor Bruns, director of the Institute of Public Law of Foreign Countries and International Law in the University of Berlin. No report of this conversation has been found.

⁸ In a letter of Oct. 6 to Weizsäcker, Joh. H. Andresen, former leader of the Conservative party in Norway, asked whether Germany would be interested in a peace effort by Norway and Sweden, either from "the highest quarters" or more privately (2165/470553-55). Weizsäcker replied on Oct. 12 that the possibility of making use of the good offices of third parties was being given "due consideration" by Berlin (2165/470556-57).

Further details concerning efforts by Andresen and other influential Norwegians to make an effective peace move at this time are given in reports which Ulrich Noack, a German historian attached to the Legation in Oslo, sent to the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry (2973/579502-05, 579508-11). Noack has published extracts from these reports and other material as well in his book, *Norwegen zwischen Friedensvermittlung und Fremdherrschaft* (Krefeld, 1952).

⁹ No report on this conversation has been found.

7. It is said that the U. S. citizen, Davis, in connection with the Four Year Plan, is striving for the United States to act as mediator.¹⁰

¹⁰ William Rhodes Davis, a businessman with long experience of dealing with German government agencies regarding the sale of Mexican oil, had a meeting with President Roosevelt on Sept. 15. He informed the President that he had received word from an associate with access to Göring that the latter hoped Roosevelt would use his influence to see if a mediated peace might be achieved. Davis had been asked to come to Rome for talks with high German officials and he proposed to do so. Roosevelt replied that he would be interested to hear what information Davis might bring back, but that he could take no position unless a proposal for mediation came through official channels.

According to Davis's own account, he saw Göring in Germany on Oct. 1, 2, and 3. He then returned to the United States and wrote two lengthy reports, dated Oct. 11 and 12, to President Roosevelt. His request to be received at the White House was denied but he was received on Oct. 12 by Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, and Pierrepont Moffat, a high official of the Department of State. In his report to the President, Davis said he had been informed that his talks with Göring would be kept secret from the Foreign Ministry, but that Hitler and Rosenberg knew of them (Department of State, File No. 800.20211 Davis, William Rhodes). No records of the Göring-Davis conversations have been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry.

No. 243

352/202788-01

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

A 1420

BRUSSELS, October 11, 1939.
Pol. II 4039.

Subject: The political situation and mood in Belgium.

With reference to our telegrams Nos. 253 of October 5 and 270 of October 8.¹

The shifting of the main weight of the Belgian home defense to the northern and eastern frontiers of the country, on which a number of reports have already been made, inevitably brings up the question whether a change in the political attitude of the Belgian Government has set in. After a careful examination of the situation, I believe that I can without reservation answer this question in the negative.

From the current reports of the Embassy, it is well known that the Belgian Government, from its own conviction of the necessity and expediency of maintaining peace for the country and strengthened by the wish of the King, has adhered to the straight line of the neutrality policy since the outbreak of the war. Although from the German point of view the attitude of public opinion and the sentiment of the people have been quite unsatisfactory, and although there have occasionally been deviations by individuals—such as the telegram of Max, the Mayor of Brussels, to the Mayor of Paris or the volunteering of the 76-year-old Socialist Deputy, Hubin, for service in the French Army—there has never been any reason seriously to doubt the sin-

¹ Neither printed (141/127296 and 141/127300-01).

cerity of the Government policy and the people's love of peace. Nor has there so far been any change in this respect. The statement by Pierlot² to the Belgian journalists, which I am enclosing herewith, confirms this. Although the part that deals with foreign policy is only a paraphrasing of well-known arguments, it is, as all previous statements, completely directed toward the continuation of the neutrality policy. All other official and semi-official statements are along the same line. But all reports from other sources as well corroborate the view that it is the desire of the Government to keep out of the conflict and maintain neutrality even in the face of great economic sacrifices.

The shifting of the Belgian troops cannot, therefore, be regarded as an indication of a change in the political attitude of Belgium. It does, of course, signify a change in the appraisal of the general political situation by the Belgian Government. In the opinion of Government circles here the conclusion of the Polish campaign represents a break in the course of the war that is important also for the attitude of the belligerents toward the neutral region of the Low Countries. At the outbreak of the war it was thought here that the French and British Armies might still march through Belgium and possibly Holland, since France and England would have to try to bring effective help to their Polish ally, and in order to do so would, in view of the impregnability of the Siegfried position, have to consider the round-about way via Belgium and Holland. This danger was, however, never taken very seriously here, since it did not seem credible that France, in view of her moral standing and political wisdom, would break her solemn promise. Since Poland has been defeated and there is no longer any Polish Army, it is believed that also France and England no longer have any reason for an offensive operation, especially since they believe they can win the war with the blockade. On the other hand, however, Germany's interest in the possession of Belgium and Holland is said to have increased enormously, since such possession would furnish a base for fighting England and make it possible to outflank the Maginot Line. This view is also reinforced by the conviction, spread in Belgium under the influence of British propaganda, that Germany will not be able to withstand the blockade very long and will have to try to break it by a powerful offensive thrust against the Western Powers. Finally, the prevalent distrust of Germany in Belgian public opinion is also an important factor. The memories of the last war have not yet been forgotten here. Under the influence of all these factors the view has developed here during

²Hubert Pierlot, Premier of Belgium.

In Pierlot's statement to the press on Oct. 7, he expressed the belief that Belgium could remain neutral, but was taking every precaution by foreseeing the worst. See the *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 1939, p. 38.

the last fortnight that Belgium is much more seriously threatened on the north and east than on the south.

In the public opinion of the country this changed appraisal of the situation has so far found only a weak and infrequent expression. All official statements, too, scrupulously avoid showing any partiality or even expressing the idea that a threat to Belgium is seen as coming only from the German side. Actually, the fear of Germany is very widespread, however, and extensive circles believe that the events of 1914 might be repeated.

The two ways in which Belgian neutrality might be violated—by England and France or by Germany—would find the Belgian people in very different moods and states of psychological preparedness for war. An attack by the Anglo-French side, which no one here expects any more, would be regarded by the people as a very deplorable and tragic event. An attempt would probably be made to resist such an incursion with military force, but presumably it would be very feeble and inadequate, while an invasion by Germany would encounter the highest degree of psychological preparedness for defense on the part of the whole Belgian people—both Walloons and Flemings. The few friends whom we have here in this country, especially among the Flemish nationalists, would in such a case break with us in indignant disillusionment and join ranks with all the others. Hence, as uncertain and hesitant as a Belgian military front against France and England would be with respect to sentiment and morale, so united would it be vis-à-vis Germany. The violation of a most solemn assurance given at the beginning of the war that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected would cause a passionate hatred to break out and make the entire nation march unitedly against the old enemy of the World War.

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

No. 244

583/242227-29

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 12, 1939—12:50 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 12—10:50 a. m.

No. 675 of October 11

Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me—by instruction of the Duce, as he repeatedly emphasized—of an incident which, though not the only one of its kind, was the worst, and was characterized as such by the Duce when he saw the police report submitted to him; it cast a glaring light on the overheated

atmosphere in the Alto Adige. According to this report unknown Germans, who had escaped in the darkness, attacked two unarmed Italian soldiers yesterday evening and beat one of them half to death, while the second, less seriously wounded, had been able to get away. If one also considered the many cases in which volksdeutsch soldiers on active service had secretly left their troop units—an offense punishable by death in the present state of mobilization, but which the Government had been very lenient about—the whole picture of the situation appeared so threatening that the Duce was requesting the Führer to give orders as quickly as possible that all of the controversial questions be swept aside and the negotiations here on the emigration be brought to a close, in order to end a state of affairs in which the Volksdeutsche considered themselves as no longer subject to the Italian laws and not yet under those of Germany, and thus committed excesses which became more dangerous by the day—especially since the rumor was being spread among the population that the political situation might change any day to such an extent that the whole repatriation action would be nullified. To my objection that quite to the contrary we had up to now observed a really exemplary discipline among the Volksdeutsche,¹ Count Ciano replied by referring to the reports to the contrary lying before him. One only had to imagine what the effect would be abroad, and also on the mood in Italy, if it should even come to an open shooting fray some day. Furthermore, the removal of 100,000 Volksdeutsche from Latvia, which had been accomplished within a few days, had proved, after all, how quickly such a movement could be carried through. Count Ciano did not reply to my very pointed reference to the fact that he could hardly consider the two actions parallel; he even reverted to this argument toward the end of the conversation. Surely, he said, we would not push into the foreground questions of the transfer rate, regarding which an agreement had already been reached for the first billion, or the carrying away of household effects “down to the doorknobs,” thereby making an agreement impossible. It was also impossible to postpone the date of registration beyond June 1940² without delaying implementation ad infinitum. He therefore wished to request most urgently that the German Foreign Minister, acting out of political considerations, issue the necessary instructions for a quick settlement of the question, which

¹ In a telegram of Oct. 6 to the Landesgruppenleiter in Italy (119/119183), State Secretary Bohle, Head of the Auslandsorganisation, had ordered a ban on all public activities of Party groups and German nationals in South Tirol. Ortsgruppen were to limit themselves to business meetings without speeches.

² In telegram No. 652 of Oct. 8 (591/244759-60) Clodius had referred to June 30, 1940, as a suitable date for the completion of registration. The Foreign Ministry reply, telegram No. 721 of Oct. 9 (591/244763) stated that, in its view, registration could not be completed before Dec. 31, 1940.

was in the mutual interest—a request which the Duce was also directing to the Führer. Ciano indicated that he would also instruct Bocchini³ to use his influence in the same sense vis-à-vis the Reichsführer-SS, who is staying with him as his guest.⁴

In agreement with Clodius I am of the opinion that, quite apart from our own interest in quickly winding up the negotiations, we should point out to the Italians in answering the Duce's request that in carrying through this action, which involves very great sacrifices on our part, we believe we can expect from them very generous treatment of the separate questions.

MACKENSEN

³ Arturo Bocchini was chief of the Italian police. Following complaints by Bocchini to Himmler that German authorities were obstructing the removal of the German minority from the South Tirol, the two met at Tremezzo on Lake Como, Oct. 11-13, 1939, to review the basic agreement of June 23, 1939. It was agreed a) that the purpose of the original agreement had been "a lasting and fundamental ethnic solution," b) that under simplified procedures the closing date for opting would be Dec. 31, 1939, c) that the Italians would desist from political arrests in the area, d) that no propaganda for or against resettlement was to be allowed, and e) that both sides would in future "really cooperate in a cordial, open, and comradely manner." This summary is based on a long memorandum of Dec. 12, 1939, by Bene, German Consul General at Milan; not printed (F7/0507-0481; F1/0247-0254).

⁴ On Oct. 11, the Italian Embassy in Berlin presented a note to the Foreign Ministry on the same subject (4537/E144318). It stated in part: "Minister Clodius is making difficulties in Rome which are greatly delaying execution of the agreement, while it is *absolutely* necessary to hasten a decision. A very serious psychological condition has developed in the Alto Adige: the Tirol Germans believe that they are beyond the reach of Italian sovereignty; naturally this cannot be tolerated. . . . The friendly attention of the German Government is therefore drawn to a situation in the Alto Adige which will admit of no further delays, and which can give rise to serious incidents."

No. 245

8333/E569839-40

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 12, 1939—12:05 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 12—1:50 p. m.

No. 677 of October 12

Pol. 2244 g.

In yesterday's conversation Count Ciano voiced his opinion on the general situation to the effect that he scarcely believed in a peaceful solution any more, while the Duce still believed in certain possibilities, without, to be sure, having any basis for this other than his own feeling.

Ciano had carried away from Berlin the strongest possible impression as the result of the assurance and strong determination with which the Führer had spoken to him about the course of events. Circles here had already been very deeply impressed in this respect at Salz-

burg.¹ The impressions of those days, however, had been considerably surpassed. As I knew, he was of a rather critical nature, but he could not rid himself of this impression and emphasized it in all his conversations, even with the French and British Ambassadors, both of whom, by the way, held very moderate views. He had also spoken to them emphatically of the military strength of the Reich as the Führer had described it to him at length and in detail in the course of the conversation. He could not remember ever having heard so clear and precise an exposition during the many years in which he had listened to situation reports by high military persons. On the basis of this he had told the Ambassadors that the Führer, in his opinion, by no means rejected a peaceful settlement; if this could not be achieved, however, he would strike with tremendous violence, and it appeared rather doubtful to Ciano whether any opponent would be able to cope with it.

He had also told the Ambassadors that he believed that the Führer's Reichstag speech was actually his last word. If this word failed to evoke sufficient response, for which the Führer would wait for a limited period of time, he would seek a solution by other means; and he would find it with the same certainty with which he had found it in the Polish question, in which his predictions had been borne out accurately and almost to the day.

Ciano told me in addition that he assumed there would be another conference before the final decision, perhaps patterned after the last Berlin meeting or perhaps in the form of a meeting between the Führer and the Duce.

He did not expect Daladier's speech of the day before yesterday² to have any influence on the development of the situation.

MACKENSEN

¹ This is a reference to Ciano's talks with Hitler on Aug. 12-13, 1939. See vol. VII, documents Nos. 43 and 47.

² The text of Daladier's broadcast to the nation on Oct. 10 in reply to Hitler's speech of Oct. 6 is given in *International Conciliation*, No. 354 (New York, November 1939), pp. 525-528.

No. 246

468/225953-54

Circular of the Acting Director of the Press Department

Telegram en clair

BERLIN, October 12, 1939.
e. o. P. 13526.

Chamberlain's speech¹ is an outrageous affront to Germany. With incredibly scurrilous insults to the German Reich and its policy,

¹ On Oct. 12, Prime Minister Chamberlain replied in the House of Commons to the German proposals contained in Hitler's speech of Oct. 6 (see Editors' Note, p. 227). For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see *Par. Deb.*, 5th ser. H of C, vol. 352, 563-568.

Chamberlain rejected in his speech the hand of peace held out to him by the Führer. It is obvious that Chamberlain did not wish to understand the Führer's generous action and the proposals inspired by his sense of responsibility. Whereas Germany desires peace and the Führer makes constructive proposals for the establishment of a peaceful and secure Europe, Chamberlain and his clique have chosen war. In his speech he did not plead the case of the people but that of a small clique which makes war its business. This afternoon Chamberlain thrust aside the hand of peace offered by Germany, not only before the House of Commons but before the entire world, and thus gave his reply to the appeal which the Führer directed to all nations in his speech of October 6 when he said: "May those peoples and their leaders who are of the same mind make now their reply, and let those who consider war to be the best solution reject my outstretched hand." Chamberlain and his henchmen have made their choice in favor of the latter. After this speech by the English Prime Minister the German people can no longer entertain any doubt that no matter what we do, no matter what we say, and no matter what offer we make, Chamberlain and Britain's warmongers, under the cloak of hypocritical phrases, are bent on exterminating the German nation.

Chamberlain's speech reveals the true meaning of the English war aim, and it is: war to annihilation against the German people and the German Reich. The English Prime Minister's speech is founded on lies and culminates in the lie. And while he accuses German policy of breaking its word he forgets that the world knows that England's world empire is built on nothing but force and the broken word.² England wanted the war. The English Prime Minister even asserts that Germany has rejected all attempts at restoring peace in the recent past. He asserts for instance, contrary to his better knowledge, that Germany declined Mussolini's mediation proposal; but it is an established fact that Mussolini's generous mediation effort was wrecked by England after it had already been accepted by France, and that as a result the French people were driven into the most senseless war of all time. After Chamberlain's speech the German people know what their enemies are after. The experience of Versailles has taught the German people what England's will to annihilate can bring to pass, and they therefore know the road they must take in order to frustrate this determination of their enemies.

DR. SCHMIDT

² The German text originally read "*Lüge*" but was changed to "*Wortbruch*."

No. 247

495/238342

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 800

BERLIN, October 12, 1939.

The Bulgarian Minister, supplementing his recent conversation with the Foreign Minister, informed me today of the following:

The suggestions recently made by Molotov to the Bulgarian Government concerning a Russo-Bulgarian agreement were not clear at first. Later it became evident that Molotov was thinking of a Russo-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in the event of an attack by a third power. This suggestion was rejected in Sofia.

To my question why Bulgaria had not accepted it, Draganov offered as his own conjecture the following: Up to now Bulgaria had never concluded any treaty of alliance of this kind, not even with Germany, with which she had close ties of long standing. Probably his Government did not, for this reason, wish to depart from this principle, nor, above all, conclude a mutual assistance pact with Russia first.

Draganov then went on to say that the Bulgarian Government had made the following counterproposal: Bulgaria was ready to conclude a treaty of nonaggression or friendship with Russia if Moscow would present concrete proposals of this kind. A reply to this has not as yet reached Sofia.

I thanked the Minister for his information and promised to transmit it to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 248

F2/0843-45

The Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Foreign Minister

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, October 12, 1939.

B. No. 1 Skl. I c 86 g.Kdos

RM 48 g Rs.

MY DEAR MINISTER: With reference to my recent oral statements, I am presenting in the following the wishes of the naval warfare people regarding Russian assistance. I shall proceed at this time on the assumption that the Russian neutrality—though interpreted generously in our favor—will remain in force in relation to the Western Powers.

If in this connection new developments favorable to us should occur, it would then become necessary to frame new plans for cooperation.

The naval warfare people seek the following objectives:

I. Improving the conditions for naval warfare by submarines and surface forces in foreign waters.

It would greatly facilitate operations by surface forces and submarines in foreign waters if Russia were to place at our disposal suitable ports, such as Murmansk and Vladivostok, as supply and repair bases.

The use of these ports is desired for the following purposes:

1. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuels, provisions) for cruisers and submarines with a view to extending their endurance at sea. The supplying of German naval units could be effected in the following manner:

a) Russian naval escort for the supply ships to areas where cruisers or submarines would receive them. (More strain on Russian neutrality.)

b) Sailing of unescorted supply ships under prearranged orders in such way that they would be nominally seized by cruisers or submarines and subsequently released after delivery of fuel and provisions. (Less strain on Russian neutrality.)

c) Meeting at prearranged locations of German tenders for replenishing their supplies.

2. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with fuels and provisions in ports directly. Ammunition and other supplies would be shipped from Germany. This would relieve the German naval units of the necessity of breaking through the mined and guarded zone at the outlets from home waters each time in and out.

3. Reconditioning of the machinery of cruisers and submarines in ports in northern Russia and the Far East, using Russian shipyards. For periods of several weeks. Transfer of additional specialists from Germany would be arranged.

4. Refitting of German steamships as auxiliary cruisers and their outfitting for commerce raiding.

5. Protection of the outlying sea areas of the ports in question against the activity of enemy naval forces and submarines.

6. Continuous transmission of information from the Russian intelligence organizations on the naval forces and merchant traffic of the enemy.

II. Other possibilities for facilitating the conduct of German naval operations:

1. The provision of an escort service for German supply transports along the Norwegian coast, which in certain cases might have to fly the Russian flag, could eventually contribute greatly toward easing the tasks of German naval warfare.

2. Cessation of all direct and indirect Russian deliveries to the enemy countries.

I regard it as very important to secure the maximum cooperation of the Russian Government so as to improve the Navy's opportunities for sea warfare most effectively. I request that clarification in principle of the points mentioned be secured through diplomatic channels as soon as possible. Particularly urgent, to my mind, is clarification of points I (2) and (3) (Outfitting and reconditioning of naval units in Russian ports). Once an agreement in principle has been reached, the technical details could be agreed upon by the two Navies through attaché channels.

Heil Hitler!

RAEDER
Grand Admiral

[EDITORS' NOTE. State Secretary von Weizsäcker at his trial at Nuremberg stated that on October 12, 1939, he submitted to the Foreign Minister a memorandum entitled "Military-Political Action after the Failure of the Present Peace Action." This memorandum advised against intensification of the war in the West and particularly against an offensive through Belgium. Weizsäcker submitted in evidence at Nuremberg a typewritten draft of the memorandum which he had kept and this appears in translation in *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949*, volume XII, pages 1203-1205, as Weizsäcker Document 370, Weizsäcker Defense Exhibit 122. The document has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Weizsäcker stated that Ribbentrop summarily rejected his suggestions on this occasion.]

No. 249

583/242236

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 681 of October 13

ROME, October 13, 1939—12:00 noon.

Received October 13—1:40 p. m.

With reference to last night's telephone instructions to me from the Foreign Minister.¹

As instructed, I informed Count Ciano this morning, emphasizing that the Foreign Minister was particularly anxious to have the Italians also clearly and unequivocally brand as an untruth the lie repeated in

¹ No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

Chamberlain's speech to the effect that the Führer had rejected Mussolini's offer of mediation.² Count Ciano showed full understanding for my statements and promised me that he would immediately contact the Duce and Alfieri to convey our wishes. I told him that at the same moment Press Counselor Mollier was at the Ministry of Culture discussing details of the treatment of Chamberlain's speech in the press, in response to a suggestion made by Alfieri yesterday. Ciano remarked with regard to the general situation that developments had proved his predictions to be correct. From what the Führer and the Foreign Minister had told him in Berlin, he was expecting massive attacks by air and sea to be unleashed against England and France in the immediate future, including unrestricted submarine warfare.

MACKENSEN

² See document No. 246.

No. 250

361/204402

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 545 of October 12

BERLIN, October 13, 1939—6:15 p. m.

Received October 13—11:40 p. m.

The Embassy in Ankara has telegraphed¹ that the conclusion of a Turkish-Russian assistance pact defining joint interests in the Black Sea, in the Balkans, and in the Straits may be anticipated any day now. The Dardanelles would be closed to foreign warships and the Turkish pact with the Western Powers probably would include the reservation that Turkey would remain neutral in the event of a conflict between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union unless she were attacked herself by a third power.²

WOERMANN

¹ Ankara telegram No. 378 of Oct. 11 (96/108054-55).

² In telegram No. 534 of Oct. 14, Schulenburg reported:

"Molotov told me today that he knew nothing of the details about the Turkish-Russian negotiations communicated in your telegram No. 545 (Pol. II 4016) of October 12. The negotiations were still in the same phase. The Soviet Government had made it unequivocally plain to Saracoglu that Germany's interests absolutely had to be safeguarded, and that the well-known clause in favor of Germany would have to be inserted in any assistance pact that might be concluded. Turkey did not seem to like the idea, but had not yet made a decision."

No. 251

141/127807

The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, October 13, 1939—8:00 p. m.

No. 282 of October 13

Received October 14—12:30 a. m.

For the Air Ministry, Attaché Group.

From today's conversation¹ with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff the following is worthy of note:

On his own initiative the Chief of the General Staff turned the conversation to the implementation of Belgian neutrality.

I pointed out that in Holland rumors about the shifting of Belgian troops from the French to the Dutch and German borders were causing uneasiness. The Chief of the General Staff replied that this was actually not altogether true, since it was only a question of an exchange of troops in the course of a slow mobilization process.

He expressly emphasized that Belgium was firmly resolved to maintain neutrality and would not only fire on any intruder, no matter from where he came, but would fight him energetically and regard him as an enemy.

He took the opportunity, for his part, to express his concern over reports he had received about the concentration of German armored troops and motorized forces in the region of Cologne, which he called the Reichenau Army. The concentration of a normal number of troops for the defense of the West Wall had been regarded by Belgium as an obvious defense measure. Armored and motorized troops were, however, evidently intended for a war of movement.

I pointed out that being a member of the Luftwaffe I knew nothing about these occurrences, but would, if he so desired, forward the report. He requested me to do so and in conclusion emphasized once more that Belgium would not give up her determination to remain neutral.

The Military Attaché here will be informed upon his return.

WENNINGER
BÜLOW

¹ Between Lt. Gen. Wenninger, the German Air Attaché in Belgium, accredited also to the Netherlands, and the Belgian Lt. Gen. H. M. van den Bergen.

No. 252

116/66658-60

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

No. 554

BERLIN, October 13, 1939.

zu Kult B spez. 68-01 11.10.39.

With reference to your telegram No. 510.¹

Please make the following reply to M. Molotov and M. Potemkin:

1. The assertion that the emigration of the Germans from the Baltic countries initiated by us seriously compromises the action of the Soviet Government is incomprehensible to us. Such a connection between the two actions is asserted only by English propaganda, which is of course interested in disturbing the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union and for this purpose constantly treats events in the Baltic countries in a most tendentious manner.

2. There cannot be the slightest question of any panicky emigration or flight. On the contrary, the resettlement is being carried out by us in a perfectly calm and orderly manner and will presumably extend over a period of months. We are carrying on negotiations in the matter with the Latvian and Estonian Governments and are regulating by agreement questions of citizenship and property especially although these matters are being dealt with in a generous, rather than a petty, manner.²

3. We are carrying out the action in accordance with the agreements made in Moscow. It does not grow out of the fear that the Germans might in any way be endangered by the Soviets; rather, it is a necessity for us to populate with Germans the many deserted farms, stores, and workshops in the occupied area. In the interest of an early restoration of economic life there we are anxious to have at least a part of the Germans emigrate from the Baltic countries even this winter.

4. To the Baltic Governments we described the evacuation as being a result of the program developed by the Führer in his last speech in the Reichstag and expressly emphasized that it has no connection with the new agreements between these Governments and the Soviet Government.

¹ Document No. 239.

² On Oct. 18, a German-Estonian Protocol on evacuation of the German element was signed (406/214522), but on Oct. 26, Frohwein wired that a bill had been introduced in the Estonian Parliament restricting the removal of economic assets from the country (406/214525-26). This action brought considerable argument regarding application of the Protocol. On Dec. 30, 1939, the Estonian Government agreed to extend for 3 months (i. e., until Mar. 1, 1940) the period for evacuation by approximately 1,000 Germans who had volunteered for resettlement (Frohwein telegram No. 389, dispatched Dec. 31: 406/214568-69). The evacuation was not completed within the stipulated time limit, and in telegram No. 242 of July 13, 1940, Frohwein reported that his Legation still had 400 requests for transfer (406/214647).

A treaty providing for the resettlement of Latvians claiming German nationality was signed by Germany and Latvia on Oct. 30, 1939 (1272/342047-69). Art. IV of this treaty provided that the evacuation be completed by Dec. 15, 1939. Kotze reported in telegram No. 416 of Dec. 16 that this had been accomplished (823/193832).

Thereupon appropriate semi-official explanations of the true meaning of the resettlement were also published in the press by the Latvian and Estonian Governments on October 8 and 9.

5. Moreover, the Soviet Government should really welcome the entire action from its point of view as well. We are thereby removing an element which might possibly in the future have disturbed our relations with the Baltic countries and consequently also with the Soviet Union. It is a well-known fact that the attitude of the Latvian and Estonian population is in some instances quite hostile toward the Germans living there. This could have led to all sorts of difficulties in the future. The evacuation is thus a clear indication that we are taking seriously Germany's political disinterestedness in the Baltic countries as agreed upon in Moscow.³

I further request you to point out to M. Molotov on this occasion that we expect the Soviet Government to agree to a similar resettlement of the Germans from the former Polish areas in the Soviet sphere of interest. The following principles should therefore be followed in the matter :

1. The question of membership in the German Volksgruppe should be given a broad interpretation.
2. The action should be carried out at an early date in the interest of resettling the deserted farms in our sphere of interest.
3. Formalities should be confined to an absolute minimum.
4. Livestock, agricultural effects, and personal belongings should be taken along at once.
5. A reichsdeutsch concern should be set up to act as custodian for all assets not taken along; the concern would assume all the indebtedness of departing individuals to public and private parties, and would settle their obligations.

VON RIBBENTROP

³ In a telegram of Oct. 14 (406/214514), reporting on the execution of this instruction, Schulenburg stated that Molotov showed himself "somewhat relieved." Molotov declared that the Soviet Government had that day published a Tass dispatch to prevent false interpretation of the German measures, and emphasized that his Government saw no need for hasty resettlement.

No. 253

73/52087

The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

No. 424

BERLIN, October 13, 1939.

With reference to your telegram No. 421.¹

1. You are requested to observe extreme reserve there on the subject of Hungarian-Russian relations and possible military measures on the part of Hungary against Russia and to make no statements in the matter whatsoever.

¹ Document No. 238.

2. In the question of German arms deliveries to Hungary all necessary steps have already been taken. You will receive a separate communication regarding the details.²

3. You will also receive separate instructions concerning the handling of the Polish refugees.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² Telegram No. 423 of Oct. 13 informed the Legation that Ribbentrop had approved the resumption to a limited extent of arms deliveries to Hungary (5571/E399614).

³ Not printed (73/52088 and 52092).

No. 254

321/193169-71

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, October 14, 1939—9:08 p. m.

No. 185 of October 14

Received October 15—2:45 a. m.

Foreign Minister Urbšys, on whom I called today following his return from Moscow, gave me rather detailed information of a strictly confidential nature on his Moscow negotiations.

First he emphasized that the rumors circulating abroad to the effect that Lithuania intended to request Memel and the Suwałki corner from Germany were entirely false. Lithuania had no such thought; on the contrary, she was very much interested in continuing to foster, insofar as the changed circumstances permitted, friendly relations with Germany in general, but especially in the economic and the cultural field. To be sure, he could only tell me this confidentially and asked that I transmit it to Berlin in the same manner, since he had noted in Moscow a certain distrust with reference to alleged German intentions in Lithuania. Especially in all Lithuanian objections against Russian wishes for garrisons, the Russians suspected that it was a case of German prompting. I thereupon told him I was convinced that it was also the desire of the Reich Government to continue to foster relations with Lithuania, but it was, of course, out of the question that Germany should in any way oppose or interfere with Soviet Russia's political interests. Concerning the Moscow negotiations, Urbšys said that in general they took place in an amicable atmosphere. He had been able to defend the Lithuanian viewpoint without restriction and to present all arguments. Only toward the end had the Russians become impatient. Stalin and Molotov had also repeatedly remarked on German-Russian relations and had described them as being very good and friendly. They had also paid high tribute to the Reich Foreign Minister himself. Specifically Urbšys stated the following:

1. Stalin and Molotov had repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union did not wish any sovietization of Lithuania. He had been especially

pleased that Stalin had repeated this at the farewell banquet in the presence of many members of the Soviet Government. Urbšys had interpreted this as a directive to the various People's Commissariats.

2. In the Vilna question the Soviet Government had drawn the frontier "with a firm hand," as Urbšys expressed it. No extensive changes had been possible, and objections had been dismissed with the statement that the Soviet Union did not need to give Lithuania any part of the Vilma area. The Lithuanian center Šviėciāny remained on the Soviet side for strategic reasons, Urbšys thought, since the Soviet Union had evidently been interested in fixing the frontier as close to the Vilna-Daugavpils¹ railway line as possible. The Soviet Government had especially urged that the territory to be ceded be taken over quickly. Lithuanian troops will march in on October 16.

3. By far the most difficult question had concerned the Russian requests for garrisons. The Soviet troops had been fixed at 20,000 men. Vilna would have a Russian garrison until it had really become the Lithuanian capital. Then the city would be evacuated by the Soviet troops. With this exception, Soviet troops are not to be stationed in the larger cities and industrial centers. The Lithuanian delegation had attempted to have further details regarding the garrisons settled at once in Moscow, because the Estonian experience had shown that it was more difficult to negotiate with the military commission. This had, however, been rejected for technical reasons. The Soviet Union had reserved the right to designate an unlimited number of strategic points for Russian garrisons. The details of the billeting were Lithuania's concern. Geographically these points have not yet been fixed; in the course of the negotiations, however, reference had been made to the area between Palanga and Kretinga and the road between Tilsit and Riga.

4. As long as he was in Moscow, no negotiations had been carried on concerning the economic question, but Norkaitis² had remained in Moscow for this purpose. In a conversation with Molotov, Urbšys had stressed that Lithuania was especially interested in continuing her full volume of trade with Germany because of the free-port zone in Memel, the settlement resulting from the evacuation of the Memel area, and the good prices paid by Germany. He had further pointed out that Lithuania had so far received the worst prices for her products in the Soviet Union; Molotov had promised to look into this matter. Details on the economic negotiations will not be known until Norkaitis returns from Moscow.

In connection with the foregoing Urbšys did not hide his concern about future developments but he also emphasized that Lithuania would still work in the future to the utmost for her independence; and in conclusion he requested once more that all this information be kept strictly confidential.

ZECHLIN

¹ The German reads "Dünaburg"; the town is also known as "Dvinsk."

² J. Norkaitis, a senior official of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.

No. 255

463/225978

The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 279 of October 14

OSLO, October 14, 1939—9:10 p. m.

Received October 14—11:40 p. m.

From a source who has good connections with the King's entourage, I have confidentially and privately learned the following: The King is said to be not unwilling to assume, with the other Scandinavian Kings, the role of mediator at the conferences in Stockholm next Wednesday.¹ The Kings, for obvious reasons, do not wish to make a peace proposal but would merely like to induce both parties to declare themselves willing to enter into peace negotiations. The Kings hold that they cannot of themselves take any initiative unless at least one of the parties wants them to. They are guided in this by the recollection that the Heads of State of the Oslo Powers found no response when they made their peace proposals this fall.² It is believed that it would be desirable to come out with the proposal before Russian pressure on Sweden, which is feared here, begins. Whether the suggestion is made via Sweden, Norway, or Denmark is regarded as immaterial.³

NEUHAUS

¹ At the invitation of King Gustav V of Sweden, the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden met in Stockholm on Oct. 18-19 to discuss problems arising out of the European war. The communiqué issued at the close of the meeting referred to their rights and interests as neutrals as well as to their continuing readiness to mediate.

² This evidently refers to the radio address of King Leopold, speaking on behalf of the Heads of State of the Oslo Powers, on the evening of Aug. 23. See vol. VII, document No. 208.

³ See document No. 259, footnote 3.

No. 256

51/33909

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 807

BERLIN, October 14, 1939.

For the Foreign Minister.

According to my information the decision on the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare against England is imminent. This decision has at least as much *political* significance as it has technical military significance.

A short time ago I submitted in writing my personal opinion¹ to the effect that unrestricted submarine warfare would at this time re-

¹ See Editors' note, p. 279.

sult in making additional enemies for us, without our as yet possessing the submarines necessary to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy has very persuasive reasons for its stand in urging the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare.

It therefore appears necessary to me that the OKW be asked for certain specialized information before a decision is made. In my opinion the following should be asked.

a. When does the Navy wish to open unrestricted submarine warfare?

b. What declared areas does it propose? (Notification of neutrals is necessary.)

c. What are the present monthly figures on sinkings and those to be expected in the future?

d. Does the Navy intend to make exceptions with reference to sinking as regards passenger vessels and certain neutrals (e. g., Russian trade to England, Danish food ships, etc.); and what steps will the Navy take to ensure that such ships will be spared?

I request that I be authorized to direct an inquiry to this effect to the OKW at once.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 270.

No. 257

F2/0347;
F2/0346;
F2/0340

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 568

BERLIN, October 14, 1939.
[Sent October 15—12:15 a. m.].¹

For the Ambassador personally.

On the occasion of the conversations in Moscow the Soviet Government, as the Embassy knows, showed itself well disposed toward our wish for a certain measure of assistance to our Navy by the Soviet Union for the duration of the war.² This idea will soon have its first

¹ From the copy in the Moscow Embassy (4191/E072496-97).

² No documents have been found on naval discussions during Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow Sept. 27-29, 1939, but "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, p. 43, includes the following from a Hitler-Raeder conference of Sept. 23: "7. The Chief, Naval Staff, raises the question of Russian and Italian cooperation on the following points: (a) cession of submarines to the German Navy, (b) equipment of auxiliary cruisers (Murmansk), (c) permission for German warships to use Russian ports.

"The Führer will ask the Foreign Minister to clarify these questions on his next visit to Moscow. The Italians will certainly be very cautious. Japan will presumably keep her promises regarding permission to use Japanese ports and equipment of German ships."

practical application in one aspect as a result of the discussions there regarding the refitting of *Iller* as an auxiliary cruiser in a Russian port.³ These discussions, according to the Naval High Command, have also already dealt informally with further wishes, such as the reconditioning of German vessels in Soviet ports.

The Naval High Command sets great value upon a far-reaching cooperation of the Soviet Government in this question, with a view to effectively improving the Navy's opportunities for sea warfare. The points primarily concerned are the following:

1. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with fuel and provisions in Russian ports, with the ammunition and other supplies being shipped from Germany.

2. Reconditioning of cruisers and submarines, especially their machinery, using Russian shipyards.

3. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuel, provisions) for cruisers and submarines, so as to extend their endurance at sea.

Please discuss this matter with Molotov immediately. In doing so, the conversation should be framed in such a way that you are not bringing up anything new or unexpected; instead, you should refer to the Foreign Minister's conversations in Moscow and the negotiations about the conversion of *Iller* into an auxiliary cruiser as well as the wishes set forth on that occasion, which are not known here in full detail.

In discussing the question of which ports are concerned, please mention Murmansk and some Far Eastern port to be agreed upon later. It is important that such ports are selected as afford adequate railroad connections for the shipping of ammunition, supplies, and repair material.

As regards point (2) it is also necessary that the ports have shipyard facilities and, if possible, docks.

Please make a telegraphic report on your conversation. It would then be left to decide with Molotov which details will subsequently be handled by yourself, and which by the Naval Attaché.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ In telegram No. 431 of Sept. 23, Schulenburg reported as follows: "Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Government agrees to our proposal to convert motor ship *Iller* into an auxiliary cruiser and will assist us in this matter" (4191/E072502). The conversion was presumably carried out at Murmansk.

⁴ Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Oct. 17 as follows: "Before starting to carry out this instruction I think I must wait for the return of Naval Attaché von Baumbach, who is now in Berlin to discuss these questions. I suggest that you get in touch with Baumbach, who wishes to leave on Wednesday [Oct. 18], at the Eden Hotel" (51/33910). Meanwhile, Raeder had reported to Hitler on Oct. 16 "that the Russians have placed at our disposal a well-situated base west of Murmansk. A repair ship is to be stationed there." ("Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, p. 52). No immediate sequel to Schulenburg's telegram has been found.

No. 258

127/69679

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 572 of October 15

BERLIN, October 15, 1939—11:20 p. m.

Received October 16—4:20 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

We should welcome it if the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty could take place in the near future. A separate communication will be sent to you regarding the technical details still to be arranged in this connection. As originally agreed upon in Moscow, we expect M. Molotov to visit Berlin for the ratification. Therefore, please repeat to M. Molotov now my earlier oral invitation. As the time for the visit I should suggest the end of October, approximately between October 25 and 31. Public announcement of the date of the visit would still have to be agreed upon. Up to that time we expect strict secrecy.

RIBBENTROP

No. 259

B18/B003116

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

[No. 346 of October 15] ¹

BERLIN, October 15, 1939.

[Pol. II 4064 Ang. I].

With reference to your telegram No. 298.²

Please tell the Finnish Foreign Minister in reply to his question that Chamberlain rejected the Führer's magnanimous peace offer in the most insolent manner and that this closes the subject for us. You will please make no further explanations about the matter.³

RIBBENTROP

¹The information in brackets comes from another copy of this telegram (463/226003).

²Not printed (463/225976-77). The Finnish Foreign Minister had asked the German Minister in Helsinki to let him know, before his departure for Stockholm to attend the meeting of the Northern Heads of State, whether Germany could still propose any possible solutions that might lead to a termination of the war.

³The text of this telegram was transmitted on Oct. 18 to the Missions in all the leading neutral states of Europe and to the Embassy in the United States with the instruction: "In case a similar question is raised there, please let this be your guide in conversation" (463/226004).

No. 260

1571/380194-95

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 16, 1939—1:10 a. m.

SECRET

Received October 16—6:05 a. m.

No. 692 of October 15

With reference to our telegrams Nos. 663¹ and 676.²

I. Another thorough discussion with Minister of Commerce Guarneri on the question of obtaining raw materials via Italy revealed that Italy is insisting unconditionally that with the British control growing constantly more strict the security of Italy's own vital supplies of raw materials must not be jeopardized by an attempt to route shipments of raw materials to Germany via Italy. Another member of the Government, too, who at first had a very affirmative attitude and had promised me to discuss the matter with the Duce, has now said that it is not possible to support Germany at the moment because of the danger to Italy's own supplies.

II. I thereupon told Ambassador Giannini that I would now have to give my Government a final report to the effect that the certain expectation of the German Government that Italy's nonparticipation in the war would facilitate the supplying of raw materials to Germany was incorrect, and in any case Italy was not willing at the present time to aid Germany in this particularly important field. Considering the serious impression which this report would make on the leading political and military authorities, I desired before sending my report that the Italian Foreign Minister once more expressly confirm the fact that the Italian stand was final. In reply Ciano sent word to me that although he would like to continue the conversation with me regarding the Italian attitude toward the British blockade, he had to state in advance that the negative Italian stand in the question of raw-material supplies could not be changed, at least for the moment.

III. The authoritative Italian offices are aware of the significance for us of their refusal; in particular, Guarneri and Giannini urgently requested understanding for the Italian attitude, which was dictated by the direst necessity. It was the unavoidable duty of the Italian

¹ Document No. 231.

² Not printed (583/242230-31). Clodius reported in this telegram of Oct. 11 that Ambassador Giannini, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Foreign Ministry, had told him that Italy would not be able to transship to Germany the previously agreed quantities of raw materials from overseas sources. The reason given was the intensified British blockade, which now required a declaration on imports of oil, rubber, and nonferrous metals that these would not be transshipped to Germany.

Government not to endanger Italy's supply of the most important raw materials, and this was also in the German interest; as soon as the present emergency was overcome, the Italian Government would do everything to aid us.

IV. With the strong concentration of Italian imports of raw materials in relatively few firms and the dependence of these firms on the Government, the delegation sees no prospect in these circumstances of obtaining any significant quantities of raw materials through Italy covertly. In particular, the possibility of supplies from Spain is thereby also made impracticable. Attempts to conclude at least individual small transactions will be continued.

I shall also continue to urge that the Italians at least refuse, as even the Oslo States have done, to give British authorities pledges against re-exporting goods.³

CLODIUS

MAC KENSEN

*In a memorandum of Oct. 13 (1848/421080-82) recounting the difficulties which Clodius was having in Rome, Wiehl recommended that influence be brought to bear through Ambassador Attolico to get the Italians to put up more resistance to British blockade measures. Weizsäcker saw the Italian Ambassador on Oct. 17 and recorded in a memorandum of the conversation (463/225995) that he told him: "... at present Italy seemed to me not to be marching at the head of the resistance by the neutral countries against such [British] pressure, but rather to be bringing up the rear."

No. 261

84/28465

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 16, 1939—2:56 p. m.

No. 547 of October 16

Received October 16—3:35 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 572 of October 15.¹

Ambassador Shkvartsev, who is returning to Berlin tomorrow, informed me today on instructions from Molotov that the Soviet Government desired early ratification of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty. It proposed that it be ratified simultaneously on both sides on October 19, and be published on October 20.² Please inform me

¹Document No. 258.

²The Treaty was ratified by the Führer and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on Oct. 19. On Dec. 30 the following announcement by Weizsäcker appeared in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*: "The German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed on September 28, 1939, and the Additional Protocol signed on October 4, 1939, with the attached maps, have been ratified. The exchange of ratifications took place in Berlin on December 15, 1939. The Treaty entered into force as provided in its Article v on September 28, 1939, the Additional Protocol as provided in its section III on October 4, 1939."

as soon as possible by telephone whether you agree to the Soviet proposal.

I informed Shkvartsev of the contents of telegraphic instruction No. 572, stressing expressly the need for secrecy, and asked him to inform Molotov so that he might at once give me the reply on my forthcoming visit.

SCHULENBURG

No. 262

141/127308-09

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium

Telegram

No. 374

BERLIN, October 16, 1939.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 282.¹

I request that you bring up the following with the Belgian Foreign Minister,² not as a special démarche, but on the occasion of your next call, which you should make as soon as possible:

1. In his conversation with Air Attaché Wenninger, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff referred to reports he had received to the effect that German armored troops and motorized units, which he called the Reichenau Army, were concentrated in the region of Cologne. He asked the Air Attaché to forward this information to Berlin. With reference hereto you have been instructed to state that actually there has been no concentration of German armored troops and motorized units in the region of Cologne, and that, consequently, the reports which the Chief of the Belgian General Staff has received are completely false.

2. On the other hand, we have definite and reliable reports that France, for her part, has concentrated motorized units on the Franco-Belgian border.

3. In view of this situation it has naturally surprised us that Belgium has proceeded to transfer Belgian troops from the Belgian-French to the Belgian-German border. That there has actually been such a transfer is attested by all the reports we have received; nor was it denied, after all, by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff in his conversation with the German Air Attaché, when he merely called the Air Attaché's reference to these transfers "not altogether true."

4. On this occasion you should also call attention to the fact that during the last few weeks the Belgian press, in contrast to the press of the other neutral countries, has shown a pronounced anti-German tone and vied with the inflammatory attitude of the British and the French press.

¹ Document No. 251.

² Paul Henri Spaak.

I request that you make the foregoing statements to the Belgian Foreign Minister in carefully formulated words but at the same time speak in a decidedly friendly manner and avoid giving your step the character of a formal action.²

RIBBENTROP

²On Oct. 20, Bülow telegraphed that he had that day made a démarche according to these instructions (141/127314).

No. 263

FS/0011-0001

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

[BERLIN, October 16? 1939].

VISIT OF THE SWEDISH EXPLORER, SVEN HEDIN, TO THE FÜHRER, ON OCTOBER 16, 1939, FROM 12 O'CLOCK NOON TO 1:15 P. M.¹

Sven Hedin had stated in advance that although he had spoken with the King of Sweden he was coming not on an official mission, but rather as an old acquaintance.

The conversation began by Sven Hedin's remarking to the Führer on the tremendous burden the Führer was carrying. The Führer replied that he was happy to be allowed to carry it. He was a man who loved responsibility and who was glad that the solution of this great problem had been allotted to him.

Sven Hedin said that he was afraid for Sweden. He thought that Sweden would soon have to help Finland, and he feared that Sweden would thereby place herself in opposition to Germany. The Führer did not think that Finland would become involved in a war with Russia; the Russian demands would not go very far. If it should come to a conflict nevertheless, he did not believe that Sweden could help Finland. At Sven Hedin's question as to whether the Führer could not help Sweden, he said he would not attack her from the rear. The Führer added some comments here on his relationship to the Scandinavian countries, observing that in the long years of Germany's struggle for equality, he had not received the slightest help from the Scandinavian countries. The Baltic States had been created by the sacrifice of German lives, and Finland also had been rescued from bolshevism by von der Goltz. Nine hundred thousand Germans had fallen on the Eastern Front and their blood had helped to bring these countries into being. To be sure, he had not expected these countries

¹Hedin's version of this conversation, together with his account of a controversy growing out of his subsequent press interview with a British reporter in Stockholm, is given in *Sven Hedin's German Diary, 1935-1942* (Dublin, 1951), pp. 40-56.

to fight for Germany now, but they could at least have taken a stand in the League of Nations in favor of Germany, for this would never have hurt them. But they had always fundamentally opposed Germany. The press in these countries had in the most shameless manner published distorted, mendacious, and inflammatory versions of conditions in Germany, so that one day he had made up his mind to revise the principles of Germany's foreign policy.

The Führer went on to say that he was through with getting politically involved in matters that were no concern of Germany's. He no longer claimed any interests in the Mediterranean, and in Albania and Greece he had registered no interest. He had effected a delimitation of spheres of interest. In the German sphere of interest he would certainly fight and defend himself to the last. Where an aircraft carrier had been established against Germany—i. e., Czechoslovakia, Poland—he had destroyed it. He had written off the West; there was no problem there. Any advance there would only impair the national-ity balance in Germany. He had written off the South and likewise the North, where he had experienced only ingratitude and antipathy, although he had never done them any harm. He could say that these countries had acted abominably [*niederträchtig*] in public statements and in their press. And to the Danes he had ceded the previously hard-won territories. Friendship was worth more to him than a few square kilometers. In the East, too, there was now a clear-cut division of interests.

He had freed Germany from bolshevism, and Germany was now invulnerable against bolshevism. The countries that, . . . the whole . . .

[one page missing from the German text]

had already lost the World War.

Hedin said he thought the British Empire was finished. He described the situation in Asia where the proud British Empire was in retreat before the Japanese. He mentioned British capital there amounting to 300 million pounds, and referred to Hong Kong and England's inability to send her Home Fleet there.

The Führer said that England was ruled by lunatics who thought that England was an island, which she no longer was. England was in for some big surprises. Hedin asked: "What are you going to do?" The Führer said that anyone considering the situation had to say that this was the most preposterous affair in world history. He had repeatedly offered peace and friendship to that nation and received only slaps in return. The preservation of the British Empire was also to Germany's advantage; for, if England lost India, we had

nothing to gain by it. Now he was convinced, however, that this war had to be fought to a finish. He could describe Chamberlain as nothing else than mad.

Naturally, he would restore the Polish state, for he did not want that riff-raff [*Geschmeiss*]¹—the Poles— within his own borders, but never again would Poland become a threat to Germany. He had no demands to make of the West aside from the colonies which were of no value to England herself.

He now compared at some length the relative strength of Germany and England, and concluded that Germany had enormous superiority. And in such circumstances England believed that Germany should beg for forgiveness!!

Hedin wondered what the French really were fighting for. They were England's slaves and faced ruin. The Führer: "France will sacrifice her national strength." There were many Frenchmen who thought the same but they were not allowed to speak out. Hedin: If he succeeded in preventing the war, future generations would venerate [*auf Händen tragen*] the name of the Führer. He asked the Führer whether he could not sacrifice something for the sake of this peace: Ease the situation of the Czechs or make special concessions to the Poles. The Führer replied that the Polish problem was to be solved by Germany and Russia alone. What was meant by redress of the wrong done to Bohemia and Moravia? He might by this token demand that England redress the wrong done to India, Egypt, and Palestine.

"I have prepared for this war." "Up to now, we have downed the British in every air battle." And he gave a detailed account of the victory in Poland. Hedin concurred with him and spoke of the great victories and of the protection from the rear that he had achieved through his pact with Russia. He was surprised to hear that the withdrawal of German troops from the East had begun as early as September 10. The Führer further pointed out that Germany in 1914 had been a state rich in a capitalistic sense, but unprepared from the standpoint of the war economy. Money alone could not decide the issue. England claimed that she could starve us out, but the reverse was the case. The Führer described the organization behind the food ration cards, which had been completed before September 1. The people knew that whoever transgressed against the common weal would die. For 5 months now, since the beginning of the difficulties with the coffee supply, he had not touched any coffee. There was little coffee and little tea, but on the other hand, we had gasoline, rubber, iron, synthetic materials, and, economically, Russia and south-

eastern Europe were at our disposal. Thanks to the abundant harvests of recent years, Germany had a 2 years' supply of grain on hand. Hedin said that it was senseless to blockade Germany. The Führer agreed. The others were much more vulnerable than we.

He was glad to take on this fight and he grew envious at the thought that this fight otherwise would have to be carried on by someone else after him.

Hedin inquired whether there was really no possibility of peace now. The Führer replied: "So far as it is up to us, at any moment, but England does not want it. England must learn that she has to keep out of the German spheres of interest. She wasn't even decent enough to help the Poles." Indeed, England had made long-distance flights through France for propaganda reasons, but the planes had carried gasoline instead of bombs. Our planes, however, were flying all the way to the Shetland Islands with heavy bomb loads and even then would engage in combat for hours.

Hedin asked whether everything would be over quickly. The Führer replied that he did not know. His first war plan was for 5 years, but he could go on fighting even 8 and 10 years. In a final showdown, we would triumph and England would be a field of ruins. The British were stupid enough to believe that they were safe from the German submarines, but they were thinking of submarines used in the World War, which had long since been improved upon. There were no weapons against our present submarines. If England wanted peace, she could have it. She was playing a role in Europe that no longer convinced anyone. In the Far East, the British were whining already. He could not say this publicly, but the only man in England that he would care to call a genius was Lloyd George. Eden was a foppish nonentity [*pomadisierte Null*] and Churchill an incompetent [*unfähig*]. Of all the British to whom he had spoken to date, Lloyd George had made the greatest impression upon him.

The Führer then gave a detailed account of the capture of Warsaw.

Hedin asked whether he could not give him a message to the King of Sweden. The Führer asked Hedin to thank the King for his good intentions, adding that it was not really up to him. France and England did not want peace. In the North we had no other desire than to live in friendship with the countries there. England was to blame for everything that was happening there today. There was only one chance for England, and that was to recognize Germany's interests. These were very limited. In the East was powerful Russia; an advance to the Urals was ruled out. Collaboration between Germany and England would be a tremendous factor in behalf of the peace

and would constitute the most potent element in the world. England was the greatest sea power, Germany the greatest land power. But England did not realize that Germany was the greatest land power. Perhaps she thought that France was. Poland's collapse had not come as a gift from Heaven. It had been accomplished by inspired generalship in the Prussian military tradition, equipment engineered superbly to the last technical detail, and painstaking, unremitting training. Germany was the soundest power in the world, and no hot-house plant. Our military preparations had been cautious and pedantic, if anything, and the training of the soldier, thorough and careful. A battle might be won once in a while by accident, but a triumphal march, such as that of the Polish campaign, was no accident, but the fruit of enormously painstaking preparations.

Sven Hedin said he had always, even in 1919, believed in a new dawn for Germany but the Führer's accomplishments were phenomenal indeed. And yet he was sometimes afraid of the peril that might threaten Germany from the United States or if Russia should betray Germany. The Führer said that he had pondered all possibilities. If the war had to come some time, it was best that it should have come now. Our lead in armaments was enormous, and we were far out in front in the field of inventions as well. He spoke of the rebirth of the German Army out of the 100,000-man army. Hedin ought to take a look at the new aircraft factories. Against them those in England were a joke. He described the amateurish [*diletantischen*] measures of the British, such as the evacuation of the children, etc.; he compared the air forces and pointed out that the German anti-aircraft defenses were the best in the whole world.

On taking leave, Hedin asked once more what Germany had to say to Sweden if she should get into difficulties over Finland: "Will Germany give Sweden her blessing in that fight?" The Führer replied: "We shall not attack Sweden from the rear." Hedin asked what could be done for the cause of peace, and the Führer replied that that was not up to us. Germany had not declared war!

If the British changed he had no objection, but he had to insist on one condition: Czechoslovakia was not to be discussed. The settlement of Poland had to be left to him, but he was prepared to negotiate all other problems.

The conversation was very cordial and amicable throughout.

HEWEL

No. 264

100/65700-07

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Pol. 719

Tokyo, October 16, 1939.

Received November 2.

Pol. VIII 1725.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Japan's attitude toward the European war.

In its memorandum of September 5, 1939, the Japanese Government communicated to the belligerent powers its intention not to become involved in the European war.¹

In the following report, the antecedents of this memorandum, Japan's policy since the beginning of the war, and future prospects are examined.

I. Antecedents

The most important forces motivating Japan's policy today became clearly apparent as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. For Japan the Pact came at a time of very great tension between the two leading political camps, the opponents and supporters of a pro-British line. Their old antagonism had in the course of this year become increasingly bitter, influenced alike by the conflict in China, which made deep inroads into the sphere of British power, and by the Anti-Comintern Pact, the development of which into an instrument of alliance against England was the subject of violent discussion in Japanese circles.

Thus, in the middle of August, the Army, the motive force of the anti-British group, had just caused the breakdown of the Tientsin negotiations² and started the final struggle for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact when the news of the impending German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact arrived. The first shock was natural and severe; it struck at the genuine feeling of friendship in the general masses which had been the Army's principal support. The Japanese press did its part to intensify this reaction, encouraged by the pro-British group in Court circles as well as in business to avoid all objective discussion of the possible advantage in the Pact to Japan, and to reject the offer of help made by the German Foreign Minister in the presence of the Moscow press as interference in the sovereign policy of Japan.

¹ See document No. 61.

² See vol. VI, document No. 526; and vol. VII, document No. 368.

The general attack of the British group failed because of the strong resistance offered by the Army and activist circles friendly to us. With an objectivity and loyalty that deserves the highest recognition they allowed themselves to become convinced of the necessity for Germany's action and its advantage against the common foe, England, and for their part attacked the indecisiveness of Japan. To be sure the Hiranuma Cabinet fell, undermined by 70 fruitless conferences on the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but its successor did not represent the pro-British group. In a bitter struggle with Court circles, the Army achieved a middle-of-the-road Cabinet, whose leader, General Abe—who at the same time took over the post of Foreign Minister—was understood to be amenable to the influence of the Army. On September 5 this neutral Abe Cabinet presented the memorandum with regard to Japan's nonintervention [in the war].

II. Policy Since Beginning of the War

In view of the attitude Japan had declared toward Europe it was clear from the start that she could not announce any ostrich policy for the Far East, for she is in the position of being compelled to confront the Great Powers in the China conflict.

Every Japanese Government describes it as the main task of its foreign policy to end the China conflict as soon as possible. This compels it to proceed against the Marshal's last sources of strength, his support by England and Russia, and obliges it further to assure the Wang Ching-wei Government of early recognition by the Great Powers in order to make it viable. Moreover, the injury done to trade by the war will force Japan to abandon her reserve. It suffices to call attention in this connection to the shortage of freight space, the interference by British naval warfare, and America's threatening attitude in the question of the expiring commercial treaty.

By its first acts, the Abe Cabinet showed its disposition to profit actively by the European conflict. The memorandum mentioned above gives the belligerent Powers the advice to withdraw their forces from the parts of China occupied by Japan. Japan has therefore started to exert pressure on the British and French, the only ones involved, in order to weaken their position in China.

In the truce of Nomonhan,³ Japan declared her intention to restore to normal her relations with Russia, and the Army pursued this further in a publication emphasizing the friendly atmosphere between the Japanese and Russian officers conducting negotiations.

Both measures were promising indications that the "nonintervention" of the Abe Cabinet would in practice be directed at a settlement

³ See document No. 77, footnote 2.

with Russia and pressure against England and France in China. Apparently the influence which the Army has secured upon the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was at work; a last manifestation of the old striking power of the Army—it has since then not again succeeded in influencing the policy of the Cabinet further in our direction.

From two sides—the pro-British camp (whose driving power, it now clearly emerges, is from the persons closest to the throne), and the Government of the United States of America—opposition arose which was directed primarily against a settlement with Russia. The pro-British camp recognized the dangers of the truce of Nomonhan when the Army and large groups of the population welcomed it most joyfully. It might again bring Japan closer to Germany, and the zealous effort at outlawing the latter would collapse if Japan followed the German example toward Russia. In this way, moreover, Japan would by necessity be driven gradually into the anti-British front.

Court circles proceeded to take carefully calculated countermeasures, first by having the press minimize the truce and deny any friendly influence on the part of Germany and, shortly after, getting the Minister of the Interior to issue a secret decree forbidding further press reports regarding negotiations with Soviet Russia. After the Soviet Army had moved into action against Poland the day after the truce and displayed an increasing activity in Europe, a general agitation began in the principal newspapers of Japan, aimed at instilling fear of Soviet Russia, which, with her growth in power and her “notorious untrustworthiness” would increasingly become a communistic and military threat to the Far East. This agitation also overshadowed appreciation of the incomparable triumph of the German Wehrmacht in Poland, which naturally also made a deep impression in Japan.

The Government of the United States had—perhaps not entirely by chance—acted in harmony with the pro-British camp in Japan. In a *démarche* about which we have learned nothing, it must have expressed its displeasure at the Japanese rapprochement with Soviet Russia. In any case, the Japanese press hastily published a statement by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, minimizing the truce of Nomonhan and denying German influence in it. By strengthening the fleet and air force in Hawaii the Government of the United States gave to its attitude an emphatic note of warning and seems also to have answered with a sharp protest the Japanese memorandum relative to withdrawal of the belligerent forces from China, which

was communicated to it by way of information.⁴ If one sums up these individual measures, one is forced to the conclusion that the Government of the United States has undertaken the task of relieving the Western Powers in the Far East and vigorously espousing their interests. In this connection, the imminent expiration of the commercial treaty is especially disquieting to the Japanese.

America's attitude provided Court circles with the opportunity of carrying out a number of far-reaching changes in personnel, with the purposes of removing the Cabinet from the influence of the Army, of purging the Army of politics through the compliant Minister of War by radical changes in all key positions, and of removing the supporters of anti-Comintern policy from the service of the Foreign Ministry. Included in this category is, first of all, the appointment of a Foreign Minister, which was forced upon the Minister President and for which Admiral Nomura was selected because of good personal relations with America, allegedly after the Army had opposed the appointment of Ambassador Shigemitsu from London. The new Foreign Minister was hailed by the principal newspapers as one who would lead the way to general settlement with America, and thus Japanese policy was given a second main task besides that of ending the Chinese conflict. It remains to be seen whether an attempt is thus to be made to bring Japan closer to the Western Powers by way of America.

No direct rapprochement with England is thus far discernible even if indications are increasing that England is revising her attitude in China. Today's special report⁵ on the organization of the Wang Ching-wei Government discusses in detail events in China and the necessary German countermeasures.

III. *Outlook for the Future*

If one reviews the Japanese attitude since the beginning of the war, there appears a brief attempt to widen the policy of friendship with Germany into an adjustment with Russia and to draw closer to the anti-British front. In a large-scale counterattack, Court circles, armed with increased power, brought this movement to a halt and put settlement with America first. A thorough purge carried out in the Cabinet, the Army, and the Foreign Ministry, especially of the supporters of the German alliance policy, is supposed to guarantee this new orientation for a long period.

⁴ Secretary of State Hull discussed the Japanese memorandum with Ambassador Horinouchi on Sept. 7 and again on Sept. 15. See his memoranda of conversations in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 12-14, 15-19.

⁵ Not printed (8137/E582155-62).

What are the prospects of success for this policy? To answer the most critical question at once, I consider the danger very slight that Japan will be brought into the war on the side of England by way of America. There are no German possessions in the Pacific that represent worth-while military objectives and that could be offered to Japan such as Tsingtao and the South Sea territories in 1914. War aimed at Russian possessions, such as Vladivostok, would be predicated on the entry of Russia on the German side, but this would surely deter Japan from entering the war, for the experience of Nomonhan has, according to reliable reports, demonstrated a formidable superiority of Russian arms and military technique. Japan will not regard as adequate British compensation in China or Hong Kong, for these may fall to her in the course of the war anyway. Also military or economic pressure applied jointly by America and England can hardly be made so effective as to constrain Japan, which is always intent upon exploiting the war situation in order to invade the sphere of her Pacific neighbors. A psychological deterrent is the fact that hostility toward England is so intense in the Army and in activist circles of the population that for the foreseeable future acts of terrorism might be expected against any collaboration with England.

The question remains whether settlement with America can be effected and whether it will prevent a settlement with Russia. An agreement with America on trade is, as I have repeatedly reported, a vital question for Japan. The policy of Court circles, therefore, means to large groups in industry and in the Navy a prospect of realizing an old dream. Extremely embittered popular feeling in America, however, and the 600 American demands arising out of the China conflict stand in the way of its realization. These culminate in the preservation of the Nine Power Pact, which would mean practically the abandonment of Japan's China policy, and thus put the greatest difficulties in the way of Japan's most urgent aim, the speedy and successful termination of the China war. The attempt at a settlement has therefore been rendered extremely difficult by circumstances and is very much impeded by the clique policy of Court circles, which have always been especially hated in the radical groups of the population and have this time exposed themselves to an extraordinary degree. It should be recalled that the bloody events of February 1936* were directed against these same Court circles.

In this situation, continued efforts toward a settlement with Russia—simultaneously or in lieu of a settlement with America—will by

* On Feb. 26, 1936, within a few days of an election victory by the moderate Okada Cabinet, a group of young officer extremists led a regiment of troops in an uprising against the Cabinet. The mutineers held control of central Tokyo for 3 days and assassinated several members of the government.

no means be hopeless as soon as the efforts with America lead to the first reverses.⁷ The Japanese protagonists of such a settlement will again be provided by the Japanese Army, which, from the experience of the last few years, defies all attempts at purging it of politics and, after a certain lapse from power, which during a war in Europe will probably be very short, again forces the new nonpolitical leaders under the active influence of the middle ranks in the officer corps. The first signs of this are already apparent in cautious contacting of the German Embassy. The like-minded younger element in Japanese official circles will probably gradually crystallize around Ambassadors Shiratori and Oshima. Ambassador Shiratori's very emphatic statement in favor of the old alliance policy upon his arrival in Japan is a step in this direction. In important business circles also, leaders have emerged and made contact with us, who reject a pact with America and England and aspire to a settlement with Russia in order finally to drive the Anglo-Saxon powers out of the western Pacific. It will be the task of the immediate future to bring together these various forces in the Army, in official life, business circles, and pro-German popular groups, to strengthen them in their attitude, and to exploit every setback in the attempted settlement with America in order to consolidate them against England's position in the Far East.

The common anxiety weighing upon all these circles concerns Russia's growth in power and doubts of her trustworthiness. With reference to their many demands for convincing proof of Russia's good will, I must call attention to my repeated telegraphic proposals that a long-term cession of the Russian oil wells in Sakhalin and a public abandonment of support for Chiang Kai-shek might advance considerably the cause of Russia and Germany here. Any encroachment by Russia on the British Empire's sphere of interest would surely have the same effect.

The greatest influence will, however, proceed from our actual successes in the war. Every British warship sunk will score a gain here for the German cause, and if German or Russian submarines were, under the eyes of the Japanese Navy, to proceed against the British fleet, whose control of the seas arouses a feeling of impotent rage, the sentiment of even the most reluctant group in Japan, the Japanese Navy, would surely be very strongly influenced.

OTT

⁷ In a report of Nov. 9 (157/131092-95), Ott recalled this prediction and stated there were already signs of its fulfillment. In a speech by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, the United States had given sharp expression to its opposition to Japan's new order in Asia, and American senators were demanding an embargo on war materials. At the same time Russian overtures for economic negotiations, especially in a speech by Molotov on Nov. 1, were receiving an increasingly friendly reception in Japan.

No. 265

4218/E078923

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain
Telegram

No. 256 of October 16

BERLIN, October 17, 1939—12:05 a. m.

Received October 17—1:00 a. m.

[Pol. IX 2127].¹

[I.] Diplomatic Missions in America have received the following instructions:

"The resolutions of the Panama Conference² are appraised here as follows:

1. Roosevelt's influence on the Ibero-American republics has been further strengthened by the outcome of the Conference. Affirmation of the will to neutrality and of American solidarity, however, will compel Roosevelt to move cautiously as regards his well-known international position. The transfer of the Economic Committee to the Washington atmosphere affords him great opportunities for exerting influence.

2. A statement as to our position on the question of the closed zone will follow.³

3. We consider as favorable to us the agreement on bona fide changes of registry and the noninclusion of foodstuffs and raw materials for the civilian population in contraband lists.

4. Until further instructions, please exercise reserve in evaluating the political and legal effects of the conference."

II. Please thank the Government there on a suitable occasion for its efforts in behalf of the maintenance of the neutrality by the Ibero-American states. You may stress in that connection that this step will surely serve to enhance the prestige of the new Spain in Latin America. In view of the expected strong countermeasures on the part of the North American Government, it is desirable that the joint efforts, in which Italy is also participating, should be continued on a larger scale. Spain unquestionably will have some interests of her own in this because any extension of North American influence will be primarily at her expense.⁴

WOERMANN

¹ The file numbers are taken from Stohrer's reply (see footnote 4).

² The Final Act of the Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 321-337.

³ See document No. 306.

⁴ In a telegram of Oct. 19, Stohrer replied that he had spoken, as instructed, with the Spanish Foreign Minister and State Secretary. They showed "great understanding of our community of interests in this area," and the Foreign Minister said that since his Government regarded Argentina as the decisive factor in the neutrality and general position of South America, it was directing its main propaganda effort to Argentina. He would be pleased if Germany would do the same (186/73925).

No. 266

2131/466338-39

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, October 17, 1939—7:45 p. m.

URGENT

No. 698 of October 17

Ciano informed me today of a telegram from Attolico, quoting an unpublished DNB report of a United Press dispatch from London, to the effect that Italy would assume leadership of a neutral bloc and veer away from the Axis. Although he had already authorized Attolico to make a similar statement, he also wanted to ask me to advise Berlin that these rumors were false. The idea of a bloc of Balkan states under Italian leadership had been aired already at the Berlin conversations,¹ and the Duce had pondered it long and in detail but then had definitely decided against it, although the Balkan capitals had clearly shown sympathy for such a project. In no circumstances did the Duce want to be made the spokesman of the neutrals. He simply detested that word because Italy belonged neither to the belligerents nor to the neutrals; her status, as before, remained that of maximum preparedness, for which the Duce was working by every means in order to be ready at the given moment. I know from the Duce himself how heavily he is weighed down by the fact that, owing to the gaps in preparedness, he must for the time being remain in the background. Impatiently he is subordinating everything to his efforts to fill the serious gaps. Leadership of a bloc of neutral Balkan states would only mean a tie for him that might prove embarrassing some day.

Ciano also added that all rumors about special instructions for Bastianini were pure inventions. Italy's new Ambassador to London received no special instructions but, on the contrary, was enjoined to confine himself to the role of a reserved observer.

MACKENSEN

¹ On Oct. 1; see document No. 176.

No. 267

F5/0468

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 17, 1939—9:57 p. m.

No. 554 of October 17

Received October 18—3:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 572 of October 15¹ and to my telegram No. 547 of October 16.²

Molotov, to whom I personally handed at 5:30 p. m. today the invitation of the Foreign Minister, stated that he was fully aware of his obligation to make a return visit, but in view of the pressure upon him of political business of the greatest importance, he most sincerely regretted not being able at this time to undertake the journey to Berlin. To my objection that a round-trip flight to Berlin could be made in 3 to 4 days, Molotov replied that he had never yet flown in his life, that he was a poor sailor, and therefore shrank from travel by air. Molotov asked that his apologies be presented to the Foreign Minister and he reiterated that he would surely make the required visit, as soon as time and circumstances permitted.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 258.

² Document No. 261.

No. 268

103/111726

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, October 17, 1939—9:57 p. m.

No. 555 of October 17

Received October 18—3:00 a. m.

Saracoglu is leaving Moscow this evening. Molotov told me, in this connection, that the conversations with Saracoglu had come to no result. Nothing had been agreed or signed. To my question as to how things now stood with respect to Turkish neutrality, closure of the Dardanelles, and peace in the Balkans, Molotov replied that everything remained uncertain since the position of Saracoglu was not clear. Obviously the Turkish Government would have to give thorough consideration now to all these questions.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ A detailed account of Saracoglu's negotiations in Moscow was sent by Woermann on Nov. 2 to the Embassies in Moscow, Ankara, and Rome, and to the principal Missions in Southeast Europe. The account came from a secret source of evidently high credibility (2131/466289-97).

No. 269

108/111724

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 591

BERLIN, October 17, 1939—[10: 02 p. m.]
zu Pol. VII 1865¹ Ang. I.

Drafting officer: Dr. Schlobies.

For the Ambassador.

Referring to your conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow regarding the possible use of Russian influence, please use a suitable opening in an informal conversation with Molotov to inquire what Russia's intentions are regarding Afghanistan and Iran. In this connection, please find out from the Russian authorities what they think about Amanullah and Afghan internal affairs.

Report by telegraph.²WEIZSÄCKER³

¹ Pol. VII 1865: This is evidently Rome telegram No. 657 of Oct. 7; not printed (617/249875).

² Marginal note on the Moscow Embassy copy of this document (352/202843): "Taken care of in a telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister himself. v[on] T[ippelskirch] Nov. 13." See also documents Nos. 353 and 369.

³ Unsigned minute: "An Afghan source (Ghulam Siddiq) has called our attention to the urgency of the matter, considering that the advancing season would soon make any operation in the Hindu Kush impossible for this year." This minute was not part of the telegram sent to Moscow. For Ghulam Siddiq (Gulam Sittig) see documents Nos. 449 and 470.

No. 270

54/36438-40

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, October 17, 1939.

St.S. No. 822

The High Command of the Wehrmacht (General Jodl) today gave me the following information concerning the Führer's orders and the Navy's intentions with reference to merchant warfare against England:¹

At present our naval vessels have instructions to sink without warning merchant ships positively identified as of enemy origin. The only exceptions are enemy passenger ships not proceeding in an enemy convoy. Furthermore, it is permissible to sink without warning

¹ These orders of the Führer were recorded by Raeder in a memorandum dated Oct. 16. The German text is published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 157-C, Exhibit GB-224, pp. 608-609, and an English translation appears in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," published in *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 51-52.

neutrals whose conduct arouses suspicion (blackouts, changes of course, etc.). Spanish, Russian, Japanese, and Italian merchant vessels will at present be left alone.²

The memorandum³ handed the Führer by Grand Admiral Raeder yesterday on the continuation of merchant warfare against England begins at the above-mentioned standpoint and then discusses a scale of further intensifying measures. The ordering of these measures is to depend, however, on a consultation between the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the Foreign Ministry, and the offices concerned with economic warfare. The invitations to such discussions will be extended shortly.

Apparently these decisions are not very urgent.

The memorandum enumerates the following points:

Enemy merchant vessels should be sunk without warning regardless of locality (this probably means also in the Western Atlantic, etc.).

The neutrals should be requested not to make use of enemy merchant vessels any longer.

The neutrals should be requested to treat armed enemy merchant ships the same as naval vessels.

The existing order to leave alone Spanish, Russian, Japanese, and Italian merchant vessels should be rescinded.

The Air Force should operate against the principal British import harbors (Air Force operations against enemy merchant vessels are not yet permitted).

Prohibition of "continued voyages".

Political and economic pressure should be brought to bear on the Northern countries to stop delivering contraband to England.

The result of the above-mentioned measures should then be awaited; if the result should be insufficient, the following measures should be considered:

A blockade of all of England (in this the Navy seems to admit that such a blockade would not be recognized by the neutrals, since it could not be effective anyhow).

A "siege" of England. The Navy believes that such a siege would have to be connected with the declaration of a sea area in which action will be taken without warning and without exception (the Navy itself is of the opinion that such intensified action cannot be considered as long as the position of the neutrals has not been clarified).

The promised invitation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to joint discussions is now to be awaited.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

² Raeder's memorandum of Oct. 16 stated that it was decided to request the Italian, Soviet, Spanish, and Japanese Governments to declare that their vessels carried no contraband; otherwise they would be treated as other neutrals.

³ The German text of this "Memorandum on intensified naval warfare against England," dated Oct. 15, 1939, together with four annexes, is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 157-C, Exhibit GB-224, pp. 609-641.

⁴ No record of the meeting anticipated here has been found.

No. 271

127/89672-75

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 594 of October 17

BERLIN, October 18, 1939—12:40 a. m.

Received Moscow, October 18—10:05 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

At an occasion soon to arise, I intend to speak in public about the foreign political situation and shall then, with reference to Chamberlain's latest speech,¹ deal with the future aims of England and the English propaganda of lies. In this connection I would also like to refute a lie recently circulated in quite specific form by the enemy press, alleging that during my stay in Moscow I had asked the Soviet Union for military assistance, but had met with an outright refusal. I propose to say on this subject approximately the following:

"In its grave disappointment at the recent development in the international situation, which has been strongly influenced by the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, English propaganda has left nothing untried to discredit and disturb this development and German-Russian relations. In its well-known manner, it stopped at nothing and has made use of the grossest and most absurd lies. Thus, for instance, it has circulated the statement that in the Moscow negotiations I had asked M. Stalin for military assistance against Poland, France, and England. To this, M. Stalin, however, is said to have given only the tart reply: 'Not a single soldier.' But what in reality was the course of these Moscow negotiations? Let me reveal it to you:

"I came to Moscow on August 23 for the purpose of negotiating and concluding, in the name of the Führer, a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. I commenced the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov with the statement that I had not come to Moscow, as the British and French delegates had come in their time, to ask the Soviet Union for armed assistance in case a war should be forced upon the German Government by England. The German Government was not in need of assistance for this contingency, but would, in this event, have sufficient military strength to take up the struggle alone against Poland and the Western foes and to carry it to a victorious conclusion. To this Stalin, with his characteristic clarity and precision, replied spontaneously: 'Germany is taking a proud attitude by rejecting at the outset any armed assistance from the Soviets. The Soviet Union, however, is interested in having a strong Germany as a neighbor and in the case of an armed showdown between Germany and the Western democracies the interests of the Soviet Union and of Germany would certainly run parallel to each other. The Soviet Union would never stand for Germany's getting into a difficult position.' I thereupon thanked Stalin for his clear and precise statement and told him that I would report to the Führer on this generous [*grosszügigen*] attitude

¹ See document No. 246, footnote 1.

of the Soviet Government. Thus the German-Russian negotiations were opened and this exchange of views created from the outset a generous and friendly climate, in which within 24 hours the Non-Aggression Pact and, in the course of further developments, at the end of September, the Boundary and Friendship Treaty were concluded. Upon the same political foundation it was likewise decided immediately to inaugurate a comprehensive economic program, the implementation of which is now being discussed at Moscow. Germany has need of the raw materials of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union has need of manufactured articles. There is no reason why the flourishing trade of the past between the two nations should not soon revive. On the contrary, I am firmly convinced that the former traditional friendship between Germany and Russia has now been restored, and that it will grow stronger and stronger and that the exchange of goods, which is complementary by nature, will result in an undreamed-of prosperity for both nations in the future. Upon the same political foundation, the German-Soviet declaration of September 28, 1939,² has also been agreed upon, to the effect that both Governments would work toward the restoration of peace upon conclusion of the Polish campaign. In case these efforts should fail—as they have—both Governments would recognize the responsibility of England and France for the continuation of the war and at the same time provision would be made for a consultation between the Government of the Reich and the Soviet Government on the necessary measures to be taken. These consultations are now under way and are proceeding in the same friendly spirit as the Moscow negotiations, and on the firm basis of kindred interests. In this connection, we expect an early visit of M. Molotov to Berlin. I believe that this brief account is sufficient to sink once and for all the whole raft of lies of the British Ministry of Lies and the other blundering propaganda centers of our enemies, about the present German-Russian negotiations and the future pattern of relations between the two greatest countries of Europe.”

Please inform M. Stalin as promptly as possible of the account of the Moscow negotiations as given above and wire me his approval.³

RIBBENTROP

² Document No. 161.

³ See document No. 280.

No. 272

108/111781-84

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 559 of October 18

Moscow, October 18, 1939—9:38 p. m.

Received October 19—5:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 509 of October 11.¹

I. The negotiations are not proceeding as methodically as we are accustomed to in this kind of negotiations and as we envisaged here,

¹ Document No. 237.

too. The other side always takes a stand on only some of the specific points in our list of requests, depending on the degree to which their own day by day deliberations lead to internal clarification and decisions. The progress of the other side in their own deliberations, which was at first somewhat slow, was expedited in the past few days as a result of the Ambassador's intervention with Molotov.²

II. The following is the present status of the negotiations in the individual fields:

First: In the case of grains, a million tons have been promised us, with delivery in one to two months; this probably includes nine hundred thousand tons of barley. We thereupon authorized Herr Dassler and Herr Donner of the Reich Grain Office, who had meanwhile arrived, to negotiate immediately on the business details.

Second: As far as petroleum is concerned, the following was promised: One hundred thousand tons of aviation gasoline, two hundred thousand tons of motor gasoline, three hundred thousand tons of diesel oil, two hundred thousand tons of fuel oil, one hundred thousand tons of lubricating oil; total, nine hundred thousand tons.

Instructions for the immediate commencement of the business negotiations have been given by Mikoyan. Special quantities from Boryslaw and Drohobycz are included in the total of nine hundred thousand tons. It is not yet clear how we shall handle these special quantities. It would probably be better in order to bring the contracts for the entire amount of nine hundred thousand tons to a speedy close if these special quantities did not receive strictly separate handling, since the crude oil production and the amount of the crude oil from Boryslaw and Drohobycz refined into various products can only be determined on the spot and this will probably take a considerable length of time. Before these things are determined, contracts for purchase of these special quantities also cannot be concluded. On the other hand, however, it is necessary in the future correspondence between Ribbentrop and Molotov to insist on the special character of and special promises for these special quantities. We shall report via the best channels, as the occasion demands.

Third: Cotton, one hundred thousand tons. Please send experts as soon as possible to attend to the closing of the contracts.

Fourth: On lumber no figures could yet be given us. It has been generally stated for the present, however, that what will be promised will come rather close to our request for lumber worth one hundred and twenty million RM.

Fifth: In the case of ores, it was stated that we could have any amount of manganese ore we wanted, but that export possibilities

²No record of this intervention has been found.

were very slight in the case of iron ore and chromium ore, since the Soviet requirements have increased considerably.

III. Regarding payment for raw materials from third countries, after consulting Molotov Mikoyan made the proposal that the Soviet Government pay 30 percent in foreign currency, and that for the remaining 70 percent Germany find the means of payment. We have not yet declared ourselves in the matter. A special telegram on the subject will follow.³

IV. With regard to German deliveries to the Soviet Union, a contract for some special ships worth approximately 10 million RM has been concluded; also one for thirty thousand tons of tubes worth some 3 to 3½ million RM. Negotiations for the delivery of other special ships are in progress. The other side also shows interest in hydrogenation plants and a Fischer-Tropsch plant. Conversations of an informational nature regarding the delivery of armaments material have been held with Eltze,⁴ who is returning to Berlin to obtain further clarification.

On Thursday evening, Mikoyan will declare himself on many of the items in our list of offers. We expect at this time also to receive further statements on specific portions of our claims of last February⁵ which have not yet been clarified.

V. The general impression thus far is not unfavorable, even though the method of negotiation of the other side is rather tiresome. The above-mentioned figures do not seem to us unsatisfactory in the specific portions of the German list of requests thus far clarified. In view of the aforementioned working method of the other side, who carefully study among themselves section after section and then negotiate with us point for point, it does not seem to us advisable to overemphasize at this stage the question of total deliveries and force the other side to make final statements on a definite total figure. By acceding to the other side's working method of building the contractual structure piece by piece from the bottom up, we shall achieve speedier and better results than by the reverse method of working from the top down.

VI. I shall make the length of my stay here dependent on the result of the next meeting with Mikoyan Thursday evening. No agreement on the substance of the negotiations as a whole is to be expected from this conversation, to be sure, but a preliminary opinion

³Telegram No. 560 of Oct. 18 (2093/452715). The German delegation considered it improbable that a more favorable Soviet proposal could at present be obtained and requested instructions from Berlin.

⁴Generaldirektor Eltze of *Ausfuhrergemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät* of the *Reichsgruppe Industrie*, a member of the German delegation (1369/357054).

⁵On the negotiations for a 1939 German-Soviet Trade Agreement, see vol. IV, ch. VI.

will then presumably be possible. If I receive no instructions to the contrary, I therefore intend to return at the end of this week.^a

VII. Before returning I shall discuss with Mikoyan the question of a possible press communiqué in which certain of the figures, such as those on grain, petroleum, cotton, which will make effective publicity are especially mentioned as an example of agreements already reached within the framework of the economic program. If there are any objections, please wire instructions.

RITTER

SCHULENBURG

^a Ritter returned to Berlin on Oct. 22, leaving Schnurre in charge of the negotiations in Moscow.

No. 273

108/111728

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 600

BERLIN, October 18, 1939.

W 2215 g. II.

With reference to our telegram No. 578 of October 16.¹

For Ritter.

1) For your information. On the assumption that British tin and rubber are to be forwarded to us, the Führer has ordered that Russian merchant ships carrying corresponding deliveries of lumber to England shall, as in the past, remain unmolested.

The question of Anglo-Russian economic relations continues to occupy the keen interest of the British public. In reply to a question in the House of Commons, the President of the Board of Trade yesterday agreed that the Government must take precautions so that the tin and rubber should not be re-exported to Germany. With reference to the new conversations of the day before yesterday between the Russian Ambassador in London and Halifax, the press reports that the British Government is considering sending a special envoy, perhaps a Cabinet Minister, to Moscow for economic discussions.

¹ Not printed (2093/452702-03). An instruction by Weizsäcker to Ritter to enter into friendly discussions with the Soviet Government regarding Soviet shipment of mining timbers to Britain and also, if necessary, regarding Soviet deliveries in general to Germany's enemies, as the German Government could not continue its policy of leaving Soviet ships unmolested if they actually carried contraband to enemy countries. Weizsäcker also stated, for Ritter's information only, that confidential reports told of a large quantity of lumber being assembled at Murmansk and Archangel for shipment to Britain.

2) Please report by telegraph as to whether the discussions have as yet brought out details of the Anglo-Russian barter agreement and give any clues as to Russian intentions respecting the trade with England.²

WIEHL

* In telegram No. 557 dispatched at 5:09 p. m., Oct. 18, Ritter reported that he had discussed the question of British-Soviet economic relations with Mikoyan in a "thorough and friendly" way. Mikoyan described the agreement for exchange of lumber for rubber, tin, copper, and other raw materials as advantageous to the Soviet Union (and indirectly to Germany) and denied any intention of aiding England economically. The amount of lumber involved was relatively small and the entire risk was borne by Britain. Ritter recommended that the matter be allowed to run its course unless new complications arose (2093/452716-17). Ritter's telegram presumably crossed Wiehl's telegram printed here.

No. 274

2862/563120

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, October 18, 1939.

THE SHIPMENT OF TIN FROM THE NETHERLANDS INDIES VIA THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY

During the conversations with Dr. Hirschfeld the latter told Herr Walter and me that the Netherlands Government was also interested in having Germany continue her imports from the Netherlands Indies on as large as possible a scale. In view of the difficulties to which shipments by the normal route would be exposed as a result of British economic warfare, the Netherlands Government was prepared to encourage shipment via the Siberian Railway and within the limits of quotas to be agreed upon, to place foreign exchange at our disposal.

Geheimrat Kreuter¹ called on me today with reference to this matter. He stated that the firm of Arnold Otto Meyer (Hamburg) was very much interested in such shipments. Because of its widespread connections of long standing in the Far East, it was particularly adapted to arrange the necessary camouflage, and it had a trusted agent immediately available who was eminently qualified to initiate the transaction. Senator Witthöfft, of the above-mentioned firm, was prepared to come here with the agent to discuss the details with the appropriate authorities.

¹ Manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit. See also document No. 535.

After consultation with the Economics Ministry (Herr Schlotterer), I informed Herr Kreuter that we would first ascertain the view of our delegation in Moscow as to whether and on what scale shipments would be possible via Russia.² I would revert to the matter as soon as a reply had been received.

WIEHL

² Copies of this document were sent on the same day by courier to Schnurre and Ritter in Moscow. See document No. 237.

In telegram No. 14 of Jan. 23, 1940, the German Consulate in Batavia was informed that difficulties in the way of transit traffic in raw materials via Japan and the Soviet Union had been removed and that Soviet consular authorities in Japan and Manchuria would issue necessary papers for such shipments (8374/-E590708).

No. 275

588/242288

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 827

BERLIN, October 18, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador told me today that a new stalemate had occurred in the negotiations on the repatriation of the South Tirolese, and it was owing to a trifle in comparison with the whole problem.¹ Clodius evidently had orders to be intransigent with regard to the transport of the possessions of the emigrants, and to demand payment for the transport as well as the insurance and packing material. Now he, Attolico, suggested that Italy should take over the transport of the goods and persons on the Italian railroad, whereas the remainder would be paid either by the emigrants or by the Reich Government. After all, it should be possible to reach an agreement on this basis in order finally to settle the matter at this time. Of course Attolico pointed again to the parallel with the Baltic countries, where we allegedly acted so much more generously.

I absolutely denied that we had given Clodius instructions to be intransigent, and said that I was unable to make a statement before investigating the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Only 5 days earlier, on Oct. 13, Mackensen had reported Ciano's satisfaction that agreement had been reached between Himmler and Bocchini (1982/440236). Himmler would instruct Clodius in Rome to conclude on the agreed terms. See document No. 244, footnote 3. The agreement was signed on Oct. 21 (119/119188-226), and was accompanied by a secret exchange of notes (5831/E425174-79).

No. 276

8589/E602581-83

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, October 18, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFA No. 181/39 Gk.Chefs. L I

By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 7 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Until the planned attack against the western enemy is begun, the previous directives for warfare in the West are supplemented herewith.

1. Permission is granted *effective immediately* as follows:

The Army may cross the French border with patrols but only as far as this is necessary for reconnaissance and for keeping in touch with an enemy avoiding contact.

The Luftwaffe may send fighter escorts into French territory as far as this is necessary for protecting our reconnaissance; may raid British naval forces *in naval harbors* (oral advance notification).

The Navy may attack enemy passenger ships which are in a convoy or are sailing without lights.

The Führer will decide on all other measures suggested for the purpose of intensifying the war against British shipping, as soon as these measures have been checked by the OKW as to their political and economic effect.

The attacks against British naval vessels at sea and in naval harbors are to be continued at every favorable opportunity, the Navy and the Luftwaffe cooperating closely.

2. *In case a Franco-British invasion into Belgium must be repulsed* (Directive No. 6,¹ paragraph 6), the *Army* will be permitted to enter *Luxembourg* territory.

If that occurs, the *Luftwaffe* will support the *Army* directly and will protect it from raids by British and French air forces. Our *Luftwaffe* will also interfere with the approach and transport of enemy forces. A further objective is to prevent British troop landings in Belgium and Holland and to prevent British and French air forces from gaining a foothold there. For this purpose flights will be allowed over the entire western frontier of Germany. Raids on industrial targets and such raids as might endanger the civilian population to a high degree are not permitted in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.

¹ Document No. 224.

For the Navy, the principles stated in Directive No. 6, paragraph 5, apply in this case, also.

3. Besides the measures taken by the commanders of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht, the offices directly subordinate to the OKW (particularly the Inspector of the Wehrmacht Signal Communications and the Intelligence and Propaganda Division) should work together to conceal *our preparations for an attack*.

Pertinent suggestions and requests are to be submitted as soon as possible to the OKW, Operations Planning.

By order:

KEITEL

Countersigned: WARLIMONT

Colonel, General Staff

No. 277

1571/380196-99

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, October 19, 1939—12:25 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 19—5:00 a. m.

No. 702 of October 18

With reference to our telegram No. 692.¹

In spite of the negative attitude of the Italian Government, which I reported, I have continued to work on the question of the transit through Italy of raw materials for Germany, with the following results:

1. The Duce informed me today through a member of the Government who discussed the question once more with him at my urging that he would see that deliveries of all Italian raw materials to Germany would be facilitated in every way. Italy was also willing to help with all possible means in the organization of German exports via Italy. This necessarily involved the elastic application of Italian regulations. Italy was also willing to assist to the limit and wherever technically possible in the import of foreign raw materials to Germany via Italy. However, this help must not lead to armed conflict with England and France. Italy could enter the war only for the sake of great objectives when the time was ripe both politically and militarily, and could not be drawn into the war by such questions at a possibly undesirable moment.

¹ Document No. 260.

The informant adds confidentially that on this occasion the Duce again stated his conviction that Italy would participate in the war, with the remark that "he could not and would not formulate Italy's policy as if she were Switzerland."

2. In a further conversation today Ciano told me in the same sense that the Italian Government knew how important raw material supplies were for Germany, and was aware of its obvious duty to help us in every way. Therefore, by order of the Duce he had instructed all offices concerned to exhaust every single economic or technical possibility, also with regard to the particularly difficult question of transit imports to Germany via Italy. However, naturally only such deliveries could be considered as could be camouflaged and passed through the British control. In particular, it would be necessary to keep at least approximately within the limits of the past import statistics. Count Ciano telephoned the agencies involved in my presence and instructed them to promote the transit to Germany as much as was humanly possible.

3. Then Count Ciano asked me to inform the Foreign Minister that in the meantime he had discussed in detail with the Duce the question of more vigorous political activity by Italy against England in the fight against the blockade, for instance at the head of a bloc of the states of Southeastern Europe. The Duce had instructed him to tell the Foreign Minister that although the first suggestion came from the Italian Ambassador in Berlin he considered it inadvisable at the present moment to initiate any sort of action at the head of the neutrals. He disliked being placed on the same level with the neutral powers, even if only outwardly; this was in contradiction to Italy's attitude. I stressed once more that in this connection we had naturally never thought of underlining Italy's position as a neutral power; on the contrary the aim was actually supposed to be intensification of the anti-British attitude. Count Ciano replied that nevertheless the Duce felt that at the present time any sort of joint protest action through diplomatic channels, which could be interpreted as being done in the name of neutral powers, was inadvisable. Count Ciano added that one must not forget that the Duce had begun his political career as an interventionist and that even now it went against his grain to be stamped as neutral, even outwardly.

4. Since the Italian Government has changed its former stand and has secretly assented also to the import of raw materials via Italy, I shall now continue trying to organize the execution of such transactions in so far as possible. However, there will still be a considerable number of technical difficulties with subordinate offices even now.

CLODIUS
MACKENSEN

No. 278

1793/408574

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 313 of October 19

HELSINKI, October 19, 1939—8:22 p. m.

Received October 19—9:25 p. m.

Pol. VI 2405.

The Finnish Government continues to maintain the strictest secrecy regarding Russian demands. The Finnish people are calm but are firmly determined to defend the independence and integrity of the Finnish mainland, by force of arms, if necessary. The stubborn attitude of the people will limit the freedom of the Finnish plenipotentiary to negotiate.

The mobilization has been concluded and the troop concentration completed.

The Scandinavian and United States démarches¹ in Moscow and Finland and the friendly press comments from these countries as well as from England, France, and South America are raising the morale here and create the impression that in the impending conflict the whole world, with the exception of Germany, is supporting Finland, at least morally.

Pro-German circles are at the moment completely disconcerted; in many, a total change of sentiment is taking place. Government representatives maintain a correct attitude, but the previous close political collaboration is a thing of the past.

Please inform OKH.

BLÜCHER

¹ The Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Governments presented identical notes to the Soviet Government on Oct. 12. The text of President Roosevelt's message to President Kalinin, dated Oct. 11 and delivered Oct. 12, is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 395, along with Kalinin's reply.

No. 279

8280/E588269-70

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram en clair

BERLIN, October 19, 1939.

zu R 25440 Angabe I.²

With reference to telegraphic instruction of September 29.³

The British Government claims that to proceed under British naval escort affords neutral merchant vessels greater protection and does not

¹ Hewel had informed Weizsäcker the day before of Hitler's wish that a new warning along these lines be issued to the neutrals (51/33915). The telegram was sent to all the principal Missions.

² R 25440: 8280/E588267.

³ Not printed (8280/E588260-66). See document No. 144. footnote 3.

signify a breach of neutrality. You are requested to notify the Government there at once as follows with reference to this matter:

German forces will combat British and French convoys by force of arms. German action will be directed not only against the naval escorts but also against all convoyed ships without exception. This is in accordance with generally recognized rules of naval warfare. At the same time it should again be pointed out that all neutral merchant vessels, including passenger steamers, which proceed at night without lights expose themselves to be mistaken for enemy naval vessels or auxiliary naval vessels, and consequently to the danger of being annihilated.⁴

Please send a telegraphic report upon execution of this instruction.

WEIZÄCKER

⁴ A supplementary circular of Oct. 22 directed that neutral governments should be informed that they ought to warn their nationals against traveling on British and French ships (8280/E588277-88).

No. 280

127/69660

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, October 19, 1939.

No. 568 of October 19

With reference to your telegram No. 594 of October 17.¹

Molotov today informed me that Stalin approved the account of the negotiations in Moscow that the Reich Foreign Minister contemplates making in his forthcoming speech. He only asked that instead of the sentences quoted as the statement of Stalin: "Germany was taking a proud attitude . . ." up to ". . . getting into a difficult position," the following version be adopted: "The attitude of Germany in declining military aid commands respect. However, a strong Germany is the absolute prerequisite for peace in Europe, whence it follows that the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. Therefore the Soviet Union cannot give its approval to the Western Powers' creating conditions which would weaken Germany and place her in a difficult position. Therein lies the community of interests between Germany and the Soviet Union."²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 271.

² The sentences discussed were apparently intended for Ribbentrop's speech given at Danzig on Oct. 24, but according to the text of that speech as printed they were not used. Cf. *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 362-381.

No. 281

48/29799-800

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, October 19, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

Colot, the Secretary of the Belgian Embassy, returned this noon from a short visit to Brussels. He confirmed the fact to members of his Embassy that the Government circles in Brussels still see a chance for peace. Reports received there from London and Paris indicate that, in spite of the negative reaction of the German press to Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, England and France are still counting on the possibility that the Führer will not at this moment make his final military decisions, which would be irrevocable. London and Paris, too, are waiting for some diplomatic initiative by the neutrals. The talk recurs repeatedly to Roosevelt, who is now regarded as the only person who comes into consideration for any serious peace move. One can assume that the representatives of many European countries in Washington have tried these last days to encourage the American President to accept the role of mediator. The Belgian diplomat, who was totally pessimistic when he left for Brussels, states that there was as yet no sign of 100 percent pessimism in Belgian Government circles, which are very well informed. The Belgian Government itself still clings to the hope that it will be possible to avert the unloosing of a frightful war in Western Europe at the last minute, as it were.

The Belgian diplomat claims that Brussels is convinced that the Führer, too, does not regard the present situation as final. It is asserted that the Reich Government is also delaying its final decisions because supposedly it is not yet convinced that the final word for war has been given.

The Belgian Embassy itself is not as optimistic as its informant from Brussels. But even there the impression still persists that fundamentally Germany, too, would prefer a peaceful solution to a spreading of the war.¹

L[IKUS]

¹Marginal note: "F[ührer]: They do not believe that we are in earnest. R[ibbentrop]"

No. 282

822/193581

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 19, 1939.

The organization of the trade relations with Spain under wartime conditions presents special difficulties because the flow of trade can be maintained only as camouflaged transit through Italy as long as the sea routes are subject to interference by the enemy powers. It is in our interest to get the maximum quantity of Spanish raw materials through this channel and to keep the Spanish from resuming exports of raw materials to the enemy powers. The Spanish Government has on several occasions assured our Ambassador of its great desire, despite the war, to carry into effect as much as it is possible the economic collaboration envisaged prior to the outbreak of the war. It has repeatedly requested the opening of negotiations, which has thus far not been possible, because the Italian Government's position on facilitating the transit traffic was not clear.

Now that this issue has been clarified, these negotiations ought to be started at the earliest opportunity. Even though the economic results of these negotiations would of necessity be slight compared to former plans, it would nonetheless be desirable to indicate to the Spaniards, also by the selection of the chief negotiator, that we, too, on our part, are anxious despite the war to carry out the original plans as far as possible.

I should like to propose the appointment of Herr Staatsrat Wohlthat as the chief negotiator; he conducted the earlier discussions with the Spaniards and is therefore the person most suitable for continuing them and adjusting them to present conditions. Herr Wohlthat would have to go to Rome as promptly as possible for briefing by Minister Clodius as to the facilities for transit, and then take a plane to Madrid. The estimated duration of the negotiations would be about 2 weeks.

When I asked him, Herr Wohlthat said that he was personally prepared to undertake the trip but was not quite sure whether the Field Marshal might not want to have him available here for some other tasks in the near future.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for authorization to ask the Field Marshal for his consent to Herr Wohlthat's trip to Spain.¹

WIEHL

¹ Göring raised objections to the sending of Wohlthat to Madrid (8882/-E047508), but he was finally delegated to go, arriving on Oct. 31 (8868/E045875).

No. 283

276/178649-50 ;
276/178652

Chief of Protocol Dörnberg to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, October 19, 1939.

Received October 22.

DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: The Foreign Minister has asked me to inform you as follows:

On the occasion of his second visit to Moscow he was particularly anxious that in the demarcation of the definitive boundary the district of Suwałki should be given to Germany or included in the German sphere of influence. The Foreign Minister was interested in the fact that the very valuable forests of Augustów, in which royal red deer are supposedly found, are situated in the Suwalki region. So far as I can recall from a conversation with the Minister, M. Stalin granted his wish, saying that the region should be awarded to Germany for her Foreign Minister because of its fine stags.

The Foreign Minister recently sent me to Poland to arrange for the protection of our hunting interests. While so doing, I found that in the whole of the Suwałki region and in the forests of Augustów there are no royal stags or stags of any sort.

Red deer are said to appear only when migrating. The Minister was naturally very disappointed at learning this. I then tried to find something suitable in the rest of Poland. In Warsaw I spoke with competent Polish forestry and hunting people, and from this it was quite plain that the really good hunting grounds, and particularly the hunting grounds for red deer, have fallen almost exclusively to Russia.

The most famous hunt in Poland, was, as we know, at Białowieża. The hunting grounds there, however, are known more for the presence of lynx, wolf, elk, and bison, than for royal red deer. The large deer are still in the Carpathian hunting grounds, and there, too, unfortunately, in the part east of the San that was ceded to Russia. According to the statements of a Carpathian huntsman, with whom I am personally well acquainted, there are two wonderful hunting grounds in this part of the Carpathians south of Borysław. One is called Skole,¹ and is on the Opor River. This district is said to have been kept in excellent condition, with shooting boxes, hunting paths, and game-keepers almost exclusively of German origin. The second famous Carpathian hunting ground belonged to the Metropolit of Lwów; it was called Zolotvina-Mizunska, near Stryj.

The Foreign Minister now requests you to tell either M. Molotov or M. Stalin himself that there are no stags at Augustów, and to suggest

¹ Marginal note in Schulenburg's handwriting: "Belonged to Baron Grödel."

that he be leased one of the two hunting grounds in the Carpathians. The Minister also sees certain political advantages in this proposal, since through his hunting visits to Russia he could come in closer contact with personages in Russia. The Minister is himself in doubt as to whether the Russians will accede to such a proposal, but he would like to have the attempt made, in any case, and he leaves it to you to make his wish known in whatever form seems appropriate.²

Next I should like to refer to my letter of October 7,³ in which I asked for another delivery of caviar. The Minister asked me for it because he would like to have the caviar given to the badly wounded who can take no other nourishment. Perhaps the next courier could bring the shipment along with him. It would be much appreciated here if the amount could be increased by another one kilogram can.

I should also like to state in conclusion that Count Ludwig Christian zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, whom I commended to you in my letter of September 24,⁴ has meanwhile turned up in a hospital as a German prisoner of war. I wish to thank you sincerely for your efforts in this matter.

My wife asks me to give you her kindest regards, and I myself remain, as ever,

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

ALEXANDER DÖRNBERG

² Marginal note: "Berlin, November 3, 1939. The Foreign Minister and Dörnberg have been informed that Molotov 'will find a way' to comply with the wish of the Foreign Minister. Schulenburg."

On Nov. 1 Schulenburg had handed Molotov a note in Russian (276/178651) asking on what conditions (temporary use, lease, etc.) Ribbentrop might hunt in the Carpathians, particularly in the two regions suggested, and had received the answer noted here. Dörnberg wrote again on Dec. 5 about this matter (276/178583-84), and Schulenburg replied on Dec. 12 that when he had raised the question about 2 weeks previously and again on Dec. 10, Molotov each time promised a prompt answer. Schulenburg suggested that the matter might proceed faster if Dörnberg came to Moscow (276/178585-86).

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

No. 284

499/234192

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Cipher letter

No. 1038 g

MADRID, October 19, 1939.

1. As has been indicated in my reports, the Foreign Minister¹ and the Under State Secretary² provide me regularly with information found in the telegraphic and written reports from the Spanish diplomatic Missions abroad.

¹ Col. Juan Beigbeder Atienza.

² J. Peche y Cabeza de Vaca.

It might be possible to make even better use of this cooperation if I were kept informed of any specific questions on which we want to get information, in so far as they concern matters which presumably would come to the attention of the Spanish diplomatic representatives abroad and particularly in the enemy countries.

2. To strengthen security, I shall henceforth refer to information supplied to me by the Minister or the Under State Secretary, by: "Wilhelm reports" or "August reports."

Please acknowledge receipt of this message by telegraph.

STOHRER

No. 285

463/226013

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 20, 1939—4: 22 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 20—11: 45 a. m.

No. 567 of October 19

Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Ambassador in London had recently had a number of talks with Halifax, Churchill, Eden, and Butler. The most interesting was his talk yesterday with Butler. Butler stated that the British Government would be ready to make peace even tomorrow if it received assurance that the understanding reached would ensure peace for 20 or 25 years. The British Government would regard as such assurance a guarantee pronounced by all major powers, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union. In such an event the British Government would be prepared, in the interest of a lasting peace, to make important concessions to Germany even in respect to colonies. In as much as such a peace could not be expected at this time, England would continue the war. Butler pointed out that Germany's latest peace offensive had been a fiasco; he is inclined to believe, however, that new peace efforts later on in the war might have better prospects of success. Molotov believes Maisky's telegram conveys the impression that a Soviet mediation would not be unwelcome to the British Government. I asked Molotov to confirm whether Maisky had interpreted Butler's words the same as he had. Molotov promised to let me know as soon as possible.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ Schulenburg reported in a telegram of Nov. 13 (852/202726) that he had spoken that day with Molotov, who told him that Maisky had added nothing substantial to his previous report, and that "Maisky did not have the impression that Butler had Soviet mediation in mind."

No. 286

F8/0019-0012

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, October 21, 1939.

Reception of Slovak Minister Černák by the Führer on October 21 from 12:00 to 12:45 p. m. State Minister Meissner and Senior Counselor Hewel were also present.

Černák expressed thanks for his reception and conveyed the congratulations of the Slovak Government on the victorious conclusion of the Polish campaign. He continued as follows:

He had wished to present a request which in the meantime, however, had probably become unnecessary, since he had been told just an hour ago that the areas lost to Poland would now definitely be reunited with Slovakia.¹ This had been the greatest desire of the Slovaks, for they had every right to these areas, on historical grounds as well as on ethnological, military, moral, and linguistic grounds. The only thing he could do now was to thank the Führer that his request had already been fulfilled. He asked that the German Reich confirm this reincorporation in writing, as had been done between Germany and Russia and Russia and Lithuania. The Führer promised that this would be done and added that Slovakia had behaved very decently in this dispute, in contrast to another country. "Your conduct has definitely established the Slovak state."

From now on Germany would no longer permit anyone to infringe upon the rights of Slovakia.

Černák mentioned that Slovakia was very small compared to other countries. She pursued a policy based on a community of interests with Germany. Germany had helped Slovakia become a state; as a state she was practically an infant. In the past five or six months she had been forced to work extremely hard to consolidate the state, and a few mistakes had been made. But the Slovaks had not done a great deal of talking, like other countries, and had not wished and asked for much; they had acted and taken risks. The word gratitude was unknown in the field of politics, but Slovakia would be happy to reintroduce it there.

¹ The Protectorate Government, in a similar manner, had taken the opportunity of the Polish defeat to ask that the Teschen area be returned to the Protectorate. Neurath endorsed this request and transmitted it to Lammers on Oct. 3 (1764/405559-62). Woermann recorded on Oct. 12 that the Political and the Economic Policy Departments of the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Volks-deutsche Mittelstelle, had opposed this transfer, and that in any event, Hitler had already decided that Teschen should not go to the Protectorate (1764/405571).

The Führer described the development of Slovakia as he saw it. He said that he had originally seen Slovakia only through Hungarian spectacles. He had always believed that Slovakia wished to return to the "thousand-year Hungarian realm." But when on one occasion he had discussed with the Hungarians the possibilities of a plebiscite and the Hungarians had said that the Slovaks were not entirely reliable, after all, he had gone into the question thoroughly and had only then become aware of Slovakia's aspirations toward independence. The Poles, too, had told him that Slovak was really only a Polish dialect and Slovakia really belonged under Polish influence. Finally he had become convinced, however, that Slovakia did not want either.

Černák said that Germany had had the power to act quite differently with reference to Slovakia, but the Führer assured him that Germany had absolutely no territorial interest there. The Carpathians were the borderline of Germany's interests. Germany had to have a barrier against the great power groups to the southeast, whose development was unpredictable. He had had confidence in Slovakia. Germany's relation to these countries was really a question of confidence. If Germany had been able to trust Czechia, she would still be in existence today, just as after the separation of the Sudeten German areas. With Poland it was different. He often considered Poland's fate really tragic, although some incredibly base acts were committed during the fighting. But the West was entirely responsible for this. Just as in the past, England was still searching the entire world for countries to do the fighting for her. By looking at the map one could see the absurdity of the [British] Empire; this ridiculous little country wanted to control the world. It could do so only because there always existed foreign peoples and countries which shed their blood for England. This did not suit us Germans, for we considered it a matter of honor for a nation to defend its own interests. Thus, for example, we were not permitting any Czech troops to fight for us.

If Germany assumed a guarantee for Slovakia, she would of course have to have certain military facilities there; this could not be avoided.

A certain bond of sympathy had always existed between the Poles and the Hungarians, resulting from the rule of the magnates in both countries. These magnates, who exploited their poor fellow countrymen in the most ruthless manner and did not have the slightest understanding of social obligations, had connections beyond the frontiers of the country, and one could never know whether these connections might not result in some sort of political agreement. Therefore one had to be careful.

Černák said that Germany's confidence in Slovakia was surely greater now than six months ago. But he had still another question, which concerned statements by the Führer, some of them from his speech pertaining to the resettlement of ethnic groups.² About 40 per cent of the Slovak people were living outside the borders of the Slovak state. The Führer replied that his statements had referred primarily to the Baltic countries. The situation was very simple there. He had always had full understanding for Russia's desire for ice-free ports. Germany had many of them, and Russia's efforts to obtain such ports would always have been a threat to peace in the future too. Germany did not want to oppose natural political developments, however. Thus she had come to an agreement with Russia concerning their respective spheres of interest, since he (the Führer) did not want to have "stupid wars" develop at some later time after his death.

Černák then spoke of about six hundred thousand Slovaks who had been living in Hungary in compact ethnic groups since the Vienna Award. The Führer said that the separation of these areas had partly resulted from the hesitant attitude of Slovakia in those decisive days. At that time the Slovak Government had caused a great deal of difficulty at the idea of admitting German troops, so that at the decisive moment he had been convinced that he should stay out of these matters entirely and not burden himself with them. He asked M. Černák whether the figures he had just mentioned were really reliable. Černák confirmed this and said that Hungarian statistics were to a large degree fraudulent. These figures, however, were taken from reliable census data of the year 1910. He spoke subsequently of the oppression by the Magyars of the Slovaks living in Hungary. The Führer agreed and further commented upon the peculiar Hungarian attitude. The Hungarians did not want to learn anything from us in certain fields: They even . . . Germany on account of her social . . .³ He draws a parallel between . . . and the great land owners in Hungary . . . he had eliminated any basis for . . .

When Černák asked whether there was a possibility for Slovakia to discuss the population question at some later date, the Führer answered that he would contact the Slovak Government as soon as this problem was ready for discussion. Understandable as these efforts were here in Germany, he realized nevertheless that it would take decades to carry them out. We had noticed that already in the case of Italy and Poland. But he wanted to draw definitive boundaries, because he believed that this would lead to peace in the political sphere also.

² See Editors' Note, p. 227.

³ These passages are only partly legible.

When Černák asked whether he could officially inform his Government of the reincorporation of the territories, the Führer said he could do so, and he would confirm this later in a state treaty. Černák said that an announcement in the press was the best argument to be used against Beneš and the other agitators. He also said that the fact should become known that if a nation was not taking a hostile attitude toward Germany's vital interests it could expect the greatest loyalty on the part of Germany, as the Slovaks had experienced it. The Führer answered that he would perhaps make use of this argument at some opportune moment.

The Führer closed the conversation by speaking at some length about England, which had actually been entirely indifferent to the Czechs and Poles. Henderson himself had told him that the Poles were "lousy dogs". He made a few more statements about Germany's strength.

After a remark regarding a press communiqué to be drawn up the Slovak Minister took his leave. The conversation went off in a very cordial manner.

HEWEL

No. 287

96/108074

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 836

BERLIN, October 21, 1939.

I discussed the Turkish-British-French treaty¹ with the Italian Ambassador today. In doing so I made it clear to Attolico how the Reich Foreign Minister had done his part in Moscow to prevent the Turks from concluding with England and France a treaty with an orientation offensive to Italy.

In the discussion of the details of the treaty I asked Attolico to let me know some time whether and in what cases, in the opinion of the Italians, British naval forces might still be expected to penetrate into the Black Sea. It seemed to me that the text of the treaty left certain doubts in this respect.

I especially asked Attolico, however, to inform me as soon as possible whether the Italian Government would undertake a démarche in Ankara because of the conclusion of this treaty, and, if so, what its substance would be. I wished to ask this question since the treaty, concluded now during a time of war, was in its general tendency of

¹ This treaty was signed at Ankara on Oct. 19, 1939. The text in English and French is published in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, pp. 167-175.

course directed against us, but viewed in its practical significance naturally aimed primarily at Italy.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² On Oct. 26 Attolico replied that Italy's attitude was that of waiting and reserve (96/108085).

No. 288

2185/472247

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 837

BERLIN, October 21, 1939.

Personal! To the State Secretaries and Directors of the Departments:

The Foreign Minister has just told me the following:

Until further notice he is forbidding members of the Ministry to receive Ambassador von Papen, who is at present in Berlin, or to enter into official conversations with him, especially concerning political matters. This order is to be transmitted to the directors of departments at once.

In so far as I shall not personally be in a position to inform orally the heads of departments of this today, I hereby request that you take cognizance of the above. Please also give the necessary instructions immediately to the senior officials concerned who are under you.

Herr von Papen, for his part, is also to be informed by me at the Foreign Minister's instruction.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (London, 1952), p. 457. This order represented Ribbentrop's reaction to the news that Papen had disobeyed the Foreign Minister's order not to discuss with Hitler recent conversations with Visser, the Netherlands Minister in Ankara, concerning possible peace moves. On the Papen-Visser conversations see document No. 242 and footnote 5.

No. 289

2422/511820-22

Chargé d'Affaires Thomsen to Under State Secretary Woermann

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1939.

zu Pol. IX 2353.¹

DEAR WOERMANN: Owing to the outbreak of the war I have been unable, for obvious reasons, to answer your letter of August 10² con-

¹ Pol. IX 2353: The basic file number was assigned to the telegraphic reply to this letter referred to in footnote 5.

² Not printed (2422/511823-24).

cerning the possibility of resuming social relations between the Foreign Ministry and the American Embassy in Berlin on the one hand, and the German Embassy in Washington and the State Department on the other. Now that the courier route is available again to a certain extent, I should like to say the following regarding the problem:

We broke off social intercourse with the State Department here at the time, including the men handling German affairs, and have rigorously maintained that condition since.³ The State Department is naturally fully aware of the reasons, the more so as it has probably been informed by Mr. Kirk that he, as he put it on some occasion, "is being treated like an outcast."⁴

The same paradoxical situations have resulted here in Washington as in Berlin. The armed forces attachés carry on regular social intercourse with all branches of the American armed services and in that way are frequently in social contact with members of the State Department.

In the interest of official business I would therefore consider it desirable at any rate to relax the social ban sufficiently to make it possible for normal social relations to be resumed at least between the members of the Embassy staff and the men in the State Department concerned with German affairs. I know that the State Department would not be averse to such a resumption of social relations. Since we were the ones who started the boycott, it is also up to us to take the first step in lifting it, a step which, for the reasons cited, I consider politically and objectively sound.⁵

Quite apart from the normalization of our social relations with members of the State Department, I should like to add parenthetically that since the outbreak of the war we have been completely boycotted by so-called good society here and the greater part of the Diplomatic Corps that is neutral. It is the same phenomenon as in 1914 and something that can be borne with equanimity.

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

THOMSEN

³ This step was taken by order of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on Jan. 4, 1939. See vol. iv, document No. 520.

⁴ The quoted passage is in English in the original.

⁵ Woermann replied on Nov. 20 by telegram (2422/511819) stating that normal social relations with the American Embassy in Berlin had been resumed at the beginning of September, and that Thomsen was authorized to proceed similarly in Washington.

No. 290

230/152080

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 426 of October 22

BELGRADE, October 22, 1939—5:50 p. m.

Received October 22—9:15 p. m.

The possibility that the principles concerning repatriation of German splinter groups, expressed in the Führer's speech,¹ might be applied to the volksdeutsch groups in Yugoslavia is beginning to arouse serious concern and unrest among Volksdeutsche and Yugoslavs here.

I therefore request authorization to state in reply to inquiries and for publication in the volksdeutsch press that the problem of repatriation of German groups in Yugoslavia is by no means acute at the present time and even later on would demand solution only in so far as this might appear necessary in order to eliminate a serious cause of friction between the countries. Naturally, the full accord of both Governments and of all those affected by the action would always be a prerequisite for any action of this kind.

HEEREN

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 227.

No. 291

B21/B005148

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 551 of October 22

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1939—6:01 p. m.

Received October 23—3:00 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

1. I have learned from a reliable source that after a talk with Churchill, in which the latter expressed his expectation of America's early entry into the war, Kennedy urgently warned the American Government of the possible consequences of a repeal of the arms embargo, stressing that Churchill's statement did not represent the views of Chamberlain and the majority of the British Cabinet. The Cabinet, rather, would prefer to avoid any intensification of warfare which might be announced or initiated by a repeal of the American arms embargo.

2. According to the same source, Beaverbrook at a club in New York described France's domestic situation as serious and far from favorable for the prosecution of the war.

THOMSEN

No. 292

F8/0020-0025

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

FAREWELL VISIT OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL OSHIMA, WITH THE FÜHRER, ON OCTOBER 24, 1939, FROM 4:30 TO 5:10

RM 52

The Japanese Ambassador first delivered to the Führer some presents from the Japanese industrialist, Fujiwara. After examining these presents they sat down and tea was served.

General Oshima thanked the Führer for the reception and, at the instruction of his Government, read a short statement which he had been directed to communicate to the Führer personally. "By order of my Government I have the following statement to make to you, Mr. Chancellor: The Japanese Government and the Japanese people always recall with sincere gratitude Germany's attitude toward Japan in the Chinese conflict. The Japanese Government cherishes the hope that the cordial relations existing between Germany and Japan will undergo no change as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe, but, on the contrary, will be maintained on the same friendly basis as ever."

The Führer replied that it was also our genuine desire more and more to strengthen the friendship between Germany and Japan. Whatever happened, one thing was certain: German and Japanese interests would never in the least conflict. Where our German interests might one day lie, there would definitely be no Japanese interests; and where Japanese interests lay, there were definitely no German interests. Only nations whose interests did not conflict could get along together permanently, and conflicts of interests were mainly the result of territorial claims. German colonial demands in Africa were of no consequence at all to Japan. It had always been the endeavor of the Führer to make clear-cut divisions between spheres of interest, as he had indeed often demonstrated, and in this he had finally gone so far as, for instance, the resettlement of the South Tirolese. From the purely climatic standpoint alone, the Japanese spheres of interest were unhealthful for Germans and not worth striving for. On the other hand, there were naturally certain regions where Germany would under no circumstances tolerate any interference. This, too, he had demonstrated. When the British had asserted that their frontier lay on the Rhine, even this had been sheer stupidity. But when they asserted that their interests lay on the Vistula, this was actually idiotic and he had given them the right answer. Finally, notwithstanding their grandiose contentions, they had even ignominiously abandoned their Vistula frontier.

General Oshima then spoke enthusiastically of his trip to the West Wall, of his inspection of the bunkers, and a long conversation followed regarding the fortifications and their impregnability. The military aspect of the Polish operation and the capture of Warsaw were also spoken of. The Führer concluded this conversation with a reference to his confidence in victory, even if war now broke out in earnest in the West. The war against England and France had not yet begun. He was a man who always liked to be sure of himself and therefore made his preparations very exactly and reliably. But in the West, too, the superiority of the German Army would be demonstrated.

Every enemy of Germany would also some time, in some way, become the enemy of Japan. If somebody should assert that Germany was all alone, he would say in reply that he did not want military help of any kind. The 82 million Germans could deal alone with the military problems that confronted them. Nor, frankly, would he care to share the victory with anyone. He had also made this clear to Mussolini and had told him, moreover, that he did not need Italy's military assistance. We Germans did not understand the methods of the British, who went about in the world begging in order to find nations that were willing to shed their blood for them and their aims. We Germans would make our own sacrifices of blood in shaping our destiny, and this would also be the sounder way and would have its effect in the development of a nation. It was the same with the Japanese. He hardly thought that the Japanese desired military assistance of any kind in China. One could do nothing more than triumph and if one was confident of victory, one preferred to triumph alone. What we needed from other nations was assistance in the form of trade, and of this we had already assured ourselves. Naturally it was of advantage to us if England met with opposition in all parts of the world.

The Führer concluded the reception with words of great cordiality, stating that he was sorry to see General Oshima go. General Oshima replied that he would not [illegible words] to continue working for German-Japanese friendship in Japan. Upon taking leave, the Führer wished him good luck and a successful conclusion of the Japanese conflict in China.

When the reception was concluded, the following press communiqué was issued, for which I obtained the approval of the Führer.

"Berlin, October 24, 1939.

"Today in the new Reich Chancellery, the Führer received for his farewell visit the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima, who has been recalled from his Berlin post. By direction of his Government, the Ambassador expressed the firm conviction that German-Japanese friendship would continue unchanged."

No. 293

174/136181-82

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, October 24, 1939—10:15 p. m.

No. 618 of October 24

Received October 24—7:45 p. m.

With reference to my report of October 1.

In our first detailed discussion Ambassador Shiratori offered close cooperation in promoting a nonaggression pact between Japan and Russia, with the ultimate aim of active cooperation between Germany, Japan, Russia, and Italy.

His impressions from his first conversation with Minister President Abe, Prince Konoye, and leading men from the armed forces and industry confirm my interpretation of the situation which is en route by courier.¹ Shiratori observed a great increase in the power of the pro-British Court circles and industry and indications of weakness within the Army, in particular because of the Nomonhan military defeat with its heavy casualties. The principal foreign policy aims at the present time are to put a quick end to the conflict in China and to come to an agreement with America before the threatened termination of the commercial treaty. In order to attain these goals, Court circles have instituted, together with British propaganda, wide-spread agitation against the Russian danger. The weak Abe Cabinet, maintained in power with difficulty by the Court circles, is in a most precarious position between America's demands for far-reaching abandonment of the Japanese objectives in China and the radical opposition of the anti-British group which is threatening terrorist action. Shiratori is counting on the fall of the Cabinet soon and the impossibility of reaching an agreement with England and America; he envisages the possibility then of a gradual rapprochement with Russia until a nonaggression pact is concluded, and he has begun to work on individual leading officials and political groups parallel with my continuing efforts to exert influence.

The chief obstacle in the way of our policy is the widespread doubt of Russia's good will. The most effective refutation would be Russian renunciation of Chiang Kai-shek, by which Japan's policy in China could be so assisted that a nonaggression pact would be feasible. Shiratori suggested that the Reich Foreign Minister be induced to give him a statement to the effect that Germany was prepared and in a position to exert such influence on Russia. He expected that this would cause a strong reaction against Court circles and greatly in-

¹ See document No. 264.

fluence the Emperor, to whom he is to report on November 6. I agree with Shiratori's opinion and repeat my proposal that Russia publicly abandon her support of Chiang Kai-shek, and in addition unequivocally deny the imperialistic aspirations in Chinese territory which have recently been imputed to her by British propaganda. I request consideration for Shiratori's suggestion of a confidential declaration by the Foreign Minister of his readiness to act in this matter. I call attention to another promising possibility which would be for the Russian standpoint to be announced for the first time through the new Russian Ambassador, who has just left Moscow.²

OTT

² The new Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Constantin Smetanin, arrived at his post early in November. Ott noted in a report of Nov. 9 (157/131092-95) that Smetanin gave several interviews en route, repeatedly stressing the friendly nature of his mission and Russia's readiness for an understanding.

No. 294

S126/E582007

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 480

BERLIN, October 24, 1939—10:30 p. m.
e. o. R 26170

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally, confidentially.

For the purpose of examining the question whether and in what way we are to take a position on the enactment of the Pittman Bill,¹ please wire us now the argument which could be effectively put forward from precisely the American standpoint if the occasion arises. As soon as the final formulation of the law is fixed, please send us a further telegraphic report.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In an earlier draft of the telegram, altered in handwriting on this copy, this opening clause had read: "As soon as the Pittman Bill becomes law we intend in a detailed note to lodge a protest with the American Government on grounds of discrimination against Germany and violation of neutrality."

The Pittman Bill, introduced in the United States Senate on Oct. 2 by Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, provided for repeal of those provisions of American neutrality legislation banning shipment of arms to belligerents.

No. 295

51/38921-22

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 843

BERLIN, October 24, 1939.

For the Foreign Minister.

War against merchant shipping requires a daily exchange of ideas between the Foreign Ministry and the Wehrmacht. The greatest pos-

sible benefit could be achieved by our Navy against enemy and neutral shipping for the purpose of combating England if the Navy would sweep clean the seas around England by utilizing all available means and methods of warfare. The Wehrmacht fully realizes, however, that it must consider certain economic and political factors, depending on the situation, which will restrict the methods of warfare. Finding the proper limits in this respect is the purpose of the daily exchange of ideas between the Foreign Ministry and the Wehrmacht.

So far the conferences between these two offices have taken place informally at the Foreign Ministry or the Wehrmacht as convenient. Just yesterday, however, I indicated that as a rule I would prefer these discussions to be held daily in our building, especially since three departments of the Foreign Ministry are regularly involved (Political, Economic Policy, Legal). The question of who should preside at the conferences has so far not played any role and I have also requested that it not be made a question of competence or prestige. Actually in these matters, the Wehrmacht cannot act without the Foreign Ministry, nor the Foreign Ministry without the Wehrmacht. So far we have been on excellent terms. As a rule orders to the naval forces are shown to us in advance, just as we in turn show the Navy our instructions and notes in advance.

I believe that it would therefore be best to retain this procedure and to take into account the importance of the Ministry and the very heavy work load of the directors, etc., by generally holding the conferences at the Foreign Ministry.

As a rule it is superfluous to invite economic representatives to these conferences, which are essentially concerned with the legal aspects of naval warfare.

The cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Foreign Ministry, herein described—which moreover existed all during the war of 1914–1918—relates to the Commission for the Economic Requirements of the War, which was appointed by Field Marshal Göring, only in exceptional cases.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 296

1625/389246-47

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*¹

BERLIN, October 24, 1939.

Pol. II 4236.

I told the Rumanian Minister, who paid me a visit today, that we were greatly displeased by the inclusion of Rumania in the Turkish-

¹ On Oct. 26 this document was sent as a circular to the Missions in Europe (1935/389246).

English-French pact.² I reminded M. Crutzescu that on his return from Ankara in June M. Gafencu had, vis-à-vis our Minister, claimed it as his personal success that Turkey had promised complete elimination of any reference to the Balkans in the treaty that was to be signed.³ To this the Minister replied that he could give us these formal and solemn assurances: Turkey's commitment to assist England and France in case the Anglo-French guarantee to Rumania became operative had been inserted in the pact without any knowledge whatever on the part of the Rumanian Government and Rumania was in no way affected by this commitment. I answered that in July, following the above-mentioned declaration made to our Minister in June, M. Gafencu appeared to have been aware of the fact that England had requested effective assistance from Turkey in case circumstances calling for implementation of the guarantee to Rumania should develop.⁴ In consequence we seriously doubted the theory that Rumania had been entirely ignorant of this. The Minister was very emphatic in reiterating his statement. At the same time, he personally deplored that the inclusion of Rumania in the Anglo-French front was bound to make an unfavorable impression on us. He then called attention to various Rumanian press statements concerning Rumania's neutrality. M. Crutzescu then expressed the opinion that Turkey had now placed herself outside the framework of a projected Balkan neutrality bloc. I answered the Minister that it was not quite clear to me what new neutrality bloc was meant and asked him whether negotiations to form such a bloc were actually in progress. To this M. Crutzescu gave an altogether vague reply, expressing the opinion that at any rate the attempts promoted by England to form a bloc directed against the North had to be regarded as having failed.

The Minister had the same report as we had, that conversations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were to be resumed in Ankara.

WOERMANN

² See document No. 338.

³ See vol. VI, documents Nos. 561 and 567.

⁴ See vol. VI, document No. 627.

No. 297

51/33926-27

Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department

BERLIN, October 24, 1939.

R 26427.

A conference was held today by Under State Secretary Woermann on the question of whether Germany should officially inform Sweden

that we do not recognize the 4-mile zone insisted on by Sweden. Those present at the conference were:

Ministerialdirektor Wiehl
Minister Prince Bismarck
Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht
Senior Counselor von Grundherr
Counselor von der Heyden-Rynsch
Counselor Lohmann

The Economic Policy Department emphasized that such a step would necessarily have a serious disturbing effect on the forthcoming very difficult negotiations with Sweden about the continuance of ore deliveries. The Economic Policy Department would therefore like to have the step postponed until the negotiations are concluded, which can be expected by the middle or the end of November.

The Political Department does not consider the disturbance to our relations with Sweden very consequential, but it, too, would rather have us refrain from such a step at the present time.

The Legal Department pointed out that Germany had always in the past recognized the 3-mile zone, but no more. There were doubts as to whether the extension of the mine barrage planned by the Navy would actually give us greater control over the traffic through the Sound.

The result of the conference was that the head of R. S.¹ was instructed to talk with the Naval Operations Staff in order to ascertain whether a short postponement of the notification could be justified. It was to be made clear at the same time that the Foreign Ministry was prepared to assist the OKM as much as possible in this matter. The OKM also was to be advised that Germany had made no reservation with respect to the footnote in the Swedish neutrality law.

Since, according to the Political Department, several formal protests of the Swedes regarding alleged violations of Swedish territory, relating to the strip between the third and fourth sea mile, are still pending, the plan has been adopted to notify the Swedes, in reply to these protests, that we can recognize only a 3-mile zone as sovereign territory. It might be possible in this way to avoid advertising the differences of opinion between Germany and Sweden to the entire world.

LOHMANN

¹ R. S., designation of a new division in the Legal Department charged with coordinating the conduct of German naval warfare involving merchant shipping. Johann Georg Lohmann headed this division; his memorandum of the ensuing conversation with the Naval Staff is printed as document No. 298.

No. 298

51/88924-25

Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department

BERLIN, October 24, 1939.

R 26428.

This afternoon I called upon Lieutenant Commander Neubauer and Ministerialrat Dr. Eckhardt of the Naval Staff of the High Command of the Navy in order to inform them, as instructed, of the result of the conference held this morning at the office of Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann on the question of the Swedish territorial waters.¹

Captain Fricke had requested Lieutenant Commander Neubauer to receive me in his stead. I stated that the question raised by the High Command of the Navy and the High Command of the Wehrmacht had been given thorough consideration at the Foreign Ministry and that serious objections had come up, primarily of an economic nature. It had not been possible at the conference held today at the office of the Under State Secretary to overcome these objections. The Chief of the Economic Policy Department, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, had referred to the imminent, very difficult, economic negotiations with Sweden, at which we would have to secure the importation of Swedish ore in the amount of some 120 million RM for the year 1940, while, for our part, we could promise payment for only about half of this amount and that, moreover, in commodity exports. We were therefore largely dependent on the goodwill of the Swedes, who would have to give us credit for the remainder. The Economic Policy Department was therefore seeking to avoid everything that might at this very time create a bad impression or annoy the Swedes. The Navy's wish to deprive the Swedes now officially of the fourth mile of their territorial waters is for that reason very awkward for us. We would be very glad to help in every respect, but we thought we had to register our objections. Postponement of the notification until after the conclusion of the economic negotiations appeared advisable to us.

Lieutenant Commander Neubauer, who first complained again that the Naval Staff had heretofore received no statement of the Foreign Ministry as to its wishes, was impressed by the objections advanced by me, and promised that he would report them to Captain Fricke. He said it was possible in view of these objections that the Naval Staff might withdraw its wish, but if it should insist, the matter would necessarily have to be brought before the High Command of the Wehrmacht. A final decision would have to be made there.

¹ See document No. 297.

Lieutenant Commander Neubauer told me, in answer to my question, that a large part of the merchant vessels carrying goods from the Baltic to the North Sea and beyond actually went through the gap in our mine barrage and through the 3-mile zone. This was done by a large number of ships every day. The Naval Staff was convinced that they were mostly ships which were afraid of control by German naval vessels.

Lieutenant Commander Neubauer will telephone me the result of his report to Captain Fricke.

LOHMANN

No. 299

B21/B005156-57

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 564 of October 25 WASHINGTON, October 25, 1939—10:25 p. m.

Received October 26—9:55 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 480 of October 24.¹

1. The Pittman Bill cannot enter into force until it has been debated and passed by the House of Representatives. No estimate can be made at this time as to the duration of the debate and the date of passage. After passage by the Senate, the Pittman Bill will probably be sent to the House as an amendment to the bill now before it. After that there will probably be a so-called "conference" between the two Houses to reconcile the two bills; this will be followed by a debate at which, in contrast to the Senate, speaking time will be limited in order to hasten a vote.

2. It is still probable that the House, too, will repeal the arms embargo, although a marked shift in favor of retention has become apparent there in the recent days under the pressure of a large section of the electorate, to which the Representatives are more responsive than the Senators. Consequently, Senate isolationists are now placing some hope of success on the vote of the House.

3. I believe it indispensable that we should issue a critical statement on the repeal of the arms embargo at the proper moment, that is, after its promulgation by the President; this must be done not just because our criticism is already anticipated here or because silence could be interpreted as concurrence, but because America is putting herself into a preposterous position from the standpoint of international law: on the one hand she participates in the war against us

¹Document No. 294.

by most actively supporting our enemies with war material; on the other hand she demands that we respect all rights to which neutrals are entitled. Senator Vandenberg strikingly characterized the situation when he said: "If we make ourselves the arsenal for one side, we must not be astonished if we become the target of the other."

4. Beyond that, it will be a matter for decision there as to whether the Reich Government should, following elimination of the arms embargo, lodge an official protest analogous to the protest of April 4, 1915, on account of unneutral attitude. To be sure, we would have to expect rejection of the protest, but before the whole world we would have maneuvered the United States of America into a legally vulnerable position, because the American Government would today have to defend its position with arguments diametrically opposed to those which it marshaled on the same subject in the Bryan note to Bernstorff of April 10, 1915.² The justification given at that time for rejecting our protest about arms exports was that America was not in a position *after* the outbreak of war to change her traditional position about the permissibility of arms exports to belligerents. Today, however, the situation is exactly reversed. America decided by the Act of 1935 not to export arms to belligerents. The principle was adhered to in the cases of Ethiopia, Bolivia, and Spain. Repeal of the arms embargo after outbreak of the war would on that account indubitably constitute an unneutral act against Germany, which is alone and one-sidedly affected by it.

5. As for arguments we could use which proceed from the American standpoint I should like to refer, apart from the above remarks, to my telegraphic reports No. 416 of September 24³ and No. 481 [491] of October 9;⁴ I also leave open the possibility of further reports on this matter.

THOMSEN

² Actually Apr. 21, 1915. Citations for the published texts of this document and of the German note of Apr. 4, 1915, are given in footnotes 1 and 2 of document No. 220.

³ Document No. 129.

⁴ Document No. 220.

No. 300

51/83923

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, October 25, 1939.

The High Command of the Navy telephoned that the Navy has decided to extend operations against merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea farther north, i. e., up to the Åland Sea. This measure was prompted by the fact that the ships of the eastern Baltic States bound

for England have made this area their habitual route for entering Swedish territorial waters.

These operations would for the most part be carried out by naval auxiliary vessels.

It is intended to inform the Russians of this decision by communication from Naval Attaché to Naval Attaché.

Pointing out the possible political consequences, I asked that this communication not be made for the present, in order that I might first report the matter to the Foreign Ministry. I was asked to give an answer in the course of this forenoon.

My question as to whether the matter had been discussed in the conference between Ambassador Ritter and Admiral Schniewind was answered in the negative, with the explanation that the decision was not reached until later.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 301

2993/586622

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 566 of October 26

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1939—3:10 a.m.

Received October 27—4:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 555 of October 24.¹

The American Government is trying to build up the seizure of the American ship *City of Flint* as an unfriendly act on the part of Germany in order to push the repeal of the arms embargo in Congress.² We should therefore avoid anything with respect to the treatment of the ship and the American crew that the American Government could exploit to that end.

If war material, including airplane parts, should be found in the cargo, it would constitute a flagrant violation of the Neutrality Act. Reliable reports indicate very brisk arms smuggling operations from New York.

THOMSEN

¹ Not printed (2422/511810).

² The American cargo vessel was intercepted by the German warship *Deutschland* on Oct. 9 on the charge of carrying contraband and a German prize crew was placed aboard. The Germans took the vessel into the port of Murmansk on Oct. 23, but were permitted by the Soviet authorities, despite representations of the American Government, to sail again 5 days later. (See *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 984 ff.) When the ship subsequently put in at the Norwegian port of Haugesund on Nov. 3, the Norwegian Government acted on the rules of international law applying to prizes by intern- ing the German prize crew and restoring the vessel to American control.

No. 302

173/89086-87

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 300 of October 26

BRUSSELS, October 26, 1939—10:50 p. m.

Received October 27—4 a. m.

The Foreign Policy Committee of the Belgian Senate met this morning for a secret session at which Foreign Minister Spaak spoke at length about the international situation. A member of the Senate who took part in the session gave the following account of what took place. His general impression of the session had been very favorable since even behind closed doors, where one speaks more freely than in public, the Committee had expressed a uniformly positive view on the neutrality policy. M. Spaak had again made a brilliant speech in behalf of his policy and, as the informant maintained, had also convinced the few somewhat uncertain and critically disposed Senators of the correctness of the neutrality policy. M. Spaak had been very categorical and had again stated emphatically that he could no longer tolerate the one-sided attitude of the press. The Belgian Government wished to follow the neutrality policy as completely and loyally as was in any way possible. It was intolerable that obstacles should be placed in its path by the press.

In the course of the Committee's deliberations one of the Senators stated that he had reports that Germany was concentrating armored divisions on the Dutch and Belgian borders. M. Spaak declared that these reports were false. The question was also discussed whether Belgium would not have to make military agreements with Holland, so as to be prepared for collaboration in the event of a German invasion. M. Spaak rejected this idea, pointing out that the Dutch did not desire any collaboration whatever and that, furthermore, General Staff conferences with Holland would amount to violations of neutrality in exactly the same way as would such conferences with England or France. In conclusion, M. Spaak was asked what the Belgian Government would do if Germany should invade Holland. The Foreign Minister replied that he could not take a stand on a contingency which in his opinion was not likely to arise, and merely stated that the Belgian Government could come to a decision only if such events should take place.

The informant who reported the foregoing has been known for years to be trustworthy and reliable.

BÜLOW

No. 303

1389/357018-19

Ambassador Ritter to Minister Schnurre [in Moscow]

Via today's courier

BERLIN, October 26, 1939.

DEAR SCHNURRE: I have just heard that there is a courier today and would just like to dictate a few words to you in all haste.

I have thus far spoken with Ministers von Ribbentrop and Funk, and also with Major General Thomas, Colonel Becker, and Under State Secretaries von Hanneken and von Jagwitz. I shall also see Minister Darré this evening, and, I assume, Field Marshal Göring tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

I have found among the men with whom I have spoken up to now (1) great satisfaction with what we have so far been able to obtain in the way of promises from the Soviet Government, and (2) complete understanding for the fact that we must now make a great effort with regard to the German deliveries. Minister Funk in particular promised me his full support in the matter. I have heard from General Thomas and Colonel Becker, after they had spoken with those responsible for the different categories of arms, that from the military standpoint the deliveries of arms would probably not encounter any difficulties. Minister Funk promised me that he would use all his influence to have the necessary iron made available to take care of all the Russian demands. The final decision will probably be made by the Führer, but not until the list promised by the Russians has been received here and been given final study. I have made all preparations for this final check to be made within a day after the list arrives here.¹

Probably things will depend on whether in your final bout at Moscow you are indeed able to obtain from them the promise of substantial deliveries of iron ore and chromium ore.

¹ On Oct. 22, Mikoyan gave [Ritter?] an oral account (1389/357024-26) of the deliveries which the Soviet Union desired from Germany, and promised to present a written list within 2 or 3 days. Mikoyan further stated that in a few days a Soviet delegation would come to Berlin for 2 or 3 weeks to conduct preliminary negotiations on this list.

This in all haste. This evening the Russian delegation is coming, the size of which alarmed us a little at first.² Everything will be done here, however, to give them a good reception.

With best regards,

Heil Hitler !

Yours,

RITTER

² In a telegram of Oct. 24 (1369/357021), Schnurre reported that the Soviet economic delegation of 45 persons, including People's Commissar for [Naval] Shipbuilding, Ivan T. Tevossyan, and General of Artillery, G. K. Savchenko, would arrive in Berlin on Oct. 26. About 16 more persons led by the acting People's Commissar for the Iron and Steel Industry, P. I. Korobov, would follow soon afterward. Then in a telegram dated Oct. 26 and dispatched the following morning (1369/356998), Schnurre said Mikoyan had told him that the Soviet delegation was taking with it to Berlin the list referred to in the document printed here. Schnurre also reported that despite Mikoyan's previous statements the delegation would not have authority actually to make commitments, so that the main negotiations at Moscow would presumably be delayed. Schnurre therefore asked whether it might not be advisable to suggest moving them to Berlin.

No. 304

51/33928

Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department

BERLIN, October 26, 1939.

R 26588.

Lieutenant Commander Neubauer of the Naval Staff of the High Command of the Navy telephoned in the evening of October 26 to inform us that the question of the Swedish territorial waters had been taken up with the Commander in Chief, Grand Admiral Raeder. Due consideration was given to the objections raised by the Foreign Ministry against the Navy's taking the desired step at this time.¹ Admiral Raeder decided nonetheless that the Foreign Ministry should be requested to approach the Swedish Government immediately with a view to securing a free hand for the measures which the German Naval Forces would have to take outside the 3-mile zone.

Herr Neubauer added that the High Command of the Navy would also communicate this decision to the Foreign Ministry in writing. He requested, however, that the necessary steps be taken at once in order to avoid any further delay.²

I replied that I would report on the matter.

LOHMANN

¹ See document No. 298.

² On Oct. 27, Woermann noted (51/33929) that Admiral Schniewind telephoned him the same day that Raeder had decided to respect only the 3-mile zone and desired to learn the final position of the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible. On Oct. 30, Weizsäcker, after consulting OKM and OKW, sent to the Legation in Sweden a telegram (205/141909-10) containing the text of a note to be handed to the Swedish Government without delay. The note referred to Swedish protests about German naval and air action in the disputed fourth mile of Swedish territorial waters, stated that Germany would continue to recognize only the standard 3-mile limit, and expressed willingness to discuss the exact course of the line to be used. Wied reported on Oct. 31 that he presented the note that evening (205/141911).

No. 305

34/23482

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 27, 1939—3:22 a. m.

No. 611 of October 26

Received October 27—5:45 a. m.

Molotov asked me to come to see him this evening and, referring to a report he had received from the Soviet Naval Attaché in Berlin, declared that the German intention to send the dispatch boat *Grille* and some auxiliary cruisers to the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic coast to carry out control measures had caused astonishment and gravest concern to the Soviet Government. The appearance of German warships in areas where there were important Soviet strategic interests was particularly awkward for the Soviet Government at the present moment, since negotiations with Finland were not yet concluded and the German operation could easily be construed as a demonstration in Finland's favor, as a result of which Finland's position would be strengthened vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government therefore urgently requested that the intended measures, which might be construed as an unfriendly act, be canceled.

When I pointed out that Germany's purpose did not in the least affect the Soviet Union, since it aimed solely at suppressing Finland's exports of lumber to England via the Baltic Sea, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government did not (group garbled) the justice of this German aim, but asked that Germany confine any activities of this nature to the Swedish side of the Baltic; this would dissipate Soviet misgivings. Please wire instructions.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 309.

No. 306

2290/483855

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 811 of October 26

BERLIN, October 27, 1939—4:00 a.m.

Received October 27—6:20 a. m.

(1) Replying to notification of the resolution of the American Governments at the Panama Conference establishing a closed zone to keep warlike activities away from the Americas, the Führer informed the

President of Panama that he had entrusted study of the matter to the German officials concerned.¹

(2) The English and French Heads of State have replied in similar vein.

(3) According to press accounts the English Government has officially announced its unwillingness to recognize the closed zone. English naval opinion is especially critical of the fact that it would cut off England from her American colonies. Please ascertain the views of the Government there [in Italy] on the fundamental question of a closed zone.

(4) For information only:

Creation of a closed zone is unfavorable to us on technical naval grounds, but we do not wish to draw upon ourselves the odium of lifting² it. It is rather in our interest to let England and France take the lead. Identical text to Madrid and Tokyo.³

WOERMANN

¹ In a telegram of Oct. 4 (8517/E597418-22), the President of Panama had communicated to the Reich Chancellor the provisions of this resolution, the full text of which is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 331-333. Hitler acknowledged receipt of this notification in a telegram of Oct. 23 (not found), as stated in the document printed here. Then on Feb. 12, 1940, Weizsäcker cabled (148/128962-65) to the Legation in Panama the text of a note to be handed the Foreign Minister in reply to the telegram of Oct. 4 and one of Dec. 24, 1939 (90/100081-35). The latter contained a protest on behalf of the 21 American Republics by the Acting President of Panama to the Reich Chancellor regarding the *Graf Spee* incident (see documents Nos. 460, 461, *et seq.*). The text of the statement transmitted to the Governments of France and Great Britain as well as to Germany is printed in *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 723, and the replies of the three belligerent Governments are printed in *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. 11, pp. 199-205.

² In German: *Aufhebung*. Presumably a coding error for *Ablehnung*, rejecting.

³ In a memorandum of Nov. 11, "The American Closed Zone," Freytag noted that the German officials who studied the matter regarded the zone as disadvantageous to Germany, but preferred to let the odium of rejecting it fall upon Great Britain and France. Until Germany recognized the zone it would in any event not be applicable to her. The Spanish and Italian Governments "showed little interest and replied evasively" to the German inquiries, and no reply had as yet been received from Tokyo. Freytag charged that the United States was seeking to monopolize inter-American shipping, particularly at Germany's expense. He recommended "dilatatory treatment" of the question of a closed zone, even though this policy might expose Germany to hostile propaganda (2401/500485-89).

No. 307

F10/106

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, October 26 [27],¹ 1939.

No. 501

Pol. VIII 1645 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally.

The Reich Foreign Minister requests that Ambassador Oshima, who will continue to work for German-Japanese friendship after his return, be supported in every possible way. He requests that telegrams which Oshima submits there be encoded without change and transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister personally, and that provision be made for safe and rapid transmittal of letters intended for the Reich Foreign Minister; if they are sealed they should be left unopened.

WOERMANN

¹ A handwritten correction on another copy (174/136187) indicates that the telegram was dispatched on Oct. 27 rather than on Oct. 26, the date appearing on the copy from the Foreign Minister's file used here.

No. 308

352/202749-50

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

A 5018

THE HAGUE, October 27, 1939.

Pol. II 4307.

Subject: Holland's fear of violation of her neutrality; measures to be taken in that event.

There can be no doubt that the emphasis of the Netherlands defense measures, which were directed largely against England during the first weeks of the war, has recently been shifted more toward the German border. The reason for this is not so much that there is now more fear of an attack by Germany, but that there is less fear of a British attack. During the Polish campaign an Anglo-French relief offensive was expected in the West and the possibility was taken into consideration that Dutch and Belgian neutrality might be violated in the course of this offensive. But with France and England having abandoned their Polish ally without lifting a finger, it is no longer believed here that our enemies could have any interest whatsoever in undertaking anything against the Netherlands. In order to conduct

the war, England and France need the support of the United States which they would lose if they failed to respect the neutrality of Belgium or Holland.

In spite of the large troop concentrations near the Netherlands boundary, the Government fears no attack on Holland by Germany, since after all, the Führer quite spontaneously had the Queen of the Netherlands informed that he would always respect Netherlands territory so long as its neutrality was not violated by a third party.¹ But quite apart from this, it is argued here, it would be the most stupid thing Germany could do to violate Dutch and Belgian neutrality. The symptoms of demoralization within France, due in particular to the activity of the outlawed Communist Party, were indeed of considerable importance and constantly increasing in intensity. But all this would immediately change if Germany invaded France, perhaps by way of the neutral countries. Against this, not only the entire Belgian but also the whole French people would rise as one man and, putting aside all differences, make every sacrifice to drive the invader out of the country again. Moreover, the violation of Dutch neutrality would bring into the field America and in particular Roosevelt, who had a great fondness for Holland as the land of his ancestors. Whether America would in that event lend active assistance to the Allies by sending an expeditionary force remains an open question. In any event, however, the entire industrial organization of the United States would be mobilized to supply our enemies with the necessary war materials. In addition, America would exert very strong pressure on the rest of the world to induce it to turn against us. The German Government realized this just as well as it was realized here, and for this reason alone Germany would be very careful not to undertake anything against the Netherlands. There is some anxiety, however, that Germany might perhaps allow herself to be provoked into action against Belgium and the Netherlands by some false maneuvers on the part of England and France, and this fear is fed by Belgium where, from everything I hear, a German attack is feared more than it is here.

Certain preparations are nevertheless being made against all eventualities, in particular by private individuals. An Amsterdam banker told me yesterday that not only did the Bank of the Netherlands have almost all its gold reserve in America now, but, as had been the case through the whole summer, a great many private bank customers were still sending their foreign securities, including those of Dutch colonial companies, to America although the insurance today amounted to about 5 percent.

ZECH

¹ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 272 and 313.

No. 309

103/111752

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 28, 1939.

No. 659

zu Pol. I M 7313 g.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch.

With reference to your telegram 611.¹

Having consulted the High Command of the Navy, I request that M. Molotov be told the following: "In order to avoid all misinterpretations of its intentions, the German Naval Staff will defer to the wishes of the Russian Government in its present measures relating to warfare against merchant shipping. It has given its naval forces the necessary orders for this purpose."

Please at the same time stress the fact that in view of our friendly relations with the Soviet Government we have in this case complied with their request. You can mention casually that in further conduct of warfare against merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea we intend to inform the Soviet Government of our measures in so far as we assume that Russian interests would be affected by them.

The Naval Attaché will receive instructions only in accordance with paragraph 1.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 305.

No. 310

449/222667

The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, October 28, 1939.

No. 341

zu W XII 3384 Ang. I.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 227.¹

You are requested to call on Metaxas immediately in any case and inform him with reference to this instruction that we would be constrained to regard as a serious departure from Greece's neutrality policy the possible conclusion of the planned agreement concerning

¹ W XII 3384 is telegram No. 227, not printed (449/222666). It reported negotiations between the British Board of Trade and Greek ship owners concerning the possible chartering of about 50 percent of all Greek merchant ships by the British.

the chartering of a considerable portion of the Greek merchant fleet to England.

Should Metaxas plead that domestic economic difficulties compel Greece to utilize her merchant fleet in that manner, please reply as your personal view that the advantage presumably gained from that transaction might very well become illusory through the loss of the present principal customer for Greek exports.

For your information: the Italian Government is being informed at the same time, with the suggestion that a similar step be undertaken.²

Report by telegraph.

WEIZSÄCKER

² According to a Rome telegram of Nov. 24 (449/222680), Mackensen brought this matter up with Ciano, after having repeatedly been unable to get an official statement by the Italian Foreign Ministry on the subject. Ciano said that Italy was not in a legal position to make representations in Athens as the Germans had suggested, adding that it might be possible to discuss this matter with the Greeks in a friendly and casual manner.

No. 311

230/152081

The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

No. 474

BERLIN, October 28, 1939.
zu Kult B spez 68-01.

With reference to your telegram No. 426 of October 22.¹

The question of repatriating the German communities in Yugoslavia is by no means acute at the present time. We are therefore interested in limiting discussion of this problem in the Southeast as much as possible at present. Any discussions in the press are therefore undesirable and to the extent that we can influence it, should be prevented as much as possible.

For guidance in your conversations: The idea underlying the repatriation is an additional important contribution by Germany to the pacification of Europe by eliminating causes of serious friction between the countries. If at the proper time a resettlement of the Germans in the Southeast, too, should appear desirable, such an action would naturally be undertaken only with the agreement of the Government and German community, for we want only voluntary repatriates in Germany.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 290.

No. 312

2161/470157-64

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 28, 1939.

1. *Iranian political observations on the question of transit via Russia.*

During my economic negotiations in Tehran in September of this year¹ I gained the impression that the present dependence of trade between Iran and Germany on transit through Russia is causing great concern to several members of the Iranian Cabinet. To be sure, my actual partner in the negotiations, Finance Minister Bader, received the report of the basic settlement of the transit question in the Moscow Agreement of September 28² of this year with great joy and termed it an essential contribution to the continuation of German-Iranian economic relations despite the war conditions. Vassighi, the Deputy Minister of Trade, and Foreign Minister Aalam, on the other hand, felt grave doubts as to the dependability of the Soviet assurances regarding transit. To be sure, the two Ministers just mentioned expressed these doubts to me personally only in so far as to state that in the light of the experience which Iran had had in recent years with Russian assurances it was necessary for Russia to give a written assurance (a) to grant transit to and from Germany through Russia to all goods without exception, i. e., especially war material; (b) to carry out this transit in the course of normal freight movements by rail; and (c) to guarantee fixed transit rates. Without such definite commitments, a Russian promise on transit would not offer sufficient security for Iran to adjust herself completely to this route.

Through a reliable informant from the Court Ministry I learned, moreover, of a discussion of the transit question in the Iranian Cabinet, which took place at the beginning of October of this year with the Shah presiding. At this session Trade Minister Vassighi presented his opinion on the changes effected by the war in Iran's trade situation and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. He came to the conclusion that the Iranian Government could no longer justify allowing the Iranian economy to continue to gravitate toward Germany by preference to the extent provided by the Iranian-German economic agreements concluded the previous year. He expressed doubt whether it would really be possible in the future to route almost exclusively via Russia the greater portion of the normal deliveries which Iran had sent to Ger-

¹ See document No. 14.² See document No. 163.

many last year by water. He said that it was necessary for Iran even now to look about for other possible markets and sources of supply and in this connection to establish contact above all with Japan and Italy. Italy had expressed general willingness to take over important German contracts on deliveries and imports, especially the compensation agreement for delivery of cotton goods in return for Iranian raw cotton. A similar but much more concrete proposal had been received from Japan. Japan was willing to take over at once, and with all of the German stipulations, the agreement of July 11, 1939, between the Christian Dierig A. G., Langenbielau, and the Iranian Cotton Goods Company; this contract provides for German imports of 10,000 tons of cotton in return for German cotton goods in an amount equal to the value of the raw cotton.

Foreign Minister Aalam supported the basic statements of the Trade Minister and voiced misgivings—especially in connection with Russian activity in the Balkan countries and the Russian invitation to Finland to come to Moscow for conversations similar to those held with the three countries mentioned above [*sic*]³—as to whether Soviet Russia might not have aggressive intentions also with reference to Iran and Afghanistan.

Minister President Djam, too, expressed the opinion—although in a very cautious manner—that it would be advisable to consider all eventualities arising from the war situation.

In contrast to these misgivings about the effectiveness of the transit rights promised Germany by the Russians and the advisability of maintaining and expanding the scope of the present economic relations with Germany, Finance Minister Bader³ stated that such doubts as had been mentioned were in his opinion unjustified. He warned against measures which Germany would doubtless have to consider at once as a departure from the present course of sincere and honest cooperation and would have to answer accordingly.

Until it was proved that transit via Russia would not work and that Germany would not be in a position to supply Iran with the goods promised her and urgently needed for the expansion of her economy, Bader believed that it was absolutely necessary to adhere to the present policy. He referred in this connection to assurances which he, as the head of the Iranian economic delegation, had given me. He had, as instructed, expressed the firm determination of the Iranian Government to maintain normal trade with Germany in spite of the war and if possible even to expand the mutual trade.

After these statements by his Ministers the Shah—according to the minutes of the Cabinet meeting—agreed with M. Bader's opinion and decided that the political and economic policies with reference

³ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "Has resigned in the meantime."

to Germany should be maintained as heretofore, unless and until it should be proved that this would be to Iran's disadvantage.

2. Iranian fears of Russia.

Aside from the positive decision of the Shah on the economic policy to be continued by Iran, it appears to be a very important point that doubts concerning Soviet Russia's attitude are entertained in the Iranian Cabinet and by important members of this Cabinet. In view of these doubts it appears to me to be urgently necessary for Germany to obtain information in Moscow about the intentions of the Soviet Government toward Iran. Any possible aggressive action by Russia against Iran will doubtless strengthen England's position in Iran and might possibly even drive Iran into the arms of our enemies, the Allies. Considering Turkey's strong ties with England and France it appears politically especially important at this particular moment to continue to strengthen Iran in her absolute neutrality for the time being.

Should the Soviets pursue aims with reference to Iran bound to affect Iranian neutrality, it would be advisable for Germany to make representations in Moscow that these be abandoned.

If Iran should turn toward the British and French side this would mean in Iran, as in Turkey, the destruction of Germany's economic position, which has been built up so laboriously. In the event of such a turn we could, moreover, no longer count on Iran to continue delivering to us the quotas agreed upon in the secret protocol of October 8⁴ of this year. Thereby we would lose annually 22,500 tons of cotton, approximately 6,000 tons of wool, 20,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 tons of barley, 20,000 tons of rice, 3,000 tons of hair, 3 million reichsmarks worth of leather, 1 million reichsmarks worth of hides and 25 million reichsmarks worth of dried fruits.

3. Iranian efforts toward the conclusion of a new economic agreement with Soviet Russia.

Concerning Russian intentions toward Iran I was not able to learn anything more definite during my stay in Moscow by talking either with our Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, or with the German delegation (Ambassador Ritter and Minister Schnurre). However, the Ambassador and the delegation had gained the impression in the conversations on the transit question that the Russians were very little interested in yielding to the Iranian campaign for bringing about a new economic agreement. It is possible to understand Russia's negative attitude if one considers the unilateral manner in which the Iranian Government insisted vis-à-vis Soviet Russia on

⁴Not printed (8529/E597530-67).

the Iranian interpretation of the economic treaty of 1935.⁵ Since Russia did not wish to give in to the Iranian request, the Iranian Government informed the Soviet Government in June 1938 that because of the Russian attitude it no longer considered the agreement to be in effect. Iranian efforts which were made in Moscow at the end of 1938 to reach a new trade agreement with Soviet Russia more in conformity with Iranian wishes than the treaty of 1935, were unsuccessful. At the beginning of this year the relations between Iran and the Soviet Union deteriorated even further as the result of the collapse of the Moscow economic negotiations. The outbreak of the war then made it appear advisable to the Iranian Cabinet to make another attempt at achieving an economic understanding with Russia. Proposals on this score, made through the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, have only had negative results. The Russians have rejected the Iranian proposal that the treaty of 1935 be put into effect again until the basis for a new agreement has been created. Moreover, they have rejected Iran's demand that the principle of complete compensation should be made the basis of trade between Iran and the Soviet Union and stated that they would have to reserve complete freedom with reference to their exports to and their imports from Iran. After these Soviet statements it appears out of the question for the time being that the two partners will reach an agreement very soon.⁶

During the discussions of the delegations in Tehran on the transportation problem occasioned by the war, the Iranian delegation had suggested that Germany and Iran reach an agreement on joint action in Moscow concerning settlement of the question of transit through Russia. The surprisingly quick basic solution of this question in the German-Russian agreement of September 28 of this year has made such joint action meaningless. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister later returned to this request and when I took leave of him he asked me to bring influence to bear as much as possible on the Russians during my sojourn in Moscow, and if necessary later from Berlin, so that they would arrive at an economic understanding with Iran. I discussed this request of the Iranian Government with Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg in Moscow, and, barring a different decision by the Foreign Ministry, reached an agreement that Count von der Schulenburg would at the request of the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow declare himself willing to maintain further contact with the latter and to advise him concerning the proposals to be made to the Russians by Iran. Such cooperation would naturally stop whenever support of the Iranians would affect adversely German-Russian

⁵ Agreement of Aug. 27, 1935.

⁶ A Soviet-Iranian economic agreement was eventually signed on Mar. 25, 1940.

relations. Economic cooperation between Soviet Russia and Iran on a new treaty basis, which should have been brought about long ago owing to the common frontiers of the two countries and the naturally favorable economic conditions, is not only in the interest of both parties themselves but also of German-Iranian economic plans. The less friction there is in Soviet-Iranian relations in the near future, the smoother can be the course of German-Iranian trade. The Iranian effort to normalize relations with Russia therefore deserves the most active German support, in my opinion. It need hardly be feared that Soviet-Iranian understanding might work to the detriment of the German position in Iran.

4. *Transport of German goods to Iran in neutral ships.*

When I called on Finance Minister Bader to take leave of him he raised the question of transporting German goods to Iran in neutral ships from neutral harbors. He said that the British Minister in Tehran had assured the Iranian Government, upon inquiry, that the British naval forces would not stop and confiscate German goods, even war material, being transported to Iran aboard neutral ships, if they had already become the property of the Iranian Government. M. Bader expressed doubt in this connection as to the absolute reliability of the British Minister's statement. He asked that I find out in Berlin after my return whether the German Government had heard of instances of German goods transported on neutral ships reaching the country of their destination unimpeded by British naval vessels. In that case his Government, too, would decide to make the attempt at transporting German goods on neutral ships.

RIPEKEN ⁷

⁷ Marginal note: "Herewith submitted to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl for his information; also, a decision is requested as to an inquiry in Moscow about the Soviet Government's intentions toward Iran. R[ipken] Nov. 11."

No. 313

103/111758

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 29, 1939—2:15 a. m.

No. 628 of October 28

Received October 29—5:40 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 611 of October 26.¹

Molotov asked me to come to see him today and said that the contents of the communication from Commander Neubauer to the Soviet Naval

¹ Document No. 305.

Attaché were not satisfactory to the Soviet Government.² The Soviet Government, to be sure, had no objections to German warfare against merchant shipping—it was even in favor of intensifying it in every possible way—but it took the position that cruising by German warships in the Soviet Union's sphere of interest was contrary to the spirit of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. It therefore asked that the activities of German warfare against merchant shipping be shifted to the area west of the twentieth degree of longitude, since the twenty-first degree, proposed by the Germans, ran too close to the Baltic coast and, among other things, went directly through Libau [Liepāja].³

SCHULENBURG

² No record of the communication made by Commander Neubauer has been found.

³ See document No. 341.

No. 314

1369/356985

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, October 29, 1939—3:48 a. m.

No. 627 of October 28

Received October 29—7:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 613 of October 20 [W IV 3940].¹

A few days ago I spoke to Mikoyan about the transit shipments of foreign raw materials through the Black Sea ports. Mikoyan today informed me that the Soviet Government was agreeable to it, but at the same time stressed the need for camouflage. The discussion brought out the readiness on the part of the Soviet Government to let its own organizations effect the purchases of raw materials for us and ship them to Odessa in neutral bottoms; if purchases are made by us in our own name or through neutral agents, the Soviet Government agrees to having the goods consigned to the Soviets, via Odessa. Lead, for instance, could be consigned to Importorganisation, industrial raw materials, to Promsyrjo-Import, Moscow. Vessels carrying such cargoes will even now be accepted in Odessa; this readiness to accept delivery also applies to goods already en route.

Mikoyan added that one means of camouflaging would be to mix the contraband goods destined for Germany with other cargoes which would first be unloaded at Bulgarian or Rumanian ports.

¹ Not found.

The appropriate confidential agent for any detailed discussion with the Soviet authorities also regarding camouflage methods would be Director Hecking in his capacity as the Embassy's shipping expert.

SCHNURRE

SCHULENBURG

No. 315

B21/B005164-65

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 585 of October 30

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1939—3:28 p. m.

Received October 31—2:00 a. m.

The course of the war thus far has caused many a reversal of political opinion in the United States. Having been mistaken in its expectations that total war would be waged, public opinion, instead of flaring up, has had opportunity to reflect soberly on the European war and its effects on America. Two views of approximately equal strength still counterbalance each other: *a*) the war is the result of a conflict of ideological or moral and political differences and must end with the crushing of "Hitlerism" (not, however, "Stalinism" also); *b*) the outcome of the battle for the European balance of power does not concern America. An antipathy to National Socialism and totalitarian forms of government and a determination in no circumstances to employ American troops except for national defense is common to both schools of thought. The last speeches of Roosevelt and Woodring have shown that the Administration is prepared to respond to public opinion in this respect. It can do this the more since the course of the war has shown that an American expeditionary corps in Europe is not indicated in the foreseeable future, and because after the lifting of the arms embargo the delivery to the Allies of at least gradually increasing supplies of all war material (particularly planes) is assured, without the necessity of now drawing the consequences of an active participation in the war. British policy is not always unreservedly approved; the abandonment of Poland, the lack of rational war aims, and the equivocal nature of British policy toward Russia are criticized. Clear-sighted economic leaders warn against a repetition of the sham prosperity of the World War through unbridled increase of production for wartime requirements, and are beginning to study the problem of gold hoarding in America with anxiety; on the other hand, they fear the development of strong competition in

Canada, which, under certain circumstances, can become the new center of the British Empire. The activity of Russia in Europe and Asia is anxiously observed. The bitterness against Russia in the "*Flint* incident" is considerably stronger than against Germany. Opinions on the power balance between Germany and Russia differ even though the predominant assumption is that Russia has won the political game at the expense of Germany. The first enthusiasm over the success of the Turkish pact vanished after the importance of the supplementary protocol was realized.¹ The view that Germany is not equal to the blockade and the economic war is widely disseminated under a scientific guise, but the hope of an early peace at present outweighs the wish to see Germany conquered after a long and bloody war. The indecisive conduct of the war by the Allies supports the hope of peace. The importance of a strong German Government as the handyman of the Western Powers against Russia is often emphasized.

The great majority of Americans have by the course of the war to date been strengthened in their belief that America can help the Allies to victory without herself having to experience the injurious effects of the European war on American economy and policy. As opposed to this, the fatalistic view that America will under any circumstances be drawn into the war has markedly receded into the background. Nevertheless, despite the counterefforts of sensible people, the belief that a defeat of the Allies is tantamount to a threat to America by Germany, remains unshakable. Any threat to the Western Hemisphere would be interpreted by the people and Government as a cause of war.

Despite the apparent calm and the aloofness of public opinion which the course of the war has induced, the tinder remains the same. The aftereffect of the experiences of the World War is so strong that America today voluntarily waives rights that she resolutely defended against belligerents in 1914. The danger that such incidents may occur in German-American relations as would, in view of the partisan attitude of public opinion, quickly lead to another flare-up, is thereby considerably lessened.

THOMSEN

¹ The reference is to Turkey's treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France signed on Oct. 19, 1939 (see document No. 287, footnote 1). The supplementary protocol stated that Turkey assumed no obligation "to take action having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with the USSR."

No. 316

1369/356982-84

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 672

BERLIN, October 30, 1939.
e. o. W IV 4148.

For Schnurre.

1. For your information: My conversations within the Government here, while not yet entirely concluded, are proceeding favorably, so that I hope that the Russian wishes can largely be met as far as the supplying of iron is concerned. Perhaps, however, later on in the final round in Moscow we shall have to insist that the Russians be very accommodating with respect to iron ore and scrap.

2. I am not so satisfied with the length of time my talks with Tevossyan and Savchenko are taking. Tevossyan has not submitted written lists here, but has only read aloud the various categories from extensive lists.¹ Despite my repeated and very urgent requests that the lists be delivered to us at once in the interests of speed, he did not allow himself to be persuaded. He said that the lists could not be delivered until the Russian desires as to deliveries could be precisely defined after conclusion of the visits of inspection.

Certain of the Russian experts, as, for example, those concerned with the production of gasoline and the refining of petroleum, have worked out an inspection program that will take 24 days. We are willing on the one hand to show the Russians everything, but on the other hand we cannot postpone the conclusion of the agreement in Moscow until these inspection trips are over. I have therefore insisted that these tours of inspection be greatly expedited. I have also proposed that Tevossyan inform us of the Soviet desires in advance, by categories and in round figures. For this purpose it has first been agreed that the various groups of experts, or at least those of them who have been touring Germany since Sunday, October 29, return to Berlin on Friday, November 3, in order, after reporting privately to Tevossyan on Saturday and Sunday, November 4 and 5, to participate in conversations here with the German side regarding those of the Russian wishes which have been decided upon by that time.

¹Ritter's file contains a list based on Tevossyan's statements of Oct. 27. It includes numerous categories of military, naval, and air weapons and matériel, as well as technical and industrial equipment, but gives little indication of the quantities expected (1369/356885-89).

The various groups of experts can then resume their tours of inspection in order to conclude them at the end of the week beginning November 5, so that the definitive talks may take place in Berlin at the end of that week. Tevossyan agreed to this work program with some hesitation. I do not have the impression, however, that this program will be adhered to. Apparently Tevossyan cannot resist the general desire of his assistants to travel around in Germany for a considerable length of time. General Savchenko repeatedly stated today, in response to my urging, that he first had to see everything before he could give figures pertaining to orders in his field.

Please take up this question again with Mikoyan before your departure and, referring to our understanding in Moscow, ask him to instruct the Soviet delegation to decide in the first place on round figures for the various categories in the delivery program. The German Government would thereupon call these round figures satisfactory, as is expected by Tevossyan. These round figures could later, of course, be revised upward or downward, if when all the tours of inspection are over or the contracts are closed the precise figures are available. Please state explicitly that we are willing that such later revisions or breakdowns be made.²

BITTER

² In telegram No. 642 of Oct. 31, Schnurre reported that he had that day had a final talk with Mikoyan in which they had reached "full agreement on this procedure" (1369/356976-77). Schnurre was returning to Berlin to take part in the negotiations with the Russian delegation in Germany for industrial deliveries.

No. 317

463/226112

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 862

BERLIN, October 31, 1939.

This morning a conference concerning the sanctioning of air attacks on enemy convoys took place in the office of Field Marshal Göring with Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General Milch, and General Jeschonnek participating. It was agreed that there were no legal objections to launching immediately attacks on all ships proceeding under enemy convoy, i. e., also neutral ships. It was further agreed that the neutrals have been warned sufficiently through diplomatic channels about accepting enemy convoy. In these circumstances Field Marshal Göring wants to propose to the Führer that air attacks on enemy convoys now be sanctioned.

I for my part requested with regard to the intended attacks that they be carried out with sufficient effect to discourage the neutrals

once and for all from proceeding under enemy convoy in the sea area involved.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[EDITORS' NOTE. On October 31, Molotov discussed before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR various major international problems as well as Soviet proposals to Finland regarding exchange of territory and the establishment of a Soviet naval base at the northern entrance to the Gulf of Finland, i. e., in Finnish territory. A translation of the speech is printed in V. Molotov, *Soviet Peace Policy* (London, 1941), pages 27-46, and various passages, translated somewhat differently, were included in two telegrams of November 1 to Washington from United States Ambassador Steinhardt; these are published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pages 785-790. The section of the speech dealing with Finland also appears, in still another translation, in *The Finnish Blue Book: The Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations During the Autumn of 1939 Including the Official Documents and the Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940*, published for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Philadelphia, 1940), pages 56-60. Paasikivi and Tanner, who had already left Helsinki, held talks with Molotov in Moscow, but these were broken off on November 13. On November 28 the Soviet Government officially denounced the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932, and on the following day Molotov announced the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Fighting broke out on November 30.]

No. 318

7433/E539989-94

Unsigned Note

[undated].

TALK WITH B[ARON] D[E] R[OPP]¹

B. d. R. stated that our first talk has been a complete success. As a result of his subsequent efforts, the English circles which want an early peace because of their concern for the Empire have brought it about that henceforth no official organ will proclaim the overthrow of the German regime *as a war aim*. He repeatedly stressed that the implications of that success were utterly incalculable.

¹ See document No. 235.

The thing now was to proceed to the second stage. These circles have to be mindful of the sentiments of the English people and therefore must in one way or another save appearances for England's commitment to the Poles. Some formulation would still have to be found for that. The Poles as such were of no further interest to them. It would therefore be necessary now to strengthen further these circles—to be referred to hereafter, for short, as the "English party"—which had meanwhile increased in power. For this reason it was especially important to meet for talks at regular intervals, so as to be able to advance step by step. His journey to Berlin ought to come when he had reason to believe that the "English party" had grown powerful enough to gain the upper hand over the warmongers. He still believed that heavy armed clashes would unfortunately be necessary before this could come about. The British as a whole were still too sure of victory over Germany.

To my question as to the source of his statements, that is, whether they might come from the Air Ministry (Fred), B. d. R. replied that the City, too, which, as is well known, is very powerful, had now to be counted among the "English party." I had the impression that he is currently in touch in particular with Sir Ralph Glynn, an exponent of the City who, he asserts, has very close personal connections with Chamberlain. The City is motivated by anxiety about the value of British currency, which typifies the power of the British Empire. As an additional success of the "English party" he cites the fact that differences have already arisen in the inner circle of the present Government, between Churchill-Eden on the one side, and Halifax, not to speak of Chamberlain, on the other.

When he believes that the time has arrived for coming to Berlin, he wants to go first from Switzerland to London. This could now be done in two days. He wants to be absolutely certain that the statements which he might make in Berlin actually reflect the views of the leading figures of the "English party." He thinks it would then be wise to go from England to Germany *officially*, via Holland, lest the opposing forces (the Foreign Office) get wind of the matter too soon and take counter steps. He would therefore propose that as a former Balt he might be invited, perhaps by Christian or some official government agency, to pay a visit to inspect Red Cross installations or the provisions made for the housing of the Baltic Germans, being a former Balt himself. Such a letter would have to be so framed that it could be submitted to the British authorities.

I told him that I had received no communications to convey to him. He wanted to have replies to the following questions, which are moving the minds of all Englishmen at the present time:

They had serious concern, in the interest of the Empire, because Bolshevik Russia was pressing continuously westward, and because of

the possibility that Germany, too, might in the end become bolshevized. That would also mean the end of England. Russia's advance in the Baltic States as also in Finland has caused the profoundest consternation. It is also feared that with National-Socialism and Bolshevism so closely akin, it would be sufficient for the one to move but slightly to the left, and the other slightly to the right, for the two to merge in one another. The withdrawal of the Baltic Germans as the outpost of the Aryan race was also viewed as extremely disturbing. I replied that I could not submit this question to my superiors. The question was exclusively the concern of Germany. We did not share this anxiety in any way. But one could call it almost comical that, after Germany had vainly tried for years to remind England of the common tasks of the Aryan race, it now was none other than England who worried that we were forgetting them. He knew only too well that it was positively absurd to see any relation whatever between National-Socialism and Bolshevism.

The second question for the British today was what would become of Poland. I told him that the Führer had already stated officially that this question would be settled exclusively by Germany and Soviet Russia alone. The British would have to learn that this was absolutely none of their business. If such questions were to be discussed at all, it could be done only with the idea of putting arguments into the hands of the "English party." I told him that I knew nothing of Germany's intentions. I only knew that it was the talk among the German population that a certain portion of Poland would come to Greater Germany, in which only Germans would live; that another part would be Congress-Poland, for the Polish population; and it was hoped that one part would be reserved only for Jews. The question of the form in which such a Congress-Poland would be constituted was not even discussed among serious-minded Germans, because this was entirely a "beer-table" issue. At the proper time the Führer would surely let the German people know what he had decided. It was certain that the territories on which an understanding had been reached with Soviet Russia would remain Germany's sphere of interest, in which the British would have, politically, nothing further to do. B. d. R. replied to this that in the interest of saving face before the people, knowledge of the bare fact, for instance, that such a Congress-Poland was being contemplated in one form or another would already be of great value to the "English party."

As a private individual I also explained to him the reasons why the Baltic Germans are being withdrawn. These measures were no retreat of the Aryan race, but on the contrary signified a strengthening against the East through abandoning the lost posts and eliminat-

ing all points of friction. He ought not to forget that a substantial Polish population element existed within Germany proper at her eastern border in 1914. If an extensive shift of population were to be effected now through a transfer, it would mean an advance, and not a retreat, for the German people and, hence, the Aryan race. B. d. R. thought that such measures were extraordinarily generous and farsighted. Unfortunately these ideas were known neither to England nor to him. I told him quite frankly that I could not understand that, because these were commonplaces that were printed in every German newspaper. He plainly gave the impression that he considered such information very valuable in strengthening the "English party," which could only be in accord with such purposes.

It is perhaps interesting to mention an illustration of how things which are taken for granted by any German are regarded by him as extremely important and news for England. During the conversation I mentioned that if it was England's war aim to break up Greater Germany into her components again, she had achieved the exact opposite in starting the war through Poland. Here for the first time all the branches of the German people united in Greater Germany fought and shed their blood under the swastika flag. I reminded him of the blood that the Germanic tribes had shed together in 1870-71, which had the effect that despite the pre-war divergencies between Prussia and Bavaria, Bismarck-Germany did not fall apart in 1918. He also was aware of how many circles in Germany had kept their allegiance to the black, white, and red flag. It was, however, entirely overlooked that Germany fought under the flag only during the World War of 1914-18. I reminded him especially of the dead of the Movement of November 9. It was therefore the mystique of blood which one had to see actually at work, whether an Englishman was capable of grasping it or not. By means of this war in Poland England had already brought it about that, through the mystique of blood, the Great German Reich was now irrevocably and forever welded together under the swastika flag. B. d. R. said that this kind of information was extremely important. It was a weighty argument against the warmongers.

An understanding was reached on the following points:

1. I am to convey to Christian that B. d. R. requests him to be patient and therefore proposes that the mutual contacts be continued. If Christian concurs, it is agreed that I am to write that the excursions have given me much pleasure. B. d. R. assured me that the communications received from us would be conveyed to the important circles, especially the Air Ministry and the City, and that, in particular, he now had a direct connection with England without using the mails.

2. He will make inquiries among his friends in London whether they would in principle be agreeable to his accepting an invitation, if forthcoming, to pay an official visit to Germany in order to inspect

Red Cross installations or—as he would prefer—look at the housing facilities for Baltic Germans. Should his friends be in agreement with the principle of it while holding—as was to be expected—that the time was not ripe for it as yet, he would write: “Health poor.” If later on execution of the project is considered, he would use the words: “Health good.”

3. If he has to send important information, as was the case in relation to the success of the first stage of operations, he would again write about snow.

I left him little hope for the possibility of continuing the talks. But he insistently begged me to underline the importance of remaining in touch and keeping the “English party” informed. The main problem now was to give thought to the formulations that could be used in the second stage of operations, because he had come to realize that the two issues raised by him—Russia’s westward advance and the Polish question—could not be proposed by me even in the form of an inquiry. In conclusion he stated that his goal was to continue his constant efforts to shorten the war, and that he was thoroughly convinced that Christian would yet play a tremendously important part in this connection. Christian was held in very high esteem by his friends. They knew his farsighted thoughts for the preservation of the Aryan race, which coincide with the interests of the British Empire. He therefore held that when the time arrived for concrete preliminaries to a peace, only Christian and not the Foreign Minister would be able to conduct such negotiations successfully. The English people as well as his friends were firmly convinced that Ribbentrop wished the destruction of the British Empire, relating this wish to the injuries to Ribbentrop’s vanity during his activity in London.

As regards the attitude of the English to Poland, the following remark of B. d. R. is perhaps worth noting: When I pointed to the amazingly swift defeat of Poland by the German Army, he replied that from the very beginning England had never expected it to take more than three weeks. Although it might perhaps sound cynical, Poland was more useful to England as a martyr than as a going state. It must be borne in mind, for instance, that at least one million Poles live in the United States.

B. d. R. said during the conversation that he agreed with Mosley on many points. Unfortunately, however, Mosley was of no consequence and therefore of no use to the “English party.” He was not a personality and had moreover made too many mistakes in his personal life, also in respect to capitalism, to make it likely for him to acquire any significant following among the English people.²

² Nothing further on this contact with Baron de Ropp has been found.

No. 319

449/222670

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 247 of November 1

ATHENS, November 1, 1939—9:45 p. m.

Received November 2—2:15 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 229¹ of October 30.

During today's conversation regarding the chartering of Greek merchant vessels by England, the Minister President² took the same stand as the State Secretary.

The Minister President emphasized repeatedly that in view of its attitude of neutrality the Greek Government desired to stay clear of the matter.

When asked to what extent the individual ship owners would be allowed to retain their freedom of action, the Minister President answered, as the State Secretary had done, that if individual contracts nevertheless should be concluded, the Greek Government had no legal means of preventing it. Moreover, only a small number of ships were involved, belonging to ship owners whose offices were in London and who operated their ships exclusively in the Atlantic.

Upon my strong representations that we took a serious view of the matter, the Minister President assured me that the Greek Government, too, had the greatest interest in preserving the national wealth, which was to a large extent invested in ships.

ERBACH

¹ Apparently this should read "No. 239"; this telegram which is not printed (449/222668) was the reply to telegram No. 341 from Berlin of Oct. 28 (document No. 310). It was Erbach's report that a *démarche* had been made with the State Secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry.

² Jon Metaxas.

No. 320

1369/356973-74

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 645 of November 1

Moscow, November 1, 1939—9:55 p. m.

Received November 2—2:15 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 627 of October 28.¹

Director Fuchs of the Metallgesellschaft, Frankfurt, today had his first conference with the Soviet authorities regarding, among other things, the transit shipments of raw materials through the Union

¹ Document No. 314.

of Soviet Socialist Republics. The conference brought out the readiness of the Soviet authorities, in conformity with the agreements between our Governments, to import raw materials purchased by us and now stored abroad under camouflage. The Soviet representative asked Director Fuchs for a list of the specific categories that might come under consideration for this procedure. Director Fuchs was unable to comply with this request because he lacked the necessary data. Please check and inform us without delay on what raw materials purchased by or belonging to German firms we should negotiate with the Soviet authorities, stating accurately the type of commodity, its location, tonnage, and the kind of packing. The next negotiations being set for November 4, Fuchs requests that at least partial data be telegraphed to him by that time.

The Soviets attach decisive importance to strictest secrecy. Mikoyan terms the procedure a German-Soviet conspiracy [*Konspiration*], knowledge of which would have to be confined to a few persons.²

SCHNURRE

SCHULENBURG

² Marginal note:

"Ambassador Ritter: The Ministry of Economics (Herr Bethke) will tomorrow morning check the relevant data, which can be sent to Moscow tomorrow. M[ackeben] November 2."

There is very extensive documentation on this subject in the files, but the particular instructions asked for here have not been found. Cf. especially 3782/E041708-11, 103/111967, and 111995-96; and 2093/452835.

No. 321

103/111764

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 864

BERLIN, November 1, 1939.

Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral Raeder, and Colonel General Keitel, independently of each other, have told me that the Russian delegation in Berlin expected too much in the way of inspection and procurement of German materials of war. General Keitel told me it was the Führer's opinion that materials regularly issued to troops could be shown to the Russians; what might be sold, we had to decide ourselves. Things in the testing stage or otherwise secret should not be shown to the Russians.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 322

173/83997-98

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 427 of November 2 THE HAGUE, November 2, 1939—2:34 p. m.

Received November 2—5:10 p. m.

Rumors from French and British sources to the effect that we intend to invade Holland soon have lately again been very intensively disseminated here and have caused great uneasiness. The Spanish Minister told me yesterday that several diplomats here had already taken some fairly far-reaching precautions. The American Minister has made inquiries with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry about the rumors, hinting that in the event of a German invasion the United States would doubtless come to the aid of Holland with all the resources at its command. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry informed the inquiring diplomats that he considered the rumors of a German invasion utter fabrications, and in corroboration of his view cited the Führer's solemn declaration to the Queen on August 26.¹ To me the Secretary General has stated that in his opinion such rumors were circulated by France for the purpose of prompting us to embark on the invasion, which would only be in the interest of France because it would produce the longed-for war sentiment in France and make American aid a certainty.

The declaration of a state of emergency has nothing to do with the above-mentioned rumors. Rather, it had been planned a long time ago and has now been put into effect in order to put some curbs on espionage activities based on Holland which had lately become quite intensive. A state of emergency had been declared here during the World War, too.

ZECH

¹ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 272 and 313.

No. 323

8129/E582033

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 608 of November 2 WASHINGTON, November 3, 1939—12:50 a. m.

Received November 3—9:45 a. m.

Pol. IX 2238.

The House of Representatives, which only a few months ago resolved to maintain the arms embargo, voted today by an unexpected

majority of 61 to raise it.¹ This change of sentiment is due both to the strong pressure brought to bear by the Administration on Representatives subject to party discipline and to events abroad in recent days. Despite organized resistance by considerable numbers of voters against raising the embargo, many Representatives were probably led to revise their earlier views in the wake of the impressions left by the *City of Flint* case,² the Molotov speech and the threat to Finland.³

THOMSEN

¹ The House vote completed legislative action on the measure, the Senate having approved it on Oct. 27 by a vote of 63 to 30. By proclamation of Nov. 4 the President revoked the existing ban on shipments of arms to belligerents. The text of the proclamation is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 453-454.

The Foreign Ministry telegraphed the Embassy in Washington on Nov. 8 (2993/586627): "We do not intend to make any official representations to the American Government against the lifting of the arms embargo. Our negative attitude is sufficiently evident from the *Diplomatische Korrespondenz* of Nov. 5 and the German press."

² See document No. 301, footnote 2.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 363.

No. 324

8488/ES96864-65

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Turkey

BERLIN, November 3, 1939.

e. o. Pol. II 4228.

After your return please call on the Turkish Foreign Minister at once and inform him of the following by direction of the Reich Government:

1. The Turkish Government is aware of the fact that even the joint declaration of May 12, 1939, by Turkey and England¹ caused the greatest astonishment on the part of the German Government. In his conversation of June 8, 1939, with Ambassador Hamdi Arpag, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed this astonishment unequivocally.²

2. Despite this warning, however, Turkey has now taken the step of concluding a treaty with England and France, the separate articles of which clearly show that it is no less than a far-reaching identification of Turkey with the system of promises of assistance and guarantees which the British Government, in league with France, brought into existence for the purpose of establishing an encirclement front against Germany.

3. If even before the outbreak of the present war Turkey's commitment to this Anglo-French line caused our greatest astonishment, the treaty now concluded has a far more serious significance precisely because of the state of war between Germany, England, and France which has come about in the meantime. There is a considerable dif-

¹ See document No. 69, footnote 1.

² See vol. VI, document No. 496.

ference between a power such as Turkey binding herself in time of peace as regards certain hypothetical eventualities and the same power entering into extremely far-reaching treaty obligations with one of the two belligerent parties in time of war.

4. The fact that in spite of this situation Turkey has now concluded this treaty and put it into force at once impels the German Government to observe that it must consider this conduct a grave violation of the duties of a power not participating in the present war and an intentional affront to Germany.

5. The German Government must reserve the right to take the measures it sees fit should the treaty just concluded lead to practical consequences against Germany.

Please report by wire on how your démarche was received.³

RIBBENTROP

³ Marginal notes:

"The enclosed finished copy, signed by the Foreign Minister is to be handed to Herr v. Papen immediately. Gaus, November 2."

"Has been arranged. November 3, 5:30 p. m." [The initial has not been identified.]

No. 325

111/116242

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 3, 1939.

No. 519

RAM 554.

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 618 of October 24.¹

I authorize you to declare on my behalf to Shiratori, for his confidential use in suitable quarters, that the Government of the Reich has always exerted its influence on Russia in the direction of complete neutrality in the China conflict, and will continue to do so in the future.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 298.

No. 326

3027/599529-32

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*¹

BERLIN, November 3, 1939.

Pol. II 4394.

Enclosed I am sending for your confidential information an excerpt from a letter of October 23 by the German Minister at The Hague, which briefly analyzes sentiment in England.

By order:
v. RINTELEN

¹ Circulated to German Missions in Europe, the Embassy in Turkey, and the Consulate General in Geneva. The text used is that of the copy sent to the Madrid Embassy. The original letter from Minister Zech has not been found.

[Enclosure]

Pol. II 4394.

If sentiment in England is reduced to a common denominator, it appears approximately as follows:

On the whole England would prefer to make peace rather than have war. Peace as envisaged by the British, however, looks different from a German peace. A peace acceptable to England means the reestablishment of an independent or practically independent Poland, not to the extent of Versailles, but nevertheless approximately within ethnographic boundaries, and greater independence for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, both brought about with British participation. Moreover, it means general European disarmament to the extent that in the future changes in the map of Europe, even in Eastern or South-eastern Europe, or basic changes in the economic spheres of influence, can be made only by way of negotiations. Finally, although still somewhat hazy in its details, it would mean the certainty that German aggressions are definitely at an end. The British believe that they will be able to achieve these objectives in a war. If they can obtain them without war, they much prefer it that way. However, at the present moment they prefer a war to a peace that does not approximate the one outlined above, a peace, in particular, that does not give England a guarantee that another war will not break out within a few months or years.

The reasons for this attitude are as follows: Aside from the fact that they believe their honor is at stake, the British have the feeling that their prestige has suffered a great setback and that this prestige, which they consider indispensable for their control of the Empire, can be reestablished only by a peace now or later that would fulfill England's demands. They are convinced that they will win the war in a military sense and consider Russia a strong factor in their favor. They feel that Russia concluded the treaty with Germany in order to cause a European war to break out in which, of all countries, only Russia has an interest and from which Russia alone can achieve any real gain. Stalin will support Germany at first but later abandon her, since a German victory and therewith a strengthening of Germany is not in Russia's interest. Russia is on the verge of pocketing whatever she can obtain through a war with German help, beginning with Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. Once she is satisfied she will withdraw her support from us. At any rate, it is certain even today that Russia, thanks to her newly gained position of predominance at the Baltic Sea, will in the future constitute a permanent threat to Germany.

The British are experiencing considerable concern at the thought that the war and the subsequent unavoidable weakening not only of

the belligerents but also of the neutrals will result in a spread of the influence of Bolshevism or Russian imperialism, or whatever one may wish to call it—not to England herself, to be sure, which is considered immune to the Bolshevik germ, but certainly to Germany and possibly even further west. This as well as the fear of the great sacrifices which a war would involve for England herself explains the desire to wind up the war in so far as this is possible without losing face. In certain circles such as at Court, around Lloyd George and his followers, etc., the opposition to a war is even greater than elsewhere in England. An informed person who recently spoke with an acquaintance of Lloyd George told me yesterday, however, that it would be a mistake to believe that in spite of all his talk Lloyd George would support a peace that would leave the solution of the questions in the East and Southeast to Russia and us alone. In his opinion the key to Lloyd George's attitude is that in view of the Last Judgment, the latter wishes to make use of the short time left to him on earth by doing a good deed.

As I heard yesterday, too, but only from City circles, *no* military offensive seems to be planned. This is also indicated by Hore-Belisha's speech.² It is believed that England and France can endure a long waiting period better than Germany, whose Government has supposedly accustomed the people to having something happening all the time. Moreover, they think it will take some time for the Russian factor to take effect against Germany. The past setbacks on land in Poland, on the sea, and in the air, are felt to be a painful experience. In consolation they tell themselves, however, that it was the same way in the beginning in the World War; that in those days the effective countermeasures grew out of the losses, and that in the end England was victorious after all.

² On Oct. 11 Leslie Hore-Belisha, British Secretary of State for War, had given in the House of Commons details of the movement of the British Expeditionary Force to France and other military dispositions.

No. 327

2181/466299-301

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

BERLIN, November 3, 1939.
Kult A 1691 g.

In spite of the fact that the foreign press was promptly informed, the Führer's statement concerning a new ordering of the ethnograph-

¹ This instruction was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions in Europe, including Turkey, and to the Embassies in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

ical situation through resettlement of the nationalities in foreign countries has in many cases been interpreted falsely or even maliciously. I therefore make the following statement for your guidance.

Behind the resettlement action there is the idea that Germany wishes to make another far-reaching contribution to the pacification of Europe by offering to aid in establishing better lines of separation and thereby eliminating grave areas of friction between states.

In his speech in the Reichstag on October 6, 1939, the Führer formulated these thoughts in the following words:

"All Eastern and Southeastern Europe is partly filled with untenable German splinter groups. There exists in these groups a prime reason for and source of continued disturbances between states. In the age of the nationality principle and the racial idea it is utopian to believe that these members of a first-class nation can be simply assimilated. Thus it is one of the tasks of a far-sighted regulation of European life to undertake resettlements here in order in this way to eliminate at least some of the causes of conflict in Europe."

In the further course of the speech the Führer again outlined the problem of establishing better lines of separation as follows:

"The disposition of the entire living-space according to the various nationalities; that is to say, a solution of the problems affecting minorities which concern not only this area but nearly all the States in the south and southeast of Europe."

In his speech in Danzig on October 24, 1939,² the Reich Foreign Minister then underlined the idea of eliminating areas of friction in the following words:

"At the moment Germany is trying to unite within this area all of the German splinter groups in Europe which can be resettled. In so doing she is creating definitive, clear national relationships and borderlines, and by means of these large-scale resettlement projects is eliminating the possibility of future conflicts."

The text of the Führer's statement to the Reichstag indicates that his offer is dependent on certain prerequisites. It refers to untenable national splinter groups which as a result of attempts at assimilation and other oppressive measures on the part of the host country or for other special reasons are a source of disturbances between states. It goes without saying, and also follows from the character of the action as a contribution to peace, that resettlements will be undertaken only if the German Government considers them necessary and is able to reach an agreement in the matter with the government concerned. Another condition, of course, is that the German group itself

² Printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. 1, pp. 362-381.

is in accord with the resettlement, for we wish to receive only voluntary repatriates.

So far we are carrying on resettlement discussions only with Italy, Russia, Estonia, and Latvia.² Other resettlements are not urgent and are not being discussed. The German splinter groups at our northern and western borders are of no interest whatsoever in this connection.

Please use the above ideas in conversations as occasion requires. We are interested, however, in restricting the discussion of this problem as much as possible. As far as our influence can be brought to bear, discussions in the press should therefore be avoided as much as possible.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See documents Nos. 199, 207, 239, 252.

No. 328

FF5/0261-57

The Regent of Hungary to the Führer and Chancellor

BUDAPEST, November 3, 1939.

EXCELLENCY: When one knows a friend to be heavily burdened with responsibility, facing great decisions and laden with care, one feels the urge to visit him in one's thoughts, to clear up any possible misunderstandings, and to warn him of dangers of which one is aware. So please do not consider my gift of fruit in these grave and dark days as naïveté.

No honest person of sound political judgment could fail to realize that unless the flagrant injustices of the Paris peace dictates were eradicated in time they would be wiped out by force of arms. A bad peace can only bring forth new wars. We Hungarians are the best witnesses to the fact that the statesmen of the Western Powers did not recognize this or, if they did, did not have the will or the power to avert the disaster, for at a time when there was nothing for us to do but try to improve our impossible situation through the League of Nations, our grievances were always ignored. The famous article 19 was never applied, though we were the ones who suffered more than any others after the World War.

Although we look up in admiration to the German Army and to German might, we face the coming events with concern, for war today is a war without romance, without swords, and causes much suffering, deprivation, and sorrow.

We were loyal comrades-in-arms and, when the entire world turned against Germany after the collapse, her only true friends. Yet

while our feeling toward Germany never changed, we had the impression that Germany's attitude toward us underwent a change. The only way we could explain this to ourselves (by "we" I mean public opinion, the Government, and myself) was that falsely colored situation reports and mendacious accounts were circulated to present our Government in a false light. In recent years a political party has been formed here, known as the Arrow Cross [*Pfeilkreuzler*], which is under the leadership of contemptible individuals and operates with anonymous leaflets. They spread false situation reports and slander our best public figures. Besides, those who are seeking to stir up the Hungarian citizens of German stock are engaged in similar activities. Both movements are working for money.

That the Hungarians oppressed the nationalities living here is a lie which was invented in Paris when the peace dictates were contrived. For centuries the German communities have spoken German, and they have not been discriminated against in their pursuits. The name of our best Minister of War was Wilhelm Röder, the present Chief of the General Staff is Heinrich Werth, the Minister for Education and Worship is Homan, the Minister of Finance is Schneller, etc. Moreover, the highest position in the country was held by Prince Primate Cardinal Czernoch, the son of a poor Slovak peasant, and is now held by Prince Primate Cardinal Seredi, the son of a Slovak roofer by the name of Zapucek.

The plan of repatriating the German minorities to their original homeland settles a multitude of questions and prevents friction; it is an excellent idea that should be applied to all minorities. The Turks and Greeks to my knowledge did exchange 1½ million people. If this plan is ever realized, the efforts of those who want to use the minority question to drive a wedge between us and the German Reich will come to naught. Our good Swabians, by the way, of whom we have always been very fond, are certainly the best farmers and farm workers among all those who can be repatriated. The Volga Germans, I hear, have become out-and-out Communists.

I have reliable information, by the way, that Russia will deliver *nothing* if Germany should get into difficulties, for she is afraid of Germany alone; if Germany is weakened the road is open for world revolution.

Lenin wrote the following: "It is a fundamental principle that in case of war the revolutionary classes must desire the defeat of their own government." And Stalin said on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Red Army: "Precisely because our army is being educated in the spirit of internationalism it is the army of world

revolution. The essence of official Soviet diplomacy is to keep the Soviet State out of a world war, but at the same time to hasten the outbreak of a world war, for it expects from it the final victory of world revolution."

After November 11, 1918, Marshal Foch made the official proposal that France, England, Italy, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, should all immediately march against Moscow, establish order there, break up into its component parts that gigantic empire composed of 118 nationalities which was a threat to all; then they were to return, sit down at the green table, and as comrades-in-arms conclude an eternal peace. This proposal was killed by Clemenceau, and yet this would have been the only practical way to save Europe.

I should also like to express my sincere and heartfelt thanks for the friendly words with which Your Excellency remembered Hungary on the historic occasion of your latest very forceful speech.¹

We are a grateful and absolutely reliable people, and we realize what we owe to you and the German nation. We want the German people to feel that even though it wishes to fight its great battle alone, it need not face its cares alone. Whatever we can spare is at your disposal.

If you should, perhaps, some day wish to make use of my services in some other way, in absolute secrecy, for very confidential negotiations, I shall always be available—except for the East.

Your Excellency's devoted friend,

HORTHY

P. S. I sent the names of the five varieties of apples with them. The grapes should be hung in a well-aired room and should be washed before eating, as they have been sprayed.

¹ On Oct. 6. See Editors' Note, p. 227.

No. 329

169/82892-94

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, November 6, 1939—8:50 p. m.

No. 834 of November 6

Received November 7—5:25 p. m.

I spoke today to Gafencu concerning today's teletype message from Rome, according to which the Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara was

negotiating about Article 3 of the Turkish pact.¹ Gafencu termed the report false; it came under the category of canards like the one about the flight of the Polish President to Brussels and similar ones that were calculated to cast doubt on Rumania's good faith.

Ambassador Stoica was negotiating about the neutrality bloc and nothing else. He showed me 1) his instruction to Stoica; 2) the latter's reply; 3) instructions to Athens and Belgrade.

Re 1) The Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara is instructed to ask the Turkish Government whether it would approve neutrality of the Balkans in a form still to be determined in detail.

Rumania has in mind:

- a) absolute neutrality in the present European conflict;
- b) binding pledges of nonaggression among the Balkan states;
- c) in the event of an attack on a Balkan state by a third state no attack must be made on the attacked state by other Balkan States (i. e. protection against Bulgaria and Hungary);
- d) withdrawal of troops from common borders in the Balkans, with demobilization as its aim (similar to the agreement with Hungary);
- e) close economic cooperation to eliminate economic difficulties during the present conflict;
- f) joint consultation for the defense of the economic interests of the neutrals.

It is stressed that the accession of Hungary and Bulgaria is necessary, and that that of Italy, which at present is still aloof, will be sought.

Re 2) Secretary General Numan welcomes the proposal and will submit it to the Turkish Minister President. He promises a reply on or before November 14.

Re 3) Belgrade and Athens will be informed of the reply.

Gafencu considers his step a contribution to the neutrality of the Balkans, and feels certain of our approval. Having already replied to his inquiry in conformity with paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 707 of October 31,² I refrained today from further remarks.

FABRICIUS

¹ See document No. 338, footnote 2.

² Not printed (583/242247. In paragraph 2 of this telegram, Woermann instructed Fabricius to tell Gafencu that "we believe the question of establishing a political bloc of all the Balkan States under Italian leadership does not arise at all, since to our knowledge Rome is not seeking anything of this kind. Thus in these circumstances there is no need for us to take a position either of approval or disapproval." See also documents Nos. 266, 296, 354, 358, 359, and 372.

No. 330

8342/E590189-43

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

No. 416

BERLIN, November 7, 1939.

Received November 7—7:00 p. m.

You are requested in accordance with the conversations with the Ambassador here to continue the economic negotiations¹ on the following basis:

(1) If the Turks persist in refusing to restore the Clearing Agreement, we propose a comprehensive compensation arrangement with bilateral general settlement. The arrangement could take in about one-third or one-half of the former volume of goods on the basis of the foreign trade during the last treaty year, exclusive of war material. We prefer comprehensive to item-by-item compensation because the latter is inadequate as the sole basis of an exchange of goods. It is necessary, however, to keep open the possibility of individual compensation transactions besides the comprehensive compensation arrangement. The limitation on the comprehensive compensation arrangement is unavoidable on account of transportation difficulties.

(2) Acceptance of proposal (1) by the Turks would also automatically ensure delivery of part of the imports of chromium ore. For the rest of the chromium ore imports [we could offer] specific compensations. The total imports during the year, counting from October 1st, must if possible [reach] last year's imports of 80,000 tons; the indispensable minimum is 60,000 tons. Failure of the Turks to agree to the inclusion of a portion of the chromium ore in the comprehensive compensation arrangement, would make it necessary to propose a special compensation arrangement for the total quantity. Conversations with Ochel and Palucca's² statements, with which you are familiar, offer the first starting points in that direction. Apart from this, Habib Edih, the Turkish merchant here acting supposedly as the agent of the Turkish War Ministry, has proposed a special compensation of 50,000 tons of chromium ore, 8,000 tons of cotton, and 2,000 tons of mohair, valued at 12 million RM, against Mauser rifles, 20-mm antiaircraft guns, 37-mm antitank guns and medical instruments and medicaments. We have given an evasive answer because we would prefer if possible to barter chromium ore for manufactures important to Turkey, e. g., railway material and only, as a last resort, for arms and, if so, then possibly only for arms on the basis of old orders.

(3) With regard to military equipment, we propose the following general settlement:

a) Large arms (heavy guns from 150 mm to 240 mm, submarines and related equipment) will not be supplied, as before;

¹ On July 31, 1939, the existing German-Turkish Agreements on Trade and Payments had terminated. Discussions concerning the resumption of trade, with or without a comprehensive agreement, had been going on since the spring of 1939. For a summary of these discussions, see document No. 391.

² Owner of a chromium ore mine near the Sea of Marmora.

since the outbreak of the war it would be equally indefensible on military grounds to deliver 60 Messerschmitt 109's and 8 Heinkel 111's as well as 16 75-mm antiaircraft guns. As regards the second order for 40 antiaircraft guns of the same type, which are not to be delivered until 1942, there is hardly any need to discuss it now. Finally, there is doubt as to the advisability of delivering in full the 4,000 light machine guns on order with Skoda, because they represent the equipment of 13 divisions. Of this, however, a portion, scaled down to a minimum could be delivered. For the information of the Embassy: 500 are ready for shipment at this time.

b) Other deliveries of military equipment can in the main be carried out provided a satisfactory general settlement is obtained. In the case of the delivery of the 278 37-mm antitank guns, which would be inconvenient at this time, it would be desirable at least to extend the delivery dates.

c) The prerequisite for deliveries under (b) is that in the event of nondelivery of orders under (a) the Turks will in all instances recognize the intervention of force majeure and waive fines for breach of contract and judicial procedure against the firms concerned. Advance payments would be returned with interest. Transferring back to German firms through the clearing of advance payments made by the same method will offer no difficulties since funds are available from a mounting balance. Negotiations will be necessary to settle the manner of refunding to firms in the Protectorate their advance payments in English pounds. Since it is obvious that we cannot make refunds in English pounds at this time, an attempt must first be made to arrange repayment through the clearing. If this is not agreeable, reimbursement could perhaps be made in the form of goods of particular interest to the Turks.

d) An additional condition for further deliveries under (b) is that deliveries of chromium ore discussed in Section 2 must be guaranteed. It is then immaterial whether they are linked directly to the former or are compensated for in some other way.

e) If guarantees for the delivery of the chromium ore cannot be obtained in this way, the last resort, in view of the imperative need for chromium ore, would be a new arms transaction; arms of the type designated under (a) would however be ruled out. From the Turkish standpoint also new contracts are probably feasible only if the fate of the old contracts is clarified. If the new contracts are for arms similar to those discussed under (b), the substitutions of new contracts for the old might perhaps have the advantage for us that this would convert credit transactions into cash transactions on the basis of chrome ore.

4) If a general settlement is effected, the balance, in so far as it is not used for repayments, must in accordance with Article 12 of the Clearing Agreement be used for imports of articles of our choice, which would exclude chromium ore if chromium ore is subject to a special arrangement.

5) We cannot deliver any goods and the Clearing Office in Germany can make no more advances until a general settlement is agreed upon.

Nor are we in a position any longer to deliver bills of lading that are not already in Turkish hands. Please advise the banks there to get in touch with their customers in regard to this matter.

You must make it plain that this is not a matter of chicanery or reprisal, but simply economic necessity because we cannot allow our balance to continue to mount unless we know what use we shall be able to make of it.

6) We are aware that negotiations are difficult on this basis. Turkey, just as any other country, must appreciate, however, that as things stand it is indeed a great technical and organizational achievement if Germany, in spite of the war, is willing to maintain German exports on the scale proposed. This is especially true with respect to war material. In international practice contracts for military equipment are signed with the express or tacit reservation that involvement of the supplier country in a war will at least suspend their performance. The proof of this is that in ordering military equipment in the last year before the outbreak of the war, buyers often expressly insisted on a clause that delivery must be performed in spite of a possible outbreak of war. The fact that notwithstanding these circumstances we are willing to carry out deliveries on a large scale is a very special concession, particularly with respect to Turkey, considering her political attitude in the past half year.

7) As soon as we can perceive a basis for agreement we would make a junior official of the Ministry of Economics temporarily available to the Embassy for the purpose of technical consultations and preparation of the text of the agreement since the sending of Clodius is now impracticable for political reasons.

Please report by telegraph.

WIEHL

No. 331

141/127838

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 873

BERLIN, November 7, 1939.

The Belgian Ambassador, who called on me today because of several instances of alleged German violations of Belgian air sovereignty, made several attempts to turn the conversation to the subject of a German offensive and rumors of an intended violation of Belgian territory. I did not follow these hints and referred Count Davignon to the Foreign Minister's address at Danzig for the general political situation.¹ Davignon intends to go to Brussels about the

¹ The Foreign Minister's address at Danzig was made on Oct. 24. For text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 362-381.

end of this week in order to contact his Government directly again and visit his family.

The Ambassador described the trip of the King of the Belgians to Holland, which became known today, as an outcome of the last meeting of the Scandinavian monarchs.² He added that the King had great respect for the Queen of the Netherlands. Belgium could also learn a great deal from the wide experience of Holland in the field of neutrality during wartime.

WEIZSÄCKER

Addendum: At a reception this afternoon the Belgian Ambassador approached me in a state of alarm, alleging that the entire German afternoon press was using the occasion of the visit of the King of the Belgians to The Hague for attacking Belgium and Holland in such a manner that it seemed as if Germany were trying to start a quarrel with these countries.

I immediately rejected this impression and said that as yet I was not familiar with these articles.

Davignon asked, since he was extremely upset, that I tell him a little more sometime during the afternoon about the meaning of these press articles, unless it should be possible for him to ask the Foreign Minister himself concerning them.

² See document No. 255, footnote 1.

No. 332

173/84010-11

Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat

SECRET

BERLIN, November 7, 1939.

St.S. No. 874

Minister Count Zech telephoned from The Hague at 7:05 p. m. and dictated the telegram annexed hereto. He added that the text of the telegram had been handed to him at the Netherlands Foreign Ministry about an hour and a half ago (it had taken that long to get a connection with Berlin). Immediately after him the French and British Ambassadors were received and handed a telegraphic communication of the same text, addressed to the President of the French Republic and the King of England.

The telegram will not be published in the Dutch press until tomorrow morning.

SIEGFRIED

[Enclosure]

Telegram of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands to the German Chancellor.

THE HAGUE, November 7, 1939.

In an hour which is of ominous import for the entire world, before the war in Western Europe begins in full violence, it is our conviction that it is our duty once more to raise our voices.¹

Some time ago, the belligerent parties declared that they were not averse to examining honest and secure bases for a just peace. It is our impression that they find it difficult in the present circumstances to establish contact for a more complete exposition and coordination of their positions.

As the Sovereigns of two neutral states which have good relations with all their neighbors, we are prepared to offer them our good offices. If agreeable to them, we are willing to place ourselves at their disposal as they may see fit and, with all resources at our command and in the spirit of friendly sympathy, facilitate the transmission of proposals for the attainment of an understanding.

This is in our judgment the mission which we have to carry out for the sake of the well-being of our nations and in the interest of the entire world. We hope that our offer will be accepted and that with it the first step will be taken toward the restoration of a lasting peace.²

WILHELMINA
LEOPOLD

¹ In testimony given June 23, 1948, before Tribunal IV, Case 11, "The Ministries Case" (Nuremberg Military Tribunals, mimeographed transcript, English edition, pp. 9807-9811), Bülow-Schwante stated that at the end of October 1939 the former Oberbürgermeister of Leipzig, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, brought to him in Brussels a message from Weizsäcker which could not be sent through regular channels. Weizsäcker urged Bülow-Schwante to act promptly on his own initiative, even if this ran counter to the official Reich policy, to impress on the Belgians the extreme gravity of the situation. Accordingly, Bülow-Schwante testified, he arranged for a private audience with King Leopold, and shortly afterwards he read that the King had gone to The Hague to consult with Queen Wilhelmina.

² On Nov. 11 the heads of the Missions in Belgium and the Netherlands were given telegraphic instructions by Ribbentrop to call immediately upon the respective Foreign Ministers and to say: "The Führer has received the telegram sent to him by Queen Wilhelmina and King Leopold jointly. The contents of the telegram will be carefully studied" (476/229466). For subsequent German reaction see document No. 356.

No. 333

4531/144260-61

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Turkey*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, November 8, 1939—[12:59 a. m.]

No. [420]¹

zu W III c 30 Ang. 3.

With reference to our telegram No. [416] of November 7,
W III c 30.²

There are numerous reports here that in her attempt to shift her industrial orders from Germany to England Turkey is confronted with great difficulties and that in most cases delivery is being refused. The situation seems to be especially critical with regard to spare parts which can be obtained only from Germany. In case these reports are correct, please take account of this situation in carrying out the instruction cited above. If the Embassy is of the opinion that the difficulties of the Turkish economy will shortly increase to such an extent that the Turks will have to approach us with a request for certain deliveries, with the result that we would be in a more favorable position, we would even agree to delay carrying out the instruction for the time being. If the pressure on the Turkish economy caused by the lack of German deliveries is really sufficiently serious, there is a better prospect for making a changeover to cash payment the condition for completion of the credit transactions already concluded both with respect to war material under section 3 b) of the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction as well as with respect to other deliveries. If in view of the situation the Embassy should consider such dilatory treatment proper, the attempt should merely be made at this time to bring about single compensation transactions on chromium ore in the sense of the previous instruction.

Report by wire.

WIEHL

¹The information in brackets is from the Ankara copy of the document (8493/E596917-18).

²Document No. 330.

No. 334

141/127846

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 327 of November 8 BRUSSELS, November 8, 1939—2:56 p. m.
Received November 8—6:15 p. m.

Have just heard from a reliable Dutch source that the journey to The Hague has been undertaken by the Belgian King owing to threatening news received concerning German preparations for attack near the Belgian and Dutch border. The King is said to have stated in The Hague that he is in possession of exact information concerning the formation of the German units, which according to military opinion show indications of intention to attack. Hitherto it was only a matter of billeting of large troop formations which had been released in the East. In the last few days, however, regrouping is said to have taken place which represented a strategic concentration for attack.

According to the King's information this concentration would be completed in about 2 to 3 days so that from then onwards the attack could ensue at any moment. From the foregoing description of the Dutch confidential agent, it is seen that the Belgian-Dutch offer of mediation¹ represents a move which derives from the initiative of the King of the Belgians and the fear of being precipitated into a war.

BÜLOW

¹ See document No. 332.

No. 335

1369/356966-67

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, November 8, 1939.

On November 7, the anniversary of the October Revolution, a reception was held by the newly-appointed Ambassador, Alexander (Alekseyevich) Shkvartsev, at the Berlin Embassy of the USSR. Field Marshal Göring was among the guests; after the welcoming address by the Ambassador, he expressed to the latter his satisfaction about the fact that the relations between the German Reich and the USSR were constantly growing more friendly. The Field Marshal then inquired of the Ambassador as to the progress of the economic negotiations and asked whether the Soviet delegation in Berlin found everything as they desired, whereupon the Ambassador replied that

the negotiations were proceeding very favorably, so that it could be expected that the agreement would be signed in the very near future.

The Ambassador thereupon introduced the head of the Soviet negotiating delegation, People's Commissar Tevossyan, to the Field Marshal. Tevossyan, an Armenian who speaks some German, stated that the Soviet delegation was not entirely satisfied with the attitude of reserve that the Germans were showing on the arms question. The Germans had promised that the Soviet delegation would be shown the most recent achievements of arms technology, for instance in field artillery, airplanes, aiming mechanisms, and communications, but the very latest improvements were nevertheless being kept secret. Field Marshal Göring declared that the Germans will adhere with painful exactitude [*peinlich genau*] to their promise. He had given strict instructions to that effect and he was ready to do away with existing difficulties. With regard to field artillery there could be no talk of secrecy; after all, that was already proven. Then it was the foot artillery [*Fussartillerie*], said Tevossyan. In aviation, too, much was being kept secret. Field Marshal Göring thereupon explained that much experimental work was being done in aviation and that only thoroughly-tested innovations could be considered. He would not like to assume the responsibility of delivering to the Soviet Government a plane that had not yet been finally tested. The many numbers of a single airplane type are explained by the fact that the figures indicate repeated series in each case. Tevossyan thereupon said he would then like to have the planes with the latest numbers shown. Field Marshal Göring replied to the People's Commissar that the German-Soviet relationship was based on mutual confidence and, as we trusted the Soviet Government, we should also like to ask that we not be approached in a spirit of mistrust. If we showed something as the most recent innovation, it was the most recent innovation. Field Marshal Göring promised again to issue instructions to this effect and asked that cases of doubt be referred to his staff whom he would instruct accordingly.

Respectfully submitted to Minister Freiherr von Dörnberg.

MAYER-HEYDENHAGEN

No. 336

173/84014

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 875

BERLIN, November 8, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador today spontaneously mentioned to me the fact that the two Sovereigns of Belgium and the Netherlands offered

their good offices in the question of peace. I told Attolico that it was obviously the wish of the British Government to obscure and kill in advance any mediation effort through Lord Halifax's speech last night.¹ As to the German reaction to the action of the two Sovereigns, I pointed out to Attolico that the Führer was not in Berlin at the moment.

In the subsequent course of the conversation I told the Italian that Belgium was making remonstrances with us at present about repeated flights over Belgian territory; of all these complaints one at most appeared to me to have any foundation. Conversely, however—I continued as instructed—we had reason to complain about the recurrent violations of Belgian territory by the Allied air forces. Belgium and Holland must be careful to maintain their neutrality not merely in words but also in deeds and to offer energetic resistance to British pressures unless the two countries wished to acquire with us the reputation of showing definite favoritism to our enemies.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The text of this speech is published in *Speeches on Foreign Policy by Viscount Halifax*, edited by H. H. E. Craster (London, 1940), pp. 330–335.

No. 337

476/229491

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, November 9, 1939—7:00 p. m.

No. 357 of November 9

Received November 9.

Civil Engineer Dahlerus requests that the following message be conveyed to Field Marshal Göring:

With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday I recommend that no definite stand be taken for several days on the appeal of the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians. I shall in the meantime seek to ascertain from England whether the British are interested at all and, if so, what their conditions are. It is regrettable that such a proposal was made without better preparation while the British still have under consideration the communications referred to in my letter of November 7.¹ End of message.

WIED

¹ Not found.

No. 338

1625/389265-66

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, November 9, 1939—7:55 p. m.

No. 464 of November 9

Received November 10—4:00 a. m.

Pol. II 4507.

1. A démarche has just been made in accordance with the Foreign Minister's instruction Pol. II 4228 of November 3.¹ My statements, made with great seriousness and supplemented in accordance with the oral instructions, were received by M. Saracoglu in silence. He repeated the old, well-known excuses that the treaty was not directed against Germany and was exclusively an instrument for defending Turkey against attacks. Italy, against which the treaty was mainly directed, had not lodged any formal protest whatever in view of this situation. In reply to my question about the meaning of articles 4 and 5, Saracoglu made evasive and empty statements. Criticizing the Turkish attitude most severely, I emphasized the value of our friendship with Russia for all future developments. The Minister admitted that he had wished to limit article 3 to consultation, but that the Western Powers had refused to give up the version previously agreed upon.² Saracoglu's speech yesterday in the Assembly, with its arrogant praise of the new partners, can be explained only by the existence of strong opposition and uneasiness in leading Turkish circles in the face of the deterioration of Turkish-Russian relations.

2. From the discussion of the meaning of article 5 of the Tripartite Pact I received the impression that (group garbled) a violation of the

¹ Document No. 324.

² The text of the articles referred to here is as follows:

Article 3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Roumania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.

Article 4. In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that Power against either of those States without the provisions of articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together.

It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.

Article 5. Without prejudice to the provisions of article 3 above, in the event of either:

(1) Aggression by a European Power against another European State which the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, or

(2) Aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.

neutrality of such countries as are of vital interest to England, detailed discussions have already been held in view of the situation on the Dutch-Belgian border, which is much discussed here and is considered very serious. It must be expected that in such an event Turkey will yield to British pressure and break off diplomatic relations with us.

3. An exhaustive conversation with the Russian Ambassador, whom I told of the reports available here on the [French] Army of the Orient, showed agreement on the necessity of preventing in all circumstances the use of this army for an attack through (group garbled) against the southern German flank. The maintenance of peace in the Balkans was equally important for the two powers. Russia had already taken precautionary military measures against Turkish troop concentrations in the Caucasus and would continue such measures until spring. Discussing the possibility of a forced entry by the British fleet into the Bosphorus the Ambassador said that he had left no doubt here that this would have the most serious consequences. He mentioned to me the possibility of a Russian air attack on the Straits being launched in that event. Present Turkish-Russian relations do not permit any continuation of the negotiations broken off in Moscow.

4. General estimate of the situation found here: In order to gain time for the operations jointly agreed upon, about which I have not spoken to Terentiev but which were suggested by him as quite possible, and in order not to be forced to give up the German foothold here prematurely, I would again recommend joint, large-scale operations against England for the spring. In any case an attempt should be made to extract a Russian declaration that any Allied attack on the Balkans would lead to a Straits conflict with Russia in the sense of Protocol 2.

PAPEN

No. 339

2121/462425

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ANKARA, November 9, 1939—11:12 p. m.

No. 465 of November 9

Received November 10—5:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 416 of November 7.¹

On the occasion of today's political discussion with the Foreign Minister I pointed out to him that the only possibility of an improvement in political relations was a new economic agreement. I found that the Minister was in general agreement, and referred him to the guiding principle of the above instruction as a basis.

¹ Document No. 330.

In view of the general war situation I consider it urgent to arrive at this agreement as soon as possible; for that reason I have not made any use of the suggestion given in instruction 420.² It developed that the chromium for which the Allies are so ardently contending is obtainable only against compensation in the form of war material in accordance with Subsection 3 b. The Minister also seemed willing to conclude agreement on this basis in accordance with Subsection 3 c (recognition of force majeure). With reference to chromium, England and France were demanding extensive deliveries, and America similarly, 50,000 tons. Turkey was trying to determine whether an increase in output would be possible. I replied that this was of no interest to us and that an agreement with Germany was possible only if the required minimum was delivered.

The Foreign Minister promised that he would give me a binding answer on Monday. I propose that the motors for the submarine here be included in Subsection 3 b, since I have ascertained that they are in Spanish harbors and therefore are useless to Germany. Such a delivery would give me an exceptional possibility of concluding a favorable treaty. Please send telegraphic instructions on this point.

PAPEN

² Document No. 333.

No. 340

2914/566588-91

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Sweden*

Telegram

BERLIN, November 9, 1939.

With reference to your telegram No. 340.¹

1) Although the conduct of naval operations is outside the function of the governmental delegation, we agree that you should enter

¹ Not printed (2914/566572-74). In this telegram dispatched Nov. 3, Ministerialdirektor Walter of the Ministry of Food, chairman of the delegation to negotiate a German-Swedish clearing agreement, reported on views expressed to him privately but on behalf of the Swedish Government by Richert, the Swedish Minister to Germany. Richert said his Government was astonished at the presentation of the German note of Oct. 31 on the 4-mile limit (see document No. 304, footnote 2) just as economic conversations were being undertaken, and regarded this act as evidencing an "unfriendly attitude." Sweden had claimed the 4-mile limit of territorial waters for many decades and was not disposed to yield it; she was, however, willing to discuss the matter through usual diplomatic channels. Richert then presented Swedish views on maintaining normal trade with belligerents. Walter replied that the economic delegation was not authorized to negotiate on problems of sea warfare. Richert thereupon requested that the German delegation ask for an extension of its powers because Sweden was not prepared to conclude a treaty unless the repercussions of German sea warfare on Swedish foreign trade were taken into account.

into conversations about it because we believe that this will improve your position in the negotiations.

2) Please take the following standpoint:

a) In accordance with the declaration made by Hassell,² it is not our intention to interfere with Sweden's trade with the enemy countries through applying economic pressure, provided that such trade is kept within normal bounds and on a pre-war scale; this means, for instance, we shall not because of such trade relations apply reprisals, such as refusing to buy Swedish products or to deliver German products essential to Sweden. We also consent to the maintenance of trade with neutral countries, but shall agree to any increase above normal trade and the pre-war volume only if it is not at the expense of exports to Germany. If so, we would construe it as a serious violation of Swedish neutrality.

b) Our commercial policy does not affect the conduct of naval operations. Since England has adopted the ruthless suppression of all trade between neutrals and Germany, where she has the power to do so, and since she has moreover subjected the trade between the neutral countries to rigid control, often rendering trade practically impossible, on the pretext of preventing goods going to Germany by way of the neutral countries, we have to claim the same right. We shall accordingly cut off Swedish exports to England with all the means of naval warfare, and also stop shipments of goods destined for neutral countries, if we have reason to suspect that they are ultimately intended for the enemy. Please emphasize that this is merely Germany's reply to England's way of handling the control of the seas.

The argument that the suppression of the direct and indirect Swedish exports to enemy countries would so weaken the Swedish economy that a reduction in Swedish exports to Germany would necessarily follow is not true. Sweden would, despite this, be in a position not only to keep up exports to Germany, but even to increase them. If the point is raised that the maintenance of normal trade with one belligerent is predicated upon the maintenance of trade with other belligerents, please reply that to our knowledge not a single country whose trade with Germany has been cut off by British measures has decided to break off trade with England, or even restrict it, on that account.

c) The 3-mile zone is internationally recognized. We are not in a position to make an exception and grant Sweden a 4-mile zone. It is desirable, however, to continue to handle the discussion of this question, on which negotiations between the Legation there and the Swedish Government are now in progress (see telegraphic report No. 349),³ in the same manner as heretofore.

² See document No. 165.

³ Not printed (205/141918-20). This telegram, dispatched Nov. 5, quoted the text of the Swedish reply of Nov. 4 to the German note of Oct. 31. The Swedish Government repeated its claim to a 4-mile limit and expressed its strong hope that the German Government, regardless of its objections on principle, would on reconsideration find it possible to respect the Swedish view.

3) For your information: Should Sweden insist on bracketing the two questions, we have no objection, if you deem proper, to breaking off the negotiations for the present.

Reply by telegram.⁴

WIEHL

⁴ Not found.

No. 341

103/111773-74

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 740

BERLIN, November 9, 1939.
zu Pol. I M 7540 g.¹

With reference to your No. 628.²

Telegraphic instruction No. 659³ and telegraphic report No. 628 apparently crossed en route. As already explained therein the Naval Staff, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, has ordered German naval forces to comply with the wishes of the Russians, particularly in view of the pending negotiations with Finland.

You are authorized to reassure the Russians regarding this, and to add that in the present situation we understood the Russian attitude also in regard to the longitude degree⁴ and were now taking it into account. Please also say that this accommodation on our part does not, of course, mean a renunciation in principle of an extension of our naval warfare to all parts of the high seas. If, as in the present case, there were particular interests to be taken into consideration, we were prepared to engage in a friendly discussion of such proposals in the future, too.

For your information:

The Russian authorities appear to have misunderstood Commander Neubauer's statements. In the conversation with the Naval Attaché it was merely a question of technical information expressly designated as such, delivered in a personal way, to which no fundamental importance whatsoever could be attached.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. I M 7540 g: Not found.

² Document No. 313.

³ Document No. 309.

⁴ See document No. 313.

No. 342

1369/356960

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 687 of November 9

Moscow, November 10, 1939—6:09 a. m.

Received November 10—8:45 a. m.

W IV 4360.

For Ritter and Schnurre:

1) Molotov informed me this evening that if Germany were to meet the wishes of the Soviet economic delegation and an agreement were reached on Soviet wishes respecting deliveries, the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to payment for the transit freight through clearing, that is, in reichsmarks. This would apply to all German transit shipments via the Soviet Union in the trade with Iran, Afghanistan, the Far East, and Rumania. With respect to the transit traffic from Rumania to Germany via former Polish territory, the Soviet Government agreed to the application of the provisions of the relevant German treaty with Rumania.

2) Molotov further stated that the Soviet Government had decided to ship to Germany "several" million tons of iron ore with a 35- to 40-percent iron content, on condition that its wishes with respect to deliveries were met. In reply to the question as to what quantity we could infer this to mean, Molotov replied that the exact quantities had not yet been settled upon, but that the Soviet Government was disposed to take account of our requirements within the limits of the possible. The relatively low iron content of the ore would be no obstacle owing to the high level of the German concentration methods.

3) The Soviet Government was prepared to start exporting grain and petroleum products to Germany at once in order to show its good will and on the assumption that our deliveries in return would not be long in coming.

SCHULENBURG

No. 343

8487/E596856-57

The State Secretary to the Legation in Switzerland

Telegram

No. 396

BERLIN, November 10, 1939.
zu Pol. I Vbd. 412.¹

With reference to your reports No. A 751, of September 2,² and No. 2893, of September 13.³

¹ Not printed (8487/E596852-54).

² Not printed (6331/E472466-71).

³ Not printed (8486/E596839-48).

According to reports received the Acting President of the Assembly of the League of Nations and the Secretary-General have proposed to call a meeting of the Assembly for December 4.

In spite of the ostensible intention to consider only administrative matters, we must fear that a war-time session will lead to political demonstrations directed against Germany, such as, for example, the possible appearance of a Czech or a Polish delegation. England and France moreover will surely seize the opportunity to make open or covert propaganda against Germany.

I therefore request that you forcefully impress upon the Swiss Government with reference to its repeated declarations of neutrality that we are obliged to inform it of our views regarding the possible deleterious effect on German-Swiss relations which might result from the session at Geneva.

We expect the Swiss Government to take every precaution against any impairment of its neutrality.

~~Please add that in the event that our fears regarding the League of Nations Assembly or Council should be realized, we would have to reserve to ourselves the right to reconsider our position.⁴~~

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴This sentence was scored through by Ribbentrop and deleted before the telegram was sent. The document bears the initial R[ibbentrop].

No. 344

173/84022-23

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, November 10, 1939.

The Netherlands Minister called on me at 7:45 this evening and handed me the annexed note verbale.

M. de With stated the case as follows:

Yesterday afternoon a Dutch automobile with two Englishmen, who supposedly were to conduct peace negotiations with Germans at the Dutch-German border, accompanied by a Dutch officer in civilian clothes, who had been assigned to them, had come to the border near Venlo, halting at a café there about 40 meters from the border line. As soon as the car had stopped, the occupants were fired upon from ambush; the Dutch officer was seriously, probably fatally, wounded, and one of the Englishmen also was hit. Immediately after the shooting, an automobile crossed the border from Germany and towed the Dutch car with the two wounded men, the second Englishman, and the driver of the car across the German border.

M. de With declared repeatedly that in these troubled times he did not wish in any way to exaggerate the incident. Since the Netherlands Government supported every peace movement, it had given its authorization to that trip. To the extent that the incident concerned the two Englishmen, it was no concern of the Netherlands Government. It did request, however, that the wounded or dead Dutch officer and the Dutch chauffeur be returned to Holland. An investigation of the matter was deemed urgent by him because, as he had heard, the incident had already been announced over the Dutch and the foreign radio.

I stated that I knew nothing of the whole matter.

BISMARCK

[Enclosure]

Note Verbale From the Netherlands Legation

No. 6719/75M

BERLIN, November 10, 1939.

The Royal Netherlands Legation has the honor to inform the Foreign Ministry of the following:

At 4:30 p. m. on November 9 of this year, a Dutch automobile containing four passengers halted at a distance of 40 meters from the border at Venlo; two of them alighted, whereupon two persons emerged from a café at that place and took off their hats. Apparently this was a signal, for immediately six persons dressed in civilian clothes rushed up and opened fire. The two persons who had alighted from the car fell to the ground. Then an automobile approached from Germany and pulled the Dutch car with its remaining occupants and the two persons who had been shot over to the German side. Whether the persons who had remained in the car were also hit is not known.

Pursuant to instructions the Legation wishes to request the Foreign Ministry to institute an investigation of this matter and to inform it of the results.¹

¹ On nine occasions, at frequent intervals, the Netherlands Legation requested a reply to its note of Nov. 10, 1939. On Jan. 25, 1940, a new Netherlands note (173/84170-72) was presented suggesting that the matter be referred to the German-Netherlands Conciliation Commission or to an international court. To this and several subsequent inquiries no reply was made prior to the German attack on the Netherlands in May 1940.

Additional information and documentation on the Venlo incident were brought out in the course of the so-called "Ministries Case" at Nuremberg. Some of this material was published in the *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949*, vol. XII, pp. 1178-80, 1206-10, 1214, 1232-42, and 1248-49.

No. 345

191/138597

An Official of the Embassy in China to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

CHUNGKING,¹ November 11, 1939—1:00 p. m.

No. 17 of November 11

Received November 11—4:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 10 of November 9 (W 2500g).²

Prime Minister Kung, who has personal control of the state monopoly production of tungsten, etc., most of which is pledged to England and the Soviet Union and for repayment of the American loan, told me yesterday afternoon that he was in principle prepared to make deliveries, but he asked that before concrete details were discussed Germany make a statement with regard to the single Chinese condition—that payment be made by means of German deliveries of arms and munitions (rifles, light and heavy machine guns, ammunition for light artillery and field guns). He had already refused offers of cash payment from other powers.

In case of German consent, he would be willing “to guarantee deliveries to Germany for the next 50 years,” and hinted that he would even make use of ores pledged to England and other countries in order to supply Germany.

Ores could be made available for German acceptance and further shipment only in the vicinity of the production areas, tin in Yunnan, antimony and tungsten in the southern part of Kiangsi Province.

Moreover, he would consent only to overland transportation, in view of the need for absolute secrecy toward England.

BIDDER

¹ Following the occupation of North China by the Japanese and the removal of the Chinese Government to Chungking, the German Embassy in China was located at Shanghai. Subordinate offices [*Zweigstellen*] of the Mission maintained diplomatic representation in both Chungking and Peking.

² Not found.

No. 346

476/299492

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

No. 493

BERLIN, November 11, 1939.

RM 566.

With reference to your telegram No. 357 of November 9.¹

Civil Engineer Dahlerus has already received word from the Field Marshal by telephone that the German Government is no longer in-

¹ Document No. 337.

terested in his sounding out England, because the official attitude of the British Government has already indicated unequivocal rejection of the German position. If Dahlerus should inquire, you are requested to inform him in this sense.

RIBBENTROP

No. 347

1625/389275-77

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 53

BERLIN, November 11, 1939.

Pol. II 4610.

The Turkish Ambassador Gerede called on me at 6:00 p. m. today in order to communicate the following:

He had been instructed to express the congratulations of the President of the Turkish Republic on the Führer's escape and at the same time his sympathy for the victims of the assassination attempt. Ambassador Gerede read to me the instruction to this effect. I thanked the Turkish Ambassador and told him that I would forward the communication of the President of the Turkish Republic to the Führer.

I then told the the Turkish Ambassador that the eventuality which we had discussed in our last conversation,¹ namely, Turkey's conclusion of mutual-assistance pacts with England and France, had in the meantime become a fact after all. Turkey had thereby joined the anti-German front.

The Turkish Ambassador denied this and declared that the treaty was in no wise directed against Germany.

I replied that it was difficult for me to follow his reasoning. On the contrary, I had the impression that Turkey's policy was chiefly directed against Germany. As proof of this I cited the fact that according to definite reports² Foreign Minister Saracoglu had offered a mutual-assistance pact in Moscow, but with the provision that Turkish assistance was not to be granted in the event the Soviet Union became involved in a conflict with England and France. The Soviet Union had then proposed a similar provision in the event of a conflict between Turkey and Germany, since the Soviet Union naturally did not wish to fight Germany. If the reports I had received were correct, Turkey had rejected the Russian reservation with respect to Germany and had insisted that she would conclude a mutual-assistance pact with the Soviet Union only if it was also directed against Germany. In addition, I received reports almost every day to the

¹ See document No. 202.

² See document No. 268, footnote 1.

effect that Turkish policy had taken a predominantly anti-German line and seemed moreover to be very active. It might almost be said that Turkish policy considered itself as an extension of the Foreign Office; indeed, it seemed at times even more British than Downing Street policy. For the rest, Ambassador von Papen had conveyed to the Turkish Foreign Minister our view on the conclusion of the treaty.⁸ Germany, which had always striven for nothing but friendly relations with Turkey in particular, was unable to understand the development of Turkish policy.

The Turkish Ambassador had little to say in reply. He merely stated that he could not believe my information about Turkish policy was correct.

Passing on to the attempted assassination in Munich, I called England its spiritual instigator and left it an open question whether the investigation would not also reveal England as the perpetrator.

At the conclusion of the conversation I told the Ambassador that I knew he had come here with the best of intentions to improve German-Turkish relations; unfortunately, however, he had entered upon his office at a very unfavorable time.

RIBBENTROP

⁸ See documents Nos. 324 and 333.

No. 348

476/229499-501

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 888

BERLIN, November 11, 1939.

Attolico has prepared an excerpt from a report by Bastianini, the Italian Ambassador in London, which he gave me in written form. Attolico requested particularly that the fact that he had informed us, of which Rome was ignorant, should not by any chance be in turn relayed to our Embassy in Rome. Attolico considered its contents interesting enough, however, to pass it on to us for our use. Of particular significance to him was England's anxiety about Russia as well as in general a certain disposition for conciliation.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure—Translation]

Cadogan met with me for the first time and discussed the situation in great detail. Since he is known as one of the most reserved men in the Foreign Office, the least inclined to let himself go, it may perhaps be regarded as symptomatic that he told me that two things were indispensable: a) the restoration of a Polish state, and b) a positive

collective guarantee that Germany would not resume tomorrow what she was unable to accomplish today. I noted that he was not free from misgivings about the easy conquests by Bolshevik Russia and the gains which the latter could derive from a prolongation of the war or a postwar period that would find Europe exhausted.

I found that Lord Halifax and Vansittart shared these doubts. In the case of the former they are a factor which possibly might exert some positive influence, and in the case of the latter, they are the only, if weak, indication that he is being shaken in his firm conviction that it is necessary once and for all to reduce Germany to a position where she could not dictate war or peace to the world at will.

Cadogan was rather explicit also about another matter, telling me that in his latest statement Chamberlain had of course not closed the door to the Germans, but that he was very well aware that Hitler did not feel he was in a position to open it himself. Continually using the word "guarantee", he defined his point of view more closely and stressed that these (guarantees) obviously could not be supplied by someone who offered a German peace and at the same time threatened a war of annihilation. Sir Ronald Graham talked to me in a similar vein.¹

Halifax as well as Cadogan and Vansittart expressed their keenest appreciation of the efforts made by the Duce and Your Excellency to avert the conflict, while Cadogan added that an understanding could have been achieved if Poland had not been invaded. But once the German troops began to march, England had had no other choice.

¹ Sir Ronald Graham had been British Ambassador in Italy, 1921-33.

No. 349

141/127357-58

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BRUSSELS, November 11 [12],¹ 1939—1: 10 a. m.

No. 337 of November 11

Received November 12—5: 30 a. m.

Foreign Minister Spaak sent for me today in order to discuss the political situation with me. He gave the impression of being very much depressed and at the very beginning of the conversation asked me why we were concentrating troops against Belgium. After all, it could certainly not be asserted that Belgium had not scrupulously observed neutrality. We would not be able to charge any incorrectness to the Belgian Government. As regards the press, which had perhaps been unsatisfactory, much was, after all, now being done, as the restrictions of the last few days showed. I would have to admit

that the tone of the press had for several days been moderate and discreet. He could not possibly be blamed because Belgium had not reacted more sharply against the British blockade measures. What, after all, was he to do except negotiate and protest? He had no means of exerting force against England. He asked me to tell him once and for all what we really demanded of Belgium and why we took this threatening attitude.

I replied that we were in no wise threatening Belgium. Troop movements, which he described as a concentration against Belgium, were caused by French action—which constituted a threat to us—on the southern border of Belgium, where a considerable number of motorized units had been concentrated. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not understand how I could give him such an explanation. He assumed that I knew as well as he himself did that the French had absolutely no idea of invading Belgium.

In reply to my doubting remark as to whether Belgian-French discussions might not actually be taking place again—of which, incidentally, I do not have any indications—the Foreign Minister told me very definitely that he could assure me this was not the case.

Although the press is calm and is not publishing any alarmist reports, very grave concern about a German attack is becoming more and more widespread among the people. Informed circles seem to be convinced of a threatening counteragitation and fear an invasion in the very near future. Military defense preparations are being continued with feverish haste.

[BÜLOW] ¹

¹The information in brackets is from the copy in the file of the Brussels Embassy (8346/E590233-34).

No. 350

5556/E395448-49

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, November 12, 1939.

As early as my return from Italy, in late October, I was told by the Defense Economy Staff [Wehrwirtschaftsstab] that the Army had laid such big claims to the Polish booty that probably next to nothing or only very little would be left for Rumania. In the very exhaustive discussions following this statement I declared very emphatically that the Foreign Minister would absolutely have to insist that we live up to the agreement of September 29, 1939,¹ about the sale to Rumania

¹ See document No. 166.

of a large part of the Polish booty, concluded with the consent of the highest authorities of the Reich and upon express instruction from the Foreign Minister. After Major General Thomas had thereupon promised to give me for my trip to Bucharest at least the prospect of delivery of part of the captured matériel, yesterday, immediately before my departure, he had one of his assistants deliver the enclosed letter,² according to which practically nothing at all is available for Rumania at present. The promise that later on perhaps deliveries could be made on a very small scale is so vaguely worded that, to judge by the prevailing attitude in this matter on the part of the Defense Economy Staff and the High Command of the Army, one must reckon with possibility that nothing will be left.

Aside from the fact that we have here a promise made by the Reich Government only a few weeks ago, it would be utterly unjustifiable in the interest of Germany's supply of petroleum, and especially of aviation gasoline, to go back now on our agreement of September 29, 1939, with Rumania. As early as last September the Rumanian Government made available 40 million RM for petroleum purchases as an advance payment on the 100 million RM stipulated as the minimum purchase price for the war material. About 600,000 tons, i. e., nearly one-third of the total amount imported annually by Germany, could be purchased for that sum.

It is impossible for me to bring the forthcoming difficult negotiations in Bucharest to a successful conclusion if I have to start out by telling the Rumanian Government that we do not intend to keep the agreement of September 29, 1939, which is of equal importance to Rumania both militarily and politically. I shall therefore try in Bucharest to treat the matter in a dilatory fashion at first, which in itself will render the negotiations considerably more difficult.

In my opinion it is absolutely necessary, however, that Colonel General Keitel be told even now by someone of the highest possible authority in the Foreign Ministry that we must insist on the implementation of the agreement and that we could not otherwise assume the responsibility for ensuring the import of petroleum to Germany.³

Herewith submitted through the Director [of the Economic Policy Department] to the State Secretary.

CLODIUS

²Not printed (5556/E395450-52).

³Marginal note: "I emphasized this today to Colonel General Keitel. K. is going to talk to Thomas this afternoon. To the Director of the Economic Policy Department. W[eizsäcker] [Nov.] 25."

No. 351

4533/E144275

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

[No. 424 of November 12¹]

BERLIN, November 11, 1939.

[Sent November 13—1:40 a. m.]

zu W III c 76

With reference to your telegram No. 465.²

The delivery of submarine motors is at least for the present not possible. It is altogether out of the question to ask a new Führer decision unless it is the only way to obtain advantages of decisive importance for the war economy. First, however, we wish at any rate to await the further progress of the negotiations and, above all, the promised Turkish reply.

WIEHL

¹ The information in brackets is from the Ankara copy (8493/E596912).

² Document No. 339.

No. 352

51/33974

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

SECRET

BERLIN, November 13, 1939.

During the military conference with the Führer this morning I was told that it is intended to intensify submarine warfare in the foreseeable future in the following manner:

1. By sinking a greater number of merchant vessels without warning in the danger zone declared by America to the west of England and France.¹

2. By declaring armed merchant vessels to be naval vessels and treating them as such.

HEWEL

¹ By a Presidential proclamation of Nov. 4, issued under authority of the new American neutrality legislation, American shipping was barred from certain areas around the British Isles and Western European ports which were defined as combat zones. The text is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 454-455.

No. 353

476/229505

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 14, 1939—12:11 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 14—5:30 a. m.

No. 714 of November 13

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I had a detailed discussion with Molotov today, as instructed, about the concentration of French troops in Syria, of British troops in Egypt, etc., as well as about Turkish troops on the Caucasus front, the entire complex of questions relating to Soviet countermeasures (concentration of troops in the Trans-Caucasus region and in Central Asia), the sending of Amanullah¹ to Afghanistan, and of Schäfer to Tibet.²

Molotov said that he would inform his Government and let me know its views.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 269.

² Ernst Schäfer had taken part in several scientific expeditions to Tibet and had charge of an SS-expedition to Tibet in 1938-39.

No. 354

2181/466340

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, November 14, 1939—12:28 a. m.

No. 884 of November 13

Received November 14—2:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 698.¹

Reports received here² indicate that the Rumanian Government has initiated negotiations with Ankara about the formation of a neutral bloc of the Balkan countries and to that end has also contacted other states of the Balkan Entente. As we have learned from a secret source,³ it is envisaged in this connection not only to invite Bulgaria and Hungary to join, but also to approach Italy. The bloc members are to bind themselves to mutual nonaggression. But evidently it is also planned to develop the bloc into a defensive entente with the general staffs entering into mutual consultation to that end.

To what extent contact has already been established with Italy rela-

¹ Document No. 266.

² See documents Nos. 296 and 329.

³ One such report had been sent by Papen on Nov. 8 (169/82896).

tive to these projects we do not know. But, in view of these recurring reports concerning such plans for a Balkan bloc, it is of importance to us to know whether the Duce's stand, as stated in your telegram No. 698, has changed somewhat in the meantime, and what stand the Italian Government is taking on these conversations today. Please discuss this question with Ciano at the first opportunity.

RIBBENTROP

No. 355

91/100108-04

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

DUBLIN, November 14, 1939.

No. 129 of November 13

Received November 14—2:20 p. m.

For the Under State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 123 of November 8.¹

I. Rumors which have increased again of late concerning alleged German support of the Irish Republican Army lead me to point out that in my opinion complete restraint continues to be advisable for us. According to my observation the Government is in control of the situation so far, in spite of the increased danger of unrest of late because of the refusal to release the political prisoners engaged in a hunger strike. The IRA is hardly strong enough for action with promise of success or involving appreciable damage to England and is probably also lacking in a leader of any stature. I refer to the lessons drawn from the Casement case.² Sensible adherents of the radical nationalist movement, correctly sizing up the situation and the danger, are opposed to coming out into the open at the present time; they also recognize, in agreement with the overwhelming majority of the population, the determination to maintain neutrality which the Government has shown so far in spite of difficult circumstances. Interference on our part would, even in their opinion, prematurely endanger the whole nationalist movement including groups which are not radical because the latter would accuse the IRA of making national interests dependent on Germany; in view of the widespread aversion to present-day Germany, especially for religious reasons, this could rob the IRA of all chances of future success. England would be given a pretext for intervening—which she would probably

¹ Not printed (91/100097). This telegram reported rumors of undercover connections between German intelligence agencies and the IRA.

² Sir Roger Casement, Irish nationalist and former member of the British consular service, had attempted to enlist Irish prisoners of war in the German service in 1914-16. He was landed in Ireland from a German submarine at the time of the Easter Rebellion in 1916, but was captured and executed.

welcome—and Irish neutrality as well as the possibility of a future utilization of the Irish cause for our interests would be prematurely destroyed.

As it is, moreover, the IRA seems to be getting sufficient support from the radical Irish groups in the USA, and it is asserted that this support, too, is of German origin. The situation would presumably change if Irish neutrality were definitely violated, perhaps also if a considerable weakening of England were to make the prospects of regaining Northern Ireland appear more favorable. Then we might expect the rise of an active nationalist movement on a broad basis, perhaps inclusive of the Government and supported by the Irish in the USA and the Dominions, which might force us to make decisions. For the time being the IRA provides favorable backing for the Government and the Army. I wish to state that I have occasionally heard the hope expressed—which is probably entertained also in some Government circles, although hardly by De Valera so far—that in case of a suitable development of the situation we would at the proper time promise Ireland our support for the return of Northern Ireland, to be made good at the conclusion of peace, and thereby assure ourselves the friendship of all Irishmen. Even for this, in my opinion at any rate, the proper moment has not yet arrived.

II. So far, I have no confirmation of reports received concerning British demands for Irish harbors. But the Government recently appears to be more concerned, especially if the war should spread to Holland and Belgium.

III. I have reliable information that the continued existence of the German Legation here is worrying London. Great care is therefore indispensable, also in view of intensive activity of informers. For this reason also I would strictly advise against sending propaganda material (cf. my telegram No. 117[127]³ of November 11) which would, moreover, interfere with my measures against British propaganda which are becoming increasingly successful. The German broadcasts in English, which are heard everywhere, are the best of propaganda. However, I hear time and again that sharp attacks on Churchill which extend even to his most intimate personal affairs achieve the opposite of the intended effect, especially in England.

HEMPPEL

³ Not printed (91/100102); dealt with postal communication between Germany and the Legation in Dublin and advised against sending certain types of material by post to the Legation.

No. 356

FS/0039-0035

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 56

BERLIN, November 14, 1939.

Today at 11:45 I received the Belgian Ambassador, who had previously announced his visit.

The Belgian Ambassador at once handed me the brief note annexed hereto, stressing that his action today had nothing to do with the last Dutch-Belgian attempt at mediation.¹ Belgium merely wished to say that she was prepared to mediate at any time, if an opportunity arose in the future course of the war. The Belgian King attached importance to making this known to us.

I took notice of the statements made by the Belgian Ambassador and declared that the last Dutch-Belgian attempt at mediation had certainly had the catastrophic result that I had all along expected. The replies of the British and French Governments, which had been made known through the press,² must be regarded as an insolence of which the German Government would take no notice. I then asked the Belgian Ambassador why the Belgian Government permitted England to treat her as she pleased. The Downs were crowded with Belgian ships which had been held up unlawfully. The British Government was ordering Belgium around as if she were just another part of England. I was informed that England had recently sent Belgium a note which was almost insulting in tone and content and such as one would think appropriate only for a vassal state.

The Belgian Ambassador interjected here that Belgium had sent a sharp reply to this note and that she did not put up with everything.

I replied to him that the actual situation seemed to me to show the opposite. Moreover, in reading the Belgian press one had the impression of reading French newspapers. Already during the Polish campaign, the attitude of a part of the Belgian press had been worse than that of the British and the French press.

The Belgian Ambassador replied that this applied only to a few newspapers and that the Flemish press especially was much better.

I then pointed out that the Flemish press was hardly read internationally. On the other hand, the countries of the enemy coalition were constantly quoting the Brussels newspapers, which distinguished themselves by the violence of their anti-German articles and their lying reports about Germany. The Belgian press, to my mind, would be well advised to practice more self-restraint. In addition, it had

¹ See document No. 332.

² The British and French replies had been published on Nov. 12.

been noted that British planes were constantly flying over Belgian territory at night. Whenever an occasional German plane flew over Belgian territory by mistake, a great outcry always went up, but the continuous neutrality violations by the British received no mention at all.

The Belgian Ambassador replied that Belgium had shot down several English and French planes and interned their crews. He then declared that Belgium had faith in the repeated assurances by Germany and the other powers that they would respect Belgium's neutrality. I should tell him frankly whether I viewed the present situation as serious.

I replied that England could have had peace early in October after the Führer's speech. We now knew, however, that England had prepared the war long in advance; the evidence discovered in Poland and Czechia gave an absolutely clear and incontrovertible picture which confirmed this. Mr. Chamberlain's desire for war was demonstrated by his reply to the Führer's peace speech,³ to which he had ingeniously referred in his reply to the peace move of the Belgian King, and now there could be only a war of annihilation between England and us. I then went into the background of this war, with particular reference to England's policy.

The Belgian Ambassador received my criticism of British policy with the remark that he, too, thought this policy insane and stupid.

In conclusion I told the Belgian Ambassador that Belgium would do well to maintain strict neutrality. It would at present seem, however, that Belgium's sympathies were entirely on England's side. I had been told that 95 percent of the Belgian people were pro-English and pro-French. If large-scale fighting were to start perhaps next year, for instance, it would be good for a country like Belgium to observe complete neutrality in all directions.

Thereupon the Belgian Ambassador told me in leaving that the Belgian King was firmly resolved to maintain neutrality in all circumstances and toward all sides.⁴

R[IBBENTROP]

[Enclosure]

We continue to believe that the offer of our good offices has not lost its purpose. For that reason we wish to continue to avail ourselves of the opportunities that may arise.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 227 and document No. 246.

⁴ In another memorandum of Nov. 14 (2177/471618), Ribbentrop recorded that shortly after the conversation with Davignon described above, he received the Dutch Minister who likewise presented the communication from the two Sovereigns.

We hope that we shall be able to continue our efforts, if necessary confidentially.⁵

WILHELMINA
LEOPOLD

⁵ A draft reply to the Belgian and Dutch telegram of Nov. 7 was prepared in the Foreign Ministry for Hitler's signature (476/229467-70), but it was not sent. Instead, on Nov. 15, Ribbentrop saw Davignon and van Haersma de With, the Dutch Minister, and informed them of a statement to be issued by DNB the next day (141/127381-82). The statement was as follows: "Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop informed the Belgian and Dutch Representatives, in the name of the Führer, that after the brusque refusal of the peace move of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands by the British and French Governments, the German Government too must consider the matter closed." No memorandum on these conversations of Nov. 15 has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Cf. Davignon's *Berlin, 1936-1940: souvenirs d'une mission* (Paris and Brussels, 1951), pp. 158-159.

No. 357

1085/317314-15

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 14, 1939.

Economic policy discussions with Belgium opened here on Saturday, November 11, between Ambassador Ritter and myself on one side and Ministerial Director Suetens of the Belgian Foreign Ministry on the other.¹ We had indirectly suggested to M. Suetens that, as the Netherlands Government had done,² he acquaint us with the Belgian negotiations with England and France which have been going on for a number of weeks.

M. Suetens postponed a response to this suggestion until the conclusion of these negotiations with England and France. He stated that the Belgian Government had not undertaken any economic policy commitments toward England and France that were inconsistent with its neutrality obligations. On the contrary, for the duration of the war it intended to conduct its economic policy autonomously. This autonomous regulation would consist of a number of export embargoes and restrictions which, while they would be formally applied to all belligerents alike, would in practice have the effect of cutting off or restricting to a greater or less extent our present imports of raw materials from Belgium.

Ambassador Ritter replied to M. Suetens that we could by no means accept such an arrangement which, even if it was autonomous, never-

¹ M. Suetens was Director General for Foreign Commerce in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

² In a memorandum of Oct. 12 (4041/E063878-84), Wiehl noted that Hirschfeld, Netherlands representative in economic negotiations with Germany, had said that he had been expressly enjoined by his Government to discuss with the Germans the progress of Dutch-British economic negotiations.

theless was obviously tailored to British wishes and would be at our expense, and that on the contrary we would be compelled to react accordingly on the economic-policy and perhaps also the political level.

M. Suetens denied that the contemplated Belgian economic policy would have the far-reaching consequences which we feared. The negotiations on the practical implementation of the exchange of goods, due to start now, would demonstrate that Belgium was willing and in a position to meet a large proportion of our wishes in the future, too.

The practical negotiations between the two government committees will begin here tomorrow, for which M. Gérard, the chief Belgian negotiator, will arrive here today with a small delegation. It is not impossible that these negotiations will be productive of satisfactory results for us, but, with a view to these continued negotiations, it was important in the preliminary talks with M. Suetens to put the Belgians under pressure.

Submitted herewith through Ambassador Ritter and the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

W[DEHL]

No. 358

2131/466366-68

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Tgb. No. A/3472 Ang. I

Moscow, November 14, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received November 16.

Pol. II 4637.

Subject: Balkan neutrality bloc.

With reference to my telegram No. 711 of November 13, 1939.¹

Enclosed I am sending a copy of the memorandum referred to in the telegram cited above which the Turkish Ambassador had handed to Molotov and which was given to me by the latter with the request that I find out the position of the German Government.

SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

The Rumanian Government, having considered the formation of a bloc of states in Southeastern Europe, has put before the Government

¹ Not printed (103/111778) : In this telegram Schulenburg reported that Molotov, upon handing him the memorandum had explained "that the Soviet Government had reached no decision as yet and asked that it be informed of the German Government's view in this matter as soon as possible. Molotov had gained the impression from the conversation with the Turkish Ambassador that the Turkish Government was favorably disposed toward this plan."

of the Turkish Republic the following proposals as a basis for such a formation.

- a) Absolute neutrality within the present scope of the war.
- b) A nonaggression treaty between the governments which participate in the bloc.
- c) In the event that a member state of the bloc should become the object (victim) of aggression, to observe at least a benevolent neutrality with regard to that state.
- d) The member states of the bloc to reduce to a normal level the military measures taken along their common borders.
- e) Direct contact between the Foreign Ministries of the bloc and exchange of political and economic information.
- f) Economic measures on the basis of membership in the bloc.

An explanatory note sent by the Rumanian Government remarks that adhesion to the bloc in no way affects present commitments of the participants in the bloc and that, besides, members of the Balkan Entente, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy will also be able to join; and the neutrality which will be proclaimed in that event shall have reference to the war within its present limits.

In case such an understanding between the members of the Balkan Entente is reached, it would be possible, in the opinion of the Rumanian Government, to have the Yugoslav Government invite the Hungarian and the Bulgarian Governments to join the bloc and then to have the Italian Government invited by all the members.

From statements made to our Ambassador in Bucharest by the Rumanian Foreign Minister it can be inferred that formation of such a bloc would be welcomed by the British, French, Italian, and German Governments. I am notifying Your Excellency of this Rumanian proposal in conformity with Article 2 of the Protocol signed on November 17, 1929,² concerning extension of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925³ and request an expression of your views on that subject.

² League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, pp. 360-362.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 354-357.

No. 359

1571/380210

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 15, 1939.

No. 895

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor von Rintelen.

With reference to our telegram No. 884 of November 13.¹

¹ Document No. 354.

The Foreign Minister requests that instead of awaiting a convenient opportunity you obtain an interview with Ciano tomorrow, and ascertain on that occasion Italy's reaction to the idea of a Balkan bloc, whether Italy has already been approached on that account by any third party, and what attitude Italy intends to take on this question.

Report by telegram.

WOERMANN

No. 360

F19/046

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 58

BERLIN, November 15, 1939.

Today at 1:30 p. m. the Foreign Minister received the Slovak Minister, who had asked to see him.

The Slovak Minister first spoke to the Foreign Minister about a treaty to be concluded between the German Reich and the Slovak Republic concerning the return of the territories which Poland robbed from Czechoslovakia, and gave him the enclosed draft of such an agreement.¹ The Foreign Minister promised the Slovak Minister to consider the matter and give an early reply.

The Slovak Minister then said that the Slovak Government intended to take a stand in a statement before the Parliament on November 21 against the efforts originating in France and England to reestablish Czechoslovakia. The Slovak Government intended to state that the Slovak people were entirely satisfied with their present independent existence and would never be willing to return to a Czechoslovak political community.

At the request of the Foreign Minister the Slovak Minister promised first to inform Berlin of the planned statement by the Slovak Government, so that Germany could express an opinion on whether such an announcement was opportune.

ERICH KORDT

¹ Not printed (F19/047-048). For the final text of this treaty see document No. 381.

No. 361

51/38977

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division 1

BERLIN, November 15, 1939.
zu Pol. I M 8095 g.¹

Captain Fricke telephoned me today to elaborate his statements of November 13 as follows:

The questions which I had put to him at the meeting at Ambassador Ritter's had also been transmitted to the Navy by other offices (OKW), and he therefore wished to recount to me once more the course of Grand Admiral Raeder's conference with the Führer.² The statements concerning the danger zone fixed by America had been purely of a theoretical nature. Complying with the Navy's memorandum concerning the intensification of naval warfare, which had also been presented to the Foreign Ministry,³ it was not intended to declare by some big proclamation a sort of siege of England and France, but to bring about the isolation of England which we desired by means of a gradual intensification on a military basis. In practice we could then utilize the danger zone fixed by America, since we would then be sure of not meeting American ships there.

Moreover, Captain Fricke stated explicitly that the order to take steps against enemy passenger vessels that were armed had not yet been issued but would be issued in a few days, when the propaganda now being spread had taken effect.

Furthermore, Captain Fricke emphasized that the order to take action against all tankers, even those sailing under a neutral flag, had not yet been given. He intended to prepare the draft of such an order today, then to discuss it with the Foreign Ministry, and only then to make the final decision on the basis of the outcome of this consultation. The conference with the Führer had merely served to obtain for the Navy the authorization to develop its measures in the direction indicated.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary with reference to the memorandum of November 13.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ Pol. I M 8095 g. is missing from the files. According to the Pol. I M register of the German Foreign Ministry, this document is a memorandum of Nov. 15 by Heyden-Rynsch entitled: Memorandum of a report by Raeder to the Führer on the intensification of submarine warfare.

² A memorandum summarizing Raeder's conference of Nov. 10 with Hitler is printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 55-57.

³ See document No. 270, footnote 3. The Navy's memorandum, though dated Oct. 15 and presented to Hitler on Oct. 16, was sent to the Foreign Ministry on Nov. 3; see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 157-C, Exhibit GB-224, p. 608. Whether Welzsäcker had seen the actual text of the Navy's memorandum when he wrote his own No. 822 of Oct. 17 is not clear. No copy of the Navy memorandum has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

No. 362

1571/880211

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 800 of November 16

ROME, November 16, 1930—11:15 p. m.

Received November 17—3:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 884 of November 13 and 895 of November 15.¹

I visited Ciano today as directed, and queried him as indicated in the above-mentioned telegraphic instructions. He stated that he had the same information that we had; but the Governments in the Balkan capitals had told his diplomatic representatives of the plans of the neutral bloc only by way of information without trying in any way to press Italy's participation. The Duce's attitude in this question was unchanged and exactly the same as the one set forth to me in the middle of October. Nothing had changed in respect to this.

To Ciano's question as to whether we had any special wishes in regard to Italy's attitude, I replied that I had no instructions in this respect, but that I had the impression that the attitude which I had reported in the middle of October² was in agreement with our views.

MACKENSEN

¹ Documents Nos. 354 and 359.² See document No. 266.

No. 363

1570/880093

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 906

BERLIN, November 16, 1939.

According to the Italian Ambassador, Marshal Pétain is regarded as the advocate of a peace policy in France. Pétain was not made a Minister in mid-September out of consideration for Gamelin. Pétain believes that even in the event of victory, France would not enjoy its fruits. If the question of peace should become more acute in France, Pétain will play a role.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 364

2000/442122

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 16, 1939.

I asked the Foreign Minister today if he would agree that the naval forces be admonished to exercise particular care even in their actions

outside the closed zone around England defined by the United States,¹ in order to avoid any loss of American lives. The Foreign Minister concurred.

He gave me on this occasion the general directive that in so far as possible we should not create any difficulties for the Navy with regard to measures which it deems necessary.

RITTER

¹ See document No. 352, footnote 1.

No. 365

2775/536978-79

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BRUSSELS, November 17, 1939—12:40 a. m.

No. 352 of November 16

Received November 17—3:30 a. m.

Following the violent excitement and panicky unrest of the past week, the situation in Belgium has begun to return to normal in the past few days. Large sections of the population had been convinced that a German invasion of Holland and Belgium was imminent and that everything had to be done to stop it. Some rumors even specified the day of the anticipated attack, some mentioning Armistice Day, others November 15. The excitement abated only when a Belga¹ communiqué was published about reassuring German statements from the Military Attaché.

The press, evidently under instruction, endeavored during the critical days to mitigate the panicky mood and foster a more confident view of the situation by observing moderation and giving prominence to hopeful-sounding news items.

It appears that the Belgian Government fully shared the fear of a German invasion but had not yet abandoned the hope of preserving the country from war. Full-scale military preparations had been made to check a German attack. According to the information obtained by the Military Attaché, almost the entire Belgian field army was concentrated along the northern and eastern borders, so that no forces of any consequence were left at the southern border. However, the Belgian Government has (group garbled) correctness. The events of the past few days were the subject of debate today in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Belgian Chamber. According to strictly confidential information which I have received, the Foreign Minister made a detailed statement on the international situation in a closed session, in which he specifically explained the military measures at Belgium's eastern border on the grounds of the serious fear of a German invasion. Spaak cited in particular the flights of

¹ Agence Belga (Agence télégraphique Belge, S. A.), Belgian news agency.

German aircraft over Belgium, the German troop concentrations, and the sharper tone toward Belgium in the German press. Contrary to declarations made to Belgium, German aircraft had flown reconnaissance missions over Belgium. The situation had calmed down, to be sure, but only moderate optimism was in order with respect to the future. An invasion of Holland by German troops would have placed Belgium in a difficult situation from the (group garbled) and moral viewpoint. The Foreign Minister again emphasized the need for the strictest neutrality. The Government would henceforth be even more rigorous in supervising the attitude of the press. He justified the measures which the Government had taken against French newspapers on several occasions. The statements made a deep impression on the Committee. The will to strictest neutrality received the unqualified support of the great majority of the Committee.

Despite the calmer atmosphere observable as the result of the foregoing, there are still strong suspicions with regard to Germany's intentions.

BÜLOW

No. 366

96/108112-13

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, November 17, 1939—7:50 p. m.

No. 493 of November 17

Received November 18—5:30 a. m.

The Foreign Minister has just informed me that the Government is prepared to agree on an over-all settlement of economic relations on the basis of your instruction.¹ The first conversation with the Minister of Commerce will be held today to discuss individual problems. A report will follow.²

The Foreign Minister then discussed the question of a possible improvement in our political relations. He read a number of telegrams from his Berlin Ambassador on the conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, from which he was pleased to be able to state, as he believed, that the relations of M. Gerede had become a shade more friendly. The President of the Republic would have liked to express his congratulations in the form of a telegram on the occasion of the attempt on the life of the Führer and Chancellor; such a telegram was not sent, on account of the fact that no German telegrams were received on October 29.³ However, the congratulations expressed

¹ See document No. 330.

² Telegram No. 499 of Nov. 18; not printed (8489/E596890).

³ The anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey's national holiday.

through the Ambassador were none the less cordial and sincere, as Saracoglu wished to emphasize once more.

From the one-hour conversation I received the impression that our serious protest has strengthened the desire of the Turkish Government to improve political relations as far as possible. Taking up this matter, I outlined the present situation for the Foreign Minister. The Führer's desire for peace had been destroyed by England through a maneuver of unsurpassed hypocrisy and sabotage. Comparison with the reply of the British King ⁴ and Churchill's speech ⁵ would reveal before the eyes of the world where the warmongers were. Saracoglu agreed entirely and acknowledged that Churchill's thesis, "The war could end only with victors and vanquished," had destroyed all hope of peace. All the more, I said, was it the duty of England's allies openly to denounce this attitude. Germany's determination to continue the war with all the means at her disposal remained unshaken, and Turkey would have to thank England for any consequences which she too might have to suffer. Saracoglu replied that the President of the Republic had told me as long ago as last May ⁶ that a strong Germany was of vital interest to Turkey. Hence the Turkish Government could never be in agreement with Churchill's war aims. Its obligations toward the Western Powers did not extend one step beyond the treaty provisions. They would become effective only in the event of a direct attack on Turkey.

I replied that if this was the situation, Turkey could now at least demonstrate in the economic field to what extent she felt independent of England.

In conclusion the Minister asked me to make sure that the approximately 700 Turkish students returning to Germany would be given all the facilities for study possible under wartime conditions.

PAPEN

⁴ See document No. 356.

⁵ For Churchill's speech of Nov. 12, see *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade (London, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 119-123.

⁶ Actually, this conversation had taken place on June 7, 1939. See vol. vi, document No. 489.

No. 367

51/83988

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 17, 1939.

In carrying out the gradual intensification of submarine warfare authorized by the Führer,¹ the Naval Staff intends to take the following measures:

¹ See document No. 352.

1. To torpedo without warning wherever they appear all enemy passenger vessels which are unmistakably found to be or known to be armed;

2. To torpedo without warning in the danger zone fixed by America all tankers, even the neutral ones. Exceptions are the tankers of the four friendly nations, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Japan, and of the United States of America. In this the basic assumption is that pursuant to the neutrality regulations the American tankers will not enter the danger zone.

After lengthy discussion with the Navy, the participating departments of the Foreign Ministry have come to the conclusion that the Navy's intentions should be approved even though certain objections might be raised for reasons of policy and international law.

The Navy is requesting an immediate decision since, according to the information which it has received, it would otherwise have to miss irretrievable opportunities.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign Minister.

RITTER

No. 368

191/138603

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 17, 1939.

zu W 2500 g.¹

The problem of "arms for China" in return for tin and other needed raw materials was laid before the Foreign Minister today and discussed with all the arguments pro and con.

The Foreign Minister refused completely any delivery of arms to China. On the other hand, he would be in agreement if important raw materials could be obtained from Chiang Kai-shek—China in exchange for other German products, pharmaceuticals, for example.²

RITTER

¹ W 2500g: Not found. This is the Foreign Ministry telegram No. 10 to Chungking referred to in document No. 345.

² A marginal note to Senior Counselor Voss of the Economic Policy Department instructed him to draft a reply in the sense of the above minute to the Chungking telegram printed as document No. 345.

No. 369

617/249880

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 18, 1939—3:03 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 18—8:30 a. m.

No. 743 of November 17

With reference to my telegram No. 714 of November 13.¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Government itself had had the intention of reinforcing its troops in Transcaucasia and Central Asia and would carry out this measure in the near future. The Soviet Government had no objection to our utilizing this fact for propaganda purposes and would not deny our reports with reference to this matter.

The Soviet Government had no basic objections to the intended dispatching of Amanullah to Afghanistan and of Schäfer to Tibet, but its final decision depended on the actual manner in which the corresponding measures were carried out. Molotov requested more detailed information on this point.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 353.

No. 370

141/127386-88

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department¹

BERLIN, November 18, 1939.

e.o. W II 6919.

GERMAN-BELGIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Ministerialdirigent Ruelberg² received M. Gérard in my presence at 11 a. m. today and told him the following:

He had presented a report on the negotiations of the past few days to higher authorities and had been instructed to inform M. Gérard that the Belgian application of the neutrality policy in the economic sphere would not be satisfactory to us. Through Ambassador Ritter's special mission we had taken the initiative previously in clarifying from the outset our viewpoint relative to the continuance of our

¹ Counselor of Legation Karl von Campe had been assigned to the Embassy at Brussels to deal with economic questions, but at this time had returned to Berlin in connection with the economic negotiations then in progress.

² Ministerialdirigent Ruelberg was a chief of section in the Ministry of Economics.

economic relations with Belgium.⁸ Minister President Pierlot had in principle concurred with the three main viewpoints advanced at that time by Herr Ritter (which Herr Ruelberg proceeded to recapitulate). Meanwhile a situation had developed which was no longer in accord with these principles. We did not intend to inquire into who was to blame for this. We were only considering the facts and had to note the following:

1. Belgium, through her export embargoes, trade lists, and the system of licenses, had reorganized her export trade in accordance with new viewpoints, without any previous consultation with us. Even today we had no clear picture of how the system of trade lists would in practice affect our trade. The Reich Government deemed this action a unilateral measure on the part of Belgium that was contrary to the promise of the Belgian Minister President.

2. Belgium tolerated the complete shutting off of our imports from the Congo and had done nothing to ensure their continuance.

3. The actual flow of goods had generally deteriorated. While our exports to Belgium were being kept up to a high level, our imports from Belgium had fallen off substantially. This trend had been aggravated during October; deliveries of many raw materials and semi-finished products had fallen far below the quotas specified and in some instances were not made at all.

4. England's influence on the Belgian economy, our information showed, was increasingly assuming proportions amounting to encroachment upon Belgian neutrality. British agents were active everywhere, making threats, trying to exercise control measures, etc. He (Ruelberg) had been instructed to state that we could no longer remain passive in the face of these British encroachments but had to express our expectation that the Belgian Government would take energetic steps against these British activities. In our opinion, the Belgian Government ought to demand for itself the powers which would enable it to expel these troublesome agents and buyers who were undermining Belgium's neutrality.

In closing Herr Ruelberg stated that the Reich Government now saw itself compelled in consequence of the above-mentioned circumstances to curtail German exports to Belgium to the extent that our purchases in Belgium had been cut off. This was not a threat or a reprisal but merely the conclusion which had to be drawn from the actual economic situation. The necessary instructions had already been drafted to stop, first of all, the export of German coal to Belgium. Under these circumstances there could naturally be no thought of his going to Brussels with a German delegation for further negotiations before the Belgian Government had taken the necessary steps to alter the above-mentioned situation. We wanted to see action first, and then we would be prepared to continue negotiations.

⁸ See documents Nos. 17 and 18, *ante*, and vol. VII, document No. 573.

M. Gérard, who took very detailed notes throughout the conversation, made the following reply to the various points in Herr Ruelberg's statements:

He considered it his mission to familiarize himself as fully as possible with the German viewpoint in order to be able to present it with all its arguments in Brussels and, if possible, gain recognition for it. He himself had been under the impression all along that the negotiations were proceeding quite satisfactorily and could be brought to a positive conclusion. Herr Ruelberg's statements exceeded his area of responsibility to some extent, however. He would therefore first have to report them to Brussels. However, in the future, as in the past, he would do everything in his power to further the German-Belgian economic relations. The arguments which he himself had to advance with respect to the separate German complaints were in general sufficiently well known. He would therefore be able to confine himself to a few brief remarks:

All he could say in reply to Germany's allegation that Belgium had done nothing to ensure our imports from the Congo was that Belgium had never carried our imports from the Congo to Germany. Germany had always attended to this herself, because all her purchases had been f. o. b. the Congo. Besides, Belgium did not even have ships of her own. Furthermore, the production of the Congo did not suffice even to cover Belgium's own requirements; after all, one could not sell what one needed oneself during the war. Germany was in the best position to know that. Belgium, for her part, accordingly did not ask Germany to sell her any vital commodities which Germany needed herself. He had to employ the same argument, by the way, in respect to Herr Ruelberg's statement about the inability to get the full quotas. One could not sell what one did not have.

M. Gérard wound up by saying that the inability to make deliveries up to the full specified quotas did not convey a correct picture of Belgium's exports, because large quantities of raw materials had been bought during the past months outside the framework of the trade agreement. A complete survey of all Belgian exports (under the trade agreement and otherwise) would give an entirely different picture.

Herr Ruelberg closed the conversation, which had been in friendly terms from beginning to end, by thanking M. Gérard for his work in the past and his promise to make an earnest presentation of the German viewpoint to his Government.

No. 371

1369/856932-33

*Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*Telegram ¹

BERLIN, November 18, 1939.

W g 2643.

For the Ambassador.

1. Tevossyan and Savchenko are leaving by plane for Moscow early Sunday to give their report. It has been agreed that they will return within a very short time, about 1 or 2 days. According to agreement the trip was not announced to the press.

2. During the last discussions Tevossyan, and in particular Savchenko, did not seem to be quite satisfied with what has been shown them in the various military branches. The dissatisfaction is caused by the idea that we have many secret things which we do not wish to reveal. This notion was often a great trial to the patience of the German military authorities. On the other hand, the impressions of the Russian delegation in nonmilitary fields were altogether satisfactory. If you have occasion to see Molotov, please call attention to the following: the Russian commission has been met with the greatest accommodation here on the part of all military authorities, to a degree which has never before been shown to foreigners. Everything in the way of arms equipment which is being used by the German Wehrmacht was shown to the Russian groups, and much more besides, which is merely in the experimental stage and has not yet been introduced. If in connection with the innumerable Russian wishes everything did not always proceed according to schedule, this was often enough to be attributed to the fact that the Russians continually changed their program and confronted the German organization with problems which were often insoluble. Please stress that after the return of Tevossyan and Savchenko we are counting on finishing up the work here quickly, and that for political reasons decisive importance must be attached to the rapid completion of the entire negotiations in Moscow.

RITTER

¹ This document is from Ritter's own file and the telegram number and time of dispatch are not indicated.

No. 372

34/23551-54

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*Telegram¹

No. —

BERLIN, November [18], 1939.
zu Pol. II 4636

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegram No. 729 of November 16.²

You are requested to convey to Molotov our view on the Turkish memorandum, a copy of which was handed to you by Molotov, and on the proposal by the Rumanian Government described therein, as follows:

1) Study of the Rumanian proposal reveals that the designation as a neutral bloc of the grouping of states in Southeastern Europe contemplated in it is misleading. Although observance of absolute neutrality is listed as the first point, the additional clause "in the present scope of the war" signifies a qualification which demonstrates the meaninglessness of this point. In consequence of this qualification the obligation of neutrality is immediately voided if any other state becomes involved in the war.

2) Since the new pact would not create any significant additional obligations between the states of the Balkan Entente of February 9, 1934, the purpose of the proposal obviously is to impose restrictions on the freedom of action of the states which are to be invited to join, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy. As Bulgaria has consistently declined all the invitations repeatedly extended to her to join the Balkan Entente, Bucharest wants to tie her hands by this new pact, while it wants at the same time by the inclusion of Hungary to secure its western boundary against any eventuality. It is unlikely that Bulgaria and Hungary will lend themselves to that as long as the well-known demands of these countries remain unsatisfied. For this reason alone the Rumanian proposal, in our opinion, has no chance of success.

3) The Rumanian assertion which is repeated in the Turkish memorandum that the English, French, Italian, and German Governments would welcome the formation of the proposed bloc is wholly unfounded, as far as the German Government is concerned. The German Government is merely interested in having all of the states of Southeastern Europe observe strict neutrality toward it in this war and not play the game of England and France, as Turkey has done through concluding the pact of October 19.³ Precisely with regard

¹ The copy available is a final edited draft from which the telegram dispatch number and date are absent. The date is given as Nov. 18 in the instruction to Rome noted in footnote 4.

² Not printed (103/111789-90). This telegram conveyed a summary of the Turkish memorandum printed as document No. 358. Berlin had evidently requested the telegraphic summary before receiving the text of the memorandum which Schulenburg dispatched by courier.

³ See document No. 287, footnote 1, and document No. 338, footnote 2.

to this point of preserving a neutral attitude, the proposed pact, with the qualifying formulation of the neutrality obligation, would not improve, but rather worsen the present situation.

4) As far as the Italian Government is concerned, we know that Rome rejects such plans.

5) Of the four Great Powers whose assenting attitude is alleged in the Turkish memorandum, only England and France remain. This, however, is precisely what inspires in us the strongest suspicions toward the plans pursued by this pact proposal, the more so since other information also confirms that this project enjoys British and French support. Actually such a pact could in the long run lead to the extension of the preponderance, which England and France have already been able to gain in Turkey, to all of Southeastern Europe.

6) Our view on the Rumanian proposal conveyed in the Turkish memorandum must therefore be summed up to the effect that its realization would be undesirable to us. Even if, because of the aforementioned reasons, we do not believe that the proposed pact will come into existence, we would deem it desirable for the Soviet Government—which can have no more interest than we have in the consummation of such a pact calculated to strengthen Anglo-French influence in the Black Sea region—likewise to take a negative attitude toward this project.⁴

RIBBENTROP

⁴ On Nov. 21 the text of this instruction was telegraphed to the Embassies in Rome (2131/466346-49) and Ankara (103/111797-99). The telegram to Rome also requested that Ciano should be informed of the German attitude which the instruction set forth and might be told also that these views had been conveyed to the Soviet Government. Mackensen replied on Nov. 24 that he had spoken to Ciano as instructed, and that the latter had stated that the Italian view remained that they wished to have nothing to do with a Balkan bloc; moreover, they had not been approached on the subject by any of the interested states (1571/380224).

The telegram to Ankara contained the following addition: "You are requested to make it clear in your conversations with the Turkish Government and representatives of the countries involved that the reports stating that the German Government welcomed the new Balkan bloc plans are false. For the rest, the extent to which you can make use of the arguments outlined above will depend upon who your conversational partner is. In any case, I request that the Moscow discussions with Molotov not be mentioned. . . ."

No. 373

476/229533/1-33/2

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, November 18, 1939.

Büro RAM 572.

It is possible that actions of one kind or another to bring about peace may continue to come up for discussion in foreign countries. On such occasions please orient your conversation with all firmness along the following lines:

¹ This instruction was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulate General in Geneva.

In his Reichstag speech on October 6 the Führer again made one last generous peace offer to England and France. England had given a purely negative reply in Chamberlain's speech on October 12, and in a manner which could only be regarded as an insulting and insolent challenge. Thus England had slammed the door on any attempt whatsoever at peace mediation. The same attitude was shown by the British and also the French reply to the Belgian-Dutch offer of mediation.² Germany had taken up the challenge flung at her and would now carry on the fight to final victory.

Please take any detailed arguments that may be necessary from the Führer's latest speech at Munich on November 8³ and from my Danzig speech of October 24.⁴

(Foreign Minister)

² See document No. 356.

³ Printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, December 1939, pp. 1061-1072.

⁴ Printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 362-381.

No. 374

2691/529200-04

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, November 18, 1939.

No. W. H. A. 744

[Extract¹]

MEETING OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 18, 1939²

2. Sweden

Ministerialdirektor Walter³ reported on the course of his negotiations in Stockholm: The Swedes demand that the 4-mile zone be recognized, wood and cellulose be removed from the list of unconditional contraband, and halted Swedish ships be dealt with more expeditiously. In return they indeed propose to keep up trade as such, but for the time being want to except certain goods, especially copper and ferrochrome steel, and for the remainder (especially ore) want to concede only the average of the years 1932-38, whereas we demand the volume of 1939.

In ores the average of 1932-38 amounts to 7,000,000 tons, whereas the total for 1939 is 10,400,000 tons. At the very end, the Swedes

¹ Other sections of the memorandum deal with negotiations with Denmark, the danger of adverse balance in clearing transactions, and Germany's decision not to check on ultimate destinations of merchant ships "for the time being."

² In addition to Wiehl, officials representing the Reichsbank, the Plenipotentiary for the Economy, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministries of Food, Finance, and Economics were present.

³ See document No. 340, footnote 1.

offered the 1938 volume of ore (9,500,000 tons); Herr Walter will not be satisfied with this, however, but will insist on maintaining the amounts exported in 1939 in all goods of interest to us.

The Commercial Policy Committee expressed agreement with this line of procedure.

At the beginning of December, the negotiations are to be continued here in Berlin. Our ore imports will continue undiminished in the meantime.

On the question of delivering coal to Sweden, Ministerialdirigent Bergemann⁴ stressed that we cannot give preference to both Italy and Sweden at the same time; this is impossible on account of the transportation problems involved. An attempt is to be made to get the Polish locomotives and freight cars from the Russians. Furthermore, the Plenipotentiary for the Economy will push action on the problem of coal transportation.⁵

Ministerialdirektor Walter also pointed out that all of the railroad stations in Denmark are full of German freight cars that cannot be unloaded. This is generally the case at the present time in neutral countries, owing to the fact that because of censorship the bills of lading do not arrive until 8 to 10 days later. The Plenipotentiary for the Economy will consult the responsible military authorities in order to remedy the situation.

WIEHL

⁴ Ministry of Economics.

⁵ In a memorandum of Dec. 7 (3072/612842-45), Wiehl recorded that the Commercial Policy Committee had that day recommended (subject to Ritter's approval) an accommodating attitude toward Swedish exports to neutral countries to the extent necessary for safeguarding German ore supplies. Since the Swedes stood firm on their position regarding minerals, it was also decided that the Ministry of Economics would find out how far the Swedish requests for iron could be met and whether transportation was available, possibly via Rotterdam, for the desired quantities of coal and coke.

No. 375

476/229543-44

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 916

BERLIN, November 20, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador today handed me the enclosed memorandum containing information from Bastianini, the Italian Ambassador in London, to the Foreign Ministry in Rome. When "I" is used in the enclosure, Bastianini is therefore meant. Attolico added orally that the conversation took place after Churchill's well-known latest speech.¹ Butler told Bastianini that Churchill's speech was in con-

¹ On Nov. 12, 1939. See *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, vol. I, pp. 119-123.

flict with the Government's views not only in the present instance. As a matter of fact, he always spoke only as Mr. Churchill.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

Annex to St.S. No. 916

The British people entered the war in order to eliminate the system of constantly recurring German aggressions; peace can be concluded only when there are concrete guarantees that such attacks cannot be repeated in the future. Acting on this fundamental premise, the British Government is even today prepared to examine and give the most serious consideration to any German proposal that offers a real possibility of achieving this goal.

I then asked Butler whether the rumor circulating in London was true that evacuation of Poland by German troops was England's basic condition for any kind of agreement. Butler denied in the most categorical manner that this was the intention of his Government; the absurdity of such a demand, which Germany—or any other Great Power—could never accept, was obvious, he added.

Butler, who in his conversation with me again stressed the well-known war aims of Great Britain and the firm resolve of the Government to achieve them at all costs, gave me to understand—although not concealing a certain skepticism about the practical feasibility of a peaceful solution at the present time—that neither the Foreign Office nor the Prime Minister excluded such an eventuality a priori.

No. 376

472/228768-72

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker

Moscow, November 20, 1939.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: In the following I take the liberty of making several remarks supplementing the reports on my latest discussions with M. Molotov, which could not be taken up adequately in the telegrams concerned.

M. Molotov was very angry at the Finns.¹ He obviously takes the view that the Soviet Union's effort to protect Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland was altogether legitimate, and everyone ought to recognize this. The demands of the Soviet Union were so modest that the stubbornness of the Finns could only be explained by the fact that their resistance was being bolstered by England. Molotov mentioned that

¹ Schulenburg had reported in a telegram dispatched Nov. 14 on a conversation of the previous day with Molotov regarding Finland (108/111779).

the Finns had been willing to move their boundary further back near Leningrad. By doing this they had already abandoned their line of fortifications. In view of that, he did not understand why the Finns were unwilling to move the boundary far enough back to permit real security to be obtained for Leningrad. He was all the more unable to understand this since the Soviet Union had offered to assume all expenses connected with any evacuation of population and any new construction which might become necessary.

I enclose a cartoon² from the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*: "Minister Beck says to General Sikorsky: We will wait for M. Erkkö, for he is following in our footsteps."

The sudden refusal of the Soviet Government to undertake any changes whatsoever in the boundary established on September 28³ is probably to be attributed to the fact that we gave "the interested persons" time to raise a storm against the Soviet Union's proposals. I imagine that these "interested persons" are people from Sieniawa and Ostrołęka who have declared themselves to be fervent Communists and are now mortally afraid of becoming German or Polish again. Presumably Sieniawa's representative in the Moscow Supreme Council was also not willing to lose his mandate. I shall try once more to salvage the Ostrołęka barracks, but I doubt that I shall have any success.⁴

² Not reprinted.

³ See document No. 157.

⁴ In a telegram of Oct. 20, Weizsäcker authorized Schulenburg to negotiate directly with Molotov or Stalin on certain proposals of the German delegation in the Boundary Commission (2426/512837). Annexed to file copies of this telegram were papers and sketch maps supporting these proposals which called for changes in the agreed boundary near Augustów, between Ostrołęka and Nur, and between Sokal and Jarosław (2426/512818-25), and also other papers relating to Germany's desire for access to Użok Pass (2426/512826-35).

On Oct. 28, Molotov handed Schulenburg a memorandum agreeing to some of the proposals and making various counterproposals. Hencke forwarded to Berlin a translation of this memorandum (2426/512716-17), recommending in an accompanying letter acceptance of the Soviet terms, even if they did not meet German wishes in all respects (2426/512712-15). On Nov. 9, however, Schulenburg wired as follows: "Molotov noted today that there had as yet been no German reply to the last Soviet proposal about boundary rectification. The Soviet Government therefore requests that we drop the idea of any such border rectification and leave everything as it was before. In reply to my objections, Molotov declared that the Soviet Government placed great value on achieving its wish and that it urged us to let the question rest, since a certain stability of relationships had meanwhile been achieved and the proposed changes would occasion new unrest, which the Soviet Government wished to avoid" (2427/512956). Weizsäcker, in a telegram of Nov. 11 which was also initiated by Ribbentrop, instructed the Embassy to express "our real regret" at this withdrawal of the Soviet proposal of Oct. 29 [28] (2427/512960). To this instruction Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Nov. 13 (dispatched Nov. 14) as follows: "In spite of my most urgent representations Molotov persisted in his request that we cease calling for any change in the boundary set on September 28. The Soviet Government considered it most important that the impression not arise, after elections had been held for the Supreme Soviet and things were somewhat stabilized, that the boundary settlement was not final, since this might induce renewed disquiet among the populace involved. All my efforts to dissuade Molotov from this view

I questioned M. Molotov cautiously on what he thought of the support of German peace efforts by the Soviet Union which he mentioned in his speech.⁵ He replied that the Soviet press had carried a considerable number of newspaper articles along these lines; his speech had served the same purpose, and at every opportunity that offered he would again make the same support available.

M. Molotov mentioned that the agreement with Bulgaria regarding a Burgas-Moscow air line would probably be signed. I cannot really believe the somewhat fantastic reports of an air and naval base at Burgas.

When, as instructed,⁶ I informed M. Molotov that in our naval warfare in the Baltic Sea we would take into account Soviet wishes (not to approach the Baltic coast too closely), but must in principle maintain our right to carry on war everywhere on the high seas, M. Molotov attempted to point out that after all we had agreed to a delimitation of spheres of interest along the southern boundary of Lithuania. I called M. Molotov's attention in a friendly but firm manner to the fact that at that time it was a question of determining a *land* boundary and that it was not permissible to extend this boundary out to sea. Whereupon M. Molotov let the matter drop.

When we discussed our plans regarding MM. Amanullah and Schäfer,⁷ M. Molotov said that both of them would surely travel incognito through the Soviet Union. I am enclosing a newspaper clipping pertaining to M. Amanullah.⁸

In case we actually want to exploit as propaganda the reinforcement of Soviet troops in the Caucasus, I should like to recommend that we have Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Guse of Neubabelsberg, Friedrich-Karl-Strasse, write an article showing how easily the Armenian plateau in Turkey (Erzurum and Ersignan [*Erzincan?*]) can be captured from Transcaucasia and how much more easily Mosul with its oil fields can be taken from there.⁹ During the World War Herr Guse was Chief of the General Staff of the Third Turkish Army in

were unsuccessful; he repeated over and over that it could not be too difficult to build new roads or barracks. Both sides must accept small inconveniences for the sake of weightier considerations. He certainly expected that the German Government would show understanding for his argument and not insist further" (34/23504). On Nov. 19, Weizsäcker wired to Schulenburg that the OKW placed great value on the barracks at Ostrołęka and the road near Sieniawa [i. e., the proposed change in the Sokal-Jaroslów sector], and asked him to try once more to arrange with Molotov for at least the barracks at Ostrołęka to remain in German hands (2427/512999). Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Nov. 21 that the Soviet Government consented to the Ostrołęka change, stipulating that Germany should propose no further changes and that the new line would be considered final and unalterable (2427/513030).

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 363.

⁶ See document No. 341.

⁷ See documents Nos. 60, 353, and 369.

⁸ Not reprinted.

⁹ Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

Erzurum. He is an authority on matters pertaining to this region. An article written by him in the above-mentioned sense would give the Turks and the British a good deal of food for thought.¹⁰

With the very best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

F. H. SCHULENBURG

¹⁰ Marginal note: "Minister Schmidt: Submit to me again later. Articles and news items of this sort should be launched in the neutral press and then picked up by [our] press. Schmidt, please take care of this at once. R[ibbentrop]."

In a letter of Dec. 5 (2196/473656), Weizsäcker informed Schulenburg that the suggested article had been written by Guse at Ribbentrop's instance; it appeared in that day's *Völkischer Beobachter* under the title "Troop reinforcements on the Caucasus Front." Weizsäcker sent Schulenburg a copy and retained one for his own files (2196/473652-55).

No. 377

8589/E602606-09

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, November 20, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L(I)

By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 8 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. For the time being a state of readiness must be maintained in order to be able to continue at any time the assembly of forces which has already begun. Only in this way is it possible to take advantage immediately of favorable weather conditions.

The branches of the Wehrmacht will make their preparations in such a way that the attack can still be canceled, even if the order to that effect arrives at the High Commands as late as 11 p. m. on A-1 day. At that time, at the latest, the High Commands will receive either the code word "Rhine" (go through with the attack) or "Elbe" (withhold the attack).¹

The Commanders in Chief, Army and Air, are requested to report to OKW, Operations Planning, immediately after the day of attack has been determined, the hour of attack agreed upon between them.

2. Contrary to the directive given previously all the proposed measures against *Holland* may be taken without special orders when the general attack begins.

The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be predicted. Where no resistance is met, the invasion is to be given the character of a peaceful occupation.

¹ The words "Rhine" and "Elbe" were changed to "Danzig" and "Augsburg," with the following marginal note: "Corrected per 1/Skl I Op 42/40 I a."

3. *Land operations* are to be executed on the basis of the directive of October 29 concerning assembly of forces.

That directive is supplemented as follows:

a. All preparations are to be made to facilitate a quick shift of the focal point of the operation from Army Group B to Army Group A, in case greater and quicker successes are scored there than at Army Group B, which seems likely with the present distribution of enemy forces.

b. Holland, including the West Frisian islands off the coast (excluding Texel for the present), is first of all to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.

4. The *Navy's* submarines will be allowed to take blockading measures against Belgian and, contrary to previous directives, also against Dutch harbors and shipping lanes during the night *before* the attack; its surface vessels and airplanes will be allowed to take such measures after the time the Army's attack begins. Even where the submarines are concerned, however, the space of time between the beginning of blockading operations and the time of the land attack must be kept as short as possible.

Operations against Dutch naval forces are permitted only if the latter take a hostile attitude.

At the coastal areas to be occupied, the Navy will be in charge of the coastal artillery defense against attacks from the sea. Preparations are to be made for this.

5. The duties of the *Luftwaffe* remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by the special verbal orders issued by the Führer concerning airborne landings and the support to be given to the Army during the capture of the bridges west of Maastricht.

The 7th Airborne Division will be used for air landing operations only after the bridges across the Albert Canal are in our hands. The message to this effect is to be assured the quickest possible transmission between OKH and OKL.

Population centers, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or in the Belgian-Luxembourg area without compelling military reasons.

6. *Closing the border:*

a. Traffic and communications across the Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg borders are to be maintained in the customary manner until the beginning of the attack, in order to preserve the element of surprise. Civil authorities are not to be involved in the preparations for closing the border until that time.

b. *When the attack begins* the German border with Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg is to be *closed* to all nonmilitary traffic and communications. Orders to that effect will be given by the Commander in Chief, Army, to the military and civilian offices concerned.

At the beginning of the attack, the OKW will inform the highest government authorities that measures to close the border are being ordered directly by the Commander in Chief, Army, even at those parts of the Dutch border which are outside of the area of operations.

c. At the *other (neutral) borders* of the Reich no restrictions will be made for the time being concerning traffic and communications. Further measures prepared with regard to the supervision of border-crossing by persons and communications will be put into effect if the need arises.

By order:

KRITTEL

A true copy: v. TROTHA
Captain

No. 378

B21/B005277-70

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1939.

No. 684 of November 20

Received November 21—9:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 562 of November 19 (Inf. 2882).¹

A stiffening of German-American relations, which was being exploited by enemy propaganda, has made necessary since the beginning of the year a more active German propaganda in the United States, on which regular reports have been made. Consequently at the outbreak of the war the following propaganda organs could be fully employed:

1. The Trans-Ocean agency in New York sends to Latin America news on the United States in line with our interests, for the purpose of disturbing North American propaganda. Moreover, the publication of Trans-Ocean reports in the press here is constantly being promoted, so that German and bilingual newspapers are increasingly printing them. For example, the leading *New Yorker Staatszeitung*, which for a time had to be banned in Reich territory, is using Trans-Ocean material in order to present the German viewpoint in unobjectionable form.

On account of their pro-Allied attitude and also for reasons of competition American newspapers avoid regular printing of Trans-Ocean material. On the other hand, it is a gain that they use it to

¹Not found. Similar replies from other Missions indicated that it was a circular telegram requesting an accounting of propaganda activities being carried on by Missions.

check their own news service, which yesterday's *New York Times* openly admits. In this way the German viewpoint gains indirect entry into the leading American newspapers.

2. In order to get over this boycott wall of the American press, the weekly periodical *Facts in Review* was founded, which now regularly reaches 20,000 especially interested persons; all materials of the Foreign Ministry, particularly political reports, are utilized for it. The periodical is proving a success and is quoted and occasionally attacked by the American press.

3. The German Information Library in New York was developed into an institute of propaganda. It has sent through numerous special editions of *Facts in Review* speeches of the Führer, the White Book, and addresses of the Reich Foreign Minister to hundreds of thousands of especially (group garbled) personages. The Information Library, in addition, provides numerous organizations, newspapers, and individuals with information and propaganda material on Germany.

4. Both through the Information Library and the office of the German Railways in New York, which works with hundreds of travel bureaus distributed over the whole continent, German films and propaganda material are circulated. Since the outbreak of the war the regular advertising matter of the German Railways office has been given a decidedly political tinge.

5. Through the press office established since the outbreak of the war, propaganda is centrally directed from the Embassy in closest collaboration with German consular officials, which is especially important in view of the size of the continent. The press office is in regular daily communication with the press here, which, moreover, is supplied from time to time by the Embassy with statements via leading American news agencies.

6. All further propaganda possibilities are being carefully observed. The requested buying up or purchase of newspapers, periodicals, or the information service, which is very popular here, is constantly being studied. The same applies by analogy to the American broadcasting stations. Every valuable speaking opportunity is taken advantage of by the undersigned (radio talks) or by members of the Embassy or suitable agents.

7. The most effective tool of German propaganda in the United States is, as heretofore, the American correspondents in Berlin, who, as for example, the *New York Times* correspondent Brooks Peters in yesterday's Sunday edition, give detailed descriptions as to their being carefully and courteously treated by German officials, and are not being handicapped by pre-censorship as on the Allied side. The Embassy is therefore endeavoring to induce suitable American jour-

nalists to visit Germany. Accordingly, the distinguished feature writer, L. Stoddard, is at present reporting in Germany for the North American Newspaper Alliance, which supplies a hundred influential American, British, and Latin American papers.

8. An important supplement to and correction of reports by American correspondents is the German short-wave transmitter, whose propaganda effect is carefully observed here and for whose activities the Embassy has sent detailed suggestions.

THOMSEN

No. 379

F19/045

Memorandum of the Foreign Minister

RM 59

BERLIN, November 21, 1939.

At 5:00 p. m. today I received Italian Ambassador Attolico who had requested an interview.

Ambassador Attolico spoke to me about the statement I had made some time ago to the effect that according to information received in Berlin, the British Government had hastily signed the treaty of alliance with Poland only after it was known that Italy would stand aside from the present conflict.¹ The hope that the Führer could be deterred from taking action by these two items of intelligence had motivated the British Government.

Ambassador Attolico tried to convince me that time and date calculations made it impossible to maintain this thesis.² He therefore asked me to re-examine the data in my possession.

I promised Ambassador Attolico that I would be glad to undertake such an examination when opportunity offered; however, the future appeared to me to be more essential than the past. In my opinion developments had actually taken a course which was in the interest of both countries. Furthermore, it appeared to me certain that after

¹ Hitler himself made this statement to Ciano in their Berlin conversation of Oct. 1. See document No. 176.

² Attolico had seen Weizsäcker on Nov. 11 with instructions from Ciano to contest the above German thesis. Weizsäcker noted: "Obviously Attolico intends to base his argument on the assertion that Mussolini absolutely wanted to participate and was only forced to the contrary position at the last moment because of the military-technical statistics. Allegedly the time relationship clearly proves that the Italian decision on Aug. 25 came much too late to have precipitated the signing of the Anglo-Polish treaty in London" (2131/466333). (The Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance was signed in the afternoon of Aug. 25.)

A copy of the Weizsäcker memorandum of this conversation was sent to the Rome Embassy. Mackensen wrote on the margin of the passage quoted above: "This assertion (except for the 'absolutely') is perhaps correct, but it has nothing to do with the question whether Britain's entry into the war was connected with Italian nonparticipation."

the inevitable German victory not only could Germany's future be guaranteed, but Italy's aspirations could also be satisfied. I assured Ambassador Attolico that we fully understood the Duce's attitude and had complete confidence in his policy.

R[IBBENTROP]

No. 380

5556/E395457-58

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 21, 1939.

Subject: Economic negotiations with Rumania.

Shortly before Minister Clodius' departure for Bucharest the military authorities, contrary to their previous position, stated that we could not, as promised in the agreement of September 29, 1939,¹ deliver to the Rumanians over 100 million RM worth of war material, but only some 10 million RM worth at most. Reason: much of the captured war material was badly damaged. Usable stocks were needed for equipping German units activated in the meantime upon higher orders.

In response to remonstrances the OKW agreed that for a beginning the Rumanians could be given binding promises of 500 guns and 14 French-made howitzers with ammunition. The pertinent telegraphic instruction to Minister Clodius² crossed the latter's telegram enclosed herewith.³ In the meantime he has already notified me by telephone that a further telegraphic report⁴ would be sent to the effect that this concession was not yet sufficient to assure the compensatory Rumanian deliveries, especially of oil, as fixed by contract.

It is expected that upon receipt of this further telegraphic report the possibility of further concessions to the Rumanians will be explored with other departments at home, the High Command of the Wehrmacht in particular. The proposals for further concessions thus agreed upon will then be submitted to the Foreign Minister.⁵

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

¹ See documents Nos. 111 and 166.

² Not printed (2117/460899): Telegram No. 783, sent to Bucharest on Nov. 18.

³ Not printed (169/82908-09): Telegram No. 877 sent on Nov. 18. Clodius reported that the Rumanian Minister President strongly persisted in his request for the Polish war material, even after having been informed of the poor quality of the war material in question.

⁴ Probably telegram No. 886 of Nov. 21; not printed (169/82913-14).

⁵ A minute by Erich Kordt of Nov. 21 (5556/E395459) stated that the Foreign Minister requested the speedy submission of new proposals. The agreement of the military authorities to increased deliveries of artillery was noted in Wiehl's answering minute of Nov. 24 (5556/E395460-61).

No. 381

2871/563885-86

Treaty Signed at Berlin, November 21, 1939

Pol. IV 2502 g.

The German Chancellor
and

the President of the Slovak Republic,

desirous of adjusting the northern frontier of the Slovak Republic to ethnic requirements and of reuniting for this purpose with the territory of the Slovak State the areas incorporated into the former Polish state in 1920, 1924, and 1938,

have agreed to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed the following as their plenipotentiaries, namely:

The German Chancellor:

Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister;

The President of the Slovak Republic:

M. Matus Černák, Minister at Berlin;

who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The two High Contracting Parties are agreed that the areas situated at the southern border of the former Polish state and indicated on the annexed maps¹ shall become a part of the national territory of the Slovak state and come under the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic on the day this treaty becomes effective.

The frontier shall be drawn on the spot as soon as possible by a German-Slovak commission.

ARTICLE 2

All questions arising as the result of reuniting the designated areas with the territory of the Slovak state in pursuance of article 1 shall be regulated by special agreements between the two High Contracting Parties.

In particular the two High Contracting Parties shall reserve the right to conclude special agreements if necessary, anent the rights and interests of German nationals and Volksdeutsche in the areas designated in article 1.

ARTICLE 3

This treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification exchanged at Pressburg as soon as possible.

¹ Not printed (2871/563889-916). Fifty-two Slovak localities (*Gemeinden*) were involved.

The treaty shall become effective with the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Done at Berlin on November 21, 1939, in duplicate in the German and Slovak languages.

V. RIBBENTROP
M. ČERNÁK

No. 382

582/242023-24

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, November 22, 1939—9:35 p. m.

No. 825 of November 22

Received November 23—12:40 a. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

Dollmann¹ just called on me after a very serious conversation with Buffarini² who considers that the development of the situation in South Tirol has become very threatening in the days since his conversation with Wolff;³ among other things he spoke of the necessity of guaranteeing public order through a further reinforcement of the Carabinieri and the military. Buffarini as well as Bocchini very emphatically pointed out the urgent necessity of dispatching as quickly as possible the special deputy promised by Wolff; together with his counterpart sent by the Italians, this deputy is to settle all differences arising, especially in police matters, but also in the general implementation of the Tremezzo agreement,⁴ so that Buffarini and Dollmann will in the future be called upon only as authorities on a higher level, that is, in cases in which the matter has definitely reached a deadlock locally; in short, Buffarini and Dollmann will not be consulted in cases in which all possibilities have not been exhausted on the lower level.

Buffarini further transmitted to Dollmann the Duce's urgent request that the number of people actually emigrating daily be increased above the minimum which Wolff had promised and which, in the Duce's opinion, was not even being adhered to. In this connection the Duce had called attention to the repatriation figures for Volksdeutsche from the Baltic area, which had been published in the press (in my opinion an irrelevant reference, since the conditions are completely

¹ Eugen Dollmann, at this date a Sturmabannführer in the SS, was Himmler's personal representative in Rome for police matters.

² Guido Buffarini-Guidi, Deputy Minister of the Interior, 1933-43, under Mussolini who himself retained the post of Minister. Buffarini was Minister of the Interior in Mussolini's Italian Fascist Republic, 1944-45.

³ Karl Wolff, at this date Gruppenführer and Chief of Personal Staff for Reichsführer-SS Himmler.

⁴ See document No. 244.

different), and according to Buffarini's account had clearly indicated that we were apparently interested only in a "plebiscite for show" in South Tirol. Buffarini had remarked in this connection that the situation would be considerably eased if we could bring ourselves to agree to the departure of the impressive number of approximately 100 persons per day, which would have to begin at once, however. Although I have no doubt whatever that the Italians are thereby making a request which exceeds what was agreed upon, I would nevertheless consider it desirable, in view of the unmistakable deterioration in the situation in South Tirol, if the Reichsführer-SS would investigate the practicability of such an action and if possible initiate the appropriate measures. On the basis of Dollmann's account I have the impression that in Buffarini's opinion the Duce would be considerably reassured if for 2 to 3 weeks we would actually arrange for the departure of approximately 100 persons daily; later, if it caused too many practical difficulties to maintain such a tempo, we could go back to the number of persons who could be taken care of in a normal and quiet manner.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁵ A memorandum (100/65424-30) from the files of the Rome Embassy, dated at Bolzano Jan. 11, 1940, and presumably submitted by the Consulate General at Milan, showed that up to that date 90.7 percent of the Volksdeutsche in South Tirol had opted for Germany.

No. 383

476/229556

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, November 22, 1939.

For [Under] State Secretary Woermann.

The Minister yesterday discussed with the Führer the draft of the reply to the Netherlands Government concerning the crossing of Netherlands territory by German aircraft.¹ The Führer then authorized me to issue the following instructions:

1. In future, all flights by German aircraft over neutral territory will be denied [*abgeleugnet*], unless they can be absolutely proven, for example, by crashing, or by parts of the aircraft which are found, or something of the sort.
2. In case it can be proven absolutely that such flights have taken place, a decision will have to be made in each individual case as to what is to be done.
3. The Foreign Minister requests [Under] State Secretary Woermann to submit to him as soon as possible an exact list of flights over

¹ Two notes (173/84050-51) protesting German flights over Netherlands territory were presented by the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires on Nov. 20.

Holland and Belgium by German aircraft and a list of flights over those countries by enemy aircraft.²

HEWEL³

²The list requested has not been found.

³Unsigned marginal note: "Neither of the drafts is to be dispatched."

No. 384

Nuremberg document 789-PS
Exhibit USA-23

Memorandum of a Conference of the Führer With the Principal Military Commanders, November 23, 1939¹

November 23, 1939—1200 hours.

Conference with the Führer, to which all principal military commanders are ordered. The Führer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the thinking which governs my view of impending events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in the final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, in the midst of the set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle, I never lost my belief. Providence had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919, when after long internal conflict I became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, moreover, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First internal reorganization, abolition of the appearances of decay and of the defeatist spirit, education to heroism. While still engaged in internal reorganization,

¹This report of Hitler's speech was found in OKW files captured at Flensburg. Its authorship is unknown. Additional information about Hitler's statements during this conference is contained in the testimony of General Halder in the "High Command Case", *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949*, vol. x, p. 857.

I undertook the second task—to release Germany from its international bonds. Two particular landmarks are to be pointed out in this connection—secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large; the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation which stood firmly behind me when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 came the introduction of compulsory military service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a step believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country, especially in the West.

One year later came Austria; this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this step was not possible to accomplish in one move. First of all, in the West the West Wall had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the establishment of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the East and then against the West or vice versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. By the pressure of events it came first to the fight against Poland. It will be charged against me: Fight and fight again. In fighting I see the fate of all creatures. Nobody can avoid fighting if he does not want to go under. The increasing number of people required a larger Lebensraum. My goal was to create a rational relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The fight must start here. No nation can evade the solution of this problem. Otherwise, it must yield and gradually go down. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southeast, then adaptation of the number of people to the smaller space by emigration. In later years, adaptation of the number of people to insufficient space by reducing the number of births. This would lead to death of the nation, to bleeding to death. If a nation chooses that course all its weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to force from the outside and uses this force against oneself by the killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of numbers, and degradation. I decided on a different way—adaptation of the living space to the

number of people. It is important to recognize one thing. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its national substance. In our case 82 million people are concerned. That means the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the body of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is an eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help here, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength to fight must withdraw. Struggles are different from those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial struggle. Today we fight for oil fields, rubber, mineral wealth, etc. After the Peace of Westphalia, Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by treaty. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition to France and England began. Since 1870, England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was, at times, in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient hardness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke's plans was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership were to blame that the opportunities were lost. The military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914, there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of the problem. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years, it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870, and considered as impossible of achievement, has come to pass. For the first time in history, we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the East and then in the West. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under the pressure of events, it was decided that the East was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious event in our history. Unexpectedly small losses of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as impossible of achievement. Now the

situation is as follows: The opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is—how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many internal conditions. Moreover, we have the Treaty with Russia. Treaties, however, are only kept as long as they serve a purpose. Russia will only keep it as long as Russia herself considers it to be to her benefit. Bismarck also thought so. One recalls the Reinsurance Treaty.² Now Russia still has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further, Russia is seeking to increase her influence in the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to her benefit. At the present moment internationalism has retired to the background. In case Russia renounces it, she will go over to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian Army is of little worth. For the next 1 or 2 years, the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death can alter everything. Italy has great goals for the consolidation of her empire. Fascism and the Duce personally are exclusively the proponents of this idea. The Court is opposed to it. As long as the Duce lives, so long can it be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goals. However, it is too much to ask of Italy that she should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the West; similarly Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise, Italy will think that France concerns herself only with Italy since Germany is sitting behind her West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. How easily the death of a statesman can come about I myself have experienced recently. Time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Yugoslavia is to be feared. Similarly the neutrality of Rumania is assured by the attitude of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxist influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of her neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

²The Reinsurance Treaty was concluded by Bismarck with Russia June 18, 1887.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more.

As the last factor I must in all modesty describe my own person: Irreplaceable. Neither a military man nor a civilian could replace me. Attempts at assassination may be repeated. I am convinced of my powers of intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the annihilation of the opponent. Anyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversaries. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious for us, but which can only deteriorate. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromises. Hardness toward ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall act accordingly. Today we still have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 [*sic*] our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England neglected the expansion of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two new modern ships—*Rodney* and *Nelson*. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war, England did not have enough forces to occupy Lake Tana. At Malta, Gibraltar, and London, little antiaircraft protection. Since 1937, rearmament has begun again. At present, however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the Army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British Army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Antiaircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer at 6,000 meters altitude is safe from English antiaircraft fire. The Navy will not be fully rearmament questions, and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914, France reduced the length of service. After 1914, decrease of military might. Only in some artillery branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French Army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary—(1) The number of active units in Germany is at its highest, (2) superiority of the Luftwaffe, (3) antiaircraft beyond all competition, (4) the tank corps, (5) large number of antitank guns, 5 times as many machine guns as in 1914, (6) German artillery has

great superiority because of the 10.5 guns, and (7) there is no French superiority in howitzers and mortars.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the troops is greater than with the others. I was most deeply pained when I heard the opinion that the German Army was not individually as capable as it should have been. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one might have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that troops must be judged on their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. The individual German infantryman is better than the French. No hurrah-enthusiasm, but tough determination. I am told that the troops will advance only if the officers lead the way. In 1914, that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liège. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance is it if a few of them disappoint. Daring in the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe. I cannot bear to hear people say the Army is not in good order. Everything lies in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small Navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small Navy, especially the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire German Lebensraum.

The land Army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it has not been shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are even superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armament industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the British. The Englishman is a tough opponent. Above all on the defense. There is no doubt that England will be represented in France by large forces at the latest in 6 to 8 months.

We have an Achilles heel—the Ruhr. The conduct of the war depends on possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralyzing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish. Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a National Socialist Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. This question is worthy of the

greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are fully armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo:³ The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch general staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Netherlands Government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not mention the incident any more. At a suitable time I shall exploit all that and use it to motivate my action. If the French Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boats, mines, and Luftwaffe (also for mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The continuous sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. No one has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or annihilation. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Also the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.

My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and earliest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is of no importance. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not justify the breach of neutrality as idiotically as in 1914. If we do not violate neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack, the war can not be ended victoriously. I consider it possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon a kind Providence. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite, however, is that

³ See document No. 344.

the leadership must give from above an example of fanatical unity. There would not be any failures if the leaders of the people always had the courage a rifleman must have. If, as in 1914, the commanders suffer a collapse of nerves, what should one demand of the simple rifleman?

The only possible conclusion: The enemy must be beaten by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically, we have more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. As for the rest, what does not happen today must happen tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just a single action. It is a matter of not just a single question but of the existence or nonexistence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons. (1) The decision is irrevocable. (2) There is only prospect for success if the whole Wehrmacht is determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate does not demand from us any more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live, I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall annihilate everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unashamed when I have to die.

I want to annihilate the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a kind Providence. Even in the present development I see the work of Providence.

If we come through this struggle victoriously—and we shall come through it—our time will go down in the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside, no revolution from within.

No. 385

103/111807

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 770 of November 23

Moscow, November 23, 1939—6: 02 p. m.
Received November 23—4: 10 p. m. [*sic*].

For the State Secretary.

For the High Command of the Army, Attaché Section.

The Italian Military Attaché called on me today to inform me confidentially of an estimate current in attaché circles: Approximately 28 divisions, plus cavalry and guard units, are believed to be assem-

bled on the Bessarabian front, with their main strength on the right wing, in East Galicia. The French Military Attaché estimates the strength at this front as being not over 11¹ divisions. The disposition of the Soviet forces vis-à-vis Finland is unanimously estimated as follows: A total of 18 divisions is assigned here, of which four are spread out from Lake Ladoga to the Arctic Ocean, with the rest on the Karelian Isthmus and south of Leningrad.

It is the general assumption, held especially by the British Military Attaché, that the Soviet Union will in no circumstances seek to enforce its demands on Rumania and Finland by resort to armed intervention. Time works for the Soviet Union, particularly in the case of Finland, so that they can attain everything without the risk of a war. The British Military Attaché believes that the Soviet Union will do nothing against Rumania before next spring. Other Military Attachés think that Stalin would like to achieve his aims without bloodshed, but with the greatest possible speed, so that in the event of an early termination of the European war he would not afterwards stand alone as the instigator of new trouble.

Köstring No. 141.
SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note by Decoding Officer: "Could also read 10."

No. 386

1869/356864

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Moscow, November 24, 1939—12:20 a. m.

No. 775 of November 23

Received November 24—2:30 a. m.

With reference to our telegrams No. 754 of November 21¹ and No. 773 of November 23.²

To the Reich Ministry of Transport.

The Embassy has entered a strong protest with all the Soviet offices concerned against the change-over of gauge of the section of the rail-

¹ Not printed (1369/356929). A telegram notifying Schnurre that Hilger had made written and oral protest to Soviet authorities about the change in railroad gauge (see document No. 237, footnote 4) and about the Rumanian transit question. As to the latter, Schnell reported in telegram No. 760 of Nov. 21 (1369/356873) that the Soviet Government had made transit through Rumania dependent upon German acceptance of a temporary agreement concerning railroad arrangements along the entire new frontier through Poland.

² Not printed (1369/356865-66). In this telegram Schnell transmitted a summary of the technical instructions issued by the Soviet Commissariat of Transport to the Lwów railroad district on technical cooperation with German officials. Schnell recommended that corresponding instructions be issued to the Kraków district.

road between Lwów and Przemyśl. The railroad delegation has also protested repeatedly in the matter. In spite of this, the fact that conversion has been started has been announced in the local railroad newspaper. Potemkin, instead of giving a direct reply to the démarche made day before yesterday, limited himself today to the statement that people in Germany were apparently not very well informed about the efficiency of the railroad section Sniatyn-Drohobycz-Przemyśl. Potemkin added in these words: "Our German friends will be satisfied." In spite of constant urging no statement of its viewpoint could be obtained from the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

It is apparent from Ministerialrat Schnell's telegram to the Ministry of Transport today that all preparations have been made for beginning transit traffic with Rumania as of December 1. The representatives of the Benzol Association who are negotiating here state that the extensive Soviet petroleum deliveries to Germany which are imminent will be greatly facilitated by the change-over of gauge on the Lwów-Przemyśl section, since in this way the installations for refilling the petroleum into other tank cars will be located on German soil.

SCHULENBURG

No. 387

B21/B005283-84

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1939—8:26 p. m.

No. 698 of November 24

Received November 25—6:00 a. m.

In a lengthy political conversation Russian Ambassador Oumansky, who called on me today upon his return after an absence of several months, expressed the personal opinion that America would in the near future enter the war against Germany—if not in a military sense, then in a politico-economic sense—but would first have to come to an understanding with Japan in order to secure herself from the rear. Oumansky saw as the reasons for America's entry into the war: 1) the long-standing desire to prevent an Anglo-French defeat; 2) in case it should become apparent that Germany might be defeated, active intervention on the side of the Allies; 3) the agitation of public opinion in the event of an occupation of Holland or Belgium by Germany. An understanding with Japan would, however, be made more difficult by the progress of Russo-Japanese negotiations, which Oumansky said were impending. After a severe military defeat by Russia, Japan had realized her inferiority, particularly in air warfare,

and had chosen the alternative of an understanding, which Russia also desired.¹

The fact that Russia is not included in the British navicert procedure was attributed by Oumansky to British apprehensions of being exposed to another sharp protest from Russia against the conduct of the naval war.

THOMSEN

¹Oumansky refers to the Nomonhan Incident which involved large-scale fighting between Japanese and Soviet troops in the summer of 1939. A settlement was announced at Moscow on Sept. 16.

No. 388

2131/466370

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 958 of November 25 BERLIN, November 25 [1939]—10:20 p. m.
Received November 26—1:30 a. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister very sharply condemned vis-à-vis the German Ambassador the procedure announced by the enemy powers with reference to German exports¹ and stated that in view of the intended Spanish protest he had ordered all Spanish representatives in neutral countries, especially in Rome, to sound out the respective Governments concerning their stand. Since he intends to let Spanish ships proceed to neutral countries under convoy of Spanish naval vessels, it is highly important for him to know what attitude Italy will adopt toward such a procedure, since other neutrals, too, will then certainly follow suit.

The Foreign Minister requested that the Italian stand also be ascertained via Berlin.

Please mention the suggestion to the Government there and use your influence to the effect that the Spanish suggestion meets with a positive reply. A later telegraphic report is requested.²

RITTER

¹Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on Nov. 21 that, in retaliation for illegal German use of mines, blockade measures would be extended to German exports, including those carried in neutral vessels.

²Mackensen replied on Nov. 26 (582/241933/2) that Ciano had said that he had not yet been approached by the Spaniards. He had added, however, that he did not see how the Spaniards proposed to undertake convoying with their warships, which "were really nothing but scrap."

No. 389

1571/880231-32

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, November 26, 1939—7: 45 p. m.

No. 864 of November 26

Received November 26—10: 30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 842 of November 24.¹

During my visit today Ciano himself brought up the step concerning the intensified British blockade measures which he had undertaken with the British Chargé d'Affaires and the French Ambassador the day before yesterday, and stated that he had refrained from carrying out the intention mentioned to me day before yesterday of taking up the matter by way of a note, since it had developed in the formulation that it would not have been possible to avoid bringing in the word neutrality in such a note. In his oral statements to the two diplomats, however, it had been easy to get around this difficulty.

When I asked how the British and the French reacted to his communication, Ciano replied that the British Chargé had taken cognizance of it with the remark that he would inform his Government; François-Poncet, however, had replied with a little smile that he was taking cognizance of this protest against the "consequences" of the measures and that he knew that just as Ciano had received the Englishman 15 minutes before him in order also to protest against the "consequences", he would send for me 15 minutes later to protest against the "causes". England and France had done no more than give an answer to our "anarchist" mines, whereby we had placed ourselves outside the laws of naval warfare. I had the impression that Ciano did not permit himself to be drawn into any further discussion of the subject.

When I asked whether he had given his remarks to the British and the French the tone of a definite demand, he replied that he had expressed himself somewhat to the effect that if England and France persisted on the course they had taken, Italy would reserve to herself the freedom of action necessary to guard her interests.

MACKENSEN

¹ Not printed (8331/E589811-12).

No. 390

96/108123-24

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 522 of November 27 ANKARA, November 27, 1939—8:15 p. m.
Received November 28—3:30 a. m.

1. The note verbale has been delivered in accordance with telegram No. 454 of November 25.¹

2. With reference to telegram No. 458 of November 27,² I today called the Foreign Minister's attention to the consequences of his economic policy if it was to be conducted in accordance with the interview.³

The Reich Government is always prepared to conclude a reasonable trade agreement; it could not but [consider] ⁴ it a very unneutral and therefore unfriendly act [if] Turkey should give in to British pressure not to deliver any chromium to us. We could understand that Turkey might want to exchange this valuable material for foreign exchange, if possible. Therefore we were even prepared to deliver war material in payment. I had to reject absolutely the Foreign Minister's request that an agreement with the Minister of Commerce be concluded first and chromium discussed later. In view of my attitude and my reference to the increased political tension which would doubtless set in between the two countries, as well as in response to the desire of the President of the Republic that this tension be eased through economic concessions, Saracoglu said that he did not intend to cut us off from chromium supplies but was only awaiting the result of an investigation of the extent to which the chromium output could be increased in order to make me an offer. Finally we agreed that the negotiations with the Minister of Commerce should be immediately begun and quickly concluded. Before the final signing he will then submit to me his proposals with regard to chromium. The trade policy of the Turkish Government coincided with the article in the *Türkische Post* of November 16, and he also wished to arrive at a political détente in this manner.

3. For this purpose Saracoglu proposed to me that the feud be called off on both sides. My representations with respect to *Tan* and

¹ Not printed (8490/E596894).

² Not printed (8493/E596956).

³ In an interview with Jules Sauerwein of *Paris Soir*, Saracoglu had indicated frank dissatisfaction with the course of economic discussions with Germany during 1939 and optimism about establishing closer economic relations with the Western Powers. DNB report of Nov. 24 on the interview: 4531/E144257-58.

⁴ The words in brackets, garbled in transmission, are from the Ankara draft (8493/E596949-50).

an entirely impossible article by Hussein Yalcin had shown him that this could not go on. The *Tan* incident would be settled in accordance with my proposal. Maranz⁵ had been warned that he was an undesirable alien. I promised that I would ask the Minister and the Government to instruct the German press not to write anything in the future that might offend Turkish national pride or the President.

PAPEN

⁵ Austrian-born correspondent of the London *Daily Herald*.

No. 391

2121/462418-15;
2121/462418-20

Unsigned Memorandum of the Economic Policy Department

[November—1939].

I

The German-Turkish agreements on the exchange of goods and payments, of July 25, 1938,¹ were in force until July 31, 1939; the agreements provided that the two Governments were to decide in the course of the month of May 1939 whether or not the agreements should be extended for another year.

Some time before that date an understanding had been reached with the Turkish Government that negotiations were to take place at Ankara early in June 1939 regarding the extension and modification of the agreements (cf. also telegraphic instruction of March 22² of this year). The negotiations were subsequently canceled (telegraphic instruction of May 27, 1939-W4240-).³ This action of ours was based, among other things, on the consideration that owing to the seasonal character of the Turkish products the Turks would be more eager to negotiate in the fall. The Turks were likewise left in uncertainty about the entry into force of the credit agreement of January 16⁴ of this year, which was to have been effected by an exchange of notes (cf. telegraphic instruction of May 11 of this year, No. 117).⁵ The Führer ordered on May 14⁶ through a directive issued by General Keitel that no heavy guns were to be delivered to Turkey. For all financial questions arising out of the contracts the German firms involved were to be referred to the Ministry of Finance. Failure to deliver was to be justified vis-à-vis Turkey on political grounds and

¹ See vol. v, documents Nos. 545 and 549.

² Not found.

³ Not printed (8452/E595141).

⁴ See vol. v, document No. 557.

⁵ Not printed (8452/E595145).

⁶ Not found. See vol. vi, document No. 435.

with the explanation that for the German firms it was a case of *force majeure*.

The Turkish Embassy in Berlin appealed to the Foreign Ministry in a note verbale of May 27 of this year (W III 4271)⁷ about the holding back of military equipment, and the Turkish Ambassador approached Minister Clodius on several occasions about this matter and also about the negotiations for the extension of the Trade Agreement and the entry into force of the Credit Agreement (memorandum of May 30, 1939).⁸

In a conversation with our Ambassador on June 5,⁹ the Turkish Foreign Minister stated in connection with the holding back of the torpedoes and the Skoda guns that if we did not perform delivery, Turkey, on her part, would have to curtail her deliveries of raw materials and stop payments. The Ambassador noted that the Turks must have been referring to chromium ore.

When the Turkish Embassy made another urgent inquiry about the starting of the German-Turkish economic negotiations contemplated for May and the question of the delivery of military equipment, an evasive answer was given on June 24 (W III 5025).¹⁰

As of July 11, the following deliveries of war material to Turkey were stopped :

1) 19 150-mm guns, ordered from Krupp, delivery of which was to begin on July 8.

2) 12 210-mm guns, from Skoda.

3) 6 batteries of 240-mm howitzers, from Skoda, valued at 935,000 English pounds (a down payment of 270,000 English pounds has already been made on this order).

4) 60 Messerschmitt planes.

The other deliveries of war material were continued.

In July we were considering starting negotiations in the middle of August with a view to extending the arrangements for another year and at the same time securing an agreement that the penalties for nondelivery of war material would not be enforced (Wg. 1163 g);¹¹ but on August 7 Papen told the Foreign Minister, who had invited him for a discussion of the question of delivery, that he was awaiting instructions and that any prior discussion would be pointless.¹²

In accordance with the instruction of August 18,¹³ our objective was to obtain extension of the Trade and Payments Agreements on con-

⁷ Not printed (7996/E575629-30). See vol. vi, document No. 454, footnote.

⁸ Vol. vi, document No. 454.

⁹ Vol. vi, document No. 475.

¹⁰ Vol. vi, document No. 565.

¹¹ Not printed (8452/E595147). These ideas were also expressed in a memorandum which Wiehl submitted to Ribbentrop on July 28, 1939 (96/107918-23).

¹² Telegram No. 225 of Aug. 8 (8452/E595148).

¹³ Vol. vii, document No. 109.

dition that an understanding could be reached regarding our release from the war material contracts (W 1361 g) ; in order to increase the pressure, the issuance of import licenses for seasonal products was stopped.¹⁴

According to report No. 243 of August 24,¹⁵ the Turkish Government took note of the nondelivery of war material and was willing not to bring up the question of indemnification guarantees provided we agreed to a four-week extension of the Trade and Payments Agreements. The Turks then declined the extension (telegraphic report No. 288 of September 12, 1939).¹⁶

Numan proposed on September 22 to continue trade relations automatically on the basis of the present treaty. Turkey was prepared to deliver 30,000 tons of chromium ore (telegraphic reports No. 329 of September 22, 1939,¹⁷ and No. 341 of September 27) ;¹⁸ we accepted with reservations on October 1 (telegraphic instruction W III 7920 II).¹⁹

On October 27, Numan withdrew his earlier promise regarding delivery of chromium and cotton (telegraphic report No. 423 of October 27, 1939).²⁰

II

The way the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed himself to Sauerwein, the special correspondent of the *Paris Soir* in Ankara,²¹ was a surprise to Germany, but it was yet not without value, because of the light which it throws on Turkey's intentions. Saracoglu stated quite frankly that Turkey wanted to turn away from the German economy and intended to intensify economic relations with England and France instead, in order to rid herself of the clearing system and return to what he called normal trade relations.

Germany can only deplore this development but must leave it to the Turks to decide whether such a course serves their interest. Germany has in the past few years given very special attention to the development of her economic relations with Turkey. As a matter of fact, trade between Germany and Turkey has quadrupled in the past five years. Germany has taken an active part in building up Turkey's

¹⁴ See Vol. VII, document No. 141, footnote.

¹⁵ Vol. VII, document No. 247.

¹⁶ Not printed (8342/E590159).

¹⁷ Not printed (8342/E590157).

¹⁸ Not printed (8342/E590154-55).

¹⁹ Not printed (8342/E590152-53).

²⁰ In this telegram (96/108088) Kroll had reported: "Today's long discussion with M. Numan indicated that in concluding the pact Turkey obviously also assumed obligations with reference to trade with Germany. Thus reports which have reached me to the effect that the British are stubbornly striving to include Turkey in the blockade front are confirmed."

²¹ See document No. 390, footnote 3.

industry through financial investments and by supplying technicians; a whole series of projects is under way. She has delivered to the Turks a great number of industrial products for which parts can now be had only from Germany. She has also bought large quantities of agricultural products on the sale of which Turkey's rural population depends. She has created a market in Germany for Turkish agricultural products and through the good prices paid for these products, which are mostly nonstandardized and therefore cannot be sold on the world market, she has made it possible for Turkey to expand her production. If Turkey believes that she can henceforth supply her industrial needs from England and France and will sell her agricultural products in these countries, that is her business. We believe that her expectations will be disappointed. If England, prompted by transparent political motives now appears as a buyer on the Turkish market, that is a development that will not suffice to meet Turkey's needs for markets even temporarily. In any case, England must still in the long run give prime consideration to the interests of her Dominions and overseas possessions, and will stop her purchases in Turkey as soon as the war is over and the political reasons prompting her present action disappear. When that time comes, however, Turkey will turn to Germany in vain. It cost Germany a great deal of effort and technical work to develop economic relations to their present high level. Existing ties can be broken easily. But if Turkey should decide to sever her connections with Germany, the Turkish producer, much to his sorrow, will also have to accept the fact that the former customer for his agricultural products turns to other markets.

III

1. At the present stage of the negotiations, the Turks are drawing a clear distinction between

- a) chromium ore deliveries, and
- b) other deliveries.

Chromium ore is to be delivered in exchange for war material; the other deliveries are to be compensated against German counter-deliveries and the open balance.

2. Previously we have taken the stand that we will not negotiate without chromium ore. This attitude clearly indicates our interest in chromium ore to the Turks and, no doubt, also to the British, and so the counteraction is all the more intense.

3. The Ministry of Economics believes that by holding back we shall compel the Turks to yield. This to my view is erroneous because industry is not of primary importance for Turkey, which is

basically an agrarian country. Experts who are familiar with Turkey hold that the factories might shut down if cut off from the necessary spare parts, but some parts could be obtained from England also. Deputies who are interested in the enterprises will not dare, in case of any losses to the enterprises, to oppose the course of grand policy and, if the occasion arises, they will take money from the British in the same manner in which we are trying to bribe them.

4. If we make no interesting deliveries of military equipment we shall certainly get no chromium ore. Deliveries of this kind, however, can not be promised at the present moment in view of the existing directives. Deliveries of less important military material, optical equipment, half-track carriers, some light artillery, cannot tip the scales, while on the other hand the significance of our important military deliveries is diminishing more and more and has by now perhaps been completely lost because ample matériel destined for Poland is made available by England and France.

5. If we are to take a stand on whether we should not after all enter into negotiations before the chromium ore question has been settled, as the Turks have suggested, the following can be said in favor of such a course:

a) Refusal to enter into such negotiations would probably not advance us on the chromium ore question, the less so because we are not in a position to offer important military equipment.

b) Included in the other commodities are semi-manufactured goods, which are of the greatest importance in view of our lack of raw materials.

c) By buying other goods we can liquidate our balance which, like the other payments due, would otherwise inevitably be frozen.

d) Such negotiations would afford an opportunity of reaching some understanding on the question of the delivery guarantees.

e) If we do not negotiate there is a risk that the other goods of interest to us, such as cotton, tobacco, and olive oil, will also be sold to England and only the most unimportant items be left for us.

f) By opening negotiations we strengthen the Turkish circles that are interested in trade with Germany and are at present completely pushed aside. A rigid refusal to negotiate at all can only strengthen the pro-British element. By means of negotiations aided by the pro-German Turks who would thereby be mobilized, there may perhaps be a possibility of finding a way to the chromium ore.

g) Negotiations that have been started can also be broken off. At any rate they ought to be initiated even while the Turko-British negotiations are still in progress.

h) Germany is big and powerful enough so that her prestige would not suffer from an outcome that is not as favorable as could be desired. The views expressed by the Minister of Economics last August still hold good on a lesser scale even today: if we rebuff Turkey, we shall drive her into the arms of England.

No. 392

169/82930

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, November 28, 1939—2:45 a. m.

No. 916 of November 27

Received November 28—3:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 810 of November 25 (Pol. II 4758).¹

Foreign Minister Gafencu repeated to me that the neutrality pact had been abandoned; he would not even refer to it in his statement to Parliament on Wednesday.

Gafencu claims, however, that England had at first been cold to the idea and had only later agreed to it. He had believed that we would give our consent because we had at one time proposed Italy's leadership in it. Nor had the Italian Minister been averse to it in the beginning. Only later did he indicate reserve. Knowing now that Germany and Italy did not welcome the neutral bloc, he was withdrawing his proposal.

FABRICIUS

¹ Not printed (6520/E487376).

No. 393

8127/E582019

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 593

BERLIN, November 27, 1939.

Sent November 28—4:20 a. m.

W VI 4046 II.

With reference to our telegram No. 589.¹

I have instructed the German Missions in Rome, Moscow, Tokyo, and also in other places to speak to the governments there about England's renewed breach of international law and urge energetic defense measures and joint action by neutral states.² Even though

¹ Not printed (51/34049-50). The telegram summarized the reaction of neutral states to new Anglo-French blockade measures against Germany under which it had been announced that all German goods of German origin or German ownership found on neutral ships would be seized in retaliation for illegal German use of mines. The telegram stated that with the exception of the United States almost all neutrals affected by the measures had protested and Germany was urging them to take joint countermeasures.

² The instructions to Rome and Moscow are printed as documents Nos. 394 and 395; that to Tokyo is not printed (1703/398323-24).

I do not expect very much from a similar step in Washington, it nevertheless seems to me necessary and desirable also to inform the Government of the United States of the developments that were reported for information by telegraphic instruction No. 589. I leave it to your judgment to decide how emphatically in your further oral statement you should urge the government there to take a stand also against this new breach of international law and to halt this interference with the commerce of the United States. Report by telegram.

RIBBENTROP

No. 394

8127/E582021-22

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 963

BERLIN, November 27, 1939.
Sent November 28—5:20 a. m.
zu W VI 4050 I.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 861¹ and 864 of November 26.²

Please point out to Ciano again and on my express instructions the necessity of Italy's protecting herself against the new violation of international law and the new attack by England on the rights and economic interests of Italy and the other neutrals. In so doing please inform him that Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Iran—thus almost all countries actually affected, with the exception of America—have also lodged protests with England. Furthermore, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry threatened countermeasures in case the British action should damage important Japanese interests. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has stated that in all probability the Inter-American Neutrality Commission, which is meeting shortly in Rio, will decide to protest against the tightening of British blockade regulations.

Italy is all the more interested in an energetic defense of her position, since she has suffered more harm than the other countries through being cut off from deliveries of German coal by sea. Although the German Government will do everything it can to replace ship deliveries which may become impossible with deliveries by rail, there should be no delusions that this might succeed even partially, especially if Italy does not provide more freight cars. In this connection, I request in particular that you suggest the formation of convoys of coal freight-

¹ No. 861 is the telegram referred to in document No. 388, footnote 2.

² Document No. 389.

ers escorted by Italian naval forces. Say that I am convinced that England would not dare molest such convoys.

I should be very pleased if you could find an opportunity soon to speak to the Duce, too, in this matter and to inform him of my opinion.

Report by wire.³

RIBBENTROP

³By Berlin's telegram No. 967 of Nov. 28 (582/241936), the Rome Embassy was asked to refrain from executing this instruction until a further message was received.

Ribbentrop's telegram No. 978 of Nov. 30 (582/241937) then ordered the Embassy to proceed with the instruction subject to replacement of its next to last paragraph with the following:

"In view of the cutting off of German coal shipments by sea, Italy has an interest in energetic defense of her position. The Reich Government will, of course, do everything it can to effect coal deliveries by the land route, but this can succeed only in part if Italy does not provide more freight cars."

The telegram added that mention of the convoy idea, contained in the first version of the instruction, was to be omitted "since for technical naval reasons we do not wish to see such convoys formed at this time."

No. 395

8127/E582020-20/1

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 907

BERLIN, November 27, 1939.

Sent November 28—6:20 a. m.

zu W VI 4046 II.¹

Please speak to Chairman Molotov about the planned tightening of British blockade measures which will probably be announced on November 28; they are now supposed to subject even export goods of German origin which are owned by neutrals, are on neutral ships, and are destined for neutral countries, to capture and seizure. I should be very pleased if M. Molotov would lodge a protest against this action to the effect that Britain was again violating accepted international law.

To judge from the great effect achieved by the recent protest by Chairman Molotov against the contraband list,² we promise ourselves even better results from the protest now being suggested because the Soviet Union is practically unaffected by the British measure. Consequently, the Soviet Union would again be able to appear as protector and defender of international law.

¹W VI 4046 II: Document No. 393.

²The files contain a German translation of a note Molotov handed to the British Ambassador Oct. 25, 1939, in reply to British notes of Sept. 6 and 11 regarding contraband of war (51/33950-53).

I suggest that during the conversation you might utilize the fact that Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Iran have already protested. Brazil intends to propose a joint protest at the session of the Inter-American Neutrality Commission which will be held shortly in Rio. Italy has protested to the British and French Ambassadors and called attention to the injurious effects on Italian commerce; she informed us confidentially that she did not intend to put up with this. Spain is likewise considering entering a protest and setting up convoys of Spanish warships for Spanish merchantmen, in case other powers, in particular Italy, take similar measures.

Please report by wire.³

RIBBENTROP

³ Schulenburg reported on Nov. 30 that Molotov received the information in a friendly way and replied that the matter had already been examined and that Ribbentrop's wishes would receive careful consideration (103/111826). On Dec. 11, Schulenburg wired that the Soviet Government that day had sent the British Embassy a note protesting the British blockade decision of Nov. 23 (103/111865).

No. 396

B21/B005288

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1939—2: 46 p. m.

No. 711 of November 28

Received November 29—4: 45 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 593 of November 27¹ and my telegram No. 709 of November 27.²

As instructed, I informed the American Government of various protests by neutrals against the British export blockade and in the ensuing conversation with the official concerned, Assistant Secretary Grady, plainly intimated what attitude we believed we could expect of the American Government, particularly in view of the determined protests of the American Government in a similar situation during the World War.

The result of the conversation is briefly as follows:

1. The American Government does not intend of itself to protest in principle against the British breach of international law or to participate in any collective protest by other neutrals.

2. The present American Government apparently considers the export blockade an admissible measure under international law as retaliation against German mine warfare.

¹ Document No. 393.

² Not printed (B21/B005287). Thomsen reported an American protest against Allied blockade measures was unlikely, as American policy was guided by the desire to assist the Allies in every way within the framework of a benevolent neutrality.

3. In view of the decline in German exports to this country the American Government does not consider itself "affected" and therefore has no material interest at stake. Higher considerations apparently play no role.

In theory the American Government, as Grady stressed, reserves to itself all the rights of neutrals. Any kind of protest against England enters into consideration, however, only in the event of an individual, concrete case of flagrant interference by England with American ships or American cargoes which directly affects American interests.

THOMSEN

No. 397

476/229585

Memorandum by the State Secretary

November 28, 1939.

Jurisdiction in relations between the Foreign Ministry and the OKW or its branches.

1. In all questions on the general conduct of war in which the Foreign Ministry is interested, the OKW shall have jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Foreign Ministry.¹

2. Questions of naval warfare shall be discussed between the OKW and the Foreign Ministry when they have basic significance or when the Führer is involved.

3. In all current matters of naval warfare the Foreign Ministry shall deal directly with the OKM, which, if necessary, shall in turn inform the OKW. This information is necessary mainly when the opinions of the Foreign Ministry and the OKM differ. It is then the task of the OKW to reach an agreement with the Foreign Ministry, taking account of both political and military requirements.

4. The same regulation applies also to the other aspects of warfare insofar as the Foreign Ministry is interested in them.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister, as directed.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ An order of Oct. 23 by Hitler specified that economic warfare, including its naval aspects, should be centrally directed by the OKW, which was also charged with coordinating the activities of other governmental organs having responsibilities for economic warfare (51/33920). An English translation of the order is to be found in "The Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, p. 53.

² Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Approved by the Foreign Minister. W[eißsäcker], Nov. 28."

No. 398

5284/E811105-06

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 896 of November 29

ROME, November 29, 1939—2:15 p. m.

Received November 29—5:00 p. m.

W III B 568.

With reference to your telegram No. 967 of November 28.¹

I canceled my visit with Ciano scheduled, as usual without mentioning the subject matter, for today.

Moreover, yesterday in the course of my conversation with Giannini, I brought up for discussion the question mentioned in telegraphic instruction No. 963 of November 28 [*sic*],² regarding the future fate of German coal deliveries to Italy by sea, and called attention to the fact that new British measures might make continuance of these shipments impossible if Italy did not decide to react more sharply; even with the best of intentions on our part the shortage in the tonnage brought in by sea could be only partially compensated for by land deliveries.

Surprisingly enough, Giannini replied that he did not share our misgivings; even after the announcement of the new British measures Italy had sent ships to Rotterdam to take on coal, and was counting on the continuation of these shipments. Since, as he said, convoys are not being considered here, the reason for his optimism may be sought in some sort of British assurances, although Giannini made no mention of anything of the sort.³

It is significant that Transportation Minister Host Venturi also told Graeff *confidentially* yesterday that in spite of the sinkings of Italian coal ships which had already occurred, he was continuing to order Italian ships to go to Rotterdam and take on German coal. From statements made by the British to the Italian Government, it appears that even after the introduction of the blockade against German exports, England does not for the time being entirely exclude the delivery of German coal by sea to Italy. However, England demands inspection of each individual steamer, if possible in British ports, and

¹ See document No. 394, footnote 3.

² Document No. 394.

³ In a memorandum of Nov. 30 (1848/421094), Weizsäcker recorded the following: "I told the Italian Ambassador today that I had the impression that the Italian Government is not very much concerned about the Anglo-French blockade of German exports. It almost seemed to me as if Italy hoped to be able to continue to use the sea routes for German exports of coal to Italy. Atolico said that if this was the case England apparently wished to spare Italy, whereupon I told him I could not well imagine that Italy would be spared in such a way for no reason at all."

⁴ Friedrich Graeff, Commercial Attaché in the German Embassy.

because of distrust of France she even rejects inspection in French ports. Delivery of coal by the sea route, however, even if not rendered impossible by the very rigorous British attitude, would be called into question for all practical purposes if the danger from mines increased. Host Venturi assumes that Anglo-German naval warfare will soon take such forms that all navigation to Belgian and Netherland ports will be paralyzed.

MACKENSEN

No. 399

8539/E602615-19

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, November 29, 1939.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA No. 215/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. Abt.L I
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 9

PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AGAINST THE ENEMY'S ECONOMY

1. In [our] war against the Western Powers, England sparks the determination to fight and is the leading power of our enemies. To throw down England is the prerequisite for final victory.

The most effective means to achieve this is to paralyze England's economy by disrupting it at critical points.

2. The development of the situation and of our armament may, in the near future, create favorable conditions for extensive warfare against England's economic foundations. *The necessary provisions must therefore be made as early as possible* to strike an annihilating blow at England's economic strength by concentrating suitable arms of our Wehrmacht on the most important targets.

The *nonmilitary* means of warfare, complementary to the measures of the Wehrmacht, will be put into effect according to special instructions.

3. As soon as the Army has succeeded in defeating the Anglo-French field army and in occupying and holding a part of the coast facing England, *the task of the Navy and the Luftwaffe* of carrying on the struggle against England's economic strength will become of prime importance. Efforts for cooperation of the S- and K- Organization are to be made.

4. To the Navy and Luftwaffe will fall the following joint tasks, enumerated here in the sequence of their importance:

a. Attacks on the main English ports of transshipment by mining and blocking the approaches to the harbors and by destroying vital port installations and sea locks.

In this connection the role of the mine-laying planes will be a very important one, especially with regard to the harbors on the west coast of England, in narrow waterways, and estuaries.

b. Attacks on English merchant shipping and against the enemy fleet protecting it.

c. Destruction of English supplies, oil reserves and of food in refrigerated warehouses and grain elevators.

d. Disruption of English troop and supply transports to the French coast.

e. Destruction of industrial plants, the elimination of which is of decisive importance for the conduct of the war; above all of key-plants of the aviation industry and the factories producing heavy ordnance, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, and explosives.

5. The most important English transshipment ports which handle 95 percent of the foreign trade and could not be adequately replaced by others, are:

London	} for <i>imports</i> of food, timber, and oil, and the processing thereof.
Liverpool	
Manchester	

These three harbors, handling 58 percent of the peacetime imports, are of decisive importance.

Newcastle	Swansea	} for the <i>export</i> of coal.
Blyth	Cardiff	
Sunderland	Barry	
Hull		

The following may be considered alternate harbors, but to a limited extent and for certain goods only:

Grangemouth	Holyhead
Leith	Bristol
Middlesbrough	Belfast
Grimsby	Newport
Southampton	Goole
Glasgow	Dundee

It will be necessary to watch continuously for any possible shifting in the use of these harbors. Besides it will be important gradually to compress and shift English foreign trade into areas which are within easy range of our naval and air forces.

French harbors will be attacked only in so far as they play a role in the siege of England, or if they are of importance as debarkation points for troops.

6. In harbors which cannot be blocked effectively with mines, merchant shipping is to be paralyzed by *sinking ships in the roadsteads* and by *destroying vital harbor installations*. Special emphasis is to be laid upon the destruction of the great canal locks at the harbors of Leith, Sunderland, Hull, Grimsby, London, Manchester (Ship Canal), Liverpool, Cardiff, Swansea and Bristol-Avonmouth. Particularly on the west coast these locks are very important in regulating the water level and, through it, the harbor traffic.

7. In preparing these actions it will be important to do the following:

a. Continually to check and supplement the basic data available on English harbors, their installations and capacity, as well as information about the English war industries and supply depots.

b. To rush the development of an effective method enabling planes to lay moored mines also.

c. To provide a supply of mines sufficient for the very high demands and numerous enough to meet the operational needs of the Navy and Luftwaffe.

d. To coordinate the conduct of operations of the Navy and Luftwaffe, as to time and location.

These preparations are to be made as soon as possible. I request the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and the Luftwaffe to keep me continuously informed about their plans.

I shall decide later as to when the restrictions still in effect in the naval and air war will be lifted. This probably will coincide with the start of the big offensive.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 400

259/169849-50

The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 18 of November 30

MILAN, November 30, 1939—3:40 p. m.

Received November 30—5:05 p. m.

A former employee of the British Embassy in Rome who for many years running has pilfered telegram duplicates, rough copies of deciphered telegrams, and duplicates of written reports, has offered me two chests full of such material. I was able to cause him to let us have a few of them to check at the Consulate. It is quite obviously genuine, very interesting material. The pieces checked concern the years 1933 to 1935, Palestine, Syria, East Pact, Abyssinia, and other topics; the entire collection is said to go to 1938.

Immediate decision is necessary, for otherwise the seller is going to offer the material to the Italians or Western Powers. The seller, who certainly expects a high profit for himself, could not be persuaded up to now to set a price, but insists that the purchaser offer a price after looking at all the material. I am still trying to get him to state how much he wants.

Suggest the sending of an official, who is exactly informed about English policy, who can judge to what extent the contents of the material is unknown and useful to us. The official must arrive at the latest by Saturday, December 2. For reasons of distance, perhaps a visit from Counselor of Embassy Kordt¹ might be considered. In case it is absolutely necessary, and instructions are received here by telephone tomorrow, Friday morning, by 11 o'clock, Attaché Lierau can arrive in Berlin with sample documents early on Saturday.

WEBER

¹ Theo Kordt had been at the Legation in Bern since September 1939. See document No. 414.

No. 401

91/100112-13

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 155 of November 30

DUBLIN, November 30, 1939.

Received November 30—4: 10 p. m.

At present the opinion is prevalent here that the British would for the time being probably continue to shrink away from forceful intervention until the development of the war situation, especially through intensification of the naval war or a regrouping of the British Cabinet, should necessitate a basically different policy with respect to Ireland. I personally assume that the Government would only make concessions concerning harbors if the British used force; it might put up armed resistance or it might not, in view of the small size of the armed forces. In my opinion the possibility of British action against the Legation would also have to be expected in that case; even now such action is considered possible, perhaps in a disguised form, in view of the British methods here which we well know from our own experience. The IRA informed us that they would in such a case be prepared to defend us and take us to safety, but the Government will probably also be willing to do so. I might mention that the provisional British representative here is considered in greater danger at present than we and is constantly under the strictest surveillance.

Since, if Irish neutrality should cease, we should let the British take the first step if at all possible for reasons with which you are familiar,

I recommend once more, with reference to my telegram No. 150 of November 27,¹ and in view of the special circumstances prevailing here and the particular threat to Ireland's position on the part of England, that Ireland, in case of intensified naval warfare, be accorded the individual treatment indicated.² In my opinion it will be difficult enough to disrupt shipping across the Irish Sea, and if the Irish export only their own products in return for goods bought in England, a fact which could presumably be assured, such shipping would at least for the time being not be important enough in volume to warrant the serious threat to Irish neutrality which would have to be expected as the result of disrupting it. If a closed area around England should be established from which Ireland could not be completely excluded, I believe an attempt should be made to find a protected route for relatively small Irish imports of goods from countries other than England.

I request at your convenience an analysis of opinions concerning the possibility of the U.S. entering the war;³ such a step could exert a decisive influence on the situation here but is not expected for the time being.

HEMPPEL

¹Not printed (8344/E590222-23).

²This sentence appears to be garbled and it is difficult to make a precise translation.

³A brief analysis of opinion in the United States was sent to Dublin in telegram No. 242 of Dec. 4 (2993/586640).

No. 402

5556/E395473-75

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Rumania*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, November 30, 1939—12:00 midnight.

SECRET

zu W 2782 g.¹

No. 835

For Clodius.

I. The Ministry of Economics warns of the progressive drop in Rumanian oil deliveries, from 70,000 tons in October to less than 60,000 tons in November, while a minimum of 100,000 tons per month is required to meet the needs of the absolutely essential program. Every effort must be made to be really sure that deliveries will be made on that scale at least for approximately the next six months. Please conclude a separate agreement on that score, if possible, whereby the Rumanian Government definitely commits itself to guarantee the

¹Not found.

actual performance of these deliveries. The existing agreements should be modified accordingly and the attempt should also be made, if necessary, to have certain major German deliveries, e. g., the powder factory, linked specifically with the oil deliveries. In any event, the necessity of obtaining a satisfactory settlement of the questions of exchange rates and prices at the current negotiations assumes decisive importance in this connection. In order to offset the opposition of the British oil companies, the Rumanian Government might find it necessary to use authoritarian measures for the regulation of her domestic oil economy, perhaps by appointing a government commissioner with powers of seizure and price-fixing.

In view of the importance and urgency of the matter, Schottky and Rosenkrantz of the Ministry of Economics will fly to Bucharest on December 2 to obtain information on the situation there.

II. With reference to your telegram No. 920.²

The arms and ammunition scheduled for delivery are being inventoried and checked for necessary repairs with the utmost dispatch, but for well-known reasons this will still take some time, especially as regards the anti-aircraft guns. We suggest that a Rumanian expert be sent here to participate in the work. The Rumanian Military Attaché has already inspected a portion of the stocks.

We will take over speedy reconditioning. It would appear advisable not to set the prices until afterwards. They will have to be established in reichsmarks on the basis of the pre-war prices of oil.

With respect to ammunition, we shall probably be able to provide 100,000 rounds for the 37 mm antitank guns, possibly more. No definite figure can be given as yet because the stocks found belong to various models of guns and have not yet been sorted out.

WIEHL

² Not printed (8497/E597091).

No. 403

F11/0299

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

No. 936

[BERLIN] November 30, 1939.

RAM 588.

For the Ambassador personally.

At a recent conference I instructed you to avoid making any official inquiries concerning the purchase of Russian submarines by Germany, but, if the opportunity should arise, to have the Naval Attaché find out privately whether the Russian Navy might be inclined to give up submarines.

Please send a report by telegram to me personally on whether the Naval Attaché has already made inquiries.¹ If there has not been any opportunity to do so as yet, please undertake nothing without further instructions.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ In a telegram of Dec. 1 (F11/0300), Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that he had taken no action and that the Naval Attaché had found no opportunity as yet to do so; they would await further orders. Schulenburg added that the Military Attaché noted some concern by the British Embassy at reports in foreign newspapers of proposed submarine purchases.

² On Oct. 10 and again on Nov. 22, Hitler had decided against attempting to get submarines from the Soviet Union. See "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, pp. 47 and 58.

No. 404

B18/B008166

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 933

BERLIN, November 30, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today in order to learn something about the hostilities between Russia and Finland and the political consequences of this conflict. I could tell him very little, because of the scant information which we have received up to now.

Attolico then told me that the Finnish Minister had just called on him in order to ask his advice on whether the hostilities could not after all be brought to a halt at the last minute by German mediation. Attolico told the Finn that he could not answer as Ambassador, but only as a good friend. As such he thought he had to say that Finland ought not to gamble on the moral support of the other Scandinavians or other friends, but should rather take account of realities. Such a conflict might perhaps be brought to a halt at the very start if the causes were eliminated, i. e., the conditions of the opponent were accepted without further ado. Without such compliance he, Attolico, believed that Germany could certainly not be of service to the Finns. The right thing would be for Finland to send any colonel she might wish to the opposing side with a flag of truce and have him state what she was willing to do.

I told Attolico for my part that I considered it proper that he had not encouraged the Finnish Minister in any way to make any sort of request for German mediation.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 405

B21/B004955-56

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1939—10:13 a.m.

No. 719 of December 1

Received December 2—2:50 p. m.

For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and Attaché Sections, Army and Air.

The reasons cited in prewar reports as to why America's entrance into the war was not to be expected in the near future are also valid after the first 3 months of the war.

1. Adequate units of the Army and Air Force as the basis for military intervention are still not available.

2. The fleet is still tied up in the Pacific Ocean. The United States is still avoiding the danger that by joining the Allies it may at the same time become a military opponent of Japan. Even warmongers are waiting to see how the situation in the Far East develops. It is not possible to influence this situation decisively in a military way so long as the Allies are tied up in Europe and the Americans have to depend upon themselves in the Pacific.

3. There are still no military agreements of any kind with the Allies. On the other hand, doubt is beginning to be felt regarding the correctness of the American prewar thesis that economic warfare would be the decisive factor in the struggle against Germany and that the present war would follow a course in accordance with the economic and military experiences of the World War. Thus they are moving toward a better realization of the limits of their own power.

4. From military considerations, the General Staff is still working against war sentiment. In contrast to the State Department's sterile policy of hatred and the impulsive policy of Roosevelt—often based on an over-estimation of American power—the General Staff still has understanding for Germany and her conduct of the war. The influence of the General Staff contributes toward the cautious appraisal of events in Finland. It takes into account the greater activity of Russia in the direction of the Balkans and the Dardanelles, also Persia and India, as well as a Japanese-Russian understanding, and considers dangerous a one-sided position on the part of the United States. I again have the impression that military expansion serves primarily to support the hemisphere policy and at the same time to provide preparedness for any contingency; I also believe that the plan is to obtain by military strength a basis for later peace mediation.

The United States, however, will still enter the war if it considers that the Western Hemisphere is threatened.

For the military activity of the United States the question of the time required for the preparation of stronger land and air armaments is still decisive; in this respect there is no change in my opinion that no land and air armaments adequate for an aggressive war policy by the United States are to be expected before the late summer of 1940.

The armaments and aviation industries are continuing to increase their capacity. Nevertheless it is to be noted that after the embargo was lifted the orders expected from the Allies did not come in to the extent anticipated in the aviation industry and only to a slight extent in other war industries, and therefore the expectation expressed by Roosevelt that the lifting of the embargo would lead to a rapid revival of the armaments industry and thus to greater war preparedness has for the time being not been fulfilled.

Indicative of the anxiety with which the situation in the Pacific is viewed is the fact that not all the five new divisions are being called to the great maneuvers planned in the spring; the Third Division is being left in California, where it is to participate in extensive exercises of the fleet.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 406

1571/380236-37

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 1, 1939—11:50 p. m.

No. 918 of December 1

Received December 2—4:15 a. m.

Secret for the Reich Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 978 of November 30.¹

I called on Ciano this evening and, stressing that I had special orders and keeping very close to the wording of the instruction, I explained to him the necessity of an energetic reaction to the new British blockade measures. Ciano listened to my statements very calmly and then remarked that only yesterday he had again called the attention of the British Ambassador in the clearest manner—then he corrected himself and said in the sharpest manner—to the consequences that might result in Italy from England's unfair attitude in enforcing the blockade measures. It also meant an unbearable strain on Italian public opinion in the long run if Italian ships were detained for a week and longer. The question of coal supplies by sea was vital for Italy. Ciano went on to tell me that these transports had not been

¹ See document No. 394, footnote 3.

interfered with up to now, but that the Italians would also by no means tolerate interference with them. The present moment, however, was not the time for more rigorous measures. Thus, for example, they were not thinking here of having the ships convoyed—a question which, in compliance with instructions, I had avoided broaching; the fleet was far too costly an instrument to be exposed to the wear and tear of convoy service. The fleet here, he interposed, was at the very peak of its efficiency. This had been demonstrated during those critical days when it had been ready to go into action within 6 hours. “Therefore Cavagnari² still had his job, and if it had been the same with the other two³ many things might have taken a different course.” Moreover, in his Ministry he was just on the point of establishing with (one group garbled) the other three Ministries chiefly interested a committee which was to take up questions of economic warfare and necessary defense measures, just as he had also had such a committee at his disposal during the conflict in Spain.

To my remark that I should be acting in accordance with the wishes of the Reich Foreign Minister if I brought this matter up for discussion with the Duce in the same sense as with him, Ciano replied that naturally he would in any case (one group missing) regarding our conversation; but if he should see the Duce tomorrow morning he would speak to him about my intention and call me to the Palazzo Venezia at once if the Duce’s schedule permitted.

MACKENSEN

² Adm. D. Cavagnari was Under Secretary of the Navy, Mussolini retaining the post of Minister himself.

³ I. e., the Army and the Air Force. Pariani and Valle, Under Secretaries respectively of the Army and Air Force, had recently been dropped.

No. 407

1370/357193-97

*Circular Letter of the Foreign Ministry*¹

SECRET

DECEMBER 1, 1939.

W 2789 g. Rs.

Subject: German-Soviet commercial negotiations. Soviet orders in Germany.

After returning from Moscow on Wednesday, November 29, People’s Commissar Tevossyan and General Savchenko submitted on Thursday evening, November 30, the final list of the orders to be placed in Germany by the Soviet Union. It includes war material as well as machinery and industrial installations. The list, comprising . . .

¹ The letter was addressed to 16 senior officials representing the armed forces, the Ministry of Economics, the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, and other offices involved in military production (1370/357198).

typewritten pages, is available at the moment only in the Russian language. A German translation has been promised for late this evening;² it will be copied and reproduced so that we can count on sending the list early tomorrow morning.

In submitting the list People's Commissar Tevossyan and General Savchenko made a number of explanatory remarks, from which the following is worthy of note:

I. Navy:

1. Warships and plans for the construction of warships.

Besides the hulls of the cruisers *Seydlitz* and *Lützow*,³ the final order list also includes the delivery of the cruiser *Prinz Eugen* and the plans of the battleship *Bismarck*.

2. Training ship, repair vessel, and tanker.

People's Commissar Tevossyan asked that the Deutsche Werft in Kiel be persuaded to make the Soviet Government a final offer as soon as possible on the delivery of the training ship to be converted for it from a merchant vessel, the repair vessel now under construction, and the tanker, also under construction; negotiations for the delivery of all three have already been going on for some time.

3. Shipbuilding material.

The amount of armor plating to be ordered has been increased from 15-17,000 tons to 31,000 tons. As regards the quality of the armor plating, the Soviet Government proceeds on the assumption that it will receive the best material now being used in the German Navy. The Soviet Government is not satisfied with the data submitted on the quality of the armor plating.

4. Torpedoes.

The Soviet Government insists on the delivery of noncontact torpedo fuses of the latest type.

5. Mines.

It likewise insists on the delivery of mines of the latest type with magnetic fuses.

II. Air Force:

1. Airplanes.

The Soviet Government insists on the delivery of airplane types such as the Messerschmitt 209. It assumes that there are also other types of latest design which it has not been shown, and wishes to see them and have them delivered too.

²Not printed (1370/357128-83).

³When the armored ship *Deutschland* (completed in 1933) was renamed *Lützow* late in 1939, the cruiser of that name then under construction became known as ex-*Lützow*. She and *Blücher*, *Seydlitz*, and *Prinz Eugen* were 10,000-ton cruisers of the *Admiral Hipper* class.

2. *Airplane engines.*

The same applies to airplane engines.

Re 1 and 2:

In return the Soviet Government offers to construct these latest airplanes and airplane-engine types in the Soviet Union and deliver one third of them to the German Government.

III. *Army:*

1. *Artillery.*

The Soviet Government asks again that it be made possible for its experts to inspect a complete 24-cm. cannon, possibly at the front.

2. *Fire-control equipment for field artillery and antiaircraft artillery.*

In the ordering of fire-control equipment the Soviet Government proceeds on the assumption that it will be provided with equipment of the latest design.

3. *Fire-control equipment for airplanes.*

The request was made once more that such equipment might be inspected, and it was pointed out that the use of modern long-range guns made such equipment absolutely necessary.

4. *Powder, explosives, and ammunition.*

A list of these is to be submitted in two or three days, as soon as the inspection still being made has been completed.

IV. *Industrial installations:*

Carbon hydrogenation.

It was pointed out that during the tours of inspection the Soviet delegation was not shown the production of catalyzers and antidetonators. In ordering a carbon hydrogenation plant exact knowledge of these two apparatuses was absolutely necessary. It was therefore requested that the necessary inspection be allowed. The Soviet Government is particularly interested in the production of airplane gasoline. The Soviet delegation is also particularly desirous to observe the testing of octane rating in the laboratory, and to receive in writing the information given it orally heretofore concerning carbon hydrogenation.

The Soviet Government is not satisfied with our offer to deliver a carbon hydrogenation plant, since this is reputed to permit only the production of gasoline with an octane rating of 87.

In return for the construction of a carbon hydrogenation plant of the latest design in the Soviet Union the Soviet Government promises increased deliveries of gasoline.

In the interest of the earliest possible conclusion of the negotiations it is necessary to take a final stand on the Soviet requests as

soon as possible. Probably a decision by the Führer will be needed for this.⁴ In order to prepare the further steps I have the honor herewith to issue an invitation to a conference on the Russian order list on Saturday, December 2, at 12:30 p. m. at the Ministry of Economics, conference room 3, fifth floor.

By order:
SCHNURRE

⁴Next sentence deleted: "People's Commissar Tevossyan has intimated that if necessary he might be received by the Führer himself." In the succeeding sentence "the further steps" originally read "the audience with the Führer."

No. 408

96/108128-29

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 469

BERLIN, December 1, 1939.
W III c 198.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 522,¹ 524,² 526.³

1. The Foreign Minister has evidently not denied the accuracy of his very unfriendly interview in any way.⁴ It must be considered rather naive for him to propose cessation of the press feud, without a word of apology or explanation at the moment when he is called to account by us for his own unprovoked press attack. In view of the promise which you have already made and the purpose which it serves, we will nevertheless refrain for the time being from publishing the reply, which has already been prepared, especially since the interview has so far found hardly any response. Should this situation change, we must reserve full freedom of action. Please inform the Foreign Ministry of the above. A further decision with reference to the press truce is reserved.

2. The Foreign Minister's statements on commercial policy are also unsatisfactory. A reference to the hardly significant statements by the Minister of Commerce in the article of November 16⁵ cannot invalidate the definite declarations of the Foreign Minister's interview. The fact that the Foreign Minister wants to make a chromium offer to us contingent upon the result of an investigation of the possibility of increasing the output confirms the reports that the available sup-

¹ Document No. 390.

² Not printed (96/108127); in this telegram of Nov. 28, Papen suggested that the German press at present should not attack Turkish President İnönü as the latter's peaceful policies and his desire for an economic agreement with Germany could be played off against Saracoglu.

³ Not printed (2121/462408).

⁴ See document No. 390, footnote 3.

⁵ See document No. 390.

plies and the present output have been or will be sold to America and the enemy countries—as was also hinted in the interview. Therefore, please insist on a clear answer as to the truth of these reports or this intention, for, if they are true, further negotiations are pointless.

3. With reference to telegram 526, telegraphic instructions will follow after a departmental conference. Until then please do not continue the conversations with the Minister of Commerce. Since his proposal, contrary to telegram 499,⁶ does not provide for payment from credit balances, it seems hardly possible to accept it as a basis for negotiations.

4. With reference to telegram No. 499.

Authorization by you to the Istanbul banks to hand over papers for small amounts of perishable goods weakens the consistency of our policy, according to the unanimous view held here. You are therefore requested to make the restriction that papers are to be handed over only on the basis of special authorization to be obtained by telegram from us in each individual case.

The Minister of Economics has reports according to which the Turks are proceeding by legal means to enforce the handing over of papers or the delivery of goods. Please use your influence to prevent such steps as long as negotiations are pending.⁷

RIBBENTROP

⁶ Not printed (8489/E596890).

⁷ In a telegram sent on Dec. 2 (96/108132-33), Papen reported that he had made representations to Saracoglu in accordance with this instruction.

No. 409

F3/0515

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 1, 1939.

The Foreign Minister received State Secretary Karmasin¹ today at the latter's request, with Minister Bernard and myself present.

After M. Karmasin had briefly reported that Communist, Czech, and other anti-German influences were making themselves felt very strongly in Slovakia, the Foreign Minister gave the following directives:

¹ František Karmasin, leader of the Germans in Slovakia and State Secretary in the Slovak government. A memorandum which Woermann submitted to the Foreign Minister on Nov. 29 (F3/0516), apparently in preparation for Karmasin's visit, recorded the fact that the latter had been receiving subsidies from various quarters, such as the V. d. A., the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart. The memorandum concluded that Karmasin was well supplied with money "so that one could wait and see whether he was going to present new demands on his part."

1. An effort is to be made to place German advisers in additional sectors of the Slovak administration and economy. Minister Bernard is to draw up and submit a plan for this purpose. The matter is to be handled cautiously so as to spare Slovak sensibilities. Things should be arranged as much as possible so that the request for advisers will come from the Slovaks.

Any money that may be needed for this purpose should be requested by Minister Bernard.

No influence is to be exerted by us on the internal structure of the Slovak state.

2. Germany's cultural influence is to be increased with the help of the German national group. No details of this were discussed.

At the Foreign Minister's request, State Secretary Karmasin promised to keep secret from the outside world the influence which the Reich intended to exert.

The Foreign Minister urged M. Karmasin to contact Minister Bernard if he should have any requests, or in special cases to ask for the Foreign Minister in person.

WOERMANN

No. 410

582/241939-42

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 2, 1939—10:05 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 3—5:00 a. m.

No. 924 of December 2

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 918 of December 1.¹

The Duce received me at noon today in the presence of Ciano. After my presentation of the Reich Foreign Minister's view he talked for about 15 minutes, starting out by requesting me to tell the Foreign Minister that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation that had arisen for Italy, too, as a result of the new British measures. For a long time now he had been observing with constantly mounting indignation the British encroachments on Italian commercial and shipping interests; filled with anger at the increasing rather than decreasing chicaneries of the British—the French were playing only a minor role in this respect—he had, particularly during the last few days, pointed out with the utmost seriousness, both to the British Ambassador here through Ciano and in London, that his patience would some day be exhausted and that he had no intention of putting up ad infinitum with the serious injury to the Italian economy, which

¹ Document No. 406.

was by no means limited to the material side. The step in London was accompanied by the submission of a long list of particularly crass cases of chicanery of the most petty kind, and notice was served that a continuation of the present situation might have the most serious consequences (*gravissimi conseguenze*). The Duce cited a few more instances in which his ships had been held, in one case for as long as 28 days; in one of the most scandalous cases a grain ship sent by Italy to relieve the food problems of the Spanish Government in the most severely distressed port cities, such as Barcelona, Alicante, and Cartagena, had even been taken to Malta. The excuses of the British, who used the pretense that their organization was not yet functioning properly (which organization, as Ciano remarked at this point, was supposed to be in smooth running order by about the middle of the month) left him cold. The indignation of commercial and shipping circles in Genoa, Naples, and Trieste, the ones mainly affected, was at a high pitch.

In the very next few days he would make an unequivocal statement on the matter, and in a special point on the agenda of the Fascist Grand Council for December 7, which he was now drafting, he would declare that the measures taken by England directly affected the vital interests of Italy.

Passing on to relations with us, he stated that ever since the beginning of the conflict he had made every effort within his power toward improving the food situation as far as possible and he would continue to do so. Thus far 17,000 ² carloads of food had been shipped from Italy to Germany and he would continue this with all his might.

There was also a great deal that could be done yet with respect to supplying Germany with raw materials via Italy and handling German exports. At this very moment he was setting up an agency in the Foreign Ministry (he was presumably thinking of the interministerial body mentioned yesterday by Ciano), which, in closest cooperation with us, was to explore the possibilities for having the individual business transactions incident thereto handled as quietly as possible by reliable firms; as such he designated especially the Italian branches of German enterprises.

The war, in its present stage, was a purely economic war, in which he intended to help us wherever possible. He hoped that every politically informed German had realized by now that Italy's attitude, which had taken form from the situation, had worked out very beneficially so far in the course of the war. Had Italy become actively involved in the conflict simultaneously with us, the situation would in all probability have afforded the Western Powers an opportunity for

² This figure, garbled in transmission, is taken from the copy in the files of the Rome Embassy (2290/483394-96).

easy victories in Libya to offset, in the public mind, the effect of our tremendous successes against Poland, which constituted an equally great defeat of the Western Powers.

In the near future, after solving certain internal Italian problems, which occupied him at present, he would write the Führer a letter that would satisfy him.

Passing on to what he referred to as the "general situation," he condemned in the sharpest terms the conduct of Russia, which, if it continued, would give rise to the worst dangers. As far as Italy was concerned, Bolshevism remained enemy No. 1, and Bolshevism and the Moscow Government were very hard to distinguish. He himself had at one time advised us to relax in some degree the tension in our relations with Russia, but only to a certain point, a policy, moreover, for which he had found complete understanding on the part of Marshal Göring.³ There could be no question that the main responsibility for the present development—and this he emphasized by raising his voice—lay with England and France, who had for weeks been on their knees at Stalin's door; and he did not for a moment fail to recognize the necessity which had determined our later decisions, but he hoped that the present temperature reading on our relations with Moscow would not be raised further. The greed of these "crooks" [*Schieber*] (he used the German expression) was insatiable. They had taken advantage of the tremendous feats of German arms to pocket their gains without fighting and effort.

The Duce brought the conversation to a close with some personal remarks.

MACKENSEN

³ See vol. VI, document No. 211.

No. 411

1795/408715-16

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, December 2, 1939.
e. o. Pol. VI 2651.

In your conversations regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict please avoid any anti-Russian note.

According to whom you are addressing, the following arguments are to be employed: The inescapable course of events in the revision

¹ This instruction was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions, and to the Consulates in Bergen, Geneva, Göteborg, Malmö and Reykjavik, but to Moscow and Helsinki for information only.

of the treaties following the last Great War. The natural requirement of Russia for increased security of Leningrad and the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The foreign policy pursued by the Finnish Government has in the last few years stressed the idea of neutrality, relied on the Scandinavian states, and treated antagonism between Germany and Russia as axiomatic. As a result Finland has avoided any rapprochement with Germany and has even rejected the conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Germany as compromising, even though Finland had a nonaggression pact with Russia. Also in the League of Nations, Finland, in spite of the debt of gratitude which she owed to Germany for the latter's help in 1918, has never come out for German interests. [Former] Foreign Minister Holsti is typical of this point of view and particularly hostile to Germany. Many elements in Finland emphasize their economic and ideological orientation in the direction of democratic England. Correspondingly, the attitude of most of the organs of the press is outspokenly unfriendly to us. The platonic sympathy of England has confirmed Finland in her previous attitude and is doing the country no good.

WEIZSÄCKER

[EDITORS' NOTE. On December 3, 1939, Rudolf Holsti, Finnish delegate to the League of Nations, presented to the Secretary General a letter charging that the Soviet Union had attacked Finland on November 30 and calling for a meeting of the Council and the Assembly to take the necessary steps to end the aggression. On December 5, Molotov wired to the Secretary General rejecting Holsti's charges, denying that he represented the lawful Government of Finland, and stating that the Soviet Government would not be able to take part in any League meetings called to consider Holsti's appeal. These meetings were held, however, and on December 14 the Assembly adopted a report and resolution condemning the Soviet action against Finland and urging members of the League to provide Finland with material and humanitarian assistance. On the same day the Council associated itself with the Assembly's condemnation of the Soviet action and found that "by its act, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has placed itself outside the League of Nations. It follows that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no longer a Member of the League." See League of Nations, *Official Journal* (Geneva, 1939), November-December 1939, pages 496-542.]

No. 412

1870/357230-32

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Economic Delegation to the Soviet Union

SECRET

BERLIN, December 2, 1939.

W 2872 g Rs.

THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS
ON DECEMBER 2, 1939, REGARDING THE SOVIET ORDER LIST OF
NOVEMBER 30, 1939 ¹

Subject: German-Soviet commercial negotiations. Soviet orders in Germany.

Present: See the appended list of participants.²

The conference was meant to give a first general view of the order list drawn up by the Soviet Government. It dealt particularly with the questions of Germany's ability to deliver, the delivery dates, the making available of raw materials, the evaluation of the various items on the order list, and the acquisition of manufacturing permits.

I. Decision by the Führer.

It was determined that if the Soviet orders on the following points are to be filled a decision by the Führer must be obtained:

1. *Navy*: Delivery of the hulls of the cruisers *Seydlitz* and *Prinz Eugen* with all of the materials necessary for their completion, and delivery of the torpedo and mine fuses. In almost all naval deliveries the decision must also apply to fitting the delivery dates into the German naval construction program.

2. *Air Force*: Delivery of the Me 209 and He 110 planes, the Junkers 207 and 208 engines, and the bombs.

3. *Army*: Demonstration of the 24-cm cannon at the front.

4. *Machine tools*: Providing productive capacity for the Russian orders where they could be filled only by postponing the Wehrmacht orders.

5. *Allocation of iron and steel*: Curtailment of the German Army delivery program in order to fill Soviet orders.³

II. Delivery possibilities.

Except for the points which require a decision by the Führer there are no fundamental difficulties as far as the Navy is concerned. This is true also for the delivery of the construction plans of the battleship *Bismarck* and the plans for a 15-cm. destroyer.

¹ In preparation for this conference, German translations of the Soviet list of Nov. 30 were sent to representatives of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Economics, the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary for the Economy, Reichsgruppe Industrie, the Plenipotentiary for Machine Production, and the Reich Office for Economic Development (1870/357192).

² Not found.

³ See document No. 413.

As regards the Air Force, the quantities desired by the Russians would not cause any particular difficulties.

III. *Delivery dates.*

No general statement can be made here. A small portion of the short-term delivery dates desired by the Russians could be met. On the other hand, in other fields, as for instance naval artillery, the construction of large armored turrets requires three to four years. With regard to the large machine tools, merely the order designed for the Hasse and Wrede firm would require the full capacity of the firm for 20 months.

IV. *Furnishing the raw materials.*

The question of providing steel, nickel, copper, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, etc. causes particular difficulty in the carrying out of the Russian delivery program. It is therefore considered necessary for the Russians to make available the necessary amounts of nonferrous metals and refining metals and also to participate in so far as possible in providing the steel and iron. The calculations of the Ministry of Economics indicate that 80,000 tons of iron will be needed per month for filling the Russian orders and delivering them within one year—not counting the deliveries of war material.

V. *Estimate of the various items.*

The total value of the Soviet order list is estimated at about 1.5 billion reichsmarks. The part falling to the Navy, with delivery of all three cruisers, amounts to about 700 million RM; the value of the ship program alone was reckoned at about 420 million RM, not counting the sum to be added for development costs.

In calculating the prices for the deliveries of war material, not only the prices paid by the Wehrmacht are to be used as a criterion, but also those paid on the international market at the moment, some of which are very much higher than the very carefully worked out prices at home. Furthermore, in each case an extra amount is to be added for the cost of development; it was proposed that about 20 percent be taken as a standard.

VI. *Acquisition of manufacturing permits.*

It was agreed that the question of acquiring licenses should be handled separately and that the necessary amounts for this should be added to the prices calculated as in section V. The details must be settled with the firms [involved].

The additional data for estimating the value of the Russian orders and the possibilities of delivery are to be worked out for the next conference, which is planned for Wednesday, December 6, at 5:00 p. m. at the Economics Ministry.

No. 413

4463/E087104

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

QUESTIONS RESERVED FOR DECISION BY THE FÜHRER

1. Making available 70,000 tons of iron per month for Russian deliveries; not, however, at the expense of other German exports.
2. Russian demands rejected by us but presented once more:
 - a. Cruiser *Seydlitz*,
 - b. Construction plans for the battleship *Bismarck*,
 - c. Torpedoes with the most modern fuses,
 - d. Mines with the most modern fuses,
 - e. Demonstration of the firing of the 24 cm. cannon.
3. Further method of negotiation.

In view of the Russian demands, agreement on conclusion of the treaty is to be expected neither with Tevossyan nor with Mikoyan. In case no agreement is reached, it is proposed that a conference be held between Ritter, Schnurre, and Molotov, and that the Foreign Minister send Molotov a letter regarding interpretation of the Russian promise of September 28. If no agreement is reached with Molotov, it should be considered whether a further step must be taken with Stalin, and what form it should take.

¹This undated memorandum is based on handwritten notes (8435/E593986) by Ritter, dated Dec. 2, of the conference of Dec. 2. See document No. 412.

No. 414

259/169854-55

The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 19 of December 3

MILAN, December 3, 1939—5:00 p. m.

Received December 3—9:30 p. m.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 66 of December 1.¹

Counselor of Embassy K[ordt] reports: Doubtless genuine material contains political correspondence of the British Embassy in Rome from 1933 until the end of 1938. Because of the great amount of it (two full chests) and the shortness of time only a partial survey was possible. Instructions and reports written by a great number of British statesmen and diplomats, among others Simon, Eden, and Sir Eric Drummond (Lord Perth) give an interesting glimpse into

¹This telegram stated that Kordt had been instructed to go immediately to Milan and to report from there by telegraph (259/169851). See also document No. 400.

the manner of working and the approach to political problems, for example, the East Pact negotiations, Albania, Yugoslavia, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria. They show the astonishing second-rank role which France played at that time. The mistaken judgments and false prognostications concerning German and Italian policy are revealing.

I have not been able to discover items which could be exploited as propaganda, which does not mean, however, that such material is not there. Thorough examination would require more than a week's work.

Since the collection contains many carbon copies of incoming and outgoing telegrams, as well as some original ciphers even, the material is apparently also valuable for Selchow.² Consider it desirable for material to come into German hands.

End of the memorandum of Counselor of Embassy K.

Supplement of the General Consulate: The owner, with whom K. has avoided coming in contact, but who because of his knowledge and connections might be valuable in the future as an agent, for which he showed an interest, first wanted a million lire. It has been possible to bring his demand down to 300,000 lire, payable Monday evening, December 4, at 9 o'clock. The amount is available from nonofficial funds and could be paid as an advance. Reimbursement from there could be made on the quiet. A [written report³] would follow after payment had been made.

Request in *any* case call to me personally tomorrow Monday before 6 o'clock in the evening. In case the material is to be bought, please ask, "When will Consul General Bene be in Milan again?" I will then consider myself authorized to pay 300,000 lire, but will naturally try to get the price reduced. In case the purchase is to be declined, please say, "Legationsrat Mohrmann can not come to the meeting."⁴

WEBER

² Curt R. H. Selchow had charge of codes in the Foreign Ministry.

³ The words in brackets are from the uncoded copy sent from Milan to the Embassy in Rome (1044/311285-86).

⁴ In telegram No. 20 of Dec. 5, Weber reported that the material had been purchased for 273,000 lire and that arrangements were being made for its safe transport to Germany (1044/311288).

No. 415

585/242521-22

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 349 of December 4

SOFIA, December 4, 1939—7:20 p. m.

Received December 4—4:00 a. m. [*sic*].

The King took me aside after a private luncheon which he gave for a German professor yesterday, in order to express his deep concern

over the latest developments in Finland, especially the setting up of a new Finnish government by the Russians. Bulgaria was about to sign an air convention with Russia and to begin economic negotiations, but what ought she to do if Russia were to raise again the question of a mutual assistance pact and demand possibly the cession of air and naval bases against Turkey? How did Berlin feel about that?

Would Germany view a Russian action in the Balkans with indifference? I replied that the assertion circulated here that Germany had given the Russians a free hand in the Balkans was obviously being spread by enemy propaganda; if the Russians should some day march into Bessarabia, they would after all take back a former province, just as in Finland they were only taking back former Russian territory which they considered indispensable to the defense of Leningrad. There were absolutely no indications, however, that Russia wished to reach beyond the prewar frontier. Poland and Finland were proofs to the contrary. The King told me that Lord Lloyd had tried to incite him against the Russians, saying that the Turks would defend their independence against the Russians by force of arms. The Bulgarians should make up their minds while there was time. He had replied that if Bulgaria had fought against the Russians in the World War, that had happened only because Russia had betrayed Bulgaria in the Balkan War. Nevertheless, the old feeling of friendship was still alive among the people, and no government could lightly disregard it. The King asked whether it was not possible, if the Russians should intend to take some action against Turkey, to divert them toward the Caucasus. In conclusion the King said that he would be very grateful for an indication of how we viewed Bulgaria's situation, so that he might adapt his policy accordingly.

Please send telegraphic instructions as to what I can reply.¹

RICHTHOFEN

¹ See document No. 454.

No. 416

B18/B003210/1-10/2

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 4, 1939.

The Finnish Minister called on me this morning in connection with his telephone conversation of yesterday evening¹ and gave me a memorandum worded as follows:

¹ Later the same day, Woermann noted the following: "In reply to my further inquiry at noon today the Finnish Minister telephoned to me at 2:30 that the request for support of the Swedish move in Moscow had been directed solely to the German Government" (B18/B003212).

"The Finnish Government, using the good offices of the Swedish Government, has addressed the Soviet Government with the continued intention of settling the conflict peacefully and with the object of presenting new positive proposals. On this basis the Soviet Government was asked whether it was prepared to negotiate.

"The Finnish Government requests the support of the German Government in this matter."

I asked the Minister the following questions and received the following replies:

1. Whether the Finnish Government had already presented these new positive proposals in Moscow and, if so, what their content was. The Minister was not informed on this score.

2. Whether the Finnish Government had also addressed other governments in the same connection. M. Wuorimaa replied that the information concerning the step taken in Moscow through the good offices of the Swedish Government had been transmitted to all governments; he did not know, however, whether the request for support had also been made of other governments.

3. Whether the Minister knew that the Soviet Government had recognized a Finnish "People's Government" and had already concluded a treaty with it. The Minister replied that he had read about it in the newspaper; this was not a real Finnish Government, however, and he could not take any cognizance of the negotiations of this "Government".

WOERMANN

No. 417

1821/416648-49

*The State Secretary to the Legations in Finland and Sweden*¹

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 5, 1939.

No. 442 to Helsinki

Sent to Helsinki, December 5—11:45 p. m.

No. 575 to Stockholm

Sent to Stockholm, December 6—2:45 p. m.

zu Pol. VI 2679,² 2680,³ 2695.⁴

For the Minister personally.

I. On the morning of December 4 the Finnish Minister here informed us by direction of his Government of the good offices of the Swedish Minister in Moscow with the Soviet Government for the pur-

¹ A copy of this telegram (minus the second paragraph of section I, and section III) was also sent as No. 980 for information to the Embassy in Moscow (B18/B003225). The entire text was repeated as telegram No. 476 to Oslo, and as telegram No. 463 to Copenhagen (1795/408762-63) with instructions to tell the Foreign Ministers concerned that in the German view the Finns could have expected no other answer.

² Pol. VI 2679: Not printed (8484/E596811).

³ Pol. VI 2680: Not printed (1821/416646).

⁴ Pol. VI 2695: Not printed (1821/416647).

pose of settling the Finnish-Russian conflict in a peaceful way and with the aim of making new positive proposals.⁵ The Finnish Government asked for the support of the German Government in this matter. Upon inquiry the Finnish Minister added that all governments had been informed of the step taken by the Swedish representative in Moscow, but that a request for support had been made only of the German Government. With regard to the treaty of the Soviet Government with the Finnish "People's Government of Kuusinen," the Finnish Minister said he could not take any cognizance of the negotiations of this "Government."

Molotov told Count Schulenburg yesterday⁶ that the Swedish Minister had informed the Russian Government in writing that the Swedish Legation in Moscow would look after Finnish interests, and had asked orally about the possibilities for the Ryti Government to negotiate with the Soviet Government. Molotov took a negative attitude toward both démarches. The Soviet Government had recognized the Finnish People's Government and could therefore not negotiate with the government in whose name the Swedish Minister was acting. The Soviet Government took the stand that the Soviet Union was not waging a war with Finland, and the Soviet Government would also inform the League of Nations to this effect, if necessary.⁷ The Soviet Government did not believe that the hostilities would last very long, in spite of the present unfavorable weather conditions; however, the many land mines delivered by England were causing difficulties.

If the Finnish Minister here should approach us once more with regard to yesterday's request for German support, he will be told that because of the Russian rejection, the question is no longer of any importance and no other answer could have been expected from the Russian Government.

II. The Legations in Copenhagen⁸ and Oslo⁹ report that the Danish and Norwegian Foreign Ministers have sounded them out whether the German Government is willing to mediate in the Finnish-Russian conflict. The Danish Foreign Minister hinted that the Finnish Government would now be willing to negotiate as regards Hangö, too. Both Legations have been instructed by wire¹⁰ to inform the Governments there of Molotov's negative answer to the Swedish Minister, and to add that no other answer could have been expected

⁵ See document No. 416.

⁶ Schulenburg's memorandum of this conversation is not printed (B18/B003224).

⁷ See Editors' Note, p. 480.

⁸ Telegram No. 296 of Dec. 4: Not printed (8484/B596811).

⁹ Telegram No. 430 of Dec. 4: Not printed (1795/408759).

¹⁰ Not printed: (B18/B003229-30).

from the Russian Government. There is no occasion for German mediation.

III. If you should be approached by the Finns¹¹ with regard to the above questions please express yourself along the same lines.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹¹ The words "by the Finns" were deleted in the copy sent to Stockholm.

No. 418

B18/B003233

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT HELSINKI-GRANKULLA, December 5, 1939—5:15 p. m.
No. 388 of December 5 Received December 6—12:45 a. m.

[Pol. VI 2702].

The Finnish Government has the reins firmly in hand. Despite the deep impression caused by the bombings of the residential section of Helsinki, the transfer of the city's population to the country was effected in exemplary fashion. There has been no new bombardment of the capital since December 2. The meager military success of the Russian army is strengthening the conviction here that Russia is weak. The manifestations of sympathy by the entire world, excluding Germany, have given a great lift to morale.

I have no contact with the Government at the moment. Finns who have remained pro-German complain to me that Germany's policy is driving Finland into the arms of England. They believe that the abhorrence of the whole world occasioned by the Russian bombings will turn against Germany, too, and they hope that in view of Russia's weakness, which has now been revealed, Germany will turn and conquer Russia with a few motorized divisions. The situation has been aggravated by the organization of the so-called Kuusinen government, for such a government is categorically rejected by over 90 percent of the Finns.

Should the efforts at reaching an understanding be continued, nevertheless, it will be essential for Germany to step in lest we lose all influence in Finland. I want to stress once more that for the sake of the copper and molybdenum alone we have a considerable interest in a prompt reconciliation, and that, on the other hand, if the war continues the tenacity and stamina of the Finns, together with the feeble offensive power of the Russians, promise a long-drawn-out struggle. Its continuation is contrary to our interest also for the reason that if the Finns gain the upper hand our position in the

country will be lost, while if the Russians win the wealth of the country will be destroyed and there will be nothing left for us.¹

The German radio with its anti-Finnish and sometimes even absurd reports is doing a great deal to arouse the Finns against us.²

BLÜCHER

¹ Marginal notes: "Siegfried: Has Blücher received our instruction for guidance of conversation? W[eizsäcker] December 6."

"Not by telegraph but by courier, who goes via Stockholm under Swedish convey to Åbo [Turku]; ought to have arrived already, according to Herr von Grundherr. Si[egfried], December 6."

² In a telegram of Dec. 19 (B18/B003291), Blücher endorsed a complaint by Otto von Zwehl, DNB representative in Helsinki, on the "incorrect and misleading rendering of his reports by the German radio which made such difficulty for him that his position had become untenable." He was willing to continue at his post only if assured that his reports would be rendered as he wrote them. In a telegram of Dec. 21 (B18/B003292), Ribbentrop rejected this complaint and stated as follows: "I hereby express my astonishment at the position you [Blücher] have taken in regard to the reported attitude of the DNB representative. He, like any other German, has his duty to perform and since his recall is at the moment not opportune for our foreign policy, he must remain there." Ribbentrop added that the representative's duty was to report on events, not to criticize measures of the Reich Government, and that Blücher might have been expected to make this clear without referring to Berlin. Ribbentrop then directed Blücher to instruct Zwehl to act in accordance with directives on foreign policy; any future violation would lead to Zwehl's instant recall. Then on Jan. 10, Blücher wired that Zwehl, whose requests to resign he had refused, wrote that he had entered the Finnish Army as a volunteer (B18/B003343).

No. 419

103/111834

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 949

BERLIN, December 5, 1939.

Colonel General Keitel telephoned me today on the following matter: Lately there have been repeated wrangles on the boundary between Russia and the Government General, into which the Wehrmacht, too, was drawn. The expulsion of Jews into Russian territory, in particular, did not proceed as smoothly as had apparently been expected. In practice, the procedure was, for example, that at a quiet place in the woods, a thousand Jews were expelled across the Russian border; 15 kilometers away, they came back, with the Russian commander trying to force the German one to readmit the group. As it was a case involving foreign policy, the OKW was not able to issue directives to the Governor General in the matter. Captain Bürkner of the Navy will get in touch with the proper officer at the Foreign Ministry. Colonel General Keitel asked me to arrange for a favorable outcome of this interview.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 420

34/23642

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 950

BERLIN, December 5, 1939.

Colonel General Keitel called me on the telephone today to say that the Russian list of requests for deliveries of German products was growing more and more voluminous and unreasonable. The negotiations with the Russians would necessarily, therefore, become more and more difficult. The Russians, for example, wanted machine tools for the manufacture of munitions, while the OKW could not spare such machine tools in the present state of the war in any circumstances. The same was true in respect to supplies of air and naval war material.

I confirmed to Colonel General Keitel that the Foreign Ministry, too, intended to put a curb on Russian demands. We had not yet quite made up our mind how to do it, whether in Moscow or here through the Russian Ambassador. The Reich Foreign Minister, too, had yet to be informed.

In conclusion, Colonel General Keitel said that he was willing, either through General Thomas or by his own participation, to bring about a meeting, if necessary.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 421

174/136204-08

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, December 5, 1939.

The attitude taken toward us by Japan since the outbreak of the war on questions connected with economic warfare has thus far been very unsatisfactory. It has been by no means what might be expected of a friendly country, particularly in view of the fact that we have continued to lend Japan undiminished support in her action against China by maintaining our ban on deliveries of war material to China.

Our points of grievance against the Japanese attitude thus far will be evident from the enclosed memorandum. At the end of the memorandum three points are listed that seem to indicate that the Japanese Government is beginning to take a more understanding attitude toward us.

I propose that in one of the first regular conversations with the new Japanese Ambassador the Japanese attitude on these questions be

taken up with the statement that we believe we have a right to expect greater understanding in future.¹

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ A memorandum from Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to Weizsäcker on Dec. 6 (174/136203) conveyed the Foreign Minister's request that the State Secretary act on this suggestion by Wiehl. Record of action taken by Weizsäcker has not be found.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM ON JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANY IN ECONOMIC MATTERS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

1. Despite our request to unload in neutral ports, particularly in Italy, the merchandise carried for Germany by Japanese ships, the Japanese directed these ships to British ports immediately after the outbreak of the war in obedience to British instructions, or even in anticipation thereof and unloaded the German merchandise there. (Steamers *Kashima*, *Hakone*, *Fushimi*, *Hakosaki*, *Sado*, *Sakito*, *Noto Maru*.)

2. In other respects, too, Japan has since then complied submissively with the British naval warfare measures and negotiated with England regarding the smooth execution of the measures dictated by England. This is true especially with regard to the following:

a. Extension of the list of contraband goods: Japan has accepted without serious protest the extension of the list of contraband merchandise to practically everything that could reach Germany in any way. The information bulletin of the Japanese Foreign Ministry of October 11 quotes without comment the English standpoint that "in view of the difficulties of distinguishing between conditional and absolute contraband, there is no other way than to treat both alike."

b. Putting in at the British control stations at Haifa, Gibraltar, etc., and the prior submission of freight lists for the purpose of facilitating inspection.

3. Japan made no protest against the blacklists which declare firms registered in Japan in which there is a German interest to be enemy firms.

4. On the German side the order has been in effect since the beginning of the war that deliveries overseas, therefore also to Japan, must be paid for upon shipment from a neutral port (for instance, Rotterdam) and title pass to a neutral. This measure was unavoidable since goods of German ownership are in danger of seizure.

Japan is applying the same principle to us, although no danger exists for Japan that Japanese goods to neutral consignees can be

seized. Nevertheless, the Japanese standpoint in the case of shipments to European neutral ports could be understood since in this case English interference with ocean transport would not be unlikely. Japan goes further, however, and demands even in the case of deliveries to Vladivostok and Dairen, that we pay for and take over the goods in the Japanese port of export; this is not justified by necessity on the part of Japan, but is simply chicanery.

At the same time Japan is delivering to England, C. I. F. British ports, and in addition is even extending 3 months credit.

Thus Japan is treating England better than America is doing and is applying "cash and carry" terms only to us.

5. Japan is giving us no help with transactions to transfer raw materials, for instance with the purchase of tin, rubber, etc., in the Netherlands Indies. The firm of O. Wolff which had concluded such a transaction with a Japanese firm was informed by their Dairen branch that the Japanese Government had forbidden such transactions for Germany.

An inquiry by the Embassy in Tokyo revealed that though no formal prohibition existed, the Japanese Government gave numerous reasons why it considered such transactions undesirable.

6. The Japanese Government took the same attitude when we tried to obtain the release from the Japanese occupation authorities of a cargo of tungsten ore (513 tons) purchased in Canton in October 1938. At the intervention of Ambassador Oshima, release was promised us only on condition that we once more deposit 80 percent of the price (already paid) in foreign exchange. But in this case also the Japanese Foreign Ministry does not believe that shipment to Germany (which could be accomplished without difficulty with Japanese assistance) is possible.

7. Because of the neutral cargoes on German ships, all sorts of disputes arose after the outbreak of the war between the German ship-owners and the neutral consignees or addressees over emergency port costs, freight rates, unloading costs, etc. These disputes were settled amicably or juridically between the parties in all other countries.

Only in Japan did the Japanese Government interfere, make unjustified and very substantial demands and, so long as we did not comply with these demands, prevent the sailing of German ships. This suggests that the Japanese Government would like to make the ships Japanese property.

Recently the Japanese Government has seemed inclined to take a more understanding attitude, as indicated by the following:

1) The Japanese Government, despite British opposition, has declared itself ready to deliver to us, as heretofore, 50,000 tons of whale oil out of the next catches and has proposed, for its part, special pre-

cautions whereby this transaction could be concealed from the British.

2) The Japanese Government was the first of the neutrals to voice an official protest against the British measure to cut off German exports and, through the Japanese press, saw to it that this got strong publicity and that countermeasures were threatened in the event of injury to important Japanese interests. Whether it is really prepared to follow up this threat with deeds remains to be seen.

3) The Japanese Government also seems ready to alter its adverse stand on the question of raw material transfer transactions (particularly tin and rubber from the Netherlands Indies).

No. 422

8496/E597073-79

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 963 of December 6

BUCHAREST, December 6, 1939—5:40 a. m.

Received December 6—12:20 p. m.

W III b 715.

With reference to our telegram No. 962.¹

At another conference the Minister President² declared today that the Rumanian Government was willing to assume a guarantee that Germany would be able to buy 130,000 tons of petroleum a month from Rumania at reasonable terms. In reply to my repeated questions he stated explicitly that the delivery of this definite quantity would not be made dependent on any other condition, and that the Rumanian Government would take suitable measures, if necessary by appointing a commissioner, as we had proposed, in order to make sure that this quantity would be available to us. Moreover, in case of additional arms transactions beyond the present agreements, Rumania was prepared to make full payment with petroleum. Rumania considered it vitally important to complete bringing her armament up to necessary strength by March 1. He would make pertinent proposals to me within the next few days. I might add that actually there is probably scant possibility of additional transactions because it is very difficult to pay for the normal amount of Rumanian exports to Germany, even when our war material deliveries are included.

The Minister President proved quite stubborn on the question of the rate of exchange. He assured me, reiterating again and again the familiar political arguments, that Rumania wished to satisfy Germany in every respect, but thought that she could do so by some *other* means. Only after a sharp clash, during which I declared that I

¹Not printed (169/82942-43). In this telegram, Clodius reported that he had urged the Rumanian Government to protect the oil fields effectively against enemy sabotage.

²George Tatarescu, appointed Rumanian Minister President on Nov. 24, 1939.

would leave at once and that then we would dictate (group garbled) from Berlin in the same unilateral way as Rumania was now doing, did the Minister President concede that if the negotiations of the next few days should prove that other methods were impracticable he would even accept an increase in the exchange rate of the reichsmark. I stated that no compromise was possible in the matter and that we were convinced after a careful exploration of all possibilities that a relatively modest increase in the rate of exchange was the only way to prevent the German purchases in Rumania from coming to a total standstill.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

No. 423

103/111836-37

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1003

BERLIN, December 6, 1939.
e. o. Pol. VI 2714 Ang. III.

With reference to instruction Pol. VI 2651 Ang. II.¹

In amplification of the telegraphic circular of December 2¹ the following additional circular instruction was sent today to all important diplomatic missions:

Please bring out the following additional points of view in your talks about the Finnish-Russian conflict:

Only a few weeks ago Finland was about to come to an understanding with Russia, which could have been reached through a prudent conduct of Finnish policy. An appeal by the Finnish Government to the League of Nations is the least suitable means for resolving the crisis.

There can be no doubt that British influence on the Finnish Government—in part operating through the Scandinavian capitals—determined the Finnish Government to reject the Russian proposals and thus brought about the present conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be stressed especially.

Germany has no part in these events. In conversations, sympathy is to be expressed for the Russian standpoint. I request that you refrain from any expression of sympathy for the Finnish position.

End of the telegraphic instruction.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. VI 2651 Ang. II is the copy of document No. 411 sent for information to Moscow and Helsinki.

No. 424

1859/422744

The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 442 of December 7

OSLO, December 7, 1939—1:50 p. m.

Received December 7—2:45 p. m.

Pol. VI 2719.

With reference to your telegram No. 476 of December 5.¹

As instructed I conveyed to the Foreign Minister the stand of the German Government. During the conversation the Foreign Minister raised two questions which he would like to have answered:

1. Is it correct that, as indicated by reliable information received by the Norwegian Government, negotiations are in progress between Moscow and Berlin concerning the occupation of ports in northern Norway by the Soviet Union?

2. The Norwegian Government does not explicitly intend to declare neutrality in the Russo-Finnish conflict and is prepared to permit arms, ammunition, etc., to be shipped to Finland through Norwegian territory. If such shipments come from America, for instance, will the German Government stop them or permit them to pass?

NEUHAUS

¹ See document No. 417, footnote 1.

No. 425

183/86028

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 521 of December 7

BERN, December 7, 1939—11:15 p. m.

Received December 8—4:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 519 of December 6.¹

Since it was impossible because of Motta's² illness to obtain any satisfaction from the Political Department as to what steps the Federal Council might take regarding the League of Nations in order to prevent anti-German propaganda at the forthcoming session of the League of Nations Council and Assembly, I have personally and confidentially, pursuant to telegraphic instruction No. 396 of November 10,³ called the attention of ex-Federal Councilor Schulthess to the

¹ Not printed (183/86027). In this telegram, Köcher passed along a confidential Swiss report that initiative for calling a League session had come from Sweden and Norway, and that Great Britain was uneasy about it.

² Giuseppe Motta, Federal Councilor, chief of the Political Department, or Swiss Foreign Ministry.

³ Document No. 343.

danger that Switzerland would incur from such a propaganda. Of the subsequent talk between Schulthess and Motta it was learned that the latter on behalf of the Federal Council had written Secretary-General Avenol to inform him that Switzerland demanded that the discussion be exclusively confined to the Russo-Finnish conflict. To Avenol's affirmative reply Motta had answered that Switzerland reserved her freedom of action in case there should, contrary to the promise, be a discussion of Polish, Czech, or other questions to be utilized for propagandistic purposes against Germany. Please give this matter no publicity and in particular avoid in any circumstance mentioning Schulthess' name, because he is of great value to us as an intermediary.

KÖCHER

No. 426

2196/473591-98

Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker

KILO, December 7, 1939.

DEAR BARON WEIZSÄCKER: Thank you very much for your kind letter of December 2.¹ Thank you in particular for the understanding—I should almost like to say consoling—words which you find for the unpleasant position into which circumstances have forced me.

You write that now "disaster has descended upon my host country". That is only too true, and of course I have a strong personal sympathy for the people and things that I have come to know and to love. But my real concern is less for Finland than for Germany. I cannot avoid the impression that with the attack by the Russians on Finland a disaster is also descending upon Germany.

I gather from your telegraphic instruction No. 442 of December 5 that any participation in attempts at a settlement, which I suggested in my telegram No. 388 of the same day, is now out of the question.² And thus the current of events must flow on freely, without dam or dike.

For someone who has had an opportunity here to observe the resolute unanimity of this nation, which, though small, is tenacious, hardened by sports, and militarily proficient, for someone who knows the country with its swamps, lakes, cliffs, forests, and harsh climate, it is difficult to believe that the Russians will have an easy time of it. On the contrary, the war may last a long time, may bring the Russians many a defeat and must cause them severe losses.

The war will probably take the following course: The Russians, because of the inaccessibility of the Finnish coast, will forego any

¹ Not found.

² Documents Nos. 417 and 418.

landing attempt and will employ their land forces at the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga, where they will be forced to fight for every foot of ground. At the same time they will try to destroy cities, factories, railroads, and bridges by air raids on a very large scale, in order to crush the resistance of the Finnish people. Since the cities and large factories have been evacuated, the Russians will cause only property damage by this action. Within a matter of a few months this flourishing country, which in the twenty years of its independence has doubled its agricultural production and tripled its industrial production, will be transformed into a heap of rubble.

This will not mean the defeat of the people, for all elements are willing to return to the most primitive conditions and continue their fight for freedom. But for us this means that Finland is eliminated as a supplier of very important raw materials for the war—copper, molybdenum, and possibly later nickel and iron—and also animal foods, especially fish from the Arctic Ocean. Herr van Scherpenberg can tell you in detail what this means to us.

Furthermore, the only sea on which our ships have heretofore been able to carry on trade and commerce as in peace time will become a theater of operations with the danger of mines and all other restrictions.

And finally it can in no wise be predicted how far the conflagration in the North will extend now that Russia has hurled the torch of war into Finnish territory. Questions such as the ore supply from Sweden arise inevitably.

In summary I should like to say that Russia, which has nothing whatever to lose in Finland or the rest of the North, is paying for her present course out of Germany's pocket. The Russian action is costing Germany:

1. Paralysis of shipping traffic to Finland;
2. Cessation of trade with Finland;
3. Evacuation of the entire German element and squandering of the assets that the Germans have created by decades of work;
4. Danger of paralysis of all Baltic Sea commerce and of extension of the war to the rest of the North.

In closing I do not need to assure you that I am keeping strictly to the instructions given me in all conversations with third parties, but with my superiors I consider it my duty to express the thoughts which arise from the perspective of my post.

If I might ask a favor, I should appreciate your informing Herr von Grundherr of this letter.

Thank you once more for your friendly lines. I kiss the Baroness's hand; all best wishes, especially for your sons with the Armed Forces.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

BLÜCHER

No. 427

169/82949-52

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, December 8, 1939—7:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 9—12:30 a. m.

No. 975 of December 8

[Pol. II 2572 g].¹

Foreign Minister Gafencu spoke to me two days ago about Rumania's difficult situation. The threat from Soviet Russia was continuing; he knew that Germany was unwilling to check Russia, and as a result Hungary, too, had become more irritating again. Rumania could not and would not call upon England and France for help, which the Foreign Minister himself described as of little value, because of the difficulties such a step would create between Rumania and Germany. The policy of neutrality would be maintained and the trade agreement with Germany would be lived up to. Despite the unceasing British attempts to block the petroleum shipments, Rumania would loyally deliver them if Germany also continued the shipments of arms. Rumania would like to conclude a nonaggression pact with Russia, but not an assistance pact. Rumania had no information as to Russia's intentions. If Russia intended to push to the Bosphorus, this would mean Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism in the Balkans, and it was impossible that this could please Germany and Italy.

I remained entirely noncommittal with respect to these statements, in accordance with my instructions from Berlin.

Yesterday afternoon Gafencu reverted to this conversation. The occasion for this was an article by Stefanov on Bessarabia and Rumania in *Kommunistetschekii international* [*sic*], in which the economic situation of the Russian [*sic*] Republic was described in the most dismal colors and the Rumanian Communists were exhorted to prepare for Bolshevik penetration. Rumania, like the Baltic states, would have to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia. The article had been reprinted by *Izvestia*, and thereby assumed very grave importance with respect to Rumania.²

¹ From 2281/480315-17.

² In a Moscow telegram of Dec. 7, Schulenburg, reporting the publication of this article and quoting some passages from it, remarked that this was the first time that the Soviet press had discussed Russo-Rumanian relations in that manner (169/82947). A further Moscow telegram sent on Dec. 9 mentioned a press statement issued by the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the article in question in no way represented official Soviet policy (169/82960). Meanwhile, Gafencu had corrected his earlier statement made to Fabricius, saying that the article denouncing Rumania had not been reprinted by *Izvestia* and therefore did not have the same grave importance (169/82953). See also document No. 455.

Rumania was firmly resolved to fight for Bessarabia. Such a struggle would severely dislocate Rumania's whole economy, however, and if Rumania should suffer defeat as the result of the hostile attitude of Hungary and Bulgaria the outcome would be chaos, and the gates would be open to Bolshevism. On that account he wanted to ask once more for our advice because after all we were interested in the preservation of the Rumanian economic area, in view of the petroleum and grain we draw from it. Should we be unable to give military assistance to Rumania against Russia, as he unfortunately had to assume from my earlier intimations, there was still the possibility of benevolent neutrality or perhaps also of diplomatic support in Moscow. He wanted to ask us the following:

1. Whether in the event of a Russian attack we would be able to induce Hungary to remain passive;
2. Whether we would continue to furnish armament in return for petroleum;³
3. Whether we would give our assent if Italy, which did not desire Russian penetration in the Balkans, came to Rumania's aid.⁴

Gafencu said that if Berlin was unwilling to give an "official" reply, then I might perhaps be able to drop him some hint or "advice personally."

The distress in which the Rumanian Government finds itself is evident. I asked Gafencu whether the decision to answer Russia with arms in the Bessarabian question was irrevocable; (group missing) replied: Yes, because in the first place Bessarabia was inhabited mostly by Rumanians, and in the second place an advance by Russia to the Danube would be too serious a threat of the spread of Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism in the Balkans. He hinted, however, that should Russia's demands be aimed only at the northern areas of Bessarabia which were inhabited by Ukrainians, there might perhaps be a basis for an understanding, although even this would be very disagreeable for the Rumanian Government during the present conflict. Gafencu, with whom I have never discussed this question, then began to talk spontaneously about the proposal contained in my report No. 5965 of November 4:⁵ Germany could secure a lasting influence for herself in Rumania if she could induce Russia to accept such a solution of the Bessarabian problem.

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "When?"

⁴ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Italy's intention?"

⁵ Not printed (1921/431289-94). This report on the foreign and domestic problems facing Rumania actually did not mention any proposals for a Russo-Rumanian settlement; it referred, however, to several conversations between Fabricius and Gafencu in the course of which the Rumanian Foreign Minister had expressed his country's willingness to make small concessions as well as its determination to resist by force those demands which would amount to a destruction of the Rumanian State.

I then asked Gafencu once more about Lord Lloyd's⁶ activity with respect to the cession of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The Foreign Minister replied: The King had flatly told Lord Lloyd that he would not allow any British mediation in this matter. However, Gafencu added, a solution of the question might be achieved through direct negotiations with Bulgaria.

I have the distinct impression that Horthy will yield in this regard in order to (group missing) free in the struggle with Russia. Inasmuch as the Turks, reportedly at British instigation, have withdrawn their troops from the Bulgarian frontier, I would be inclined to believe that the British intervened also with reference to Dobruja, and it is my opinion that we ought to use our influence here. If we are interested in the tranquility of this economic region, it would be to our advantage if we became politically more active than heretofore and attempted, through negotiations with Rumania and her neighbors, to bring about a reasonable settlement of territorial questions, which would assure us of a continuous and regular supply of Rumanian products (group garbled). If at the same time we succeed in preventing Russia from penetrating too far into the Balkans and from advancing to the mouth of the Danube, we would exert decisive influence in the Balkans even after the war is over. It cannot be in our interest to let Italy take the lead in this matter.

FABRICIUS

⁶ A previous telegram from Bucharest sent on Nov. 20 (169/82912) had reported alleged efforts by Lord Lloyd, then in Budapest, to promote a Bulgarian-Rumanian rapprochement on the basis of Rumania's ceding southern Dobruja.

No. 428

2290/483400

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 971 of December 8

ROME, December 8, 1939—12:15 p. m.

The reference to Russia is worth noting in the statement of the Fascist Grand Council¹ which, in justification of the newly confirmed nonparticipation in the war, explicitly mentions the development of the situation from the Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains; while disinterest in this area is expressed, it is emphasized on the other hand that there is the strongest interest in the Balkans and the Danube area.

¹ On the night of Dec. 7-8, the Fascist Grand Council held its first meeting since the outbreak of war and adopted an order of the day confirming Italy's policy of "nonbelligerency." The text is published in the *Popolo d'Italia* of Dec. 9, 1939.

Particularly pleasing for us is the renewed confirmation of Axis policy and the clear statement on British blockade policy (cf. paragraph 2 of telegraphic report No. 924 of December 2),² in which the word prestige occurs for the first time.³

PLESSEN

²Document No. 410.

³This latter passage in the statement of the Fascist Grand Council read: "Italy intends to obtain security for her maritime trade in the most decisive manner, out of consideration for her prestige as well as for her absolutely vital requirements."

No. 429

1821/416656-57

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, December 7, 1939.

Sent December 8—8:20 p. m.

e.o. Pol. VI 2714 Ang. I.

With reference to our telegraphic instruction No.²

In conversations about the Russo-Finnish conflict please make use of the following additional considerations:

A few weeks ago Finland was on the point of reaching a settlement with Russia, which would have been possible had there been a wise Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations by the Finnish Government is the least suitable way of solving the crisis.

There is no doubt that English influence on the Finnish Government—operating partly through the Scandinavian capitals—induced the Finnish Government to reject the Russian proposals and thus brought about the present conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be especially emphasized.

Germany is not involved in these events. In conversations sympathy with the Russian standpoint should be expressed. Please refrain from any expression of sympathy for the Finnish position.

Supplement for Tokyo:

With reference to telegraphic report No. 731.³

The British Government, by means of propaganda, will make a determined effort in Japan to exploit the Russo-Finnish conflict to its own advantage. Please counter these attempts energetically in every respect.

(The Foreign Minister)

¹This instruction was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulates in Bergen, Geneva, Göteborg, Malmö, and Reykjavik, but to Moscow and Helsinki for information only.

²The reference is to document No. 411; the appropriate number for each addressee was to be written in before dispatch.

³Not printed (1859/422733).

No. 430

1870/357108-12

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, December 8, 1939.

FOR A REPORT TO THE FÜHRER

TRANSACTIONS WITH RUSSIA

Iron requirements for the Russian transactions

The iron requirements for the Russian transactions are estimated at approximately 70,000 tons a month. According to the previous attitude of the domestic agencies, it was to be expected that these requirements would be met. Cf. Annex I, letter of November 16 from Field Marshal Göring to the Minister of Economics. The negotiations with Russia to date were conducted on this assumption.

On December 6, I was informed by General von Hanneken that Field Marshal Göring and Minister of Economics Funk had decided that on account of the newly announced requirements of the Wehrmacht no special allocation of iron could be made for the Russian transactions. The 70,000 tons would have to be taken from the quota of 185,000 tons set aside for export. Cf. Annex 2. At the same time, however, this export quota itself was to be considerably reduced (by an amount not yet fixed) on account of the new requirements of the Wehrmacht. Of the 185,000 tons practically nothing would thus be left for our other exports (the Balkans, Scandinavia, Italy, etc.)—which is impossible in view of the essential imports from these countries e. g., petroleum, iron ore, wheat, copper, etc. This means that no iron is available for the Russian transactions.

Consequently there are the following choices:

Either to revise the Göring-Funk decision and reduce the iron allocated for the needs of others (see Annex 2);

Or to give up the Russian transactions;

Or else to try to place the entire Russian business on a basis different from that provided for in the Ribbentrop-Molotov exchange of notes of September 28,¹ that is, not on a reciprocal-transaction basis, but on that of unilateral deliveries by the Soviet Union—in other words, a sort of subsidy treaty. This would require a new political departure for the negotiations.

RITTER

¹ Document No. 162.

Marginal note: "Field Marshal Göring will try to see to it that the 70,000 tons are made available. He will let us know on Monday, December 11.² I request that Ambassador Ritter get in touch with the men of the Four-Year Plan. Furthermore, we must try to get the Russians to reduce the 70,000 tons by one-half or, better still, by two-thirds. R[IBBENTROP]"

[Enclosure 1]

*The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Minister of
Economics*

SECRET

BERLIN, November 16, 1939.

Received in Foreign Ministry November 29.

St. M. Dev. 10423/39 g

W IV 4817.

(II L 2068/39 g)

With reference to the letter of November 6, 1939—II L No. 1944/39 g—³

In view of the present situation it is obvious that the negotiations with the Russians certainly must be brought to a positive conclusion. Certain difficulties anticipated in supplying the domestic market and to some extent also the Wehrmacht if the Russian orders are filled will have to be faced as things now stand. However, I believe it is possible to mitigate these consequences considerably. In the first place, in view of the situation that has arisen for Germany as a result of the war, we must stipulate delivery dates which will be practicable for us. For another thing, we must try in every way to promote the import of Swedish ore via Narvik. As appears from the discussions with the Minister of Transport, the prospects for this are indeed good as far as transportation is concerned. All the ore that can be obtained via Narvik is to be regarded as in excess of the import program drawn up recently with respect to the raw material balances. The quantities of iron thus obtained are to be used, in the first place, for filling the Russian orders and, in the second place, for expanding the construction of freight cars. I request you to ensure that action will be taken accordingly and that none of the excess imports will be used for other purposes.

Moreover, I regard it as an especially important task for our negotiators that they should try to get the Russians to take a certain volume

² In a memorandum of Dec. 15, Ritter described a conversation of the previous day with Göring, who repeated his statement of Dec. 9 to Ribbentrop that the 70,000 tons of iron per month would be forthcoming. Ritter also protested to Göring about a letter (not found) by Eltze of Reichsgruppe Industrie which might have led to a breakdown of negotiations. "But the present negotiations with the Soviet Union must not be allowed to break down," Ritter added (1370/357199-200).

³ Not found.

of consumer goods, too, and not confine their demands exclusively to the most valuable capital goods. Perhaps this cannot yet be achieved during the present negotiations, but it ought to be brought up as soon as possible and energetically pressed in future negotiations.

GÖRING

[Enclosure 2]

Present Plan of Iron Production and Allocation per Month

Total production	1,500,000 tons
Amount allocated to the Wehrmacht	850,000 tons
Amount allocated to the Four Year Plan, rail-roads, domestic economy, exports	650,000 tons
Amount allocated for exports	185,000 tons

No. 431

2810/548597-800

The Consul General at New York to the Foreign Ministry

NEW YORK, December 8, 1939.

Received January 3, 1940.

Pol. IX 26.

Subject: Conviction of Bund Leader Fritz Kuhn of the German-American Bund.

At the end of last May the local press reported with big headlines the arrest of Bund Leader Fritz Kuhn of the German-American Bund on charges of grand larceny and fraud. Kuhn was accused by the authorities of having embezzled and used for his own purposes funds totaling approximately \$14,500, from the German-American Bund as well as the German-American Siedlungsbund, an affiliate of that organization. A few hours after his arrest Kuhn succeeded in regaining his liberty by posting bail for \$5,000. Early last October he had to increase his bail to \$50,000 upon order of the court, because he had come under the suspicion in the meantime of intending to evade the impending trial by flight across the border. The trial, which lasted approximately 3 weeks, started in the middle of October and was reported at length by the entire local press, in some instances under sensational headlines. The jury having found him guilty a few days ago, the judge has now sentenced Kuhn to a prison term of from 2½ to 5 years for embezzlement and forgery. The condemned defendant has meanwhile been transferred to the well-known state prison of Sing Sing, where he has been housed for his own safety in a separate wing, segregated from the other prisoners.

In general the following must be said regarding the trial and the sentence of Bund Leader Kuhn:

While it was ascertained that some of the charges which the prosecution made against Kuhn broke down and the sum allegedly embezzled was only a fraction of the \$14,500 named at the outset, the various phases of the trial nevertheless did bring out some highly unsavory facts. A not unimportant part was played here particularly by some silly, high-flown love letters which Kuhn, a married man and the father of two children, wrote to an American woman, Mrs. Camp—who, moreover, figured in the trial as a witness testifying against him. The noisy performance of his defense counsel, who endeavored to excuse the contested expenditures of the Bund Leader by invoking the Führer principle observed in the German-American Bund, was likewise little adapted toward exonerating Kuhn in the public eye, not to speak of the highly deplorable effect on the distorted picture of German conditions which prevail here.

There can hardly be any doubt that Kuhn is now considered politically finished not only by the American public but also by all thinking Germans of national sentiment here. To be sure, the organ of the German-American Bund, the *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, tried in its last issue to picture him as a victim of American justice, headlining its article in poor taste with "Kuhn a prisoner of war";¹ but actually this will convince hardly anyone. The fact that, by German standards, the trial throws a strange light on American legal procedure is another matter. However that may be, not only German circles in general but also many confirmed Bund members are deeply upset by the turn of events and tax Kuhn—and justly so—at least with having acted in an extremely frivolous and undignified manner. To what extent the existence of the German-American Bund is affected by these occurrences cannot be estimated at the moment. According to inquiries and observations a portion of the Bund membership has resigned in disgust. An additional factor is that the other leading patriotic organizations of Germans in America, which had in any case been annoyed with the methods of the German-American Bund for some time, will now feel less inclined than ever to cooperate with an organization which was headed for several years by a man now serving time in prison for embezzlement and forgery.

Fortunately, neither the trial proceedings nor their treatment in the newspapers implicated the official German agencies here, either directly or indirectly. For years the Consulate General has been maintaining a pointed reserve vis-à-vis the German-American Bund after Kuhn, who would not take any advice, made one gross tactical

¹ In English in the original.

blunder after another to the detriment of German interests. In reporting to the Foreign Ministry and to the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP we stressed repeatedly that it was absolutely essential to have a clean separation between Reich-German citizens and the German-American Bund, and, further, between the official German agencies and that organization. Quite apart from the political aspect, this attitude has again been proved very sound during Kuhn's trial. It goes without saying that we shall carefully adhere to this policy in the future, too. The less official German agencies concern themselves with the activity of the Bund, the better will the cause of the German Reich be served in the USA. It has been observed that officers of the Bund insistently point to their supposedly very friendly relations with German authorities. The names of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the Auslands-Institut in Stuttgart are particularly mentioned in this connection. I would suggest that the offices concerned be reminded that given the whole development it is by no means in Germany's interest if such relations continue to be cultivated and maintained today with the German-American Bund, even on a purely personal basis.²

I am enclosing several newspaper clippings³ about the trial.

The Embassy in Washington is receiving a copy of this report.

BORCHERS

² Copies of this report were forwarded without comment to the above agencies and to other party and government departments on Jan. 8, 1940 (8130/E582037).

³ Not found.

No. 432

103/111850

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow [December 9, 1939].

No. 903 of December 9

Received [December] 9—9:15 p. m.

Molotov asked me to call on him this afternoon and told me with visible agitation that during the last few days Italy had delivered about 50 pursuit planes to Finland, and that Germany had permitted the transit of these planes. Molotov declared that Italy's conduct was "provocative" and "outrageous" and that the Soviet Government would demand an explanation by Italy on this account. Germany's complicity, however, was completely incomprehensible to the Soviet Government. When I replied that this report could not possibly be true and could only be aimed at disturbing German-Soviet relations, Molotov answered that the entire foreign press was filled with these

reports and that the Soviet Government had proof of their correctness.¹

I repeatedly declared that I still did not believe the report and would immediately take steps to obtain clarification. Please send telegraphic instructions.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: “?”

No. 433

103/111857

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 905 of December 9

Moscow, December 9, 1939—9:40 p. m.

Received December 10—2:00 a. m.

Only for the State Secretary personally.

For the High Command of the Navy and the Wehrmacht.

The Soviet Naval Committee [*Sowjet-Marineausschuss*] informs us in strict confidence that a submarine blockade against Finland is planned in the Gulf of Bothnia. The Chief of the Naval Staff inquires whether German steamers on the regular route to northern Sweden could take fuel and food for secret delivery at sea to Soviet submarines there. The quantities delivered would be returned in kind wherever we wished, for example, in any Soviet port where our naval forces had similar needs. The Russians will communicate the details of their wishes, the place of contact, etc., as soon as Germany has indicated her agreement in principle. The Russians ask for utmost speed, since they are planning on the first deliveries at sea in just three or four days. I strongly recommend taking into consideration compliance with the Russian request because, first, such assistance would have little effect on the Finnish position and be of minor consequence for the outcome of the conflict; second, because return deliveries, for example in the Far East, would offer great possibilities for naval operations; and third, because the German Naval authorities on the strength of such assistance can make demands on the Soviet Navy in the future. 448 G Kdos.

BAUMBACH

SCHULENBURG

No. 434

1859/422745

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 9, 1939—10:20 p. m.

No. 497

zu Pol. VI 2719 Ang. I.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 442.¹

Please convey the following to the Foreign Minister in reply to his questions:

Re 1: The inquiry has astonished us to the utmost and appears utterly incomprehensible. We fail to understand how the Norwegian Government could take seriously any such information as it allegedly received. We can characterize such allegations only as malicious slander; we would be interested to know the source.

Re 2: The German Government is not involved in the Russo-Finnish conflict. Its naval measures, in conformity with the accepted principles of international law, result exclusively from the state of war existing between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other.

(Reich Foreign Minister)

¹ Document No. 424.

No. 435

103/111852

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 10, 1939.

No. 1039

With reference to your telegram No. 903.¹

DNB released the following report today:

Certain Swedish newspapers are publishing sensational reports of German war material deliveries to Finland; in addition, the assertion is made that a foreign power recently supplied Finland with planes and that Germany permitted and expedited their transit.

This report is sheer invention and aimed solely at disturbing German-Russian relations. We have learned from an informed source that since the beginning of the conflict between Soviet Russia and Finland no war material of any kind has been shipped to Finland either by or through Germany.

End of DNB report.

Please bring this to Molotov's notice and take definite steps to counter the suspicion and mistrust of the Russian Government. It is true

¹ Document No. 432.

that we have received requests for transit of war material from third countries since the outbreak of hostilities, but we have strictly rejected them.

I further request that you see to it that in the future Tass refrains from casting such unfounded suspicion upon Germany and gets in touch with the German Embassy as a matter of routine when such reports come up.²

RIBBENTROP

² On Dec. 11, Schulenburg wired as follows: "With the same prominence that the Soviet press gave yesterday to the Swedish news report, it has published today the Transocean agency text of the démenti regarding alleged German arms deliveries to Finland and alleged transit of Italian airplanes for Finland." (103/111866)

No. 436

314/190778-81

*Memorandum of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop*¹

BERLIN, December 10, 1939.

1. Reichsleiter Dr. Ley transmitted to the Foreign Minister about the beginning of September 1939 a letter of his liaison man to the Italian Confederations in Rome, Dr. Rust, in which the latter reported a conversation with the present State Secretary in the Italian Ministry of Corporations, Cianetti.² According to Dr. Rust, State Secretary Cianetti had made very unfriendly remarks about Germany in this conversation. He has asserted that the military clauses of the German-Italian treaty of alliance were to have become effective only in the year 1941 and that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had deceived the Italian Government by deliberately concealing the seriousness of the actual situation.

2. The Foreign Minister refuted point by point the false assertions of Cianetti in a letter to Dr. Ley from the Führer's headquarters,³ and requested Dr. Ley to meet with State Secretary Cianetti as soon as possible in order to correct his statements.

3. On instructions of Reichsleiter Dr. Ley, Dr. Rust tried for weeks to arrange a meeting between Dr. Ley and Cianetti, but the latter continually evaded this and finally declared that the things that he had implied earlier had been superseded by the agreements made later between the Führer and the Duce.

4. Since the Foreign Minister, however, felt obliged to insist upon straightening out once and for all the misunderstandings which had obviously arisen, he instructed Ambassador von Mackensen to arrange the Dr. Ley-Cianetti conversation as soon as possible. This was ac-

¹ The memorandum is unsigned but comes from a file of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

² See the enclosure to document No. 24.

³ Document No. 68.

completed within a very short time. Ambassador von Mackensen reported by telegram⁴ that State Secretary Cianetti would be available on December 9 and thereafter transmitted the official invitation.

5. It was the Foreign Minister's view that Dr. Ley should utilize his stay in Italy to make brief visits to the Duce and Count Ciano. After the Führer's approval had been obtained, the Foreign Minister had a conversation with Reichsleiter Dr. Ley the week before the latter's departure in which the Foreign Minister gave Dr. Ley information for his trip and in particular for the talks with State Secretary Cianetti. He requested Dr. Ley to give clear expression in his talks in Italy to Germany's absolute confidence in victory. Germany would not lay down her arms, he said, until France and England had received crushing blows and begged for peace. He further requested Dr. Ley in his visits with the Duce and Count Ciano to avoid foreign policy discussion as much as possible and in particular not to go into the Russian question. The friendship with Russia was firm, he said, and had already proved itself. With respect to relations with Italy, the Foreign Minister declared that the Führer, and therefore Germany, had a firm confidence in the Duce. Dr. Ley was to give particular expression to this. Dr. Ley had indeed plenty of material to discuss in connection with questions in his own field of work. The Foreign Minister would be glad to see the mutual exchange of tourists and workers renewed to a certain extent. Moreover, the Foreign Minister had already directed that the cultural relations between Germany and Italy should be continued and rendered more active. On leaving, Dr. Ley promised the Foreign Minister to make an immediate report after his return from Italy.

6. As Dr. Ley told the section head in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Party Comrade Wüster, who accompanied Dr. Ley to Italy on the Foreign Minister's instructions, he had received instructions from the Führer before his departure for Rome. The scope and content of these instructions were not conveyed to the Foreign Minister by Dr. Ley before his departure.

7. Reichsleiter Dr. Ley returned from Rome on Saturday, December 9, and did not inform the Foreign Minister of the content of his talks with the Duce, Count Ciano, State Secretary Cianetti, and other personalities.⁵ Only from a memorandum which Count Ciano

⁴ Not printed (8332/E589835).

⁵ A memorandum of Dec. 12 (314/190771-73) by Büttner, the Foreign Ministry liaison man to Ley, states that he met Ley on his arrival at the railroad station, but was unable then or in later contacts with Ley's staff to arrange a meeting between Ley and Ribbentrop.

gave Reichsleiter Dr. Ley,⁶ the content of which was known to Party Comrade Wüster because he participated in its translation, and from the oral reports of Party Comrade Wüster, did the Foreign Minister learn that Reichsleiter Dr. Ley in his talks with the Duce, Count Ciano, and State Secretary Cianetti did not abide by the directives given him by the Foreign Minister. Rather he had made the most detailed statements concerning German foreign policy and the military aims of Germany, in particular to the Duce and Count Ciano. It is set down in the memorandum that Reichsleiter Dr. Ley informed Count Ciano of Germany's intentions with respect to the situation to be established in the east and concerning military intentions in the west. Accordingly, Italy is informed in detail of Germany's plans.

8. According to Party Comrade Wüster, the Duce complained to Reichsleiter Dr. Ley that his Government was not sufficiently informed either in Rome or in Berlin, and in particular he felt obliged to complain that Ambassador Attolico had received and was receiving only inadequate information from the Foreign Minister. Dr. Ley was the first, he said, who had brought the Duce a clear picture of Germany's intentions.⁷

⁶ Not printed (314/190774-77). This document, marked "Translation," is a point by point summary of Ciano's memorandum of his conversation with Ley which is published in *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 321-327. For the Italian version see *Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 484-493.

⁷ On Dec. 13, Weizsäcker wrote to Mackensen to inquire what he knew about Ley's visit in Rome (472/228663). Weizsäcker said that he had not been able to learn any details, although Ley had written a long memorandum which he had handed to the Führer personally. Mackensen replied on Dec. 22 (472/228664-65) that his only additional information concerned Ley's statements to Minister of Corporations Ricci and some others to whom he had spoken mainly of German confidence in victory and intention to destroy the British Empire. Ricci had found Ley's statements on the subject of Russia particularly reassuring.

No. 437

103/111858

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, December 10, 1939.

Drafting officers: Counselor Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch; Secretary of Legation Federer.

With reference to telegram No. 905 of December 9 from Moscow,¹ Admiral Fricke informed us at 1:00 p. m., by direction of Grand Admiral Raeder, that the Grand Admiral requests that the Russian inquiry as to whether German steamers on the route to Northern

¹ Document No. 433.

Sweden could supply the Soviet Russian submarines with fuel and food should in principle receive an affirmative reply.

Shortly thereafter Admiral Fricke reported that the Führer had given his approval and that the Navy would therefore send appropriate instruction to Moscow through the Foreign Ministry.²

FEDERER

² In a telegram of Dec. 10 to the Embassy in Moscow (B18/B003257), Weizsäcker stated that the proposal had been approved in principle and that one or more small ships could probably be made available within a few days instead of the Luleå steamer which was unsuitable. He asked for details as to the fuel and food desired and the size of oil intake couplings on Soviet submarines.

No. 438

F18/041-043

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

BERLIN, December 11, 1939.

RAM No. 60.

I. I asked the Russian Ambassador to see me today at 5 p. m.

At the beginning of our conversation, I indicated to M. Shkvartsev the inappropriateness of the report given out by the Tass agency yesterday, dealing with alleged armament supplies by Germany to Finland. I stressed the fact that this report had been denied yesterday by German sources. All the more did I regret that this report, apparently launched from English sources via Sweden and only designed to create discord between Germany and the Soviet Union, has been taken up in so striking a fashion by the official Russian agency.

On the armaments business with Finland I made the following statement¹ to him:

1) Before the commencement of hostilities last summer Germany had contracted with Finland for the supply of certain antiaircraft guns in exchange for nickel shipments from Finland. After the hostilities began, further shipments ceased.²

2) The Italian Government had inquired in October whether Germany was willing to permit the transit of fifty aircraft to Finland.

¹ On another copy (F18/395-393) the word "proposals" is used instead of "statement."

² In a memorandum of Dec. 11, Weizsäcker noted that on the previous day Kapitän zur See Bürkner of OKW, after consulting Generals Thomas and Jeschonek, told him the following: "In the past four weeks, i. e., prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish hostilities, only two shipments, each consisting of twenty to thirty 20 mm. antiaircraft guns, had gone to Finland from Germany. There had been no further shipment of war material to Finland from Germany during that period.

"There has been no transit of foreign aircraft to Finland through or over Germany before or since the outbreak of hostilities." (103/111867)

At that time the threat of military measures between Russia and Finland could not yet be foreseen. Therefore, the German Government had, to be sure, refused transit by air, but raised no objection to transit by rail. The Italian Government, however, did not refer to this matter again, and neither the Italians nor the Finns made requests for a transit permit for the planes.

3) Some time ago an application was made to ship certain war materials for Finland from Belgium through Germany. This application, too, had been rejected.

I now ask the Russian Ambassador to inform his Government of the foregoing and to point out that with publications such as the Tass report mentioned, only England's game is being played. England stands behind Finland and according to intelligence available to me, England is also responsible for the failure of the Russo-Finnish negotiations last November. I should be grateful if the Russian Government would cause the Tass agency, before releasing such reports in the future, first to get in touch either with the German Embassy in Moscow or with Berlin, in order that such unpleasant incidents might be avoided.

The Russian Ambassador showed appreciation of my viewpoint and promised to report to his Government accordingly.

II. I then spoke to the Russian Ambassador about the extensive demands for military supplies put forward by the Russian trade delegation. I wanted to say beforehand that I had given instructions to comply with the Russian requests in any conceivable way, within the limits of possibility. But it should not be forgotten that Germany is at war and that certain things are simply not possible. As I had since been told, a new basis had been found in the meantime, upon which the further negotiations can soon be concluded in Moscow, between the Russian delegation which has just returned there and our negotiators.³ I asked the Russian Ambassador, however, to point out in Moscow that from the German side everything humanly possible has been done and that beyond that one could not go.

The Russian Ambassador promised to report to Moscow in this sense and stressed the point that from the Russian side any military information obtained here by the Russian delegation would, of course, be kept secret.

I told the Russian Ambassador that we had complete confidence in the Russian promises, but it should be understood by the Russians that there was certain material that we could not supply during the war.

R[IBBENTROP]

³ See document No. 442. According to a Foreign Ministry statement to DNB, the Soviet delegation actually left Berlin on the evening of Dec. 13 (1370/357202).

No. 439

2181/466570-71

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, December 11, 1939—6:15 p. m.

No. 991 of December 11

With reference to your No. 1014 of December 10.¹

During the economic negotiations here early in October Giannini asked Clodius for German consent to the transit of Italian planes to Finland. After inquiry by telephone [to Berlin] Clodius replied as instructed that there was no German objection in principle to transit by rail and that the necessary transit authorizations were to be fetched, according to circumstances, by the shipper, carrier, or receiver, supported by the proper foreign diplomatic Mission in Berlin, from the proper offices.

Consorzio Italiano Esportazioni Aeronautiche informed this Embassy that at the end of November or beginning of December two fighter planes with parachutes in cars 685369 and 685321, two planes in cars 685386 and 685197, five tons castor oil in car 166492, airplane ammunition (calibre 12.7) in cars 1011057, 100533, and 163117, and airplane matériel in cars 685158, 685141, 685323, and 685373 were loaded for shipment to Germany with destination Finland via Sweden.²

MACKENSEN

¹Not printed (2181/466568-69). In this telegram, Wiehl quoted the telegram from the Moscow Embassy printed as document No. 432 and added: "Please ascertain when, by what means, and how many Italian planes have been sent to Finland. Immediate telegraphic report requested."

²On Dec. 15, Woermann recorded that Magistrati had told him that the Italian Government had ordered the return to Italy of ten cars with planes for Finland then at Sassnitz, the southern terminus of the German-Swedish railway ferry (1571/380247).

No. 440

103/111872

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 923 of December 11

Moscow, December 11, 1939—9:31 p. m.

Received December 12—2:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1039 of December 10.¹

I carried out the instruction with Molotov today and expressed our astonishment that the canard was published by Tass before we had an opportunity to expose its falsity.

¹Document No. 435.

Molotov replied that his information had been based not only on newspaper reports. Moreover, the numerous foreign press reports of arms deliveries to Finland via Germany had gone undenied by Germany for several days. He noted with satisfaction my disapproval today and now considered the matter cleared up.

SCHULENBURG

No. 441

22/13744

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 463 of December 11

OSLO, December 11, 1939—11:31 p. m.

Received December 11—3:40 p. m.¹

For Minister Altenburg.

State Councilor [*Staatsrat*] Quisling, the former Minister of War and present leader of the Nasjonal Samling, which has lost much of its importance, left for Berlin last night in the company of Dr. Noack,² and will pay a call there. Quisling wishes to establish contact with leading German authorities to discuss certain plans relating to Russia. Quisling's visit has been prepared by Noack. The Legation was called upon in this matter only with regard to passport technicalities. Shortly before his departure, Noack apprised me of Quisling's ideas, which are ambiguous and based on his personal knowledge of Russia;³ they need not be taken seriously, however, and are completely contrary to our policy. I have the impression that Noack has already gone very far in the positive consideration of Quisling's idea. Inasmuch as Noack continually stresses his connections with leading German elements, his talk might possibly have an adverse effect on the policy we pursue (group garbled). I would suggest that Noack be reminded of the limitations of his authority and enjoined to observe the necessary reserve.⁴

BRÄUER⁵

¹The timing appears to be in error. Quisling was in Berlin on Dec. 11. See document No. 443, footnote 2.

²See document No. 242, footnote 8.

³Noack had written extensive reports on Dec. 8 and 10 concerning conversations with Quisling (2973/579490-93, 579496-99). Excerpts from these reports are published in his book *Norwegen zwischen Friedensvermittlung und Fremdherrschaft*, pp. 33-37.

⁴See document No. 452.

⁵Curt Bräuer, formerly Counselor of Embassy in France, was designated Chargé d'Affaires in Norway Sept. 28, and took up his post somewhat later. After the death of Heinrich Sahn, Minister to Norway since 1936, Bräuer was appointed Minister. He presented his credentials on Nov. 18.

No. 442

1370/357205-10

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 11, 1939.

No. 1045

Sent [in two parts] December 12—4:00 a. m.

11:00 a. m.

e. o. W IV 5043.

For the Ambassador.

You are requested to bring the following to the attention of Mikoyan or Molotov or both, according to your own discretion, in a very friendly but quite serious manner:

I. After weeks of inspection trips the Soviet Commission here finally submitted a list of *military* orders a few days ago. The list has caused very great astonishment here. According to rough estimates it runs to more than a billion reichsmarks. It contains all of the very latest matériel that has been introduced in the Wehrmacht or is in the process of development. In addition, the Soviet Commission maintains in full the list of industrial orders previously submitted,¹ which amounts to about 300 million reichsmarks, and demands prompt delivery of both lists if possible before the end of 1940. It intends, moreover, to order some large industrial installations which would also run into several hundred million reichsmarks. The result is that the orders of the Soviet Commission here amount to a total of about one and a half billion.

II. We referred the Soviet Commission very emphatically to the point of departure and the treaty basis of the negotiations in Moscow and here, namely the Ribbentrop-Molotov letter of September 28 and the Credit Treaty of August 19, 1939.² The order lists submitted were inconsistent with these documents. The first document specifically set forth as the basic assumption of the agreement that the Soviet Union would make deliveries to Germany and that Germany would then compensate Russia for these deliveries, but only with *industrial* deliveries spread over a more extended period of time. So far Mikoyan has promised us deliveries only in the amount of 420 million reichsmarks, of which 90 million reichsmarks come under the first annual installment of the Credit Treaty. It would be turning the treaty basis virtually upside down if the Soviet Commission here

¹ See document No. 407.

² See vol. VII, document No. 131.

now demanded that we pledge German deliveries in the aforesaid amount. Germany's deliveries must obviously depend on the deliveries of the Soviet Union to Germany for which compensation is due.

In addition to this over-all disparity the disproportion in regard to the military orders was still more glaring. The first document made no mention of military orders at all, but clearly only of industrial orders. In the second document, Germany promised military orders only in the amount of 58 million reichsmarks. During the Moscow negotiations, to be sure, a German offer had at first been under consideration for additional military deliveries over and above these 58 million reichsmarks, specifically in partial compensation for raw materials wanted by us, such as tin, copper, rubber, etc., which the Soviet Union would procure in third countries. But this proposal had been rejected by Mikoyan. This special offer had thereby been nullified and eliminated from consideration. Thus there remained only our offer and commitment to fill military orders for 58 million reichsmarks. Although we were prepared in practice to go a long way toward meeting further wishes of the Soviet Union with regard to military orders, it was necessary when judging whether our promises were "satisfactory," as Mikoyan understood that term, to take the treaty basis of the negotiations as the point of departure. In this connection we repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Commission here acted in opposition to the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, which was fully approved by Stalin and signed in his presence. To this, People's Commissar Tevossyan replied that the two aforesaid documents were of course law for every Soviet citizen and that he was strictly adhering to them. Nevertheless, he insisted that we give pledges for the total amount of the military and industrial lists, and with short delivery terms at that.

III. While maintaining our fundamental position, we did give a qualified promise with respect to military orders in the amount of about 660 million reichsmarks, on three conditions: first, that German deliveries would be made only in the amount of the Soviet deliveries; second, that the question of iron first had to be solved in a manner satisfactory to us; and, third, that the nonferrous and hardening metals would be delivered in time to be on hand in Germany before manufacturing was started. Under these three conditions deliveries for 660 million reichsmarks could be made partly at once, and in the main during 1940 and running into the first quarter of 1941. Thus we made commitments for the short-term delivery of orders eleven times larger than the 58 million reichsmarks provided by the treaty.

In addition, with only a few exceptions we also promised in principle to supply the remainder of the military orders, providing, however, that setting the terms of delivery should be reserved for later. Still Tevossyan said that our promises were unsatisfactory.

IV. Thus a very muddled situation has arisen here, which is wholly in contradiction to the two aforesaid documents. It is hopeless to clear up this contradiction with the Soviet Commission here. Obviously the Soviet representatives here are not sufficiently informed about the background of the two documents and about the Moscow negotiations with Mikoyan. We have therefore proposed to M. Tevossyan that the further negotiations be transferred back to Moscow. Apparently he, too, realizes the futility of further negotiations here and is prepared to transfer the negotiations back to Moscow. We therefore propose that after clarification of a few remaining technical points, the negotiations be transferred to Moscow toward the end of this week.

V. I recommend that you emphasize there, too, that the negotiations here deviate totally from the basis agreed upon with M. Stalin. I recommend that in your conversation you also drop a plain remark to the effect that the whole conduct of the Soviet Commission, and especially its stubborn insistence on seeing things which either do not exist or for certain reasons cannot be shown, have required the greatest patience and self-control on the part of the German generals, admirals, and other high officers concerned. Our officers placed themselves at the disposal of the Soviet Commission in a really unprecedented manner. Very often the conduct of the Soviet experts reminded us of the behavior of the Inter-Allied Disarmament Control Commission during the post-war years. We believe that such a critical remark will at the same time be a favor to the members of the Soviet Commission, because it will show Moscow with what zeal and utter unrestraint they devoted themselves to their tasks here.

VI. After so much time has been lost through the Soviet Commission's method of procedure, we positively anticipate that the signing of the agreement can still take place before Christmas.

Please send telegraphic report.³

BITTER

³ Not found.

No. 443

Nuremberg document No. 064-C
Exhibit GB-86

*Report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Führer,
December 12, 1939, at Noon*¹

Also present: Colonel General Keitel,
Major General Jodl,
Lieutenant Commander v. Puttkammer.

Subject: The Norwegian Affair.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy received MM. Q[uisling] and H[agelin].² Q., former Minister of War and leader of the National Party, made a reliable impression. He reported the following: Public opinion in Norway is very hostile to Germany, as a result of the conflict between Russia and Finland even more so than formerly. England's influence is very great, above all through the President of the Storting, Hambro (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha), who is at present all-powerful in Norway. Q. is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway about a possible future [eventuell] occupation of Norway. There is a very real danger that Norway may be occupied by Britain, possibly soon. Sweden would then also turn against Germany. The Storting, and with it the Government of Norway, will no longer be legal from January 11, 1940, since it decided to extend itself for a year, contrary to the constitution. This would provide an opportunity for a political revolution. Q. has good connections with officers in the Norwegian Army and has followers in important places (e. g., railways). Should the occasion arise, Q. is prepared to take over the government and to ask Germany for aid. In addition, Q. is ready to discuss preparations of a military nature with the German Wehrmacht.

The C.-in-C., Navy, points out that it is impossible to know with such offers how much the people concerned wish to further their own party schemes and how important German interests are to them. Caution is therefore advisable. It must be made impossible for Norway to fall into British hands, as this could be decisive for the out-

¹ The German text of this document is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 271-273.

² A record of Raeder's conversation of Dec. 11 with Quisling and Hagelin is printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, pp. 65-66.

come of the war; Sweden would then be entirely under British influence and the war would be carried into the Baltic Sea, thereby completely disrupting German naval warfare in the Atlantic and in the North Sea.

The Führer also regards the occupation of Norway by Britain as unacceptable. The C-in-C., Navy, points out that German occupation of Norwegian coastal bases would naturally occasion strong British countermeasures for the purpose of interrupting the transport of ore from Narvik. Severe surface warfare off the Norwegian coast would be the result, and the German Navy is not yet prepared to cope with this for any length of time. In the event of occupation, this is a weak spot.

The Führer considers whether he should speak to Q. personally, in order to form an impression of him; he would like to hear Reichsleiter Rosenberg's opinion first, as the latter has known Q. for some time.³

The C-in-C., Navy, suggests that if the Führer is favorably impressed, the OKW be permitted to make plans with Q. for preparing and executing the occupation either: (a) by friendly methods, i. e., the German Wehrmacht is called upon by Norway; or (b) by force.⁴

2. The C-in-C., Navy, recommends keeping a clear policy with regard to the Russo-Finnish conflict. No armament is to be sent in support of Finland (via unreliable Sweden). The Chief of Staff, OKW, declares that the Foreign Ministry has been informed that arms would be delivered to Sweden only if the Swedish Government guarantees in writing that they are to be used solely by the Swedish Army. On the other hand, the C-in-C., Navy, recommends accommodating Russia, for example in the matter of oil supply for submarines, as

³ Rosenberg wrote to Raeder on Dec. 13, indicating that he thought it would be a good idea for Hitler to see Quisling. He enclosed a memorandum about Quisling and his plans. This memorandum is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 065-C, exhibit GB-85, pp. 273-275. Rosenberg's letter is printed in F. Palmström and R. N. Torgersen, *Preliminary Report on Germany's Crimes Against Norway* (Oslo, 1945), pp. 35-36.

⁴ Marginal note in handwriting at (b): "The Führer agrees." In the Jodl diary introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1811-PS, but not included in the published collection, there is an entry for Dec. 13 stating that on that date Hitler received Quisling and later on the same day ordered "that investigations on how to seize N[orway] should be conducted by a very restricted staff group." Excerpts from the Jodl and Halder diaries on Denmark and Norway have been arranged chronologically and printed in Walther Hubatsch, *Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen, 1940* (Göttingen, 1952), pp. 379-403. Minutes of Hitler's two conversations with Quisling—the second was on Dec. 18—have not been found. Cf. Rosenberg's retrospective account of June 15, 1940, published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxv, document No. 004-PS, exhibit GB-140, pp. 26-34, and Raeder's account of Jan. 30, 1944, *ibid.*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 066-C, exhibit GB-81, pp. 276-282. Incorrect dates for the first Hitler-Quisling conversation are given in the Rosenberg and Raeder accounts.

Russia also offers us practical advantages, e. g., holding foreign ships in Murmansk for 3 days after the departure of the *Bremen*.

The Führer agrees on both points.

RAEDER

Countersigned: ASSMANN

No. 444

2131/466577

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1023 of December 12 BERLIN, December 12, 1939—10:00 p. m.
Received December 13—3:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 991 of December 12 [11].¹

Please inform the Government there as a precautionary measure that the consent we originally gave to the transit of Italian war material to Finland has been nullified by the outbreak of the war between Finland and Russia. Permission for such transit shipments can no longer be granted by Germany.

For your information:

We have not yet been able to determine whether the material mentioned in your telegraphic report¹ had already crossed the frontier into Germany. Transit applications for the shipments in question have not been made as yet.

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 489.

No. 445

127/69620

Under State Secretary Habicht to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT BERLIN, December 12, 1939—10:26 p. m.
No. 1049 of December 12 Received December 12—5:40 a. m. [sic].

For the Chief of Mission personally.

Dr. Kleist has been charged with making preparations in Moscow for the Dr. Schäfer and Sittiq Khan business and for this purpose to establish contacts with the Embassy and the appropriate Russian authorities. Please support Dr. Kleist in his plans in every way, and in particular arrange for contacts with the appropriate Russian authorities.

HABICHT

No. 446

319/192867-68

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, December 12, 1939.

Subject: Deliveries of arms to Sweden.

During the last few days the Swedish Government has been trying very hard to get large quantities of arms delivered as soon as possible. It has approached the Rheinmetall Borsig firm with regard to delivery of antiaircraft and antitank guns and 105 mm. field howitzers together with ammunition for them, if possible within 3 months. Furthermore, the Swedish Military Attaché, accompanied by several officers who came here especially for the purpose, called on the Defense Economy Staff [*Wehrwirtschaftsstab*] and asked that the following matériel (around 100 million RM in value) be relinquished, if possible at once, from Army stocks:

- 32 antitank guns
- 54 field howitzers
- 350 20 mm. antiaircraft guns
- 18 37 mm. antiaircraft guns
- 30 20 mm. antitank rifles
- 500 submachine guns
- 10,000 hand grenades
- 100 armored cars

According to information from the Defense Economy Staff, the Führer, after a preliminary report by General Keitel, agreed to arms deliveries to Sweden in so far as we do not deprive ourselves thereby. An investigation of what could be released is under way. Probably only part of the requested arms can be delivered, at most about 60 million RM in value.¹ At the moment the Swedish military delegation is on an inspection trip which will be completed on Friday, December 15. By that time the basic approval of the Foreign Ministry is desirable.

Arms deliveries to Sweden have been undertaken regularly in the past. From April to October, for example, 12 Heinkel planes valued at 3,800,000 RM were delivered, and contracts have been concluded regarding 12 Heinkel planes and 12 Focke-Wulf planes which are supposed to be delivered from December 1939 to March 1940.

I suggest that consent be given on condition that the Swedes promise us equivalents in valuable raw materials which we particularly need at the present time, especially copper, nickel, tool steel, etc.; moreover, these deliveries should be supplementary to the quantities of these raw materials which Sweden normally delivers to us.

¹ In an agreement of Jan. 27, 1940 (319/192834-37), the Swedish and German Governments arranged for Sweden to receive armament and munitions worth about 25,000,000 RM in exchange for gold and raw materials.

Considering the arms deliveries which, according to press reports, Sweden has recently made to Finland, it is important that the Swedes have on their own initiative proposed a clause in the contract in which they obligate themselves not to sell to third parties the arms which they obtain from Germany.

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

No. 447

6783/E513635

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, December 12, 1939.

W 3141 g.

DELIVERIES OF ARMS TO HOLLAND

At the economic negotiations with a Dutch delegation starting here tomorrow, it is intended to put pressure on the Dutch by the announcement that we will no longer supply them with commodities of importance to them so long as they cannot supply us with commodities that are especially important to us, e. g., rubber and tin from the Netherlands Indies. Accordingly, they are to be told that we are not prepared to make any further deliveries of arms for foreign currency, even those already contracted for. On the contrary, we can make deliveries of arms in the future only if we receive full value in raw materials of importance to us.

A list of the principal arms contracts with Holland is annexed hereto.¹ They refer in the main to about 110 anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, for immediate delivery, and the closing of a contract for 18 bomber planes, to be delivered by the middle of next year, which, however, has not yet been approved by the Field Marshal.

The OKW has already, of its own initiative, stopped delivery of the anti-aircraft guns.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for approval of the proposed procedure.²

WIEHL

¹Not printed (6783/E513636). Under anti-aircraft artillery were listed: "80 guns of 7.5 cm. with substantial quantities of ammunition. Four guns have been delivered. Further, 36 guns, complete with ammunition, ready for delivery, but retained by the OKW. The treaty was just concluded in October."

²At the bottom of the document is the note: "Deliver slowly and in small amounts. R[ibbentrop]."

Ribbentrop's comment was based on a penciled note of Dec. 14: "The Führer is of the opinion that the arms should be delivered to the Dutch slowly and in small lots. Hewel." (6783/E513637)

A further Hitler order of Jan. 24, 1940, directed that deliveries of anti-aircraft guns to the Netherlands were to be delayed and that no 7.5 cm. anti-aircraft guns were to be supplied (6783/E513647).

No. 448

F19/031-036

Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol

RM 62

BERLIN, December 12, 1939.

The Foreign Minister today received the newly-appointed Japanese Ambassador, Kurusu, who was making his first official call.

The Foreign Minister began the conversation by tracing the development of German-Japanese relations during recent years as follows:

Since 1934 the Foreign Minister had devoted special attention to cultivating German-Japanese relations. In this he had been supported to the fullest extent by the then Military Attaché and [word illegible] Ambassador Oshima. In countless conversations [several words illegible] all points [several words illegible] cooperation were discussed and it was established that the views of both sides were in complete harmony. From this cooperation there had developed a relationship of trust which had contributed considerably toward promoting German-Japanese relations. An essential step in this field had been the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He, the Foreign Minister, had then attempted to obtain a mutual alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan. This alliance did not come about. For 6 months the German Government had been prepared to conclude this alliance, but the Japanese Government had not been able to reach a decision. Thereupon Germany had signed with Italy alone. Further efforts to reach agreement with Japan after the conclusion of the treaty with Italy also remained unsuccessful. Meanwhile France and England had negotiated with Russia, in order to draw Russia into the encirclement of Germany. German policy had foiled this attempt, however, and had reached an understanding with Russia which was in the interest of both countries. On his visit to Moscow the Foreign Minister had urged the Russians to reach an understanding with Japan¹ and had also instructed Ambassador Ott in Tokyo to make representations to the Japanese Government in the same sense.²

The Ambassador then replied that the good relations between Germany and Japan were deeply anchored. He attributed this principally to the fact that German influence was very great in Japan in the artistic as well as the scientific field, for many professors in Japanese universities had received their earlier training in Germany and had transmitted their thoroughly deep friendship for Germany to the

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 213.

² See document No. 40.

younger generation in Japan. These were the roots of a friendship which, no matter what time might bring, could never die out. This friendship could be compared with Mount Fujiyama, which might sometimes be covered by clouds, but which was nevertheless always there and could never disappear. But he had to say that Germany's friends in Japan had been disappointed by the German-Russian pact. He believed that Ambassador Oshima, too, had suffered within himself because of that agreement. But General Oshima was in every respect a soldier; he would not brood over a lost battle, but employ all his strength for the task which he had recognized as the right one.

Here the Foreign Minister interposed that this alleged disappointment had been unjustified. Did Japan think that it would be more advantageous for Japan if Russia were today among the enemies of Germany? Moreover, he had spoken with General Oshima already in 1937 of the fact that a kind of adjustment between Germany and Russia and Russia and Japan was necessary. Oshima had shown understanding for this policy and had told him, the Foreign Minister, that he had conveyed this idea to the military authorities in Japan in numerous telegrams.

At this Ambassador Kurusu replied that Oshima, who was a close personal friend and one of whom he thought very highly, had never spoken to him of that. He was, however, convinced of the correctness of that conception, for he too had felt for years that such a development would have to take place, and he had to admit that in the Foreign Minister's place he would have done exactly the same. But it was very difficult to bring this idea of adjustment home to the Japanese. The Japanese had always been taught that Russia was their real enemy. This attitude was particularly prevalent in circles of the armed forces, and it was, of course, difficult to eradicate it now.

The Foreign Minister replied that he fully understood this, but the time had come for the Japanese Government to recognize clearly that Japan's real enemy was England. The [one word illegible] of Japan's China policy with England was impossible, for England would never voluntarily give up the 600,000,000 pounds she had invested in China. Agreement with England would mean renouncing the expansion of Japan. Only in opposition to and in struggle against England could Japan grow strong, just as Germany could attain her goal only by struggle against England. He knew very well that there were strong forces at work in Japan in favor of collaboration with England. These forces were anchored mainly in business, for the business mind again and again made the mistake of selling its political birthright for a mess of economic pottage. (As the Ambassador did not understand this comparison, it was explained to him by a simpler formulation.)

Germany had taken absolutely firm decisions on the basis of the situation seen as a whole. Germany would win this war. There was no longer any question of a desire for peace. At the conclusion of the Polish campaign the Führer had again held out to the British the hand of peace. This had been rejected, and now Germany no longer wanted peace; on the contrary, Germany wanted to carry through this war and would bring it to a victorious conclusion. The Minister did not want to prophesy, but he was convinced that we would defeat France and that England would approach us within the course of the next year with a plea for peace.

After these words the Foreign Minister intended to conclude the conversation, but Ambassador Kurusu requested to be allowed a few more words in reply. He wanted to draw the Foreign Minister's attention to the Pacific side of Japanese policy. He himself had lived in the United States for a long time, his wife was an American, and he knew the sentimental side of the American temperament. He also well knew that the American Government was holding firmly to its goal, and that this goal was to block a strong Japan. On that point England and America were agreed. Japan was acquainted with this political objective but she would not allow herself to be arrested in her course. The people and the Government were firmly determined to end the China conflict in Japan's favor, even if—and he would admit this quite frankly—the economic side and the food situation in Japan were difficult at the moment.

The Foreign Minister agreed with the Ambassador's statements to the extent of saying that Germany and Japan would have to become great and strong by their own efforts, and that this was possible only by opposing England. The British were willing to use any means to reach their goal. This was proved anew by the measures against German exports. He did not wish to give advice to the Japanese Government, but he was convinced that England would immediately desist from searching Japanese ships for German goods if two British ships were halted and searched in Chinese waters for every Japanese ship stopped. Germany wanted nothing from Japan, but the identity of interests as regards England made close collaboration necessary.*

* The following passage appears in the margin in Ribbentrop's handwriting as an addition to this paragraph: "I told the Ambassador that Japan today could have only one interest, and that was a German victory over England. So there was, in my opinion, only one policy for Japan—with all available means to help Germany in her struggle, and to avoid anything that would mean strengthening our enemies directly (England and France) or indirectly [two or three words in parentheses illegible]. Only in the event of a German victory would Japan hold China; otherwise a world coalition would take China away from Japan again. R[ibbentrop]"

The Ambassador thanked the Foreign Minister for his interesting and important statements and assured him that he, the Ambassador, valued this collaboration most highly; he would immediately inform his Government of the present conversation.

DÖRNBERG

No. 449

Nuremberg document No. 1287-PS ¹

Memorandum of the Ausenpolitisches Amt

BERLIN, December 12, 1939.

Subject: Operation against India.

According to reliable confidential information the Foreign Ministry, in agreement with Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr, has decided in principle on a joint action with Soviet Russia against India under the banner of Amanullah.² Discussions with Soviet Russia are to be started immediately.

The recently appointed Under State Secretary Habicht has primary responsibility in the Foreign Ministry. At first, he had to start from scratch to become acquainted with the problems of the Middle East. To brief him he had Ministers von Hentig (specialist on the Middle East in the Foreign Ministry) and Dr. Grobba (for Iraq and Saudi Arabia). The views of these two as to actions to be taken were diametrically opposed.

Dr. Grobba is said to have taken the position that one must cooperate with the present Afghan Government. The latter should be urged to make the attempt to reconquer, with the help of Germany and Soviet Russia, the areas up to the Indus River which were inhabited by as many Afghans as was the Kingdom itself. In this connection, assurances would have to be given to the Afghans that agreements would be made with Soviet Russia to preserve the independence of Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that Russian support was indispensable.

Grobba's view is said to have prevailed in a meeting about three weeks ago. On this occasion he suggested, moreover, that Counselor Ripken, the Foreign Ministry official in charge of economic affairs for the Middle East, should go to Kabul to establish contact with the Afghan Government. Grobba's attitude is noteworthy inasmuch as he had not been able to observe personally, because of his activity as

¹ This document was not published in the Nuremberg collection. It is in the custody of the National Archives in Washington.

² See document No. 60.

Minister [in Iraq], the development of Germany's political and economic relations with Afghanistan in recent years. For this reason, also, the strong position which Germany had meanwhile established in Afghanistan was unknown to him. In carrying out these proposals the personal contacts with the Afghan Government, gained by years of work, as well as the strong German colony which is active in all spheres of military, economic, and cultural life, could have been immediately utilized for the struggle against England.

Nevertheless, in a recent meeting to which, significantly, Dr. Grobba was not invited, the view of Minister von Hentig won out, i. e., that the present Afghan Government be eliminated by the instigation of insurrections and the restoration to power of Amanullah.

Hentig has always taken the position that the present Afghan Government is subservient to England. It is known that he has lacked any understanding of Germany's successful penetration during recent years. It is indicative of his sabotaging attitude that the German Government delegation which went to Kabul last summer (Counselor Ripken, Oberregierungsrat Ter-Nedden of the Economics Ministry, Oberregierungsbaurat Schnell, representing the office of Dr. Todt) has not been able, so far, to present its views to Under State Secretary Habicht.³ Having spent several months in Kabul, the members of the delegation here openly stated that they have now adopted the views of the Aussenpolitisches Amt. The President of the Afghan Bank⁴ was absolutely the most powerful person in the Afghan Government, and one could rely fully and completely on his efforts to expand steadily political cooperation with Germany (see enclosure).⁵

Even if the assumption were correct that the present Afghan Government is subservient to England, all the necessary prerequisites for the intended action with Amanullah are at present lacking. With respect to military strategy and personalities, no preliminary plans, based on a comprehensive and exact examination of the problems over a period of several months, exist. (Cf. the exposition by Colonel Niedermayer "Policy and Warfare in the Near East.")⁶

The Afghan personage designated by von Hentig to carry out [these plans] must be completely rejected. He is Amanullah's former envoy and Foreign Minister, Gulam Sittig (Berlin).⁷ He is known to the Aussenpolitisches Amt as untrustworthy on account

³ A memorandum of Nov. 7 by Counselor Ripken summarized the political impressions gained on the basis of conversations with Afghan statesmen during the economic negotiations in Kabul, June-August 1939 (2277/479899-911).

⁴ Abdul Medjid Khan.

⁵ This enclosure listed a program for continued German cooperation with the present Afghan Government on the basis of German military, technical, and economic assistance.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ See document No. 269.

of his obscure relations with England. Amanullah himself—as he has made known—has no confidence in him either. Heretofore Gulam Sittig has been rejected also by Canaris' Abwehr Department and by Minister Grobba, who had met him in 1928 when he was specialist for the Middle East.

It is worth mentioning that Afghan supporters of Amanullah residing in Germany who are living in extreme want and are waiting only for the day when they will assist Amanullah in getting restored to power, have stated that improvised insurrections would never be successful. The Afghan army with its modern equipment (from Germany!) would have to be opposed by a similarly equipped force, while simultaneously the present leading figures of the government would have to die at the hand of assassins.

Yet the decision has now been made to achieve the goal by fomenting insurrections. Dr. Grobba has rightly expressed the view that such an action would merely lead to a civil war inside Afghanistan which would be advantageous, rather than harmful, to the English and would presumably destroy Germany's strong position in Afghanistan.

It has been further decided to send within a short time Gulam Sittig, accompanied by Party Comrade Kleist of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's Secretariat^s to Moscow for the purpose of concluding final agreements with Soviet Russia.

^s Actually, Kleist was a member of Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

No. 450

F19/037-038

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 61

BERLIN, December 13, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister, on instruction from Count Csáky, suggested to me that Germany conduct negotiations for a settlement between Russia and Finland. Hungary was depressed by the thought that Russia might attempt to realize her aspirations in the Balkans after her victory in the north, which was ultimately inevitable. Hungary would like to prevent this and was staking her hopes on Germany.

I pointed out the following facts to the Hungarian Minister:

1. Russia was a nation with which we were on friendly terms and whose desire to safeguard her position on the Baltic Sea we understood perfectly well.

2. According to our information, Russia and Finland could very well have come to a mutual understanding if the British had not thwarted it. Because England was backing Finland, she was also responsible for the latter's foolish policy.

3. Germany had had unfortunate experiences with such mediations and arbitrations, as for example the Vienna Award. At that time she thought that she had met Hungary's wishes to a great extent; she had, however, received nothing but criticism and worse from the Hungarian statesmen. Nor had Slovakia been satisfied with the decision.

The Hungarian Minister declared that Csáky was in the possession of reliable information to the effect that the Finns now desired to comply with Russian wishes and to conclude peace with Russia.

I replied that this was nothing new. Finland had been pursuing a miserable policy. To begin with, she had rejected the Russian proposals; Russia had scarcely started the war, however, when Finland had informed us that she was prepared to negotiate with the Russians and asked us to mediate. On the same day, however, the treaty between Russia and the Kuusinen Government had been concluded in Moscow,¹ so that the Russians, in my opinion, could not at present negotiate with another Finnish Government.

The Hungarian Minister then presented a memorandum regarding Hungarian ammunition deliveries to Turkey and asked how Germany in principle looked upon such deliveries.²

I told him that Germany would consider arms deliveries to Turkey as military deliveries to an ally of England and France.

Thereupon the Hungarian Minister remarked that this was the end of the matter as far as Hungary was concerned.

R[IBBENTROP]

¹ On Dec. 2 a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance had been concluded between Russia and the Soviet-sponsored "People's government of the democratic republic of Finland," headed by Otto Kuusinen.

² Not printed (F19/039). Turkey had asked Hungary to supply her with munitions and to assist in the construction of a munitions plant in Turkey.

No. 451

8496/E597081-83

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BUCHAREST, December 14, 1939—2:45 a. m.

No. 1009 of December 14

Received December 14—8:30 a. m.

W III b 897.

With reference to our telegram No. 963.¹

I. Failing to make any progress with the Minister President in regard to the exchange rate question, I brought the matter to the atten-

¹ Document No. 422.

tion of the King in a suitable way. As a result I was informed yesterday by the Court Minister that the King himself, for political reasons and against the counsel of all of his advisers, had ordered that the exchange rate be raised. The Court Minister then detailed to me once more the King's ideas concerning political and diplomatic assistance which Rumania expected of Germany vis-à-vis Russia. Furthermore the King again urgently requested that the deliveries of war material be hastened and increased.

In a subsequent conversation with the Minister President, he told me, using similar arguments, that Rumania could not accept as justified any of the economic reasons for an increase in the rate of exchange, which we had advanced, but that she was nevertheless willing, solely for political reasons, to raise the rate by 15 percent, from 41 to 47 lei. I told the Minister President that the raise was insufficient, and sought to obtain his agreement to a larger increase. The Minister President assured me that the proposal was the utmost that could be offered, and urged me to accept it. I promised that I would obtain the decision of the Reich Government, but insisted that I personally could not regard the exchange rate as sufficient.

II. England and France have lately exerted increasingly severe pressure on Rumania with a view to preventing a raise in the exchange rate. Only yesterday, the French Ambassador addressed a letter to the Minister President—I was informed of the contents—in which he stated, among other things, that an increase in the rate of exchange of the reichsmark represented a unilateral and wholly unjustified favor to Germany, which was incompatible with neutrality. The rate of exchange question had thus become more and more a matter of political prestige. The increase in the exchange rate is generally regarded here as an important political triumph for Germany. Seen from the economic viewpoint, the proposed exchange rate meets our demands only in part, but this is supposed to be made up for, as the Minister President has promised, not only by prevention of any rise in prices but also by a lowering of domestic prices and the exchange rates of foreign currencies. Moreover, the Minister President confirmed the promise to guarantee petroleum deliveries regardless of value and in disregard of our purchases (group garbled) quota of 25 percent of the total export. I shall nevertheless endeavor to secure an agreement on the basis of a higher figure. I believe, however, that for political reasons it would be unwise to carry the matter to extremes. So far it has been possible, despite the peremptory [*ultimativ*] manner in which the negotiations were conducted, to secure substantial concessions in the petroleum and exchange rate questions without causing any political or personal ill feelings.

III. Since the Hungarian Government has been urging me for days to come to Budapest, if only for a short time, and has placed a plane at my disposal to that end, I shall fly to Budapest tomorrow for a day and shall be back in Bucharest on Friday morning.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

No. 452

2973/579484-86

Minister Altenburg to Minister Bräuer

BERLIN, December 14, 1939.

DEAR HERR BRÄUER: Sincere thanks for your letter of December 11.¹ I have spoken just as you did to Herr Noack. He has been strictly enjoined to abstain from "high policy" and, along with his scholarly work, to devote himself solely to cultural and propagandist questions, the latter obviously only in closest touch with the Legation or yourself. I have urged Herr Noack to visit you immediately after his return to Oslo and to ask you to tell him how you can build him into the cultural and propagandist work of the Legation. I should be grateful if you would speak to him along these lines. In addition, I have told Herr Noack not to meddle in political matters and if demands of that sort are made upon him, to refer those involved directly to the Legation or yourself. If therefore in the near future, he should refer to contrary instructions, this would not conform to the facts. Otherwise, during this visit he again made upon me the favorable personal impression which he also made upon you earlier. Accordingly, I hope that now after the admonitions from all sides, things will straighten out for him again. If contrary to expectation this does not happen, I should appreciate a report. We would then have to consider what to do.

As for the occasion of his present visit in Berlin—the trip of Councilor Quisling—I immediately characterized the whole business to him as naive and then put him in touch with the proper official, Herr von Grundherr. Their conversations had the desired effect, that Quisling gave up his plan to take his project to the Foreign Minister or even to the Führer.² Even the easy solution of a conversation with the State Secretary was given up.

So far as I know, Herr Noack came again here to the Cultural Policy Department and spoke with Rühle, Roth, and Kolb. The conversa-

¹ Not printed (2973/579488-89). This letter supplemented Bräuer's telegram No. 463, printed as document No. 441.

² See document No. 443, footnote 4.

tion concerned a book or teaching aids exhibit for which Herr Noack apparently was able to make suggestions that were readily accepted. That was about all.

With sincere greetings and Heil Hitler.

Yours, etc.,

ALTENBURG

No. 453

22/13745

The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

No. 511

BERLIN, December 15, 1939.

With reference to your No. 463.¹

For the Minister personally.

Please telegraph immediately what else you know about State Councilor Quisling and his movement, as well as about Director Hagelin, who also is now in Berlin, and the standing of both figures. I expressly request, however, that you refrain from making inquiries outside the Legation and confine inquiries within the Legation to a very limited circle. What has been Quisling's attitude toward England during the past decade? However, we are especially interested in Quisling's attitude in recent times. Do Quisling and Hagelin pursue a distinctly anti-Russian policy at the present time, and what is their present position on England?

Reply is requested by Monday morning, December 18.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 441.

² See document No. 466.

No. 454

585/242523-27

The State Secretary to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 15, 1939.

No. 489

Pol. II 1849 g Rs.

With reference to your telegram No. 349.¹

If it is necessary to take up again with the King the questions brought up by him, you are requested to tell him the following: [We fully understand his concern, but he for his part will also understand that it is impossible for us to answer hypothetical questions of this kind

¹ Document No. 415.

in advance. Our own policy is determined by the fact of our war and by our treaties with Italy and the Soviet Union. We expect that Bulgarian policy will be conducted in such a way that Bulgaria does not come into conflict with the Soviet Union, in which, despite all our friendship for Bulgaria and all our willingness to help her in difficult situations, we could not, in view of the present situation, support Bulgaria. Nor do we believe that there is any possibility of such a conflict.] ² On the basis of all reports received from Sofia so far we are of the opinion that Bulgaria's military preparations have not yet progressed to a point where she could wish at this time to become involved in a war. In this respect our interests, which are directed toward the preservation of peace in the Balkans, coincide with those of Bulgaria. Moreover, we also continue to rely on the promise that, for her part, Bulgaria will not strike the first blow without having assured herself of our consent. Any reply to Soviet wishes for the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact and cession of air and naval bases would naturally depend in the main on the time and the circumstances, especially on whether Bulgaria's national aspirations could thereby be fully realized. Did the Soviet Union actually make a demand for the cession of air and naval bases? According to the reports available to us this is not the case, nor do the Soviets have any intention of pursuing an aggressive policy in the Balkans. If such demands should be made, it would presumably still be time enough to examine the situation in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. Moreover, you might sometime point out casually that Italy, too, is after all interested in these questions. Does the Bulgarian Government know the Italian view?

In reply to the King's question whether it would not be possible to divert the Russians toward the Caucasus if they should intend to take some action against Turkey, you might tell the King, as your personal opinion, that the article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of December 6, "Troop Reinforcements on the Caucasus Front," should probably lend itself to an interpretation in that sense.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² The passages in brackets were deleted from the final version of this telegram. The following notes refer to these changes in the text: "Herr Under State Secretary Woermann. Would you object to omission of bracketed passages? W[eizsäcker], December 8."

"No! W[oermann], December 8."

"The Foreign Minister has taken along to a conference with the Führer the corrected draft of a telegram to Sofia in reply to telegram No. 349. Herewith respectfully returned to State Secretary Weizsäcker. Schmidt, Berlin, Dec. 9, 1939."

³ See document No. 376, footnote 10.

No. 455

169/82954-55

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

SECRET
No. 891BERLIN, December 15, 1939.
zu Pol. II 2572 g.¹
2573 g.² Ang. I.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 975 of December 8.³

Although to judge from your telegram No. 183⁴ of December 9 a measure of calm has returned there and the panicky mood of the preceding days, which was reflected in Gafencu's statements of December 6 and 7,⁵ has been dissipated, I nevertheless consider it advisable that you do not let matters rest with respect to the conversation on Russo-Rumanian relations which the Rumanian Foreign Minister entered into with you, but rather continue it at a suitable opportunity. No reply, however, either official or unofficial should be made to the question addressed to you by Gafencu as to our attitude in the event of a Russian attack upon Rumania; for it is impossible to take any stand whatsoever on questions of this sort dealing with a purely hypothetical situation. Approximately the following could be pointed out:

1. As regards the Soviet Russian attitude toward Rumania, we have no evidence that Russia is entertaining any aggressive intentions directed toward the Balkan Peninsula. As is known, Stefanov's article in the *Communist International* has after all meanwhile been the subject of an explicit démenti by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, published by the Tass Agency, and thus need no longer be regarded as having any significance.

2. Gafencu told you that Rumania's decision to answer Russia with arms in the Bessarabian question, if necessary, was irrevocable because Bessarabia was inhabited mainly by Rumanians and because an advance by Soviet Russia to the Danube would constitute too serious a threat of Bolshevism and Pan Slavism spreading in the Balkans. At the same time Gafencu hinted to you that a solution might be found in a voluntary renunciation by Rumania of the northern portion of Bessarabia, and suggested that we bring our influence to bear on Soviet Russia in the direction of such a proposal.

¹ Pol. II 2572 g: Document No. 427.

² Pol. II 2573 g: Not printed (2281/480319). This was Bucharest telegram 983 of Dec. 9 which reported that the recent Tass statement on the subject of the anti-Rumanian article in the Comintern journal had calmed Rumanian apprehensions considerably.

³ Document No. 427.

⁴ This is apparently an error and should read No. 983; see footnote 2.

⁵ See document No. 427.

The arguments advanced by Gafencu in support of an intransigent attitude are not very convincing, since the Rumanians are quite aware of the fact that Bessarabia was a component of the Russian Empire prior to 1918, and that Soviet Russia never recognized the cession of this area to Rumania. We have always held that the awarding of this territory to Rumania was truly a Greek gift of the former Paris Conference of Ambassadors, and that Rumania would hardly be able to retain it in the long run. On the other hand, of course, we would deeply regret it if that issue led to a conflict between Rumania and Russia. Therefore, we would like to see such an eventuality precluded and hoped, though we were not informed as to Russia's intentions, that Rumanian concessions at the right moment and of the required scope would make it possible to reach a peaceable compromise.

In your conversation with Gafencu please avoid giving the impression of any attempted pressure or mediation, and do not show that you have any instructions from here.⁶

WEIZSÄCKER

⁶ On Dec. 22, Fabricius reported (2281/480342-46) that he had had an opportunity to discuss the Bessarabian problem with Gafencu in accordance with this instruction. Gafencu then claimed to have documentary proof that Rumania had originally seized Bessarabia at the suggestion of Field Marshal Mackensen in connection with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1918, and that the Conference of Ambassadors gave its sanction only later. For the rest, Gafencu had emphasized again that Rumania would fight in defense of Bessarabia.

No. 456

141/127409-10

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 992

BERLIN, December 15, 1939.

The Belgian Ambassador called on me today for a talk, the purpose of which he did not specify, in the course of which he touched upon the following points:

1. Belgium's need for an early resumption of trade talks. Ambassador Ritter had been awaiting new developments in the economic field from the Belgian side. They had materialized, but they would have to become the subject of negotiations.

2. The allegedly sincere and absolutely neutral attitude of the King as the determining factor in Belgium. With his new policy of independence the King, as was known, had severed every military link with France and would continue to pursue that line. More in memory of the past November than in regard to the future, M. Davignon spoke of the insistence with which not only England but also France had sought to foment a German invasion of Belgium because Belgium had, for her part, refused to open her borders.

3. The prospects for a termination of the war. Davignon himself viewed these prospects as very small and acknowledged that in Eng-

land, and lately also in France, they were piling up almost insurmountable barriers to peace through public speeches, despite the utter senselessness of wanting to fight it out to the end. In the western theater of the war no real decision could be found. If once the battle should flare up there in its full fury, it would end only in political chaos. Possibly Russia's expansionist tendencies might yet give pause to the British and French.

Davignon thought that the only hope in the situation, of which he took such a gloomy view, was the possibility of surprises of which there had indeed been no lack in this war.

I conducted the conversation for my part with all the reserve indicated by the situation.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 457

1370/357201

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, December 15, 1939.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister.

In accordance with instructions, I spoke with Grand Admiral Raeder with regard to the possible sale of the plans and drawings of the cruiser [*sic*] *Bismarck* to the Soviet Union.¹

The Admiral naturally also proceeds on the assumption that the plans and drawings will not fall into the wrong hands, particularly British hands. But he favored the sale even at the risk of their falling into British hands. He did not fear that this would entail any danger to the German naval forces or especially to the cruiser *Bismarck*.

The Admiral told me that the Führer's scruples were of another kind, namely that the plans and drawings showed that the cruiser had been planned and projected on a larger scale than was permissible at the time under the international agreements.² The Admiral was prepared to brush these scruples aside, provided always that the Soviet Union pays a very high price for the plans and drawings.

RITTER

¹ Under date of Dec. 8, the "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, p. 63, includes the following paragraph: "13. Sales to the Russians. The Führer decides that sale of the *Seydlitz* and the *Prinz Eugen* is to be refused, also sale of the turrets of ships "H" and "I" [battleships under construction]. Sale of 20-cm. guns intended for the *Lützow* is to be put off (they must be returned to the Army first). If after the offensive a war of position ensues, though we hope this will not be the case, 20-cm. guns will be needed by the Army; otherwise they can be sold. Plans for the *Bismarck* are discussed. What is the price? The Führer will then make a decision. The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees, as only two ships are being built and the Russians need at least six years to copy them."

² A limit of 35,000 tons standard displacement was set for warships by art. 4 of pt. II of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 17, 1937, by which Germany adhered to the London Naval Treaty of Mar. 25, 1936.

No. 458

3035/600042-43

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

PRAGUE, December 15, 1939.
Kult. Gen 1850 g. Ra.

Subject: Political report.

With reference to report D. Pol. 4 of December 7.¹

The Reich Protector was recently ordered to Berlin by the Führer for a conference. As Freiherr von Neurath has told me in strict confidence, policy directives for the immediate future were laid down at that conference. Abolishing the Protectorate is not being considered at present, especially since there are not enough German civil servants available for direct administration. Nor will there be any large-scale settling of the country with Germans, because the Germanization of the new German East has precedence and there are hardly enough settlers available even for that program. The customs border is to be abolished on April 1, 1940.² The German authorities are to avoid anything that is likely to provoke Czech mass actions, but any Czech defiance must be crushed with the harshest means from the outset. The Czech universities will remain closed,³ but their research institutes and libraries are to be reopened. In doing so precautions must be taken to prevent these institutes from becoming underground schools.

Following his return from Berlin, the Reich Protector had State President Hácha and his daughter as guests for luncheon. The invitation was not publicized in the local press, but the news was released to the foreign correspondents as a token of the good understanding between the Reich Protector and the Protectorate Government.

To the outward observer there has been a noticeable improvement in Czech public sentiment, especially as many people have realized the futility of active resistance. They want to wait and see, and meanwhile not risk anything. It is on this account that the loyalty declarations of the Protectorate Government and the Czech leaders have found approval; they probably take comfort in the thought that these declarations compromise no one because they will be regarded abroad as having been made under coercion. But there is no question

¹ Not found.² On Feb. 28, Woermann recorded that on this day Hitler had decided to postpone until further notice the intended abolition of the customs border between the Reich and the Protectorate (331/195881).³ The Czech universities had been closed after the anti-German demonstrations in Prague on Oct. 28.

of any coercion; the people have actually made these declarations voluntarily since they are fully aware that it is to their own interest to do so.

DR. ZIEMKE

No. 459

1859/422829-32

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Tgb, No. 132

OSLO, December 15, 1939.

Received December 17.

Pol. VII [*sic*] 2838.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Norway in the Russo-Finnish War.

The ferment caused in Norway by the Russo-Finnish conflict continues and intensifies the more the belief grows that Russia will stretch out her hand toward northern Norway once her objectives in Finland are attained. It is widely believed in Norway, to be sure, that England would not stand by idly if Russia occupied ports in northern Norway, but would try to forestall the Russians by occupying, for instance, the port of Tromsø. It is being pointed out that England would then be in a position to close the North Sea completely also in the North, and that on that account, England probably would not in the least mind such a development in Scandinavia, for it would bring her nearer to the consummation of a wish expressed even a year before the war; namely, to make of Norway "one big Gibraltar" (cf. report A-IIIa of June 28, 1938).¹

Norwegians of all parties are convinced that Finland is fighting her defensive war against Russia not for herself alone, but for all of Scandinavia, and that Norway is therefore honor-bound to support Finland in this struggle. The Norwegian Government is surely determined to remain neutral. Although it will wish to help Finland indirectly by sending arms, etc., it will not for a moment lose sight of the fact that any direct assistance to Finland would inexorably drag Norway into that war. It was on the basis of this consideration that Norway refrained from voting at the meeting of the delegates at Geneva on Russia's expulsion from the League of Nations,² an action which has the approval of the entire country. Moreover, the attitude of the Norwegian Government is in accord with the statements made

¹ Not found.

² See Editors' Note, p. 480.

to me by Foreign Minister Koht during our talk on December 12, on which I have reported by telegraph.³

While the Government is in this way endeavoring to preserve neutrality, it is on the other hand compelled to a certain extent to take into account the sentiment of the people. The Commanding General of the Norwegian Army has issued, for officers only (the Norwegian Army has no noncommissioned officers), a ban against volunteering in Finland on the ground that Norway herself needs all her officers in these critical times. On the other hand, however, the Government seems disinclined to prohibit participation of Norwegian volunteers in the Russo-Finnish war by invoking a Royal Resolution on the basis of the law of March 11, 1937, as it did in the Spanish Civil War. This attitude is explained on the ground that, in contrast to the Spanish war, the conflict between Russia and Finland is not a civil war. The recruiting of soldiers being prohibited by article 133 of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, the various agencies which have been formed to assemble volunteers will confine themselves to organizing and equipping them; there is no recruiting in the proper meaning of the term, however, especially since enough volunteers are reporting. There are rumors of a thousand volunteers, but this figure is probably too high.

I have pointed out in previous reports⁴ that Norwegian feeling regarding Germany is deteriorating in proportion as the Russo-Finnish conflict sharpens. Recently the rumor has been assiduously spread by word of mouth, especially via Sweden, that Germany would take advantage of Norway's increased involvement in the north to invade Scandinavia from the south. This rumor has been attacked with gratifying severity in the newspaper *Tidens Tegn* by Benjamin Vogt, who was for many years Norwegian Minister to London. Nevertheless, as I hear from Norwegian quarters, the rumor has by no means been silenced thereby.

This alleged threat from the south is offset by the much more concrete danger in the north. I have information from a reliable source that until very recently Norwegian Army personnel with communist leanings showed a marked consistency in volunteering for service in northern Norway. In connection with the events of the last weeks this matter has acquired a decided relevancy owing to the fear that it might be part of a plan, inspired by the Comintern or some other

³ Bräuer had a talk with Koht on this subject on Dec. 11 concerning which he reported by telegram No. 462 (1859/422784-86), but no record has been found of such a conversation on Dec. 12.

⁴ e. g., telegram No. 417 of Dec. 1 (1859/422727).

Russian organization operating abroad, to set the stage for a possible Russian invasion of northern Norway. This collaboration is thought to be contemplated on a political rather than military plane, and would probably work out in such a way that in the area in question a communist puppet government [*Scheinregierung*], patterned after Kuusinen's, would call upon Russia for revolutionary liberation. Nationally-oriented elements have already undertaken countermeasures to replace this Communist army personnel and so neutralize that potential trouble spot.

Norwegian military authorities take the view that the Norwegian Government should do nothing to prevent nationals of foreign countries from assembling on Norwegian territory to go to Finland as volunteers. This should be subject to the condition, however, that these volunteers arrive as civilians and have a regular passport with a Norwegian entrance visa. This seems to me a point to which particular attention ought to be given by Germany.

BRÄUER

No. 460

8523/E597470/1

The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939—12:35 a. m.

No. 182 of December 15

Received December 16—7:00 a. m.

Pol. I M 10371 g.

With reference to our telegrams No. 178 of December 14¹ and No. 181 of December 15.²

The Legation's request for a 14-day period has been denied. The Government agreed to the same 48-hour period hitherto granted the British. The Council of Ministers went beyond that and granted 72 hours. It was announced here tonight that the period extends to Sunday noon [December 17]. Naturally, I did not recognize the position adopted by the Uruguayan Government. A further report follows tonight. .

LANGMANN

¹ Not printed (51/34098).

² Not printed (51/34104). A description by the Naval Attaché of the Legation in Montevideo of severe damage sustained by the pocket battleship, *Admiral Graf Spee*, in an encounter with the British cruisers HMS *Ajax*, *Achilles*, and *Baeter* on Dec. 13. *Graf Spee* had reached Montevideo the same evening. It was judged there that at least 14 days would be needed for repairs, and this length of time was requested on Dec. 14.

No. 461

1205/331829

The Legation in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939—1:06 a. m.

No. 183 of December 15

Received December 16—7:45 a. m.

Pol. I M 10372 g.

[For] High Command of the Navy.

1. Strategic position off Montevideo: Besides the cruisers and destroyers, *Ark Royal* and *Renown*. Close blockade at night. Escape into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless.

2. Propose putting out as far as neutral boundary. If it is possible to fight our way through to Buenos Aires, using remaining ammunition, this will be attempted.

3. If a break-through would result in certain destruction of *Graf Spee* without opportunity of damaging enemy, request decision on whether the ship should be scuttled in spite of insufficient depth in the estuary of the La Plata, or whether internment is to be preferred.

4. Decision requested by radiogram.

[LANGSDORFF]

Captain, *Graf Spee*

LANGMANN

No. 462

8519/E597441

The State Secretary to the Legation in Uruguay

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 16, 1939—3:30 p. m.

No. 267

R 31732.

With reference to your telegram No. 182.¹

The present decision of the Uruguayan Government regarding the length of stay is utterly incomprehensible in view of the condition of the ship and the legal situation, which is known there. You must therefore use every effort in concurrence with the captain of *Graf Spee* to obtain the longest possible extension of the time limit and to counteract in the most energetic manner the British influence working against us.

In reply to telegram No. 183 ² the captain of *Spee* will at the same time receive direct radio instructions from the Naval Staff.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 460.² Document No. 461.

No. 463

51/84115

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 16, 1939.

The High Command of the Navy, (Lieutenant Commander Neubauer), has conveyed the following:

The Naval Command has decided to issue the following instruction to the captain of the *Admiral Graf Spee*:

1. Attempt by all means to extend the time limit.
2. Re paragraph 2 of telegraphic report No. 183:¹ Approved.
Re paragraph 3: No internment in Uruguay.

In addition Commander Neubauer requested that our Legation in Montevideo be instructed as quickly as possible to seek extension of the time limit until seaworthiness is restored and say that we consider the matter a violation of the provisions of the Hague Convention.

On receiving this report, the State Secretary reported the matter to the Foreign Minister in the presence of Under State Secretary Gaus. The Foreign Minister gave instructions for the immediate sending of a telegram to Montevideo in accordance with the Navy's suggestion. The telegram is to be dispatched by two routes, first the usual channel through the Foreign Ministry and, second, through Naval radio facilities.

A telegram to this effect was then dispatched to Montevideo after being cleared with the Navy.²

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ Document No. 461.² See document No. 462.

No. 464

1205/881830-81

The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939—9 a. m.

No. 184 of December 16

Received December 16—6:10 p. m.

Pol. I M 10373 g.

I. With reference to our telegrams Nos. 182¹ and 183.²

The attitude of the Government and the populace is not unfriendly, but British pressure is very strong. The Government obviously feels in the face of the far-reaching British demands that a 72-hour period

¹ Document No. 460.² Document No. 461.

is all it can grant without courting economic suicide. The Foreign Minister stated confidentially that he would try to persuade the Council of Ministers to let the 72-hour period start at the time of the return of the investigating commission from aboard the ship so that it would actually be 96 hours. The Foreign Minister stated that he had to inform me with a heavy heart and in full appreciation of our situation that the decision of the Council of Ministers on the 72-hour period was final. He said that Uruguay has to contend not only with pressure from England, but also from France, and that the Neutrality Decree is not a treaty, but an act of Uruguayan sovereignty. When I pointed out that such a sovereign act constitutes a binding international commitment, he countered that Uruguay has the sole right to interpret the Decree and that the terms provide that a report by Uruguayan experts would be the basis of a decision by the Government. The experts (group garbled) 72 hours sufficient for restoring seaworthiness. Our questioning the qualifications of the experts does not in my opinion change the situation in any respect because the Hague Convention does not provide for any impartial experts and because the decision of the Government is actually based on a political horse trade with the Western Powers. Our argument that an interpretation of the Decree would not [ought not?] reverse the original meaning could not change the situation. It goes without saying that I left no doubt as to the seriousness of the situation created by Uruguay.

II. No debate on the law can change anything as regards the pressing need for a decision on the *Graf Spee*. Superior heavy forces which were sighted and verified beyond any doubt by the ship have convinced the captain that it would be impossible to shake off the ships trailing him and so make good a break for home. A 2-weeks time limit would not change anything in the situation; on the contrary, it would only favor the concentration of enemy forces.

III. I am in accord with the Naval Attaché in regarding internment of the ship the worst possible solution in any event. Blowing up the ship, even in the shallow La Plata waters, and subsequent internment of the crew would be preferable. The reason: exhaustion of ammunition.

IV. I have learned confidentially from a dependable source that the British Minister bluntly demands that *Spee* leave the harbor within 46 [sic] hours and that relations with Germany be severed in the near future. The President³ energetically objected to a break before Argentina and Brazil. How long the President will be able to hold out against the arguments inspired by England and several Ministers remains a question. The reports of a number of agents

³ Alfredo Baldomir.

agree in corroborating the present pro-German attitude not only of the President but also of the Foreign Minister.⁴ Privately the President has voiced hope of the early arrival of German submarines to break the blockade of the La Plata river.

V. Please send instructions⁵ as to further steps. Diplomatic break on the part of Uruguay essentially (group garbled).

LANGMANN

⁴ Alberto Guani.

⁵ Telegram No. 272 of Dec. 16 stated that the captain of the *Graf Spee* had the necessary instructions; not printed (8523/E597470). See also document No. 467.

No. 465

91/100122-23

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 182 of December 16

DUBLIN, December 16, 1939.

Received December 16—3:20 p. m.

For Under State Secretary Woermann personally.

Pfaus, of the Fichtebund of Hamburg,¹ who was in Ireland before the war, has lately again been sending propaganda material, some of which is allegedly very strong, to radical Irish-nationalist personalities. The explanation for the striking circumstance that the British, who generally suppress mail to Ireland which they do not like, permit this material to pass, is in my opinion, in view of the compromising choice of addressees, that England looks forward to further exposure in order to be able at a given time to point to German connections with subversive Irish elements and to a breach of neutrality. I am confirmed in this by a number of requests for aid to the IRA with which I have recently been approached through suspicious channels, and by offers of dangerous services which I have good reason to consider provocations. The responsible radical Irish-nationalist groups are opposed, for reasons known from my previous reports, to approaching the Legation in such a fashion. Fichtebund's propaganda in radical circles is arousing the concern of the Government, as Walshe indicated to me yesterday, lest German agencies not under the control of the Foreign Ministry should establish more extensive connections with the IRA. I had the impression that the Government believes it has indications to this effect. I have no reason to believe that financial support is being given, although this is asserted again and again, nor that there is political incitement of the IRA going beyond pure propaganda. In this connection I should like to mention, however, that in

¹ Oscar C. Pfaus of the Deutscher Fichtebund (headquarters in Hamburg). The Fichtebund was an organization, founded in 1914, engaged in world-wide dissemination of German propaganda, principally in the cultural field.

my opinion the liaison mentioned in telegrams Nos. 122² and 123 of November 9³ did exist, but it is uncertain whether with the Fichtebund, or another German agency, or even with the British provocation service [*Provokationsdienst*]. Walshe also told me that the Government was now (group garbled) to put a stop to the propaganda of both sides and with reference to British propaganda place a complete ban on the malignant press; earlier I had repeatedly suggested such a step in connection with provisions successfully put through concerning a number of gross insults to Germany which appeared in British papers sold here. I request that the matter, especially in so far as possible where steps with reference to the Fichtebund or the Propaganda Ministry are concerned, be handled with the greatest caution and without any mention of my part, since I must in no case be compromised in connection with the Irish nationalist movement.⁴

• HEMPEL

² Not found.

³ Not printed (91/100097). See document No. 355, footnote 1.

⁴ In telegram No. 192 of Dec. 20 (91/100126-27), Hempel urged that assistance for travel to Germany be given to Francis Stuart as a representative of responsible Irish nationalists. He was to serve as a lecturer at the University of Berlin. On Jan. 28, 1940, Under State Secretary Woermann recorded in a memorandum (91/100147), that Stuart had reached Berlin and visited him. Hempel transmitted through Stuart a repetition of his request that the propaganda efforts of the Fichtebund be stopped. Woermann assigned further liaison with Stuart to Stolzmann of the Cultural Policy Department.

No. 466

22/13748-49

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

OSLO, December 17, 1939—7:20 p. m.

No. 482 of December 17

Received December 17—10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 511 of December 15.¹

For the State Secretary personally.

For several years after the World War, Quisling was Norwegian Military Attaché in Moscow, where he married a Russian woman and after at first being in great sympathy with Bolshevism became its most violent opponent. Subsequently he was Military Attaché in Finland for 3 years. After being Minister of War in the Hundseid Agrarian Cabinet (until February 1933), he founded that same year the Nasjonal Samling, which drew many of its ideas and its organization from National Socialism. This movement, which showed some modest growth at the outset, has suffered a great decline since the parliamentary elections of 1936, in the main probably because the social and economic conditions essential for the movement were lack-

¹ Document No. 453.

ing in Norway. Despite his personal prestige, Quisling's political influence and prospects are on that account very slight. His newspaper *Fritt Folk* has a maximum circulation of 1,000 copies and is now to be subsidized by us (cf. Instruction P VI 16981 of December 9).²

Quisling considers Bolshevism the greatest menace to Europe. His political outlook since the conclusion of the Russo-German pact is dominated by the fear that the Soviet Union might wish to use Scandinavia as a bridge for carrying the world revolution into Europe. He is greatly influenced in this by memories of Bolshevik plans in 1931 which were supposed to have provided for the establishment of a Scandinavian Soviet Federation under Kuusinen. The Norwegian proponent of this plan was Støstad, now Norway's Minister of Social Affairs. When we met at the book exhibition, Quisling explained to me that Russia had not abandoned her plan for world revolution and had no intention of helping Germany to implement the German-Russian treaty. Even if Russia wished to do so, she would be unable to give any material assistance on account of the present level of her production and organization.

Quisling is imbued with the idea that the Germanic race should work together. This accounts for his advocating German-English collaboration and a German-Scandinavian-British bloc. His inclination toward Germany is much stronger than his sympathy for England. He need not in any way be regarded as an exponent of England. Since the outbreak of the war he has vehemently attacked England for her insatiable imperialism which is driving her to seek Germany's extermination. Quisling shares with the men around him a sincere admiration for the German nation and its Führer, but since the Russo-German settlement and the outbreak of the war he is in a serious inner conflict as a result of the attitude described above.

Director Hagelin is not known to the Legation.

BRÄUER

² Not found.

No. 467

8523/E597466/1

The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MONTEVIDEO, December 17, [1939]—9:17 p. m.

Received December 18—2 a. m.

Pol. I M 9632.

The pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* put out at 4:56 p. m. local time. She was blown up by the crew outside the three-mile zone.

A note in accordance with telegraphic instructions¹ was delivered to the Political Director. The captain of the pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* made a formal protest to me over the decision of the Uruguayan Council of Ministers regarding the time limit for his ship, communicated to me on the 15th of this month. Accordingly I am protesting in due form on behalf of my Government to the Uruguayan Government over its refusal, in most flagrant disregard of international law and custom, to allow the damaged warship the period necessary for restoring her seaworthiness, which in the circumstances was due her as a matter of course. Formal close. At the same time I have released for publication the detailed letter of protest addressed to me by the captain.

LANGMANN

¹ Telegram No. 274 of Dec. 17: Not printed (64/44228).

No. 468

127/69608

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

No. 965 of December 18 Moscow, December 18, 1939—2:50 p. m.

For Habicht.

With reference to your telegram No. 1099 of December 16¹ and No. 1101 of December 17.²

The information which I brought along has been discussed with Molotov. Molotov continued to indicate his willingness to support the plans, if the occasion should arise, provided he received more detailed information about the basis of the operation and the methods to be applied. Only then would it be possible to consider more closely the idea of dispatching Schäfer and the Afghan to Moscow. I therefore propose that I return to Berlin in order to work out the particulars requested by Molotov and that I depart again for Moscow in a short time. On the 19th the Soviet authorities concerned will give a reception for me. Departure on the 20th.

KLEIST

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (127/69611).

² Not printed (127/69609).

No. 469

5571/E399681

Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, December 18, 1939.

zu W 3019 g.¹

The enclosures to the report of Minister Clodius¹ set forth in detail the Hungarian requests for deliveries of war material. (Cf. also telegraphic report No. 619 from Budapest of December 15.²) The total value of the Hungarian requests amounts to more than 127 million RM.

Recently we informed the other departments (W 2260 g III of November 3, 1939³) that we agree in principle with new contracts, in so far as they involve small current transactions, and that if the Hungarians should present major requests, an understanding between the departments concerned would have to be reached in each separate case.

It appears practical, even in transmitting the large list of Hungarian requests which is at hand, to inform the other departments to what extent the Foreign Ministry attaches importance to complying with these requests for reasons of foreign policy. If the list of requests is merely passed on, without such a view being expressed, it is to be expected that the other departments will reply that the Hungarian requests cannot be considered on account of production for Germany's own needs.

I therefore respectfully suggest that the State Secretary be asked for a decision.⁴

Herewith submitted to the Director of the Economic Policy Department through Minister Moraht.

ADAMOVIC

¹ W 3019 g: Not printed (5571/E399670-81). This report was sent from Budapest on Dec. 15.

² Not printed (5571/E399668).

³ Not printed (5571/E399625-26).

⁴ Marginal note: "Decision of the Foreign Minister: Delivery only of such arms and in such quantities as we can spare easily. W[iehl] December 18."

No. 470

4512/E132682-97

Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt

BERLIN, December 18, 1939.

AFGHANISTAN—THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT OF THE NSDAP¹

In 1936-37, during the visit of the Afghan Minister President and several of his Ministers, who were the guests of Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Berlin, the German Reich and Afghanistan concluded a number of basic treaties covering military, cultural, and economic matters, on the preparation of which this office had worked for years.² Their purpose was to aid Afghanistan systematically to realize her ambition of becoming more independent of her neighbors. It was the objective of the Aussenpolitisches Amt to make it possible for Afghanistan to remain neutral in the case of a war, or, if the opportunity arose, for the country to be used by Germany for operations against British India or Soviet Russia. The implications of such a program for the British Empire in the event of a war are also shown by the World War, when Germany failed to take advantage of the balance of forces in the Near East (cf. also Churchill, *The World Crisis 1916-18*).

In close collaboration with the present Afghan Government the Amt drew up a comprehensive plan for all sectors of the Afghan state and arranged for the appointment of German experts to positions in the Afghan government service as an essential condition for the successful implementation of the plan. By means of such experienced German personnel a network of strong points was to be established in the vital positions providing Germany with the possibility of utilizing them in the event that Afghanistan should take military action with German aid.

Results of planning and cooperation

The German colony developed during that time from an insignificant group to the largest group of Europeans in Afghanistan.

¹This memorandum was sent to Lammers on Dec. 21 by Arno Schickedanz, the head of Rosenberg's staff in the Aussenpolitisches Amt, with a cover letter (4512/E132681) explaining that the memorandum dealt with topics which had been discussed by Lammers and Schickedanz on Dec. 19. It is not unlikely that the APA memorandum of Dec. 12 printed as document No. 449 was drafted in preparation for this conversation between Lammers and Schickedanz.

²The basic treaties referred to are filmed in the following serials: 6665, 6668, 8527, 8528, 8531, 8532, and 8534.

The extent and the progress of German-Afghan collaboration to date are outlined in the enclosure.³ Particularly noteworthy are the effects of the Dr. Todt agreement⁴ and of the economic agreement concluded last August.⁵ The agreement provides for a tenfold increase in the exchange of goods as compared to 1937, including strategic materials such as cotton and wool, commodities for which Afghanistan and Iran are the only sources at the present time with the recent exception of Soviet Russia.

The equipment of the Afghan army was modernized and its potential considerably increased by means of German deliveries (delivery of German anti-aircraft guns, trench mortars and mountain artillery in the approximate amount of 9 million reichsmarks). Moreover, the army has 2,500 new machine guns (Brünn), 20 new mountain howitzers (Skoda) and 40 old but serviceable mountain howitzers of Austrian origin. Between 30,000 and 40,000 men are equipped with modern infantry rifles. In addition to this the army has an excellent cavalry equipped with modern arms, and about 30 planes (Italy) with well-trained pilots; the Afghans have shown remarkable aptitude for the air arm (training is under a German aviation instructor).

The training of the army by German instructors (Major Schenk and Captain Horlock) has, according to their reports, made unexpectedly good progress. Because of their manual dexterity the Afghans are in every respect adapted for the operation and maintenance of complex weapons. Furthermore, the German instructors have trained a corps of capable officers and technicians. Conspicuous evidence of the present level of training of the Afghan army was provided this year by the excellent two-day demonstration of sharpshooting on the occasion of the parade, as well as by the swift suppression of revolts.

German police officers have completely reorganized the police and the secret state police of Afghanistan. Thus, within a short time a hard-hitting, well-disciplined police force has been created which enjoys great respect among the population.

The policy and strength of the present Government

The principal advocate of Afghanistan's political orientation toward Germany is Abdul Medjid Khan, the Afghan Minister of Commerce and president of the National Bank, who may also be regarded as the most powerful figure in the Government today. He assumed a very great personal risk in order to put through the pro-

³ Not printed (4512/E132698-700).

⁴ Not printed (8531/E597625-32).

⁵ Not printed (8530/E597572-616). There is also in the files a memorandum by Ripken dated Dec. 1, summarizing the German-Afghan economic negotiations which led to the agreements of Aug. 3 (2277/479912-37).

German policy in the past few years, but always lived up to his promises.

The actual developments are proof that his confidential information on the weak and strong points of the Afghan Government was correct. The German Government delegation, too, declared after their return from Kabul last September that they now fully shared the views of the Aussenpolitisches Amt about the importance and reliability of Abdul Medjid. Nor was any change in the political course noticeable after the outbreak of the war in September. Abdul Medjid is sending urgent telegrams even to this day, requesting more German experts for the government service.

German influence in the Afghan Government has doubtless greatly increased. The Germans are very popular everywhere in the country and are the only Europeans who have succeeded in gaining access to the strictly orthodox warrior tribes. British prestige, on the other hand, has dwindled despite the constant political pressure being exerted on the Afghan Government.

According to the reports of the German instructors, the army is absolutely loyal to the Government. Only the following can be regarded as being in opposition to the Government:

1. The followers of Amanullah, largely confined to the chauvinistic youth, who hope for reunion with the tribes living east of the national border all the way to the Indus (as many pure Afghans are said to be living there as in the Kingdom itself) and who object to the present government by the "cautious old men" on the grounds of insufficient nationalist activity; so far, however, this pro-Amanullah movement is completely unorganized and cannot therefore be considered as dangerous.

2. A few tribes which are suffering as a result of Abdul Medjid's monopolistic economic measures. From time to time they become restive and are then either promptly subdued by the army or readily pacified by economic concessions.

In conclusion it may be stated that with the support of the present Afghan Government Germany has for the first time assumed political significance in Afghanistan.

Opposition in the Foreign Ministry

The consistent policy of the Aussenpolitisches Amt was carried into effect despite the opposition of the Foreign Ministry's policy officer responsible for the area, Minister von Hentig, who had until recently been claiming for years that Afghanistan was of no political interest to Germany. Our systematic work in Afghanistan was thus made possible only by several special directives issued to the head of the Amt.

The present sudden change in Hentig's view as regards Afghanistan's importance and his promoting of Amanullah as an instrument of our fight against British India is paralleled by his handling of Saudi Arabia, which likewise showed his lack of any political conception whatever.

Plans involving Amanullah

Several months ago ex-King Amanullah had a friend inquire at the Amt as to whether he could count on German support if he should attempt to regain the throne of Afghanistan. The Intelligence Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht has been studying the question for the past year and to that end had one of its men stationed in Tehran for a year. The only thing apparently done in the matter was to establish contact with Amanullah's Court Minister, who lives in Tehran. This contact and the statement of the Court Minister that he had everything set for a revolution seem to have been all that was deemed necessary to conclude that the time was ripe for a move aiming at the overthrow of the present Government and the reinstallation of Amanullah.

The superficial character of the preparations is illustrated by the fact that no consideration was given to the revolutionary Amanullah group in Germany, which includes former officers as, for instance, Abdul Geni, who some years ago, with the authorization of Reich President von Hindenburg and by instruction of King Amanullah, served some time in the German Army and later devoted himself to military studies in Germany. Even this follower of Amanullah always stressed that no coup in behalf of Amanullah could be successful without careful military preparation. The Afghan army with its modern equipment would have to be confronted with a force similarly equipped, while the present leaders of the Government would have to be assassinated. It would be utterly misjudging the present situation in Afghanistan to think that the goal could be attained just by sending money, arms, and planes to the tribes disposed to revolt.

The project of the Foreign Ministry

Now that the Amanullah idea has been proposed to them, the Foreign Ministry seems to consider embarking on an even rasher adventure. The Foreign Ministry has also decided to overthrow the present government by revolt and to put Amanullah back on the throne. The project is to be executed, however, by Gulam Sittig (Berlin), Amanullah's former Foreign Minister and envoy, without any active support whatever by Germany and Soviet Russia. Gulam Sittig is known to the Aussenpolitisches Amt for his ambiguous connections (England).

He had been rejected so far by Canaris' Intelligence Department as well as by Minister Dr. Grobba, who made his acquaintance in 1928 while he was the [Foreign Ministry] officer for the Middle East. All the preparations for carrying the project into effect seem to consist in accepting Sittig's statement that he is able to realize these plans. It would probably not be wrong to assume that the guiding spirit of this project is Minister von Hentig, who already on previous occasions designated Gulam Sittig as Amanullah's representative in Germany. Habicht, the new Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, seems to have adopted this view together with the explanation for it. For Party Comrade Habicht has stated, in full accord with the interpretation which von Hentig has always advanced, that the present Government of Afghanistan is weak and subservient to England, that the Afghan army, air force, and police are no good, and that Gulam Sittig consequently would find it easy to sweep away that Government. The plans involving him have progressed to the stage where Gulam Sittig and Party Comrade Kleist, of Minister Ribbentrop's Secretariat, are at present negotiating in Moscow for the assent of Soviet Russia, following previous inquiries by Count Schulenburg⁶ with Molotov.

The position of the Aussenpolitisches Amt

In the opinion of the Amt, Gulam Sittig's projected coup would result only in setting off a civil war in Afghanistan without achieving the desired goal. It is even possible that the present Government, out of fear of far-reaching military action by Germany and Soviet Russia, might feel compelled, as a precautionary measure, to appeal to England for help (planes, etc.) and thus fall back into its former policy of dependence. Such a step, however, would destroy Germany's whole position in one blow, and Afghanistan would be lost as a base for a German thrust against British India.

The inquiry already made in Moscow was especially dangerous because, in the absence of any previously obtained guarantee of Afghanistan's boundaries, it virtually challenges Soviet Russia to take advantage of the civil war to annex the northern provinces (in analogy with the penetration of the Baltic countries) and so exclude German influence in that region.

It therefore appears urgently necessary:

1. To put an immediate stop to the action planned by the Foreign Ministry and to recall its emissaries from Moscow, because if the Afghan Government should learn of the current discussions it would see in them a confirmation of the rumors launched by the British in Kabul that Germany and Soviet Russia are planning a thrust against

⁶ See documents Nos. 60, 353, and 369.

British India through Afghanistan, and would of necessity draw its own conclusions.

2. To try to put pressure on the present Afghan Government to have it open the borders to the warlike Afghan tribes in the so-called no-man's land, which in deference to England it has hitherto left to their own devices in their revolts, and unofficially to give them systematic aid; meanwhile, a benevolent attitude will be taken by Germany and Soviet Russia. Moreover, the present Government should be prevailed upon to agree to a study of the possibilities of war against British India, as well as to general staff consultations; to that end it would be desirable to send to Kabul a prominent figure familiar with the Orient, e. g., Minister Dr. Grobba.

3. As a preliminary condition, to obtain Soviet Russia's agreement to a guarantee of Afghanistan's present boundaries; in other words, to have her renounce her aspirations to access to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan.

4. In the event that the negotiations with the present Government of Afghanistan should be unsuccessful, to give careful consideration and preparation in all respects to every other project, such as, for instance, that relating to Amanullah, so as to give due regard to Afghanistan's significance as a bridge to British India.⁷

⁷The outcome of this conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the Ausenpolitisches Amt on policies toward Afghanistan can be learned from a document of a much later period. On July 12, 1941, the Ausenpolitisches Amt sent a letter to Lammers protesting the contemplated appointment of Hentig as Minister to Afghanistan and, in support of this position, submitted a critical appraisal of Hentig's policies in the Middle East in the form of a note dated July 8, 1941. With reference to Afghanistan, the memorandum reviewed the controversy dealt with in the documents printed and then stated: "Fortunately, by means of a report sent by the Amt to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, this Amanullah action was prevented at the last minute." This document is Nuremberg No. 281-PS, but was not published in the Nuremberg collection. It is in the custody of the National Archives in Washington.

No. 471

452/223389-92/1

Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

KILO, December 18, 1939.

DEAR BARON WEIZSÄCKER: In my letter of December 7¹ I took the liberty of pointing out that the Russian attack on Finland will entail severe damage to our war economy. In the meantime, unfortunately, all this has come to pass. The Russians have blockaded the western coast, they have sunk a German ship, and since then all sea connections between Germany and Finland have been severed. To take one example, 600 tons of copper and one million eggs destined for Germany cannot be shipped.

¹ Document No. 426.
260090-54-41

I must continue to play the role of Cassandra, which is not at all to my liking.

You know that in spite of three weeks of war the Russians have not achieved any decisive victories and that in equipment and manner of fighting the Red Army exhibits notable shortcomings. In all probability the war will last for a long time and numerous complications may arise. But if we suppose that within the foreseeable future the Russians will have occupied the Finnish territory, after it has been ravaged by fire and deserted by its inhabitants, how will the situation appear then?

It is not Sweden which possesses the key position in the Baltic Sea, but Finland, including the Åland Islands. We would have the Russians in Liepāja, Ventspils, Saare, Hiiumaa, and also in Åland and Tornio.² This was the case even in the time of the Tsars, to be sure, but today, with the effectiveness of modern weapons, this gives Russia quite a different position. A great power holding these positions dominates the central and northern parts of the Baltic Sea, and also Sweden, whose capital and whose mines are exposed to the action of modern weapons based at Åland and Tornio. The entire North would then come under Russia's influence.

No counteraction is possible against this, especially not from Swedish territory.

I know that I am not saying anything new, but this letter is meant to show that these thoughts have come up anew and in definite form precisely under the impact of the first weeks of the war, which I am experiencing here. Therefore I am also sending you a report at the same time, which deals with the same subject.³

In this private letter, however, I want to go beyond the report and add something which I cannot take up in the report, since I have received the strictest instructions from you that there is no chance of mediation.

The little less than three weeks of war must have brought intelligent Russians to the realization that the sacrifices which they have made are out of all proportion to the results achieved; that it is more than doubtful whether and when they can gain possession of Finland; and that even if they do have possession this will mean—aside from a gain from the standpoint of power politics—only new and great difficulties.

On the other hand, the Finns have seen that the Russians are in earnest, and they are well aware of the dangerous nature of the situation. It seems to me that there is no doubt that the Finnish Govern-

² Libau, Windau, Ösel, Dagö, Åland, and Torneå in the German original.

³ Not printed (1821/416719-22).

ment would now be willing to give in on the main point of contention, Hangö.

If the role of honest broker was ever appropriate to a political situation, it is here, and no country but Germany is in a position to play this role.

The Russian adventure in Finland, if it is pursued further, can have only bad consequences for Germany. Therefore we for our part have the greatest interest in tactfully guiding the two opponents toward a settlement.

That is all, and I expect that you will anathematize the heretic.

If I might ask a favor, I should appreciate it if Herr von Grundherr were informed of the contents of this letter.

With Heil Hitler, a kiss to the Baroness's hand, and the best wishes for the new year, I remain,

Yours, etc.,

BLÜCHER

No. 472

259/169866

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

COPENHAGEN, December 19, 1939—1:00 a. m.

No. 320 of December 18

Received December 19—5:15 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

In the talk which the Danish merchant Pless-Schmidt had with Lord Halifax yesterday, the latter is said to have shown lively interest in an early peace and readiness to enter negotiations. The conversation was apparently based on the following proposal drafted together with former Finnish Foreign Minister Erkkö:

1. Poland is to be reconstituted as an independent state, bounded in the west by the German border of 1914, in the east by the Russian border of September 1939.
2. Czechia is to be given a government of her own under German suzerainty and remain part of Germany's military sphere of interest.
3. Return of the colonies.
4. An alliance between the belligerent countries, together with Italy and Spain, to guarantee the peace in Europe (Russia omitted!).
5. A guarantee of the integrity of Finland and the Baltic states.

The Finnish Minister¹ will probably try to arrange a meeting between the Reich Foreign Minister and Pless-Schmidt, who is flying to Berlin tomorrow as a Finnish courier.²

RENTHE-FINK

¹ Aarne Wuorimaa.

² Nothing further has been found on this incident.

No. 473

1860/422889

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 428 of December 19

HELSINKI, December 19, 1939—2:45 p. m.

Received December 19—4:10 p. m.

Pol. VI 2859.

1. It is asserted in authoritative circles here that the German Government has told the Swedish Government that if Sweden should intervene on the side of Finland the result would be military action by Germany against Sweden. Please wire instructions on whether I may deny this assertion.

2. I hear that England and France are exerting pressure on the Swedish Government to intervene in favor of Finland. The Finns suspect that the Western Powers may create a secondary theater of operations in the North, possibly with airbases in Southern Sweden.

3. The Finnish military wish to keep the Russo-Finnish war isolated from the larger war, and they desire Sweden to come in on the Finnish side.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ Marginal note: "The Minister should not participate in such gossip. We are neutral in this conflict and have other things to do than occupy ourselves with such hypothetical possibilities. The basis for our attitude on the northern question is our friendship with Soviet Russia. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 474

1188/824645-46

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow, December 19, 1939].

SECRET

No. 968 of December 19

For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary von Weizsäcker only.

I. The first conversation with Mikoyan today led to the expected difficulties:¹

Mikoyan insisted that the German compensatory deliveries had to consist almost entirely of military deliveries. The Soviet Government demanded a positive reply on the entire military list submitted in Berlin, even on the individual items definitely rejected in Berlin. As you know, we rejected the following very important items in

¹ The economic negotiations had been transferred back to Moscow; see document No. 442.

Berlin: the two cruisers *Seydlitz* and *Prinz Eugen*, plans of the battleship *Bismarck*, heavy naval artillery, 24 cm. cannon, the most modern mines and torpedoes, machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition. The Soviet Government considers delivery of the entire list the only satisfactory equivalent for the deliveries of raw materials, which under present conditions are not otherwise obtainable for Germany on the world market.

I pointed out very emphatically to Mikoyan that in making this demand he was acting contrary to the spirit of the correspondence between Ribbentrop and Molotov of September 28, which mentioned only German compensatory deliveries of an industrial nature. Actually the only contractual claim to deliveries of military supplies lay within the framework of the Credit Treaty of August 19. Even though we did not want to restrict ourselves to this limitation in all circumstances, we nevertheless had to reserve the right to decide what military equipment we could and wished to supply. Mikoyan, however, persisted in his demand.

I definitely rejected it. The negotiations have therefore failed in this instance.

II. If the other side does not bring up the matter again on Wednesday on their own initiative, I shall first of all call on Molotov on Thursday in order to bring the negotiations back in line with the correspondence of September 28 between Ribbentrop and Molotov.

BITTER

SCHULENBURG

No. 475

4063/E067839

The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

URGENT
No. 493

BERLIN, December 20, 1939—10:45 p. m.
zu Pol. VI 2859.

For the Minister personally.

The Foreign Minister requests that you avoid discussions of hypothetical possibilities such as are described in paragraph one of telegraphic report No. 428.¹ Germany is neutral in the Russo-Finnish conflict. The basis for our attitude on the northern question is our friendship with Soviet Russia.

For your information: Germany has not made the alleged statement to the Swedish Government.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 473.

No. 476

103/111898

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1124

BERLIN, December 20, 1939.
RAM No. 609.

For Ambassador Ritter.

With reference to your telegram No. 968 of December 19.¹

I entirely agree with your procedure and request that on my express authority you influence Molotov to get the negotiations returned to the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28. There can be no question of deliveries of military equipment alone or of delivery of the separate items already rejected in Berlin.

Tell M. Molotov also that I am very much surprised at Mikoyan's attitude and can hardly assume that it has the approval of Stalin and Molotov.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 474.

No. 477

Nuremberg document 2233-PS
Exhibit Frank-10

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

KRAKÓW, December 20, 1939.

CONVERSATION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL² WITH MINISTER VON
WÜHLISCH³ ON DECEMBER 20, 1939

Among other things the Governor General was informed of the complaint made by the Soviet Union that again and again Jews were being deported from the Government General to the Soviet Union by official organs of the German Reich.

The Governor General authorized Minister von Wühlisch to inform SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger⁴ directly that any action of this kind

¹ This document is found on p. 110, vol. 1, of the Frank Diary, a microfilm copy of which is in the custody of the National Archives in Washington, D. C.

² Hans Frank had assumed his functions as Governor General of the General Government of Poland on Oct. 25.

³ J. Wühlisch was the Foreign Ministry's representative with the Oberbefehlshaber Ost, the Chief of the military administration in occupied Poland.

⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, high SS and police official in the Government General, 1939-43.

was to be discontinued in the future. The complaint made by the Soviet Union is to be taken absolutely seriously; disturbance of the necessary friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany by such actions must in all circumstances be avoided.

[EDITORS' NOTE. No record in the files of the Foreign Ministry has been found of the conversations which, according to *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 181, took place between Mussolini and Himmler on December 20, and between Ciano and Himmler on December 21.]

No. 478

495/233448

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 1016

BERLIN, December 21, 1939.

During his visit today on routine business, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires once more reverted to Ciano's speech¹ and the impression it made in Germany. He wanted to make it clear to me at some length in what a pro-German manner Ciano had spoken and how excellent the speech had been.

I let Magistrati talk himself out and then referred him to the French, British, and neutral expressions of opinion, which had interpreted Ciano's speech somewhat differently.

Magistrati associated my reference mainly with the well-known passage in Ciano's speech that mentioned the periods of several years which Italy and Germany had specified were still necessary for their material preparations for war.² This passage had only served the purpose of showing the peaceful character of the German-Italian alliance, etc. I then let the matter drop.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The Fascist Grand Council in its declaration of Dec. 8 (see document No. 428, footnote 1), requested the Italian Foreign Minister to make an early statement on the international situation to the Chamber of Corporations. Ciano did so on Dec. 16. The text of his speech was published in the *Giornale d'Italia* of Dec. 17, 1939.

² In his speech Ciano reviewed the negotiation of the Axis alliance at Milan on May 6-7, 1939, and said that at that time Germany and Italy "were in full agreement as to the need for every effort to preserve peace in Europe for a long period, if only to assure to both countries the time necessary for finishing their construction programs and completing their armaments." He went on, "The length of this period was estimated by us as 3 years, by the Germans as 4 or 5."

No. 479

64/44284

The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MONTEVIDEO, December 22, 1939—9:31 p. m.

No. 191 of December 22

Received December 23—6:35 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. (group garbled) of December 21.¹

I urge that the DNB be told to stop and deny the false report about improper conduct of British sailors at the graves of the men from *Graf Spee*. The untruth of the report is obvious here and merely impugns the credibility of all DNB reports without doing any good. The chivalry of the captured British sailors has been sufficiently publicized in the American newspapers by the United Press, which at the same time gave recognition to the good conduct of the sailors of *Graf Spee* towards them, so that the DNB report of the (group garbled) of the dead is being exploited against us as being unworthy of belief; this has already happened in several newspapers. The attitude of the South American public toward those who died on *Spee* is so full of admiration and sympathy that such false reporting needlessly destroys this popular sympathy for Germany once and for all and drives the public irretrievably into the arms of the enemy propaganda. Up to now as a result of our counterpropaganda the man in the street was suspicious in the face of the large-scale press propaganda of the enemy and had confidence in the German reports.

LANGMANN

¹ Not found.

No. 480

APA Reel No. 290

*Stabsleiter Schickedanz to Reichsminister Lammers*¹

Schi./L 4957/39

DECEMBER 22, 1939.

DEAR HERR REICHSMINISTER DR. LAMMERS: I am enclosing two more memoranda for your information on the matter indicated.²

Heil Hitler!

¹ The document and the two enclosures are unsigned but are from a file of the Executive Staff [*Stabsleitung*] of the APA, headed by Schickedanz, Rosenberg's chief of staff. The file is in custody of the German Military Documents Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U. S. Army, No. 250-d-18-42/1.

² The second memorandum, not printed, recorded a telephone call of Dec. 22 from Grundherr who had wished to see Scheidt before he went to Oslo. Schickedanz told Grundherr that Scheidt had already left, but assured him that Scheidt was going purely as an observer and would give a full report on his return.

[Enclosure]

Stabsleitung

BERLIN, December 22, 1939.

REICHSLIETTER ROSENBERG'S CONVERSATION WITH COUNSELOR HEWEL,
DECEMBER 21, 1939, IN THE PRESENCE OF REICHSAMTSLEITER SCHEIDT

Subject: Norway.

Hewel gave a few explanations about the Foreign Ministry's discreet investigations concerning Quisling and his organization. He emphasized moreover that the Foreign Minister had entrusted handling of this question to Geheimrat Grundherr of the Foreign Ministry.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg forcefully pointed out that the Foreign Ministry could not possibly concern itself with carrying out this matter without overburdening itself. He promised to keep the Foreign Minister informed and to talk it over with him as soon as he [Rosenberg] was well again. Hewel then expressed some concern as to possible effects of the intended action upon the Foreign Minister's Russian policy. Reichsleiter Rosenberg explained the situation to him. Such an action would lead not to hindrance but rather to a perceptible easing, since with the present state of affairs and the forcing back of the Finns, armed incidents might occur at any moment at the new frontier with Norway. Such an incident could develop into a serious conflict, perhaps involving England. Then naturally an intervention by us in the intended manner [*Eingreifen unsererseits in der beabsichtigten Weise*] would be much more difficult than before. Now it could be explained as a safeguard for Russia in her actions against Finland and thereby meet with Russia's complete understanding—assuming, of course, that the Foreign Minister has not already recognized Scandinavia as a Russian sphere of influence. Since Hewel ruled out this assumption, complete agreement was reached.

Hewel then asked again for as prompt information as possible for the Foreign Minister on any measures that may be impending. Reichsleiter Rosenberg promised this too. In passing Hewel also mentioned the financial support once again. He mentioned that there were a great many so-called "dribblets of foreign exchange." [*Devisen-tröpfchen*], and English pounds must gradually be disposed of, for already people in Sweden no longer want to accept them. Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasized that the details of this would have to be taken care of by the Reich Chancellery.

No. 481

4475/E087913-18

Special Protocol

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, December 22, 1939.

SPECIAL PROTOCOL OF DECEMBER 22, 1939, OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN
THE GERMAN AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES CONCERNING
GERMAN-SWEDISH TRADE IN 1940

On the occasion of the signature today of the "Protocol of the Conversations from December 11 to December 22, 1939, between the German and Swedish Government Committees on Questions of Trade and Payments between Germany and Sweden"¹ the following was also agreed on by the two Government Committees in consideration of the present special circumstances :

I

Swedish Exports to Germany in 1940

1. In so far as relevant applications are submitted, the Royal Swedish Government will permit export licenses to be issued for the export of Swedish goods to the German Reich as a rule up to the amounts which, according to the official Swedish export statistics of 1938, were exported to Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It is agreed that in the cases in which important deviations are noted between the official Swedish export statistics of 1938 and the corresponding import statistics the situation will be reviewed.

2. It was stated on the Swedish side that in consideration of the production and supply situation of Sweden the quantities exported in 1938 could not be maintained in all categories, but that an increase was possible in other categories.

a. In the case of the goods mentioned below, the following annual quantities replace the quantities for 1938 :

aa. Iron ore, list Nos. 405-407	10,000,000 t
bb. Charcoal pig iron, list No. 1330	20,000 t
cc. Tall oil, list No. 235	8,000 t
dd. Ferrosilicon, list Nos. 1333:1 and 1334:1	4,500 t
ee. Silicomanganese, list No. 1333:2	1,000 t
ff. Tallow, list No. 250	600 t

Note re aa.:

Attention is called by Sweden to the fact that export in the projected amount can be carried out only if a considerable portion, about 2 to 3 million tons, is taken via Narvik.

b. In the case of the following goods Sweden will not limit exports:

- aa. Lumber
- bb. Cellulose

¹ Not printed (4475/E087903-12).

- c. For the export of coal tar from list No. 435, export licenses will be issued at least for the amount which is obtained from German coal.
- d. For the products of agriculture and fishing the temporary arrangement in the annex ² has been made for 1940.
- e. A list of the goods which in consideration of her own supply situation Sweden can no longer deliver in 1940, or can deliver only during a transitional period,³ has been transmitted, as well as a communication concerning the further delivery of calfskins.

3. If there should be changes in the production and supply situation of Sweden which bring about a change in the export situation, the Government Committees will confer again.

4. The promise is made by Sweden that exports will be regulated in such a way that no country which has broken off relations with Germany will be treated better than Germany, on the basis of its former share of the Swedish exports.

II

German Exports to Sweden in 1940

1. Everything will be done by Germany so that the following deliveries will be made to Sweden in 1940, in so far as there are orders from Sweden:

- a. Coal up to 3,000,000 t
- b. Coke up to 1,500,000 t

It has been pointed out by Germany that the delivery of these amounts of coal and coke, which are a great deal more than the past exports to Sweden, depend upon the railroad transport situation, and that therefore Sweden's cooperation in the employment of railroad cars, etc. is urgently needed. Sweden has promised to do everything possible in this area.

Sweden is particularly interested in having coke delivered in the winter months in larger quantities than one-twelfth of the prescribed amount per month. Germany will do everything possible to comply with this wish.

c. Rolling mill products up to 300,000 t distributed as equally as possible over the separate months.

The amounts falling to the separate production groups are to be agreed upon by the experts with the participation of government representatives. If these conferences of experts do not lead to any results by the end of January 1940, then the Government Committees will confer once more.

² Not printed (4475/E087919).

³ Not printed (4475/E087930-31).

d. Coke pig iron up to 75,000 t distributed as equally as possible over the separate months. It was pointed out by the German side that it will probably not be possible to deliver steel pig iron.

e. Potash up to 85,000 t

f. Glauber's salt up to 130,000 t

g. Table salt up to 100,000 t

h. Calcined soda up to 30,000 t

i. Caustic soda up to 5,000 t

k. Chlorine, liquid, up to 14,000 t

l. Regarding further Swedish wishes for imports the German side has transmitted a reply in the form of a minute.⁴

2. In the cases in which under the changed circumstances the German exports to Sweden are no longer possible owing to raw materials difficulties, the Swedish Government will sympathetically consider whether the delivery of the necessary raw materials can be permitted the Swedish purchaser in the amounts agreed upon between purchaser and seller. The German Government will permit the export to Sweden of the goods produced with the help of such deliveries.

III

1. The assumption is made that the F. O. B. prices for the quantities of German products specified under II 1, *a* to *c* and *e* to *k* and the F. O. B. prices for the quantity of Swedish iron ore specified under I 2 are to be kept at the level of the F. O. B. prices in force in 1939 before September 1. At the same time it is not excluded that there may be an agreed moderate increase in prices on both sides, in order that the desire of the parties concerned to make deliveries may be maintained. Details are to be clarified forthwith between the experts of both countries, with the participation of government representatives. The Government Committees will then confer once more.⁵

It is agreed that on the above basis there is to be a balance between the F. O. B. value of the German deliveries designated above and the F. O. B. value of the Swedish deliveries designated above. If the F. O. B. value of the German deliveries does not reach the F. O. B. value of the Swedish deliveries, or if it exceeds this value, which will still be checked, a balance must be found.

2. If the amounts contemplated on both sides should not be delivered in their entirety, the Government Committees will confer about the resulting consequences.

IV

In order to facilitate an orderly German-Swedish exchange of goods the Government Committees have pointed to the necessity of employ-

⁴ Not printed (4475/E087924-27).

⁵ On Jan. 12, 1940, a further Protocol was signed at Stockholm increasing the values to be attached to various items exchanged (4475/E087933-36).

ing ferry traffic more effectively and accelerating the circulation of railroad cars by improving and relieving ferry traffic, rerouting ferries, etc.

Experts of both traffic administrations have discussed these questions and will continue their discussions immediately. The Government Committees will follow the progress of these discussions.*

DR. WALTER

RICHERT

* On Feb. 22 the Defense Economy Staff of OKW notified the Operations Division of the Naval Staff of OKM of the status of Swedish and Norwegian ore deliveries to Germany. The report, which was an annex to the record of the Führer Naval Conference of Feb. 23 but was not included in the Brassey publication, was as follows:

"A. *Sweden*: Iron ore deliveries to Germany for 1940 as specified by German-Swedish agreement: 10,000,000 tons.

(Swedish authorities consider it necessary to ship 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 tons via Narvik.)

However if arrangements could be made for storage during the winter months, the following amounts could be shipped:

via Luleå up to: 6,000,000 tons
via Oxelösund at least: 3,000,000 tons

Thus the ore to be shipped via Narvik would not exceed: 1,000,000 tons.

However we *cannot* depend on shipment of this amount during 1940 for the following reasons:

1. Owing to unfavorable weather conditions shipments from Luleå will begin later than usual this year.

2. Accumulated stocks do not exceed normal figures.

3. The ore railroad Luleå-Narvik will have to carry the additional load of supplies for Finland.

Swedish ore shipments to Germany since the beginning of the war have been as follows:

September	590,000 tons
October	795,000 tons
November	873,000 tons
December	ca. 661,000 tons (including 118,000 tons via Narvik)
January	490,000 tons (including 260,000 tons via Narvik)

B. *Norway*: Deliveries to be made to Germany in 1940:

Iron ore: 1,200,000 tons (ores poor in phosphorus, mainly via Kirkenes)

Deliveries since the beginning of the war:

September	80,000 tons
October	27,000 tons
November	21,000 tons
December	73,000 tons
January	40,000 tons

Copper (metal content): 7,200 tons

to be extracted from ca.:	180,000 tons cupriferous pyrites
	19,000 tons cupriferous calcined pyrites
	20,000 tons copper ore

Zinc ore: 6,500 tons

No limit on molybdenum concentrates. Output not more than: 750 tons

Deliveries to Germany in 1938: 415 tons

Titanium ore: 40,000 tons

Sulphur: 5,500 tons (taking into consideration the sulphur content of the cupriferous pyrites, the total sulphur deliveries are about 40,000 tons).

Iron alloys:

Ferrochrome:	No limit on deliveries, ca. 6,000 tons
Ferro-silicon:	ca. 13,000 tons
Silicomanganese:	ca. 5,000 tons

At present shipments are progressing normally."

No. 482

324/194235-87

Protocol Signed at Madrid on December 22, 1939

SECRET

zu W. XXII/600.¹

Not for publication.

At the negotiations which took place at Madrid,² the delegations appointed by the German and the Spanish Governments have established the following:

The German delegation states that the German and Spanish Governments, in the secret agreements of July 1937 and especially in the protocols of July 12 and 15, 1937,³ have declared their desire by means of the projected comprehensive settlement of their relations to develop trade between the two countries in a manner that would be most conducive to its maximum expansion. Guided by this viewpoint, the delegations of the two Governments carried on negotiations on economic and financial questions at Burgos from June 12 to July 5, 1939.⁴ These negotiations led to agreement in principle on the future normal exchange of goods and payments, which is calculated to expand and intensify the economic relations between the two countries for a long time to come.

The contracting parties also declared in article 9 of the Treaty of Friendship of March 31, 1939⁵ that they would intensify the economic relations between their countries as much as possible and they affirmed their desire that Germany and Spain should supplement each other and cooperate in economic matters in every way. The contracting parties further declared in article 6 of the Treaty that in the event of warlike complications with any third power they would avoid anything that might be disadvantageous to the treaty partner or of advantage to its opponent.

In consequence of the general development, it has not been possible to complete the negotiations on the German-Spanish economic relations in the manner envisaged in July 1939.

Likewise, the German delegation declares that as soon as the situation permits the resumption of normal economic relations, the negotiations to give them final form are to be continued and completed with a view to achieving the objectives set forth in the protocols and the afore-mentioned Treaty of Friendship.

In carrying into effect the decisions of the Inter-Ministerial Treaty Commission as approved by the higher authorities, the Spanish dele-

¹ W XXII/600 is the cover note of Dec. 29 (324/194168; not printed) with which the Protocol of Dec. 22 was transmitted.

² See document No. 282.

³ See vol. III, documents Nos. 392, 394, 397.

⁴ See vol. III, document No. 809.

⁵ See vol. III, document No. 773.

gation for its part emphasizes the keen desire and the firm intention of the Spanish Government to give full support not only to the treaty instruments referred to in the German declaration, but also to the spirit of mutual trust and sincerity which animates them and which dominated the negotiations, started during the past summer, which were referred to in the above-mentioned declaration. Although these negotiations did not culminate in an agreement, they gave expression nonetheless to the desires of the two countries with regard to their economic and commercial relations, as well as to Spain's desire to meet her commitments to which the declaration mentioned refers; their realization has been prevented thus far by the deplorable international situation.

Both Governments take cognizance of the above statements and declare their agreement with them.

Done in duplicate in the German and Spanish languages at Madrid, December 22, 1939.*

For the German Government:

E. VON STOHRER

HELMUTH WOHLTHAT

For the Spanish Government:

JUAN BEIGBEDER

CASA ROJAS

* A more specific agreement laying down the basic principles for German-Spanish economic relations was also signed on Dec. 22 (324/194238-44). A mixed German-Spanish commission was to be set up with the power to authorize private transactions between firms on either side. The commission was to be guided by the principle that current trade would be in those goods in which each of the two countries was especially interested. Both sides agreed that, even though the present situation prevented a development of German-Spanish trade as envisaged in June 1939, economic agreements with other countries and economic policies in general must not prejudice a resumption of normal economic relations between the two countries after the war. Both recognized that the volume of future German-Spanish trade could not be calculated at present. The Spanish Government stated also its willingness "to examine" certain German claims arising from civil war contracts and to enter into negotiations about them; but it also pointed to Spain's great difficulties in settling her debts during the present period of economic reconstruction. Finally, Spain emphasized her willingness to meet German import wishes, though with the reservation that the goods in question were not needed by Spain herself or had to be exported to other markets in view of Spain's foreign exchange situation.

No. 483

22/18750

The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 542

BERLIN, December 23, 1939.

e. o. Pol. VI 2667 g.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 482 of December 17.¹ Reichsamtssleiter Scheidt of the Aussenpolitisches Amt left last

¹ Document No. 466.

night at the instruction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for several days in Oslo, in order to consult with Quisling, Hagelin, and their circle. The purpose of the visit is observation, but not active participation in Quisling's plans.² The Foreign Minister requests that you maintain discreet contact with Scheidt and come to Berlin for instructions shortly before or after the New Year.³ You will report in this matter only to the Foreign Minister, myself, and Grundherr.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 511.

³ See document No. 503.

No. 434

1370/357101-05

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, December 23, 1939.

At 10:00 p. m. on December 22, 1939, a conversation took place between Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg and the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, M. Molotov, regarding the status of the economic negotiations. The Ambassador pointed out to M. Molotov that the negotiations were unfortunately not taking the course expected. The difficulties that had arisen were mainly attributable to the fact that the parties have so far not been able to reach an agreement regarding deliveries and compensatory deliveries. Whereas we understood by the term "industrial deliveries," mentioned in the exchange of letters between Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and M. Molotov, principally products of our civilian industry, the Soviets were demanding the adoption of an exorbitant and purely military program, apparently disregarding entirely the fact that we are at present at war with two of the strongest countries in the world and therefore have corresponding requirements of our own. For this reason the conversations with Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre had so far not led to any understanding. The German Government deplored this all the more since it regarded these negotiations as of much more than merely economic importance and held that an agreement on a sensible basis was in the interest of both countries. Consequently, the German Government had instructed him to make an appointment with M. Molotov for Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre, since M. Molotov had conducted the correspondence with Herr von Ribbentrop and was in any case more competent to interpret it than was M. Mikoyan, who had not participated in the conversations of September 28. The German Government therefore expected that M.

Molotov would assert his great authority and influence also in this matter, in order to clarify the situation. For this reason he asked him to receive Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre tomorrow for a detailed discussion in order that they might present to M. Molotov the German viewpoint in all its details.

M. Molotov replied that he was informed about the difficulties that had arisen in connection with the economic negotiations. On the question of the interpretation of his exchange of letters with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, he was obliged to state the following at the very outset: By the term "industrial deliveries" they had by no means meant only products of the German civilian industry. This expression had been chosen at the time because the correspondence was to be published. The Soviet Government had never entertained a doubt, however, that by the term "industrial deliveries" military orders were also meant. He—Molotov—remembered distinctly that in the course of the conversations on September 28 Herr von Ribbentrop had made the remark that Germany would deliver everything to her friend, the Soviet Union, that the latter desired of Germany. The Soviet Government had noted this at the time with especial satisfaction. It did not have the intention of requesting anything of Germany which went beyond what was usual in trade between two friendly countries. Above all, the Soviet Government had full understanding for the fact that Germany was producing certain military articles which for reasons of military secrecy she could not supply to other states, even if she was very friendly with them. There could be no misunderstanding on this score. As far as the war which Germany was now waging was concerned, the Soviet Government naturally wished to take it fully into consideration. On the other hand, however, it knew that Germany had an industry capable of producing large amounts of war material. Nevertheless the Soviet Government did not expect us to grant all its wishes in the military field. Thus, for example, three cruisers were mentioned in the Soviet lists, but the Soviet Government would understand it if Germany explained that in the present situation she could deliver only one of these. He also wished to state that in such negotiations differences of opinion were unavoidable. Despite all the interest the Soviet Government had in having its wishes fulfilled, it had never expected that we would grant them 100 percent. It would be the task of the negotiations to obtain an agreement in this matter that satisfied the wishes of both sides. But there was another side to the whole affair that was producing a very unfavorable reaction, since it shed a peculiar light on the German attitude toward the negotiations. He was thinking in this connection of the German

prices, particularly in the field of aviation. These prices were so exorbitant as actually to give the effect of a kind of demonstration. They gave the impression that the whole agreement was intentionally being allowed to fail. This would be a particularly inappropriate and annoying form of refusal. It was customary in all such negotiations for the parties concerned to make greater demands at the start; he had the impression in the present case that both sides were guilty of exaggeration. None the less, with good will and a sensible attitude on both sides, a solution could be found. But the decisive thing was that the German viewpoint, according to which the exchange of letters between Herr von Ribbentrop and himself had not envisaged deliveries of military equipment, was untenable. In this connection he again had to point out that Herr von Ribbentrop had promised the Soviet Government generous cooperation on the part of Germany, precisely in the military field. This naturally did not preclude Germany's being able with justification to refuse to supply the Soviet Union with certain products, such as modern torpedoes and the like.

Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg stated in reply that Germany did not refuse to make a certain portion of the deliveries, that seemed reasonable to her, in military products. It was absurd, however, for M. Mikoyan to demand a 120 percent fulfillment of the program, and that exclusively in the form of military supplies, and to state in addition "either everything or nothing." As far as prices were concerned, the planes and related material represented an investment of billions that had had to be spent for the construction and development of the models in question, and it was only right and proper that the Soviet Union should share proportionately in these costs.

M. Molotov replied that he could not share this view. The Soviet Government had also spent many billions on the development of its oil fields and its agricultural enterprises and it was only because of this that it was in a position to supply Germany with correspondingly large amounts of petroleum and grains. It did not occur to it, however, to raise its grain and petroleum prices on this account. Our impression that M. Mikoyan demanded "either everything or nothing" was also not correct. They were not making any unjust demands of us, and with good will on both sides, it would be possible to reach an agreement. He was prepared accordingly to receive Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre in the Kremlin on December 23 at 5:00 p. m., in the presence of People's Commissar Mikoyan.

No. 485

8485/E596834

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 440 of December 23 HELSINKI, December 24, 1939—2:25 p. m.

Received December 24—9:30 p. m.

Pol. VI 2915.

The great interest which Italy is taking in Finland's fate is attracting attention here, although Finland participated in the sanctions at the time and at one time [*sic*] showed sympathy for Fascism. Italy is delivering planes and is supporting Finland in the warmest way on the radio, and Italian journalists who have come here are ostentatiously siding with Finland.

The difference between the German and the Italian positions causes a good deal of comment.

BLÜCHER

No. 486

2997/587586

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1939—8:58 p. m.

No. 814 of December 24 Received December 25—11:30 a. m.

Pol. IX 2547.

In his efforts to have the United States participate in a possible mediation attempt, President Roosevelt has felt the need for closer cooperation with the Pope.

For several weeks rumors have persisted here that President Roosevelt would send a special American envoy to the Vatican, and the name of Secretary of War Woodring was first mentioned in this connection. In view of the aversion of large Protestant groups in America to establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Roosevelt had to await the proper moment for this plan, and thought that the Christmas season would be the right time. In order to forestall criticism by these groups, Roosevelt had his press spokesman state, simultaneously with the announcement concerning Taylor's appointment as his special envoy to the Vatican, that this should not be considered a departure from the traditional American policy toward the Vatican, and that the appointment did not signify the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

Myron C. Taylor is the 70-year-old, highly respected former president of the biggest American steel concern, the United States of America [*sic*] Steel Corporation; he is a member of the Episcopal Church, is closely connected with Quakers and is consequently not a Catholic. Taylor is well known in Italy and has owned a villa in Florence for many years. He will take over his post in a few weeks.

THOMSEN

No. 487

1270/357089-100

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1000 of December 24

[Moscow, December 24, 1939].

For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

With reference to your telegram No. 1194 [*11249*] of December 20.¹

Conversations with Molotov make it possible to resume negotiations with Mikoyan.

Molotov did not support various points of Mikoyan's position as communicated in telegraphic report No. 968 of December 19.² He does not insist that German compensatory deliveries be of an exclusively military nature. He admits that even between powers such as Germany and the Soviet Union, where especially friendly relations exist, there are reasons for military secrecy and consideration for the fact of being at war.

Conversations with Molotov have produced two new viewpoints. First, the statement that for the present the Soviet Union did not intend to copy German airplanes. If at a later time after she had become familiar with the planes she wished to copy one airplane type or another, she would get in touch with us again for this purpose. In this connection Molotov repeatedly declared that the Soviet Government had found the over-all price of three hundred million reichsmarks for the planes a particularly inappropriate and annoying form of refusal. Second, the statement that the term "industrial" deliveries in the Ribbentrop-Molotov exchange of letters of September 28 also included "military" deliveries. The word "industrial" had been selected at the time only because the correspondence was to be published and the intention of making "military" deliveries should not be publicized.

The conversations with Molotov, too, were very sharp at times. Even though they make it possible to resume negotiations, we can

¹ Document No. 476.

² Document No. 474.

hardly expect the negotiations to make smooth and rapid progress.* The other side attaches decisive importance to the delivery of heavy naval artillery and coastal artillery; we did not refuse this in Berlin, to be sure, but we did indicate that any statement as to time of delivery was impossible. I shall make a special report on this point shortly if the occasion demands.⁴

RITTER
SCHULENBURG

* In a letter of Dec. 27 (1370/857106-07) to Ribbentrop, Ritter referred to this telegram and to Hilger's memorandum (document No. 484), and concluded with the following observation: "Negotiations here are not proceeding favorably. Both in general and in detail the other side is not showing the generosity that should result from the new political situation. Instead they are trying to get all they think they can. I assume that in the next few days I shall be obliged to report orally in Berlin about the whole situation." See document No. 490, footnote 8.

⁴ See document No. 499, enclosure 1.

No. 488

1719/399356-57;
169/82971-72

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, December 25, 1939—11:45 p. m.

No. 1052 of December 25

Received December 26—6:00 a. m.

Pol. V 12419.

Foreign Minister Gafencu just summoned me to inform me that former Polish President Moscicki had become very ill, so that physicians urgently recommended his transfer to a Swiss sanatorium. A cabinet meeting which took place the day before yesterday thought that from humanitarian considerations it had to consent to his departure, particularly as there were no juridical grounds for the internment of this dying man, who had definitely renounced politics; thereupon the decision had been adopted yesterday evening to permit Moscicki to leave together with his wife and his daughter, and last night arrangements had been made with Belgrade and Rome to permit the transit of the sleeping car. The departure had taken place today; I nevertheless strongly remonstrated with Gafencu, as he and the former head of the Government had promised me to permit departure only after consultation with us.¹ Juridically this promise, already given me by Calinescu, was (group garbled) outside the neutrality question. At the time Argetoianu, too, had thought it appropriate and tactful personally to inform us of the King's wish for Moscicki's

¹ See documents Nos. 64 and 100.

departure.² It was beyond my understanding how one could disregard that; the cabinet decision of December 23 was an affront. It had evidently been intended to present us with a fait accompli.

Gafencu, who was deeply impressed, wanted to shift the question to the sphere of humanitarianism (treatment of a seriously ill person). From his remarks it was evident that persistent representations from Swiss and American diplomatic quarters had influenced the Cabinet, also, if the Rumanian Ambassador in Berlin had made a démarche in the matter, we had not been able to show him legal grounds for Moscicki's retention.

To my ironical question whether the same procedure would be followed with regard to Beck and other members of the Government, Gafencu said there could be no question of that.

When I suggested that Moscicki still be stopped at the border Gafencu stated that this was no longer possible because of the time element involved, as the entire Government and the King had left Bucharest for the holidays, and the train would cross the border this evening.

FABRICIUS

² See document No. 100, footnote 1.

No. 489

582/241946-50

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET.

BERLIN, December 26, 1939.

Subject: Delivery of coal to Italy.

Our coal deliveries to Italy during 1939 did not reach the agreed monthly quota of approximately 750,000 tons until July; they decreased to about 670,000 tons in September and October and dropped to 330,000 tons in November. The greater part went by sea; rail shipments reached a maximum of 277,000 tons in the month of October, and declined to 175,000 tons in November.

The alarming drop in November led to repeated urgent representations by the Italians: by the Commercial Counselor of the Italian Embassy to me in the middle of November;¹ by Ambassador Attolico to State Secretary von Weizsäcker on November 23;² as well as to Ambassador Ritter on November 27,³ and to the Reich Foreign Minister on December 4.⁴ Attolico on each occasion emphasized the de-

¹ The record of this step was not found.

² The full memorandum is in the files but is not printed (1571/380219-20).

³ The full memorandum is in the files but is not printed (1848/421088-93).

⁴ Not found.

cisive political importance of the question, which we allegedly did not yet appreciate sufficiently. The following is from the memorandum by State Secretary Weizsäcker:

"All that the Italian Government wanted was to attain a state of economic preparation for war which would preclude a repetition of the experiences of August 25. Attolico maintained that the Germans had obviously not yet made all the necessary efforts in transportation. At the same time it seemed that we entirely overlooked the political import of the problem."

The following is from the memorandum by Ambassador Ritter:

"Important Italian war industries had only a one- to two-week coal supply. The situation thus was still the same as the 'tragic moment' in August. Unless her coal situation improved radically, Italy would also find herself in the same situation on similar occasions in the future. In the earlier discussions, which had envisaged a period of several years, it had in fact been agreed that Italy must in the meantime lay up a reserve of 2 million tons of coal annually. Far from making this possible, the current imports did not even suffice for the current requirements. . . . The Italian Ambassador intends to propose in Rome that another conference of railway experts from both countries be held. The experts of both sides, however, would have to be headed by a political figure, otherwise not much would be achieved."

At the conference with the Reich Foreign Minister on December 4, Attolico made similar statements: Regardless of maximum increase in deliveries by sea, the rail deliveries had to be increased to 1 million tons a month. The Reich Foreign Minister promised the Ambassador that he would use his influence to this end and instructed me in the presence of the Ambassador to do everything possible in order to reach that goal.

The Foreign Ministry thereupon intensified the efforts which had been under way in this direction since the middle of November. It was a question of releasing the necessary number of coal cars for the deliveries. The German railroads up to that time had furnished 5,300 cars for the purpose; the Italians had promised 3,000 cars. About 30,000 cars in all are necessary to attain the maximum capacity aimed at; of these, approximately 20,000 must be provided by the Germans and 10,000 by the Italians. The demand that Italy provide 10,000 cars had already been made by the Reich Foreign Minister in the conversation with Attolico on December 4. Attolico was going to make a strong recommendation to this end in Rome.

On December 5 Count Magistrati stated⁵ that the head of the Italian Coal Office, Nobili, an engineer, was prepared to come here

⁵ No memorandum of this conversation has been found.

for the contemplated discussions. On December 8 I informed him* that the discussions could begin here on December 13, but what they required primarily was a transportation expert with the necessary full powers, not a coal expert. We were prepared to do everything possible on our part to reach the monthly figure of 1 million tons, but the Italians would have to make available a minimum of 10,000 cars.

Magistrati promised that Italian representatives provided with the necessary powers would be here on December 13. In the course of the conversation he remarked incidentally but with emphasis that these talks were to be of a purely technical, not a political nature.

On December 11 Count Magistrati sent a memorandum⁷ giving the names of the Italian representatives for the talks on December 13 and stating that the Italians were prepared to furnish about 10,000 cars but had to request that in this case 5,000 Italian cars now used for the transportation of food to Germany be replaced by German ones.

In the meantime, the Reich Foreign Minister, through personal conversations with Field Marshal Göring, had been able to obtain the deferment of important economic interests at home in order to make possible the release of the 20,000 coal cars necessary for the shipment of 1 million tons a month to Italy.

This was reported by Ambassador Ritter at the opening of the conference on December 13. Surprisingly, the Italian representative Nobili thereupon declared that the program for delivery of 1 million tons a month was to be set up only as a precautionary measure for the contingency that the shipment of coal by sea should cease. He had come here only to discuss a current railway program for about 500,000 tons a month. Ambassador Ritter replied that this must be a mistake; the Italian delegation would have to request new instructions. Referring to the continued *démarches* of the Italian Ambassador and the resulting personal intervention by the Reich Foreign Minister, he reproached the Italian Commercial Attaché severely for the manner in which the matter was handled by the Italians.

Ambassador Mackensen was informed of the situation by telegram on December 14 and was instructed to discuss the matter in Rome and also inform Ambassador Attolico (attached telegram No. 1025⁸).

Attolico then gave Herr von Mackensen the following explanation in Rome: On the basis of his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister he had reported to Rome as the German view that Germany was to make available 20,000 cars if Italy provided 10,000. After his departure from Berlin, Ambassador Ritter had stated that if, on

* The memorandum on this conversation is not printed (8331/E589813).

⁷ Not printed (5234/E311155-57).

⁸ Not printed (1848/421101-02).

the basis of Magistrati's memorandum of December 11 (withdrawal of 5,000 food cars), Italy actually provided only 5,000 cars, the German offer would have to be reduced to 10,000 cars. Accordingly, since only 15,000 cars in all could be counted upon, Nobili had been instructed to discuss for the time being only a program of 500,000 tons a month, this being the quantity that could then be transported. (Cf. attached telegram No. 1023 of December 18 from Rome.⁹)

On December 16 Magistrati informed both State Secretary Weizsäcker¹⁰ and Ambassador Ritter¹¹ that the view of the Italian Government in the matter of the coal deliveries would be presented by Ambassador Attolico, who would presumably return here on December 18. The return of Attolico has been delayed without any further communication having been received from the Italian Government.

Two programs were drawn up at the technical discussions with the Italians on December 15,¹² namely one for a monthly shipment of 500,000 tons, and another for a monthly shipment of 1 million tons, under which the Germans and Italians were to furnish cars in the proportion of 2 to 1, respectively. The 500,000-ton program is getting under way.

Recommendation

In further discussions with Attolico it will be advisable to recall to him his earlier declarations and his urgent political representations, to state that Germany still agrees to the program of 1 million tons a month, and to make clear that the Italians are to blame if only a smaller program is to be carried out now.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

WIEHL

⁹ Not printed (1848/421104-05).

¹⁰ No memorandum of the Weizsäcker-Magistrati conversation has been found.

¹¹ The memorandum of the Ritter-Magistrati conversation is not printed (1848/421103).

¹² The memorandum of these discussions is not printed (5234/E311206-11).

No. 490

2997/587587-88

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, December 27, 1939.

zu Pol. IX 2547.¹

I should like to make the following comment on the annexed telegram No. 814 from Washington:¹

I do not believe that the sending of a special envoy to the Vatican indicates so much a desire on Roosevelt's part for close cooperation

¹ Pol. IX 2547: Document No. 486.

with the Pope in the event of possible attempts to mediate for peace; in my opinion it is, rather, a tactical move made with the *elections* in mind. The President has always shown unusually great consideration for the Catholic element in the United States (although, or perhaps because, he has many adversaries particularly among the Catholics, e. g., Father Coughlin,² etc.) and he now emphasizes this tendency in view of the coming election. The sending of Ambassador Kennedy to the Pope's coronation in the spring of 1939 was a step in that direction, and the appointment of Myron C. Taylor is a logical second step toward the same goal. Naturally, even Roosevelt cannot dare in the face of the preponderantly anti-Popish attitude of the American people to establish regular diplomatic relations between the American Government and the Vatican; to do this he would moreover need the consent of Congress, which he cannot get. As a result he confines himself to sending a special envoy for some time, probably until the American elections are over.

Myron C. Taylor is well known to us; as chairman of the refugee conference at Evian in 1938 he made a very nasty speech against Germany. He is very one-sidedly anti-German.

Submitted herewith to the Political Department.

I would propose that our Embassy at the Vatican, which probably will have received a copy of telegram No. 814 from Washington, be sent a commentary along these lines.³

DIECKHOFF

² Father Charles Edward Coughlin, whose radio addresses commanded a large audience at this time.

³ Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting: "Yes." The commentary was sent on Jan. 3, 1940. Copies were also sent to Rome and Madrid (8128/E582026-27).

No. 491

1719/399360-61

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 928

BERLIN, December 28, 1939—1:30 p. m.
zu Pol. V 12419.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 1052 of December 25.¹

I fully approve the line you have taken with Gafencu in the question of former Polish President Moscicki's departure. I request you to express emphatically to the Foreign Minister in my name also our great surprise at the breach of the promise made to me, and to add that it could not remain without consequences if a similar case contrary to the promise given were to occur again.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 488.

No. 492

8521/E597455

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Uruguay

Telegram

No. 286 of December 28

BERLIN, December 28, 1939—7:00 p. m.

zu R 32165

R 32196.¹

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 195 of December 24 and 196 of December 26.¹

For the Minister personally.

Please continue to convey by your manner that we regard the attitude of the Uruguayan Government in the *Graf Spee* incident as unjustified and without foundation, but otherwise continue to handle current matters with calm matter-of-factness. Further reply to the Uruguayan answer of December 19 is not contemplated.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Neither printed (8521/E597454/1-3 and 8521/E597454/4-5), dispatched Dec. 24 and Dec. 26, respectively. In telegram No. 195, Langmann described a conversation of Dec. 16 with Foreign Minister Guani, the decision to destroy the *Graf Spee*, the events which followed, and his view that Uruguay had been unable to resist British and French pressure. Langmann also reported in this telegram that on Dec. 22 Uruguay rejected the German Note of Protest of Dec. 17. (See document No. 467.) The Uruguayan rejection, dated Dec. 19 and transmitted in telegram No. 196, stated that since the *Graf Spee* had been treated in accordance with the Hague Convention and the Uruguayan Neutrality Decree of Sept. 5, 1939, there were no grounds for the captain's complaint that his ship had not been accorded her rights under international law. The Uruguayan Government therefore rejected the German Minister's protest embodying this complaint.

No. 493

F19/024-025

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 64

BERLIN, December 28, 1939.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 28, 1939

1. The Foreign Minister informed the Italian Ambassador briefly of the Pfitzner affair¹ and at the same time expressed his astonish-

¹ On Dec. 23, Ciano had complained to Mackensen of a speech delivered to a closed Party gathering by Josef Pfitzner, a Sudeten German and vice mayor of Prague, in which the latter was reported to have spoken of a future German empire embracing Trieste, the South Tirol, and Lombardy. See *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Dec. 23 and 27, 1939, Jan. 3 and 5, 1940. Ciano's version of this episode is supported by documents in the Foreign Ministry files: not printed (1571/380254-55, 70-71, 73-74; 2281/480567-69; 1848/421110-13).

A month earlier, on Nov. 26, Mackensen had reported (1571/380225-26) a similar complaint by Ciano because the Provincial Governor [*Statthalter*] at Dresden, in a speech delivered in the presence of the Italian Consul General, warned of "our friends who betray us," a reference which was taken to apply to Italians, as more dangerous even than the enemies of Germany. See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 26, 1939.

ment that a matter which from the outset bore the stamp of falsehood should have been taken so seriously by Ciano, and this at the very moment when the Führer was making the tremendous gesture vis-à-vis Italy in the question of the South Tirol. The Foreign Minister added that although the whole affair was in his opinion a pure fabrication, he had summoned Ambassador von Mackensen to Berlin to have him now clear up the matter with the Duce and Count Ciano once and for all.

2. On the question of coal deliveries Attolico expressed himself in the same sense as he had to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.² The Foreign Minister told him that he would use his influence in behalf of an arrangement whereby Germany would provide 20,000 cars even if Italy provided only 5,000, so that Italy might be supplied with sufficient coal.³

3. In reply to Attolico's question concerning Ciano's speech,⁴ the Foreign Minister said that it contained some excellent formulations. On reading the speech he had merely felt some apprehension that a few points might be exploited by France and England for their purposes. And that had actually occurred, particularly with respect to the passages on the Berchtesgaden negotiations preceding the outbreak of the war, on which the German and Italian views differed, and from which England and France deduced proof of Germany's war guilt. The second point which had given rise to apprehensions was the mention of the target periods, 3 years for Italy and 5 years for Germany, which the two countries needed to be prepared for war. The Foreign Minister closed this subject with the remark that he did not attach any further importance to the matter in itself.

4. With reference to Russia, the Foreign Minister told Attolico that he was surprised at the extreme anti-Russian attitude of Italy, since the Russian expansion did not, after all, threaten either Germany or Italy. Ambassador Attolico explained this anti-Russian attitude by referring to the vital needs of Fascist domestic policy.

R[IEBENTROP]

² Wiehl's record of Attolico's preliminary conversation on the same day is not printed (1848/421114-16).

³ It was subsequently agreed at an internal discussion on Jan. 8 (1848/421119-20), that owing to the frost, the 1:2 ratio was the maximum which the German Railways could achieve for the present. Attolico was informed on Jan. 13 that a daily quota of 560 cars would be provided even if the Italian quota did not always reach 280 (5234/E311261-62).

⁴ See document No. 478.

No. 494

2290/483402-08

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1095 of December 29

ROME, December 29, 1939—6:10 p. m.

Anfuso sent for me today and told me at Ciano's instruction that the newly appointed Russian Ambassador here had left Rome prior to presenting his credentials, following anti-Russian demonstrations occasioned by the war with Finland, and had simply announced that he was leaving, without giving any reason. As we knew, Italy had never, not even in Ciano's recent speech, taken any official stand against the war with Finland. The demonstrations at the time had occurred spontaneously. Now that a month had passed since the departure of the Russian Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow had yesterday been instructed to leave Moscow and to say that he was going on vacation. This step, which was the minimum that Italy had to do in view of the conduct of the Russian Ambassador, did not indicate any change in Italian policy vis-à-vis Russia. The Italian Ambassador had not been recalled; he remained Ambassador to Moscow. Affairs there would be handled by the Chargé d'Affaires, as in the Russian Embassy here.

Ciano had been anxious to inform us confidentially of the instruction to the Italian Ambassador, which might perhaps be interpreted differently by the Russians.¹

PLESSEN

¹ A memorandum in the files of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union (366/206711) records that on Jan. 7, 1940, Molotov told Ambassador Schulenburg that the Russian Ambassador had been called home "to report" because the Rome demonstrations against Russia "could not be ignored." He said he did not know why the Italian Ambassador had left Moscow; the Soviet Government had done nothing to occasion any change in its relations with Italy.

No. 495

F19/528-529

*The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia*

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, December 30, 1939.

R M No. 2, Ang. II

For decoding by the Minister himself.

With reference to my instruction No. 1 of December 30, 1939,¹ I herewith assign to Minister von Killinger the following duties:

1. To ascertain all secret enemy organizations (Secret Service, etc.) active in the Balkan countries, and to watch and impede their operation.
2. To watch the entire enemy press and propaganda.
3. To supervise, to assist, and to intensify the work of our own press and propaganda.

In order to camouflage his activities he will work on the following matters:

Transportation questions
Economic questions
Safety of transports of goods
The Polish refugee problem
Establishment of cultural institutions
Sports and matters relating to youth organizations
Shipping questions relative to German operations against merchant shipping.

Please assist Minister von Killinger in every way possible in the accomplishment of his duties.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not printed (F19/531-32). In this instruction, Ribbentrop had defined Killinger's duties as follows: "I have appointed Minister von Killinger Inspector of our Missions abroad, and charged him with the task of investigating on the spot the situation of our diplomatic and consular Missions with respect to personnel, organization, finances and administration. He is to submit to me a report in writing about the material he gathers and his experiences, together with any recommendations for changes." The instruction then requested the Missions to make available to Killinger all material necessary for the performance of his task and to assist him in every way.

No. 496

8138/E582169-72

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 797 of December 30

Tokyo, December 31, 1939—12:20 p. m.

Received December 31—3:00 a. m.

Pol. VIII 10.

With reference to our telegrams No. 791 of December 29 and No. 777 of December 18.¹

At the close of the year the Japanese administration is laboring under very strong pressure in both foreign and domestic policy. The three great problems of Japanese foreign policy, solution of the China question, agreement with America, and settlement with Russia, are unsolved. Announcement of the opening of the Yangtze from Nanking on did not bring about the desired change in the American attitude. The American Ambassador presented new demands with the obvious aim of independence and liberty of trade for China, at least Central and South China. He is supposed principally to have demanded the following: a gradual withdrawal of troops, with a maximum of eight garrisons in Northern China, a guarantee of an open door and treaty rights of foreign powers, together with dissolution of the monopolistic Japanese Development Company. America's attitude brought disappointment to the initially high hopes that were nourished by the calculated optimism of the Government. In order to avoid pressure from America (group garbled) idea of ending the China conflict by concessions to Chiang Kai-shek is again being entertained in some circles, possibly by entering into peace negotiations with him while abandoning the Konoye declaration, and employing Wang Ching-wei only as a mediator in the matter. To be sure, the Army, that is the China Army, is thus far still determined to form a new central government under Wang Ching-wei, although the latter ("demands" apparently lacking) considerable independence and is still struggling with serious personnel difficulties.

Negotiations with Russia remain confined to details (Manchuria boundary demarcation, fisheries treaty) without touching the basic questions of the Japanese-Russian settlement, particularly Russia's relations to China. Trivial Russian counterdemands augment the difficulties, such as payment of the remaining debt of 6 million yen on the South Manchurian Railroad.

¹ Neither found.

Internally, the surprise revolt of 270 representatives in the Diet out of a total of 466 has created a new situation.² The revolt was supported by all the small parties and numerous representatives of the major parties, who came to the opening of the Diet from the election districts with first hand impressions of the dangerous state of popular sentiment. The popular sentiment is conditioned by the foreign trade policy, the deterioration in the food and supply situation resulting from the war with China, specifically by the increase in the price of rice and the failure of the Government in the distribution of essential goods. The Cabinet decided, as reported, to remain in office despite the action of the majority in the Diet, and is trying to split the opposition through negotiations with the party leaders.

The party leaders are, however, hardly ready to oppose the action of the members of their parliamentary groups, since in that case there would be a danger of further splits in the parties. Resignation of the Cabinet in the middle of January before the reconvening of the Diet is therefore generally expected. The pro-Anglo-Saxon press also is beginning to abandon the Cabinet, which it has thus far (1 group garbled) despite all its failures. (2 groups garbled) Court circles, which from their (1 group garbled) to preserve the Cabinet are obviously shaken. According to recent information, Court circles are trying to prepare a cabinet of national union with the participation of the parties in the Diet in order to forestall any essential change of course. General Ugaki, who is known there as the Foreign Minister of the Konoye Cabinet, is being mentioned for Prime Minister. Since the crisis in foreign policy and serious internal differences continue, no workable union cabinet or even association with one of the European power groups should be expected for the present. In the opinion of Ambassadors Oshima and Shiratori, who are working hard for the overthrow of the present Cabinet, two or three transition cabinets are still necessary to bring about a fundamental change of course.

OTT

² On Dec. 28 a resolution was passed by representatives of the leading parties calling upon the Cabinet to "take the proper steps regarding resignation." On Jan. 9, 276 members of the Lower House signed a declaration of no confidence in the Cabinet and on Jan. 14 General Abe's Cabinet resigned.

No. 497

230/152113-14

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1 of January 2

BELGRADE, January 2, 1940—9:05 p. m.

Received January 3—3:30 a. m.

In today's conversation the Foreign Minister pointed out that finally, after all difficulties had been overcome, the copper and

lead deliveries under the Landfried Protocol¹ had now begun to get under way, and he continued with the following remarks: "He was happy to be able to assure me that in spite of all the intrigues, with which I was of course familiar, the question of Yugoslav relations with Germany was settled for the future, too, on the basis of good neighborly relations and the closest economic cooperation. The Minister President, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, and he himself actually formed a solid front which also had the full approval in the highest quarters. We could depend on it that everything would be done to foil any efforts at interference and sabotage directed against it, regardless of whether they were undertaken in the political or the economic field. He also asked me to believe that all Yugoslav efforts to pacify the Danube area and the Balkans and to promote political cooperation between the countries in this area had always been done with the idea of German-Yugoslav friendship." I believe these statements indicate that the Anglo-French attempts at weakening the Foreign Minister's position, which were mentioned in telegraphic report No. 566 of December 16,² came to naught. The manner in which Cincar-Markovich spoke was more definite and more self-confident than before.

HEEREN

¹ See document No. 117, footnote 4.

² Not printed (230/152109).

No. 498

103/111926-28

The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 8

BERLIN, January 2, 1940.

For Ambassador Ritter.

With reference to the private letter of December 27¹ to the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister does not consider a personal letter to Molotov advisable in the question mentioned by you, but sends you the following information to be used orally in a suitable manner:

It is certainly an error on Molotov's part when he says that the expression "industrial deliveries" was chosen in the Moscow negotiations only because the correspondence was to be published. The question whether and to what extent the German deliveries were to include deliveries of a military nature was never discussed at all, at the time. The letters were drafted by Schnurre and myself and even this first

¹ See document No. 487, footnote 3.

German version contained in the passage involved here the same wording as the final text, in which the German industrial deliveries were placed opposite the Russian raw-material deliveries without being defined more closely. Nor were any such specifications made during the oral negotiations. At one point Stalin merely mentioned the delivery of steel tubes as an example of supplies important to the Soviet Union.

It is true that the Reich Foreign Minister stated in the negotiations that a large-scale program for the exchange of commodities was desirable and possible, and the letters were also edited to that effect. It is obvious, on the other hand, that the Foreign Minister's statements on this subject could not have meant that Germany would deliver without limitations everything that the Soviet Union might desire from her.

Perhaps Molotov is confusing this with another passage in the correspondence. For the introductory sentence of the first German draft stated that the Government of the Soviet Union was willing "to give economic support to Germany in the present war." At the request of Stalin, who pointed to the publication of the correspondence, these words were then changed so as to make mention of the development of economic relations and trade between Germany and the Soviet Union.

GAUS

No. 499

F18/412-396

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] January—1940.¹

THE CONFERENCE IN THE KREMLIN ON DECEMBER 31, 1939

Present:

For Germany:

Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg,
Ambassador Ritter,
Minister Schnurre,
Counselor of Embassy Hilger;

For the Soviet Union:

M. Stalin,
Chairman Molotov,
People's Commissars Mikoyan and
Tevoosyan, and
Trade Representative Babarin

¹ This document is undated, but the second (more detailed) section follows closely the text of a memorandum initialed Jan. 2, 1940, by Schnurre (1187/324471-78).

On December 29, 1939, People's Commissar Mikoyan announced in a conversation concerning German requests for iron that the matter would have to be discussed with M. Stalin. There were binding decisions of the Soviet authorities concerned that pig iron and scrap iron could not be exported. There could be no deviation from this except by a decision of M. Stalin. At this time the other more important points of negotiation that were still open could also be taken up.

The conversation with M. Stalin lasted a little over three hours. It went into great detail. On the whole M. Stalin appeared not to be in a very friendly mood. Quite incidentally, he expressed his low evaluation of England and France. Although on individual points he showed more understanding of German needs than the Soviet negotiators had previously done, he steadfastly insisted on the Soviet wishes brought forward by him, which, to be sure, are quite limited compared to previous Soviet demands.

From a general political standpoint the most remarkable fact is that for the first time he used the expression *mutual assistance* [*gegenseitigen Hilfeleistung*]. In this connection he said that the Soviet Government did not consider the treaty as an ordinary trade agreement, but as one of mutual assistance. The Soviet Union was prepared to help Germany by deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs, which it could sell elsewhere at higher prices and for foreign currency. For this it also expected Germany's help. The Soviet Union wanted to learn from Germany, particularly in the field of military armament. If German officials were at all concerned lest in this way other powers might learn something about the condition of German armament, such anxiety was not in keeping with existing relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. Moreover, he thoroughly recognized the necessity for keeping certain things secret.

Ambassador Ritter thereupon replied that such an anxiety had not played any part in the German attitude. If the Reich Government had not fulfilled all of the Soviet delegation's wishes, this was due to other reasons. For Germany also it was not merely a question of an ordinary trade agreement. By the exchange of notes of September 28, 1939, the Soviet Government had promised its assistance through deliveries of raw materials. Germany would compensate for these deliveries in the manner promised. In this way Germany was also helping the Soviet Union. Never before had experts in a foreign country been permitted to see so much as the Soviet delegation in Germany. Unfortunately, the Soviet wishes were largely concentrated in those industrial and military fields in which their fulfillment was not possible at the time, or occasioned very great difficulties. In ordinary circumstances it would have been easier. The Soviet

Government must not forget that Germany was at war with two of the strongest military powers.

The course of the conversation in its essential details is given below.

In accordance with the special reason for the meeting, Ambassador Ritter set forth the German situation as regards iron. All the shipments desired by the Soviet Union called for iron. Because of Germany's own armament needs as well as the loss of some of her previous sources of iron ore, it was a condition for the fulfillment of the Soviet desires that Germany should promptly receive in return, in usable form, the iron necessary for expediting the Soviet orders. He specified the German desire for the delivery of 200,000 tons each of pig iron and scrap iron, and a million and a half tons of iron ore of 55 percent average iron content. The desire for the delivery of 180,000 tons of chromium ore was related to this.

M. Stalin immediately spoke up regarding the iron question and declared that the Soviet Union was unable to deliver such high-grade ore. The Soviet Union did not have at its disposal sufficient quantities for its own iron production, which at the present time was only adapted to the use of high-content ores. He hoped however that the development of Soviet extraction and concentration installations would make possible the delivery of high-content iron ore the very next year. Germany had ore concentration establishments in which it prepared even 18 to 22 percent iron ore and then smelted it. Germany could make all the more use of the ores of 35 to 42 percent iron content offered by the Soviet Union. Thereby it also saved the expenses connected with the preparation of German ores.

As regards scrap iron, it was doubtful whether the entire 200,000 tons could be delivered. Nor could all the pig iron be delivered. The Soviet Union would, however, do everything possible in regard to pig iron and scrap iron. The prospect was held out that exact figures would be quoted.

Of chromium ore the Soviet Union could deliver 100,000 tons in the year 1940. The deposits were large and were being further developed. In the absence of a railroad, the chromium ore was for the time being delivered by truck. Within 10 months the railroad would be ready. In 1941, then, the deliveries could presumably be increased.

In connection with the general preliminary explanations, M. Stalin then began to speak about the Soviet wishes. Foremost were the desires in the field of naval artillery. The Soviet Union was prepared to restrict its wishes to the minimum. It wished to learn from Germany and requested Germany's help in this field. This help was not desired gratis, but was to be paid for. The details of the restricted Soviet wishes in this field set forth by M. Stalin appear in enclosure 1.

M. Stalin then began to speak of the Soviet wishes in regard to warships and welcomed the fact that Germany was prepared to deliver the cruiser *Lützow*. If Germany declined to deliver other ships in process of construction because she wanted to complete them herself, he could not object to this stand.

He then turned to the Soviet wishes in the field of machine tools. He pointed out that for the Soviet Government it was principally a question of large-scale machines for the production of ammunition for heavy artillery. The Soviet Union was very urgently in need of these machines and was very much dissatisfied with the previous German replies. The Germans pointed out the particular difficulties posed by the delivery of precisely these machines at present. M. Stalin said that he would also keep the Soviet wishes for immediate delivery in this field to a minimum. But he must insist on these limited deliveries in the year 1940. The present status of the Soviet requirements in the field of machine tools may be seen from enclosure 2.

M. Stalin furthermore characterized the total price of the airplanes as out of the question. It represented a multiplication of the actual prices. If Germany did not wish to deliver the airplanes, he would have preferred to have this openly stated.

M. Stalin further characterized the acquisition of the Lurgi or Renn process, which we had already sold to Japan, as important. Besides, he expressed his amazement that Germany did not wish to deliver the few periscopes, and that even in the case of storage batteries for U-boats difficulties of delivery were brought up.

Ambassador Ritter characterized the information given by M. Stalin concerning iron ore as a great disappointment. Although it was true that Germany had made great progress in the last few years in the dressing of low-grade iron ores, the capacity of these plants was still restricted to her own production. What we needed was the high-grade iron ore from Spain, North Africa, and overseas. The iron ore offered was also undesirable for us because of the high freight costs and because of its high content of silicic acid. M. Stalin, however, stood by his decision that high-content iron ore could not be delivered this year. To the question as to whether the statement concerning higher-content iron ore could be considered as a concrete prospect for the year 1941, M. Stalin replied that he had already explained that.

Ambassador Ritter then went over the Soviet wishes mentioned by M. Stalin one by one. He stated first of all that Germany had declared herself ready to make deliveries of almost all the items mentioned by M. Stalin and had merely declined to set specific time

limits. The Russians had set time limits which were in part incomprehensible to experts. For artillery turrets for warships we required three or four years. This caused skeptical amazement. In the Soviet Union a gun turret could be produced in a year and a half after the completion of the plans.

Ambassador Ritter promised that after his return to Berlin he would look into the matter of whether, in view of the greatly reduced Soviet demands, time limits could be set.

In regard to the airplanes, Ambassador Ritter pointed out that we had offered not only airplanes of today and yesterday but even of tomorrow, and that the Soviet delegation had always spoken of purchasing a few planes as "models." The word "model" implied the idea of wanting to copy the airplanes. Naturally we could not, therefore, content ourselves with the value of individual planes, but must request reimbursement for the licenses and compensation for the fact that we placed our entire costly work of development and our experience at the disposal of the Soviet Union. M. Stalin replied that for the present the planes were being bought for testing purposes only. The object was to become acquainted with the German types and to learn from them. If it was decided to copy them, the Soviet Government would approach us and pay for the right to use them as models. People's Commissar Tevossyan returned to the matter of the high-speed dive bombers allegedly on hand.

Ambassador Ritter continued, stating that Germany was prepared to deliver installations for the Lurgi or Renn processes. But the Soviet Government should make up its mind soon and conclude contracts, for the production of such installations required time. He went on to explain why the delivery of even a few periscopes caused difficulties at present. Germany had already delivered such periscopes to the Soviet Union in the year 1937. From this it was apparent that we were not opposed to the delivery as such.

The next item brought up for discussion by Ambassador Ritter was the delivery of non-ferrous metals and hardening metals. We could not take from our own stockpiles the quantities required for the completion of the Soviet orders. It was therefore essential that these metals should be delivered by the Soviet Government, and on time, i. e. before the commencement of the work. The simplest method would be the establishment for this purpose of consignment depots in Germany, from which the necessary amounts could be taken from time to time as needed. M. Stalin objected to the method proposed. He pointed out that the establishment of such consignment depots in Germany would surely become known to England. This might have repercussions on the Soviet chances of purchasing these

metals—for Germany's account, too—in the world market. It would be more practical if Germany bought these metals directly from the Soviet Union. Even now the Soviet Union was prepared to set aside certain amounts from the Soviet stocks and deliver them to Germany. Thus, for example, 1,500 tons of nickel could be delivered immediately. Also, several hundred tons of tin could be delivered on short notice. (On January 2 Mikoyan defined more exactly Stalin's pledge to the effect that the Soviet Union would deliver 1,500 tons of nickel, 450 tons of tin, and 5,000 tons of copper to Germany against payment in reichsmarks through the clearing system.) As already stated, the Soviet Union was also prepared to purchase such metals for Germany in third countries. Ambassador Ritter called attention to the necessity of keeping the two questions—guaranteeing of the necessary requirements for the Soviet orders and purchases for Germany's own supplies—separate from each other.

In this connection M. Stalin went more into detail concerning the metal resources of the Soviet Union and the difficulties which at present retarded the development of the individual deposits. These difficulties were caused by the lack of machinery, especially dredges and mining machinery, and the inadequate technical experience of the Soviet experts. There were large deposits of nickel in the Soviet Union, whose exploitation could in time bring the Soviet Union's own production up to 20 or 30 thousand tons annually. The same held true for iron ore and other metals. In Orenburg [Chkalov] there was iron ore with a high nickel content. Delivery of German coal to the Kola peninsula for phosphates, the hard metal Widia, etc. If Germany furnished the necessary machines and installations, enough could be produced in the Soviet Union to supply "two Germanies" with these metals. Ambassador Ritter characterized this as an interesting prospect for both sides and declared the willingness of Germany to cooperate with the Soviet Union along this line. A program for this cooperation could be set up as soon as the present treaty was signed. Chairman Molotov agreed with the suggestion of Ambassador Ritter that experts on both sides should then meet for that purpose.

Ambassador Ritter then said that in preparing the text of the treaty yesterday a new and very serious difference of opinion had come up unexpectedly. It concerned the rate at which the German shipments in compensation for the Soviet deliveries were to be made. The wording and purport of the exchange of notes of September 28, 1939 were quite clear on this point. It spoke of ". . . raw materials for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through delivery of manufactured goods *over a more extended period of time.*" The

present treaty was to run for one year. Even if we assumed that the Soviet Union would, if possible, carry out its deliveries in a shorter time, and the Soviet negotiators had on various occasions promised this, we had previously without contradiction proceeded on the assumption that "a more extended period" in any case was understood to mean more than a year. That also necessarily followed from the fact that in connection with the German compensatory deliveries it was largely a question of newly manufactured articles, and that the Soviet delegation wished to order articles which, as for example the ship turrets, required a long time. In drawing up the text of the treaty the Soviet negotiators had, however, insisted on the stipulation that the balance of shipments and compensatory deliveries should be drawn up quarterly, and in case of failure of one party to make deliveries, the other could consequently limit its deliveries. It was to be expected that the German deliveries would be considerably behind the Soviet deliveries in the first and second quarters of the year and probably also in the third and fourth. This was brought out right in the exchange of notes of September 28, 1939. The new interpretation of the Soviet negotiators would change the Agreement of September 28, 1939, on a decisive point and was not acceptable to us.

M. Stalin upheld the interpretation of the Soviet negotiators to the extent that the shipments and compensatory deliveries must be balanced at the end of the year at least. The contingency should not occur that at the end of the year the Soviet Union should have made deliveries worth 500,000,000 RM and Germany merely 400,000,000 RM. That would of course amount to a credit to Germany from the Soviet Union. There had been no talk of credits. In that case it would have been necessary also to discuss interest. The detailed discussion on this point did not lead to any understanding. Ambassador Ritter rejected the view of M. Stalin as unworkable in practice and contrary to the Agreement of September 18 [28], 1939. M. Stalin thereupon proposed to come back to that point in a later discussion.

Ambassador Ritter in conclusion again brought up the undecided question of the 50 percent reduction of railroad freight rates for soybeans in connection with the payment of transit freight charges through the clearing system. This question was settled during the same night by an exchange of letters² on the basis of the German point of view.

RITTER¹

¹ Not printed (3782/E041720-21).

² Ritter wired from Moscow on Jan. 3 that after a full discussion with Stalin on the points still open, he thought it necessary to return to Berlin for a few days to reach some final decisions; he would leave Moscow the evening of Jan. 3 and asked that appointments with the principal officials involved be arranged for him (1138/324601-02).

[Enclosure 1]

**LIMITED PROGRAM OF SOVIET DESIRES IN THE FIELD OF NAVAL
ARTILLERY, DECEMBER 31, 1939**

M. Stalin explained that in view of the difficulties in regard to delivery alleged by the Germans, the Soviets were prepared to reduce their desires in the field of naval artillery to a minimum.

1) In place of the previously requested fourteen 381 mm. or 15-inch double turrets they would be satisfied with three double turrets of this caliber which, according to his information, Germany could deliver easily. German production was running smoothly.

2) Germany's production of triple ship turrets, caliber 280 mm. or 11-inch, was running just as well. The Soviet Union desired three of these triple turrets.

3) The previously expressed desire for the delivery of twelve triple ship turrets, caliber 149.1 mm. or 6-inch, was reduced to four triple turrets of this caliber.

Time of delivery for items 1 to 3, within the year 1940. Ambassador Ritter called attention to the impossibility of delivering within this time limit, since the completion of the desired turrets required a much longer time.

4) Germany had designs for triple turret installations, caliber 16-inch or 400 mm. The Soviet Government requested that it be given merely the *drawings* of these.

[Enclosure 2]

The previous desires of the Soviet Government in the field of machine tools were:

I. On the principal list for war material, under subdivision 12, machines for the production of artillery munitions to the value of	54 million RM.
On the supplementary list of war material, machine tools of the same type to the value of	6 million RM.
Total	<u>60 million RM.</u>

II. The Soviet Delegation has now reduced its requests substantially and formulated them anew in the following manner:

1) It starts out with the previous list of war material accepted by us at an earlier stage in the negotiations, which amounted to a total

of 7 million RM. The items are marked in the war material list with an asterisk.⁴

2) In place of the previously reported desire to obtain machines from the Hasse & Wrede firm and the Heller firm (Section I, items 5 and 7) (under 5, 527 pieces; under 7, 96 pieces), the Russians now expressed a wish to receive a total of only 34 pieces during the year 1940, namely: Two sets of machine tools for Russian manufacture of 150 mm. shells [as follows]:

1. Centering machine—Hasse & Wrede	2 machines
2. Special, automatic, hard composition steel planing machine—Hasse & Wrede	8 machines
3. Machine for fuse threading—Hasse & Wrede	4 machines
4. Automatic grinders—Hasse & Wrede	6 machines
5. Thread milling machines for milling the thread of the bore for the fuse—Heller	4 machines
6. Machine for milling grooves—Hasse & Wrede	2 machines
7. Machine for rolling grooves—Hasse & Wrede	2 machines
8. Machine for making rotating bands—Hasse & Wrede	2 machines
9. Presses for hydraulic tests—Hasse & Wrede	4 machines
	<hr/> 34 machines

3) Moreover, in the main only the few items entered under II, III, IV, and V of the old war material list were retained for delivery in the year 1940.

Items of the old war material list and the supplementary list *not* mentioned under 1 and 3 are, to be sure, not canceled, but have been postponed till later.

⁴ The list was that submitted by the Russians on Nov. 30 (see document No. 407). The list with asterisks opposite the items accepted by the Germans has not been printed (1138/324742-97).

No. 500

B18/B003287-88

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Blücher

PERSONAL

BERLIN, January 2, 1940.

DEAR HERR VON BLÜCHER: I still have to thank you for your letter of December 18,¹ and should like in the first place to express the hope that the new year will be less difficult for you than the last. We have full understanding here of what it means for you now to have to follow a new policy toward a country where you have cultivated such friendly relations.

¹ Document No. 471.

You recently suggested ² that it might be well for you to come here to report in the first days of January. However, I have had to ask that you postpone this idea for a while,³ as we feared that a trip here by you at the present moment might be given a political interpretation, which you did not intend. There is no reason, however, why you should not approach us again with this suggestion, and we for our part will also keep the trip in mind.

It is clear that our situation, as it has developed in the course of the last 6 months, does not permit us to appear to equivocate vis-à-vis the Russians. An unexposed flank toward the east means a great deal to us at the present time.

We have learned from your wife that so far her letters have not reached you. I hope this situation has changed by now; if not, I should of course be glad to lend my assistance, and shall take the liberty of informing Frau von Blücher of this once again.

I am keeping my fingers crossed for you.

Sincere greetings.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

WEIZSÄCKER

²Not found.

³According to a memorandum by Grundherr of Dec. 30, 1939 (452/223392/2-93), this was done by Grundherr on Dec. 28.

No. 501

1879/357647

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 14 of January 3

BERLIN, January 3—6:53 p. m.

Received Moscow, January 4—12:50 a. m.

For the Ambassador.

We plan to send Herr Nikolaus Rost, a man born in Russia and familiar with conditions there, who is personally very well known to us, as a courier to Moscow for about 2 weeks. He is to prepare an investigation of whether it is possible to bring influence to bear on the French Section of the Third International and whether Soviet information files on French Communists could be inspected. Please treat Rost's mission, which is purely of an informative and preparatory nature, in strict confidence and lend him every assistance within the

scope of the mission we have assigned him. Rost will be instructed to act in close liaison with you.

RIBBENTROP¹

¹ Marginal note: "Was discussed by the Ambassador with M. Potemkin, who was asked whether Rost could talk to the head of the French Section of the Comintern. P. will study the question and let us know. To be filed. v[on] T[ippelskirch] January 9."

This document was found in the files of the German Embassy in Moscow, which contain some additional material on this episode. There are some notes apparently used by Ambassador Schulenburg in his conversation with Potemkin on Jan. 9. According to these notes (1379/357648-50), the German Government assumed that the Soviet Union was greatly interested "in freeing French domestic policies from the repressive measures of the present War Government and in restoring democratic liberties." Therefore, German-Soviet cooperation toward these ends was being considered and the Soviets were requested to designate someone with whom the German emissary Rost could discuss further details. On Jan. 27, von Tippelskirch told Potemkin that Rost had now arrived in Moscow, and reminded him of Schulenburg's request that Rost be allowed to talk to the head of the French section of the Comintern (1379/357652). Potemkin said he would submit the matter to Molotov. A memorandum by Tippelskirch of Feb. 5 (1379/357653) quotes Potemkin as saying that he had reported on the German request to Molotov who had listened without, however, expressing himself on the subject. On Feb. 8, Tippelskirch recorded (1379/357654) having discussed with Rost the possible effects on the latter's mission of the police raid on the Soviet Trade Office in Paris which had just been reported on the radio; it was agreed that the Soviets would probably observe even greater caution now, and that it would be advisable not to press the matter too hard. Marginal notes on this copy indicate that Potemkin was ill when Tippelskirch went to see him on Feb. 10, and that he was still ill on Feb. 13. Finally, on Feb. 16, Tippelskirch inquired once more at the Foreign Commissariat whether there were any new developments with regard to the Rost mission.

According to a memorandum of the same day (1379/357655), Potemkin had answered in the negative, saying that the Soviet Foreign Commissariat preferred not to take any initiative in that matter but that it was up to Rost to do on his own whatever he deemed necessary "in this affair which was of interest to him." Tippelskirch's statement that Rost had already left Moscow was received by Potemkin "with a little shrug."

No. 502

169/82979-86

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, January 3, 1940.

On January 2 a discussion took place in Karinhall under the chairmanship of the Field Marshal, in which I, as a representative of Ambassador Ritter, who had been asked to attend, took part together with Minister Clodius.

The other participants were:

From the staff of the Field Marshal: State Secretary Körner, State Secretary Neumann, Major General Bodenschatz, Staatsrat Wohlthat, and several adjutants;

From the Economics Ministry: State Secretary Landfried, Under State Secretary von Jagwitz, Under State Secretary Hanneken, Ministerialrat Reinhardt;

From the High Command of the Wehrmacht: Lieutenant General Thomas, Lieutenant Commander Koch;

From the High Command of the Navy: Admiral Canaris;
From the Sicherheitsdienst: Gruppenführer Heydrich and Brigadeführer Johst;
From the Ministry of Communications: State Secretary Kleinmann;
From the German Legation in Belgrade: Consul General Neuhausen;
From the German Legation in Bucharest: Air Attaché Colonel Gerstenberg;
From the Air Ministry: Ministerialrat Müller.

The discussion was devoted to economic questions, especially Rumania and the transportation problems in the Balkans. Some of the problems also related to Sweden and Yugoslavia.

The Field Marshal opened the discussion with some general observations:

Not only in the military sphere but in all others likewise we would have to ward off the attacks of the enemy and go over to the offensive. The propaganda field was the business of the Foreign Ministry and would not be taken up for discussion. In the economic field, the important subject of trade warfare at sea would likewise not be discussed today. But the enemy was also trying by other means, in particular by preemptive purchasing and even violent sabotage, to prevent us from getting our supplies from foreign countries. These questions would be the subject of discussion today, especially as they concerned Rumania, where this type of enemy activity was especially prevalent.

The official defense was the business of the Foreign Ministry, through representations by the Minister, by influencing the Rumanian Government, by conducting appropriate negotiations with it. The Minister was naturally handicapped by his official position; he also obviously had his own views on these questions. He was not entirely satisfied with the work of the trade delegation, and would not permit matters to continue as they were.

Still more had to be done, however, in addition to this activity by the Foreign Ministry. If the British were working against us with all legal and illegal means, we would have to do the same. He had obtained the Führer's permission for us to pass over to an active counterattack in Rumania. Action would have to be taken with the greatest determination. In so doing we must not shrink from using the most extreme methods, such as were being applied by the British. Keeping planes in readiness after major actions would also come in for consideration. The particulars of the fight against sabotage should be discussed later in a smaller group. To begin with, therefore, the discussion was to be limited to the other kinds of action. Foreign policy activities, which have just been termed the task of the Foreign Ministry to be carried out by the Minister and the trade delegation, would be left out of the discussion. However, in the economic field the Foreign Ministry was merely an executive agency, while the Eco-

nomics Ministry was the one to make the actual decisions. The way in which economic matters were being handled did not please him. We ought not to haggle about the rate of exchange of the reichsmark; the important thing was to increase the volume of raw material imports and to assure their delivery. It did not seem to him that we had been successful in this, in spite of the improved rate of exchange which had been obtained. He now requested the Economics Ministry to express an opinion in regard to these questions.

State Secretary Landfried declared that it would be advantageous to make an agreement with Rumania similar to the one with Yugoslavia,¹ in which Yugoslav metals were delivered in exchange for German arms and with the proviso that price fluctuations should affect deliveries in both directions in the same way. Under State Secretary von Jagwitz stressed the fact that as a result of the latest agreements concluded by the trade delegation much more Rumanian raw material could be bought than we were in a position to haul away—for example, 130,000 tons of oil per month—while at present, since the Danube was blocked by ice, only approximately 30,000 tons could be transported. An extension of the agreements was thus not urgent; the important thing was merely the assurance that they would be carried out.

Thereupon Minister Clodius gave a report on his latest negotiations in Bucharest² as follows: The improvement of the treaty by obtaining a binding commitment by the Rumanian Government to deliver 1½ million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of grain without any definite agreements regarding a guarantee of German payment, and even the delivery of Rumanian oil on credit up to the value of 40 million RM; increase of our purchasing opportunities by 50 million RM as a result of an improvement in the rate of exchange; measures of protection against sabotage taken by the Rumanian Minister President after a discussion with Minister Clodius; military protection of the entire oil region under a division commander as military chief, to whom the police are also to be subordinated; a definite promise by the Minister President to fulfill the obligation to deliver oil, if necessary by compelling the oil companies to sell, possibly even by resorting to expropriation.

The Field Marshal was evidently satisfied with Minister Clodius' statements. He said in this connection that he had not been correctly informed; he was now convinced that Minister Clodius had acted correctly and properly in Bucharest. However, various things

¹ See document No. 117, footnote 4.

² Clodius' negotiations in Bucharest in December (the 7th session of the Government Committees) were concluded on Dec. 21 by a Protocol (903/292986-3000). Also signed on Dec. 21 was a secret supplementary agreement (5556/E395478-77) to the one classified confidential on payment for armament deliveries which formed part of the complex of agreements signed on Sept. 29, 1939. See document No. 166.

still had to be done now in order to be on the safe side. When Minister Clodius during his report spoke of his conversations with the Rumanian Minister President, the Master of the Royal Court, and other Rumanian Ministers, the Field Marshal asked him twice whether he had seen the Ministers personally and had personally spoken to the Master of the Royal Court, to which Minister Clodius replied emphatically in the affirmative.

Next the Field Marshal requested Colonel Gerstenberg to give his opinion. The latter said that he had had occasion in Bucharest to observe the activity of the government committee at four different times. He had asked himself this question: Are these negotiations sufficiently dependable to permit the German Wehrmacht to rely on their being carried out punctiliously? In view of the national characteristics of the Rumanians, he had become convinced that in the event of total war the oil supplies for the German Wehrmacht were not assured by these negotiations.

Then there ensued lengthy discussions of the transportation question (navigation on the Danube, increase in the number of tankers, capacity of the railroad, increase in the number of tank cars) in which State Secretary Kleinmann and Under State Secretary Hanneken took the floor; there was also discussion of the enemy's acts of sabotage and our defense against them, in regard to which Admiral Canaris made some comments.

From these discussions there emerged the proposal to send to Bucharest a special representative for economic and transportation questions; his task would be to see that in the implementation of the agreements between the Governments our imports of raw materials from Rumania would be guaranteed through the conclusion of commercial purchase contracts, the punctual performance of Rumanian deliveries and German payments, and through providing for means of transportation and the actual hauling away. To this I remarked that in the Foreign Ministry, too, the necessity had already been discussed of stationing a special representative for these extremely important questions in Bucharest and perhaps also one in Berlin, under whom would be placed the men from the various departments who are now dealing with the question both in Berlin and in Bucharest. The special representative in Bucharest would have to be attached to the staff of the Legation. The Field Marshal did not contradict the last statement and for his part remarked that the activity of Minister Clodius as chief negotiator with the Rumanian Government ought not to be encroached upon in any way by the special representative.

During the discussion in regard to the special representative the Field Marshal handed me a folded note across the table, upon which he had written the words: "Wohlthat to be assigned by the Foreign

Ministry?" I read the note and put it away. Wohlthat's name was not mentioned in conversation. On the other hand, the Field Marshal remarked that in discussions on Southeastern questions the Führer had quite frequently spoken of the special qualifications of Viennese personalities for dealing with such questions, and in that connection had mentioned the name of Guido Schmidt, the former Austrian Foreign Minister.

In conclusion the Field Marshal remarked that the appointment of such a special representative seemed to him to be particularly urgent and important. He asked me to lay the matter before the Reich Foreign Minister immediately, and said he would welcome very much the proposal indicated in the note.

This concluded the discussion of the Rumanian problem. There was still some discussion of Sweden and Yugoslavia, and then the Field Marshal dismissed the large group and retained only Admiral Canaris and the two men from the Sicherheitsdienst along with his own entourage for a smaller conference.

I was already aware from the reports of the Minister and the Air Attaché that the Air Attaché, Colonel Gerstenberg, and Minister Fabricius had had considerable differences of opinion for quite some time, and likewise that Colonel Gerstenberg believed that something more would have to be done to assure the execution of the trade agreements and afford protection against enemy sabotage. Upon instructions from the State Secretary I had a discussion about this with Colonel Gerstenberg on December 26, at which time his strong bias against the activities of Minister Fabricius had become apparent, whereas Colonel Gerstenberg did not criticize Minister Clodius' activities in any way on this [later] occasion, but on the contrary expressed approval. My knowledge of this background as well as the course of the discussion with the Field Marshal made me suspect that the reason for his calling the conference and for the attitude he adopted at first was to be found in the reports which he had received from Colonel Gerstenberg.³

³In a supplementary memorandum of the same day (169/82977-78), Clodius noted: "Before I had an opportunity in yesterday's session to explain the progress of the negotiations, the Field Marshal repeatedly expressed the opinion that I had been too severe and unyielding toward the Rumanian Government and had thereby caused considerable ill will in Bucharest. When in reply to this I explained that precisely in time of war a certain amount of severity was unavoidable in negotiations in a foreign country in order to put through Germany's vital demands, and that in Bucharest, too, I had not done anything more than use the necessary pressure to obtain acceptance of our just demands, the Field Marshal appeared to be satisfied. Nevertheless, he asked me once more whether the Rumanians had been very much annoyed at the close of the negotiations. Not until I answered him that this had by no means been the case, that in spite of the unavoidable political pressure our demands had been put through in a thoroughly friendly manner, and that the leave taking between me and the lead-

Several hours after the return from Karinhall State Secretary Landfried called me by telephone and made the following statements:

He had turned over in his mind once more the result of the discussion with regard to the suggested special commissioner and had also talked the matter over with State Secretary Körner. He was of the opinion that it would not be necessary to have a special representative here in Berlin, since the departments concerned, and in particular the transportation board established to deal with transportation questions, could deal adequately with the problems arising here. As far as the sending of a special representative to Bucharest was concerned, he assumed that the Foreign Ministry would doubtless also wish to aim at a complete solution, for it would surely have an unfortunate effect if a special representative were sent to Bucharest in addition to the Minister. I declined to express any opinion at all in the matter, since I first had to lay the matter before the Foreign Minister.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

WIEHL

ing Rumanian statesmen had occurred in complete friendship, were the Field Marshal's doubts in the matter entirely dissipated.

"From the above it is apparent that one of the Field Marshal's informants must have laid particular stress on the alleged excessive severity during the negotiations. But this can by no means have been Colonel Gerstenberg, whose difference of opinion with Minister Fabricius is based on the very fact that he thinks the Rumanians should be treated more severely than has been the case heretofore."

No. 503

F11/0153-54

Memorandum by the Minister to Norway

BERLIN,¹ January 3, 1940.

I vouch for the Norwegian Government's determination today to remain neutral.

I believe I can vouch for my ability to give prompt notice if this attitude should undergo any change.

The Norwegian Government's determination to remain neutral could be undermined through assistance given in the Russo-Finnish conflict, but it cannot be seriously impaired by any British proposals to Norway that England be granted bases on the Norwegian coast. The Norwegian Government would resist such a move with the support of the Norwegian people.

Watchfulness is required, as stated above, with respect to assistance given in the Russo-Finnish conflict. The King and the Foreign Min-

¹ See document No. 483.

ister have told me that they see no violation of neutrality in permitting material and humanitarian aid to Finland. The Foreign Minister told me that he would keep watch on the private character of such aid. The question is what Norway would do if England and France, without officially intervening in the Russo-Finnish conflict and without declaring war on Russia, should begin delivering arms and sending volunteers. I believe that Norway would not obstruct the transit of arms or of volunteers not organized in military units, taking the position that Norwegian neutrality is not violated thereby. Under its present policy the Norwegian Government will be careful to continue keeping out of the Russo-Finnish conflict and to prevent England from gaining a foothold in Norway. It wants to remain master in its own house and considers strict neutrality as Norway's only effective armament.²

The situation would naturally change if Russia were to undertake measures against Norway or Sweden.

BRÄUER

² In a memorandum of a visit on Jan. 9 by S. Johannessen, Commercial Counselor in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker recorded the following: "I tried to explain to M. Johannessen, as I have done with other visitors, our urgent desire that Norway not become a theater of war. Norway's attitude would begin to assume importance for us whenever, succumbing to British or French influence, Norway began to grant our enemies facilities and concessions which are incompatible with our interests." (54/36492/2)

No. 504

F1/0203-09

The Duce to the Führer and Chancellor¹

[January 3, 1940].²

FÜHRER: Four months have passed since the exchange of letters between us during the first part of September,³ four months during which your attention has been completely absorbed by action and I have considered it inopportune to disturb you.

But today, while there is a period of waiting, I consider it necessary to submit to you an examination of the situation from my point

¹ Translated from the Italian, two German translations (100/64889-98 and F7/0537-0532—F1/0200-02) having been compared.

² This date appears on one of the German translations (F7/0537). In his *Diaries*, Ciano noted that Mussolini had prepared the letter on Jan. 3, but subsequently made a few changes in it and ordered it to be dispatched on Jan. 5. The latter date appears on a photostat of the document from Italian official sources. The source for the date Jan. 4, which is that given for the translation of the document in *Les lettres secrètes échangées par Hitler et Mussolini*, ed. by André François-Poncet (Paris, 1946), p. 47, is unknown to the editors. Weizsäcker noted in a memorandum of Jan. 8 (1848/421118) that Attolico had that morning requested an audience with Hitler to present Mussolini's letter to him. See also document No. 583.

³ See document No. 1.

of view and speak to you about the problems of the moment with that absolute sincerity and loyalty which have been and are the very conditions of our personal and political relations.

Ciano's speech. I shall begin with that speech, which has been the only political declaration of the Fascist Government since September.⁴ It has come to my knowledge that some parts of this speech did not please certain German circles. I need not tell you that it represents my thoughts from the first to the last word, and I believe that it was absolutely necessary to explain to the Italian people the origin of events and the reasons for our present attitude. The revelation of some details of the truth, such as the fact that both of us desired a rather long period of peace, did not do any harm to the German cause. You know that Count Ciano has been and is still one of the most convinced champions of Italo-German friendship, and for this very reason it was his duty to enlighten Italians and foreigners. That there have been more or less ridiculous speculations apropos of Ciano's speech is unimportant. Whatever he might have said, the same thing would have happened.

Tour d'horizon. I now wish to tell you about Italy's relations with the other European states. I shall begin with the State which is contained within the city of Rome. I can inform you that the recent exchange of visits between the King and the Pope has been of a predominantly domestic, not international, significance. The conversations have been brief and general, without anything definitive or anything in the nature of proposals; nor could it have been otherwise.

You will not be surprised if I tell you that the German-Russian agreement has had painful repercussions in Spain. The Civil War is too recent. The earth which covers the dead—yours and ours and the Spanish—is still fresh. Bolshevism is a memory that obsesses Spain and the Spaniards; with their passionate and fanatical logic they do not understand the tactical necessities of politics. It is clear that what Germany and Italy have lost during the last few months in Spain has been won by the French and the British.

The relations of Italy with the French and the British are correct but cool. We are supplying both with goods of various kinds, some of which may *indirectly* aid the war effort, but all deliveries of a typically military nature have been prohibited. The existence of these commercial relations permits us to acquire those raw materials without which we cannot complete our military preparations and which therefore ultimately benefit Germany as well. The rumors of political conversations are false. Between us and the British there was a period of

⁴ See documents No. 478, footnote 1, and No. 493.

strong tension in connection with the blockade, and although the procedures of the British have been modified for the better, things are far from normal and from that complete freedom for our shipping which we intend to ensure for ourselves. Neither in Paris nor in London does anyone have any illusions about seeing the phenomenon of 1914-15 repeated in 1940 or 1941. Feeling⁵ in Italy is still strongly anti-British, in spite of the propaganda to which I shall revert later.

The Balkans. We have never intended, and do not now intend, to form that bloc which became "suspect" from the moment that it was sponsored by the big democracies.⁶ I regard peace in the Danubian basin as of fundamental interest to Germany.

Russia. Although Count Ciano's speech made no mention of Finland, the Russian Ambassador in Rome did not present his credentials and departed.⁷ We have recalled our Ambassador from Moscow. Relations between Rome and Moscow are bad. We shall do nothing to aggravate them, but the attitude of the Russians is a matter of indifference to us.

Finland. Fascist Italy is favorably disposed toward this brave little nation, in spite of the sanctions which the Government voted for at Geneva but which the better part of the Finnish people did not accept.⁸ There has been talk of immense aid given by Italy to Finland. That is a matter of 25 fighter planes ordered before the war and nothing else. Thousands of volunteers have presented themselves individually at the Finnish Legation in Rome and at the Consulates, but the offers have to date been declined by the Finns.

Motives of Anglo-French propaganda. Through the Catholics and the remnants of the old parties, through radio broadcasts, which we cannot effectively interfere with and which are freely listened to, and through personal relations, the British, more than the French, are conducting intensive propaganda. As regards the responsibility for the war, no Italian believes in the innocence of Great Britain. As regards the war aims of the big democracies no Italian takes seriously the words liberty, justice, right, morality, etc., which are pronounced by the heads of those democracies.

But British propaganda is emphasizing two facts, namely, the Russo-German agreements, which in practice mark the end of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the treatment which is said to have been meted out in Poland to the genuinely Polish population. On this point the German counterpropaganda seems late and weak. A people

⁵ The Italian text here uses the German word *Stimmung*.

⁶ See documents Nos. 145, 176, 266, 296, 329, 354, 359, 362, and 372.

⁷ See document No. 494.

⁸ Finland participated in sanctions applied against Italy under art. 16 of the League of Nations Covenant in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute of 1935.

which has been ignominiously betrayed by its miserable politico-military governing class but which—as you yourself chivalrously recognized in your Danzig speech⁹—fought courageously, deserves a treatment which does not give occasion for hostile speculations. It is my conviction that the creation of a modest, disarmed Poland which is exclusively Polish, liberated from the Jews—for whom I fully approve your project of gathering them all in a large ghetto in Lublin—can no longer constitute any threat to the Greater Reich. If this were done, it would be an element of great importance which would deprive the big democracies of any justification for continuing the war and would liquidate the ridiculous Polish Republic created by the French and British at Angers.¹⁰ Unless you are irrevocably resolved to prosecute the war to a finish, I believe that the creation of a Polish state under the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and constitute a condition sufficient for the peace.

You might—as in fact your radio broadcasts to the French do every day—reaffirm that you do not have any war aims in the West and thereby, before the world, place the responsibility for the continuation of the conflict on the French and the British, and in any event refrain, as you have done hitherto, from taking the initiative on the Western front.

I am profoundly convinced that Great Britain and France will never succeed in making your Germany, assisted by Italy, capitulate, but it is not certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British to their knees or even divide them. To believe that is to delude oneself. The United States would not permit a total defeat of the democracies. Empires crumble for lack of internal equilibrium, whereas blows from the outside may consolidate them. As you have said, it is possible to foresee an outcome of the war with both sides losing.¹¹ Now that you have secured your eastern frontiers and created the Greater Reich of 90 million inhabitants, is it worth while to risk all—including the regime—and sacrifice the flower of German generations in order to hasten the fall of a fruit which must of necessity fall and be harvested by us, who represent the new forces of Europe? The big democracies carry within themselves the seeds of their decadence.

⁹ The text of Hitler's speech at Danzig, Sept. 19, 1939, is printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, Sept.-Oct. 1939, pp. 929-944. An English translation appeared in the *New York Times* for Sept. 20.

¹⁰ On Sept. 30, 1939, the establishment of a Polish "Government in Exile" in France was announced.

¹¹ Presumably a reference to Hitler's speech of Oct. 6, 1939 (see Editors' Note, p. 227) when he said: "Mr. Churchill may be convinced that Great Britain will win. I do not doubt for a single moment that Germany will be victorious. Destiny will decide who is right. One thing only is certain. In the course of world history, there have never been two victors, but very often only losers. This seems to me to have been the case in the last war."

Agreements with Russia. No one knows better than I, who have now had 40 years of political experience, that politics—even revolutionary politics—has its tactical exigencies. I recognized the Soviets in 1924; in 1934 I concluded with them a treaty of commerce and friendship.¹² So I realize that since von Ribbentrop's efforts toward nonintervention by the French and the British were not realized, you have avoided a second front. Without striking a blow, Russia has, in Poland and the Baltic, profited from the war.

But I, a born revolutionist who has not modified his way of thinking, tell you that you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of your Revolution to the tactical exigencies of a certain political moment. I feel that you cannot abandon the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist banner which you have been flying for 20 years and for which so many of your comrades have died; you cannot renounce your gospel, in which the German people have blindly believed. It is my definite duty to add that a further step in your relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where the anti-Bolshevik unanimity, especially among the Fascist masses, is absolute, solid as rock, and indivisible.

Permit me to believe that this will not happen. The solution of your Lebensraum problem is in Russia and nowhere else; in Russia, which has the immense area of 21 million square kilometers and 9 inhabitants per square kilometer. Russia is alien to Europe. In spite of her extent and her population, Russia is not a power but a weakness. The mass of her population is Slavic and Asiatic. In olden times the element of cohesion was furnished by the people of the Baltic; today, by the Jews; that explains everything. Germany's task is this: to defend Europe from Asia. That is not only Spengler's thesis. Until 4 months ago Russia was world enemy number one; she cannot have become, and is not, friend number one. This has profoundly disturbed the Fascists in Italy and perhaps also many National Socialists in Germany.

The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have kept faith with our two Revolutions. It will then be the turn of the big democracies, which cannot survive the cancer which is gnawing at them and which manifests itself in the demographic, political, and moral fields.

The situation of Italy. I am accelerating the tempo of military preparations. Italy cannot and does not wish to become involved in a long war; her intervention should come at the most profitable and decisive moment. In East Africa Italy is containing considerable French forces at Jibuti and in the adjacent British colonies. The

¹² On Sept. 2, 1933, a Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Neutrality was signed at Rome. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXLVIII, p. 319.

15 divisions in North Africa (8 regular army, 4 Black Shirt, and 3 Libyan divisions) are containing 80,000 British, Egyptians, and Indians and 250,000 French. In the Alps our troop dispositions have been retarded but not reduced by the snow, and the troops confront from 10 to 15 French divisions.

Fascist Italy intends at this time to constitute your reserve:

from the political and diplomatic point of view, in case you should desire to reach a political and diplomatic solution;

from the economic point of view, aiding you to the greatest possible extent in everything which may strengthen your resistance to the blockade;

from the military point of view, when the aid will be not a burden but a relief to you. And this question should be studied by the military.

I believe that the nonintervention of Italy has been and is much more useful to Germany than intervention, which in the war against Poland would have been entirely superfluous.

I desire the German people to be convinced that the attitude of Italy is within, not outside, the framework of the Pact of Alliance.

There are also other things that I might say, but this letter is already, contrary to my custom, deplorably long. I ask you to read it with the thought in mind that it takes the place of a conversation between us, which I should have liked to have.

Accept my ever-friendly greetings and my best wishes for your future and that of Germany.

MUSSOLINI

No. 505

1982/440268-76

*Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy*¹

Rome, January 3, 1940.

OBSERVATIONS ON GERMAN-ITALIAN RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1940

I. *In retrospect*

The year 1935 is of particular significance in German-Italian relations, since it brought the basic change in the relationship of the two countries. As late as the spring of 1935, when the Stresa conference convened, the Italians were among the prime agitators against Germany.²

¹ This document is from the papers of Ambassador Mackensen. No copy has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry, and it is not known whether one was sent to Berlin or not.

² See *Documents on International Affairs, 1935*, vol. 1, pp. 80-93.

This changed when Italy embarked on the Ethiopian campaign and the majority of the other nations attempted to counter Italy's action by means of the sanctions.³ Germany did not participate in the sanctions.

Over and above such "negative" aid we gave "positive" assistance to the Italians by the fact that we occupied the Rhineland during the Ethiopian war (spring 1936) and thereby diverted, as it were, the attention of the world from Italy to ourselves.

In May 1936 the Empire was proclaimed and shortly thereafter it was recognized by us on the occasion of Count Ciano's trip to Berlin and Berchtesgaden.⁴

In November 1936 Mussolini made his well-known Milan speech, which initiated the new era in Italy's relations with Yugoslavia (pact with Yugoslavia, March 1937) and in which the word "Axis" occurred for the first time.⁵

The Duce's trip to Berlin followed in the fall of 1937.⁶

Consequently, the new German-Italian friendship was created not by the spontaneous inner urge of two countries which are similar in nature or which originally pursued the same objectives, but ad hoc, on rational grounds as the result of necessities confronting both of them. This situation is not changed by the similarity in the character of Fascism and National Socialism. Even after 1933 the Germans did not want to hear anything about Italy or about closer relations with the "two-faced Italians [*Katzlmachern*]." Chance brought Germany and Italy together. Both countries recognized the present identity of their interests, consisting in the fact that they were have-nots in contrast to the powers which were satiated by the peace treaties. It is important to note this, since it allows the drawing of conclusions as to the status of present relations.

The Axis, which was welded more and more firmly in the years after 1935 until it reached its culmination in the German-Italian treaty of alliance of May 1939,⁷ could not, of course, remove at one stroke the existing possibilities of friction between Germany and Italy.

Such possibilities of friction existed in Austria and Southeastern Europe.

The continued existence of an independent Austria as a buffer state between Germany and Italy was to Italy a necessary condition for a good understanding; this was constantly reiterated. The Italians liked us better at a little distance than in immediate proximity.

³ See *Documents on International Affairs, 1935*, vol. II.

⁴ Ciano visited Germany Oct. 21-25, 1936. Recognition of the Italian Empire of Ethiopia was announced in an official German communiqué of Oct. 24, 1936.

⁵ A translation of Mussolini's speech of Nov. 1, 1936, at Milan appears in *Documents on International Affairs, 1936*, pp. 343-347.

⁶ See vol. I, documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 252, 253, 256, and 682.

⁷ See vol. VI, document No. 426.

Another necessary condition was that Germany not outdo Italy in the Balkans.

Then came the Austrian Anschluss (March 1938).⁸ This was the first serious jolt which the Axis experienced, but it survived it unweakened. At that time Mussolini extricated himself brilliantly from the predicament and made the best of it. During his visit to Italy (May 1938), the Führer renounced all claim to South Tirol once and for all.⁹

Mussolini's role at Munich in the fall of 1938 is common knowledge.¹⁰ He is doubtless one of those primarily to be credited for averting war at that time. The fate of the Sudeten area, contrary to that of Austria, did not particularly concern Mussolini. Germany's right to the Sudeten area was really recognized in the whole world.

Matters were different with regard to the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shortly thereafter (spring 1939).¹¹ Just a few months earlier Mussolini had stated in an open letter to Lord Runciman that Italy supported the German claim to the Sudeten area, since only Germans were to be incorporated into the Reich; it would be a different matter if non-German areas should also be claimed.¹² Moreover, for Italy the establishment of the Protectorate signified a further step by Germany toward the southeast and this was not agreeable to Italy. The decision to annex Albania (April 1939)¹³ is said to have involved the consideration that the Italian people should not gain the impression that the Axis partner was getting everything and Italy nothing. Otherwise, however, the Italians were indifferent to the fate of Czechoslovakia, for which no particular sympathy was felt here.

Finally, the Polish war broke out (September 1939). It is common knowledge that this did not fit into Mussolini's plans at all and that he was of the opinion that our claims in Poland could be satisfied in a peaceful way; the same applies to the fact that Mussolini was convinced, in contrast to the German Government, that England and France would fight. Mussolini did not leave us any doubt as to his views.

Our treaty with Russia (September 1939)¹⁴ at first elicited the admiration of the Italian Government for the successful diplomatic coup and also otherwise met with its approval because of the hoped-for effect on England and France. This soon changed, however, when the consequences made themselves felt: Re-entry of the Russians

⁸ See vol. I.

⁹ See vol. I, documents Nos. 758-762.

¹⁰ See vols. II and IV.

¹¹ See vol. IV, document No. 246.

¹² See vol. II, document No. 488.

¹³ See vol. VI, documents Nos. 150, 158, 166, 170, 171, and 172.

¹⁴ Document No. 157.

into Europe, danger of an advance in the Balkans, and finally the war with Finland (November 1939). No one could express more plainly than all circles here sympathy for Finland and loathing for Russia and everything Soviet.

II. *General attitude vis-à-vis Germany*

The broad mass of the Italian people, and this applies to all classes, never liked us. The German character with its frequently ponderous thoroughness is foreign to the superficial Italian. That has always been the case and is probably true today to an increased degree.

There are few Italians who seek personal association in German circles. In general the Italians prefer to be among themselves. Associations with foreigners are fostered primarily by so-called society, and then mostly with the British and the French. To a great extent, to be sure, this involves persons who do not have any political importance in Italy today. Nevertheless, they influence the attitude of a large sector of the Italian people. Count Ciano moves a great deal in this so-called society. He never seeks to enter into personal relations in German circles.

The antipathy toward Germans which has always existed is coupled at present with the widespread aversion to National Socialism and especially to our policy vis-à-vis the Catholic Church. Italy is a strictly Catholic country. How great the influence of the Church is here and what great value the Italians attach to good relations with the Vatican was evident, among other things, during the recent exchange of visits between the Pope and the King.

Large sectors of the Italian people fear that they might be drawn into the war by us. They disapprove of German policy, which in their opinion is responsible for the war.

Even Italian Government circles lack understanding for our policy vis-à-vis Russia.

Many circles mistrust Germany and believe that we will sooner or later assert claims for Italian territory after all.

All this does not alter the fact that Mussolini, and with him Count Ciano, adheres to Axis policy as a matter of honest conviction.

III. *Prospects*

If the question is asked as to what the course of German-Italian relations should be in the future, in my opinion the following must be noted:

1. The Axis is not popular with the Italian people; its fate depends on Mussolini. Mussolini is guided in his policy by very sober considerations, which are concerned only with Italy's advantage.

2. Mussolini is convinced that there is at present no other way for Italy than to go together with Germany.

3. There is no need to fear that Mussolini will join the ranks of our enemies.

4. The question whether Mussolini intends to enter the war actively on our side cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." Prior to the outbreak of the war, Mussolini left us not the least doubt about what he could and would do. His conduct was unequivocally honest. The alliance with us was concluded on the assumption that nothing should happen during the next 3 or 4 years. In spite of different opinions which one sometimes hears, I think Mussolini never intended at the outbreak of the war to take part in it at once. He is unhappy, however, that he was also unable to do so because of Italy's inadequate military preparations. At present he is doing all he can to be armed by next spring so that he can make his decisions freely. He wants to be able to participate in the spring if this appears to him to be the correct thing. It is impossible to foresee whether it will seem correct to him. If at the given time Mussolini thinks he can achieve his aims by peaceful means he will not take military measures.

PLESSEN

No. 506

B18/B003315/8-15/9

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, January 4, 1940—9:05 p. m.

SECRET

Received January 5—2:00 a. m.

No. 7 of January 4

The Foreign Minister sent for me and had a conversation with me which lasted an hour.

M. Tanner began by saying that Germany had previously always had friendly relations with Finland. For some time, however, he had had the impression from the German radio and the German press that Germany was downright hostile to Finland. He wished to know what attitude Germany took toward the Russo-Finnish conflict.

I replied that Germany had a nonaggression pact with Russia, but not with Finland. Apart from that, Germany had no share in the conflict.

M. Tanner then proceeded to speak about the Russo-Finnish war and the sacrifices which it is demanding. He stated that in view of the numerical superiority of the Russians, Finland could not forego the help which was being offered from all sides.

I remarked at this point that if Finland accepted help from Germany's enemies, it would depend upon the nature of this help whether Germany would be forced to re-examine her relations with Finland.

M. Tanner then asked whether I could not tell him what kinds of assistance Germany would consider unobjectionable. I declined to

answer this question. Tanner [did not]¹ (group garbled) insist, but remarked that the matter involved the delivery of war material, financial assistance, and the sending of volunteers.

I left him in no doubt that Germany would in each individual case of foreign aid carefully investigate to what extent German military or political interests would be affected.

Tanner remarked in reply that Finland had no interest in providing a battlefield for the Great Powers.

Tanner then went on to speak about the devastations caused by the Russo-Finnish war, which also complicated deliveries of important products from Finland to Germany, and he asked me whether I believed that Russia was prepared to enter into new negotiations with Finland. I replied that it was not within my authority to give an answer. If he wanted to know my personal opinion, it was that Russia, which had not yet committed her main forces, would hardly depart from her previously negative stand. Tanner said that it would perhaps be easier for Russia now than three months later, for Russia would then still be in her initial positions.

Tanner then asked: "Can the German Government give us any advice?" I told him that there was no occasion for German mediation. Tanner then withdrew the question, but after a discussion of other subjects returned to it by submitting it to me in an unofficial form, with the request that it be transmitted to the German Government.

My impression is that this is an attempt by the Finnish Government to isolate the Russo-Finnish conflict and bring about a settlement through an understanding before yielding to offers of assistance from the League of Nations Powers.

Tanner requested strictly confidential treatment.

Please wire instructions.

BLÜCHER

¹ "Did not" is taken from the copy sent to Moscow; see document No. 513, footnote 1.

No. 507

1821/416743

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, January 4, 1940.

e. o. W V 29.

In connection with preliminary conversations concerning the extension of the German-Finnish economic agreements, the Finns inquired whether there was any possibility that Germany might permit the

transit of war material destined for Finland. I stated that we could not permit such transit in the future.

VAN SCHERPENBERG

No. 508

F6/0235-40

*Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal Göring*¹

PERSONAL

BERLIN, January 4, 1940.

MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl reported to me on the conference on various economic questions in the Balkans which you held in Karin hall on January 2.² In the interest of smooth further treatment of these questions I am very much interested in informing you of my opinion on several points which were discussed or touched upon at the conference.

1. To begin with, a personal request: In your introductory remarks before the group of representatives from various agencies you expressed your dissatisfaction with the activity of the German trade delegation in Bucharest headed by Minister Clodius, and also let fall a general remark about Minister Fabricius which was apparently interpreted as a criticism of his activity by the members of this large group. Should you ever again believe on the basis of your observations and information that you have reason for raising objections against officials of the Foreign Service, I should be grateful to you if you would inform me of this directly and clear it up with me.

In addition I must stress emphatically that I consider your criticism to be in substance unfounded. Minister Fabricius has always carried out the duties of his office, which particularly in the last few months have often been especially difficult and delicate, with the proper political tact, energy, and skill.

In my opinion Minister Clodius, too, has conducted the negotiations in Bucharest exceedingly well and with the greatest success imaginable, so that I have expressed my special appreciation to him. In the further course of the discussion, after Herr Clodius had described the course of the negotiations in detail, you recognized this yourself and remarked that you had not been correctly informed. I am very grateful to you for this frank statement, but consider it direct proof of how justified my request is that you clear up directly with me any cases which on the basis of reports coming to you seem to give reason for complaints relating to the activity of my officials. In this

¹ Marginal note: "File in a secret place. E[rich] K[ordt] January 6."

² See document No. 502.

connection, I should like to remind you of the case we recently discussed regarding a complaint about the activity of Ambassador Ritter. The justice of my request, by the way, is also confirmed by a curious sequel to your conference. The representative of another Ministry, who took part in the discussion, informed Ministerialdirektor Wiehl a few hours later that in his opinion the Foreign Ministry would be likely to decide on a "complete solution," [*Totallösung*] with respect to sending a special representative to Bucharest, since it would not work to have a special representative operating in Bucharest alongside the Minister. In other words, he requested or suggested the recall of Minister Fabricius. You will surely understand that this method of handling an important personnel matter is not agreeable to me.

2. As far as assigning a special representative for economic and transportation questions to Bucharest is concerned, I, too, consider this important and urgent. Ministerialdirektor Wiehl pointed out at the time of the conference that the special representative should be located within the German Legation; it follows that a man like Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat, whose capabilities I value very highly, would be a person with too high a rank for this position. I therefore intend to send Minister Clodius, who is acquainted with these things in the minutest detail down to the present moment, to Bucharest in order to take over himself for the time being the duties of special representative in the Legation there. I shall assign to him Party Comrade Neubacher, whom you know and who has been familiar with the economic problems of Southeastern Europe for years; he will later take over Clodius' duties. I believe that in this way the centralized administration of the German-Rumanian economic agreements, which you and I both consider necessary, will be assured and that you will also be satisfied with this solution from the point of view of the Four Year Plan.

3. At the conference you also brought up for discussion the subject of defense against enemy sabotage in the Balkans. In so far as this involves "legal" measures of protection at points of production, they can of course be carried out only by the foreign governments themselves which are concerned. In order to induce these governments to do this effectively, constant political influence and diplomatic pressure will be necessary. But I am entirely of your opinion that it is time to go beyond "legal" measures and to combat sabotage actively by all effective means at our command. For a long time already I have had the activity of the British in the Balkans under surveillance by my agents, with the result that even today we have rather extensive knowledge of these intrigues and of those who organize them. Furthermore, some time ago I got in touch with the Gestapo and the

Intelligence Department of the OKW and discussed with both of them the further action to be taken in this field. As soon as any definite active measures in this regard on the part of Germany prove to be necessary, it is clear that their execution will have a very strong effect on foreign policy. Consequently, I must attach considerable importance to my retaining control over such measures at all times. Therefore several weeks ago, with the consent of the Führer, I gave Minister Killinger the task of going to the Balkan countries,³ ostensibly as an inspector of our Legations; there he was to contact our diplomatic missions, my personal agents, and the local German counterintelligence people from the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht, obtain an exact impression of the situation and the necessities arising therefrom, and keep me currently informed on these things. I shall at all times appreciate being informed of your wishes in this regard which may result from your own observations. I shall of course likewise see that you are kept currently informed about all these matters.⁴

I remain, as ever, with best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.⁵

³ See document No. 495.

⁴ Another letter from Ribbentrop to Göring, dated Jan. 25, 1940 (2117/460970-71), indicated that the letter which is printed here was answered by Göring on Jan. 19. Referring to Göring's reply, Ribbentrop expressed satisfaction that his measures directed at ensuring and increasing oil deliveries from Rumania had met with Göring's approval. He also welcomed Göring's suggestion that the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, be used in some capacity. Ribbentrop finally expressed satisfaction with cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the economic departments as organized under the Economic Policy Committee in April 1938. Göring's letter has not been found.

⁵ The copy printed is unsigned.

No. 509

2181/466476-78

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

ROME, January 4, 1940.

9870

Subject: Italian deliveries of war material to England and France.

With reference to your instruction W 2824 g of December 4, 1939.¹

I refer to the reports previously submitted in the above-mentioned matter by the German Consulates in the industrial areas of Northern Italy. The situation has remained the same. The rumors concerning Italian deliveries of war material to our enemies persist. The Foreign Minister here and other offices which have been asked openly

¹ Not printed (2181/466469-70): A request for the Embassy's views on information Clodius had received from Gafencu in Bucharest on Nov. 29, 1939, regarding reported large-scale arms deliveries by Italy to France.

or covertly continue to deny any war material deliveries to England and France.

An attempt has been made to trace each individual rumor to its source, but so far no evidence of actual deliveries of war material in the strict sense could be produced.

The rumors in question refer primarily to the delivery of airplanes and airplane engines to France. It might be correct that agents of France were and still are in contact with the Italian airplane industry. The informants insist that orders were placed for the delivery of training planes and light engines.

I do not believe that orders have been placed with the Fiat firm in Turin for the delivery of tanks, but truck deliveries are probably being made to France.

Thus the orders placed of late by England and France for the most part seem to involve not war material in the strict sense but equipment for the enemy armies. Among others the reports concerning deliveries of military fabrics, blankets, and boots can be considered correct.

The representatives of French and British machine factories in Italy, who have so far been occupied with the sale of foreign machine tools in Italy, are striving at present to purchase machines in Italy for export to France.

The Innocenti firm in Milan is said to be delivering to France scaffolding, corrugated sheet metal, and sections for the construction of airplane hangars.

England and France are striving to obtain in Italy additional hemp, mercury, and sulphur, as well as skins and hides, and appear to be getting considerable quantities.

Since the Italian military authorities pay poorly and belatedly, the Italian armament concerns are very much interested in exports abroad with much more favorable conditions of payment.

The French and British Governments have interested the Italian Government in the deliveries by promising at the same time the delivery of raw materials and semifinished products. Thus the Italian trucks are to be paid for in part with deliveries of scrap iron.

A local informant has now, however, made the following report:

"France has let it be known during the negotiations now in progress concerning Italian deliveries that she will hereafter no longer be able to commit herself to repay by deliveries of raw materials, but that she will pay in gold bullion. Thus new difficulties arise for Italy in obtaining raw materials, since it is becoming increasingly difficult to purchase them even with gold and to transport them to Italy."

Italian firms in Trieste and Fiume are endeavoring to obtain meat and fats in Yugoslavia through clearing payments and to send them on to France in return for free currency.

In summary, it can probably be said that negotiations of considerable scope are doubtless being carried on by England and France with Italian firms concerning the purchase of war material in a broad sense and that Italian Government authorities and the Italian concerns involved are by no means unfavorably predisposed toward these wishes. The Italian rearmament now in progress, however, will probably not permit any extensive deliveries of war material in a strict sense, and politically, too, the Government here seems to prefer to make war material exports to neutral countries like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Northern countries rather than to England and France. In order to conceal its own rearmament, the Italian Government is probably not interested in refuting the exaggerated rumors about exports of war material.

V. MACKENSEN

No. 510

B21/B005327-28

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States*¹

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, January 5, 1940.

No. 16 of January 5

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally; strictly confidential.

The President of the German Red Cross, the Duke of Coburg, is going via Japan to the United States of America, where he will spend altogether about 4 to 6 weeks. Purpose of the trip: friendly conversations with leaders of the American Red Cross and social contact with leading American personalities. The Duke will be accompanied by Captain von Grolman and an attendant. He will presumably arrive in San Francisco at the beginning of March.

Although the Duke has no official mission, we nevertheless attach the greatest value to having his tour of the United States go smoothly and bring satisfactory results. The Embassy and Consulates are to lend the Duke assistance in every way. Counselor of Legation Dr. Tannenberg will be placed at the Duke's disposal for the entire length of his stay in the United States and must stand by to advise and assist him from the moment he arrives in San Francisco.

Please work out program suggestions for either a longer or a shorter tour and telegraph them here by January 13 at the latest. You are

¹A typed note appears at the head of the document: "By oral instruction of the Foreign Minister."

requested to treat the plan as confidential for the time being and to discuss it discreetly only with the Consulates concerned.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² On Feb. 20, Thomsen was instructed to take special care that public opinion in the United States did not misinterpret the Duke's mission, in particular that the press did not represent it as having political significance (B21/B005393). A further telegram of Feb. 28 (B21/B005411-12) stated that the American Ambassador in Japan, it was assumed on instructions of the State Department, had advised against the visit on the ground that in view of anti-German feeling in the United States undesirable demonstrations might occur. Berlin had decided, however, that Coburg should proceed and he had sailed from Yokohama on Feb. 23. For a report on his stay in the United States see document No. 683.

No. 511

APA Reel No. 290

*Memorandum by an Official of the Aussepolitisches Amt*¹

BERLIN, January 5, 1940.

TRAVEL REPORT OF REICHSAMTSLEITER SCHEIDT ON HIS TRIP TO NORWAY AND HIS STAY THERE FROM DECEMBER 24, 1939, TO JANUARY 2, 1940

In consequence of the discussions which took place here in Berlin in mid-December on the Norwegian question, I left as directed on the morning of December 22 for Norway, where I was to gather information about the situation and maintain contact with [former] Minister Quisling, and be available if needed to advise him in his propaganda work.² The trip to Norway went without any difficulties worth mentioning; only that the route via Sassnitz-Trälleborg is not advisable these days, since the ferry at Sassnitz sails most irregularly and only by daylight. I was told the reason for this was the danger of mines along the Swedish coast. In the roadstead of Trälleborg harbor lies a remarkable number of ships, yet none over about 4000 tons, all freighters, including several under 1000 tons and of all Scandinavian nationalities. Altogether I counted 20 freighters (steam) in the roadsteads. Except for four small minelayers and a tender no Swedish naval vessels were to be seen. On the return voyage the picture was substantially different. During the holidays all had left but four small freighters, and these were not in the roadsteads, but on a westerly course under protection of the shore.

In Malmö I visited the German Consul, Dr. Kirchhof. I asked him how he judged the situation in his consular district or the rest of Sweden as he knew it. From his utterances I perceived that anxiety

¹ This document is in custody of the German Military Documents Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U. S. Army, file 250-d-18-42/3.

² See document No. 483.

about the Finnish conflict is extremely acute among the Swedes. The military were unanimous in the view that extension of the Russo-Finnish conflict to Norway and Sweden is unavoidable. The Swedes already have troops in the Åland Islands and it is expected that the Russians will attempt to occupy the Ålands. Even in Skåne, they are extremely nervous and are working hard at building up coastal defenses. Still stronger is the fear and anxiety in the eastern provinces, Södermanland and farther north. Public opinion is fully prepared by intensive pro-Finnish propaganda to come soon to the active aid of the Finns. Volunteer formations for Finland are already assembling in Sweden. According to one report not verified by me, some volunteer units are already fighting in Finland. Sweden is fully determined to stand with arms in hand against Russian occupation of the Åland Islands. According to Consul Kirchhof, many political elements in Sweden are ventilating the question of whether a German guarantee of Swedish frontiers could be achieved. The Swedes expect no active help from England.

Immediately after I arrived in Oslo I got in touch with Norwegian elements I know well. There, too, it was true that the Finnish conflict had excited public opinion to a truly disconcerting degree. Contrary to the calm nature of the Scandinavians as I have known them at other times, their emotions are aroused. Although I was already prepared by Minister Quisling's descriptions of the prevailing mood in Scandinavia, the high degree of excitement disconcerted me. The active participation of Norway in the Finnish conflict is promoted by placards and in show window displays. Meetings for aid to Finland are taking place in the streets. The Norwegian press is completely dominated by the Finnish conflict. It is noteworthy and disquieting that the question of active Allied aid for Finland is not nearly as much in view as the constant reproach that Germany has left Finland, always friendly to her, in the lurch facing Russia. This one-sided attitude regarding Germany closely resembles the British line, as does the least possible mention of the Allied states in this connection. Two Norwegian publicists known previously to be extremely pro-German, M. Jakobsen in the newspaper *Ragnarek* and Viktor Mogens in his weekly *Utenriks Chronik*, have dropped their previously pro-German course and are writing in an extremely anti-German way. In their accounts they have taken over completely the terminology of the Western Powers relating to Central European questions. Both papers now speak of Jewish "persecutions," of aggression against Czechia and Poland, etc. My information in Oslo on this point indicates clearly that both publicists receive even more money from England than from Germany. Under pressure of public

opinion and the drop in subscriptions, which occurred spontaneously after Germany concluded the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, both have been captured by England. I have had a chance to speak personally several times in Oslo with Viktor Mogens, and from the very beginning I have had a poor impression of him. He has no political weight and in his weekly *Utenriks Chronik*, without any political conceptions of his own, he expresses a certain point of view, yet offers no supporting argumentation. Since the Norwegian is greatly influenced by any powerful experience, is not allowed to dig very deep into political problems, and is naive toward any at all complicated motives of a political nature, he is all the more interested in this rather superficial style of treating foreign policy questions since he is glad to find his own political views stated in print. This characteristic of the man in the street in Norway is known to the Western Powers and is exploited by them. Through a skilfully managed press policy Germany, too, could enjoy equal success in Norway. It will, however, be extremely hard to carry on propaganda work for Germany in Norway unless the German press is strictly restrained in handling Russo-German relations. The wide display of extremely good relations between Germany and Bolshevik Russia on Stalin's birthday, the extremely favorable judgment of the person of this Bolshevik statesman, gave the British very easy arguments with which to work on the Norwegian public. For successful press policy in Norway, I should regard as indispensable the halting of such outspoken demonstrations of sympathy for Bolshevik Russia as have been seen over and over again since the Non-Aggression Pact. If—as could easily be done—the Norwegian press each day printed a German quotation from before the pact with Russia and right next to it one from after the pact, no further commentary would be needed to completely convince Scandinavian public opinion of the unreliability of German policy, all the more so because nothing is done by Germany comparable in effectiveness to the propaganda of the enemy coalition.

When I began the trip I received orders to report to the German Minister in Oslo, but without telling him anything about my assignment. I could not miss discovering that even before my arrival in Oslo the Minister was aware that I was to work with Minister Quisling and also that M. Quisling's confidential agent, M. Hagelin, had just come to Norway from Germany. The Minister for his part had orders from State Secretary von Weizsäcker to maintain inconspicuous contact with me. Since from the beginning M. Quisling has always emphasized that his contact with Germany as well as the proposals he made here [in Berlin] must remain absolutely secret and that he would deal in these matters exclusively with Reichsleiter

Rosenberg and me, this disclosure to the German Minister in Oslo caused him extraordinary consternation. Minister Quisling pointed out that the wider the circle of people knowing his plans, the harder it would be to keep them secret. I can certainly understand his wishes in this matter, for as a former Norwegian Minister of War his own neck is at stake with his policy. He saw reason for the presence of some people at the conversation between the Führer and himself, and in addition that the Foreign Minister had to be included in the total circle of those informed. On the other hand, his experiences with the German Mission in Oslo had made it seem advisable not to inform the Legation. That some other men in the German Foreign Ministry, along with the Minister in Oslo, are informed of his plans has disturbed him. He has naturally learned this through his agent, M. William Hagelin. I calmed Minister Quisling, as I could do in good conscience after I got to know Herr Bräuer, the German Minister in Oslo, and became convinced that he had made no use of what he knew, not even with the men of his Legation. Since the German Minister had been informed, I spoke openly with him on everything and gained the impression that Herr Bräuer has known the direction of the intended development. It is too bad that for the present Herr Bräuer evidently is directed to carry on with the staff of his predecessor. I regard Herr von Neuhaus as unsuited to be, during the present extremely difficult situation in Norway, the regular adviser to the newly-arrived German Minister in Norway. Herr von Neuhaus certainly enjoys no reputation for great intelligence. All the Norwegians regard him as a "very nice" and affable man, but beyond that he is not feared by Norwegians known to be pro-British. This blunt characterization has come to me several times from Norwegians.

My talks with Norwegians have resulted in all seeing the extremely great danger that Norway will be drawn into the whole conflict of Germany and the Western Powers. Obviously, they emphasize to me as to all Germans that they are determined to remain absolutely neutral. Anyone knowing the character of the Norwegian people knows, however, that little value should be attached to these assurances. The German Legation in Oslo and its members naturally will be acquainted only with this view and the Legation will be unable to gain knowledge of any other utterances of influential men in the Government. I should therefore like to warn against taking the Legation's reports as absolutely correct. This is not the fault of the Legation, which certainly does its best, but Germany lacks in Norway an organization comparable to the British Secret Service. I am convinced that Germany is well informed on the true opinions of the man in the street and on much of the background of high policy in

England, France, America, etc. I am not convinced that in the Wilhelmstrasse the measures planned by the Norwegian Government or the public opinion of Norway are taken into account in handling the Scandinavian question.

On the way to Oslo, I had already gathered from German press accounts that Minister of War Monsen planned to resign; this displeased me, for I knew him to be incompetent and rejected by the whole officer corps. Monsen would be easy game in Norway, for anyone fighting him would have universal sympathy. I therefore warned Quisling against proceeding too strongly against Monsen, for in the circumstances this might be [too] successful. On arrival in Oslo, I heard that at the King's desire Colonel Ljungberg had become Minister of War and that the press inferred that he had "no political ties." I asked M. Quisling to make an investigation of Ljungberg's person. Quisling's friends among the officers of the 1st Infantry Regiment in Frederikshavn [*sic*] which Ljungberg commanded until he was named War Minister, testified unanimously that he is outspokenly pro-British. For a long time he was aide to the King of Norway, an acknowledged friend of England. Mme. Ljungberg was for a long time lady-in-waiting to the Queen, who was herself English. So far the new Minister of War has taken no special steps. The call-up of reserves into the Norwegian Army has not been increased, and there are about 25,000 men under arms, of whom three-fourths are in Finnmark (against this reliable report from Norwegian officer circles is to be set the information received by the German Naval Attaché in Norway that about 40,000 men have been called up and of these 30,000 are in Finland) [*sic*]. Quisling considers these figures known to the Naval Attaché as incorrect. It is noteworthy that at the urging of the new Minister of War an air route—Northern England—West Coast of Norway—Stockholm—previously banned, is now permitted. It might be superfluous to point out that such an airline, with its middle base on an island (Smøla?), is not civilian in origin. It might also be noted that the entire personnel of the Norwegian Navy was denied Christmas leave, the reason given being that Germany intended to carry out fleet actions on the Norwegian coast. This information comes from England, and this also is admitted.

The German Naval Attaché tells further that the international Association of Combat Veterans [*Frontkämpfer*] plans a meeting soon in Oslo. Some German veterans who lived in Norway formerly were members of this international association. Because of the Ossietzky scandal³ and the lasting unfriendly attitude of the Norwegian Gov-

³ In 1935, Carl von Ossietzky, a German pacifist imprisoned by the German Government, was awarded the Nobel peace prize by a committee named by the Norwegian Storting, whereupon Hitler forbade Germans to accept such awards.

ernment, Germany has as a gesture ordered her nationals out of the Norwegian branch of this international association. Now the Norwegians can reach common decisions with England which are beyond Germany's control. Had the German veterans remained in the association, then Germany would have reasonable expectation of being represented in its leadership and could have prevented making basic decisions without Germany's knowledge. In this connection, the German Naval Attaché expressed misgivings that under this camouflage it would be not at all hard for the British to bring several hundred combat soldiers unobtrusively to Oslo. Clearly all sorts of plans can be carried out in this way, all the more so when one knows how exposed Oslo is to this sort of thing.

I spoke with the senior captain of the Norwegian-American Line, the master of the passenger vessel *Stavangerfjord*. Captain Irgens told me that from the beginning of the war until about 3 weeks ago, he had crossed to North America from Oslo or Bergen several times. When I asked if the British had not searched him, he said he had gone through the blockade unseen by the British every time except one, when they detained him and took him to Kirkwall where his ship was inspected for a whole week. When I asked him to tell more about his experience, it transpired that before the detention by the British a German plane had circled his ship and afterwards flown over several times on the way to Kirkwall. Knowing that Irgens is pro-British, I cannot avoid the impression that the British are purposely letting *S. S. Stavangerfjord* through since they are informed anyhow by the smooth functioning of their intelligence services as to the ship's passengers and cargo. The report that a German plane had circled *Stavangerfjord* while British warships were near in my opinion led the British to demonstrate impartiality by taking her to Kirkwall. I do not believe at all that in the circumstances the British thought it worthwhile to search such a well-known Norwegian ocean liner, since this would be displeasing to the passengers, owners, and public as well. My experience with a few other seamen was that they are most skeptical about the German conduct of the naval and air war and its results. Norwegian maritime circles consider it in general extremely doubtful that airplane attacks can be effective against ships under way. In this connection someone told the story of a convoy which included among other ships a large whaler, chartered by England and flying the British flag. Over a dozen German planes bombed the floating factory, all missing the target. The entire convoy reached England unscathed and without loss of time. Whether or not this story is true does not seem to me to matter, the important thing is that British propaganda is succeeding in Norwegian mari-

time circles. I have the same impression about the Norwegian Government. The present Government is evidently following the same course as the Czech and Polish. The British Government leads the Norwegian Government to believe that it is winning the war and is more than a match for the Germans. At the same time, the British promise to protect Norway's neutrality and independence. German Army communiqués are received with the greatest caution.

In a conversation with M. Odal, editor in chief of the anti-Marxist and hitherto quite pro-German newspaper, *Nationen*, I was told under the seal of deepest secrecy that the bane of Norwegian politics was M. Hambro, President of the Storting, chairman of its committee on foreign policy, and Norwegian representative in Geneva. This Jew is always spinning threads for England. When I asked Odal if he knew how far M. Hambro had gone in his conversations with the Geneva Powers during its last session, Odal, who is well informed, told me that in a secret session of the Storting there had been great astonishment, even horror [*Entsetzen*] at the concessions which Hambro had made in the name of the Norwegian Government at Geneva to the enemy coalition. There he gave Norway's assent in all questions concerning sanctions and permission for troop transit to Finland. Thereupon a special emissary of the Norwegian Government was sent after M. Hambro to recall all these concessions in the name and authority of the Norwegian Government. I do not believe M. Odal's account in all respects. By and large, however, the description may conform to the actual facts. I believe, however, that Odal's information to me was a calculated indiscretion. It would be just like M. Hambro and the British to neutralize such concessions by calculated indiscretions to other states, right until they thought it time to intervene.

Quisling has meanwhile prepared his propaganda work. He has undertaken various dealings with newspaper proprietors whose papers he buys out if occasion arises. To camouflage his German sources of funds he has begun a great money-raising drive for Nasjonal Samling. Besides that, he is now selecting from his shock troops a suitable number of reliable men who can be considered for a possible surprise action. To carry out all these prepared plans he urgently needs the funds he has asked Germany for. In the last few days through Minister for Social Affairs Støstad, M. Hagelin has come in touch with [Trygve] Lie, the Minister of Supply, about Norwegian import licenses. After getting these licenses, he expects to return to Germany to conduct further negotiations.⁴ From Hagelin's conversations with

⁴ Hagelin represented the Norwegian Government in negotiations for the purchase of German antiaircraft equipment.

Støstad and other official personages while in Oslo, one gathers that they fully intend to increase imports from Germany; this only partly meets Hagelin's wishes. He and Quisling hope that final permission to provide German funds will be given very soon, and they will then immediately begin their work in Norway. Quisling has meanwhile received another message from Colonel Sundlo at Narvik. Sundlo regimental commander there, states in this message that on his own initiative he has made all preparations at Narvik and now only waits Quisling's order to attack. I have asked Quisling to restrain Sundlo, for any action by him will be called for only if and when the German authorities consider the moment for surprise opportune. Similarly, Quisling has been asked by a rather large number of officers at Trondheim to come there to discuss with them the political situation. One day before I left Oslo, Quisling went to Trondheim. In my view, the younger officer corps and the younger staff officers of the Norwegian Army are the only ones completely clear about the situation. After seeing the reports of Finnish successes they realize that the reason for the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact is not any German fear of Russia, and as soldiers they also see that Germany's strong military position in this war and the economic strength bolstering that position are possible only through avoiding a two-front war. In addition, they also realize that Germany's battle with England must end in destruction of England's importance on the continent if Germany wants to avoid a two-front war in the future. Similarly, in the Norwegian Army it is feared, as mentioned above, that the Norwegian Government, just as Czechia and Poland, will some day be sacrificed to the British siren songs. If one now reckons with the known respect for Quisling which exists in the Norwegian officer corps and far beyond that, he can understand why the Norwegian officers always wish to learn Quisling's position on political events and incline to him and his advice. It is to be hoped that Quisling will extend further his relations with the officer corps, and he will be able to do this all the better the sooner German means for decisive propaganda are available.

An hour before I left Oslo, I had tea with a few Norwegians I know who told me that they had just heard of border incidents between Soviet and Norwegian troops at the Finnish-Norwegian frontier. To get the evidence for this was not possible in the time remaining.

No. 512

4581/E144250-51

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 21 of January 6

ANKARA, January 6, 1940—5:05 p. m.

Received January 6—8:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 8 of January 4 (W IIIc 41):¹

1. I reached the following agreement with the Minister of Commerce today:

In return for the delivery of papers for the goods in customs storage² in accordance with your instructions, Turkish products with a total value of 5 million Turkish pounds will be exported, distributed as follows:

tobacco—2.6 (two point six) million
raisins—400,000 (four hundred thousand)
figs—100,000 (one hundred thousand)
hazelnuts—1 (one) million
cotton seed—100,000 (one hundred thousand)
olive oil—300,000 (three hundred thousand)
oil cake—100,000 (one hundred thousand)
sesame—100,000 (one hundred thousand)
industrial figs—300,000 (three hundred thousand)

Thus in accordance with your wishes better terms for important goods have been obtained.

I have instructed the banks to deliver the papers. Please inform the suppliers accordingly.

2. The data you have requested concerning German shipments on the basis of old contracts will follow as soon as possible. With reference to the new orders for pharmaceutical products the Minister remarked that in view of sufficient offers and possible imports from England, France, America, and Switzerland he is ready to dispense with German deliveries, but that German industry would thereby be displaced from the local market from now on. German representatives here confirm the existence of this danger and urge that the quantities requested by the Turks, which are negligible as such, be released. I request that the chemicals for X-ray treatments, which are urgently needed in the earthquake area,³ be released at any rate.

3. Your dilatory treatment of the proposals made here has seriously affected the favorable atmosphere laboriously created for future large

¹ Not printed (8493/E596933-34).

² The German decision to stop deliveries to Turkey until a general settlement had been agreed upon (see document No. 330) had been supplemented by German refusal to release goods already in Turkish customs (telegram No. 559 of Dec. 14, 1939, from Papen: 4531/E144254-55).

³ On Dec. 27, 1939, a severe earthquake had occurred in eastern central Anatolia.

scale negotiations and has created the impression that we intend to exert pressure on the Turks by withholding German deliveries, even for the very small amount of 2 million Turkish pounds. The delay in coming to an agreement is being utilized by the British to sabotage German efforts at normalizing economic relations as well as the political relations connected therewith, and to remove goods from the market. I request therefore in the interest of as speedy a settlement on point 2 as possible that the list of goods desired by the Turks, which will be sent within the next few days, be examined very quickly and accepted, if possible without change, and that my proposal for Turkish return deliveries be approved as given below:

hides—270,000 (two hundred seventy thousand)
olive oil—500,000 (five hundred thousand)
mohair—700,000 (seven hundred thousand)
valex—300,000 (three hundred thousand)
opium—60,000 (sixty thousand)
hemp—100,000 (one hundred thousand)
emery—20,000 (twenty thousand)
licorice root—50,000 (fifty thousand)

Because of excessive prices owing to considerable Italian and Rumanian purchases, cotton is practically out of the question for us.

PAPEN

No. 513

103/111937-39

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 47 of January 8

Moscow, January 8, 1940—4:41 p. m.

Received January 8—9:05 p. m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 10 of January 3 and No. 42 of January 6.¹

After 5 weeks of attack the Red Army in Finland has so far nowhere achieved victory worth mentioning. The slow progress of the Red Army and the occasional setbacks are the result of the skillful opposition of the Finns, difficulties of terrain and climate, and above all very considerable faults of Soviet organization, particularly as regards equipment and provisioning. Nevertheless there can be no

¹Not printed. In telegram No. 10 (103/111931), Weizsäcker asked the Embassy for its political and military evaluation of the Russo-Finnish conflict. Then in telegram No. 42 (B18/B003315/13-B003318), he sent to Moscow the text of Blücher's telegram of Jan. 4 (document No. 506) and asked the Embassy to present its views on that, too, without informing the Soviet Government of Blücher's report.

doubt of the ultimate victory of the Red Army in this fight. It is merely a question of time, the approximate length of which it is impossible to predict.

The situation came about owing to the fact that the Soviet Government was not sufficiently prepared for such a war, since it had expected Finland, just as the Baltic countries, to yield finally to its demands. A misjudging of the situation on the part of the Finnish Government caused the Soviet Government to feel obliged to use force in order to avoid a loss of prestige after it had laid down a definite minimum program in Molotov's speech before the Supreme Soviet on October 31.²

The war against Finland was from the very beginning unpopular with the population of the Soviet Union. The fear of war, which has always been strong among the masses here and which had temporarily been diminished by the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, has been given a new impetus by the Finnish conflict. This sentiment is strengthened by the absence of victories at the Finnish front, increasing supply difficulties, reports about imminent price increases, and the large number of Red soldiers with frozen limbs who are crowding the provincial hospitals.

I see confirmation of the existing difficulties in a statement by Molotov, with whom I had a conversation yesterday during the conference session³ and who spoke in connection with the Finnish conflict about a serious situation, the strength of the Finnish fortifications and the unfavorable effects of the severe cold.

When I asked how the Soviet Government regarded the possibility of support by third states, especially Sweden and Norway, Molotov said that the Soviet Government was aware of the danger that would arise if England and France should use Sweden and Norway for their own ends and had therefore warned the two Governments on January 5 and 6 through appropriate notes. In these notes the Soviet Government had reproached Sweden and Norway for tolerating hostile actions directed against the Soviet Union and incompatible with the neutrality of these two countries and had pointed to the possibility that complications might arise. The Norwegian Government had answered at once, protested its determination to maintain strict neutrality, and laid the blame for certain happenings in Norway on private groups as well as the opposition press. No official written reply from Sweden had yet been presented, but in accepting the note Günther had already given a similar tentative answer by word of mouth.

² See Editors' Note, p. 363.

³ See document No. 520.

Moreover, the Soviet Government expected that Germany would use her influence with Sweden in a suitable manner.

When I remarked that the Finns could not in the nature of things expect ultimate victory and would therefore probably be ready to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government, Molotov did not, interestingly enough, make an entirely negative reply but answered with the words that it was "late, very late" for this and that it would have been better for the Finns to accept the Soviet demands in the first place.

Settlement of the Soviet-Finnish conflict would in my opinion foil British intentions, afford the Soviet Union considerable relief, and—if it came about with our help—would mean a great gain in prestige for Germany apart from other advantages, for instance undisturbed deliveries of ore from Sweden. However, to begin with, the following questions, still completely open at present, arise in this connection:

1. Does the prestige of the Soviet Union permit taking up negotiations at all in these circumstances?
2. What conditions will she set in this event?

There is no doubt in my mind that, if such a possibility does exist or should arise, the person of Tanner, who is here considered the "evil spirit" of the past negotiations, will disappear from the scene.

SCHULENBURG

No. 514

F11/0224-28

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, January 8, 1940.

MY DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: With reference to our lengthy conversation of December 30, I am sending you the enclosed condensed study of my operations office [*Führungsamt*] on the military and the military-political problems of the Southeast and the Near East from the viewpoint of military strategy.

If you or your office should want information on additional military details, I would be very glad either to give it to you myself or to have it supplied to you by the chief of the Wehrmacht operations office with the help of maps.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

KEITEL

[Enclosure]

No. 22004/40 g. K. Chefs. L (I)
Wehrmachtführungsamt
Abteilung Landesverteidigung

BERLIN, January 6, 1940.

POLICY AND THE WAR EFFORT IN THE EAST

1. It is in the interest of the German war effort

a) that the strategically favorable starting position (war on one front), brought about through political means and through arms, should not be impaired by the necessity to commit forces in the Southeast;

b) that the Southeast, being an important source of supplies, should remain neutral, at least as long as in the economic field it gives us what we must have;

c) not to draw Italy into the war through military action in the Southeast, thereby causing conflict of interests between Italy and Russia which would be a serious threat to our relations with Italy;

d) to use every means to contain the Army in Syria in at least its present strength and to make all possible trouble for the British in India, as well as in the Arabian countries, without making necessary any substantial German assistance.

2. Purpose and possible employment of the Army in Syria.

a) To safeguard the line of communications from the Mediterranean to India (the Suez of the Air).

b) To scotch any Arabian tendencies to revolt.

c) Commitment against a Russian attack in the direction of Western Asia.

d) Establishment of a Balkan front at the side of Turkey in case a favorable opportunity should develop during the war.

3. Possible Russian operations—German interests.

a) An operation against India is ruled out by the distances and terrain conditions with which the Russians would have to contend. On the other hand it would require relatively little to foment a rebellious movement of the mountain tribes at the Indian border, possibly also in Afghanistan. This would create a trouble spot threatening to England, hinder the departure of English troops for Europe, and is therefore desirable in *Germany's* interest.

b) An occupation of *Bessarabia* would be relatively easy for the Russians. The Rumanians have withdrawn their troops behind the Prut and will scarcely offer any resistance. The outcome of such a Russian move would be an unrest in the Balkans which we do not at all desire. If Russia were to encroach upon the Balkans beyond Bessarabia by military and political treaties or even by a direct attack, in order to come closer to her old goal, the Straits, then Russo-Italian conflicts would become unavoidable.

c) An operation into the Near East from the Trans-Caucasus region, would bring in the *Syrian Army* as well as additional Anglo-French forces. The Russians might base this on the following political objectives:

I. The Soviet Union seeks to deal a decisive blow to England's power by a thrust toward Mosul-Bagdad-Basra which would cut off communications to India.

II. She seeks to acquire the Iraqi oil fields near Mosul for their economic value.

III. She wants to regain the territories southwest of Batum which were ceded by the Treaty of Kars, in 1921.

Attainment of objectives I and II would also eliminate the threat of air attack from Western Asia on Soviet Russia's principal oil region around Baku (50 percent of Russia's oil).

We have no reliable reports on strength, distribution, and the combat value of the Russian forces in the Caucasus. Nor have we any information on Russia's operational intentions and plans.

German studies have shown that any objective beyond reconquest of the region west of Baku would require very large Russian forces; supplying them would be extremely difficult with the existing railroad and highway system. The eastern wing of an attack in the direction of Mosul-Bagdad would have to advance through Iran. It would meet the opposition of parts of the Turkish and Iranian armies, the forces stationed in Iraq, which would be certainly reinforced, as well as Weygand's Syrian Army.

It is questionable whether the Russian armed forces would in their present state believe themselves capable of an operation toward the Near East. From the German standpoint, however, it is highly desirable to divert the Russian forces in this direction and thus probably away from the Balkans. As far as we can see at present, this would not affect Italian interests. Considering the special significance of a strike in that direction in the war against England, we would be justified in supporting at least indirectly any such operation.

JODL

No. 515

1860/422903

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 16 of January 9

STOCKHOLM, January 9, 1940—9:25 p. m.

Received January 10—12:45 a. m.

Pol. VI 85.

With reference to your No. 14 of January 6.¹

The Foreign Minister asked me today to see him in order that he might better define his recent statements (telegraphic report No. 2 of January 2 regarding the desire for absolute neutrality).² The

¹ Not printed (1860/422879).

² Not printed (205/141987).

Swedish Government had declined the League of Nations invitation to participate in a relief action for Finland as irreconcilable with neutrality. Sweden was prepared energetically, and, if necessary, by force of arms, to repel any attempts of the Western Powers to establish bases in Sweden or to transport British and French troops through Swedish territory. This also held for British and French military supplies of all kinds. Transit permits would be granted, however, for war material that was the property of the Finnish Government. When I pointed to the dangers that might be involved in implementing this intention, Günther replied that practically no war material for Finland had been shipped in transit so far. The Foreign Minister urged me to treat his statement regarding Sweden's refusal to the League of Nations as confidential and not to make use of it in the press.

WIED

No. 516

8493/E597005-06

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 16 of January 9

BERLIN, January 9, 1940—10:08 p. m.

Received January 10—2:30 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 15 of January 8.¹

Re points 2 and 3 of your telegram No. 21 of January 6.²

The two million transaction is also approved. The list of Turkish return deliveries is accepted. We are still expecting the Turkish list of goods desired. We are even ready in this connection to permit new transactions to the extent desired by the Turks (25%), especially as regards pharmaceutical products and other chemicals. Orders for chemicals for X-ray treatments can be placed at once, independently of other agreements.

By consenting to the two million transaction we merely wish to give the Embassy the chance it desires for obtaining in this manner, through further transactions, the chromium ore supplies needed by us. *For your strictly confidential information:* The German war economy is not interested in the greatest possible volume of trade with the greatest possible number of countries, but in the wisest possible distribution of German exports, the volume of which is limited by

¹ Not printed (8493/E597007). This telegram gave Foreign Ministry assent to the agreement summarized in point 1 of document No. 512.

² Document No. 512.

the conditions prevailing with regard to raw materials, capacity, and transportation. In this respect those countries are of primary importance which can supply us with goods that are essential for conduct of the war. In the final analysis, therefore, we are interested in trade with Turkey during the war from an economic standpoint only if Turkey makes concessions in the chromium ore question.

WIEHL

No. 517

2121/462387-88

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, January 9, 1940.

CHROMIUM ORES

(Oral information given by Dr. Hoffmann, specialist of the Reich Office for Iron and Steel)

1. Mobilization requirement 12,000 tons of ore per month (with an average content of 40 percent Cr_2O_3).
2. Available supplies are sufficient for 13 months.
3. To cover our further requirements the following is available to us:

from Greece a maximum of	12,000	tons	per	year
from Yugoslavia a maximum of . . .	12,000	"	"	"
from Bulgaria approximately	8,000	"	"	"
	<hr/>			
	32,000	"	"	"

If this quantity is received by the end of 1940, we shall have a supply for an additional two to three months. To this will possibly be added another 100,000 tons from Russia, which would assure our supply for another 8 to 9 months¹ and perhaps (that is, in case the British permit transport by sea) the 35,000 tons of chromium ore which the Norwegian ferro-chrome works Bjölvfossen purchased in Turkey for the purpose of sending on the ferro-chrome obtained therefrom to Germany.

4. Dr. Hoffmann received enthusiastically my communication concerning the possibility of obtaining 40,000 tons of chromium ores from Turkey (Hungarian proposal: 40,000 tons of Turkish chromium ore in return for permission to export 200,000 time fuses from the Hungarian optical works to England). He sees two possibilities: either this refers to the output of a mine in the vicinity of the Sea of

¹ Unsigned marginal note: "altogether for 2 years!"

Marmara (on the Asiatic side) which belongs to a certain Paluka;² up to now the latter has been our main supplier of Turkish chromium ores and is for the time being still placing his output at our disposal; so far, however, he has tried in vain to obtain the Turkish export permit. Or else this refers to ore which England secured for herself in Turkey; in this case it might be assumed that the Hungarian proposal originated in response to a British suggestion.

MORAHT

² In a memorandum of Jan. 10 (2121/462386), Moraht recorded that information had been received that the Hungarian offer actually did refer to the output of this particular mine near the Sea of Marmara. Meanwhile OKW had been asked to give its views on the Hungarian proposal (8483/E596879-80). In a memorandum of Jan. 11 (2121/462383-84), Wiehl noted that Keitel had expressed the desire to refer the matter to Hitler. Wiehl recommended that the Foreign Ministry support the proposed arrangement, provided the OKW agreed, but documents indicating what action was taken have not been found.

No. 518

F18/090-088

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 1

BERLIN, January 10, 1940.

I received the Italian Ambassador at 12:00 today. I told Ambassador Attolico that Herr von Steengracht had communicated to me his [Attolico's] readiness to make more detailed comments on the Duce's letter¹ and asked him whether he had something to say on specific points. Ambassador Attolico said no, but that he would be glad to place himself at our disposal for any questions. I told him that I had so far discussed the Duce's letter with the Führer only very briefly; the Führer wished to think over the separate points very carefully and form a clear view of the general situation; then he would presumably communicate to the Duce in writing his opinion on the various subjects discussed. This answer would, to be sure, probably take some time;² Ambassador Attolico showed full understanding for this.

Then I asked Ambassador Attolico a number of questions on the points dealt with in the Duce's letter:

1. *Ciano's speech.* I asked Signor Attolico which German circles the Duce had in mind when he said that some parts of Ciano's speech had not met with approval. Signor Attolico replied that the impression generally prevailed that the speech had not been received

¹ Document No. 504.

² In his memoirs Weizsäcker stated that he composed a memorandum about Mussolini's letter (*Erinnerungen*, p. 274). No copy of this memorandum has been found in the Foreign Ministry files.

very enthusiastically. I told him that I had answered his question at the time to the effect that some of the points of this speech were excellent but that there were one or two points which, I feared, might be misused by our enemies.³ I had in mind the mention of a divergence of opinion in the conversations at Fuschl and Berchtesgaden,⁴ the disclosure of which might create the impression in the world of a German will to war. And certain quarters had actually taken this passage as proof of Germany's war guilt. Attolico replied that the Duce did not attach great significance to such calculations. I closed the discussion of this point with the remark that of course everyone in Germany firmly believed that Ciano was a convinced champion of Italo-German friendship and would remain so.

2. I then asked Signor Attolico what was meant by the *Italian war preparations* which upon completion would "ultimately benefit Germany as well." Signor Attolico replied that the more Italy armed, the more this would prove to Germany's advantage.

3. *The Balkans*. I confirmed to Signor Attolico that the maintenance of peace in the Balkans must be of basic interest to both Germany and Italy today.

4. *Russia*. I expressed my astonishment to Signor Attolico concerning the sharp anti-Bolshevist tone of the Duce's letter. Some time ago Mussolini himself had recommended bringing about an easing of German-Russian relations,⁵ and that was exactly what Germany had done—no more, no less. Moreover, we were engaged in lively trade with the Soviet Union. From a military standpoint the Soviet Union was not to be considered excessively strong. Neither German nor Italian interests could be seriously threatened by the Soviet Union. I had therefore believed that the Duce would have greatly welcomed an easing of Russo-German relations; for an easing relieved Germany and consequently also the Axis. At any rate the situation would be considerably less favorable if the Soviet Union had allied herself with England and France. Moreover, the Führer and the Duce had always agreed on the fact that England and France were the principal enemies of the Axis. Therefore, why this animosity toward Russia?

Ambassador Attolico pointed out that the Communist papers in Moscow had spoken of Italy's standing aside in the present conflict in order to make common cause with Germany at the moment of

³ See document No. 493.

⁴ This refers to the passage in Ciano's speech (*Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, January 1940, p. 45) where he spoke of his conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop when he visited Germany on Aug. 11, 12, and 13, 1939. See vol. vii, documents Nos. 43 and 47.

⁵ See vol. vi, document No. 211.

victory. This slander had aroused the greatest indignation. Finally, the Soviet Union's attack on Finland had shown the danger from Russia which might some day threaten the Balkans, too. There, however, Italian interests were involved to a very large extent. Otherwise, Ambassador Attolico had little to say in reply to my arguments about German-Russian relations.

In the Finnish question I explained that England had maneuvered Finland into a senseless situation. I knew that Stalin had not wanted the conflict with Finland either. Moreover, I did not believe in a Russian policy of expansion, but only in limited revisionism, which was primarily directed against the post-war treaties forced upon Russia. I also expressed surprise that the Duce should really believe the Führer would pursue a Bolshevik policy. For my own information, in case the Führer should ask, I would be grateful to him for enlightening me on whether the Duce thought it possible that Germany would open her gates wide to Bolshevism and recall the Jewish emigrants. Italian anti-Semitism had, after all, only been the result of National Socialist anti-Semitism.

Ambassador Attolico explained that of course the Duce assumed no such thing.

5. *General situation.* I explained to Ambassador Attolico that the Duce's letter appeared to me to contain primarily the advice to refrain from unleashing a real war with England and France. The Duce was of the opinion that "the creation of a Polish state under the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and constitute a condition sufficient for the peace." That meant, however, that Germany could conclude peace with the Western Powers on this basis. This opinion, however, seemed to me to conflict to a certain extent with the fact that the Führer had offered such a peace to the Western Powers in October, but they had scornfully rejected it. The most varied statements by British and French statesmen, the most recent of which was yesterday's speech by Chamberlain, constantly demanded the elimination of the "tyrant," that is, of the Führer, and consequently of the German people. I asked Ambassador Attolico whether the Duce perhaps had information to the effect that the Western democracies abandoned these views. Ambassador Attolico replied that he had not been present at the drafting of the letter and therefore could not add anything on this point. At any rate, however, the Duce had not had any conversations about it with the British and the French, and he also did not believe that the Duce had any other definite information. We finally agreed on the fact that in the Duce's personal opinion a peace could be brought about gradually on the proposed basis. Signor Attolico formulated

this to the effect that logic told the Duce that such a development was thinkable.

I told Signor Attolico that I would at any time welcome a peace on the basis outlined by the Duce, but that I strongly doubted whether England would be ready for it. England's attitude manifested the will to annihilate, decimate, and destroy the German people. We could counter this only with the same will to annihilate. We were determined to beat England and bring her to her knees. If, however, the Duce had other information, despite all the statements made by Western statesmen, and despite all attempts to decimate Germany, such as those being scientifically prepared by the Toynbee Committee in Balliol College at Oxford, I would be greatly interested in learning it. Signor Attolico replied that he did not believe that such positive information was available. I concluded this point of our conversation with the statement that as long as England did not clearly express her desire for peace, Germany's determination to annihilate her enemy was unshakable.

6. *England and France.* No one in Germany believed that it would be possible to separate England and France; nevertheless, it appeared to me that propaganda in this direction would be injurious to the enemy and we would therefore continue it.

Attolico then explained the passage in the Duce's letter, "it is not certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British to their knees," to the effect that the Duce did not doubt the strength and striking power of the German Army. On the contrary, he was of the opinion that Germany had great possibilities of victory. He believed, however, that such military victories, even if we should conquer Paris, would not force Britain to her knees. Therefore, it appeared more advantageous to the Duce to seek a solution other than a purely military one.

7. With reference to the passage in the Duce's letter that the conditions for British and French nonparticipation had not materialized, I explained that I had told Count Ciano earlier that such nonintervention could not be predicted automatically, but that I had thought it entirely feasible in certain circumstances.

8. I then asked what was meant by the "catastrophic repercussions" that would result from a further step along the road of our relations with Moscow. Ambassador Attolico explained that this referred to conclusion of a Russo-German alliance as had been mentioned in the press a number of times. I told Signor Attolico that no such alliance existed and that neither the Soviet Union nor Germany had considered such an alliance. Germany had only one alliance, namely that with Italy.

9. *Italy's situation.* I asked Signor Attolico what was meant by the statement that Italy could not and would not permit herself to be drawn into a long war and that her intervention would have to come at the most useful and decisive moment.

Ambassador Attolico explained that in case the war lasted five years Italy could not enter it as early as the first, second, or third year. I refrained from replying to that.

10. When I asked what was meant by the statement that Italy was our reserve in the political and diplomatic field, Attolico replied that the Duce was completely at Germany's disposal in case she desired a solution by diplomatic and political means.

I thanked Ambassador Attolico for his additional information. I requested that he consider my statements and in general the entire conversation as private and my statements as purely personal. I had been primarily interested in preparing myself for possible questioning by the Führer and had therefore welcomed it very much that Signor Attolico had made himself available for further explanations. The German answer was, of course, entirely in the hands of the Führer.

Ambassador Attolico stated that he understood this very well.

RIBBENTROP

No. 519

1879/357672

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, January 10, 1940.

Received January 15.

W V 27 III.

For your information.

With reference to our instruction No. 1039 of Dec. 10, 1939.¹

The dementi issued some time ago concerning the transit of war material from Italy to Finland via Germany was based on the fact that no transit permit for such material had been issued during the time in question, and according to the legal regulations in force transit could take place only on the basis of such a transit permit. Together with the denial all customs offices had again been given very emphatic instructions to the effect that no war material of any kind for Finland might cross the German frontiers. On the basis of this instruction it then developed that several carloads of war material from third countries for Finland had actually gotten into Germany owing to an oversight on the part of the customs offices involved; as a matter of fact there were 8 carloads of war material from Hungary and 11 carloads with planes and plane ammunition from Italy. It was still possible

¹ Document No. 435.

to stop the 8 Hungarian cars. Of the 11 Italian carloads, 2 had left Germany even before the outbreak of hostilities between Finland and Russia and 3 more during the first days of December, before the dementi became known. Thus 3 carloads of plane ammunition were inadvertently permitted to leave Germany for Finland after November 30, but no planes or other war material. So far the dementi has also been essentially substantiated by the various inquiries made. All the shipments detained here were returned to the senders. Suitable measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of carelessness on the part of the customs offices such as was evidently responsible for the occurrences mentioned above.

By order:
WIEHL

No. 520

1133/324528-31

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, January 10, 1940.

In his conversation with M. Molotov on January 7, 1940, the Ambassador reverted to the conference on the present economic negotiations which took place on December 31, 1939 in the Kremlin in Stalin's presence.¹

The Ambassador explained that the conference with M. Stalin had unfortunately had to be broken off suddenly because of the late hour, and that another important point had therefore remained unsettled on which he, the Ambassador, should have liked to say a few more words at the time. It concerned the statement in the exchange of letters between Ribbentrop and Molotov according to which the Soviet Union would supply Germany with raw materials for which Germany was to pay with industrial deliveries over a more extended period of time. Since it had not been possible to reach an agreement on the term "more extended period of time" in the conference of December 31, he wished to go back to the origin of the exchange of letters mentioned and briefly sketch the historical development. Its beginning had to be sought in the German-Polish war, as a result of which the Soviet Union obtained possession of the Western Ukraine and Western White Russia after the German Wehrmacht had overcome Polish resistance. Thus Germany had rendered valuable service to the Soviet Union in the expansion of her territories. The negotiations between Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and M. Molotov had then been carried on in this atmosphere and on this realistic basis. The Soviet Union had recognized that Germany needed the

¹ See document No. 499.

speedy delivery of certain Soviet raw materials to carry on the war. Germany did not by any means wish to get these raw materials for nothing, and wished to give proper compensation for them. Because of the entire nature of the German deliveries these could not, however, be made as quickly as the delivery of the readily available Soviet raw materials. With this in mind the stipulation was made that compensation for the Soviet raw-material deliveries would be made over an extended period of time. If M. Mikoyan now took the stand that the Soviet Union never promised Germany any credit, then this was literally correct but did not accord with the facts insofar as Germany—by the advance service she rendered in the course of the campaign against Poland—had done the Soviet Union a favor which doubtless justified some compensation.

This, however, was merely the theoretical side of the question; the practical side was much simpler. The fact of the matter was that Germany had declared that compensation for the Soviet deliveries, which were to be completed by the end of 1940, could not be made faster than over a period of 15 months, i. e., approximately by April 1, 1941. The Ambassador was even of the opinion that the Soviet Government should grant Germany a still more extended period of time, in other words about 18 months, which would be even more in conformity with the spirit and intention of the letters. Nevertheless Germany was prepared to make compensation for the Soviet raw-material deliveries after 15 months, but with the best will in the world was not in a position to do so by the end of 1940. He asked M. Molotov to take these considerations into account and to give appropriate instructions to M. Mikoyan so that the latter recognized the justice of the German stand.

M. Molotov, who had listened very attentively, replied as follows:

As far as the historical side of the matter was concerned, there had really never been any talk of a Soviet credit to Germany. And it would have been strange if the Soviet Union, which had just received a credit of 200 million from Germany, would now grant Germany credit on her part. The Soviet Government fully recognized that the manufacture of German products took a longer period of time. Therefore it was fully prepared to begin its deliveries at once, but with the condition that the account had to be balanced by the end of 1940. At present it was primarily a question of finding a practical solution, for the Soviet Union was interested in knowing concretely what German products she could be sure of getting and exactly when. This was necessary from the standpoint of economic planning and especially with regard to Soviet armament. The Soviet Government did not intend to make impossible demands on Germany. The Soviet Union had already withdrawn her first proposal concerning a quarterly settlement of the deliveries on both sides and had agreed to having these

settlements made every half year. The Soviet Government was convinced that a large number of products that were important for the Soviet Union were available in Germany and could be delivered at once. Thus the German Government had only to give permission for delivery of a cruiser in order to create at once a large balance in the payments account in Germany's favor. If Germany should decide upon delivery of both cruisers, the sum in question would increase even more. Also the delivery of several sample planes would immediately bring a substantial amount to Germany's credit. Consequently Molotov did not consider the Soviet demand any insurmountable obstacle in the way of reaching a mutual understanding. He was convinced that Herr Ritter and M. Mikoyan would come to an agreement concerning the methods following Herr Ritter's return from Germany and would find a practical means for a mutual understanding. A necessary condition for this was for the Soviet Government to learn what the actual German deliveries consisted in and when they would be made. For the Soviet Union these were not theoretical problems but very concrete ones. The large raw-material deliveries to Germany meant for the Soviet Union a curtailment of her own economic interests and necessitated considerable limitations on domestic consumption. The fact that the Soviet Government had declared itself willing to make such sacrifices proved that it, too, attributed a definite political significance to the economic agreement with Germany. It was indispensable, however, for the Soviet Government to know what it could expect in the way of war material from Germany in the near future.

The conference closed with the Ambassador's request to Molotov that he submit the matter once more to M. Stalin.

HILGER

No. 521

124/122602-04

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker

Moscow, January 10, 1940.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: During the past few days I had a lengthy conversation first with M. Molotov and then with M. Potemkin. During my talk with M. Molotov the conversation turned to the departure of the British and French Ambassadors; it was noted in this connection that their departure coincided with the summoning of Italian Ambassador Rosso to Rome and was used by the anti-German press, as was to be expected, to put an unfavorable interpretation on all of this. M. Molotov emphasized that the attitude of the Italian Government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had been very unfriendly, for which Moscow could see no particular reason.

When I spoke with M. Potemkin today, he reverted to the matter of his own accord. He said that the Soviet Government had just received a report from its Embassy in Rome to the effect that Count Ciano's favorite paper had come out with a very abusive article directly aimed at the person of Stalin. M. Potemkin asked whether I had any idea why Count Ciano should behave in this manner. It certainly appeared as though he wished to do the work of the British and the French. At the same time the Soviet Government knew that Signor Mussolini thought quite differently and had always been interested in having correct relations with the Soviet Union. The conduct of Count Ciano and the Italian authorities had considerably complicated the position of the new Soviet Ambassador in Rome. During the conversation M. Potemkin mentioned that Italian students had clamored for half an hour directly outside the windows of the Soviet Embassy; all efforts at calling the police by telephone had been in vain. M. Potemkin hinted that the Soviet Union would not look unfavorably upon our using our influence in Rome toward moderation. In general I remained noncommittal and merely said that Rome and Moscow would probably soon find a way of eliminating this very disagreeable friction.

In my opinion it would be up to the Soviet Government, which was the first to recall its Ambassador, to be the first to send him back. Doubtless it is in the interest of all of us to have correct relations re-established between Rome and Moscow. I am unable to judge whether we can do anything in this direction.

In my conversation with Molotov the discussion on Finland was the most interesting. I have already telegraphed what is most important.¹ I should like to add that we had assumed M. Molotov would energetically reject any possibility of negotiations with the Ryti Government from the very start, as he had once told me. We were surprised that he did not do so. His answer, "late, very late," is difficult to evaluate. It is obvious that M. Molotov's statements and attitude certainly reflect M. Stalin's opinion and that, on the other hand, M. Molotov cannot say anything definite in such important matters without having spoken with M. Stalin. I am curious to see whether M. Molotov will revert to this matter in his next conversation with me.

I should like to add that according to all our observations the food situation, which is worse than it has been for a long time, letters with unfavorable news from the Finnish front, and the lack or inadequacy of support given the families of the soldiers are creating unmistakable dissatisfaction among the population.

With most cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

F. W. SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 513.

No. 522

141/126444-45

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 7 of January 10

BRUSSELS, January 11, 1940—2:35 a. m.

Received January 11—8:05 a. m.

Last night, for the first time since the holidays, I had an opportunity for another long political talk with the Foreign Minister. M. Spaak complained first of all about an article in the *Angriff* of January 6, which, referring to an article in the *Gazette* of January 5, had sharply attacked Belgium for her unneutral trade agreement. The statements in the *Gazette* had been purely hypothetical and did not warrant attacks of this order.

Proceeding from this episode, M. Spaak declared that he was afraid Germany failed to realize the Belgian people's unity in backing the neutrality policy of the King and the Government and the fact that this policy had steadily gained followers since the outbreak of the war. Except for a few cranks there was no one in Belgium who would advocate any other policy. This had also been evident when the Chamber and the Senate voted on the budget of the Foreign Ministry, and likewise in the voting at the convention of the Socialist Party. I used the opportunity to remonstrate to the Foreign Minister once more about the sins of the Belgian press and to insist again on neutrality of thought.

In connection with the deliberations of the Chamber our conversation turned to the Foreign Minister's declaration on the relationship between Belgium and Holland.¹ M. Spaak remarked that he thought the notion of a German attack on Holland was absurd. At the out-

¹ Spaak had made a statement on foreign policy in the Chamber on Dec. 19, 1939. Concerning Belgian relations with the Netherlands he had said: "For my part, I have no hesitation in saying that from the military as well as the economic and moral point of view, an independent and neutral Holland is of vital importance to Belgium. I do not think it necessary to labour so obvious a truth."

"I am even more anxious than I was—what has happened makes it necessary—that there should be nothing mechanical about Belgian foreign policy. I want to be quite free to form a judgment in the light of all the facts. For that reason, I think it would be unwise to decide now what attitude we shall have to adopt if the situation in Holland changes. But I should like to make it clear that it would be madness to suppose such an event would leave us indifferent."

"As far as I am concerned—and I am sure I am speaking for the whole Government—I am deeply conscious of the ties between Belgium and the Netherlands."

For text of the speech, see *Annales Parlementaires de Belgique: Chambre des Représentants*, Dec. 19, 1939, pp. 153-195; for translation, see *Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened, 1939-1940* (London, 1941), pp. 80-84. Bülow-Schwante had sent on Dec. 20 a lengthy report on the Spaak statement (2323/548960-63).

break of the war both Holland and Belgium had received solemn assurances that their neutrality would be respected; he had faith in the word which had been given. If in his speech he had, nevertheless, taken up the question of what Belgium would do if Holland should be attacked from one side or another, he had done so only because he had been forced to by the report of the Chamber Committee. In view of the general expectation that large-scale fighting would break out somewhere next spring, it was quite natural that the Belgian public was speculating on where these battles would occur. Belgium would be directly affected only by an attack against her own border or against that of her northern neighbor. In the former event, the situation was clear: Belgium would then fight no matter from what side she was attacked.

As regards the latter case, the Belgian public had been wondering what position the Government would take. Here he would have to say that any occupation of Holland, whether by England or by Germany, would create a situation for Belgium that would call for new decisions. With the German Army in Holland, Belgium would not be able with her small Army to defend her several hundred kilometers of border from Arlon to Antwerp; besides, occupation of the Scheldt estuary would make it impossible to maintain the flow of supplies for the country. Furthermore, if Holland were to be attacked in spite of the solemn assurances given her, it would be impossible to convince the Belgian people that they in turn would not suffer invasion sooner or later. If it were England, on the other hand, which occupied Holland, the situation would be equally difficult, and any other attempt to keep the country out of the war would probably also be foredoomed to failure.

Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that the point of his statements had been merely to indicate that any attack on Holland would create a new situation that would require reexamination. He had rejected the idea of an automatic reaction. The Belgian Government would accordingly keep its hands free for that contingency. In the circumstances obtaining at the outbreak of the war, Belgium, in pursuance of her policy of independence, had declared her neutrality, and she would continue to observe the strictest neutrality as long as these circumstances prevailed. There were no grounds for doubting that; the Government was as firm in its resolve to pursue its neutrality policy as it had been at the start of the war, when Franco-British inclinations to march through Belgium undoubtedly failed to materialize because, among other factors, there was a firm determination to defend the country against any attack.

No. 523

2790/547590-91

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

BERLIN, January 11, 1940.

zu Kult B 64-11 6/1.1.¹THE N. V. HOLLANDSCHE BUITENLAND-BANK, THE HAGUE²

I. Now that the provinces of Weichselgau and Warthegau have at last become integral parts of the Reich,³ the conditions which made it necessary at one time to set up such a camouflaged corporation as the N. V. Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank of The Hague have ceased to exist.

II. Liquidation of the credits which we extended in the former Poland through the N. V. Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank must absolutely be handled in a manner that will stand up under the scrutiny of the Netherlands authorities.

III. Due consideration must also be given to the Dutch members of the board of directors, some of whom are very prominent persons.

IV. Following the liquidation of the credits, it would be advisable to retain the valuable framework of the Buitenland-Bank for future Germanization projects of the Reich which might need camouflage.

A reduction of the capital stock to about 1 million Dutch guilders would on the other hand appear desirable.

The Buitenland-Bank also administers for the Cautio⁴ the international commitments of the Tobis,⁵ and also renders valuable services to the Reich-Kredit-Gesellschaft A. G. in the financing of exports and imports.

¹Not printed (2790/547593-96).

²The Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank, founded in 1925 with assistance of the Reich and Prussian Governments, had been engaged in financing and refinancing enterprises of German nationalist interest among German minorities principally in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The financial structure engaged in this type of activity was headed by the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G. m. b. H. (formerly the Ossa Vermittlungs- und Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H.), a government-controlled agency, over which the Foreign Ministry exercised supervision through Kult B, and which at this time went under the cover name of Exzelsior A. G. Activities of this organization in Austria have been mentioned in vol. I, documents Nos. 170 and 175, its activities in Poland in vol. V, document No. 85, and in Denmark in vol. V, document No. 462.

³The Weichselgau and Warthegau (German descriptions of areas in the four western provinces of Poland) were declared to be incorporated into the Reich by a decree of Oct. 8, 1939, to be effective Nov. 1, 1939 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, pt. I, p. 2042).

⁴The Cautio Treuhandgesellschaft m. b. H., a financial holding company.

⁵A German and an international film concern. The international concern had headquarters in Amsterdam.

Submitted to the official in charge, Senior Counselor Schwager,⁶ with the request for an opinion.⁷

GROSSKOPF

⁶ Schwager, who had formerly been in charge of these matters as head of Kult B, now exercised supervision over them as officer in charge of budget and financial questions in the Personnel and Administrative Department.

⁷ Marginal notes:

"Re I. The H[ollandsche] B[uitenland-] B[ank] is used also for other credits, e. g., in Rumania.

"Re II. Yes!

"Re III. Yes!

"Re IV. I strongly recommend that the attention of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl and Ambassador Ritter be called to other *administrative possibilities* of the H. B. B., on the basis of a detailed memorandum on the H. B. B. in the files of Kult B—prepared by us about 2 or 3 years ago. [Not printed, 2790/547621-26].

"I disagree with the Exzelsior, whose interests are one-sided, and am convinced that very good use could be made of the H. B. B., in one way or another during the war. Schwager."

On Jan. 28, the Minister in the Netherlands was asked to state his opinion on proposals for liquidating or reducing the scale of the Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank (2168/471060-61). Count Zech replied on Feb. 14, that the Bank had proved extremely useful and that he was opposed to liquidating the bank or reducing substantially the scale of its operations (2168/471062-63). Grosskopf, in a memorandum of Mar. 7, noted that the Exzelsior A. G. and the Finance Ministry were in agreement with the position that the Bank should be continued on its current scale to the end of the war (2790/547584).

No. 524

100/64808-10

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, January 11, 1940.

Upon presenting the attached memorandum, the Italian Ambassador told me, with reference to yesterday's question by the Foreign Minister¹ as to what evidence the Duce had of a possible change of mind by the enemy, that the Duce's opinion was founded less on concrete facts than on the logic of the situation. If Germany allowed Poland to be restored in some form or other, she would deprive her enemies of that very reason for the war on which they have focused the attention of their own public. This would logically lead to a peace movement.

Moreover, if Germany abstained from taking the offensive on the Western front, the only result of such a situation would likewise be peace, for the Allies themselves certainly would not attack in the West.

Attolico then asked me whether any German reaction to the Duce's letter was yet discernible. I replied that the German reaction had been made evident in the talk that he had had with the Foreign Min-

¹ See document No. 518.

ister yesterday, from which he could gather at any rate that Germany was studying the Duce's letter very closely.²

SCHMIDT

[Enclosure]

PARIS, December 20, [1939].

MEMORANDUM FROM ATTOLICO

There continues to be agitation in parliamentary circles for a reorganization of the Cabinet, the main objective of which, in the minds of many deputies, would be Daladier's resignation as Foreign Minister and the formation of a ministry to coordinate the armed forces. Mandel, as the heir to Clemenceau's tradition, would have to be placed at the head of the latter ministry. There is an overabundance of candidates for the Foreign Ministry, including de Monzie, who, however, would gladly take the Ministry of the Interior if he were not appointed Foreign Minister. I have been assured, however, that de Monzie recently had a talk with Halifax and discussed with him his views on foreign affairs, which received the approval of the British Minister.

Another candidate for the Foreign portfolio is M. Chautemps. The decision may be made in the first days of January.

But the chief issue debated at this moment is really whether the serious internal incidents caused by the military inactivity may be more severe or less severe than those which might be provoked by an attempt to shake off this inactivity. This, too, is reported to have been discussed at the Anglo-French meeting in Paris the day before yesterday. The problem is, however, complex and difficult because it involves not only military factors but more particularly political and social factors, the appraisal of which varies with the general viewpoints of the two countries and the special viewpoints of their political officials. In reality, England feels that the burden of this siege warfare rests more heavily on her and would like her ally to bear a greater share of it. On the other hand, it is said here that in the British Government itself the ideas of absolute intransigence are beginning to change a little. There is no doubt that the anxieties increase in the same measure as the intentions or the opportunities of conducting a real and regular war—of infantry—diminish.

It is possible that just as the two opposing sides, as the result of a chain of fateful mistakes, found themselves in an intolerable political situation from which the only logical way out sooner or later had to be war, so it might also come to pass that if it should suit neither side to take the initiative in large-scale operations, peace will sooner or later appear as the only logical way out of an intolerable military situation.

² See document No. 504.

No. 525

4467/E087442-43

Memorandum by an Official of the Aussepolitisches Amt

BERLIN, January 11, 1940.

On Monday, January 8, I spoke at the Fürstenhof [hotel] to the German Naval Attaché to Oslo, Lieutenant Commander Schreiber, who told me of a visit he had paid Geheimrat von Grundherr in the Foreign Ministry. I asked Commander Schreiber whether he had spoken to Herr von Grundherr on the question of possible British intervention in Norway. Commander Schreiber affirmed this, and said that Geheimrat von Grundherr regarded it as a fairy tale. Commander Schreiber then asked Herr von Grundherr if he thought an unhindered supply of Swedish ore vital to Germany and her war effort, and he said yes. Then Commander Schreiber asked further what Herr von Grundherr himself would do if he were an Englishman and knew that delivery of the ore was vital to the German war effort. Herr von Grundherr then had to admit it was altogether probable that the British would overlook nothing to disturb ore deliveries to Germany from Narvik.

I myself visited Herr von Grundherr on the evening of January 9. To me also he stressed that he did not believe England would intervene in Norway in any way whatever. Moreover, he was quite certain that in any case the Norwegian Government would maintain its neutrality. He said expressly that recently the Norwegian Government has been extraordinarily courageous in the neutrality question. I had the impression that my objection to this view made no lasting impression on him.

Regarding the Finnish affair, it is interesting to note that Herr von Grundherr told me that he considered German conduct toward Russia as neither wise nor correct and thought any yielding to Russia ominous for further developments in northern Scandinavia. That this view contradicts those of the Foreign Ministry was left unsaid, but could clearly be inferred.

SCHEIDT

No. 526

124/122854-55

Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker

KIL0, January 11, 1940.

DEAR BARON WEIZSÄCKER: I wish to thank you most cordially for your kind letter of January 2.¹ Thank you, too, for your kindness

¹ Document No. 500.

to my wife and your offer to arrange for forwarding her letters. They are now coming through regularly, so that I do not need to trouble you.

Permit me now to add a few remarks with the brutal frankness excusable only in a private letter.

My old friend Hedin wrote me a few days ago: "Finnish resistance may in certain circumstances change the entire world situation." This is correct according to my impressions here.

What Soviet Russia amounts to was heretofore a big question mark. For the past six weeks Finland has now been the guinea pig on which the excellence of the Red Army and the appeal of Bolshevism have been tested by experiment.

The result is unequivocal.

In spite of a tremendous superiority in men and matériel, the Red Army has suffered one defeat after another, lost thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns, tanks, and planes, and has made no decisive gain in territory.

Kuusinen's government has not found support anywhere in Finland. Even the workers have entirely rejected it.

In view of this experience the ideas on Bolshevist Russia must be thoroughly revised. All of us started with the wrong premises when we assumed that Russia was a first-rate military factor and that Bolshevism and its Comintern exerted a strong influence on the laboring masses of other countries. Actually, the Red Army has such shortcomings that it cannot even dispose of a small country and the Comintern does not even gain ground in a population that is more than 40 percent socialist.

What Russia amounts to economically cannot be ascertained, to be sure, on the basis of the Finnish experiment—that Herr Ritter must establish; at any rate, however, the experience gained in Finland shows that Russia has not for some time past constituted a threat to the great power, Germany, and that Germany already had a safe flank in the East and did not need to make any sacrifices for it.

In these circumstances it might now be possible to adopt an entirely different tone toward the gentlemen in the Kremlin from that of August and September.

In addition there is the fact that Russia's alignment with the Western Powers is at present out of the question, now that Russia has seriously compromised herself in these countries through the Finnish adventure and has revealed her military and political weakness.

I would therefore assume that our position vis-à-vis Moscow is strong enough today so that we can without difficulty put a stop to this calamitous excursion into the North.

I hope you will not mind if I send a copy of this letter to Herr von Grundherr.

With a Heil Hitler, a kiss of the Baroness's hand, and my best regards to you, I remain

Yours, etc.

BLÜCHER

No. 527

124/122483-88

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

SECRET

ROME, January 11, 1940.

MY DEAR FRIEND: Professor Hermanin von Reichenfeld, the curator of the art treasures at the Palazzo Venezia, where he also has his office and so is constantly in the same building as the Duce—a person who is known to you as the man who, after the big banquet at the Palazzo Venezia on the occasion of the Führer's visit, conducted the Führer, the Duce, and our immediate circle through the collections of the Palazzo Venezia, and a person who has for years been closely associated with the Embassy and with me personally—urgently requested a few days ago that my colleague, Reichert, a personal friend of his, come to see him in order that he might tell Reichert his views as set forth in the enclosed memorandum.

In this conversation, as you will see, he expressed certain grave anxieties, which, I must add, we hear from many quarters and especially from the none-too-numerous Italian friends of ours who stand squarely by the Axis. We are giving the greatest attention here to these anxieties, which we fully share. Our counterpropaganda, which was launched pursuant to the instructions given me personally by the Reich Foreign Minister early last December in Berlin and in line with the conditions stated by him at that time, will take effect only gradually. We anticipate a certain measure of success, although we must also bear in mind that for a great number of reasons the other side probably will have the advantage over us for some time yet.

I would not have considered forwarding the enclosed memorandum to Berlin—especially since it is unlikely to contain anything new to you—if it were not that I supposed, I might even say felt certain, that what Hermanin had to say to Reichert came directly from the Duce, who, I know, has confidential relations with Hermanin and has used him as go-between on a number of occasions in the past. The cautious Hermanin would never have entered into such political talks without the approval of the Duce, and least of all would he have

urged a member of the Embassy staff to visit him for such a purpose. This gives special weight to the matter, for it indicates that the unmistakable advantage which the propaganda of the Western Powers has here is causing serious concern also to the Duce. As I pointed out in my oral report in Berlin, the Duce attaches particular importance to popular sentiment, more so perhaps than one would expect in an authoritarian regime. It is quite certain—and this, too, I made clear in Berlin—that in his final decision he will never allow himself to be governed by such popular sentiment; but there is no question that at the critical moment, when he presses the button, he would, if possible like to have the people solidly behind him and resolved to follow him of their own free will. Considering this, it is natural that he should feel some concern about the present status of the propaganda war of the two sides on Italian territory. Just as I did in Berlin, so I should like to emphasize now once more that the whole question is of no vital importance for his decision, because when the time comes he will, as he has always done in the past, find the right phrase to make his people fall in behind him. Still we must do everything to ease his task in that field also.

What I have in mind in this connection is not so much the question of our relations with the Church, broached by Hermanin, or the question of the *Graf Spee* (regarding the latter, incidentally, there is already an interchange of ideas going on between the Naval Attaché and the Naval High Command, although this has produced nothing fruitful for us to date)—what the Duce is most of all concerned about is the question of our relations with Russia. It has been brought out in both my written and oral reports that the Duce—practically alone in Italy, I should say—has a full understanding for the events in Moscow following in the train of the visits there by the Reich Foreign Minister. I need to call to mind only his statement to me that this regulation of German-Russian relations was an “absolute necessity” for us; but I recall also that he followed it up by raising a warning finger against any intensification or further development of our relations with Russia.¹ Considering the psychology of the Italian people, it is after all impossible for him, in a country where the memory of our common battle in Spain is still so vivid and the Anti-Comintern idea is perhaps more deeply rooted than among us, to make the broad masses understand—in this case the broad masses extend far into government circles—that what has happened does not signify any change in the course of German policy.

¹ See documents Nos. 205 and 410.

Concerning the question as to what we can do in this field, I should like first of all to say negatively that we must at all events avoid anything of the sort that happened in the case of the Stalin leaflet, for instance, (cf. telegraphic report No. 1078 of December 27, 1939)² and more recently with the *Joy and Work* brochures sent us for distribution here (cf. Instruction of December 28, 1939—Inf. 4202).³

I should furthermore like to urge very strongly that if it is at all possible all releases concerning our relations with Russia, and not least of all pictorial representations, always be reviewed in the light of how they will affect the Italians. Finally, I should be grateful if I could have ample material suitable for use in publicity—especially for word-of-mouth propaganda—so as to promote understanding for our Russian policy.

In conclusion I should like to call your attention to the fact that Hermanin, who mentioned the Russian question to Reichert twice, stated at the end that "according to his firm conviction" (i. e. a conviction probably based on statements by the Duce) Italy could not remain a passive observer if Russia should ever become an aggressor against Rumania or, what is more, Hungary.

I should be extremely grateful to you, my dear friend, if you would give this letter your special attention and consider whether and in what measure my suggestions can be acted upon.⁴

With cordial greeting and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

MACKENSEN

P. S. On the subject of propaganda, the secret report of the Military Attaché (g. Kdos No. 2 of January 5, Annex 1, a copy of which was submitted to the Foreign Ministry)⁵ is also of interest; it states the arguments of "one of the oldest Fascists" (this refers to Giunta, whom you know about).

² Not printed (8336/E589873-74).

³ Not found.

⁴ On Jan. 18 Weizsäcker replied that Berlin was keenly aware of the propaganda difficulties in Rome and had studied Mackensen's suggestions. He then went on as follows: "As regards our Russian policy, the development it has taken since September 1, 1939, is rather inevitable [*ziemlich zwangsläufige*], and I am afraid it will remain a vulnerable point of attack for the propaganda of the opposing forces in Rome.

"By the way, anticipating your agreement, I passed on your recommendations of January 11 to Herr von Ribbentrop and the offices in the Ministry which are primarily concerned with them.

"Finally, I find the unqualified statement important according to which Italy would not remain passive if Russia should attack Rumania. That is a question which we also discussed during your last sojourn in Berlin. This new version seems to be rather unequivocal. At the moment, however, we have no sure indications that it will be the Balkans' 'turn' next" (2281/480329-30).

⁵ Not found.

[Enclosure]

ROME, January 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

Upon his telephoned request, I today visited Professor Hermanin at the Palazzo Venezia. He explained that his urgent request for me to visit him was prompted by the desire to inform me, privately and as friend to friend, of the following:

He was watching with deep concern how the French and British propaganda was increasing and having more success in Italy with every passing day. Of German propaganda, on the other hand, there was practically nothing to be seen. Very cleverly, as the Embassy must be aware, capital was made of Germany's close relations with the Soviet Union, whose action against Finland had enormously intensified Italy's dislike for the Soviet Union. There were many Italians who would gladly join in fighting on the side of the opponents of the Bolsheviks, as they had done in the Spanish campaign. He knew of some who had already done so. In view of this outlook of the Italians, one could imagine the effect of the slogan, very cleverly exploited by the enemy propaganda, that Germany was on the side of the Bolsheviks and let them help her. The force of that argument was further increased by our bad relations with the Church; Catholic Italy was likening these to the Bolshevikist atheistic movement and thus furnishing the enemy propaganda with an extremely effective device to foment hate. He, Hermanin, as the good friend of Germany that we knew him to be, could not urge us insistently enough to launch as active a propaganda campaign here as possible, with all available means, so as to avert the loss of valuable ground. It was lucky for us that the Italians had a fundamental dislike for the British individually and, above all, politically. This, in his opinion, was the point which our propaganda should seize upon.

Hermanin then turned the conversation to the events that followed the "unfortunate" naval engagement in the bay of Montevideo. He had been told yesterday by someone connected with the Italian Navy that on leaving the port, the pocket battleship *Graf Spee* was confronted only by the two small British cruisers which it had effectively shelled before, and a small gunboat. It was a matter of regret to him that Germany had not issued an authentic communiqué on the last days of the *Graf Spee*; such a communiqué would surely have afforded sufficient material to quash such allegations which, unless counteracted, would create a very unfortunate impression here.

Professor Hermanin then touched once more on the subject of Russia's action. He only hoped that Germany was in a position to check this advance if it should turn toward the Balkans. Should Russia resort to aggression against Rumania or especially Hungary, he was firmly convinced that Italy could not remain passive. The result would be a spread of the conflagration in Europe, which certainly could not be desired by Germany.

Respectfully submitted through the Counselor of Embassy to the Ambassador.

REICHERT

No. 528

141/126450-52

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II

JANUARY 12, 1940.

The Belgian Counselor of Embassy, Vicomte Berryer, handed me today the attached note verbale containing a protest against two separate cases of German airplanes flying over Belgian territory on January 10, and requesting that appropriate measures be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. In his oral statements accompanying the presentation of the note, Vicomte Berryer stressed that the note gave very specific data as to place, time, and aircraft type, so that there could be no question of a mistake on the part of the Belgian authorities.

I confined myself to saying that we must reserve our reply in this matter until the results of the investigation by the competent German authorities regarding the representations of the Embassy were available.

In this connection Vicomte Berryer also mentioned briefly the German Luftwaffe plane which had made an emergency landing near Mechelen-sur-Meuse, remarking that this airplane, too, had flown over Belgian sovereign territory.¹ I referred him to the DNB report that the airplane in question had lost its direction by mistake.

¹ A German courier plane had made a forced landing in Belgian territory near Mechelen-sur-Meuse on January 10. Two German Luftwaffe officers, Major Reinberger and Major Hoenmanns, were aboard the plane. Major Reinberger had in his possession some confidential documents which he attempted to burn. The documents were preliminary instructions for use of German troops in an invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands planned to begin on Jan. 17, but subsequently postponed. (See the OKW directives of Jan. 11 and Jan. 15, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 072-C, exhibit GB-109, pp. 294-96.) Translations and photographs of portions of the documents may be found in the Belgian Foreign Ministry's publication, *Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened, 1939-1940*, pp. 85-91, and in the work of the military aide to King Leopold, General R. F. C. van Overstraeten, *Albert I-Léopold III: Vingt Ans de politique militaire Belge, 1920-1940* (Bruges, 1946), pp. 449 ff.

Vicomte Berryer then stated, emphasizing that this was not an official communication, that the German side had admitted during the German-Belgian trade negotiations that German airplanes flew over Belgium on photographic missions. At any rate the German negotiations had countered the Belgian statement that no railroad cars were available with the assertion that this was not true; on the contrary, photographs had disclosed the presence of 300 railroad cars standing idle on tracks in southern Belgium. In replying to this statement by the Belgian Counselor of Embassy I confined myself to the remark that I had the impression that there must be some misunderstanding here.

VON RINTELEN

[Enclosure]

*Note Verbale From the Belgian Embassy*²

P. 5272

BERLIN, January 12, 1940.

No. 473

Pol. II 148.

The Belgian Embassy has the honor to call once more to the attention of the Reich Government that new cases of flights over Belgian territory were recorded in great detail by the competent Belgian authorities on January 10.

A German Heinkel 111 plane was spotted

at 10:36 a. m. near Houffalize
at 10:40 a. m. near St. Hubert
at 10:43 a. m. near Jemelle
at 10:45 a. m. near Dinant
at 10:51 a. m. again near Jemelle
at 10:59 a. m. near Namur
at 11:11 a. m. near Laroche
at 11:15 a. m. near Fauvillers.

On the same day a detailed report was made regarding a German Junkers 88 plane above Fauvillers at 1:07 p. m. This plane then took the following direction: Laroche, Marche, Huy, where it passed at 1:27 p. m., and then Aywaille, Verviers, Visé, where it passed at 1:44 p. m.

The Belgian Embassy has been instructed to address to the Reich Government its renewed protest against these violations of the neutrality of Belgian territory and a request that appropriate measures be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

² The original of this document was in French.

No. 529

141/126454

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, January 12, 1940.¹

No. 11

RAM 13.

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 12 of January 12.²

Please wire immediately detailed report on the particulars of the conversation between Wenninger and Reinberger, as well as an exact account of the circumstances attending the destruction of the courier baggage.

RIBBENTROP

¹ The Embassy copy of this telegram (2845/551208) shows it to have been sent at 9:12 p. m. Berlin time and received at 9:10 p. m. Brussels time on Jan. 12.

² In telegram No. 12 of Jan. 12, 1:25 p. m., Lt. Gen. Wenninger, Air Attaché in Brussels, reported to the High Command of the Luftwaffe, Attaché Group: "Reinberger reports that the courier baggage was burned down to insignificant fragments. The conduct of both officers following the landing was unobjectionable." (141/126453)

No. 530

1860/422921-22

Memorandum by the State Secretary¹

St.S. No. 44

BERLIN, January 12, 1940.

Pol. VI 133.

The Swedish Minister, who had spent several days in Stockholm, called on me today and began the conversation with the remark that he came without specific instructions. He wanted to give me the assurance once more, however, on the basis of the impressions he had gained in Stockholm, that his Government was maintaining its neutrality and had not in any way complied with the League of Nations resolution regarding assistance to Finland nor would it do so in the future. Sweden had informed the League of Nations of this, too. Everything that Sweden did for Finland was done of her own accord, without any cooperation with foreign powers, and was not of an official nature. M. Richert attached particular importance to this remark since on his last visit² I had shown him telegrams to the Secretary General of the League of Nations from London and Paris from which other conclusions could have been drawn.

¹ Richert's report on this conversation is printed in *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Förspälet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940*, a collection of documents published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 29-30.

² On Jan. 4 (1860/422882-83).

Today I called M. Richert's attention to an article in the *Temps* of January 10 which quite plainly demands that Scandinavia be drawn into the general theater of war. M. Richert knew this article and also the polemics in the German press opposing this thesis. He strictly adhered to his assertion, however, that Swedish cooperation with third powers in favor of Finland was out of the question.

The Minister then explained that the Swedish Parliament at present agreed with this policy of the Government. However, M. Richert continued, patriotic excitement in Sweden continued to run very high. If at some later time the Russian weight should crush Finland and the Russian Army approach Sweden, it was uncertain whether the national exuberance might not push Sweden into the war against Russia. It was clear to the Minister that this would entail great danger for Sweden. From there he went on to speak of the joint interest of Germany and Scandinavia in seeing that peace was preserved in Sweden and Norway, and in that connection privately inquired whether Germany could not after all render the tremendous service and win the prestige of effecting a settlement between Russia and Finland before matters went to extremes.

In answer to M. Richert's last remark, I only confirmed the German interest in preserving Scandinavian neutrality and pointed to the fact that the Kuusinen Government had been recognized by Russia. As he knew, the Russian Government had stated that it could not negotiate with two Finnish governments. Thus I did not see that there was any room for negotiations.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 531

141/126458

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, January 13, 1940—4:40 a. m.

No. 13 [15] of January 13

Received January 13—7:35 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 11 of January 12.¹

1. Major Reinberger informed General Wenninger on January 12 that he destroyed the courier baggage by burning, leaving only a few fragments, the size of the palm of his hand.

Reinberger further reported that he had ascertained by inspection that the major portion of the remnant that was not burned was of no importance.

He was unable to identify the remaining pieces.

¹ Document No. 529.

2. According to Major Reinberger's report the destruction of the courier baggage took place as follows:

a. After an emergency landing, Reinberger took the courier pouches behind some bushes in order to burn them out of sight of approaching Belgian soldiers, whose attention Major Hoenmanns engaged in order to gain time. It was possible to burn a considerable portion of the material before the light of the fire attracted the attention of the soldiers. When the fire was forcibly extinguished, there remained the fragments described under 1.

b. After being taken to military quarters near the landing site, Reinberger tried to complete the destruction of the remaining pieces, which were lying on a table, by throwing them into the stove. A Belgian officer managed to pull the remnants from the stove without their apparently having sustained much damage from burning. Reinberger has not seen the remnants mentioned under [paragraph] 1 again since that moment.

3. The conversation of the Lieutenant General with Majors Reinberger and H[oenmanns] took place in the presence of the Military Attaché and the assistant to the Air Attaché, with no Belgian witnesses present; it was taken for granted that the conversation was being overheard with listening devices. Consequently, the content of the courier mail could not be discussed in detail.

4. The Military Attaché has made arrangements for a watch on any military measures that might be touched off by this incident.

5. General Wenninger will arrive in Berlin early on January 13 to report in person to the Air Ministry.²

BÜLOW

² In the Jodl diary introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1811-PS, but not included in the published collection, there is the following entry on the conference which Wenninger had at 11:00 a. m. on Jan. 13 with Göring, Bodenschatz, and Jeschonnek: "Report on a conversation of Luftwaffe Attaché with the two fliers who made the forced landing. Result: Despatch case burnt for certain."

No. 532

141/126459

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, January 13, 1940—12:45 p. m.

No. 16 of January 13

Received January 13—5:45 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 15 of January 13.¹

1. Following yesterday's reception of the Defense Minister² and the Chief of the General Staff by the King, the Foreign Minister made the following announcement:³

¹ Document No. 531.

² Lt. Gen. Henri Denis.

³ The quoted portion of the telegram is in French.

"In accordance with decisions previously adopted by the Government, certain protective measures have been taken today.

"These measures constitute nothing more than the carrying into effect of the defense plan envisaged from the first days of mobilization."

Although the announcement seeks to create the impression that the defense measures involved were prepared long in advance, it may nevertheless be assumed that the measures were taken as a result of alarming reports received by the Belgian General Staff in recent days.

2. Since the night of January 12, troop movements have been in progress. So far it has not been possible to ascertain particulars as to direction and strength.

3. The Military Attaché requests that the Army High Command be notified at once.

BÜLOW

No. 533

8712/E085718

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

BERLIN, January 13, 1940.

W 144 g.

Making sure of our imports from Rumania is of special importance in time of war and demands extraordinary measures. In order to deal with these problems in a responsible way an economics office under a "special representative for economic questions" is being set up in the Bucharest Legation and he is accountable directly to the Minister.

I am charging the Chairman of the German Government Committee for Rumania, Minister Clodius, with setting up this office. To be head of the office Herr Neubacher, Mayor of Vienna, is going on leave of absence from his official duties in Vienna, and is being assigned to the Legation in Bucharest as special representative for economic questions. Both men are leaving immediately for Bucharest.

It is the task of the special representative to see that every means is used to ensure that all possibilities available to us under existing governmental agreements for acquiring important raw materials and food are fully exploited; this will involve initiating at the right time and in the appropriate way the effecting and following through of the necessary purchase contracts, ensuring the required transport facilities, and counteracting attempts at sabotage by the enemy powers.

RIBBENTROP

No. 534

141/126466

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, January 13, 1940.

The Belgian Ambassador told me today that he wants to call on the State Secretary in the question of the continued instances of flights of German aircraft over Belgian territory. In particular he criticized that we had left former complaints unanswered, which places him in a difficult position toward his Government.

Also Counselor of Embassy Count Berryer has spoken to me repeatedly about these flights over Belgian territory, which he says had continued up to the last few days.

The Luftwaffe Operations Staff has been requested to give us a plausible explanation for Belgian consumption [*plausible Darstellung für den Gebrauch der Belgier*].

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

No. 535

173/84143

Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, January 13, 1940.

Geheimrat Kreuter, the manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit, told me the following from a conversation with the Dutch Director-General Hirschfeld last week:

The Netherlands Government has sent former Netherlands Minister President Colijn to Rome for an unofficial discussion of the situation with the Italian Government. Colijn was to explain that Holland "was greatly concerned about the existing régime in the event that property in Germany should become further undermined." The Netherlands Government was for that reason greatly interested in an early peace; it expected little from any initiative of its own in this direction, but was at all times prepared to support an Italian initiative.

When Colijn's trip was announced, Mussolini had replied that he was prepared to receive him, but not to discuss peace possibilities with him. Ciano would be available for further conversations.

Herr Kreuter had been promised by the Dutch that he would be informed about the result of the conversations in Rome after the return of M. Colijn.¹

WIEHL

¹ In a memorandum of Jan. 28 (173/84181-83), Wiehl noted further information which had been received from Dutch sources about the visit of the former Netherlands Minister President to Rome in order to explore peace possibilities. Colijn was reported to have considered his visit to have been without results. Count Ciano's account of the visit appears in *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Jan. 9, 1940.

No. 536

173/84153

Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, January 13, 1940.

Geheimrat Kreuter, the manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit, told me the following from a conversation with the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Kleffens, last week:

The Foreign Minister had mentioned that the ships with Swedish ore for Germany were still reaching the port of Rotterdam without trouble. This was facilitated by a friendly shadowing of these ships in Dutch waters by the Netherlands Navy.

In this connection, the Foreign Minister referred to the contracts for the delivery of arms from Germany to Holland (Dornier planes, anti-aircraft guns). Holland was aware that these arms were ready for delivery, but that delivery seemed to have been delayed. Holland was urgently in need of these arms and hoped that these old contracts would still be honored although she understood that new contracts were out of the question because of Germany's own arms requirements.

WIEHL

No. 537

Nuremberg document No. 021-C
Exhibit GB-194

*Extract From War Diary of the Naval Staff*¹

[Extract]

CHEFSACHE

JANUARY 13, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

By Officer Only

SITUATION DISCUSSION WITH THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF

2. "Study North" received from the OKW. This gives a rough preliminary survey of the possibilities of German operations in the northern area. The Führer has ordered a Working Committee to be formed to revise the study; it is to be headed by a Luftwaffe General who will at the same time be entrusted with the execution of any eventual operation. The Chief of Staff of the Working Committee

¹The German text of this extract (less the final paragraph) is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 181-185. The German text of the entire extract is printed in Walther Hubatsch, *Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen, 1940*, pp. 404-406.

will be a naval officer and the Chief of Operations Branch an army officer.²

The study commences with the premise that should England establish herself in the Norwegian area it would create an intolerable situation for Germany in her military strategy, and that probably the only way to prevent this would be for Germany to anticipate a British move and occupy Norway first. Anti-German feeling is growing in the Scandinavian countries as the situation becomes tenser owing to the Russo-Finnish conflict, and this would be in favor of England if she were to take action in Norway. Resistance on the part of the Norwegians can hardly be expected. According to OKW's study, the possibility of such a development becomes the more probable because the Storting, contrary to constitutional practice, was not dissolved on January 11 and the Jewish pro-British Minister President [*sic*], Hambro, remains at the head of the present Norwegian Government. In the opinion of the OKW, it is also possible that a German offensive in the West will be used by England as a pretext for occupying Norway.

The OKW's study was initiated by a report made to the Führer on December 12, 1939, by the Commander in Chief, Navy, in which the latter, as the result of his conversation with M. Qu[isling] on December 11, drew attention to the great threat which the establishment of the British in the Scandinavian area would imply to German strategy, and explained the opportunities for German operations which the possible development of internal political conditions in Norway might afford. (See memorandum of conversation between the Commander in Chief, Navy, and Quisling, and the report to the Führer in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.³)

The Chief, Naval Staff, is still firmly convinced that England *intends to occupy Norway in the near future* in order to cut off completely all exports from the Norwegian-Swedish area to Germany, and to hinder German warfare on the ocean and in the North Sea; in so doing she will be able to count on Norway's tacit consent or at least that of the Government and the majority of the population because of the Norwegians' anti-German attitude. This opinion is confirmed by

² The Jodl diary (entries for Jan. 23, 24, and Feb. 5) records that at Hitler's order these arrangements were canceled and "Study North" was instead assigned to a staff under direct OKW control. On Jan. 27, Keitel notified the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe that the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht had assigned responsibility to him for "Study N[orth]," to be known in future as "Weser Exercise" [*Weserübung*]. Plans were to be prepared by a special staff under Keitel's direction. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 063-C, exhibit GB-87, pp. 269-270. An English translation appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. vi, p. 883.

³ See document No. 443 and footnote 2.

special intelligence which has reached the Chief, Naval Staff. In the view of the Chief, Naval Staff, the exercise of very strong British pressure on Sweden could be expected as a further result of such an occupation, with the aim of choking off the flow of all merchant traffic to Germany, and, if possible, of forcing Sweden into the war on the side of the Western Powers. The Chief, Naval Staff, sees a most serious threat to Germany in such a development, since the occupation of Norway by England would have a decisive effect on the war against Germany.

In partial opposition to the opinion of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Operations Division of Naval Staff does *not* believe that an imminent British occupation of Norway is probable. Apart from the fact that it is in any case doubtful whether England is at present capable of such a display of force, in the opinion of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, such an operation would involve great risk and great difficulties for England. The occupation of Norway would bring England into strong and extremely undesirable opposition to Russia, and, further, would immediately call forth severe countermeasures on Germany's side. The establishing of British forces in Norwegian bases would directly result in the immediate extension of the German operational base to Denmark and, if necessary, to Sweden, and German sea and air forces would thus constitute an effective threat to any British activities in the south Norwegian area.

Any British military pressure exerted on Sweden from Norway could be rendered ineffective by immediate German action against Sweden since the effects of German warfare could be made felt to a much greater degree and much more quickly than would be the case with British operations undertaken from the Norwegian area.

In the opinion of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, it must be regarded as very improbable that England could release such strong forces at home as would be necessary for the occupation of Norway in order to counter effectively the grave threat from Germany.

The Operations Division, Naval Staff, considers, however, that an occupation of Norway by Germany, if no British action is to be feared, would be a dangerous undertaking both from the strategic and economic point of view. After German seizure of Norway, the neutral Norwegian territorial waters would no longer be safe, and with Germany's at present still small naval strength, the maintenance of German ore imports—especially vital during the winter months—from the Norwegian area, and of the important sea routes to Base North and to and from overseas could no longer be guaranteed.

While in complete agreement with this opinion, the Chief, Naval Staff, is also convinced that the most favorable solution is definitely

the maintenance of the status quo, which, while Norway preserves the strictest neutrality, permits Germany's important wartime sea traffic to use Norwegian territorial waters in safety without the fear that Great Britain will make any serious attempt to disrupt these sea communications.

The development of the political situation in Norway and also the situation of the war as a whole cannot be predicted. It is therefore necessary, on principle, to include an occupation of Norway in the operational preparations for general war strategy, and where the Navy, which would play a decisive part, is concerned, to get all preliminary work underway which would be necessary for the fulfillment of any demands which may be made on the Naval Staff, possibly at short notice. This preliminary work will be summarized in Study North.

No. 538

141/126467

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, January 14, 1940—1:50 p. m.

No. 22 of January 14

Received January 15—12:10 a. m.

Also for the War Ministry.

With reference to our telegram No. 20 of January 13.¹

The Belgian Defense Ministry tonight ordered phase D, that is, the next to the last mobilization step. Moreover, portions of age classes 20 and 21 were called in tonight. Details will be reported by the Military Attaché. The new military measures seem to have been occasioned by the lively activity of German fliers over Belgian territory, reports of German troop movements at the Belgian and Dutch frontiers, as well as the content of the partly unburned courier mail found on the German Air Force officer. This morning's Belgian papers point in a calm tone to the great seriousness of the situation. The population is very anxious because a German invasion of Holland and Belgium is believed to be imminent.²

BÜLOW

¹ This telegram reported that members of the Belgian armed forces were being recalled from leave (141/126463).

² The Embassy reported further in telegram No. 27 of Jan. 15, 6:15 p. m. (141/126478), that Belgian popular feeling was becoming calmer. This trend was assisted by the moderate tone taken by the press. Official circles remained alert and mistrustful, but so far there seemed to be no inclination to deviate from the policy of neutrality or to seek aid from England or France.

No. 539

173/84145

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

THE HAGUE, January 14, 1940—8:52 p. m.

No. 35 of January 14

Received January 15—12:10 a. m.

For Pol. I M.

All leaves canceled in Holland; thus far alarm has not been issued. No troop movements from North Holland ascertained up to 6 p. m. Increased telephone traffic at 2 p. m. I have posted watchers for any troop movements. Weather: thawing, heavy fog, no visibility. Team P. with S. are leaving Monday forenoon. KOH.¹

ZECH

¹ These initials are believed to stand for *Kriegsorganisation Holland*, a unit of the Abwehr. A notation by the coding office of the Foreign Ministry indicates that 4 copies were to be sent to Lt. Col. Pieckenbrock, who was head of Abwehr I.

No. 540

141/126471-72

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, January 14, 1940.

Pursuant to the instructions received from the Foreign Minister I have taken the following steps:

1. Since Admiral Canaris was en route and could not be reached, and his deputy, Captain Bürkner, could also not be reached, I contacted the General Staff of the Luftwaffe directly.

2. When I learned that the Chief of the General Staff, General Jeschonnek, had been summoned to Field Marshal Göring to make a report, I contacted General Jeschonnek directly.

3. At 12:55 p. m. General Jeschonnek told me the following:

a. There has been no substantial intensification of reconnaissance activity over Belgian territory in the past days.

Probably no more than one or two planes had been over the area during the day.

b. It was true that after the long period of bad weather there had been a small increase in flights in the fine weather of the past days, and this probably had also attracted attention.

c. In view of the political considerations indicated to him, General Jeschonnek would issue orders that the flights be cut as drastically as was in any way consistent with the military requirements.

4. Subsequently, I informed Admiral Canaris about the conversation with General Jeschonnek. Admiral Canaris in turn will inform General Keitel.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 541

141/126473-76

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 15, 1940.

St.S. No. 47

After the Belgian Ambassador had asked on Saturday¹ to be received by me I received him at noon today.²

Count Davignon started immediately to talk of the numerous occasions when our planes were guilty of flying over Belgian territory recently. He hoped for a plausible explanation on my part, especially as our answer to the Belgian complaints of the more distant past was also still lacking. I promised an early reply to the Belgian complaints of the months of November and December to the Ambassador. Our investigations were always most thorough and would, therefore, frequently take some time. We desired to really clarify the subject in every case and did not consciously delay our explanation. On the contrary, we were prepared to acknowledge a frontier violation, if it was confirmed also by our side, and would not hesitate to express our regrets.

After we had concluded this subject within a few minutes, I told the Ambassador that I, on my part, would possibly have asked him to come in today if he had not, as it happened, requested it himself. I had had submitted to me a series of reports of the foreign press on Belgium this very morning, which showed a shocking state of excitement and of a military activity which was directed one-sidedly against Germany.

The Ambassador frankly admitted this. This was the third phase in the military preparedness of Belgium. The fourth and last phase, however, was not yet reached. It might be that Belgium would have been better off if she had completely mobilized earlier, just as Holland and Switzerland had done. For it was true that the present measure must give us the impression of a special alarm.

¹ Jan. 13.

² Davignon's account of this interview appears in his *Berlin 1936-1940: souvenirs d'une mission*, pp. 199-200.

After this I asked the Ambassador to give me the reasons which impelled his Government to take such steps.

The best means to produce a crisis are conditions of excitement as created by Brussels. It was the right and the duty of every neutral country to prepare its defense, but not to strengthen this defense onesidedly against one of the belligerent parties.

Then Davignon came into the open with the reasons which in Brussels had caused fear of a German invasion. First he spoke of his own information. He would, however, be very cautious in forwarding this to Brussels and would weigh it carefully:

a. Everybody in Berlin speaks in the open street of the German invasion of Belgium and Holland. I answered this point by saying that Brussels should not, after all, rely upon gossip in the street.

b. The Embassy continuously received anonymous letters dealing with the planned invasion. Davignon himself did not put any decisive emphasis on these.

c. His colleagues of the diplomatic corps were already paying him visits of condolence. Davignon pretends at least that he reprimanded the visitors.

d. The flying over Belgian territory during the last few days had also taken him—Davignon—aback.

I replied to this by saying that such individual instances never permitted such far-reaching conclusions, even if they were true. The Ambassador denied my objection that English and French planes were certainly also seen at the Belgian frontier and had crossed it in flight. The French and English had been very cautious recently.

e. Davignon told me confidentially that a member of the German economic delegation had told a member of the Belgian delegation that our aerial photographs proved that 300 unused and empty freight cars were standing in a Belgian village (X). I told Davignon with regard to this story that it certainly would not be in keeping with the facts. At best it was just a bluff in order to cause the Belgian delegation to put more freight cars at disposal.

After these experiences of the Belgian Embassy itself, Davignon presented the following as the presumable reasons for his Government's worries:

f. Alleged German troop movements next to the Belgian frontiers. He conceded that the Embassy knew comparatively little of them.

I told Davignon he should inquire how things looked at the French-Belgian frontier, whether there were not great numbers of French and English troops massed there. The danger point would be right there, but Brussels did not seem to react against it.

Davignon asserted then that a spontaneous French invasion of Belgium was absolutely out of the question. France's most urgent desire

would be that we enter Belgium, for this would waken the French population from its lethargy. But France by herself would never take the first step toward Belgium. France's entire policy consisted in the hope of support from America. But America's sympathy would be gone once and for all and turned to the opposite if France sought to violate Belgium's territory.

g. Davignon replied to my doubts thereof that the reports about the German intention to attack France through Belgium came from every quarter. This kind of thing was reported from Italy. It seemed likely that Germany did not have anything against Belgium, except the very fact that its geographical position invited an invasion. Then Davignon returned a second time to the warnings which came from Italy.³

h. Davignon finally mentioned that it was perhaps also known to me that a German plane had made an emergency landing near Meche-len recently. There was presumably some alarming material in this plane. I conceded quite incidentally that I had learned of the fact of such an emergency landing from the press.

I then steered the conversation back to the point that the Belgian Government was in my opinion being frightened by unfounded reports and was being pushed into a very one-sided action. I considered this very objectionable. I could not recognize any particular cause for the Belgian alarm.

Davignon left after this last remark.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See documents Nos. 553 and 557.

No. 542

582/241951-58

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 88 of January 15

ROME, January 16, 1940—1: 00 a. m.

Received January 16—1: 45 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 87 of January 15.¹

The following is a translation of the pro memoria referred to in No. 87:

"1. The report² in Berlin concerning the sale to France by Italy of airplane engines manufactured by the Isotta Fraschini firm stems

¹ Not printed (8831/E589814-15). In this Mackensen summarized the pro memoria, which had just been handed to him by Ciano, and reported that it had been drafted by Ciano and revised by the Duce himself.

² On instructions from the Foreign Ministry (2131/466588-89), Mackensen had handed to Ciano on Jan. 11 a memorandum (2131/466592) containing details of the report which had reached Berlin.

from the conclusion of a contract for the delivery of engine parts which the Italian plant is making for the account of the Gnome et Rhône company. These connections between Italian firms and the Gnome et Rhône company go back to 1937, and since then it has happened several times that Italian firms have turned to Manfred Weiss in Budapest for the production of engine parts.

"2. Although Italy has in the past rejected the numerous and urgent requests for materials for direct war use, which her industries received from France and Great Britain, and for reasons of her military security also intends to do so in the future, it must be pointed out that Italy must build up her own armaments to a maximum as soon as possible. She had allowed for a long period (until 1942) to carry out this plan, and during that whole period she would have to try to accept the greatest possible number of orders from countries with free currencies, and to offer war material in order to secure for her own rearmament approximately twice the amount of the raw materials used in the goods delivered to other countries, since the prices amount on an average to 3 times the value of the raw materials used in such war orders. The outbreak of the war did not diminish, but rather increased, Italy's obligation and necessity to accelerate her own rearmament. This being the case, Italy cannot escape the necessity of intensifying her exports, among which, for obvious reasons in the circumstances, war materials are the most important item.

"It is clear that without these exports Italy would not be able to speed the execution of the program which has become even more urgent owing to the fact that in the circumstances it might be necessary to use the armaments much earlier than 1942. In carrying this military program into effect, Italy increases her own war potential and makes an extremely important contribution to Germany's strength.

"3. The German Government is well aware that the Franco-British naval blockade is being very strictly enforced, and that it would doubtless become even stricter if Italian industry should persistently refuse to consider any wishes of the Allies.

"It should be added that, apart from the above-mentioned necessity of procuring the necessary currency for our purchases in other countries, the sources of the most important raw materials lacking in Italy are controlled by France and England, and that these countries can easily cut off our supplies at any moment if the economic and commercial relations between Italy and the two Allied countries should enter the phase of open conflict. If that should occur, our armaments program would suffer new and unpredictable delays or even be halted altogether.

"4. On the basis of this necessity, Italy contemplates limiting her military deliveries to France and England by so restricting and staggering them as to preclude any really noticeable change in the ratio of strength between the belligerent countries, and to help Italy in case of a rupture. At the same time, we shall not neglect to keep the Reich Government informed in detail about the receipt and acceptance of all orders, thereby providing the German Government with useful information on the armament situation of the countries at war with the Reich.

"5. It is stressed that the existence of the above-mentioned commercial relations with France and Great Britain does not in any way influence or change the known policy of the Fascist Government as agreed upon with the Reich Government and in accordance with the Berlin pact of alliance and the existing agreements. No negotiations of a political character have been initiated or are intended between Italy, France, and Great Britain. The commercial relations are the result of direct contacts between the Italian industry and individual foreign firms; none of them has been developed through diplomatic or any other official channels."

MACKENSEN

No. 543

1138/324569-70

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, January 16, 1940.

The Foreign Minister made the following communication to me on January 15 concerning his conference with the Führer on January 13:¹

¹The basis for this conversation was evidently a memorandum of Jan. 10 by Ritter setting forth for Ribbentrop the points requiring decision by Hitler (1138/324580-84). Attached to this memorandum were the following tables:

A. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET DELIVERIES AND OTHER SERVICES IN 1940

I. Deliveries and services on the basis of the new economic program.

a. Deliveries:

1. <i>Food Industry</i> (grain, legumes, tobacco, intestines and stomachs)	approx. RM	126, 000, 000
2. <i>Industry</i> petroleum products	" "	116, 000, 000
textile raw materials (cotton, flax)	" "	96, 000, 000
3. <i>Ores</i> (crude iron, scrap iron, iron ore, manganese ore, chromium ore)	" "	60, 000, 000
4. <i>Precious and nonferrous metals</i> (platinum, copper, nickel, tin).	" "	20, 000, 000
5. <i>Other industrial raw materials</i> (phosphates, asbestos, sulphur)	" "	13, 000, 000
6. <i>Forest products</i>	" "	43, 000, 000
7. <i>Miscellaneous products</i> (tobaccos, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc)	" "	16, 000, 000
	" "	490, 000, 000

b. Part of clearing balance

made up of Soviet raw-material purchases in third countries on behalf of Germany	approx. RM	30, 000, 000(?)
c. <i>Transit freight</i> (soy beans, etc.)	" "	70, 000, 000(?)

II. Delivery of goods on the basis of the credit agreement of August 19, 1939	" "	90, 000, 000
III. Deliveries to the Protectorate	" "	50, 000, 000

Total RM 730, 000, 000

It was difficult for the Führer to make a positive decision on some of the points given below. He had decided to do so, however, in view of the over-all situation and in order to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. I was authorized to transmit to M. Stalin a statement to this effect by order of the Führer.

The Foreign Minister further instructed me to explain to M. Molotov that the latter's recollections of the Foreign Minister's statements on military deliveries were erroneous.

The following are the details of the Führer's decision:

1. Six 381 mm turrets can be delivered by the following dates: March 1, 1941; June 1, 1941; September 1, 1941; December 1, 1941; March 1, 1942; and June 1, 1942.
2. The 203 mm guns for the cruiser *Lützow* can be delivered in a similar manner as the other accessories, parallel with the completion of the *Lützow*.²
3. Of the periscopes and storage batteries requested by M. Stalin, only one of each is to be delivered immediately. The remainder of the articles requested by M. Stalin is to be delivered in 1941. In case I cannot get M. Stalin to agree to this, I am to telegraph to Berlin for a possible new decision.
4. With reference to the planes, according to M. Stalin's statements the total demand will no longer be insisted upon. It is to be explained that in case the Soviet Government wishes to copy certain types, it will pay "suitable" license fees.
5. Of the 34 machine tools especially requested by M. Stalin, one complete set is to be delivered in 1940, the second one in 1941.

RITTER

Footnote (1)—Continued

B. ESTIMATE OF GERMAN ARMAMENT DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1940 AND THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1941

I. Delivery of goods on the basis of the new economic program.	
<i>Industrial deliveries agreed upon:</i>	
steel tubing, locomotives, turbines, mining equipment; equipment for the naphtha and chemical industry, for steel wire factories and electric power plants; freighters and special ships; metals and coal	RM 250,000,000
II. Delivery of goods on the basis of the credit agreement of August 19, 1939	
	90,000,000
III. Delivery of goods from the Protectorate	50,000,000
Total RM 390,000,000	

The following insertion was made between items II and III of list A:

"III. Delivery of goods on the basis of the German-Soviet Trade and Payments Agreement . . . approx. RM 15,000,000"

and the total changed to read RM 745,000,000.

In list B, the 90,000,000 was changed in pencil to 60,000,000, which was in turn changed to 75,000,000, and the total was changed to read 375,000,000. The figure 15,000,000 was also inserted into the list, with a cross-reference to the change in list A, but the total figure was allowed to stand as 375,000,000.

² "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, p. 79, includes the following paragraph at Jan. 26, 1940: "8. Political questions. The Führer desires to delay as long as possible giving plans of the *Bismarck* class as well as the hull of the *Lützow* to Russia, since he hopes to avoid this altogether if the war develops favorably."

No. 544

141/126480-81

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, January 17, 1940—6:40 a. m.

No. 32 of January 16

Received January 17—10:30 a. m.

Foreign Minister Spaak requested me to see him tonight and spoke in an earnest but studiously friendly manner in order, as he expressed himself, to try to restore the basis of mutual trust between our countries which had been shaken in the past days. State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker had asked Vicomte Davignon about the meaning of the military measures taken in Belgium over the weekend.¹ He wanted to give me the same answer which Davignon was going to deliver. The military measures were taken mainly for two reasons:

1. The military authorities had had reports that German troops during the last week had been brought up directly to the frontier as their jumping-off position and that units stationed further back had been moved forward.

2. According to the statement of the military authorities the plane which made an emergency landing on January 10 had put into Belgian hands a document of the most extraordinary and serious nature, which contained the clear proof of an intention to attack. It was not just an operations plan, but an attack order worked out in every detail, in which only the (group garbled) time remained to be inserted.

The two reasons given above had compelled the Belgian Government to take, for its part, the military measures deemed necessary. That was the truth of the matter; all other reports were mere speculations.

When I asked whether it was not conceivable to him that the Belgian Government had fallen a victim to the war of nerves, the Foreign Minister replied that he, too, had for a time played with the notion of such an attempt on the part of Germany, especially in view of the whole idea of a complete attack order dropping down from the sky. But he had asked himself, for what purpose? The purpose could only have been to make the Belgian Government lose all composure, so that it would on its own initiative call the French and British into the country for the joint defense against a German attack. He could assure me solemnly and most earnestly, however, that the Belgian Government would never commit the folly of calling the Allies into the country. Belgium's policy was that of independence and neutrality toward every one. Calling upon one belligerent party for help was inconsistent with the policy pursued so far and would inevitably result in what it was intended to avoid, namely, war in one's own country.

¹ See document No. 541.

The Foreign Minister concluded by saying that he hoped that his words, which were meant sincerely, would serve to restore confidence in the relations between the two countries.

I should like to add to the Foreign Minister's statements that a representative of the Court, who is very close to the King, emphatically told me yesterday that the King, who is himself of German extraction and whose pro-German sentiment is known, would never permit the Belgian Government to depart from the clear line of a neutral policy. He would uphold this policy even in the most critical hour and not let himself be influenced by either side. He was firmly resolved to pursue to the end—even to the bitter end—this policy of neutrality, which he himself had initiated. If Belgium therefore should be drawn into the war, this would happen only through her violation, for which she herself had given no cause.

BÜLOW

No. 545

73/52172

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 43 of January 16

BUDAPEST, January 17, 1940—6:00 p. m.

Received January 17—9:45 p. m.

I. The agreements were signed today.¹ Together with economic agreements, very secret protocols regarding cooperation in matters of war economy were signed. As authorized by the Reich Foreign Minister, I told Count Csáky at my farewell visit that the German Government recognized that Hungary had tried, in the development of economic relations since the beginning of the war, to do everything in her power to take Germany's vital interests into consideration. This also applied in particular to the granting of the latest German requests in the exchange rate question. Csáky thanked me for this communication and asked me to tell the Reich Foreign Minister that in accordance with the promise he had given to the Führer and again recently to the Foreign Minister in the Führer's headquarters, Hungary would also in the future aid Germany economically with all her resources.

II. Following up his recent statement² that according to his in-

¹ The agreements signed were the 16th Confidential Protocol (8502/E597167-235) and a secret record of conversations on military questions (8502/E597238-45). Copies of papers to which the record referred had previously been forwarded to the Foreign Ministry by Clodius under a report from Budapest of Dec. 15, 1939 (5571/E399670-81).

² On Dec. 15, 1939, Clodius had reported a conversation with Csáky in the course of which the latter had launched forth into various speculations about future political developments in Southeast Europe (73/52131-32).

formation Russia would not undertake anything against Rumania but would rather turn against Turkey, Csáky informed me that from the latest reports of the Hungarian Minister in Moscow he now had the distinct impression that the Russians had changed their intentions and were seriously considering action against Rumania. Potemkin had recently sought to find out in detail from the Hungarian Minister what Hungary's attitude would be if Russia took action against Rumania. The Minister had received the distinct impression that these were not theoretical considerations.

III. Count Csáky gave the following confidential figures regarding Hungarian rearmament: Since the beginning of 1938 an additional 2 billion pengő had been expended for armament. The last installment of 450 million pengő had just been made available to the Army. Of this amount, 170 million pengő were earmarked for orders in Germany and 150 million pengő for orders in Italy. The Hungarian Government was particularly grateful that Germany, in spite of the war, had already made possible at least in part the placing of these orders and hoped that before very long she would also take on deliveries which were not yet filled at the present time; these were of decisive importance in increasing the Hungarian war potential and to have them carried out should therefore be of political interest to Germany also.

CLORIUS

No. 546

8142/E582208

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 34 of January 17

TOKYO, January 17, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Received January 17—7:00 p. m.

Pol. IX 101.

With reference to my telegram No. 29 of January 15.¹

The Yonai Cabinet was formed yesterday. The list of Ministers has been transmitted by the *Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro*. There is no assurance that the new men will be able to overcome the difficult internal economic problems which brought the fall of the previous cabinet. Although Yonai failed in his efforts to commit the major parties to the policy of the new Government by summoning their leaders into

¹ Not printed (174/136221-22). The telegram reported the fall of the Abe Cabinet on Jan. 14 and stated that both Prince Konoye and Army leaders had refused to form a new cabinet because, in view of the serious domestic and international problems pending, they anticipated a series of transition cabinets. It recalled that the new Prime Minister, Admiral Yonai, had been Navy Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet of 1938-1939 when the Navy opposed the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance with Germany.

the Cabinet, nevertheless the assignment to party men of the now particularly important post of Finance Minister as well as the equally important Ministry of Agriculture means a broadening of participation in the Government by the parties, which have hitherto been limited to the Ministry of Railways and Transport.

The strong influence of the anti-reform high finance and Court circles on the new Cabinet is unmistakable and is already the subject of increasing criticism in the press. Particularly worthy of note with respect to the new Cabinet is the very considerable reserve of the Army, which is being explained by its concern to concentrate all its energies on disposing of the China enterprise. That parts of the Army disapprove this attitude is evident from the very fact that it required a personal appeal of the Emperor to insure support for the Cabinet by the Army.

The foreign situation and the known attitude of Foreign Minister Arita² indicate that a continuation of the present foreign policy, in particular of efforts for an agreement with America, is to be expected. All the leading personalities of the new Cabinet have spoken in their first press interviews in favor of the early formation of a new Chinese government under Wang Ching-wei.

The new Cabinet, despite the proclaimed opposition of the Social Mass Party and splinter groups in the Diet, will probably encounter no very great difficulties, since the major parties have promised their support for the present. Same text to Shanghai, Hsinking.

OTT

² Arita had been Foreign Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet, October 1938–August 1939, and was identified with the opposition to a military alliance with Germany.

No. 547

B18/B003331

The State Secretary to the Minister in Finland

Telegram

SECRET

No. 25

BERLIN, January 17, 1940.

zu Pol. VI 44 g I.¹

For the Minister.

With reference to your No. 7 of January 4.²

In case M. Tanner should again mention the subject to you, please tell him that you transmitted his unofficial inquiry to the German Government. The latter, however, was of the opinion that there were at the moment no prospects of putting an end to the conflict.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. VI 44 g I: Not found.

² Document No. 506.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "This telegram is based on instructions given me orally this morning (January 16) by the Foreign Minister."

No. 548

171/134896

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, January 17, 1940.

Received January 22.

DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: I owe you thanks for several letters. With reference to the subject of Russo-Italian relations which you discussed on January 10¹ I must confirm your doubts as to whether anything can be done in Rome to correct the language used there with reference to Moscow. At the moment anti-Bolshevism is the trump in Rome.

Your information was very interesting for the question of possible mediation between Russia and Finland. Ambassador Ritter will inform you in the next few days, however, that we do not believe that we can undertake such mediation at the present time. I do not, however, wish to discourage you thereby from making further reports when you obtain new material.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 521.

No. 549

174/136228-29

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy*Draft Telegram¹

SECRET

BERLIN, January—1940.

zu Pol. VIII 86 g geh.

87 g.²

Drafting Officer: Counselor Knoll.

With reference to your No. 101 of January 17.³

On January 13 the Embassy in Tokyo sent the following telegram:

I spoke to the Italian Ambassador today regarding the report from a reliable informant in the Foreign Ministry to the effect that he had

¹ The telegram was not sent, as is explained in the following minute which appears in the margin: "Minute of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat—The Foreign Minister requests that the telegram not be sent, since he intends to take up the matter personally. Berlin, Jan. 30, 1940, Kordt." Ribbentrop did so in his conversation with Mussolini and Ciano in Rome on Mar. 11; see document No. 669.

² The two file numbers presumably refer to the Tokyo telegram of Jan. 13 quoted in the draft, and to the cited telegram from Rome to which this was intended to be a reply.

³ Not printed (174/136227). Mackensen reported that the Japanese Ambassador in Rome had told him that Italian Ambassador Auriti in Tokyo had, on instructions from his Government, advised the Japanese Foreign Minister to be "reserved and cautious" in Japan's relations with Russia.

spoken to the Japanese Foreign Minister about Italy's objections to a political rapprochement with Russia and about her interest in a friendly understanding with America. The Ambassador did not deny having made the *démarche* but tried in a lengthy statement to justify the action of Italy by her desire for an understanding between America and Japan in the interest of world peace and her deep anxiety over a Russian penetration of the Balkan region. I pointed out in no uncertain terms that Japan's choice between America and Russia in the final analysis meant a choice between England and Germany and that the influence exerted by the Ambassador was very regrettable in view of the Axis policy.

End of the telegraphic report from Tokyo.

I ask you to call on Ciano and, referring to Auriti's conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, state the following:

As our Ambassador in Tokyo has already explained to Auriti, we are of the opinion that it is injurious to German interests to exert influence on Japan in order to bring about an understanding with America and at the same time warn against a rapprochement with Russia. Nor can we understand what interest Italian foreign policy has in influencing Japan toward such an orientation of her policy, which in practice amounts to orienting the policy of that country toward the Western democracies, and thereby promoting the antagonism already existing between Japan and Russia with all the political developments which might result therefrom in the future. Italy as well as Germany must after all, with a view to a speedy termination of the war, be interested in eliminating as far as possible all friction between the nations not involved in the war.

We therefore request that the impression created in Japan by Auriti's conversation—which, moreover, cannot have given the Japanese Government a good impression of the political cooperation between the two Axis Powers—be corrected in a suitable manner.

I request a telegraphic report.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 550

486/231723-26

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 50

BERLIN, January 17, 1940.

Bishop Berggrav, Norway's leading Protestant clergyman, called on me today, as he wishes to make no mistakes in his projected meetings with Protestant clergy here or cause them any embarrassment.¹

¹ Twardowski had noted in a memorandum of Dec. 16, 1939 (3023/599153-54) that Bishop Berggrav had proposed to Bishop Heckel, head of the Foreign Department of the German Evangelical Church, that representatives of the Northern churches meet in Denmark with representatives of the German Evangelical Church and in Norway with those of the Anglican Church to discuss "what Christians can do right now to prepare a constructive peace plan." To

We agreed that there would be no objections if Bishop Berggrav, and the Archbishop of Upsala, who apparently is also in Berlin, were brought together by Bishop Heckel with the local Protestant circles, with a view to keeping intact their long-standing relations. However, there must be no political discussions nor any attempt to interfere in domestic German church questions on that occasion. The meeting should be kept on a social and religious plane.

Bishop Berggrav, whom I have known from the time of my sojourn in Norway, then told me of a meeting he had had with four representatives of the High Church² and an important French Protestant minister. The meeting took place in Holland. Political as well as ecclesiastical topics were discussed on that occasion. The British churchmen left Bishop Berggrav their views on the peace problem in writing, whereas the French minister did not commit himself to a written statement. Berggrav left with me the English text, which is annexed hereto.³

Berggrav, who spent 2 weeks in England at the end of the year, gave me an account of the views prevailing in England, which largely correspond with Minister Aschmann's report Pr. 79 of January 13 from The Hague.⁴ The gist is this: The French war aims are not taken seriously in England, but the British Government, on the other hand, is weak. It is also too weak to take any peace initiative. Such an initiative could only come from the Führer, as the only outstanding personality, and it would specifically have to go beyond his constructive ideas of October 6 of last year, by holding out to the world the prospect of a "federated Europe." Such conceptions would destroy the British will to war and prepare the ground for ending the conflict, which is not likely to be brought to an end through military operations.

Bishop Berggrav formed this opinion from a lengthy conversation with Lord Halifax, whom he described as the dominant figure at present in the British Cabinet.

WEIZSÄCKER

further this plan Bishop Berggrav had already visited the Archbishop of Canterbury. Since Bishop Berggrav was regarded by the Legation in Oslo as of "great significance for us," Twardowski recommended that Germany's refusal should take a courteous form, and it was decided to accept Bishop Heckel's offer to write a personal letter to Bishop Berggrav after the first of the year. An attached draft for such a letter (3023/599155-57) was approved by Weizsäcker, and Woermann recorded that the letter was actually sent.

² "High Church" in English in the original.

³ An unsigned and undated memorandum, in English, of two typewritten pages. It called for Christian reconciliation of the warring nations, and stated a belief that "it would be right to enter negotiation if the following points were secured: (a) that the Czech and Slovak and the Polish peoples be recognized as independent and sovereign—and that practical guarantees for this be forthcoming; the nature of such guarantees cannot be defined in advance, because they may greatly depend upon the condition existing at the time. (b) That the definitive peace be negotiated in a Congress including at least the European nations, the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles being full partners in the Congress." (486/231725-26)

⁴ Not found.

No. 551

141/126482-84

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 17, 1940.

St.S. No. 53

The Belgian Ambassador yesterday had again asked for an appointment with me without indicating the subject matter. I received him this noon.¹ Davignon came right out with the reason for his visit. He had been told by me the day before yesterday² that Germany was surprised about the feeling of alarm and the military measures in Belgium which were directed against Germany. I had told him that I was at a loss to understand such an attitude, which I considered unwarranted and harmful. He had reported this to Brussels. His Government now deemed it essential as a token of its good faith to answer the German doubts regarding the justification of its actions. The answer was simple. The Ambassador had already spoken to me the day before yesterday about certain documents which had been found in a German plane that had landed near Mechelen. These documents conveyed the definite impression of German aggressive intentions against Belgium.

When I assumed an expression of surprise at this and repeated my remark of the day before yesterday that I knew of this story only through the press and that Davignon apparently had nothing in hand himself either, the Ambassador said that he did not, of course, have the documents here. He repeated, however, that these documents, which had come into the possession of his Government in such an unusual manner, had created the impression with his Government and the King, who surely were serious people and certainly did not exaggerate, that an offensive was planned. Davignon added that he did not know whether these documents spoke of a definite date of attack. In the meantime, to be sure, the excitement in Belgium had somewhat subsided. However, his Government continued to consider the matter as serious. That was the reason why it had sent him to the Foreign Ministry.

In order to put his visit in the proper focus, Davignon then went on to say, however, that his Government did not on the other hand intend to dramatize matters, and today's visit was not to be construed as a *démarche*. He was not making any protest or asking any questions. He would be especially happy, however, if I could give him any additional reassuring information, because his own policy, which had always been in accord with the King's from the very beginning, was

¹ Davignon's account of this interview appears in his *Berlin, 1936-1940: souvenirs d'une mission*, pp. 204-05.

² See document No. 541.

justified only if everything remained peaceful between Belgium and Germany.

In conclusion, I told Davignon that the only information which he seemed to have about these documents from the airplane was a short telegram, while I myself knew nothing at all about it; thus both of us were lacking an adequate basis for discussing the matter. Now as heretofore, I saw Belgium's harmful and unilateral military measures being justified on grounds which I could not recognize.³

Davignon then turned to a more general topic and stated that the Belgian policy of independence was completely unchanged in spite of the increase in military security measures. His Government had not followed any foreign inspiration. Nor had his Government made a fuss about the airplane affair abroad; it would not approach or make an agreement with any of the belligerent countries until an invasion by one or the other side had created an accomplished fact. If, however, such an eventuality should materialize as a result of German or French action, his Government would, of course, make an appeal to the other side. (Davignon implied an appeal under the agreements of 1937,⁴ but did not explicitly refer to them.)

WEIZSÄCKER

³ On Jan. 19, Erich Kordt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat sent to Weizsäcker the following memorandum:

"The Foreign Minister requests you to talk to the Netherlands Minister in the same way as you did to the Belgian Ambassador and to express to him our astonishment at the steps which have been taken which we consider to be objectionable. The reasons advanced for them in the press cannot be accepted by Germany." (178/84169)

See document No. 555.

⁴ See vol. v, document No. 475.

No. 552

124/122356

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, January 18, 1940.

Excerpt from a letter written by hand to Minister Blücher at Helsinki:

. . . In the meantime you will have seen that your gentle hint for mediation, which reached us, was not followed.¹ You will be interested to know that this decision was made by the highest authority [*massgebendster Stelle*]. Without doubt it must be interpreted and understood in the light of the over-all situation.

Moreover we are at present getting many indications from other countries, too, that we are in a unique position for mediation. We

¹ See documents Nos. 506 and 547.

are also answering these, at present, along the same lines as in the instructions telegraphed to you.

Many thanks for your letter of January 11, which I just received.² I wonder whether the weight of the Russian state will not after all succeed in smothering Finnish opposition in the spring?

WEIZSÄCKER

² Document No. 526.

No. 553

100/64885-87

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen*¹

BERLIN, January 18, 1940.

DEAR FRIEND: As far as I know, Herr von Ribbentrop advised you in good time of certain occurrences (Rome-Brussels)² and the Duce letter.³ It was thus unnecessary for me to mix in this myself, but I thought it very important that the texts in question were shown or sent to you. My personal opinion about the letter is that while in the nature of things it is inspired by Italy's interests, it must *like-wise* be viewed as *counsel from a friend*. If it is disregarded the warning party obtains freedom of action which he may use as he sees fit. However, I do not wish to anticipate the official reply, not even in this entirely private letter. Besides, we have occasion every day to view the situation in a new light.

It is still unclear to me what objectives Italy has set for herself in the Balkans in the event of a conflagration there. A hint can be

¹ This letter is in Weizsäcker's handwriting.

² In his diaries Ciano recorded that on Dec. 26, 1939, Mussolini asked him to inform the Dutch and Belgian diplomatic representatives in Rome that he had intelligence from good sources indicating that invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium was imminent. On Jan. 2, 1940, Ciano says he conveyed the warning to the Belgian Ambassador (*The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Dec. 26, 1939 and Jan. 2, 1940). Two messages from the Belgian Ambassador in Rome to Brussels, reporting this warning, were then intercepted and deciphered by the Germans, according to an account by Weizsäcker in his memoirs. Mackensen, upon being informed, had expressed disbelief in the contents of the intercepts (Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, p. 275). Documents on this incident have not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

³ See document No. 504. A copy of Mussolini's letter was sent to Mackensen from Ribbentrop's office on Jan. 15 (100/64899). Mackensen had already been informed in a general way of the contents of the letter on Jan. 11 by Ciano, and had telegraphed that same day to the Foreign Ministry: "I believe it would be extremely desirable at this very moment if a personal meeting of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Duce could be arranged for the transmittal of the Führer's reply. A visit to Rome would surely be greatly appreciated here, if only to return Ciano's two visits to Salzburg and Berlin" (1848/421121). Ribbentrop delivered Hitler's reply to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See documents Nos. 663 and 665.

found in your letter of January 11.⁴ Would it be possible to find out more? ⁵

Cordial greetings, also to your wife,
Yours, etc.,

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ Document No. 527.

⁵ On Feb. 7, Mackensen submitted a political report, "Tendencies of Italian Balkan policy", in which it was argued that although Italy did not intend to participate in all Balkan affairs and saw no occasion to form a Balkan bloc at that time, she could not tolerate Soviet entry into the area south of the Carpathians; Italy did not regard Bessarabia as part of the Balkan problem (2281/481285-86).

No. 554

B18/B003368

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, January 19, 1940—5:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received January 19—7:30 p. m.

No. 38 of January 19

With reference to your telegram No. 25.¹

In the course of a conversation I informed the Finnish Foreign Minister today that the German Government was of the opinion that there were at present no prospects for putting an end to the conflict. M. Tanner was unable to hide his disappointment.

It was possible to gather from his further remarks that diplomats of third powers, accredited in Moscow, had suggested to the Finnish Government that it try to enter into conversations with Moscow via Berlin. It is likely that M. Tanner now has the impression that the obstacles exist more in Berlin than in Moscow.

M. Tanner told me that the Ryti Government was formed to facilitate a peaceful settlement. The Government remains ready to discuss matters.

If the Russians should desire to continue the war, their task would not become easier even after the end of winter. They would have to fight for every foot of ground among the lakes and swamps of Finland.

After this conversation I must assume that if contact is established between Helsinki and Moscow, it will not be undertaken via Berlin.

BRÜCKNER

¹ Document No. 547.

No. 555

173/84187-68

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 19, 1940.

St.S. No. 73

During today's visit of the Netherlands Minister, I adverted to the rumors circulating about complications between Germany and Holland, and asked the Minister to tell me what measures his Government had taken and what had been the occasion for these measures. I was aware, for instance, that leaves in the Dutch Army had been ordered canceled.

M. de With admitted the cancellation of leaves but asserted that no other military preparations of any kind had been made. Dutch feeling was very calm indeed. The reaction had been much less in Holland than in Belgium. However, he would admit, said the Minister, that he, too, had become a little nervous by the numerous reports that had come to him in the past week.

I replied that I was unable to discern any special reason for such alarm. A neutral country had the right and also the duty to make preparations for the defense of its territory, but it could in no way justify directing these measures against one side, as had been the case in Belgium, for example.

M. de With agreed with me fully, but declared that his country had made equal defense preparations in all directions and particularly at the coast against British attacks. No matter from what direction an attack should come, the country would defend itself and do so with all vigor.

I did not ask the Minister in the course of the conversation about the nature of the rumors and warnings that he or his Government had received. Nor did M. de With drop any hints in this regard.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 556

1822/416807-11

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

No. 301

TALLINN, January 19, 1940.

Received January 25.

Pol. VI 247.

Subject: The Russo-Finnish conflict.

During a social function at the Legation the day before yesterday I had an opportunity for a long confidential conversation with the

Commander in Chief, General Laidoner. The General, who, as is known, also wields a certain influence outside military circles in Estonia, especially in questions of foreign policy, expressed himself very frankly concerning the observations which he had made during his visit to Moscow in the middle of December. According to his statements he met with Stalin four or five times and had several very long conversations with him in which, understandably enough, the Russo-Finnish conflict played a considerable role.

The General explained that he had on the whole gained the impression from Stalin's statements that the latter was not actually striving to incorporate Finland into the territory of the Soviet Union. Rather he evidently intended, as in the case of the Baltic countries, to content himself with obtaining certain strategic spots and clarifying Soviet-Finnish relations to the end that Finland could not align herself with the enemies of the Soviet Union. He evidently considered this solution adequate and more advantageous for the over-all interests of the Union than incorporation.

With reference to certain reports—known also to the Foreign Ministry—according to which the Soviet Russian military commander for the Leningrad district had brought on the conflict arbitrarily and really contrary to the wishes of the Moscow central authority, the General stated that in so far as he knew this was not correct. He thought it was true, however, that Zhdanov, the Party Secretary for the Leningrad district, had striven in his reporting to induce the Moscow central authority to sharpen the conflict; this had then led to the outbreak of hostilities. To his knowledge Zhdanov had disappeared from the scene some time ago; it was possible that he had fallen into disfavor because of the turn events had taken and had been withdrawn from his post. The Soviet Government had in fact obviously misjudged the situation regarding Finland and the prospects for the Soviet offensive at the beginning of December, and it was possible that Kuusinen's reports on internal conditions in Finland might have played a certain role in this.

Nevertheless it was clear that now, once she had started, the Soviet Union had to continue her campaign if only for prestige reasons; she would not permit herself to be diverted by the setbacks which the Russian troops had suffered at the hands of the Finns. In their extreme sentimental leaning toward the Scandinavian-British orientation, the Finns had to a considerable extent lost sight of actual realities and for their part, too, underestimated the Russians. At first it had been believed that the latter were not actually in earnest; this turned out to be an illusion. It now seemed that Finland was placing great hopes in the Geneva resolution of the League of Nations,¹ the declara-

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 480.

tions of sympathy by many countries, prominent among them England and France, and the occasional support in the form of gifts, volunteers, etc.; these, too, would turn out to be illusory. Finland would not receive any really effective aid in the form of troops from other countries in spite of all the declarations of sympathy; on the contrary, she would be left to her own devices, as had been the lot of Poland. Finland was merely another example of how for all practical purposes the hardly comprehensible nimbus which still enveloped England in spite of all past experience continued to delude some countries even now.

As for putting an end to the conflict, the General believed that an amicable agreement between the parties was altogether possible even now. Finland herself had indicated that she was ready to negotiate. To be sure, Foreign Minister Tanner had simultaneously made the mistake of again offending the exceptionally sensitive and resentful Soviet Russians by polemic statements, so that it was doubtful whether any accord could ever be reached involving this man, who was particularly disliked by the Soviet Russians. Nor would the Soviet Union, in his opinion, be disinclined to reach a compromise agreement with Finland, though perhaps not precisely at the present moment, when the Red Army had just suffered setbacks for which Soviet Russia's prestige required compensation. He thought the psychological moment might come very soon, however. The General did not consider Kuusinen's government any real obstacle, for he believed that Stalin would abandon Kuusinen without hesitation if he thought this conducive to a solution appearing acceptable to the Russians, since Kuusinen was merely a pawn to Stalin, not a real power factor.

One incident which the General told about his Moscow visit might also be mentioned: At one of the dinners in Moscow, some of which took a very long time and during which—in Russian fashion—many speeches were made, Stalin had said to the General at a late hour that he would now drink a toast that would astonish some of the guests and might not meet the approval of all. Then Stalin had risen and had raised his glass “to the independence and national People's Government of Finland.”

Of the General's further statements during the conversation one other remark on the causes of the war is of interest. The General stated that during his visit to Warsaw in March 1939 he had had the unmistakable impresssion that Beck and several of the men close to him had fully realized the imminent danger to Poland and had been inclined to accept the Führer's offers. The great majority of the Poles, however, had been practically out of their minds and bereft of reason because of the British guarantee. The feeling that nothing could happen to them now had been so overwhelming that Beck had

no longer been able to put through his real intentions at all. The General had heard that Beck had even been told by one of the leading military men, probably General Kaprecinski, that he would risk physical annihilation if he continued his trend toward reconciliation.

FROHWEIN

No. 557

582/241956

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 22, 1940.

St.S. No. 83

The Italian Ambassador today showed me a *Le Temps* article which dealt with the forced landing of a German plane near Mechelen¹ and was designed to prove that German military orders taken from this plane were the cause of the recent alarm in Belgium. Attolico handed me the article with the remark that apparently this was an important incident that I had not mentioned to him during his visit last week.

Since I did not wish to pursue this theme, I told Attolico that this story had certainly been current in the foreign press for some time, but that I should like to ask *him* whether he *for his part* could not give me the real reason why the Belgians had been so alarmed a week ago.²

Our conversation then turned elsewhere, so that I was not able to determine whether or to what extent Attolico was aware of the Italian role in this whole business.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See documents Nos. 528, 529, 531, 538, 541, 544, and 551.

² See document No. 553, footnote 2.

No. 558

2981/567006-07

Minute by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, January 22, 1940.
Pol. VIII 118.

The Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Ting, called on me today in order to inquire about Count Ciano's telegram to Wang Ching-wei.¹ He asked particularly whether the Italians had informed us of this

¹ On Jan. 8, the Abe Cabinet announced its intention to sponsor a new Chinese regime under Wang's leadership. Ciano had acknowledged this development with a telegram of congratulations to Wang.

telegram. I said they had not. Ting asked whether the German Government intended to take an attitude toward Wang similar to that of Count Ciano. I replied that we had as yet reached no decision in this matter; for the present the new government had not yet been formed and, to judge from reports that had come in, it could not even be said with certainty that it would be formed in the near future. Ting replied that for him the amazing thing about Ciano's attitude was that he had sent his telegram of congratulations to Wang at a time when it was entirely clear that the Abe government, which in its death-struggle had proclaimed its support of Wang, would have to resign, and it was not at all sure that its successor would take the same attitude toward Wang.

I asked Ting whether he knew anything about a recent change in Wang's relations with Chungking.² He said that Chiang Kai-shek was still opposed to Wang. I asked him about Wang's collaborators mentioned in Chungking telegram No. 6 of January 18,³ namely Ku Meng-yu, Cheng Kung-po, and Tsung-wu. Ting said that Ku Meng-yu was not a follower of Wang. On the contrary, after he had long been inactive for reasons of health he had gone to Chungking in order to demonstrate that he was on the side of Chungking. It was possible that Wang had asked him to induce Chungking to accept his peace terms. Wang himself must have known beforehand that he would have no success in this. It had long been known that Cheng Kung-po did not support Wang's purposes. It was interesting, to be sure, if it were true, that Kao Tsung-wu had deserted Wang. He had originally conducted peace talks with Japan, with Chiang's consent. Later he had gone over entirely to Wang. It had already been remarked that Kao had not appeared as Foreign Minister on the list of ministers that Wang had recently issued. Ting had not yet heard of Kao's defection, however.

Ting then said that he thought that the proclamation of the new Wang Ching-wei government would aggravate Japanese-American relations still more. By way of provoking comment I interjected that Roosevelt had long since abandoned the principle of China's inviolability and was now concerned only with the preservation of American interests. If Wang gave him assurances concerning these, the United States would undertake nothing against his government. Ting said the American Government was now primarily concerned to put across rearmament on as large a scale as possible. For this purpose it was making use of the anti-Japanese sentiment. And this

²In a telegram of Jan. 17 (8137/E582163), the German Consulate in Shanghai had reported alleged negotiations between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek for fusion and for peace with Japan. The French and British Ambassadors were said to be active as mediators.

³Not printed (8137/E582164).

sentiment would be wasted if the State Department tolerated in silence the setting up of Wang Ching-wei.

In reply to a question from me Ting stated that the British Ambassador had made no attempt of any kind during his last visit in Chungking to influence the Chinese Government to adopt an unfriendly attitude toward Germany.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Deputy Director and Director of the Political Department.

KNOLL

No. 559

486/231748

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 40 of January 22

DUBLIN, January 23, 1940.

Received January 23—12 noon.

Various representatives of British peace movements have lately tried to approach the Legation through the intermediary of distinguished Irishmen, in particular—through a certain Northern Irishman, Craig,¹ of Belfast, who has a German wife—the office of a central organization of the British peace movements alleged to have been founded recently by Lord Tavistock,² to which the Bishop [Archbishop]³ of York and G. Lansbury⁴ are also said to belong. They want to find out in particular whether something could be stated about our intentions regarding the ultimate political future of Poland, and secondly also Bohemia, which would be calculated to encourage the peace movement in England. They also want the Foreign Ministry to be informed. Our practice of maintaining complete reserve and calling attention to the well-known official German statements obviously causes disappointment. I should like to mention in this connection that in a talk with De Valera at Christmas, he told me, stressing that this was only his personal opinion, that an early settlement on Poland, which the Allies could accept without too great a loss of prestige, possibly combined with concessions on Bohemia, might perhaps help Chamberlain's fundamental desire for

¹The German text, which had been garbled at this point, has "Greig," but references to this telegram in other documents, Dublin telegrams No. 119 of Mar. 1, 1940 (91/100164-65) and No. 137 of Mar. 8, 1940 (91/100170), indicate that Craig is the name intended.

²Hastings William Sackville Russell, Marquess of Tavistock, since 1940 Duke of Bedford.

³Most Rev. William Temple.

⁴Rt. Hon. George Lansbury, Labor M. P. for Bow and Bromley.

peace—which he thought was sincere—prevail against Churchill and the other obstinate war supporters in the British Cabinet. In that instance, too, I strictly adhered to the directives of your telegraphic instruction No. 185 of October 24, 1939,⁵ and avoided any discussion.

I want to add that around Christmas time the Foreign Office here, evidently on the basis of reports from the Irish High Commissioner in London, showed increasing optimism about British peace tendencies, which were noticeable also among several members of the British Cabinet. Fear seems to have arisen lately that Russia's weakness evidenced by the Finnish conflict has stimulated the inclination to carry on the war against Germany.

HEMPFEL

⁵ This telegraphic instruction (91/100088), in explaining the German official attitude toward discussions of peace at that time, stated that the only German peace terms were those announced in Hitler's Reichstag speech of Oct. 6, 1939, and directed that any discussion of the subject should be in accordance with the official published pronouncement, i. e., that in DNB, but that such discussion should not be initiated.

No. 560

5570/E399251-52

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Yugoslavia

SECRET

BERLIN, January 23, 1940.

zu W 180 g.¹

Through a letter to the Air Ministry, a copy of which is enclosed,² the Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe has given instructions that arms deliveries for Yugoslavia and the related transactions to pay for them shall be handled in Yugoslavia by Consul General Neuhausen.

This instruction by the Field Marshal, as I would like to point out so that misunderstandings may be avoided, merely aims at clarifying how the activities of the Air Attaché in Belgrade and Consul General Neuhausen are to be delimited in the handling of aircraft transactions. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the Legation in the handling of arms deliveries is thereby not affected,³ particularly in so far as this should require negotiations with the Yugoslav Government going beyond the purely commercial sphere. In so far as Consul General Neuhausen acts within this sphere of jurisdiction of the Legation, he does so, as heretofore, under the responsibility and control of the Minister. Please inform Consul General Neuhausen of this.⁴

By order:

WIEHL

¹ W 180 g: Not printed (5570/399245).

² Not printed (5570/E399247).

³ Marginal note: "Goes without saying. R[ibbentrop]"

⁴ Copies of this instruction were sent to the Air Ministry, the High Command of the Wehrmacht, and the Economics Ministry.

No. 561

3081/613182-84

Minister Bräuer to Senior Counselor Grundherr

OSLO, January 23, 1940.

DEAR GRUNDHERR: I am sending you enclosed:

1. A further report on the transactions of the Storting with special reference to the defense question;¹

2. A confidential memorandum regarding Minister Quisling's standing in the Norwegian Army.²

In connection with the memorandum, I feel obliged to inform you confidentially that Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt on his various visits to Oslo always maintains very close contact with former Ortsgruppenleiter Kern, with whose career you are familiar, just as you are aware of the reasons for his recall exactly 2 years ago. I fear that the accomplishment of Herr Scheidt's mission here will be rendered difficult or even jeopardized by these very close relations with Kern. The interest which certain elements, e. g., Consul General Ringnes, take in Kern is still very great.³ Only a few days ago there was an article in the local press to the effect that Kern was an officially accredited court interpreter and that this fact deserved greater attention on the part of the Norwegians. Certain signs indicate that Ringnes is responsible for these articles against Kern. So Kern is under a certain surveillance not by the police, to be sure, but privately, and it is quite possible that Herr Scheidt might be subjected to such surveillance; that, I believe, would not be in our interest. I am writing this to you as a personal letter, because I am under instruction to deal in this matter only with the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary, and you.

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

B[RÄUER]

¹ Not found.

² Not printed (3081/613185-86). The memorandum, dated Jan. 23 but unsigned, suggested that Quisling's influence in the Norwegian Army had been exaggerated.

³ Ellef Ringnes, a Norwegian national and former Consul General for Austria in Oslo, wrote Hitler a letter dated Apr. 7, 1937, deploring the activities of Günther Kern, Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in Oslo. Ringnes, who identified himself as founder of the Norwegian-German-Austrian Association in Norway and Party Member No. 59 of the National Socialist Party of Norway, assured Hitler that his letter was not directed against the NSDAP but that on the contrary he and those whom he represented had the greatest admiration and sympathy for the Third Reich and its political ideas (3010/588003-04).

No. 562

91/100144

The Consulate General at Genoa to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 7 of January 24

GENOA, January 24, 1940—2:50 p. m.

Received January 24—6:55 p. m.

The delegate of the Irish movement, John McCarthy, who has arrived from New York, asked today whether the German Government was prepared to take to Ireland John Russell, the Chief of Staff of the Irish movement, who is still in New York without the knowledge of the American Government. If so, he would arrive here from New York aboard a new direct steamship line under an assumed name and would be identified here by McCarthy. The inquiry is being made since direct traffic between America and Ireland has been stopped and the route via London is impossible because of the danger of arrest. McCarthy, who is leaving for Naples by steamer today, requests an answer by the time of his return from there on Saturday, January 27.¹

Also for Political and Information Departments.

SCHEIDT

¹ See document No. 605.

No. 563

2431/514131-32

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 39 of January 24

BRUSSELS, January 24, 1940—6:20 p. m.

Received January 25—1:10 a. m.

Pol. II 335.

The newly-appointed American Ambassador Cudahy called on me yesterday. From the long conversation the following is worthy of note:

1. The Ambassador stated at the outset that he had particularly good relations with President Roosevelt and was a friend of his of long standing. However, he was not entirely in agreement with the President's current policies. He would have found it more desirable for America to take a completely objective and neutral attitude and maintain greater reserve in European affairs.

2. The Ambassador then discussed the situation of Belgium, and stated that Belgium's fate was being followed in the United States

with the greatest interest. Violation of Belgian neutrality would arouse profound indignation in America, no matter how good the arguments the aggressor thought he could muster for this action, and the feeling would be the same from whichever side the aggression occurred. England and France were fully aware of this fact, and he presumed that this was also true of Germany. In response to my remark that I could not believe that the United States of America would somehow allow herself to be drawn into a war again, the Ambassador replied it would be a mistake to think that America would keep out of the European conflict under all circumstances. A violation of Belgian neutrality must by no means be undertaken lightly in view of possible developments in the United States of America. Public opinion could change very suddenly and set off surprising reactions.

The sense of the Ambassador's statements was that he anticipated America's entry into the war in the event of the violation of Belgium's neutrality by Germany, although this was not stated explicitly.

BÜLOW

No. 564

585/242540-41

The Chargé d'Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SOFIA, January 24, 1940—11:40 p. m.

No. 32 of January 24

Received January 25—3:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 46 of January 22.¹

I brought the questions raised in your instruction to the attention of the Minister President today when I congratulated him on the exchange of declarations, reaffirming peace, with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister on the occasion of the anniversary of the treaty of friendship.² Menemencioglu reported on behalf of London that England was prepared to purchase Bulgarian tobacco, but without any political condition (two groups missing). Kiosseivanov took cognizance.

¹ Not printed (585/242536). In this telegram, Woermann asked Richthofen to verify certain reports received in Berlin, according to which Menemencioglu during his visit to Sofia, Jan. 12-13, had told the Bulgarians that they would receive financial support from Britain if they changed their political course. Menemencioglu was also said to have asked "that Bulgaria give an assurance of neutrality in the event of Turkey's entry into the war, as well as in the event of an attack on one of the neighboring Balkan states by a great power, and that she put off her territorial demands for the duration of the war; in return he is said to have promised Turkish support for Bulgarian wishes after the end of the war."

² On Jan. 24, 1937, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had signed a pact of perpetual friendship (*Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 401-405.)

The Turk then tried, as reported in telegram No. 17 of January 15,³ to arouse fear of Germany and Russia, and proposed a formula of strict neutrality, that is, one that would bind Bulgaria in any eventuality. Forewarned by Rendell's advance notice that the Turkish Secretary General was going to confer with Halifax and Hugessen on the previously discussed plan, the Minister President rejected the proposal. In the second conversation Menemencioglu then did not make any more demands of this kind, emphasizing instead that the Turkish Government had no intention at all of hitching Bulgaria to a neutral Balkan bloc. Agreement was then reached on the neutrality formula and communiqué,⁴ which we know. Nothing whatever had been said about putting off the Bulgarian revisionist demands and linking this with later Turkish support for them. For his part, however, he had again set forth the well-known Bulgarian revisionist demands.

The general impression the Minister President gained from the conversations is that the visit was doubtless made under strong British pressure and for the purpose of neutralizing Bulgaria more securely, but that Turkey's desire to strengthen the peace in Southeastern Europe had also played a part. To affirm this, Menemencioglu had assured him that Turkey would oppose any passage of foreign troops through Bulgaria or even Greece. Despite all his distrust of Turkey's ulterior motives, he had therefore felt that he would not be justified in rejecting a reaffirmation of the common determination to maintain neutrality in the sense of the communiqué, if only to keep the Turks—whom he, Kiosseivanov, did not yet regard as (1 group garbled) lost—from being driven entirely into the enemy camp. Germany could rest assured that, as in the past, Bulgaria would not enter into any commitment without a previous understanding with Germany.

BÜLOW

³ Not printed (585/242534-35).

⁴ The communiqué reaffirmed the ties established by the Turkish-Bulgarian Friendship Treaty of 1925 and stated the identity of views of the two countries.

No. 565

22/13780-81

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 77 of January 24

OSLO, January 24, 1940—11:41 p. m.

Received January 25—4:00 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 73 of January 23.¹

¹ Not printed (22/13778-79). In this telegram Bräuer described the bad reception which Churchill's speech of Jan. 20 had had in Norway and cited other evidence indicating that a reaction against England in Norwegian governmental circles had set in. Churchill's speech is printed in *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, vol. I, pp. 135-138.

During a call I paid Foreign Minister Koht today for another purpose, I brought the conversation around to Winston Churchill's radio address the day before yesterday. In a conversational tone, the Foreign Minister quite calmly and frankly expressed his views in regard to the address and British policy in general, and I repeat them here with the request that they be treated as confidential.

It was incomprehensible, said Koht, that one of the ranking members of the Cabinet should have delivered such an address which would drive the neutral countries into opposition to British policy even if they were in sympathy with England. The speech was provocative and silly. The Norwegian press had, in fact, made a reply to it which left nothing to be desired as regards bluntness. He had known Churchill for 30 years and considered him a demagogue and a windbag (sic!). True enough, he had written some very good books, but every time he ventured into practical politics, he got on the wrong track. He, Koht, had at the time been very much astonished that Churchill had been taken into the Cabinet just at so difficult a period and had been given a position of such importance in the British Government which called for the greatest tact and the deepest wisdom. This could be explained on the ground of the lack of realism of Chamberlain, who "means well, but is a bungler" [*"ein guter Mensch, aber ein schlechter Musikant"*]. It was his softness which probably also accounted for the fact that such slips as Churchill's address could occur. The man in the British Cabinet whose thinking was straight and solid, according to the Foreign Minister, was Lord Halifax; his speech, delivered on the same day, followed a line entirely different from that of Churchill, a fact that threw an unfavorable light on teamwork in the British Cabinet.² The Foreign Minister believed he could discern peace feelers in Halifax's speech as also in Chamberlain's last address,³ and felt that these two speeches probably were more indicative of the views prevailing in the British Cabinet than was the speech of Churchill. The mistake in Halifax's speech, the Foreign Minister said, was that it again contained attacks on National Socialism; for one could not expect peace, which England assuredly wanted, if at the same time one attacked like that the enemy's Government, on which, after all, the will to peace also depended.

BRÄUER

²This speech, delivered at Leeds, is printed in *Speeches on Foreign Policy by Viscount Halifax*, pp. 345-357.

³Presumably a reference to the Mansion House speech of Jan. 9; the text is printed in the *Times* (London), Jan. 10, 1940.

No. 566

22/13782-84

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 78 of January 24

OSLO, January 24, 1940—11:40 p. m.

Received January 25—4:40 a. m.

During my call on Foreign Minister Koht today, I was approached by him on the subject of the notes which the Norwegian Legation had delivered to the Foreign Ministry between January 11 and 15 regarding the sinking of the two British ships, the *Thomas Walton* and the *Deptford*, and the Greek steamer *Garaufalia*.

The Foreign Minister informed me confidentially of the following regarding the background of these notes: After the sinking of the above-named British ships, the British Government, around the turn of the year, had made very forceful representations with the Norwegian Government. The British Government had protested that the Norwegian Government permitted Germany without protest to undertake naval operations in Norwegian territorial waters. Should such incidents be repeated, England would be compelled to act in the same manner, that is, to operate with her naval forces in Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian Government had replied to this in the sharpest manner conceivable, stating that the evidence collected so far had not in any way produced proof of German naval operations in Norwegian territorial waters; that the Norwegian Government, on establishing the facts, would request an explanation from the German Government; but that a violation of Norwegian territorial waters by one belligerent power did not give the other the right to do the same. The Norwegian reply closed with the statement that any use of force within the boundaries of Norwegian sovereignty would be countered with force by Norway to the limit of her powers.

The Foreign Minister explained to me in this connection that in the light of her experience with Germany to date, Norway was firmly convinced that Germany was prepared in every way to respect Norway's integrity as well as her territorial waters, and that if for some reason violations of Norwegian territorial waters by Germany should occur, Germany would admit it and give the satisfaction customary in such cases under international law. As regards the three ships mentioned, Norway's position would be very greatly eased if Germany were to send some sort of reply as quickly as possible and if the Norwegian Government were permitted to publish that reply. The Norwegian Government was not at all concerned with the nature of the reply, just so it was satisfactory to the extent that Norway could point out that the three incidents had been brought to a conclusion unob-

jectionable under international law, that Norway's reaction had been correct and Germany's reply equally correct. The report on the Norwegian investigation had been submitted to the Reich Foreign Ministry together with the notes of the Norwegian Government referred to above.

In this context, the Foreign Minister also cited the threats against Norway published by the *Daily Telegraph*, from Paris (Pertinax), in consequence of the German naval operations along the Norwegian coast. He stressed the importance of a German reply for the reason that it would also enable him to counter these fantastic rumors and threats with even greater effectiveness.

The Foreign Minister added confidentially that in the case of the *Deptford* the ship had unquestionably been sunk within Norwegian territorial waters, but the sinking of the *Thomas Walton* and the *Garaufalia* had occurred on the borderline of Norwegian territorial waters, possibly just outside. In none of the three instances had it been possible to obtain positive proof of torpedoing, although one witness or another claimed to have seen a torpedo.

The Foreign Minister took the occasion to express his thanks for the support we had given him by replying, prior to the debate in the Storting, to the Norwegian notes protesting flights over Norwegian territory.¹

Since I consider our reply to the Norwegian note as an important instrument in Norway's defense against England, which is naturally keeping a very close watch over our naval operations and our shipping along the Norwegian coast and is only waiting for some opportunity to interfere, I request that our reply be expedited as much as possible.

BRÄUER

¹ In reply to an inquiry from the Legation in Oslo, Woermann telegraphed on Jan. 15 that a reply to a note of the Norwegian Legation of Oct. 19, 1939, had been drafted in December but was not delivered since the Norwegians had not raised the question again. On Jan. 15 the reply was transmitted to the Norwegian Legation, with the additional remark that the German planes involved had been strictly enjoined not to fly over Norwegian waters (22/13766).

No. 567

124/122534-35

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Ott

BERLIN, January 24, 1940.

DEAR HERR OTT: Within the next few days Herr Stahmer will go to Japan, accompanying the Duke of Coburg.¹ I do not like to pass up this good opportunity to get a letter to you.

¹ Heinrich Stahmer, who was in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, accompanied the Duke of Coburg, President of the German Red Cross, on a good will mission to Japan and the United States.

Actually I have nothing really new to tell you, since you are doubtless well posted. The obstacles which were placed in your path by your former Italian colleague, Auriti, now no longer exist. We complained in Rome, and Auriti is on the way out.² Our relations with Italy are naturally somewhat burdened by our closer ties with Russia. They make a good deal of their anti-Bolshevism in Rome, but they sometimes forget that it was precisely Rome that had advised us repeatedly to normalize our relations with Moscow. The situation could become critical if, contrary to our desires, the Balkans should be drawn into the theater of war and a conflagration should break out there. Then Italy would really find her interests in conflict. At present the lines of force brought to bear by the Great Powers in the Balkans seem to be sufficiently balanced to preserve the peace there. If Russia remains quiet with respect to Rumania, there would seem to be no danger to the existing peace.

For the rest, it is so cold here that one is reminded of conditions in former wars when the soldiers went into winter quarters. In a certain sense, this may also be said of diplomacy at the present time.

The new Japanese Ambassador to Berlin is less impulsive than his predecessor and probably also somewhat more cautious in his reports. He gave me the advice for Herr Stahmer that the latter should not give too much emphasis in Japan to his old friendship with Oshima—a piece of advice that is probably well meant.

Cordial greetings from our house to yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 549.

No. 568

3076/612949

An Official of Political Division I to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 67 of January 24

BERLIN, January 25 [1940]—5:40 a. m.

Received Oslo, January 25—6:30 a. m.

Also for Kirkenes.

For the Chief of Mission or his deputy personally.

Special security handling. Decode personally.

The Navy has advised us for your strictly confidential information:

The motor tanker *Altmark*, returning from the Atlantic, is expected in Norwegian waters beginning the 25th. The ship is considered as being on official Government service and flies the official Reich ensign. The ship has orders not to display any deceptive markings in territorial waters. She has no armament. She is probably

carrying a large number of captured crew members from ships sunk by the pocket battleship *Graf Spee*. *Altmark* is under orders to pass through Norwegian territorial waters without stopping.

Please notify Kristiansand through reliable channels. The other regular Consulates have been notified.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 569

B21/B005346-47

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 89 of January 25 WASHINGTON, January 25, 1940—1:34 p. m.

Received January 26—12:25 a. m.

For the State Secretary personally.

I have learned that a German-American, von Hausberger, and a German citizen, Walter, both of New York, are alleged to be planning acts of sabotage against the American armament industry by direction of the German Abwehr; von Hausberger is supposed to have detonators hidden in his dwelling.

In full agreement with the two representatives of the Wehrmacht, who identify themselves with this report on all points, I should like to make the following comments:

In accordance with the political directives given me I regard it as my foremost duty to use every effort to remove any causes of conflict which might drive the United States into breaking off relations or entering the war.

As I already stated at length in telegram No. 382 of September 18, 1939,¹ alleged German acts of sabotage in the United States were a decisive contributory factor to America's entry into the World War. As a result of the trials of the alleged German spy ring recently conducted with greatest publicity in New York, Panama, and New Orleans; of the sensational decisions in the sabotage trial;² of the recent statements of the former agent von Rintelen;³ and of the measures inaugurated since the outbreak of the war by the [Federal] Bureau of Investigation in order to preclude a repetition of sabotage acts, the entire American public is so sensitive on this point that discovery of attempted sabotage or of any sort of agent or espionage activity directed from Germany will certainly entail the severest consequences.

¹ Document No. 88.

² See document No. 88, footnote 1.

³ Capt. Franz von Rintelen had been interviewed in London and his statements about German undercover activity in the first World War were reported in the *New York Times* of Jan. 3.

There is no doubt but that in its present mood the American people would in such an eventuality go along with decisive measures by the American Government.

Since our foreign policy aims at keeping America out of the war under all circumstances, it is my opinion that all such attempts must be prohibited.

There is no surer way of driving America into the war than by resorting again to a course of action which drove America into the ranks of our enemies once before in the World War and, incidentally, did not in the least impede the war industries of the United States.

As a precautionary measure I have therefore had the above-mentioned alleged agents ordered in an appropriate manner to desist immediately from all activity until further notice. I request telegraphic instructions as to whether the agents named, as well as any others not known here, can be definitely relieved of their missions.

I should like to add that both individuals, whose relations with official German agencies are well known, are unfitted in every respect to act as agents of the Abwehr.

The wife of Hausberger, moreover, has been employed at the Consulate General in New York.⁴

THOMSEN

⁴ In a telegram of Jan. 27 (B21/B005348), Weizsäcker replied that Thomsen's attitude and the steps he had taken were "entirely approved." He added that neither of the men was in the service of the Abwehr. A note on this document states: "Based on conversation with Admiral Canaris."

Other documents in the Foreign Ministry files, however, reveal that on Jan. 24 an Abwehr agent left Buenos Aires with instructions to report to Fritz von Hausberger at Weehawken, New Jersey "for instruction in our specialty." Abwehr messages to arrange this mission were sent by the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Argentina. One of these stated that another agent, who had left Buenos Aires for New York in December with instructions to gather intelligence on American aircraft factories and arms shipments to the Allies, was not to make his presence known to the German diplomatic representation in the United States. (1709/398707, 398710-11; 4491/E097624-26, E097632-37, E097639).

On Feb. 29, Thomsen reported (1725/401170) that another agent, one Baron Konstantin von Maydell, a Baltic German of Estonian citizenship, had appeared at the Embassy and represented himself as having arrived in the United States on Dec. 16, 1939, on a sabotage mission for the Abwehr. Weizsäcker replied on Mar. 12 (1725/401171) that Maydell did have connections with the Abwehr, that he had no specific mission, but was merely instructed to be available in the United States in the event of war. In view of his inept behavior he would be recalled.

No. 570

170/84720

The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 23 of January 25

MEXICO CITY, January 25, 1940—6: 45 p. m.

Received January 26—8: 55 a. m.

Last November I was solicited by groups of Guatemalan emigrants for German financial support for the purpose of occupying British

Honduras. I have now been approached by the Mexican ex-General Philemore with a similar request. He recently accompanied President Cardenas on a tour of the southwestern [*sic*] provinces up to the border of British Honduras, and then visited the British colony on his own to recruit followers. General Philemore claims that the project has the sympathetic interest of the President and that he would for that reason be able to obtain the weapons he needs for his thousand or so newly enlisted volunteers in Mexico. Philemore asked for financial aid in the amount of \$30,000 to meet his payroll for 3 months. The possibility of establishing a naval base in some hidden cove along the coast of British Honduras was hinted at. The immediate objective is the establishment of the Free State of Belize.

A plebiscite regarding division between Guatemala and Mexico would follow. I have of course aroused no hope in him as to the fulfillment of his wish, but I believe I should submit it.¹

RÜDT

¹ In a telegram of Mar. 8, Woermann replied that Berlin regarded British Honduras as a matter more of concern to Guatemala than to Mexico, and moreover that Philemore's plans seemed to have too little hope of success to justify financial support at present. However, Woermann instructed Rüdte to maintain contact with Philemore through an intermediary (176/84721).

No. 571

22/13788-90

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

OSLO, January 25, 1940—8:00 p. m.

No. 81 of January 25

Received January 26—12:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 63 of January 24¹ and my telegram No. 78 of January 24.²

The questions asked in the above telegraphic instruction have for the most part been answered by my telegraphic report No. 78 of yesterday. The Swedish and Danish reports of British action against German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, cited in the instructions, are accordingly incorrect in important aspects, although, as shown by Koht's statements, certain indications would point in that direction.

As shown in my above-mentioned telegraphic report, England has made no attempt to press Norway to take any action against our

¹ Not printed (3077/612988). Instructions to sound out the Norwegian Government as to the truth of reports of British pressure on Norway to cut off German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters without revealing that these reports reached Germany through the Swedish Foreign Minister and the Danish Minister to Berlin.

² Document No. 566.

shipping in Norwegian territorial waters which would be in violation of her neutrality (that would have been emphatically rejected by Norway), but she did protest to the Norwegian Government with regard to the sinking of the British steamer *Deptford* in Norwegian territorial waters and threatened that if this should happen again she, too, would carry naval warfare into Norwegian territorial waters, an action which in the circumstances could of course be directed only against German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters.

I am convinced that Koht's statements regarding the Norwegian Government's reply to the British step are true. And, with the omission of a few points, they were repeated in the speech which Foreign Minister Koht delivered before the Storting on January 19. Norway's reply demonstrates her will to take action with the means at her disposal against any British measure to interfere with shipping in her territorial waters. At the same time, we must realize that in the event force is used, Norway's power naturally would be insufficient for effective defense. For that reason Norway has with remarkable consistency taken a stand of strict neutrality, attempting thereby to establish a defense against any foreign intervention. As things stand today, Norway could be successful in this. Since there have as yet been no overt violations of neutrality by any of the belligerents, England is very unlikely to be the first country to take the politically weighty decision to violate openly the neutrality of a small country.

Nevertheless, we must of course proceed on the assumption that England is aware of the importance for our war economy of our shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, especially of our ore transports, and is seeking means of stopping it. But as long as the Norwegians have the will, born of their instinct of self-preservation, to resist any violation of their neutrality, England will be hard put to find an effectual means of stopping that traffic. Lately, a strikingly large number of mines have been fished up in the Varanger Fjord, as well as at many other places along the coast of Norway. Apparently they are floating mines, however, since it is unlikely, in view of British shipping traffic along the Norwegian coast, that England would lay mines in the vicinity of Norwegian territorial waters in order to interfere with shipping since these mines might also cause damage to her own shipping. I shall continue to give my fullest attention to this question. In the present circumstances our policy must be to watch and support the will to be neutral. In this war, Norway has had more reason for complaint about England than about us. As a result of the blockade warfare waged by England, her brazen demands in the trade agreement negotiations, and after the Churchill address, a correct conduct on our part will bring England increasingly into discredit. It would, moreover, help to put a neutral belt around

Norway and to some extent afford protection for the expansion of our shipping traffic. By the same token, we are also interested in seeing Norway's neutrality respected by Russia. Any spreading of the Russo-Finnish conflict to northern Norway would so upset the balance resulting from Norway's neutrality that we, too, would then have to expect reactions on our coastal shipping, quite apart from the fact that Narvik especially, which is regarded here as the objective of any Russian action against northern Norway, is, along with Kirkenes, particularly important for our ore shipments.

I repeat my request made in telegraphic report No. 78 that the Norwegian notes be answered as soon and correctly as possible. In this connection, please refer to my telegraphic report No. 82 of January 25,³ sent in response to a different instruction.⁴

BRÄUER

³ Not printed (22/13792).

⁴ Telegram No. 66 of Jan. 24, not printed (8388/E591797).

No. 572

824/194154

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Spain*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 110

BERLIN, January 25, 1940.

W 320 g.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Sabath.

With reference to your No. 276 of January 22.¹

The Foreign Minister is in accord with your position and requests that you continue pressing energetically for the delivery of the promised 2000 tons of lead and that you make a serious protest if it should develop that Spain, on the basis of the *modus vivendi* just arrived at, is shipping strategic materials to France in excess of the quantities shipped before the war. If the Anglo-Spanish economic negotiations should also lead to an agreement which gives England a considerably better position than she had before the war, similar action ought to be taken.

WIEHL

¹ Not printed (136/74022-23). In this telegram Stohrer reported that, having been informed of a new Spanish-French agreement according to which Spain would deliver to France large amounts of lead in excess of prewar deliveries, he had made a protest to the Spanish Foreign Minister.

No. 573

8118/641580-81

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 95 of January 25

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1940.

Received January 26—8:55 a. m.

As of tomorrow trade relations between the United States of America and Japan will no longer be governed by treaty.¹ The efforts of the Japanese Government until the very last days to create at least a temporary basis for trade relations by means of an exchange of notes failed because of the unyielding attitude of the American Government, which believes that it has the upper hand and intends to hold the absence of a treaty, including the possibility of sanctions in individual cases, over Japan's head as a sword of Damocles. Thus within the American Government those circles were able to prevail which pursue the aim, as did formerly Secretary of State Stimson and now Under Secretary of State Welles and Ambassador Grew, of re-establishing the open-door policy in China and of at least obtaining sufficient Japanese guarantees for the security and free exercise of American rights in China. An important factor contributing to this decision was the circumstance that the Japanese made no concessions of any kind during the 6 months since notice of intention to terminate the treaty was given and thereby exhausted American patience. With this decision of the American Government, however, it may well be that all measures aimed at an embargo or other reprisals against Japan will lose their force. I do not believe that Senator Pittman and others with proposals in that direction will be successful in Congress. In this connection it should be taken into consideration that Japanese exports to this country (especially silk) are extremely vital to American economic interests. The Japanese-Russian economic negotiations, too, should dictate a certain caution to the United States, although satisfaction is felt here in the belief that Japanese trade with Russia offers relatively few exchange possibilities and will for years not be able to replace the American market. Finally, a similar restraining influence is exerted by the general political consideration of not introducing any disturbances into the Pacific area, especially now during the war; this is of particular interest to Great Britain, which is bringing influence to bear on the United States of America to this

¹ On July 26, 1939, the United States had given Japan the required 6 months notice of its intention to terminate the 1911 treaty governing trade relations between the two countries.

effect. It is realized that the bow must not be drawn too tight. In the present state of their relations the two Governments will not make any *de facto* changes in current trade, i.e., they will neither introduce discriminatory measures with reference to tariff treatment nor interfere with the activities of each other's commercial agents, who have now lost their legal status. Likewise the United States of America will continue to accord Japan tariff preferences which are not based upon the reciprocal trade agreement. Only renewed serious interference on the part of Japan with American interests in East Asia would cause this to be changed.

THOMSEN

No. 574

4447/E086886-98

*Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

SECRET

Moscow, January 25, 1940.

The Soviet-Finnish conflict is for various reasons viewed with mixed feelings on the German side. The reason for this is that this conflict entails disadvantages as well as advantages for Germany, and that the significance of each must be carefully weighed against the other; it is not so easy to say whether the drawbacks or the advantages predominate.

To begin with the drawbacks, it should be noted that Germany is being made to bear the blame for having made possible the conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. This causes resentment against Germany, which is consciously fostered by our enemies. Another factor is that the fighting in Finland, the war situation and the inevitable consequences of the conflict cut deeply into the trade between Germany and Finland, and also impair Russia's economic productivity to Germany's detriment. The latter has only been intimated as yet, to be sure, but a number of observations would indicate that the Soviet Union's general capability is very extensively engaged by the Soviet-Finnish conflict, which cannot fail to have its effect eventually upon the deliveries to Germany. Furthermore there is no mistaking that the shortcomings of the Red Army, brought out by the fighting in Finland, together with several severe setbacks at the front and the duration of the war, whose end cannot be predicted today, have caused the Soviet Union to lose prestige before the eyes of the whole world—a fact to which Germany cannot be indifferent in view of her ties with

¹ Marginal note: "Original given to the Ambassador. T[ippelskirch]."

the Soviet Union. Finally, there is no telling whether the Soviet-Finnish conflict might not of necessity or through the conscious efforts of England and France so develop as to draw Sweden and Norway into the struggle and later involve the Soviet Union in a war with England and France. That would eliminate Russia from the picture as a supplier and a rear guard [*Rückendeckung*] for Germany.

The foregoing drawbacks, to which surely more could be added, must be contrasted with a like number of advantages, which should not be underrated.

The substantial difficulties of the campaign in Finland, of which the Soviet Government is becoming increasingly aware, are a wholesome damper for the well-known Soviet conceit and overestimation of their own victories. After the promenade into Poland, where the German Army had done most of the work, and after the highly successful action in the Baltic States, there was a tendency to be very casual about the Finnish campaign. The great difficulties and the reverses incurred, in particular as regard the Kuusinen government, will serve as a warning for the Soviet Union and the Comintern, and will also desirably weaken the ideas of world revolution. Besides, the diminished prestige of the Red Army will inevitably entail a weakening of the post-war position of the Soviet Union. As we know, it is generally imputed to the Soviet Union that, with her army intact, she plans to set herself up as arbiter after the end of the European war. In the light of the events of the past months there is scant likelihood that she can carry this plan into effect on the contemplated scale. Furthermore, the military difficulties and the political disappointment of the Soviet Government in Finland will have the general effect of imposing greater caution with respect to its political aspirations. At any event, it is to be expected that the designs which the Government may be entertaining with regard to Bessarabia will at least be put off for a long time. This would suit our policy, which, in view of our economic and political interests, is oriented toward maintaining peace in the Balkans. The increased restraint on the part of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Japan is a similar situation. Finally, it must not be overlooked that the recent events are forcing the Soviet Union more and more to the side of Germany. The new friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union's participation in the partition of Poland, and the Soviet attack on Finland have had a definite effect on the policy of the other countries toward the Soviet Union. In consequence, ties with Germany are at present of great importance for the Soviet Union.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

No. 575

124/122612-15

Memorandum of the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, January 25, 1940.¹

Subject: Conversation of Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg with Molotov regarding Finland, on January 25, 1940.

The Ambassador informed M. Molotov that he had been instructed by his Government to come to Berlin within the next few days, and that he was bound to be asked, among other things, some questions regarding the Soviet-Finnish conflict, in connection with certain economic difficulties. He would therefore be grateful to M. Molotov if he would give him his views on the Soviet Government's estimate of how the matter would develop, that is, whether the conflict would be prolonged for a long time or whether one could expect it to be terminated in the foreseeable future.

M. Molotov replied that the time when the conflict would terminate obviously could not be predicted to the day, but it was certain that it would not drag on much longer. The Soviet Government had not wished for this conflict and had done everything to avoid it. As far as the economic difficulties affecting Germany were concerned, they would just have to be accepted for a time, especially since it certainly would not be for long. It was a fact that the British and French press revealed a very hostile attitude of these countries toward the Soviet Union. They were trying to influence Sweden and Norway in that direction, too, although England and France could not fail to realize that the Soviet Union had no intention of changing her relations with Sweden and Norway. The Soviet Union had no demands of any kind to make on Sweden and Norway. As regards Finland, the matter under discussion would reach its logical conclusion in the not too distant future. Finland's situation, which was entirely of her own making, was extremely difficult and would eventually lead to its inevitable consequences. The Soviet Government demanded from Finland only that she satisfy its earlier demands. Of course, the situation had changed since the outbreak of actual fighting and the shedding of blood. The original demands of the Soviet Government had been extremely modest. It had not demanded any influence of any kind on Finland's Government and had been concerned only with the protection of Leningrad. Since then, however, the hostile attitude of the Finnish Government toward the Soviet Union had shown itself to the full. The fortifications found in Finland had been an eye-opener for the Soviet Government as to the intentions of the Finnish Govern-

¹ This memorandum was received and circulated in the Foreign Ministry on Feb. 5 (124/122612).

ment. The uses to which England could have put a Finland hostile to the Soviet Union had become clear. The territorial wishes of the Soviet Government as to Finland were stated, to be sure, in the plan agreed upon with the People's Government; but the Soviet Government could never tolerate a hostile Finnish Government close to Leningrad and the Murmansk railroad. An understanding with the Tanner-Ryti Government and with Mannerheim was entirely out of the question.

At the Ambassador's remark that he would probably be asked in Berlin whether an understanding might perhaps be possible if so respected a figure as Svinhufvud assumed the leadership of the Finnish Government, Molotov replied that Svinhufvud obviously stood for about the same things as did the present Government. On the other hand, however, the declaration of the People's Government did provide that it could be expanded and supplemented.

Molotov answered with a definite affirmative the Ambassador's question whether such expansion and supplementation was to be construed as meaning that a democratic Finnish Government might come about.

Then Molotov stressed repeatedly that although the Soviet Government had no intention of infringing upon the independence of the future Finnish Government, it could by no means permit a hostile government to control territories close to Leningrad and the Murmansk railroad, the destruction of which was being openly propagated by the French press.

No. 576

124/122608-10

Unsigned Memorandum From the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, January 25, 1940.¹

Subject: Conversation of Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg with Molotov on January 25, 1940, concerning the situation in the Balkans and the Near East.

With reference to his impending visit to Berlin, the Ambassador told M. Molotov that he would like to hear from him what the Soviet Government thought about the present situation in Southeastern Europe and in Turkey. The Ambassador described to M. Molotov the excitement and political activity which had been noticed recently in the Balkans, and also mentioned the Ciano-Csáky meeting² and

¹ This memorandum was initialed by Weizsäcker on [Feb.] 12.

² The Foreign Ministers of Italy and Hungary met in Venice on Jan. 6 and 7. According to a telegram from the German Minister in Budapest, sent on Jan. 11 (1571/380279-82), Csáky had told him that he had assured Ciano that Hungary, while upholding her demands for territorial revisions, would not start an attack against Rumania. A brief summary of the Venice conversations was given by Ciano to Mackensen and was reported in a Rome telegram of Jan. 11 (2081/444707).

the visit to Sofia of the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.³ One had the impression of a wild confusion of conflicting rumors, with fear of the Soviet Union clearly standing out in the foreground. The rumors even went so far as to suspect the Soviet Union of the darkest intentions and to conjure up in particular the Soviet threat to Rumania. On the other hand, there was talk about Weygand's Army in Syria, of the threat to the Caucasus and of Anglo-French plans to destroy Baku and thus strike at the vital nerve of the Soviet Union.

M. Molotov replied that in conformity with German wishes the Soviet Union had indirectly encouraged the rise of such rumors by not issuing any denial. The Soviet Government intended to maintain a calm attitude of waiting also in the future, holding that it was all a matter of much ado about nothing. The press was full of the wildest rumors, but in reality there was less going on than these rumors suggested.

As far as the Balkans were concerned, German relations with Italy were closer than those of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Germany should be better informed than the Soviet Union about Italy's intentions in the Balkans. Italy unquestionably was trying to form her own groupings in the Balkans. Turkey also would not be disinclined to take part in this, and they were working on Bulgaria with intensity; there was an impression however, that Italy had made no headway and that up to now nothing serious had happened in the Balkans.

As for the alleged "dark intentions" of the Soviet Union it would not even be worth the trouble to issue denials of these fantasies. Germany was very well acquainted with the attitude of the Soviet Union in the Rumanian question. The Soviet Union would stand on her rights, but the Rumanian question was in no way acute at the present.

The Ambassador then pointed out that the moves in the Balkans and the attitude of Italy and Hungary apparently were dictated largely by fear of the Soviet Union. The short stretch of common boundary between the Soviet Union and Hungary was enough to keep Hungary in a state of great anxiety; in the case of Italy there was the fear of Soviet Russian competition in the Balkans. This fear had recently received new fuel from the Soviet Union's friendly attitude toward Bulgaria. This presumably was responsible for the stronger tone adopted by the Italian press toward the Soviet Union.

M. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union on her part had done nothing to justify the anxieties mentioned. With respect to Italy in particular, the Soviet Union had not taken any steps that could

³ Jan. 12-13, 1940; see document No. 564.

arouse Italy's apprehensions. He also concurred in the Ambassador's view that Italy did not desire a Balkan bloc but that Turkey did. The idea of a Balkan bloc appeared hopeless however. With reference to the relations of the Soviet Union to Turkey, Molotov stated that there were no concrete signs of an improvement, but neither had the relations deteriorated.

No. 577

540/240584

The Consul at Lourenço Marques to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

LOURENÇO MARQUES, January 26, 1940—2:01 p. m.

No. 30 of January 26

Received January 26—5:00 p. m.

For Pol. X.

With reference to my telegram No. 7 of January 6.¹

Denk² reported that his wife has carried out in Capetown the instruction to have a personal conversation with Malan, who promised to work in this sense.

Denk is convinced that Malan informed Hertzog,³ thereby favorably influencing contents of speech of opposition leader.

Denk will shortly return from here to Germany.

TROMPKE

¹ Not found.

² Hans Denk had been sent to South Africa by the Foreign Minister to establish contact with the nationalist opposition there. Additional details on his mission, including his wife's conference with Dr. Malan on Jan. 16, are given in a report of Consul General Karlowa of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop for the Foreign Minister, dated Mar. 29 (116/66170-74).

³ Gen. J. B. M. Hertzog, former Prime Minister, at this time a leader of the opposition, had introduced a motion in the South African House of Assembly declaring that the war with Germany should be ended. The motion was debated in the Assembly from Jan. 24 to 27 and defeated.

No. 578

486/231752

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 26, 1940.

St. S. No. 91

Attolico gave me today in strict confidence the following information taken from a report of January 11 from the Italian Ambassador in Paris: In his reports from Syria Weygand is trying to promote direct action against Russia, using Rumania as a theater of war. His motivation is obvious: to shake or overthrow the Bolshevik system in Russia and at the same time strike a vital blow against Germany in the Rumanian oil fields.

According to the Italian report from Paris, Weygand's proposals have found the approval of MM. de Monzie¹ and Sarraut² and of General Georges.³ The other members of the Cabinet, General Gamelin, and the entire British Cabinet, will have nothing to do with the plan, however.

Attolico told me that he was not authorized to give us this information and requested that it be treated with the greatest discretion.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Anatole de Monzie, Minister of Public Works.

² Albert Sarraut, Minister of Interior, leading member of the Radical Socialist Party.

³ General Georges, Commander of French Forces in the Northeastern Theater of Operations.

No. 579

108/111974

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, January 26, 1940.

During a social function today the Soviet Ambassador "privately" and in a lively manner unusual in him asked me a whole series of questions which indicated in general that he has received little information from his Government:

1. The Ambassador asked the meaning of the well-known article in the *Nachtausgabe* of January 13, according to which the Soviet Union was seeking an outlet to the North Atlantic. His question did not give any indication of his attitude. I told him that this involved a slip-up [*Entgleisung*] on the part of a journalist. We had also indicated as much to other agencies that had asked us about it.

2. M. Shkvartsev asked directly about our relations with Italy. I told him that our relations were excellent. The Axis continued to exist as heretofore. We hoped very much that no difficulties would arise between the Soviet Union and Italy. The Ambassador spoke with animosity toward Italy.

3. The Ambassador raised the question of the anti-Soviet reports broadcast by the Vatican Radio. I told him that some of these were directed against the Soviet Union and Germany. We were making representations to the Vatican on account of these broadcasts. The Ambassador asked whether we expected any success from these representations to the Vatican, which he designated as a dead man.

4. The Ambassador asked, very generally, what news we had from England. I seized upon Churchill's speech¹ and England's wish expressed therein that the neutrals enter the war. The Ambassador's reply was rather inconclusive but visibly anti-British.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 565.

No. 580

124/122667-68

Minister Zech to State Secretary Weizsäcker

PERSONAL

THE HAGUE, January 27, 1940.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: Through personal relationships I might have the opportunity to establish certain lines leading to the Duke of Windsor. As of course you know, W. is a member of the British military mission with the French Army Command. He does not, however, feel entirely satisfied with this position and seeks a field of activity in which he would not have merely a representative character and which would permit him a more active role. In order to attain this objective he was recently in London. There, however, he achieved nothing and is supposed to be most disgruntled over it. He has expressed himself in especially uncomplimentary terms about Chamberlain, whom he particularly dislikes and who, as he thinks, is responsible for his being frozen out. Also there seems to be something like the beginning of a Fronde forming around W. which for the moment of course still has nothing to say, but which at some time under favorable circumstances might acquire a certain significance. I do not know whether you are interested in the doings and activities of W. I recall, however, having formerly heard from English friends that W. had had especially good connections with the Reich Foreign Minister in London. I might perhaps have the opportunity to hear something from the group around Windsor and also incidentally to get something through to him. Thus, when he was just recently in London, I had explained to him through an intermediary why it is completely utopian for England to attempt to effect a change of regime in Germany, and the statements of my intermediary are believed to have made a certain impression on him, more in any case than those pitched in the contrary tone, which he got at the same time from the group around Chamberlain.

So, if you would care to have me cultivate this connection please write me a line. I would, however, be extremely grateful to you if as little as possible could be said about the matter, since I would not want to compromise my intermediaries in any way.¹

With best greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

ZECH

¹ Marginal note: "State Secretary: Please discuss with me. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 581

1848/421128-24

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 213 of January 27

ROME, January 28, 1940—1:10 p. m.

Received January 28—1:35 p. m.

The Italian Government, as was to be expected, has from the very first day designated the coal question as one of the most important points in the negotiations. The Italians want us to include in the program for 1940 the delivery of 12 million tons from Greater Germany, including Polish Upper Silesia. Asking that it be treated confidentially, Ambassador Giannini repeated the statement that following the most recent political developments, and particularly after the recent speech of the Secretary General of the Fascist Party,¹ which had occasioned considerable annoyance in England and France, the Italian Government was anticipating the imminent closing of the sea route for coal shipments from Holland to Italy. The program for 1940 therefore had to be based on the assumption that all coal shipments would be shipped by land. According to computations made here by traffic experts, it appears that with 10,000 cars made available by Germany and 5,000 cars by Italy, even assuming an optimum of 15 days for a round trip, at most 500,000 tons could be transported monthly. The Italian Government would see to it that the Italian state railways would make available every car that could possibly be spared. In view of the great shortage of cars, it could not guarantee at present that more than 5,000 cars would be released. However, since the Germans had declared in Berlin that Germany could furnish 20,000 cars if Italy produced 10,000, it must surely be possible to release this number regardless of the number of cars offered by Italy. In a vital issue such as this, where it was a question of ensuring the entire further economic and military collaboration between Germany and Italy, the question of wrangling for reciprocal concessions could surely play no part.

Since the fixing of a ratio between the two figures really cannot be justified in view of the special relations obtaining between Germany and Italy, I turned away from that argument and said I was afraid that, quite apart from the ratio, Germany was not in a position today to promise more than 10,000. The Italians thereupon urged a new study of the matter.

¹ On Jan. 17, Ettore Muti reported that at a recent conference with Fascist leaders in Central Italy, he had reaffirmed the uncompromising attitude of Fascism toward Democracy, Bolshevism, and the "bourgeois" outlook and called for an intensification of Fascist imperial, racial, and autarkic principles.

Please send telegraphic instructions as to whether 12 million tons can be promised as far as quantity is concerned, and what may be stated regarding the possibility of exclusive land transportation and availability of cars independent of any increase over 5,000 in the number of cars furnished by Italy. The matter is doubtless of very grave importance for the Duce and particularly those circles which desire to adhere to a common policy with Germany in all circumstances. But it would be dangerous to allow political considerations to prompt promises now which we are technically unable to keep. Particularly after the bad experience that Italy had in the past year even before the war with our performance in meeting the coal quotas established by the agreement of February 13, 1939,² it will be absolutely essential to keep the promises made by us at this time. In case the deliveries requested by Italy cannot be made because of the production and transportation situation, it will still be possible, even if only a smaller quantity can be promised, to reach a satisfactory agreement not harmful to important political interests, provided that for this smaller quantity I can make absolutely binding promises, 100 percent certain of performance, as to delivery and land transportation.

CLODIUS

MACKENSEN

² See vol. IV, document No. 451.

No. 582

103/111978-79

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 196 of January 28

Moscow, January 28, 1940—9:13 p. m.

Received January 29—12:45 a. m.

Citing numerous examples, the Russians are complaining about the increasing difficulty of placing orders in Germany. This applies to orders under the Credit Agreement as well as to orders within the framework of the future treaty. They mentioned products of the aviation industry, ships, coal, drilling machinery, steel tubes, boilers, compressors, and numerous other items. Many German firms did not reply at all, others mentioned delivery dates years hence, which practically precluded any negotiations. The difficulties originated in official quarters and private firms. Even now the tempo of placing Russian orders is lagging considerably behind the tempo of Russian deliveries. The Russians urgently request that the situation be remedied and a more positive attitude adopted toward Russian wishes with reference to orders. They have presented a memorandum¹ with de-

¹ Not found.

tailed information, which will be transmitted with the next courier for your scrutiny.

The origin of the Russian complaint was our demand that the business contracts concerning delivery be prepared even now in such a manner that they would, if possible, take effect within a month after the government agreement was concluded [provided that?] the delivery dates mentioned by us are adhered to. The understandings reported in your telegram No. 183 of January 24,² were contested by the Russians. Please investigate this and wire the result.²

The Russian attitude is creating a difficult situation for negotiations here, since the suspicion is constantly growing that we are unwilling and not in a position to make deliveries in the amounts agreed upon. The conclusion of the agreement and delivery of the Russian raw materials will depend on the Russian orders being disposed of promptly and German deliveries being made according to agreement. The delegation considers it necessary that the official agencies and industries concerned be imbued with an entirely clear and uniform attitude on the Russian transactions. First of all, it will have to be certain that Russian orders falling under the Credit Agreement can be placed. Second, it is necessary once more to instruct the industrial groups involved in the Russian transactions to negotiate even now about items which are the subject of the future treaty. An exception should be made in the case of war material that is to be kept secret and that will be released only on the basis of a new treaty. The negotiations about items in the new treaty will in almost all cases require so much time that the delivery contracts will be concluded after the government agreement. If these contracts should be concluded earlier, they will be credited under the new treaty. We have called the attention of the Russians to the necessity of promptly informing the Reich Economics Ministry of their wishes with regard to orders and negotiations with German firms, so that official influence may be exerted on the German firms at the very beginning of the business negotiations. In this connection it must be assured that the stipulated volume and delivery dates of the deliveries promised the Russians under the credit agreement and in the present negotiations are not jeopardized by other demands.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

² Not found.

No. 583

525/238178

Memorandum by the State Secretary

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 97

BERLIN, January 29, 1940.
St.S. No. 134 g. Rs.¹

The Italian Ambassador today again alluded in my office to the letter of January 8, the reply to which they had now been awaiting for 3 weeks.²

I observed that the Führer obviously wished to gain a clearer picture regarding the many specific questions brought up in the letter, as well as regarding the general situation, so as to have a basis for his reply.

Attolico seemed to assume that this might easily result in a mere statement of ready-made and prepared decisions by the Führer, while he had hoped for a written exchange of views between the Führer and the Duce.

Attolico answered in the negative when I asked him whether he had been instructed by Rome to remind us of the letter; he expected instructions in the near future, however.

The following interpretation by Attolico of the gist of the letter represents his own ideas: The Duce must have arrived at the conviction that since the active emergence of the Russians on the political scene in the fall of 1939, a clarification of the true positions of the European powers and a re-alignment had become evident. The Anti-Comintern idea had gained considerable ground. If there were no war between Germany and the Western Powers, Germany would undoubtedly be in their camp, just as, conversely, the realization was growing in the British Cabinet that not Germany but Bolshevism was enemy No. 1. Here was the latent basis for an understanding between us and our opponents. This understanding need not cause a split between us and Moscow. It meant for us an automatic assurance against Bolshevism, but one which did not commit us to anything.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This is the number under which this document is entered in the Secret Register.

² See document No. 504, footnote 2.

No. 584

F18/425-418

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation
in the Soviet Union*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, January 30, 1940.

THE SECOND CONFERENCE IN THE KREMLIN ON JANUARY 29, 1940,
FROM 9:30 P. M. TO 12 MIDNIGHT

Present:

For Germany: Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg
 Ambassador Ritter²
 Minister Schnurre
 Counselor of Embassy Hilger

For the Soviet Union: M. Stalin
 Chairman Molotov
 People's Commissar Mikoyan
 People's Commissar Tevossyan
 Trade Representative Babarin

Immediately after his return to Moscow Ambassador Ritter informed People's Commissar Mikoyan that he would like to present the answers to Stalin's questions of December 31, 1939, to M. Molotov or M. Stalin.³ This discussion was only held after eight days of waiting, since the Russians stated that Stalin was physically unable to arrange it. The reason for this physical impossibility was apparently a severe cold, from which Stalin had not yet quite recovered at the meeting yesterday. At the beginning Molotov apologized once more for this delay.

Ambassador Ritter presented the answers to the items of the Stalin program (ship turrets, airplanes, two sets of machine tools for 15 cm. ammunition, periscopes, submarine storage batteries) as they had been decided upon in Berlin. The release of the patents on widia and titanite for sale to the Soviet Union was also announced by Ambassador Ritter. The German Government had thereby made a very great effort and a quite special gesture. This had only been possible by promising delivery at the expense of its own armament program. We had done this since these wishes had been represented to us by

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el]. February 10, 1940."

² On Jan. 31 two telegrams by Ritter were dispatched to the Foreign Ministry, No. 214 of Jan. 30 (103/111988-89) and No. 219 of Jan. 31 (103/111992), summarizing various aspects of the discussion described more fully in the memorandum printed here. Points on which the telegrams are more explicit or which indicate Ritter's reactions and recommendations are noted in footnotes below.

³ See document No. 499, enclosure 1.

M. Stalin as particularly important. But we had the hope that our wishes, which were still pending, would now also be taken into consideration. Ambassador Ritter first named the imports desired by Germany that were still pending—oil cakes, oil seed, legumes, flax, hemp, phosphates—and then went on to the still unsettled cardinal point of interpretation of the letter of September 28, 1939, according to which the German compensatory deliveries are to extend over a more extended period of time than is contemplated for the Soviet deliveries of raw materials.

Here Stalin, who hitherto had not been sitting at the conference table but in an armchair in the corner, joined in. To begin with, he thanked the Germans for the important and positive work which they had in the meantime carried out. In connection with a remark by Molotov that the time limits for the deliveries of the gun turrets were really quite long, Stalin then began to speak of the delivery of gun turrets of 28 and 38.1 cm.

He would like to ask us two questions:

(1) Assuming that there were ships in process of construction on which 30 cm. turrets were intended to be used, was it then possible to use 28 cm. turrets? The keels for such ships had been laid and he wished to have the 28 cm. turrets for them. According to his information, these turrets had been built in Germany for a long time; the plans were at hand. If it took that long to complete the job, he requested that the plans be sold to the Soviet Union.

In regard to the delivery of the 28 cm. turrets, Ambassador Ritter explained further that the delivery could be made 5 months earlier, if the Soviet Union wanted the turrets the way we had previously built them. We ourselves would now build them somewhat differently. M. Stalin remarked that the Soviet Union, to be sure, did not consider the 28 cm. gun an ideal gun, but recognized its offensive power. Moreover, it had not been known that we had in the meantime discontinued its manufacture.

(2) He then came to his second question. Again assuming that there were ships under construction capable of mounting 30 cm. guns, with three triple turrets of this caliber, could three double turrets of 38 cm. caliber be built in instead of the three 30 cm. triple turrets? How was the weight distribution and the offensive power? Now we would understand why the Soviet Government was in such a hurry for the delivery of the gun turrets. M. Stalin requested that this information be kept *secret*. Ambassador Ritter replied that he was not in a position to answer these technical questions, but that the German Navy had already stated previously that it was prepared

to give technical advice. Only the Soviet Government could make the decision as to which turrets should be ordered.⁴

M. Stalin then went into detail concerning the question of the terms of the treaty and the time limit for the German deliveries. Two treaties should be concluded. One treaty for a year, in which we stated what we could deliver during this year. In return the Soviet Union would deliver to us what we principally needed: grain, naphtha, apatite, iron ore, and nonferrous metals. Then a second treaty should be concluded simultaneously for the second year. In this treaty should be incorporated what the Germans could deliver within the next year, and the Soviet deliveries were to be fixed accordingly. The Soviet Government desired no deliveries that were difficult for Germany to make; it would not insist on such deliveries and not extort anything. According to the clearing system, however, the balance would have to be drawn up. If we did not desire this settlement, then it would be a question of credits, and we ought to say so candidly. But there had been no mention of any credit in the letter of September 28.

Ambassador Ritter stated that he would assent to the proposed method of concluding two treaties, if in so doing the wording and intent of the letter of September 28, 1939, were observed. This letter contemplated a departure from the clearing system. The German deliveries in compensation for the Soviet raw materials should take place over a more extended period of time. This idea must be brought out clearly, otherwise there would be nothing remaining of the exchange of letters of September 28. Moreover, it was not a question of credit but only of a delayed transfer operation, since the purchase price in reichsmarks would be promptly paid by Germany. The exchange of letters of September 28 could only be understood in the light of the political situation at that time. The Reich Foreign Minister had requested the Soviet Government to give Germany economic assistance in this war. The letter of September 28 was to be the basis for this economic aid—an aid which consisted of the immediate and prior deliveries of raw materials from Russia, for which the German compensatory deliveries were to be made over a more extended period of time.

In the subsequent discussion M. Stalin did not adhere to this viewpoint. At times he became quite agitated and excused himself for

⁴In telegram No. 219, Ritter reported that "during the discussion of the delivery of gun turrets for ships Stalin, requesting that the matter be kept secret, broached the question of the intended use of the turrets. His statements indicated that several, in any event two, large ships were already under construction, for which 30 cm. gun turrets were originally planned," but that the Soviet Government now wished to use three 38 cm. (double) turrets on one, and three 28 cm. triple turrets on the other. Ritter requested that this information be kept secret and be reported to the proper German military authorities.

this later. The Soviet Union rendered a very great service to Germany by selling her raw materials in exchange for reichsmarks. Nor had there been any question in the exchange of letters of September 28 of selling to Germany nonferrous metals, of which the Soviet Union itself did not have a sufficient amount. Nevertheless, it had done so. The Soviet Union had made enemies by rendering this assistance. But neither England nor France would induce the Soviet Union to deviate from this attitude. All this was certainly a great help to Germany. After Stalin had reread the wording of the letter, he was of the opinion that, in regard to machines which we experienced difficulties in delivering within twelve months, we could give notice to that effect. The delivery could then be made in 15 months.

Ambassador Ritter stated he was ready to make an attempt on the basis proposed by M. Stalin. According to this principle we would attempt to set up two lists, one for the first treaty year, with a designation of those items which would require 15 months for delivery, and a second list of deliveries which could be made in the second treaty year.⁵

Then Ambassador Ritter again brought up the question of the prior deliveries of the nonferrous and hardening metals necessitated by the Soviet orders. We would have to take care that simultaneously with the placing of the Soviet orders the required amounts of nonferrous and hardening metals were at hand in Germany. These were copper, tin, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, wolfram, etc. The discussion did not lead to any satisfactory conclusion for us. Stalin declined categorically to undertake any further concrete obligations for the delivery of these metals except such as he had already undertaken in connection with the delivery of copper, nickel, and tin. The Soviet Union would do all that it possibly could without fixing quantities. It would relinquish a part of what it bought for itself. Now, for example, a whole shipload of wolfram was being held in Hong Kong by the British. If it was released to them, they would also supply us generously from it. The Soviet Union would resell to us half of what it purchased. Nor did the Soviet Union wish to exercise any control over the use of the metals delivered by it. Germany could use these metals in any way it desired, for its own use or for Soviet deliveries. In any case the delivery obligations undertaken by Germany must be *absolute and independent of the question of metals*. It would not do for each firm to demand now that the necessary metals be placed at its disposal in advance. In that case these orders would have to be canceled.

⁵ In telegram No. 214, Ritter characterized Stalin's remarks on "deliveries over a more extended period" as "evasions" [*Ausflüchten*]. Ritter also expressed fear that the proposal for two treaties would reduce the total amount for 1940, but said he had agreed in principle to take this way out in order to prevent a complete deadlock [*Festfahren*] in the negotiations.

Ambassador Ritter characterized this arrangement as unsatisfactory. He called attention to the great difficulties that would thereby arise for carrying out the treaty to be concluded, since these metals were not available in Germany in the required amounts. M. Stalin again replied that these orders must then be canceled. If we maintained these conditions the treaty would not be concluded.*

Finally Chairman Molotov and People's Commissar Mikoyan again called attention—as had already been done repeatedly by other Soviet sources—to the difficulties that had been raised by the Germans in connection with the fulfillment of the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939.⁷ People's Commissar Mikoyan urgently requested remedial measures in order to bring about a settlement of the mutual deliveries, since otherwise it would be necessary to proceed according to the sanction provisions of this treaty.

SCHNURRE

* In telegram No. 214, Ritter described Stalin's position on advance delivery of nonferrous and hard metals as "really unsatisfactory" [*richtig unbefriedigende*] and contrary to earlier Soviet statements about providing additional metals beyond the copper, nickel, and tin already promised. Ritter said that he would try to achieve an improvement on this point later, but did not think it should be allowed to cause the breakdown of treaty negotiation, in view of the "absolute necessity of obtaining the other indispensable raw materials such as platinum, chromium ore, petroleum, etc."

⁷ See vol. VII, document No. 131.

No. 585

2845/551224-25

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium

Telegram

No. 48 of [January] 31

[JANUARY] 31, [1940].

For the Ambassador or his representative personally. Special security handling. To be decoded personally. Top secret. Exclusively for the Ambassador himself.

With reference to your telegram No. 32 of January 17.¹

You are requested to call on the Belgian Foreign Minister, without giving this step the appearance of a formal *démarche* and to tell him the following:

1. You reported at the time (group garbled) the information which M. Spaak gave you on January 17 explaining the measures taken by Belgium during the preceding days.
2. You were thereupon instructed to tell M. Spaak (group garbled) that the information of the Belgian military authorities to the effect that German troops had in the course of the preceding week taken up jump-off positions directly at the German-Belgian frontier and

¹ Document No. 544.

that troops from further back had been moved forward was incorrect and hence must have been based on false reports.

3. As for M. Spaak's statement that a military document had fallen into Belgian hands in a German plane that made an emergency landing on January 10, nothing was known or could be ascertained in Berlin as to the nature of, or the circumstances surrounding, this document.

4. Apart from this, however, you are authorized to call M. Spaak's attention to the following absolutely positive facts: Since the beginning of October a drastic regrouping of the Belgian Army—and of the Dutch Army as well—has occurred to the end that the disposition of this Army is directed exclusively against Germany. Pursuant to your instructions you called M. Spaak's attention to this fact relating to the Belgian Army as early as October 20 (cf. your telegram No. 293),² without either then or later receiving from him any explanation of this. It is of particularly grave significance that the regrouping of the Belgian Army was initiated at exactly the same time that a strong Franco-British offensive Army, composed in the main of motorized units, was being assembled at the Franco-Belgian frontier; the Belgian-French frontier had been virtually denuded of any Belgian troops and the concentration of the Army was carried through facing Germany exclusively. It is quite natural that in view of these threatening assembly movements in France, Belgium, and Holland, it was necessary for Germany progressively to take all the precautionary measures made necessary by them.

R[IBBENTROP].

² Not printed (141/127314).

No. 586

1779/406445-46

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

PRAGUE, January 31, 1940.

No. D. Pol. 2.g

81-63 g Rs. (67 g Rs).

Subject: The political situation in the Protectorate.

With reference to my report D Pol 2g of January 29.¹

I approached the Reich Protector today on the subject of the political situation in the Protectorate, asking him for guidance as to what information I could pass on to the Foreign Ministry. Baron Neurath told me that Minister Feierabend and M. Nečas had been under suspicion for some time. They were not accused of participation in the secret military organization which had been discovered, but of

¹ Not printed (1779/406443-44). This report stated that President Hácha had formally removed from office Minister of Agriculture Ladislav Feierabend and the Head of the Price Control Office, Jaromir Nečas; both men had fled the country to escape arrest in connection with the discovery of a secret Czech military organization.

having known of its existence and kept silent about it. There had been no intention of taking any serious measures against the two. Apparently they got wind of the fact that the statements of the arrested members of the organization brought out increasing evidence against them, and so they fled, Nečas first, and Feierabend after him. Minister Feierabend's flight strongly suggested that he had been more deeply involved than was believed at first. An investigation was now under way to find out whether, in his capacity of Minister of Agriculture, he had diverted Government funds to the secret organization.

As regards the filling of the vacant posts in the Protectorate Government or of reorganizing the latter, the Reich Protector stated that it was actually unimportant whether Feierabend or some other Czech occupied a post in the Government. It was impossible in any case to find candidates for the Cabinet posts who were entirely unobjectionable and could be depended upon. Filling posts in the Government was the business of the Czechs, and they had to submit their proposals. True enough, the Vlaika group and also the Czech Fascists were eager to get into the Government, but the information he had received on these candidates so far was of a rather dubious nature. They were persons of bad reputation and some even had records of convictions for common crimes.

The Reich Protector then touched upon the wave of arrests that was sweeping the Protectorate. The nervousness of the Czechs was increasing and there was a widening rift between Germans and Czechs. However, it was necessary to rule with a firm hand, the Reich Protector emphasized, for the Czechs were thick-skulled and treacherous. The Reich Protector was of the opinion that everything would remain quiet because our strong military and political position discouraged any serious resistance on the part of the Czechs.

ZIEMCKO

No. 587

141/126495-96

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 56 of February 1

BRUSSELS, February 1, 1940—9:20 p. m.

Received February 2—4:30 a. m.

The Rexist leader Degrelle wants to publish an afternoon paper without political affiliation, under the name of *Journal de Bruxelles*, in addition to the *Pays Réel*. The main line is to be the defense of Belgium's neutrality. Through his liaison at the Embassy Degrelle has asked for support. The plan deserves consideration, especially

from the standpoint that we have an interest in having neutrality violations by our enemies and possible anti-neutrality efforts on the part of certain Belgian groups systematically denounced by a Belgian daily. The *Pays Réel* is less suited for that purpose because as the organ of the oppositional Rexist movement—as shown by the recent search of the houses of a number of Rexist—it is under the same threat as the Flemish nationalist and the Communist press, which were prohibited some time ago. Outwardly, therefore, the *Journal de Bruxelles* is to have no connection with Degrelle and the Rexist movement. This affords greater possibilities for defending the German viewpoint and promoting German propaganda. In view of Degrelle's exceptional ability as a journalist and propagandist, the new paper has prospects of becoming a success.

The initial request for a subsidy in the form of 10,000 subscriptions for one year was disapproved by me because of foreign currency considerations and in order to avoid long-term commitments, but I would recommend a subsidy through 10,000 subscriptions for 3 months, payable in monthly installments. Degrelle has agreed. The funds required would be 12,600 RM per month, in foreign currency. However, continuation of support must be envisaged past the first 3 months because the paper would not be able to exist otherwise. The amount could then be made dependent on the success and the attitude of the paper. Please wire decision.¹

BÜLOW

¹ In telegram No. 82 of Feb. 21 (141/126503), the Ambassador again requested a decision on this proposal.

No. 588

141/126497-98

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, February 1, 1940—11:35 p. m.

No. 58 of February 1¹

Received February 2—6:15 a. m.

With reference to telegram No. 48 of January 31.²

I called on Foreign Minister Spaak today to give notice of my forthcoming short trip to Berlin and in so doing presented in forceful language the substance of the telegraphic instruction referred to above. M. Spaak replied on point 2: He would immediately communicate to the proper authorities the statement about the falseness of the report regarding German troop movements but could not himself take any stand in regard to this matter.

¹ Marginal note: "Not circulated in the office of the State Secretary. All copies given to the Secretariat of the Minister."

² Document No. 585.

On point 3: The statement that nothing was known in Berlin regarding the nature of the military documents that had fallen into Belgian hands and nothing could be found out about them either filled him with the greatest astonishment. He would pass on this information also and reserve to himself the right of giving or showing me particulars on my return.

On point 4: The Belgian Army occupied all the frontiers at the beginning of the Polish campaign, but with the increasing deployment of the Germans in the West, it effected appropriate regroupings. England and France would have to respect Belgian neutrality, since otherwise the reason for their going to war—the protection of the small states—would logically collapse and hope of help from North and South America vanish. An invasion of Belgium might mean losing the war for the Western Powers and therefore, he believed, need not be feared. On the other hand, the Western Powers would like Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality. They would thereby acquire almost a million more fighting men, have a theater of war in a third country, and perhaps win America over to their cause.

Belgium was standing between the fronts of the belligerents. She had no cause even today to regret her policy of independence embarked upon in 1936, and was still hopeful that she would be able to keep out of the war. The King together with a loyal Army and Government, backed by the united Belgian people, would carry on the policy of neutrality to the bitter end if necessary. The Belgian Army, by the very nature of its training, was not an attacking force, but had always been a defensive force only.

In conclusion, M. Spaak declared with marked emphasis that there was no contact whatsoever between the Belgian Army Command and the French and British General Staffs, and that he could assure me that the content of the military documents would not be divulged to the Allies.

BÜLOW

No. 589

F7/0520-0518

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 1, 1940.

Subject: Coal deliveries to Italy.

A conference was held today at the Ministry of Economics, presided over by State Secretary Landfried, on the subject of telegram No. 213 from Minister Clodius in Rome.¹ The following persons participated:

¹ Document No. 581.

Foreign Ministry
Ministry of Economics

Ministry of Transportation

Reich Coal Commissioner
OKW

Minister Eisenlohr and I;
State Secretary Landfried,
Under State Secretary Hanne-
ken, and a number others;
State Secretary Kleinmann,
Ministerialdirektor Leibhardt,
and Ministerialdirektor
Triebe;
Wagner;
3 representatives from the Chief
of the Field Railways

I explained that for reasons of foreign policy known to all we must do our utmost to deliver to the Italians by land the 1 million tons of coal a month which they need to build up their striking capacity. Although we recognize the present difficulties of Germany's internal coal situation, it should nevertheless be possible to increase the deliveries from 377,000 tons in January to 500,000 tons in February, which could be done by having Germany provide 150-200 additional railway cars a day. Once the cold spell has passed and the coal situation inside Germany has improved, an effort must be made gradually to increase the monthly deliveries to 750,000 tons by assigning an increasing number of German railway cars. Even though such an undertaking does not suffice to reach the objective of 1 million tons, it would probably still be possible to come to some agreement which would also take due account of the political interests.

The subsequent discussion brought out that all the offices represented consider the solution I proposed impracticable even after due consideration of the requirements of foreign policy. It was acknowledged that the quantity of 1 million tons of coal a month for Italy could be extracted from the German mines without difficulty, but within the foreseeable future it will be impossible to transport it to Italy by the available transport facilities. In consequence of the coal shortage brought on by the extreme cold, it was pointed out, partial shut-downs in the armament industry are causing production to lag behind the program by an average of 30 percent; the requirements of the civilian population are being met only at a bare minimum; and the reserves needed for the Reichsbahn and industry are nearly exhausted. This situation has arisen in spite of the most drastic restrictions on passenger trains and an embargo on shipment of even the most essential products, such as raw materials for industry, food for the population, and fertilizers for agriculture. If in spite of this situation approximately 250,000 tons of coal were shipped to Italy in January by German cars, this was made possible only by the imposition of the greatest sacrifices and restrictions. Therefore, any increase of shipments to Italy is entirely out of the question as long as the extreme cold persists. After the cold has passed, the most that

can be promised is the shipment of a total of 500,000 tons a month. For then our own armament plants must first be placed in a position to utilize their full capacity, the stocks of the Reichsbahn and the industrial plants must be brought up to a level absolutely essential for the prosecution of the war, and the supply of the civilian population for the next winter must be assured in a manner that will positively preclude the recurrence of the present experiences.

I pointed out that the objective of our foreign policy could not be attained with promises within these limits, and brought up for discussion a variety of possibilities for increasing the supply. The other offices maintained their position, however, and stated that the various arguments advanced in its support are so weighty that they can be set aside only by order of a higher authority. They requested that in case the Foreign Minister should discuss the matter with the Field Marshal or present it to the Führer, the Ministers of Economics and of Transportation also be given an opportunity to justify their stands.

The only thing that I was able to accomplish was to have the commitments made positive, that is, subject only to circumstances beyond our control (e. g., floods, destruction of communications or production plants by enemy action), and that the general promise can be added that we will do everything in our power to increase the quantity to more than 500,000 tons a month as soon as the domestic situation in Germany permits.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request that the appended draft of a telegraphic reply for Minister Clodius be approved.²

WIEHL

² Presumably the draft of document No. 592.

No. 590

1671/394576-82

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

SECRET

BERLIN, February 1, 1940.
Pol. VIII 230 g.

Subject: The policy of Japanese Ambassador Kurusu.

Ambassador Kurusu invited me to tea on January 31 and took the occasion to inform me in a systematic way of his, as he called it, private conception of German-Japanese relations. Although he has surely communicated at least portions of what he told me to other gentlemen of the Foreign Ministry, I should like to summarize his views as follows, because the Ambassador indicated that he was interested in having my superiors confidentially informed of his statements.

1. The conversation started with a question about the further conduct of the war by Germany, which I said I was not in a position to answer. The Ambassador thereupon stated: As German Foreign Minister he too would have concluded the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia. He considered Germany's present situation excellent. He was not certain, to be sure, how much we could obtain in the way of deliveries from Russia. He was inclined to be somewhat sceptical on this point. But we were sure of Rumania, and she was very useful to us. He knew the Rumanians and he knew from his own conversations and those of his colleagues with Rumanian statesmen that Rumania was very far from giving heed to British promptings. The Rumanians knew very well that their future depended on close ties with Germany. Even Rumanians who were not close to Germany politically had told him: "There is simply no gainsaying the basic fact that Germany is our largest and most important customer. The British now want to make emergency purchases from us, but after their victory they would again leave us in the lurch; whether we like it or not, we must stick to Germany." As long as the door to the southeast was open, however, the British blockade could not force us to our knees. This the British already knew. If we entertained friendly relations with the other neutral states also and developed our economic ties, England would see no possibility of continuing the war successfully.

What he feared most was a German invasion of Belgium and Holland. He believed that such an operation was not necessary. Holland and Belgium could not long sustain economically the present state of mobilization. If these conditions continued, then these two neutral countries would be the first to collapse in this war. For this reason Belgium and Holland had approached Roosevelt through former American Ambassador Davies, in order to get him to intervene as leader of the neutrals. Roosevelt considered that the time for this was not yet ripe, but sooner or later he would have to abandon his reserve. If the story were true that we are nourishing the fears of Holland and Belgium concerning a German attack in order to force these countries to take steps in the direction of peace mediation, then he would be very glad. He would deeply regret it, however, if we really contemplated an attack on these two countries, because we would thereby lose the sympathies of all neutral countries and because this would mean a long war. He did not believe that the United States would intervene in the war against Germany; he did not assume they would do so even in case we attacked Holland and Belgium. But he expected nothing for us from such an attack even in case of a complete military victory. He said that even if we really starved England out from the Belgian coast and forced her to make peace, the United States would interfere in the peace negotiations and

deprive us of the fruits of victory. He certainly realized that we had to show England our strength at some time or other, but for this our air force and our navy were adequate. He considered that an attack by ground forces would weaken Germany and would not help to force a peace. This was also the lesson of the World War.

2. He was saying this not only as a sincere friend of Germany but also in the interest of Japan. Japan must under all circumstances desire Germany's victory. It was clear that if Germany should be defeated Japan would be the next victim. They now realized in Japan that the European war was not to Japan's advantage. At the beginning they had believed in Japan that the European war would permit Japan to settle the East Asiatic problems by herself. This had been an error. Japan could not do this alone. She saw herself deprived of Germany's help by the European war, just as Germany saw herself deprived of Japanese help by the East Asiatic conflict. Just as earlier we had quite properly advised cessation of the China conflict because we had thought it weakened Japan to no avail, so he thought that Japan deplored the European war today because it was a burden upon Germany. Therefore Japan's interest today lay in an early cessation of the European war; he considered this entirely possible, with the attainment of 70 to 80 percent of the German war aims, if we did not attack Belgium and Holland.

As a matter of fact, on the following day Foreign Minister Arita clearly indicated this Japanese interest in his speech in Parliament.¹

3. The Ambassador then continued: "I believe in the necessity of a strong German-Japanese friendship, and would like to support it with all the powers at my command. In this I am looking far beyond the present war; I am looking, let us say, at the next 25 years. I do not desire any brilliant successes. I want to work at this task in my time, and my successors should continue to work at it." With regard to Russia, the Ambassador recalled the words of Count Goto:² "Germany, Russia, and Japan are a three-horse team, but the Russian horse must walk in the middle so that it cannot break loose and start a disturbance." He said that this three-horse team was a goal of the future. He considered this combination the best imaginable. Perhaps they would wait for an evolution in Russia. In Japan there was still strong antipathy to the Communists. From the standpoint of Japan, Russia was like gold that lay concealed in a sheath of dirt, so that one could not take hold of it. Regarding Italy, the Ambassador said: "Italy is just as much interested in the victory of Germany as is Japan. Italy has, indeed, only become a factor through the Axis. Who would

¹ DNB report: 8136/E582125-31.

² Count Shimpei Goto, Japanese Foreign Minister in 1918, became an advocate of Japanese-Russian friendship in the years following the war. He had studied in Germany and was the founder of the German-Japanese Society.

respect Italy if she stood alone? Italy could not be successful either in Japan or elsewhere in the world if she did not go along with Germany and certainly not if she went against Germany."

4. In his previous statements the Ambassador had indicated at one point that in our war we needed the mediation of a third party, just as Japan did in hers. I asked whom he was thinking of as mediator in the Japanese-Chinese war. The Ambassador first answered evasively and then said, "Of Germany, if she has ended her war by then." He mentioned Wang Ching-wei, but did not seem to think much of him, and rather stressed the fact that Japan could hold out for a long time yet in the present war. Only as long as it lasted she was not in a position to collaborate with Germany. The Ambassador did not evince any interest at all in a possible recognition of Wang Ching-wei by Germany.

5. In connection with the often recurring main theme of his statements, the interest in an early European peace, the Ambassador said incidentally that if he could be useful in any way at all, through his connections in the neutral countries, particularly in the United States, he gladly offered his services. Moreover, his colleague, Amau, in Rome, would be still better qualified, he said, because of the greater freedom of movement that was possible from a neutral country. The Ambassador realizes that the time for this has not yet come.

6. The Ambassador is obviously thinking of Japanese assistance in the settlement of the European war and thereafter German assistance in the settlement of the East Asiatic war. His statements had the character of confidential declarations, such as Japanese diplomats and statesmen like to make. He concluded laughingly: "Naturally, if you march into Holland and Belgium my whole beautiful political scheme will collapse. Then, of course, nothing can be done."

7. During the conversation it was announced that the Duke of Coburg and Herr Stahmer were leaving that evening.³ Apropos of this, the Ambassador said: "I hope that Herr Stahmer will not associate himself too strongly with the Oshima-Shiratori group. Since he is on especially friendly terms with these gentlemen this would be natural. But, after all, he is traveling with the Duke, who will be received in an entirely official capacity, and so he will come in direct contact with the Foreign Ministry. He ought not enter via the group mentioned, through the back door, so to speak. You know how it is in Japan. It was simply not desired that policy should be made by this group. Among many people, the jubilation over the collapse of the German-Japanese alliance negotiations was directed not against Germany, but primarily against this group. I stand between this group and the Anglophiles, as does Arita, too. That is

³ See document No. 567, footnote 1.

why I was sent here. We also desire the closest collaboration with Germany. But you know how it is in Japan when one wishes to work only with a special group. One jeopardizes one's plans thereby." The Ambassador asked me to call Herr Stahmer's attention to this fact. But since Herr Stahmer had just announced his intention of paying the Ambassador a farewell visit, I asked the Ambassador himself to give him an appropriate hint.⁴

KNOLL

⁴ In a handwritten note Knoll records that the memorandum had been shown to Ribbentrop. A copy was dispatched by courier to the German Embassy in Tokyo on Feb. 15, 1940 (1671/394583).

No. 591

F18/072-82

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, February 2, 1940.

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH COUNT MAGISTRATI ON THE OCCASION OF THE LATTER'S FAREWELL VISIT¹ ON FEBRUARY 2, 1940, FROM 12:00 TO 12:45 P. M.

Present: State Minister Meissner, Senior Counselor Hewel.

Count Magistrati handed the Führer a picture of his deceased wife who, as Count Magistrati told the Führer, had always had very special esteem for the Führer. A short talk followed regarding the illness of the deceased Countess. Then they spoke about the weather, and the Führer said that, oddly enough, the unusually cold weather had resulted in an amazingly good condition of health in the Army. Besides, the epidemic of grippe that recurred every year had not made its appearance so far.

Count Magistrati then spoke of a commission he had from his Ambassador, who had been instructed by his Foreign Minister to inquire whether and when a reply to the Duce's letter² was to be expected from the Führer. The Führer answered that the weather was also to blame for the delay in the reply for he wanted to make it a very detailed one and the weather did not permit him to make any predictions as to possible decisions.

He did not believe that at present there was any possibility at all of composing differences with England and France. He had come into possession of an extraordinarily revealing document³ in the Far East, which he would also divulge to the Duce. This document exposed England's cynical intentions regarding the authoritarian

¹ Magistrati had recently been appointed Minister to Bulgaria.

² Document No. 504.

³ Not found.

states. There was no doubt that England was firmly resolved to destroy one of the two states, in the hope of then also weakening the other or creating the conditions for destroying it, too. The situation, moreover, was such that he would refuse today to agree to any spurious compromise, the result of which would only be that in a few years time new disputes would arise. The Führer discoursed at length on Germany's superiority over the Western Democracies, particularly with respect to military and economic preparedness.

He reverted once more to the strange attitude of the British, who in their dreams were still living in the Victorian era, when all they had to do was send out cruisers to restore order in the world. England had long since ceased to be the foremost nation in the world, which she still thought she was. This belief no longer had any foundation in fact. America was a more important factor now, even in the economic and financial fields. Japan, too, did not have to put up with anything from England any longer, nor could England compete with Russia. Germany considered herself today to be a stronger power than England. The same was true with respect to France, which was torn with envy at the thought that she was no longer the foremost power in the Mediterranean. Magistrati was doubtless familiar with the Führer's ideas and his proposals, which England had rejected with boundless stupidity. Actually he regarded a German-British-Italian-Japanese bloc as an entirely practical possibility, and thought that such a bloc would have been a blessing for the world. But the whole mentality of England was such that she could not share her fancied world supremacy with others, and so this struggle had to be fought out to victory.

Our struggle against England was only just beginning. Whatever had happened so far was insignificant, and the British would be dumfounded when the big effort really began. He felt unbounded confidence. Regarding the fighting strength of the nations, the Führer said that he did not like to disparage his enemies, but the French were decidedly not the French of 1914; this had been noticeable in all combat engagements. Aside from two bombardments of isolated pillboxes, no single military action of a serious nature had occurred in 5 months. Indeed, no Frenchman had shown himself as yet before the Siegfried Line. We had practically no losses on the Western Front; indeed, our fatal casualties there were far below normal traffic accidents.

The Führer then spoke of the British guarantee offers. Magistrati agreed that the British guarantees had fallen into very bad repute; this was evident, for example, in the case of Rumania, which had readily acceded to Germany's and Italy's wishes despite British wooing. The Führer corroborated these conclusions and elaborated upon

them with a detailed account concerning Poland. He described once more his offers to Poland and expressed the conviction that Poland would, indeed, have made a satisfactory settlement of some sort with Germany if she had not been goaded on by England. This settlement would have been possible even as late as September 8, when the Polish Government, meeting in Lublin, expressed its desire to enter into negotiations with Germany. At that time, however, the British Ambassador had raved like a madman and promised them everything under the sun. This performance is said to have been accompanied by the most glowing reports of attacks by the French and British on the Western Front, of advances, battles, capture of villages, battles at the Siegfried Line, and the like, which we had laughed over at the time, for actually nothing more had happened than that the French had occupied some French villages in their outpost area against no opposition. England was utterly callous [*eiskalt*] in sacrificing others and this action of the British Ambassador was designed only to goad the Poles on to a last desperate resistance for England's benefit. For it was perfectly clear to him that the British had been firmly convinced that Germany would not dispatch Poland in such short order. They had hoped to drag the war on into the winter, and the fact is that nothing can be done with a modern army in winter. The Führer went into a lengthy discourse regarding the effect of a hard winter on modern mechanized warfare, describing the influence of the cold upon motorized troops and expressing the conviction that war had to come to a standstill when the temperature dropped below 10 degrees below freezing [-10° C.] He pointed to parallels in history, remarking that Napoleon would not have been overthrown if the Russian winter had not destroyed his army.

The conversation then turned to the political questions of the Balkans, and Magistrati remarked that these problems were naturally of great interest to him, since his new post would take him there. The Führer said that it would be best for the Balkans to remain completely still. He had been glad, therefore, that Italy had invited Csáky,⁴ for if Hungary should seek now to carry into execution her revisionist demands, she might touch off the spark that would set the whole Balkan peninsula aflame. This would cause chaos on a scale impossible to imagine. And Rumania, too, would do well to remain quiet, for once the fire broke out, not only would the Balkan powers destroy each other, but it would then probably also be impossible to keep Russia, Turkey, and also non-Balkan powers from intervening there. Answering Magistrati's question as to whether Russia did not constitute a threat to the Balkans, the Führer said he did not

⁴ See document No. 576, footnote 2.

think so. The difficult fighting in Finland would undoubtedly hold Russia back. At present, naturally, Russia could do nothing in Finland, for at 40 degrees below freezing [-40° C.] no nation including Germany could mount an attack. He could not understand why Russia had started the war there at the beginning of the winter, of all times. He assumed that Stalin had been misinformed, especially by Finnish émigrés, such as Kuusinen, etc., who, just like the German émigrés in England, did not know their homeland at all. Just as the German émigrés in England had drilled it into the British that Germany would collapse a week after a British declaration of war, the Finnish émigrés in Russia had dished out similar nonsense. At Magistrati's question as to what the spring would bring, the Führer said he believed that Finland would have to give up by next spring or summer. To be sure, he felt sorry for the Finns, but they had shown a lack of gratitude toward Germany, too, the country to which they owed their freedom. He quoted Bismarck's dictum: "The only things more ungrateful than human beings are nations," and applied this also to the Baltic states. Russia could not back down. She had been called so many names by the Western Democracies that she had to go through with the war if only for the sake of her prestige. He was convinced that the Kremlin had never thought of war, since, everything considered, the Russian demands on Finland were justified. In point of fact, it was impossible for Russia in the long run—and this was again demonstrated by this winter—to exist without free access to the sea. This pressure had always been evident in Russia, and if Finland had given Russia those few islands and had agreed to a border revision in the vicinity of Leningrad, everything would have gone off peaceably. But here again, France, and particularly England, working partly through Sweden, had egged the Finns on to such an extent and led this small country to hope for so much assistance that, against all reason, it stood up against the Russian demands. At the time when there was still prospect of a British-French-Russian coalition, Russia had been the most powerful empire, the greatest military power, the most gigantic economic factor; but today, when Germany had intervened and effected a normal reconciliation with Russia, Russia was the most criminal, uncivilized, weakest, and militarily the most laughable country. The Führer here interpolated some observations on German-Russian relations and the logic of the alliance, which he justified chiefly on economic grounds. The British designs in the case of Finland, too, were unspeakably base. The British would never ship anything at all to the Finns, and the fate of the Finns was a matter of complete indifference to them. If the Finnish Ministers had not made their stupid speeches, everything would have developed quietly and Germany would have been able

to mediate between Russia and Finland, as he would have been very glad to do. The Russian Army, moreover, was not so ridiculous as the Western Powers tried to make it out. We Germans knew the Russian Army. Everything considered, it was a powerful instrument, with tremendous manpower reserves and economic resources. To be sure, he doubted that Russia could fight successfully against Japan, if only because of the transport difficulties, and we Germans were certainly not afraid of the Russian Army; but in battles in the North or South, Russia would be a very substantial military factor. Our main concern at that time had been not to have this great power against us. Magistrati noted that it had been a bad move on the part of the Russians to install an international communistic government right at the start of the conflict with Finland, instead of negotiating with the new Finnish Government and thus documenting before the world her purely national aims. With respect to this, too, the Führer emphasized that the Russians really had not seriously believed in a war, for otherwise they would have prepared for it better. They would have concentrated the Siberian divisions and the ski troops, which they also had. To be sure, even so they would have been unable to win the war at a temperature of 40 degrees [-40° C.]. Then he referred again to the sensitiveness of a modern army, with its trucks, in periods of great cold. In response to a question of Magistrati he estimated that May or June would be the earliest date when Russia could again take the offensive. Not before then was it possible to wage offensive warfare, and besides, the long day would then favor the attacker, for the attacker's best ally was the day, while the defender's was the night.

The Führer then terminated the conversation, wishing Magistrati success in his new post.

HEWEL

No. 592

1848/421133-84

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

SECRET

No. 104 of February 3

BERLIN, February 3, 1940.

zu W 497 g.¹

For Clodius.

Repeated discussions and thorough examination with the officers concerned produced the following result:²

¹ W 497 g: Not found.

² See document No. 589.

The delivery of 12,000,000 tons in 1940 would involve no difficulties so far as production is concerned. We also wish to adhere to our aim to ship this quantity by the land route, but have little hope that this objective for 1940 can be attained even by dint of the greatest effort. Because of the unusual and persistent cold and the resultant worsening of the German domestic coal situation, even the January shipments, totaling 377,000 tons, made one-third in Italian, and two-thirds in German cars, were possible only by virtue of the greatest sacrifices and retrenchments.

Since it is difficult in present circumstances to tell future possibilities, and we wish, on the other hand, in accordance with the position taken there, and shared by us, to undertake only commitments which are capable of fulfillment, it will be possible to make only the following promises at present:

(a) For the duration of the freezing temperatures, at least the quantity shipped in January;

(b) When the freezing weather ends, at least 500,000 tons per month if 5,000 Italian cars are made available;

(c) These promises will positively be kept even in the event that the line via Basel should be unavailable. Subject, however, to forces beyond our control such as, for example, disruption of production or transport through floods or enemy action;

(d) We shall, for our part, do everything to increase shipments over and above this unconditional promise as soon as the situation in any way permits, and do this irrespective of whether or not the number of Italian cars will be increased above 5,000.

For your information only: The Italian Government cannot be given any details regarding the German coal situation in the vital industries and armament plants, or in supplies for home consumption and for the railroads and factories. We believe, however, that it is kept sufficiently well informed by the reports of the Italian Embassy to view the situation understandingly and appreciate the significance of our performance and promises, and we therefore assume that it will be possible, with the above authorization, to reach an agreement that will also take into account political interests.

RIBBENTROP

No. 593

1848/421130-32

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

SECRET
No. 109

BERLIN, February 3, 1940.

zu W 248 g.

W 249 g.

W 258 g.

W 327 g.

W 401 g.

With reference to No. 87¹ and No. 88² of January 15, No. 97³ of January 16, No. 140⁴ of January 18, and No. 200⁵ of January 26.

We cannot depart from the basic view that just as Germany is doing her utmost and sacrificing a great deal in order to maintain her trade with Italy and especially her coal exports at the highest level possible, without regard for the fact that all her capacities are directed toward the war effort, it is equally the duty of Italy to support us economically and not to lend assistance to our enemies. If the Italian Government believes that without trade with the enemy powers it cannot supply its own country with raw materials and food and complete its rearmament, at least we ought to be able to expect that such trade does not by reason of its extent and the type of goods exported contribute to the military strengthening of our enemies so as to modify the ratio of strength to our disadvantage. We must leave it to the Italian Government to determine in each instance how to avoid this danger and how on the other hand to give due consideration to Italy's vital necessities. We could not in fairness be expected to acquiesce in deliveries of important war materials by Italy to the enemy powers. We would be glad, however, if the Italian Government would keep us currently informed about the requests addressed to it or Italian industry by the enemy powers, and about the nature and extent of the deliveries, because such information can indeed be useful to us in estimating the state of the enemy's armaments, and because such friendly frankness is best adapted to prevent disharmony or misunderstandings.

¹ Not printed (8331/E589814-15).

² Document No. 542.

³ Not printed (8331/E589816).

⁴ Not printed (1571/380287). In this telegram Mackensen summarized statements by the Italian Minister of Transport regarding the situation created by the British blockade; Host Venturi maintained that it was in Italy's interest "to dance like an acrobat and keep her balance toward both sides as long as possible."

⁵ Not printed (8337/E589879).

Furthermore we expect that Italy will do her utmost, just as we are doing, to deliver goods important to German-Italian trade, and that as regards the blockade in the Mediterranean, especially the removal of German passengers from Italian ships, search and seizure of mail, inspection of Italian ships in Italian ports by British consular authorities, and the examination of the books of Italian importers by British agents, she will be unremitting in offering resistance and be more forceful than in the past, and that she will lend us effective assistance in the transit trade.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 594

F18/430-426

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, February 3, 1940.

SECRET

W 511 g. Rs. II.

No. 251 of February 3

For Ritter.

With reference to your No. 214 of January 30¹ and to our No. 238 of February 2.²

The Russian attitude on the question of the settlement about deliveries corresponds so little to the wording and spirit of the September agreements that I do not like to assent to it without having exhausted every means. I am assuming here that their proposal for drawing up two treaties actually would result in a serious loss of Russian deliveries for us in the year 1940, and that there is hope of essential improvement of this situation through measures undertaken by me personally. On this assumption I request you to convey orally to M. Stalin a personal communication from me, worded approximately as follows, which, in case he so desires, may also be left with him in writing:

"From the reports of the progress of our economic negotiations in Moscow I understand that on a number of questions a satisfactory solution has not yet been found. Of particular importance is the

¹ See document No. 584, footnote 2.

² Not printed (103/111990). A telegram by Wiehl notifying Ritter that Ribbentrop was considering a personal message to Stalin and wished him to refrain meanwhile from any final commitment on the proposal for two separate treaties. Ritter's reply, telegram No. 256, dispatched at 9:40 p. m., Feb. 3 (34/23674), seems to have crossed the telegram printed here; it requested that no further decisions be made until the result was seen of the attempt then being made to reach an acceptable accord based on Stalin's proposal.

question regarding the period of time within which the Russian shipments shall be paid for by German deliveries in return. The original Russian request was to the effect that the deliveries of both sides would have to balance on June 30 and December 31, 1940; while we proceeded on the assumption that the balancing by means of German deliveries could take even more than a year according to the time necessary for their completion.

"In the last interview which M. Stalin granted Ambassador Ritter he proposed, as a way out of this difference of opinion, to conclude two treaties now, one regarding German deliveries that can be made in 12 to 15 months, the other pertaining to deliveries that cannot be made till later; the Russian deliveries in both periods of time were to correspond to the value of what was received. Such an interpretation would, however, not do justice to German interests, since the value of the Russian shipments which we were expecting for the year 1940 would be considerably reduced. I cannot, therefore, refrain from calling attention to the following considerations on the other side:

"The request for comparatively short-term balancing is not in accordance with the explicit wording of the letter which Chairman Molotov wrote to me on September 28, 1939. The unequivocal statements of the Soviet Government contained therein can only be interpreted to mean that the Soviet deliveries, consisting of raw materials at hand or which can be delivered shortly, are to be carried out as soon and in as large quantities as possible; while the German compensatory deliveries, consisting principally of complicated finished goods, may be 'extended over a longer period'—over such period, at least, as is required for their manufacture.

"Still I should prefer not to place the principal emphasis on the wording of this statement of the Soviet Government, however unmistakably it argues in favor of our interpretation. For in these negotiations it really is not—in this I believe I am in agreement with M. Stalin—a matter of an ordinary trade agreement, in which as exact and simultaneous a balancing of the mutual services as is possible is the principal thing. It is rather a question of fulfilling punctually the promise which in effect was given during the September negotiations, even if for particular reasons it was not literally mentioned in the exchange of notes—namely, the promise that the Soviet Government was willing to support Germany economically during the war which had been forced upon her. It was, furthermore, a question of carrying out the reestablishment of economic relations between the two countries as quickly and on as large a scale as possible, as had been decided upon 'on the basis and in the sense of the general political understanding which had been reached.'

"The question concerning the time and extent of advance deliveries on the part of the Soviet Government cannot accordingly be considered in reference to the purely economic aspects of a balance, but must rather be regarded in the light of the general political understanding reached between the two Governments. This understanding has meanwhile made it possible—as must not be overlooked in this connection—for the Soviet Government to realize its desires regarding

the former Polish territory and to develop and protect its interests in the Baltic.

"The fact that this was possible not least of all because of the German victory in Poland may, it would seem, be considered in this regard as a not inconsiderable advance payment by Germany and cited as an important reason justifying our desire to obtain support now, in continuing the war against England and France, by as rapid and as extensive deliveries of raw materials from the Soviet Government as possible.

"From these general political considerations the reserved attitude of the Soviet Government may be deemed all the more unjustifiable, in view of the accommodating spirit shown thus far by the Germans in carrying out the Agreement. We have even now on the basis of the Credit Agreement of August 23, 1939, definitely accepted orders exceeding 90 million reichsmarks and already begun filling them, and thereby given unmistakable evidence of our willingness and ability to make deliveries. In addition, we have stated in the proposed new agreement that we are prepared to make extensive military deliveries, although the September agreement concerned only industrial shipments. Among the war materials which we are willing to deliver there is a considerable amount of such material as we have never before shown to foreign countries, not to mention delivered to them. We agreed to the delivery of war material despite the fact that we ourselves are at war, and we thereby render an all the more valuable assistance to the Soviet Government, inasmuch as such war material is at present scarcely obtainable elsewhere. It was gratifying to me that M. Stalin in his last conversation with Ambassador Ritter expressly recognized our accommodating attitude. He will surely not have failed to appreciate how great a sacrifice this accommodating spirit regarding the delivery of valuable weapons means in the midst of war.

"I should therefore sincerely regret it if, in consequence of the Soviet Government's insistence on requiring short-term settlement, we did not obtain the deliveries that are so important to us as quickly or in such quantities as is actually possible for the Soviet Government. Therefore, I wish to suggest to M. Stalin that he consider this viewpoint in re-examining the question mentioned and the others still undecided and give the necessary instructions that everything be done to let us have the raw materials which the Soviet Government can deliver to us, as rapidly as we need them, even if the German compensatory deliveries will have to be stretched over a more extended period of time than was previously requested by the Soviet Government. I am convinced that M. Stalin will not close his mind to these considerations and that the treaty will be concluded in the framework originally contemplated."

End of communication.

In case of any hesitation regarding this procedure or any essential proposals for change, please report by telegram.

RIBBENTROP

No. 595

265/172174

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ANKARA, February 5, 1940—2:15 p. m.

No. 79 of February 5

Received February 5—7:05 p. m.

Two chiefs of mission who are friends of mine have confirmed to me that Weygand voiced the following view here: It is not to be expected that Germany will do the Allied Powers the favor of attacking in the West. Therefore the war, which France cannot drag out indefinitely, can be won only by a very great intensification of the blockade. The Balkans and Russia have to be engaged. They say Ismet and Cakmak¹ have violently opposed this plan (cf. the telegraphic report of the Military Attaché). Massigli, however, is said to have told his friends repeatedly that Turkey would be in the war by May at the latest. If as late as December the view was voiced in Paris that a break in relations with Russia had to be avoided in any case (Numan's statement—cf. my written report No. A 458 of February 1),² the present change proves how pessimistically the situation is viewed in France as the result of our naval warfare. England, it is emphasized here, does not support Weygand's view, because she does not desire a break with Russia. This difference of opinion is said to be very welcome to Turkey, which since she is being courted in this way, is again trying to increase her armament credit.

PAPEN

¹ Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, Turkish Chief of Staff.² Not found.

No. 596

2281/480331-39

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy

SECRET

ROME, February 6, 1940.

CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER [IN BERLIN] ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 11 A. M. TO 3:30 P. M.

The Foreign Minister sent me for my comments the Ambassador's report of January 11 regarding the conference between Hermanin and Reichert,¹ and at the same time ordered a conference in his office for Wednesday, January 24, together with Under State Secretary Habicht.

¹ Document No. 527.

At this conference the Foreign Minister announced that in planning the reorganization of the cultural and informational activities at all German Missions he had made provisions for a special solution for Italy. He had informed the Embassy in Rome that I was to have charge in the future, under the direction of the Ambassador, of cultural propaganda and information in Italy (exclusive of the press). Secretary of Legation Dr. Blahut and Dr. von der Schulenburg would be at my disposal for this work. The latter was to be brought in [*eingebaut*] in some form or other and given regular contract status. At the same time the Foreign Minister informed me that he had proposed to the Führer that I be appointed Consul General. As such I would be assigned to the Embassy at Rome. He wished, however, that I should continue to head the Southern Section of his Dienststelle, and particularly that I should go on with the work I had begun in Slovakia.²

I then gave the Foreign Minister a report on the propaganda work so far initiated in Italy and also pointed out to him the operations carried out from Berlin that had had a negative effect (Stalin leaflet, *Joy and Work* pamphlet in November 1939, radio broadcasts from Munich carrying Russian Army communiqués, etc.). I set forth that while it was possible to supervise from Berlin the general direction of German propaganda work, it was desirable to do the actual work in the countries themselves, because that was the only way to conduct effective propaganda. I also took the stand that the most important thing in Italy was a positive German cultural program, which, however, had to be handled on a large scale in every respect.

The Foreign Minister then reviewed in detail the individual fields of cultural and propaganda activity. He wanted—and this was also the view of the Führer—a maximum intensification in all fields of our work in Italy. We should not fritter away our energies on trivialities, but rather work on a large scale. He thought that this was also the wish of the Duce.

Radio. In response to my report on the inadequacy of the daily Italian-language news broadcast by Radio Munich, the Foreign Minister directed that the conferences on these broadcasts of Radio Munich be conducted by Senior Counselor Ruehle from Berlin. The news must not be a mechanical translation of the wireless service; rather it should be especially adapted to Italy, and good Italian speakers were to be put before the microphone. If necessary, another German transmitter was to be put into service besides Radio Munich.

² In a memorandum of Feb. 20 (100/64940-42), Wüster recorded a conversation of Feb. 18 with Ribbentrop, who ordered that Wüster continue his propaganda activity regarding Slovakia, and arranged for him to have a deputy in Bratislava.

Theater, Music. The Foreign Minister wishes that the very best German talent be continuously represented in the Italian theaters and concert halls. A Furtwängler concert, with the Berlin Philharmonic, for instance, could make a great hit. The best German opera, a first-rate musical or review, as well as plays, should be brought to Italy. I referred to the inadequate handling of these matters by the Ministry of Propaganda. The Foreign Minister emphasized that the Führer had put him in charge of the propaganda work abroad.³ The Ministry of Propaganda should therefore not be consulted; negotiations should be directly with him.

Films. The Foreign Minister wants everything to be done to facilitate the sending of good German films to Italy, with special attention to newsreels. Should there be any difficulties at this time, it would be desirable to make arrangements for the greatest possible number of special showings, such as, for example, the recent presentation of the West Wall film by invitation of the Ambassador.

The same applied to cultural work in the field of literature and the creative arts.

Another important aspect was the arrangement of social functions. He had already made provisions for sending the Bismarck family from Berlin to Rome in order to maintain contact with Roman society circles.⁴ This social activity had to be intensified, however. The Foreign Minister asked for suggestions as to others to be sent to Italy.

I called attention to the importance of the German Foreign Institutes [*Auslandsinstitute*] for our cultural propaganda and pointed particularly to the difficulties in filling the post of Director at the German Academy. I mentioned that the Reich Minister of Education had considered for this post the former cultural officer at the Reich Youth Office, Obergebietsführer Cerff; I was sure there was no objection to Cerff on professional grounds, but he had no foreign experience. The Foreign Minister realized that this post had to be filled by a person who possessed special social qualifications. The Ambassador's proposal to reinstate Gericke was not known to me at the time. I had gathered from a talk at the Reich Ministry of Education that the Minister of Education felt committed to the removal of Gericke, and made difficulties about reinstating him. ~~Meanwhile in a report to the Foreign Minister I have indicated Gericke's reinstatement as the ideal solution.~~⁵

³ See document No. 31.

⁴ On Apr. 1 Bismarck, Deputy Director of the Political Department, became Counselor of Embassy with the rank of Minister at the Quirinal.

⁵ This sentence was scored through in the original. The report to Ribbentrop has not been found. Professor Gericke subsequently was reinstated.

The Foreign Minister then went into details regarding the systematic propaganda work to be carried out in Italy with the aim of winning over the Italian people to German interests. I said that I knew from conversations with friends of Ciano that Herr von Ribbentrop was regarded there as the one who had neglected German-Italian friendship for the German-Russian pact. The Foreign Minister thereupon related to me in detail the conversations that had taken place between the Duce and the Führer in Munich, as well as his own conversations with Count Ciano in Milan, Salzburg, and Berlin, and explained his viewpoint that England would not have entered this war if Italy had immediately and unconditionally come forward on the German side. The Foreign Minister stated that he had repeatedly emphasized this view in speaking with Signor Attolico. But these things must by no means be discussed in Italy. His frankness was probably the cause of a certain annoyance. He would have no objection against subtle personal propaganda conducted in his favor in Italy. He was of the opinion, moreover, that a violation of German-Italian friendship was impossible for Fascist Italy. The fate of the two authoritarian states was so closely interwoven that either both would be victorious or both would perish.

The Foreign Minister then described our relations with Russia. One had to realize that the German-Russian Friendship Pact really meant what it said. This friendship had nothing to do with ideological conflicts between Bolshevism and National Socialism, but was based on sober and realistic considerations. It was absolutely essential to bring about an understanding in Italy for Germany's orientation toward the East. It should be borne in mind what tremendous possibilities of economic development would offer themselves to Germany and Italy once the East was opened for commerce and trade. There was no danger whatever of bolshevization of Europe. Russia would not be capable of any full-scale action in less than 10 to 15 years. The Red Army had no leader and was in no position to wage a war of expansion. Stalin had primarily revisionist aspirations. The war with Finland was of minor interest to us. We should remember that the Northern states had always been enemies of the authoritarian regimes in Germany and Italy. A Russian victory in Finland was a question of time. Russian revisionist aspirations toward Bessarabia were entirely possible. Any further advance of the Russians in the Balkans was not to be anticipated.⁶ Perhaps Italian

⁶ In his account of the conversation of Feb. 18 (see footnote 2 above), Wüster stated that Ribbentrop spoke approximately as follows: "Mussolini still seemed to have many doubts about the possibility of German victory in the West. On the other hand, the Führer firmly believes in a brilliant victory there. Finland's fate was sealed. The Russians had realized through this undertaking, however,

interest in the German-Russian alliance could be awakened by circulating appropriate literature on the economic possibilities in Russia. It was important to point out again and again in Italy that England was the great enemy of Germany and Italy. The decisive battle in this war would be fought in the West. Germany was very well prepared. Our artillery and infantry had a headstart over the enemy powers in equipment and training which could scarcely be made up. On the question of a German attack in the West it should be noted that it is the National-Socialist way to triumph through attack and not to cling to the defense. The question of a march through Holland and Belgium was, if possible, not to be discussed. We respected the neutrality of these states as long as they really behaved as neutrals.

These ideas would have to be disseminated by means of skilful word-of-mouth propaganda in Italy.

Undoubtedly the most important thing in this connection was to awaken Italian interest in Russia.

It would be not without interest to find out in Rome what the Italian Chargés d'Affaires reported about the mood in Paris and London.

His view of François-Poncet was clear; he did not trust him farther than he could see him and knew that at heart he was our enemy. It was important for us, moreover, to appeal to the old-time Fascist elements, among whom François-Poncet surely found no over-eager listeners.

Discussions of Balkan questions were out of place at the present. But the time would yet come when we would have to speak with the Italians on the subject.

He was watching very attentively the efforts of the Vatican. He was of the opinion that an understanding with the Church was useful. He reminded the Führer of it almost every week. Thus far, however, the Führer had turned a deaf ear to it because of his bad experience with the Vatican. For instance, at the request of the Pope, the Führer had recently ordered all proceedings against the monasteries quashed, although there was still plenty of material on hand for several years. The Vatican, however, had not expressed its thanks for this but instead had immediately come forward with a new demand.

that they were in no position to carry on war. Nor did he believe that Russia would risk war with Rumania. It would certainly be more convenient if the Rumanians would negotiate with Russia on the Bessarabian question and conclude a nonaggression treaty. Germany was actually uninterested in all Balkan questions, however. With the return of Austria and the Sudetenland and the establishment of the Protectorate, the entire Southeastern problem was closed for us. We were interested only in maintaining good economic relations with the Balkan States and for this the preservation of peace in the Balkans was absolutely necessary.

"To the question of what Russia might undertake after the Finnish conflict, the Foreign Minister replied that he could not see into the brain of a dictator. Still he did not believe that Russia was interested in any warlike undertakings in the foreseeable future."

The Foreign Minister, in conclusion, spoke again at some length about the conduct of the propaganda activities in Italy. We must have no inhibitions of any kind, but had to do whatever was necessary to preserve German-Italian friendship. To my comment that a great deal of money would be needed for this, the Foreign Minister said that he had placed a sizable amount at the disposal of the Ambassador and that more would follow. The money could for the present be taken from this fund. For special activities he would gladly make appropriate sums available. For example, a cleverly made-up edition of the periodical *Joy and Work* could easily be circulated in 50,000 copies. He promised he would appropriate 100,000 reichsmarks for that purpose. He showed great interest in a political exhibition "Germany at War," or "The Campaign of 18 Days," which I proposed. For this, too, an allotment of 100,000 reichsmarks could readily be made.

Moreover, we now had a free hand for the work in Italy. From now on he wanted to receive no more negative reports saying that nothing was being done in Italy; instead we should report what we had done and what effect had been produced, or we should state that we were not in a position to conduct appropriate German cultural and political propaganda in Italy.

The Foreign Minister considered it desirable to inform the Duce in a suitable manner of the activity which I was to carry on, in order to forestall any new criticism that Germany was too inactive in Italy, as well as to integrate our activities with those of the Italians. The activity in Rome was important also because from there its effects could be felt throughout the entire Mediterranean area.

The Foreign Minister asked me to inform the Ambassador that his trip to Rome was only postponed.⁷ He had agreed to it in principle. The Foreign Minister asked that I inform him as to when, in the Ambassador's opinion, this visit should take place.

WÜSTER

⁷ Ribbentrop delivered Hitler's letter to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See documents Nos. 663 and 665.

No. 597

2997/587589-92

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

No. 217

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1940.

Received March 6.

Pol. IX 431.

Subject: Outlook for a third term for Roosevelt.

The signs that President Roosevelt is making a bid for a third term have greatly increased since the outbreak of the war.

I. Foreign policy aspects of the third term.

It is no exaggeration to say that for the President foreign policy considerations outweigh all those of a domestic nature in the preparation for the election campaign. The President's entire interest, as one hears from his immediate entourage, is absorbed by foreign policy.

His endeavor to play a prominent role as a peace mediator is undiminished, as is his desire that America take part in shaping the peace. The establishment of a special division in the State Department for preparatory work on post-war problems is an indication of this.

The endorsement of his re-election by Ambassadors Kennedy, Davies, and Bullitt is a tactical device for bringing foreign policy to the fore in reaching important decisions.

The current foreign policy of the United States stands or falls with President Roosevelt. England and France in particular are aware of that, too. Under a Republican or a right-wing Democratic President American foreign policy would depart from its present course and assume a character which would bring it near to the foreign policy program of the isolationists.

If Roosevelt were seriously considering retiring into private life at the beginning of 1941, he would by now have put some curbs on his inner drive for action. But there is no evidence of any withdrawal; on the contrary, his political pronouncements and directives indicate that he is counting on the continuation and realization of *his* policies, although he says nothing himself on the subject of re-election. Such a continuity, however, is conceivable only under his direction. The motive of refraining as long as possible from saying anything for the remainder of the term in the interest of maintaining this authority is secondary to this.

The war in Europe was probably decisive in making up Roosevelt's mind. In addition to his strongly developed pretensions to leadership and his vanity vis-à-vis world opinion, he believes that in these critical times he must make the "sacrifice" of another 4-year term to the American people. He is being supported in this belief by a host of flatterers and hangers-on.¹

II. Domestic aspects of the third term.

The American people at large reject in principle a break with the two-term tradition. The opposition to Roosevelt is working hard to stiffen this resistance. Where is this going to end? Are we getting a Roosevelt dynasty? Will it go on like this with deficits, state socialism and economic controls? Is Roosevelt, like Wilson and with

¹ This paragraph, as well as the final paragraph of the report, was typed in code and the decoded text was pasted over the numbered code groups when the report was received in Berlin.

the same results, leading us into a war that is not our concern? These arguments capture a considerable proportion of the electorate, but not the great masses. Roosevelt's name and personality, owing to the social measures which were energetically pushed within the framework of the New Deal, kindle a spark even today among the needy farmers and the industrial workers, whom Roosevelt's social legislation has given a new basis of existence, as well as among the army of lower and middle civil servants who owe their jobs to him, the poor and unemployed, and the youth of the country. Twenty million Catholics have been won over by the appointment of a special envoy to the Pope.

These masses can easily be persuaded to accept the idea of a third term. The tradition will be thrown overboard if the Roosevelt propaganda succeeds in making the President's election for the third time plausible as the only way out of an otherwise hopelessly confused situation. It is well on the way to success.

Should Roosevelt not permit himself to be renominated there will be a serious split within the Democratic Party, which the Republicans will capitalize on in every conceivable way. Roosevelt's own Vice-President, Garner, has served notice of his candidacy, regardless of whether his chief becomes a candidate. Thus Roosevelt, confronted with this candidacy of Garner's which he cannot and will not endorse, would be constrained to name a candidate of his own choosing. Among the many personalities from Roosevelt's New Deal camp who have been mentioned not one, not even Hull, is popular enough to hold his own against Garner. Garner, on the other hand, will be unable to beat the Republican candidate if he has to fight a split in the Democratic Party at the same time.

Roosevelt can cut this Gordian knot by having himself nominated again. The timing and strategy of the nomination will doubtless be so cleverly synchronized with the real or pretended seriousness of the international situation that not only will the wind be taken out of the sails of the Republicans but Roosevelt will also be able to take over the role of Cincinnatus, to whom his country appeals in its hour of need.

The argument that Roosevelt wants to lead America into the war on the side of the Allies is already being successfully counteracted by the subtle propaganda that even such a turn of events would involve little danger to life and limb, for the American people would not under any circumstances be expected to send another American Expeditionary Force to Europe.

III. *The outlook.*

For the moment the only conclusion with any claim to probability that can be drawn from this situation is that Roosevelt's re-election

and a continuation of his foreign policy must be reckoned with, but that up to that time, that is, until next November, the President will refrain from any actions that might alienate the voters, including taking any hasty steps in foreign policy which the American people are not, or not yet, prepared to participate in or approve.

THOMSEN

No. 598

83/25205

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1940—1:59 p. m.

No. 150 of February 8

Received February 9—1:00 a. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles called on me today by instruction of President Roosevelt to inform me that the President planned to send him to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London in the near future as "his personal representative."¹ The President asked me to inform the Führer and the Reich Government of this myself. Sumner Welles was not instructed to make proposals of any kind; he was only to report to the President on the basis of the talks which he would request with the Chiefs of State and government in the countries concerned. The President had decided on this step in order to have the numerous opinions and reports which he received on the European situation supplemented and coordinated by a person whom he particularly trusted. The President would be extremely grateful if I could give Mr. Welles the assurance before his departure that he would be received by both the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister in person. Welles plans to leave here on February 17 on the *Rex*, and will probably leave from Rome for Berlin on February 28. When I asked whether a reception by Mussolini had already been arranged, Welles replied that he had called on me first; he would see the Italian Ambassador only subsequently.

This conversation took place at my private residence in order to avoid all publicity.

The President's decision appears noteworthy, among other reasons, particularly because it permits the inference that Roosevelt's policies are planned well in advance, and thus it is necessary to reckon with his re-election next fall.

A short characterization of Welles will follow.²

Please send telegraphic instructions.

THOMSEN

¹ These words appear in English in the original text.

² Telegram No. 152 of Feb. 8, not printed (83/25206).

No. 599

1848/421186-37

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, February 8, 1940—10:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received February 9—1:00 a. m.

No. 341 of February 8

Ciano asked me to see him tonight in order to tell me the following on behalf of the Duce, with the request that it be reported immediately to Berlin:

Anglo-Italian discussions had been in progress for some time, mainly in London, with a view to reaching an agreement on trade relations, including certain questions such as the control of Italian shipping, etc. A total of approximately 20 million pounds sterling was being contemplated as the basis for Italian deliveries to England. In view of this great sum it had naturally from the outset been difficult to find materials suitable for deliveries in large enough quantities. Now today the British Ambassador had come to his office with the specific demand that Italy include in her deliveries bombers and fighter planes, guns, machine guns, etc., otherwise England did not intend to permit the sea transport of German coal to Italy. If, on the other hand, Italy agreed to comply with the British wishes, England would accommodate her also in other respects (shipments of British coal, relaxation of the control, etc.). Ciano had promptly consulted with the Duce, who instructed him to tell the British Ambassador immediately that he would not think of sending even as much as a single rifle to Germany's enemies. The British Ambassador had received this statement, communicated to him on this same day, with extreme coolness and had pointed once more to the consequences for the sea transport of German coal. Ciano had merely replied that some other way would then be found. He added that this meant the collapse of the Anglo-Italian conversations also with respect to other deliveries. The Duce was unalterably resolved to hold to the stand which he had already outlined in the pro memoria sent to us.¹ As a result of these developments there had been a sharp deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations.²

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 542.

² The Ciano Diary, entry for Feb. 8, states: "I take Prince Hesse to the Duce. Hitler proposes a meeting of the two chiefs at the frontier. Mussolini immediately declared himself favorable." The Halder Diary, introduced in the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals as document No. NOKW-3140, contains the following entry for Feb. 12 not included in the published extracts: "The Prince of Hesse: The Duce wants to come in as soon as this will be a help and not a hindrance to Germany. The English are convinced that the Duce holds to his line. New phase of Anglo-Italian relations. If the situation became more acute, it would mean the break."

No. 600

F18/484-431

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation
in the Soviet Union*¹

Moscow, February 8, 1940.

THE CONVERSATION IN THE KREMLIN FROM 1 TO 2 A. M.,
FEBRUARY 8, 1940

Present:

For Germany:	Ambassador Ritter Minister Schnurre Counselor of Embassy Hilger
For the Soviet Union:	M. Stalin Chairman Molotov People's Commissar Mikoyan People's Commissar Tevossyan Trade Representative Babarin

M. Stalin opened the discussion with the remark that there was little time and therefore he wished to get *in medias res* immediately. The letter from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop altered the situation.² The Soviet Government would take his views into consideration. He [Stalin] now had material concerning the possibilities of delivering wolfram, molybdenum, and cobalt. The Soviet Government could now promise something, though for a later part of the treaty.

One treaty and not two should be concluded. The Soviet Union would deliver commodities worth 420 to 430 million RM within 12 months of the day of signing. When a question was brought up by People's Commissar Mikoyan, Stalin clarified this figure to the effect that the Soviet shipments under the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, were not included in this. The Credit Agreement was an independent agreement and would be carried out separately by both parties.

Germany should make deliveries of an equal value within 15 months, that is also 420 to 430 million RM.

For the next 6 months the Soviet Union would make deliveries worth 220 to 230 million RM. Germany would deliver a like amount of products within 1 year.

¹ Marginal notes: "[For] F[ührer]" in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

² "Shown to the Führer. He[we], March 2, 1940."

³ See document No. 594.

The Soviet Union would, therefore, deliver in

12 months	
+ 6 months	
18 months	650 to 660 million RM.

Germany would deliver an equivalent value in 2 years and 3 months, or 27 months.

Stalin then took up the delivery of metals. From Soviet stocks only the shipments of 5,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel, and 450 tons of tin already promised could be made within the first 12 months. In the next 6 months the following Soviet deliveries could be promised:

Copper	6,000 tons
Nickel	1,500 "
Tin	500 "
Molybdenum	500 "
Tungsten	500 "
Cobalt	3 "

M. Stalin then requested the Germans to propose suitable prices and not to set them too high, as had happened before. As examples were mentioned the total price of 300 million RM for airplanes and the German valuation of the cruiser *Lützow* at 150 million RM. One should not take advantage of the Soviet Union's good nature.

He had the following understanding of the settlement of the balance under the new Treaty:

In that section of the Treaty by which the Soviet Union was to make deliveries within 12 months and Germany within 15 months, a settlement in accordance with the contemplated ratio in the mutual exchange of goods must be called for after 6 and 12 months. This ratio was 100:80. The Soviet Union was to deliver 100 percent in 12 months, and Germany in

6 months	40 percent
6 "	40 percent
3 "	20 percent

In connection with the Soviet deliveries which were to be made in the succeeding 6 months in the amount of 220 to 230 million RM and to be repaid by German compensatory shipments in 12 months (computed from the 16th to the 27th month after the conclusion of the treaty), a settlement in accordance with the contemplated ratio in the mutual exchange of goods must be made every 3 months.

When M. Stalin had finished, People's Commissar Mikoyan brought up our request—submitted to the Soviet Government in vain for months—for permission to station a mother ship in Murmansk waters

for the processing of our catches. M. Stalin decided the matter affirmatively in accordance with our wishes.

Ambassador Ritter expressed his thanks for the accommodating spirit in the question of the fish-processing project in Murmansk waters. He characterized Stalin's proposal as progress. It was a compromise between the two interpretations and it seemed to him, subject to a closer examination, possible to come to an agreement on this basis. As for Stalin's reproach of charging too high prices, Ambassador Ritter called attention to the fact that German industry followed the general rule of making the August prices basic in price computation, on the assumption, to be sure, that the Soviet Union does likewise with its deliveries to Germany. The valuations given for war materials were estimates and permitted no conclusions regarding the final prices. The final prices were to be determined in the coming commercial negotiations.

Ambassador Ritter then dealt, in the sense of the last telegraphic instruction³ concerning it, with the question of whether 28 or 38 cm. turrets could be built into Soviet warships which had been constructed for an armament of 30 cm. turrets. Ambassador Ritter voiced the willingness of the German Navy to give technical advice and to provide the necessary technical assistance. It was merely necessary to send the plans for the ships in question to the Navy. M. Stalin welcomed this and characterized such advice as desirable.

Ambassador Ritter gave the information that the plans for the battleship *Bismarck* could be entered on the list of German deliveries of war material, and likewise the drawings for the 28 cm. triple turrets. M. Stalin inquired about plans for 30.5 cm. turrets. We replied that we did not have drawings for this caliber, since we did not construct such turrets.

M. Stalin, who proved to be particularly well informed on all these matters, devoted special interest to the question of the construction of 40 cm. turrets, for which we had promised to sell the plans. Ambassador Ritter called attention to the willingness of the Krupp firm to build such a turret for the Soviet Union on the basis of workshop drawings.

Finally M. Stalin inquired what caliber the cruiser *Lützow* carried. He hoped it carried 20.3 cm. turrets, for the Soviet Union had no interest in the cruiser if it had a smaller caliber, something like 15 cm. This question was answered by us to the effect that the cruiser *Lützow* would receive an armament of 20.3 cm. turrets.

SCHNURRE

³ Not printed (8434/E593964).

No. 601

54/36523

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 137

BERLIN, February 8, 1940.

Herr Neubacher¹ told me that the Foreign Minister had authorized him to state in Bucharest that Herr von Ribbentrop had informed him—Neubacher—that he was not concerned about Rumania and did not anticipate any Russian attack there.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 508.

No. 602

108/112030-32

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, February 9, 1940—5:52 p. m.

No. 296 of February 9

Received February 10—12:10 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 251 of February 3.¹

1. With reference to our telegraphic report No. 256 of February 3² and the concluding statement in the above telegraphic instruction, I wish to state in advance that the gesture was made precisely at the right moment as far as the situation here is concerned. For at the first negotiation with Mikoyan based on the proposal made at the time by Stalin, it was apparent that *no* acceptable agreement could be reached on that basis. We would therefore of our own accord have suggested a *démarche* on the part of the Foreign Minister with M. Stalin.

2. Consequently, immediately following receipt of the telegraphic instruction, we made an appointment with M. Molotov for the purpose of transmitting the Foreign Minister's personal communication to M. Stalin. We were immediately received by M. Molotov alone, apparently because M. Stalin had still not completely recovered from his indisposition. The personal communication of the Reich Foreign Minister was presented orally with a small supplementary statement and upon request was left in writing. M. Molotov conducted the subsequent lengthy conversation in a noncommittal [*unverbindlich*] manner, and considerable differences of opinion again became apparent.

¹ Document No. 594.

² See document No. 594, footnote 2.

3. On February 7 we were asked to call on M. Stalin at one o'clock at night. He opened the conversation with the remark that the Reich Foreign Minister's personal communication had created a new situation. The Soviet Government would take the Foreign Minister's view into consideration. Then M. Stalin first explained a rather complicated new scheme with reference to the problem of compensation "over a more extended period of time" and secondly made new concessions concerning the delivery of nonferrous and hard metals from Soviet supplies.

Note 1. I am refraining from making a telegraphic report on all the details of the new scheme, which is difficult to understand without oral explanations.

The most important thing is that only one treaty will be concluded, and that the Soviet goods will be delivered over a period of 18 months, and the German deliveries in payment thereof over a period of 27 months. The total value of the Soviet goods delivered during 18 months and the German goods delivered during 27 months (group garbled) 640 million to 660 million reichsmarks each. In addition there are the Soviet goods delivered under the Credit Agreement and to the Protectorate, as well as other Soviet services such as the transit shipments and the purchase of raw materials in third countries, the value of which is difficult to estimate and which are to be paid for separately. Consequently Soviet services over a period of 18 months, inclusive of the above-mentioned goods delivered under the Credit Agreement, etc. nevertheless amount to the considerable sum of close to one billion reichsmarks.

Within this schedule, however, M. Stalin insisted on a few subdivisions with reference to time which are bothersome. Thus, for example, he insisted in particular that Soviet goods in the amount of 420 to 430 million reichsmarks, delivered during the first 12 months, should be paid for during the first 15 months. He inserted a number of other bottlenecks from the standpoint of time which are causing us some concern.

Note 2. In addition to the delivery of 5,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel and 450 tons of tin promised earlier for the first 12 months, it was promised to deliver from Soviet stocks during the following 6 months 6,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel, 500 tons of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, 500 tons of tungsten and 3 tons of cobalt.³

³ In an exchange of letters at Moscow on Feb. 11 (F18/437-38) in connection with the conclusion of the Economic Agreement of that date (document No. 607), Mikoyan notified Schnurre that the Soviet Government would issue instructions for delivering the metals in the quantities and periods mentioned here; these deliveries were to be included in the totals provided for in articles 1 and 2 of that Agreement.

We have reserved taking a final stand on these new proposals until the details have been worked out. The first negotiation with Mikoyan for the purpose of working out the details of these new proposals created a favorable impression. The previous pettifogging [*schikanöser*] methods have clearly been replaced by a certain ease of manner. A statement by Mikoyan has shown that there is agreement that negotiations for the conclusion of a second economic agreement for 1941 will take place at the proper time. It may therefore be expected that the schedules for the 1941 deliveries of both sides will be drawn up later.

We believe that an economic agreement on this basis can be ready for signature within the next few days. Please give us a free hand in signing the agreement, depending on the outcome of the attempts at adjustment and provided no new incidents occur.

Suggestions for possible intermediaries will follow.⁴

BITTER

TIPPELSKIRCH

⁴ According to the telegram sent (No. 301 of Feb. 9, 103/112035), the garbled word "intermediaries" should have read "press releases."

No. 603

33/25208-10

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1940—12:10 a. m.

No. 162 of February 9

Received February 10—10:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 156 of February 9.¹

Simultaneously with Roosevelt's statement to the press on Welles' informatory trip to Europe,² Secretary of State Hull announced a further American diplomatic action, at the outset of which he had initiated nonbinding discussions with various neutral states with the objective, if possible, of restoring world peace,³ reviving international trade, and preparing for universal disarmament. The text of his statement is being simultaneously telegraphed in clear.⁴ So as not to burden Sumner Welles' informatory trip unnecessarily, Hull believes that this second action should be conducted separately from it.

¹ Not printed (33/25208). The telegram reported President Roosevelt's announcement of Sumner Welles' mission.

² The text of the President's statement is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 155.

³ The Secretary of State's statement also included the following: "Matters involving present war conditions are not a part of these preliminary conversations." *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁴ Not printed (33/25208).

It will be difficult for the American Government to do this, however, particularly since Italy is affected by both actions. Up to now Hull is reported to have established contact with the Italian representative, Holland, and Belgium.

Roosevelt probably initiated these two sudden steps for the following reasons: The American Government, as I have reported, has been surprised and confused by the course of the war and the international power situation to date, and has not yet been able to reach any definite conclusions.

The American Government is afraid that following the collapse of Finnish resistance, which probably can no longer be avoided, the European war will not remain localized in its present theaters, but that the Allies will have to change their current strategy, thus making Allied military action in the Balkans and the Near East a possibility. This would render it even more difficult than in the past to predict the course of the war and its duration, as well as the resulting effect on American interests. In order to obtain specific information on the subject, Roosevelt made the sudden decision to despatch Welles. Welles appears to him to be especially suited for this prospective tour, among other reasons, because Roosevelt assumes that Welles can count on a sympathetic reception in Berlin, owing to his sharp attacks on the Versailles Treaty and its consequences for Germany.

In so far as can be judged from here, this informatory trip suits the purposes of the British Government very well in order to convince Roosevelt how essential energetic aid by the United States is for an early termination of the war. On that account it is an open question whether the original idea for this trip originated with Roosevelt or is due to English initiative.

These two actions unquestionably fit in well with Roosevelt's domestic political strategy for the impending presidential campaign, in which he will endeavor to play up his election for the third time as unavoidable and enforced by circumstances. They also accord with his desire to go down in history as the great American peacemaker.

I shall report on the reaction of Congress and the press to these two parallel actions.

THOMSEN

No. 604

138/74049-50

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 459 of February 10

MADRID, February 10, 1940.
Received February 10—9:30 p. m.

Also for Staatsrat Wohlthat.

Sofindus¹ seems to have intensified its efforts lately to obtain a monopoly. Apart from the Wagner action,² the company seeks to be put in charge of all purchases of Spanish merchandise for Germany, under exclusion of other German buyers, etc. A detailed report will follow at the next safe opportunity.

The attitude of Sofindus appears to be prompted by directives from Berlin. Establishing a monopoly like that of the late Hisma, a proposal that has been decisively rejected by the Spanish Government since the end of the civil war, seems to me to be in contradiction with the directives laid down by the departments in Berlin which guided Wohlthat in concluding the German-Spanish economic agreement here on December 22, 1939.³ It is to be feared that the move would also compromise the camouflage arrangements for the shipment of goods (cf. telegram No. 1610 of October 19, 1939),⁴ and threaten the existence of the other German businessmen in Spain who are engaged in a hard struggle just now. If there has been a change in our past policy which causes Sofindus to take the attitude that it does, please advise by telegraph; otherwise, I request that it be ordered to fall in line.⁵

In respect to the motor torpedo boats⁶ and other blockade runners (instruction No. W 533g of February 3⁷ and telegraphic instruction

¹ Abbreviation for Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltda. For a description of this enterprise, and the closely related Hisma and Rowak companies, see Editors' Note, vol. III, pp. 1-2.

² The draft copy of this telegram in the files of the German Embassy in Madrid (1308/348197-98) indicates that this passage was received in Berlin in garbled form. The Wagner action was a scheme to have a part of the German ships lying in Spanish ports attempt to run the blockade while the remaining ships were either to be sold to Spain or to stay there under the German flag for the time being. Madrid telegram No. 1918 of Nov. 11, 1939 (136/73942-43) had reported that this plan had been worked out by Kapitän Wagner of the Transport Ministry together with the German Naval Attaché and representatives of Sofindus.

³ See document No. 482.

⁴ Not printed (322/193529-30).

⁵ This passage is printed as found on the Madrid Embassy copy (see footnote 2) since it was garbled in transmission to Berlin.

⁶ Thus in the Madrid copy; the Foreign Ministry copy reads here "boat."

⁷ Not printed (1308/347772). This was a Foreign Ministry instruction informing the Embassy in Spain that the use of motor torpedo boats for transport of goods between Spain and Italy was being considered even though there was no complete assurance that it would be successful.

No. 182 of February 8^s) Sofindus has received complete telegraphic instructions in the Rowak cipher and has been instructed to go ahead immediately with execution in Spain. Please advise if this is not considered dangerous there because of the need for camouflage especially at the beginning of this action; I have given instructions that Sofindus is not to do anything until further notice. Einhart will leave tomorrow for Berlin via Rome; in accordance with instruction (telegram No. 182 of February 8) he will call on Minister Clodius in Rome, and on Staatsrat Wohlthat and Geheimrat Sabath in Berlin.

STOHRER

*Not printed (1308/347778). This telegraphic instruction informed the Embassy in Spain that according to reports from Rome, the Italian authorities were ready to facilitate in every possible way secret runs of small Spanish boats (and in cases of necessity Italian boats) from Spain to Italy. These ships would be unloaded in secret under the protection of the Italian coast guard.

No. 605

91/100155-56

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

St.S. No. 136 g. Rs.

BERLIN, February 10, 1940.

With reference to telegram No. 7¹ from Genoa and telegrams Nos. 50² and 52³ from Dublin re Ireland.

1. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a secret militant society which fights for the union of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic and the complete separation of Ireland from the British Empire. This is also the ultimate objective of the present Irish Government. The difference between the Government and the IRA lies mainly in the method. The Government hopes to attain its objective by legal political means while the IRA tries to achieve success by terrorist means. Most of the members of the present Irish Government formerly belonged also to the IRA.

By reason of its militant attitude toward England the IRA is a natural ally of Germany.

2. The Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] already has strictly secret connections with the IRA, a part of which utilized a channel which is now closed as the result of the war. The Intelligence Department knows of McCarthy's presence in Italy and attaches the greatest value to resuming the connection at once. It has asked the Foreign Ministry today to inform the Consulate General at Genoa that it will immediately dispatch there two of its representatives for the purpose of establishing contact with McCarthy. The Intelli-

¹ Document No. 562.

² Not printed (91/100148-49).

³ Not printed (91/100150).

gence Department has been asked to establish contact only after the Consulate General at Genoa gives the cue for it. The interest of the Intelligence Department is confined to the promotion of acts of sabotage.

3. It is technically possible to take John Russell (Irish name: Sean Russell) to Ireland aboard a German submarine.

4. In his telegram No. 50 of January 27, which is herewith enclosed,⁴ Minister Hempel, upon inquiry, expressed himself against dispatching John Russell to Ireland at the present moment. He is of the opinion that the IRA in Ireland does not have enough striking power to bring about success. He fears that John Russell's arrival and Germany's part therein will become known, that this will lead to a further discrediting of the IRA, and that England will profit therefrom in the end. Thus an incident would be created that would be parallel to the landing of Sir Roger Casement by a German submarine in the World War.

5. In the opinion of the Political Department such an action may very well be considered. However, the proper time for it would not arrive until Great Britain is in considerable difficulties all along the line. The operation would then have to be carried out, if possible suddenly, in connection with other operations within the British Empire or at its periphery. For the present, Minister Hempel's objections are shared. If it learned of Russell's arrival, the Irish Government would in all probability have him arrested and, if German complicity became known, as could be expected, it would have to take the necessary steps with reference to us. Irish neutrality would thereby be jeopardized.

6. It is therefore proposed that the contact with McCarthy be maintained so that the plan can be pursued further at the proper moment. Since the Intelligence Department already has connections with McCarthy, it is suggested that for the time being such connections not be established through another channel as well.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

⁴ See footnote 2.

No. 606

8484/E596828

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, February 10, 1940.

The Finnish Minister told me today at a chance meeting not in the Ministry that he had information to the effect that the German Gov-

ernment was bringing influence to bear on Sweden to induce her not to give any military assistance to Finland. I told the Minister that these reports were false. According to our information Sweden had herself declined to assist Finland with Swedish troops, but permitted the departure of volunteers, who, however, if they were members of the Swedish armed forces, had to resign from the service. We had not taken any official stand on this action by Sweden. A different situation would naturally arise if forces of the powers with whom we were at war should arrive in Sweden or Norway en route to Finland. That would be an issue of importance to us.

The Minister remarked that the coming two months would be the most critical for Finland. If they could be weathered, Finland would surely be able to hold out until the end of the summer, for climatic conditions in the spring would confront Russia with even greater difficulties than in the winter.

WOERMANN

No. 607

F6/0026-0021

Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

zu RM 9 g. Rs.¹

In the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939,² between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics it was established that the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the basis of and in the sense of the general political understanding achieved, desired by all possible means to develop the commercial relations and the exchange of commodities between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For this purpose an economic program was to be drawn up by both sides, according to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should make deliveries of raw materials to Germany, which should be compensated for by Germany with industrial deliveries over a more extended period of time.

As a result of the negotiations for the establishment and execution of the contemplated economic program, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have made the following Agreement:

¹ RM 9 g. Rs: Document No. 636.

² Document No. 162.

Article 1

In the period February 11, 1940, to February 11, 1941, in addition to the deliveries provided for in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939,³ the commodities enumerated in List 1⁴ to the value of 420 to 430 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany.

Article 2

In the period February 11, 1941, to August 11, 1941, there shall be delivered, likewise in addition to the deliveries provided for in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, commodities to the value of 220 to 230 million reichsmarks from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany, namely, in each case, half of the values or amounts specified for the various commodities in List 1.

Article 3

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pledges itself to take all measures necessary to insure the performance of the deliveries named in Articles 1 and 2. The deliveries shall begin immediately.

Article 4

In payment for the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, German products of the kind designated in List 2 (war material)⁵ and List

³ Vol. VII, document No. 131.

⁴ Not printed (2093/452908-09). In addition to the products summarized in general terms in section 2 of document No. 636, the list also includes such items as asbestos, sulphur, rags, powdered arsenate, iridium, tobacco, guts, herbs, iodine, turpentine, oils of ether, opium, nicotine, spruce-needle oil, endocrine products, brownstone, mica ore, glycerine, licorice, horn materials, albumin, seeds, vegetable tar, and lime.

⁵ Not printed (1137/324410-51), a 42 page typewritten list on which contract negotiations were to begin without delay. The principal items in the 14 categories of the list are summarized as follows:

1. Naval construction. Cruiser *ex-Lützow*: After launching, the hull and all the equipment, armament, spare parts, etc., to be delivered for completion in the USSR, with 80 percent of the total to be delivered within 12 months of the signature of the Economic Agreement, the rest within 15 months. Complete plans, specifications, working drawings, and trial results of *ex-Lützow*, plus information on the performance of *Seydlitz* and *Prinz Eugen* or *Admiral Hipper*. Plans for battleship *Bismarck* and a large destroyer with 15 cm. guns; complete machinery for a large destroyer.

2. Shipbuilding material. Electrodes for welding, 365 tons; armor plate, 31,000 tons; various types of boiler tubing, 2628 tons; 175 power shafts of various lengths; 1 submarine periscope; several thousand items of electrical equipment; and various tanks, motors, ventilating systems, etc.

3. Naval artillery. One 381 mm. double turret, fully equipped, to be delivered by Mar. 1, 1941; preliminary sketches for a 406 mm. triple turret and working drawings for a 280 mm. triple turret; 2 noncorrosive submarine guns; fire control apparatus; etc.

4. Mine and torpedo gear.

5. Marine acoustical devices; precision clocks and watches.

6. Hydrographic instruments; optical instruments.

7. Aircraft. 10 Heinkel "He-100"; 5 Messerschmitt 109; 5 Messerschmitt 110; 2 Junkers "Ju-88"; 2 Dornier "Do-215"; 3 Buecker "Bü-131", 3 "Bü-133"; 3

3 (industrial equipment and other industrial products)* to the value of 420 to 430 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of February 11, 1940 to May 11, 1941.

Article 5

In payment of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 2, German products of the kind designated in List 4 (war material)[†]

Fokke-Wulf "Fw-58-V-13"; 2 Fokke-Wulf "Fa-266" helicopters; all of these for delivery within 12 months. One Messerschmitt 209 in 15 months, if ready; various motors, instruments, spare parts, armaments, bombs, etc.

8. Field artillery and ballistics instruments. Two 211 mm. heavy howitzers, fully equipped; a complete 105 mm. antiaircraft battery comprising 4 guns; a ballistics laboratory like that of Krupp at the proving grounds near Meppen; laboratory equipment.

9. Communications. Radio, telephone, and telegraph equipment.

10. Chemical warfare equipment; synthetic rubber (Buna S, SS, N, NN).

11. Engineer equipment. Roadbuilding gear, explosives, pumps, etc.

12. Munitions. Samples of pyroxylin and dinitroglikol powder; 500 105 mm. mortar charges; 150 parachute flares; a shell-loading plant (75-150 mm.) with hourly capacity of 1,000 75 mm. shells, similar to plant at arsenal in Jüterbog; installations to produce nitroglycerine, hexogen, TNT, natrium acid, and TNBS.

13. Armored vehicles and accessories. One medium tank, type III, fully equipped; 5 10-ton trailers; 2 20-ton trailers; 5 half-tracks.

14. Machine tools and other equipment. 308 machines of various types.

*Not printed (2093/452910-21). The principal items on this list were the following:

1. Mining equipment. 146 excavators, 90 of them to be delivered within 10 months; drills worth 8,325,000 RM; electric locomotives; cars; electric motors; compressors worth 3,900,000 RM; pumps with electric motors worth 1,380,000 RM; etc.

2. Locomobiles and turbines, 7,700,000 RM and 1,900,000 RM respectively, including generators.

3. Equipment for petroleum industry. Diesel engines worth 6,500,000 RM; compressors worth 8,100,000 RM; drills and parts worth 4,500,000 RM; electric motors worth 6,250,000 RM; pumps worth 1,800,000 RM; drill-tubes worth 6,500,000 RM; pump compressor tubes worth 5,000,000 RM; etc.

4. Equipment for electric power plants. Turbines with generators up to 6000 KW, worth 10,000,000 RM; steam generators with armatures, worth 30,000,000 RM; transformers worth 5,250,000 RM; oil switches (high power) worth 10,000,000 RM; meters and protection worth 4,000,000 RM; etc.

5. Equipment for the chemical industry. Turbo-compressors and gas-bellows for nitrogen and sulphuric acid; numerous items of laboratory and industrial apparatus; plastics machines; high-pressure tubes; etc., with a total value of about 12,000,000 RM.

6. Equipment for steel wire works; machinery worth 6,900,000 RM.

7. Forges and presses, 800,000 RM.

8. Coal and steel tubing. Coal worth 52,500,000 RM, of which 20,000,000 RM worth was to be delivered between Sept. 28, 1939, and Sept. 27, 1940; 12,500,000 RM worth between Sept. 28, 1940, and May 11, 1941; and the rest between Feb. 11, 1940, and May 11, 1941. Steel tubing worth 16,250,000 RM, with 10,000,000 RM worth to be delivered between Sept. 28, 1939 and Sept. 27, 1940, and the rest by May 11, 1941.

9. Ships. To be delivered "promptly": one tanker of about 12,000 tons; M/S *Memel*; M/S *Phoenicia*; S/S *Nürnberg*. To be delivered within 12 months: 1 training vessel; 1 repair ship; 1 hoist-ship.

10. Metals. 50,000 tons of steel tubing (including the quantities shown in sections 3 and 8 above); about 45,000 tons of other metals and metal products.

[†]Not printed (1137/324452-57). The main items were the following:

1. Naval construction. 5 floating cranes, 3 of them having 250 tons capacity; outfitting an electrode shop; various other items similar to those in List 2.

2. Naval artillery and other matériel. Two 381 mm. double turrets for delivery in 17 and 20 months; 3 280 mm. triple turrets for delivery within 30-36

and List 5 (industrial equipment and other industrial products)* to the value of 220 to 230 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of May 11, 1941 to May 11, 1942.

Article 6

The Government of the German Reich pledges itself to take all steps necessary to insure the performance of the deliveries named in Articles 4 and 5. The German deliveries shall begin immediately.

Article 7

In List 6* appended to this Agreement are specified the machinery,

months (or alternatively 3 additional 381 mm. double turrets within 23-29 months); 4 149.1 mm. triple turrets within 18-22 months; 14 105 mm. twin mounts (including 4 sets to be included with *Lützow*); all naval artillery to be fully equipped with fire control apparatus and spare parts; 2 8 m. submarine periscopes, by mid-1941.

3. Hydrographic gear. 1950 stop-clocks; 2000 stop-watches; 80 chronometers; 3 gyro-compasses for training; 150 deck clocks.

4. Aircraft equipment. Three installations for altitude testing of motors; 2 motion picture theodolite stations; 5 fully-equipped motor testing establishments; 1 cylinder-testing device.

5. Machine tools, etc. Seventeen machine tools for delivery in fall 1941; 29 others, delivery dates unspecified; 1 plant for bimetallic rotating bands for shells, capacity 2000 tons per year, during second half of 1941; 1 plant for widia and titanite alloys, with capacity of 30 tons per year (the exact production formulas to be furnished, and the plants to be set up in working order in the USSR, with a 2-year period for installation and training of personnel). Delivery of these 2 plants will be governed by the conditions stated in List 6.

* Not printed (2093/452922-23). Principal items:

1. Mining equipment: various excavators worth 15,000,000 RM; cars, drills, compressors, and electric motors, totaling 12,500,000 RM.

2. Diesels, locomobiles, turbines, and boilers: 32,500,000 RM.

3. Equipment for electric power plants: 12,000,000 RM.

4. Coal: 40,000,000 RM.

5. Metal-working machines, especially of Hasse & Wrede system, in quantities to be agreed upon.

6. Forges, presses, and equipment for steel wire plants: 2,000,000 RM.

7. Ships: 1 crane ship with 75-ton lift; 5,450 h.p. tugs; 1 self-propelled river tanker.

8. Metals: 50,000 tons of drill tubing and compressor tubing; 15,000 tons of steel cable; 300 tons of rustproof steel tubing; 3,000 tons of zinc-coated wire.

* Not printed (2093/452924-26). This list is prefaced by two general conditions: (1) that the industrial processes revealed by Germany to the Soviet Union be kept secret; (2) that the Soviet Union refrain from competing with German firms in the world market with products of the installations, plants, and processes furnished by Germany.

The list includes the following items to be ready, depending on conditions, in "normal delivery time":

1. Complete plants for recovering old rubber by analysis (capacity 5 to 10 tons); for continuous vulcanizing of fabrics; and for hydrogenation of coal to produce 200,000 tons of oil per year.

2. Plans and equipment for plants to produce Rohgummi Buna [synthetic rubber]; synthetic urea (2,000 tons annually); aniline and chlorbenzol (10,000 tons annually); phenol and chlorbenzol (6,000 tons annually); 4 types of anilines (5000 tons annually); chlorbenzol by continuous chlorination; betanaftol, tiuram, koptaks, difinilguanidin; concentrated nitric acid (10-15,000 tons annually); hydrosulphate by electrolysis; cellulose wood.

3. A plant for rapid vulcanization.

4. Plans and equipment for Renn and Lurgi [metallurgical] installations, ready in 12 and 12 to 15 months, respectively.

equipment, and processes of production which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is interested in acquiring or receiving. Both parties shall take all steps that may be necessary in order that commercial contracts for machinery, equipment, and processes of production of the kind enumerated in the list may be concluded as soon as possible.

The payments that become due on the basis of these contracts during the validity of this Agreement shall be made from special accounts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany by way of the German-Soviet clearing system. If they become due during the first 15 months of the Treaty they shall be used in settlement of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, and insofar as they become due in the succeeding 12 months, in settlement of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 2.

For this settlement other payments which are credited to the special accounts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for example for transit traffic, shall also be used.

Article 8

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has declared by the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, that it is prepared to deliver, in addition to the quantities of petroleum otherwise agreed upon or still to be agreed upon, a supplementary quantity of petroleum equivalent to the annual production of the Droho-byz and Boryslaw oil region, in such proportions that half of this amount shall be delivered to Germany from the oil fields of the said oil region and the other half from the other oil regions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As compensation for these petroleum deliveries the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall receive deliveries of coal and steel tubing.

It is agreed that the quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to be delivered in accordance herewith during the period September 28, 1939, to September 28, 1940, shall be included in the amount named in List 1. In calculating the value of the compensatory deliveries of coal and steel tubing, it shall be assumed that this first annual amount is equal to the value of 30 million reichsmarks. These petroleum deliveries shall be compensated by German deliveries of coal to the value of 20 million reichsmarks and steel tubing to the value of 10 million reichsmarks. These deliveries shall be made by September 28, 1940.

Article 9

Both parties take it for granted that the mutual deliveries based on this Agreement are to balance.

The Soviet deliveries made during the first 12 months of the duration of this Agreement shall be compensated by German deliveries

by May 11, 1941; that is, after the first six months 50 percent of the Soviet deliveries provided for in the first period of the treaty shall be balanced by 40 percent of the German deliveries provided for in the same period of time; after 12 months 100 percent of the Soviet deliveries shall be balanced by 80 percent of the German deliveries. The rest of the German deliveries shall be made within the following 3 months.

The Soviet deliveries made during the period from the 13th to the end of the 18th month of the duration of this Agreement shall be compensated by German deliveries to be made during the period from the 16th to the end of the 27th month, computed from the date this Agreement goes into effect, in equal quarterly amounts. It is provided that during this second period of the Agreement a balance sheet of the mutual deliveries shall be drawn up every three months.

Article 10

Each of the two Governments shall appoint plenipotentiaries who shall meet on the date specified in the previous Article. The task of these plenipotentiaries shall be to study currently the total commercial intercourse between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the observance of the percentage relationship between the German and the Soviet deliveries mentioned in Article 9, and to take all measures necessary to carry out the economic program agreed upon between the Governments, especially to balance the above-mentioned percentage relationship.

The Plenipotentiaries of both Governments shall be empowered within the scope of their duties to communicate with each other directly, either in writing or orally. They may from time to time draw the experts needed in their work into their consultations.

If the percentage relationship fixed by Article 9 for the mutual deliveries is disturbed in one of the periods of time, both parties shall take measures in the shortest possible time for the removal of the disproportion, in which connection supplementary deliveries, especially of coal, shall be used by Germany as a means of settlement. In case this cannot be arranged, the interested party shall have the right to discontinue temporarily its deliveries until the stipulated relationship is attained.

Article 11

In the execution of this Agreement the following shall be applied:

a) the Agreement regarding exchange of goods and payments of December 31, 1939;¹⁰

b) the provisions of Article IV and of section 3 of Article V of the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939.

¹⁰ Not printed (3782/EO41719-21).

Besides, in connection with the payment of Soviet obligations arising from orders made on the basis of this Agreement, the provisions of section 5 of Article V of the above-mentioned Credit Agreement shall be correspondingly applicable;

c) the Confidential Protocol of August 26, 1939.¹¹

Article 12

Both Parties have agreed that the accommodations granted for transit traffic on the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939 (freight reductions of 50 percent on soybeans and the payment of all railway freight charges in the transit traffic through the German-Soviet clearing system) shall remain in force during the entire period of the validity of this Agreement. In order to facilitate use of the sums paid in reichsmarks by Germany for freight charges, Germany shall lend her cooperation to the Soviets in placing orders in Germany and in acquiring goods and techniques of production there.

Article 13

This Agreement shall not affect the Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 19, 1939, which shall remain completely in force.

Article 14

This Agreement shall become effective upon signature.

Done in two original copies in the German and the Russian languages respectively, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow, February 11, 1940.

For the Government
of the German Reich:

K. RITTER

K. SCHENURRE

Representing the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. MIKOYAN

BABARIN

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

In connection with the Economic Agreement signed today between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of both Parties have agreed concerning the following:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall instruct the proper Soviet commercial organizations to enter into negotiations with the German organizations and firms designated by the Government of the German Reich in regard to the purchase by the Soviet Union of metals and other goods in third countries and in

¹¹ Vol. VII, document No. 340.

regard to the sale of these metals and goods to Germany. Such sales shall be made by the Soviet organizations on the following basis:

Payment for the goods by the German purchasers up to 70 percent in transferable foreign currency to be designated by the Soviet commercial organization making the delivery and 30 percent in reichsmarks in accordance with the German-Soviet Agreement regarding exchange of goods and payments of December 31, 1939. If the German purchaser is not in a position to make payment in the currency suggested by the Soviet commercial organization, he may offer to make payment in another transferable currency. If the Soviet commercial organization refuses this currency, payment shall be made in gold on conditions to be agreed upon between the purchaser and the Soviet commercial organization making delivery.

In this connection the Germans shall, for the purpose of utilization of the sums in reichsmarks paid by the Germans to the Soviet commercial organizations, lend their cooperation in placing orders in Germany and in the acquisition of goods and production techniques in Germany.

Moscow, February 11, 1940.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
K. RITTER
K. SCHNURRE

Representing the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. MIKOYAN
BABARIN

No. 608

F18/485

*The Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in Germany to the
Chairman of the German Economic Delegation*

at present in Moscow, February 11, 1940.

HERR MINISTER: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of today's date, which reads as follows:¹

"Germany agrees that the amounts of money totaling 58.4 million reichsmarks provided for war material by the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, may in accordance with the provisions of the said Credit Agreement also be used for ordering articles from Lists 2 and 4 appended to the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940. It is agreed that articles to be ordered in this manner shall be decided upon between the Ministry of Economics of the Reich and the Trade Agency of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany."

I declare myself to be in agreement with the contents.

Please accept, Herr Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

BABARIN

¹ Not printed (F18/436).

No. 609

173/84191-93

The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 109 of February 12

THE HAGUE, February 12, 1940—6:45 p. m.

Received February 12—9:30 p. m.

A neutral source which is very well disposed toward us indicated to me that the Japanese offer to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Netherlands is Japan's answer to Roosevelt's step of sending Welles to Europe. Roosevelt is especially concerned about East Asia, since a Japanese reaction to the American embargo is feared, and this reaction is expected to take the direction of new expansion. In view of the aroused and united public opinion in the United States, Roosevelt is not in a position to give his policy in the Far East a different direction.

Behind the Japanese attempt at political rapprochement with the Netherlands there is the Japanese desire of obtaining from the Netherlands not only new concessions in Borneo but also the permission very quickly to make both the old, impoverished concessions and the new ones productive by permitting thousands of Chinese workers to come in. Japan is said to be striving to win Chinese youth through promising prospects of colonization in the Netherlands Indies. Although it is recognized here that Japan must obtain new sources of oil, the influence of the oil magnates here, who are under British domination and are accustomed to seeing things only through British eyes, is too great to make rapprochement with Japan appear feasible for the time being.

It was pointed out to me that developments attending Welles' trip would be the more advantageous from our point of view if Germany would as ostentatiously as possible during his European trip, promote open rapprochement with Japan, particularly economic negotiations concerning, possibly, concessions in Northern China; this would bring effective pressure to bear on Roosevelt toward considering German demands and objectives with greater understanding than would otherwise be the case. It is Roosevelt's anxiety which brings Welles here. England and France, involved in the European war, could (group missing) the United States of America alone in a conflict with Japan, which would be tantamount to a political defeat and a tremendous loss of prestige for presidential candidate Roosevelt, especially since he does not at present have at his disposal the forces for maintaining his policy. Since the War Council in Paris is said to have considered East Asiatic questions in the sense of giving secondary priority to all interests there for the present, Welles' trip was hastened. Roosevelt's

fears would be confirmed if German-Japanese rapprochement in the economic field were now making visible progress. Roosevelt would then have to bring all of his influence to bear on England and France to break off the futile war, accept the new situation in Europe and devote themselves explicitly to the greater interests in the Far East. Roosevelt's fears are confirmed by increasing indications that England is planning a tighter consolidation of the Empire in the Near East and Africa, without giving up her position in British India. With reference to the African report it is significant that a strong Anglo-French financial group is having the Banque de Paris et Pays-Bas buy up all Belgian-Congo shares obtainable on the open market (a report which could probably be checked unobtrusively).

Thereby it is also intended to exert pressure on the King of the Belgians, whose family probably holds most of the shares. The main objective, however, is to prepare for England in the African area a visible increase in power, consolidation, and extension of the British sphere of influence, and maintenance of British prestige in the world—which cannot be attained, as circumspect circles in England are coming to realize more and more, through the war with Germany.

The fact that England's active policy vis-à-vis Turkey is also already serving the greater plan of consolidating the Empire in a smaller circle (Near East and Africa) is confirmed in today's article by the diplomatic correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, who writes that England cannot remain indifferent to developments in the area of Iran and Iraq.

If rumors here should prove correct, to the effect that the British Government induced the Imperial Chemical trust (Eden) to offer to the Italian Government, in spite of the well-known capital investments at the Dead Sea, the financing of the potash exploitation in Ethiopia, and further, that the British Government is again playing up increased Italian participation in the Administration of the Suez Canal, this should be considered a further confirmation of British plans. Since the British Government realizes that such offers would not satisfy Italian aspirations and that France is not prepared to make territorial concessions in Tunisia, consideration is being given to obtaining Italian participation in the planned "Chartered Compagnie Africa" through the cession of Jibuti and Somaliland.

A contributing factor in Welles' trip is the American fear that the war will end with the division of European markets between the Anglo-French economic bloc and Germany, which would mean a total loss of Europe as a customer of the American export industry.

The American plan of suggesting a *four-year truce* to the belligerents and then of intervening in the meantime in economic negotiations in which Japan (but not Russia) and Italy would be included springs

originally from this same concern. A new course becomes apparent from Hull's statement about making preparations with the neutrals for economic policy after the war,¹ and it is typical that he first received the Dutch Minister, to the surprise of the Government here (by way of a counteraction to Japan's offer to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Netherlands).

ASCHMANN²

¹ See document No. 603.

² Gottfried Aschmann had been Director of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry from 1936 to 1939. Pensioned in 1939 with the rank of Minister, he was called back into service at the outbreak of war and attached to the Legation at the Hague to be in charge of the greatly expanded press activities of the Missions in the Netherlands and Belgium.

No. 610

183/86061

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 146

BERLIN, February 12, 1940.

The President of the Swiss National Council, Henry Vallotton, of Lausanne, was in Finland to study the present condition of the Finnish people. He appears also to have left there a donation of Swiss money.

M. Vallotton, with whom I have been well acquainted for a long time, also came around to talking about the atmosphere in Switzerland and the threat from Germany. I assured him how urgently necessary for Germany it was to leave Switzerland out of the present war. I authorized him to mention this wish of ours in talks with his friends in Parliament provided he made sure that the Swiss press did not make a "declaration" out of it. I did not want to be mentioned in the Swiss press at all, for I was not authorized to make any such "declaration." I availed myself moreover of the opportunity to impress upon him how necessary it was for the Swiss press to adopt a different attitude from that heretofore taken.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 611

F11/0139-0141

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Minister

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, February 12, 1940.

By orderly

RM 7 g Rs.

VI F C.d.S. AZ: 53081/40 Bi./H.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE VON RIBBENTROP! A confidential agent of my office has proved on several occasions in the past to have excellent

connections with Netherlands governmental circles. He is personally acquainted with Foreign Minister Kleffens and, he says, was included in several recent meetings of an "action committee" of the Netherlands Government to which belong Minister President de Geer and Foreign Minister Kleffens, among others.

The informant describes the view on the present situation held by the Netherlands Government as follows: The Netherlands Government fails to understand why Belgium on the occasion of the recent crisis (mobilization, phase D), secured for herself an option, as it were, on England's help. It believes that this decision was imprudent and does not contemplate any similar action. It wants to have a good understanding with Belgium, but not military alliance by any means. Outwardly, a pretense of unconcern is maintained: Holland has the Führer's promise! Inwardly, however, the Government is practical enough to reckon with "possibilities."

If Holland keeps her present government—and there is every indication that she will—then Holland will solve all the problems that might possibly arise independently of foreign powers. If Germany should march through Belgium, Holland would do nothing. If German troops march through southern Limburg, Holland would offer local resistance and raise a big outcry, but definitely would not counter-attack or beg England and France for help.

The informant has assured us that his statements are absolutely reliable although they must not, of course, be expressed publicly. He also asks that Berlin should bear in mind at all times that the attitudes of Belgium and Holland are widely divergent in the present situation. The men governing Holland at present regard independence as the highest good and would do everything to find solutions that would end the conflict as soon as possible. These men also realize that the difficulty lies with England alone. It is not impossible that the Netherlands Government might in the very near future make semiofficial inquiries in Italy since the Duce is the only man in a position to take such an initiative.

Most important among the statements of the informant seem to be those referring to a possible passage of German troops. The impression is that Germany is perhaps to be approached through the informant with certain suggestions, but that conversely, he could also be used to convey them to the "action committee" of the Netherlands Government.

The informant can probably be reached until Wednesday of this week.¹

HEYDRICH

¹ The Foreign Minister requested on Feb. 14 (F11/0138) that Heydrich be thanked for forwarding the report, but that the informant for the moment be given no suggestion for further action.

No. 612

B18/B003384

*Memorandum by the Minister to Finland*¹

SECRET

BERLIN, February 13, 1940.

The Reich Foreign Minister told me yesterday at the conclusion of a lengthy conference that Germany did not wish to mediate in the Finnish-Russian conflict at the moment. It could not be predicted today how that question would stand in a few weeks.

The Foreign Minister then raised the question whether I could find out in a discreet way in Finland what conditions the Finnish Government would agree to if the occasion should arise. I replied that this was a difficult task in view of the situation. But even if real mediation were out of the question, still it might be possible to make discreet arrangements for a Finn who was persona grata in Moscow, such as, M. Paasikivi, to have an interview with some Russian in Berlin. The Foreign Minister replied that I could suggest to the Finnish Foreign Minister as my own idea that he might through me ask the Reich Foreign Minister to sound out Moscow as to whether the Russians were disposed to send someone to Berlin for a talk with Paasikivi.

BLÜCHER

¹ For another account of this interview see Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 172-174.

No. 613

33/25221

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 136 of February 14

BERLIN, February 14, 1940.

RAM 57.

With reference to your telegram No. 150 of February 8, 1940.¹

Please inform Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles orally of the following:

The Reich Government has taken cognizance of President Roosevelt's intention to send a special representative to Europe and, among other capitals, also to Berlin. It seems to the Reich Government that there is a certain contradiction between the recall of American Ambassador Wilson and President Roosevelt's desire to inform himself on the situation in Germany. The Reich Government is not acquainted with the intention and objective pursued by President

¹ Document No. 598.

Roosevelt in sending Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe, but is prepared to receive Mr. Sumner Welles. The German position on the international situation and the war has been made unmistakably clear to the world in the Führer's speeches. As regards Germany's relations with the United States in particular, it should be noted that the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory to both peoples. Should the American Government desire in sending Mr. Sumner Welles to Berlin to express the intention of terminating this situation—to the development of which the Reich Government has not contributed in any way—and effecting a change, this would undoubtedly be in the interest of both peoples.²

RIBBENTROP

²Thomsen replied in a telegram of Feb. 15 (33/25222) that he had handed Welles an aide-mémoire in the sense of these instructions which Welles had promised to transmit to the President. Welles had emphasized that his journey had no purpose other than to provide the President with a coordinated picture of the European situation based on conversations with its leading statesmen.

On Feb. 20, Japanese Counselor of Embassy Usami asked Woermann about Germany's interpretation of the Welles mission. Woermann replied that Germany knew no more about the Welles mission than the official American communiqué stated. He pointed out that the subject had "not exactly been treated as a sensation on the front page of our newspapers," and recalled that Roosevelt as well as Welles himself had made many anti-German speeches. Woermann memorandum of Feb. 20 (33/25226).

On Feb. 27, Weizsäcker recorded in a memorandum (B21/B005410) that American Chargé d'Affaires Kirk said he was uninformed as to the contents of Welles' talks in Europe. Weizsäcker also noted: "Kirk's personal views are well known. For him Europe now confronts a choice between peace and Bolshevism."

No. 614

5568/ES98117-18

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 152

BERLIN, February 14, 1940.

W 782 g.

The Greek Minister ¹ called on me today and opened the conversation with a few political statements which culminated in the assurance that Greece would preserve her neutrality with all her strength and to the very last.

After that, the Minister turned to Greek foreign trade relations. He set forth Greece's dependence on British coal and the income derived from Greek shipping. He added that his Minister President wished not only to maintain but also to expand trade with Germany.

Finally the Minister turned to our deliveries of war material to Greece. In this connection I had to refute a misstatement on the part of the Minister when he spoke of the delivery of German planes to Bulgaria, which could have no other target than Greece. A remark

¹ Alexander Rizo-Rangabé.

by the Minister about the fear of Germany in the Balkans also prompted me to make it quite plain to him who it was that had an interest in disturbing the peace in the Balkans, and that it might be better for him to consider the purpose of the Weygand army. Germany, I continued, did not inject any political considerations into her trade relations with Greece.

On this basis, which the Minister surely could not fail to recognize, I would gladly take under consideration his troubles about the delivery of war material.

Herewith submitted to the Economic Policy Department with a request that, at a suitable opportunity, information be given concerning the justification of the Greek wishes.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 615

3687/E035544

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, February 17, 1940—2:45 a. m.

No. 133 of February 17

Received Oslo, February 17—3:40 a. m.

The OKM has reported that the steamer *Altmark* was molested in Norwegian territorial waters near the coast by a British destroyer which attempted to come alongside.

Please instruct all Consulates in question to exercise constantly the greatest watchfulness.

Please also point out to the Norwegian Government at once in earnest terms—at an unconventional hour if necessary—that Norway's neutrality has been violated and that there is acute danger of further violations.¹

Please take all measures required by the situation there in cooperation with the Naval Attaché.²

WOERMANN

¹ On Feb. 17, Bräuer sent Jens Bull, Secretary-General of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, a note (3687/E035542) confirming a telephone conversation at 9:30 that morning. Bräuer had protested the "outrage" perpetrated by the British destroyer *Cossack* against *Altmark*, charged that the Norwegian Government had afforded her inadequate protection, called for restoration of the ship to her original condition, and demanded that all measures be taken against the assailants. In a telegram later that day (3687/E035549-50), Bräuer reported that he had been officially notified that the Norwegian Legation in London had been instructed to protest to the British Government about the violation of Norway's sovereignty by British naval forces against *Altmark*. The text of the Norwegian note of Feb. 17, together with a British record of the conversation which took place when the Norwegian Minister, E. A. Colban, presented it to Halifax, are printed in *Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Norwegian Government Respecting the German Steamer "Altmark"*, London, 17th February—15th March, 1940 (Cmd. 8012), London, 1950.

² See document No. 618.

No. 616

136/74058-59

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, February 17, 1940.

No. 550 of February 17

Received February 17—4:45 p. m.

Make no copies

For the Foreign Ministry only.

With reference to my telegram No. 459 of February 10¹ and to your telegram No. 225 of February 14.²

It is being said in Sofindus circles that Bernhardt is returning to Spain equipped with the fullest powers because the Spanish-German agreement of December 22³ is supposedly a complete failure. This tallies with the recent monopoly pretensions of Sofindus reported in despatch W 201/40 of February 14,⁴ and the position of the Economics Ministry, reported in instructions W 601 g of February 7⁵ and W 681 g of February 10,⁶ which amounts to nothing less than a partial elimination or a "bowing out" of the Embassy. A reliable source in Berlin further indicates that Bernhardt intends to submit to Franco here in Spain plans for the reconstruction of Spain; that would be a renewal of Bernhardt's political activity in Spain, prohibited once before by the Foreign Ministry.⁷ Bernhardt is also said to have declared in Germany that it would be he who would dispense the orders for industry. Furthermore, it appears to be a positive fact that the Economics Ministry is again going to send Bernhardt to Spain on a permanent basis as the top man in Sofindus.

To what extent these stories are completely true it is impossible to judge from here. It is certain, however, that Bernhardt's impending reappearance here will bring on all the serious difficulties which I have been anticipating.

If impossible situations like those during the civil war are not to recur and if a politically dangerous dissatisfaction of the Spanish Government over the new attempts at monopoly of a German firm is to be avoided, it would be essential to define exactly Bernhardt's powers and responsibilities in writing, indicating the limitation as to scope and time, and to inform me of the particulars.

Please inform Staatsrat Wohlthat.

STOHRER.

¹ Document No. 604.

² Not printed (1308/348194). This announced the impending arrival in Spain of Johannes Bernhardt. The instruction stated that no change of policy was under consideration with regard to Sofindus.

³ Document No. 482.

⁴ Not printed (1308/348147-48).

⁵ Not printed (1308/348228).

⁶ Not printed (1308/348223-25).

⁷ See vol. III, documents Nos. 794 and 795.

No. 617

B18/B003398-97

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, February 17, 1940—6:44 p. m.

SECRET

Received February 17—10:00 p. m.

No. 71 of February 17

I had a long talk today with the Foreign Minister. I remonstrated with him for the statement reported in our telegram No. 62.¹ M. Tanner defended himself with the argument that he had had to assume that the rumors about mediation had been launched by the Russians in order to paralyze the will of the Finnish people to defend themselves. His statement had had the purpose of strengthening the home front. After a further rather heated discussion M. Tanner stated that he had not meant to say anything against Germany.

I then told him that the Finnish army, notwithstanding all local successes, could not in the long run hold out against Russia's superior force, that none of the powers would dare to side openly with Finland, and that assistance in the form of volunteers and arms was insufficient. Besides, I did not see how a third state could undertake any mediation, and German mediation could not be considered at this time, either.

M. Tanner said mournfully that I had only bad news for him when he had hoped that I would have something cheerful to say. After talking about many other things I said that on my lonely return trip I had constantly been turning the matter over in my mind, and had come to the entirely personal conclusion that something might perhaps be accomplished if a Finn who was respected [*beliebt*] in Moscow should have a secret meeting with some Russian in a third country. M. Tanner seized upon the idea, and remarked, on the personal side, that he himself, being a Menshevik, was *persona ingrata* in Moscow. We agreed that Paasikivi met the requisite of being well looked upon in Moscow. At the end of the talk I formulated the idea to the effect that M. Tanner would ask the Reich Foreign Minister through me whether he was willing to sound out the Kremlin as to whether the Russian Government was disposed to send someone to Berlin for a secret exchange of views with M. Paasikivi. I emphasized that this

¹ This telegram (B18/B003388) transmitted Tanner's statement to the Finnish Chamber denying foreign press reports that "a Great Power" was expected to mediate in the Russo-Finnish conflict. Tanner said that the Finnish Government had taken no steps in this direction and knew of none, and also that Finland—with the help now coming in response to the League of Nations resolution—would be able to meet all attacks. Finland would not accept a dictated peace, and the rumors of mediation might well be spread merely to paralyze foreign aid.

was my own personal idea and that its execution was contingent on two conditions, both unknown to me; first, the willingness of the Reich Foreign Minister, and second, that of the Russian Government. M. Tanner thanked me for the interest I had shown for Finland and added that he would discuss the matter with his Cabinet colleagues and would inform me of further developments.

BLÜCHER

No. 618

3076/612958-57

*Memorandum by the Naval Attaché in Norway*¹

SECRET

OSLO, February 17, 1940.

B. No. 590 g

Subject: S. S. *Altmark*.

1. *February 15, evening*: A message was received from Bergen (telegram from the captain of *Altmark*) that the ship was lying north of Bergen, having been stopped by a patrol vessel and kept from proceeding on the ground that the declared area cannot be passed at night. Thereupon, the following steps were taken:

a) The matter was cleared with Admiral Diesen (Commanding Admiral). The steamer received authorization to pass through the declared area at night.

b) A coded telephone message was sent to the OKM that the steamer would pass Bergen on a southerly course around 11 p. m.

2. *February 16, forenoon*: Clarification was sought by a coded telephone call to Haugesund whether the steamer actually had passed through the Bergen zone during the night. Haugesund notified the OKM in code via the Foreign Ministry that the steamer had passed.

3. *February 16, 5 p. m.*: A telephone call was received from the Naval Attaché section, OKM, giving the approximate position of the steamer as well as instructions to make appropriate arrangements for her safety. Action taken:

A telephone call was made to the Commanding Admiral, requesting that arrangements be made to escort the steamer through the coastal district of Kristiansand (which also comprises the district of Eigerøy). Emphasis was placed on the importance of the vessel which flies the official Reich ensign. A promise was received that due attention would be given to this information.

¹ The files also contain detailed reports of the *Altmark* incident by Captain Dau, master of the vessel, and by the Legation in Oslo. Dau's report, dated Feb. 20 (3076/612962-72), describes events of Feb. 16 and 17 directly involving his ship. The basic text of the Legation report (3687/E035568-77), which took a wider view of the incident, was initiated by Neuhaus, the Counselor of Legation, on Feb. 28, and various amplifications were inserted later.

4. *February 16, late afternoon:* Another telephone call was made to the Commanding Admiral requesting information. The reply was: "We have heard nothing specific. Protection is assured. I cannot tell you anything more."

5. *February 16, 9:50 p. m.:* Prompted by the special bulletin of the Deutschland transmitter, I telephoned the Admiralty once more. I was now referred to the Secretary General, who in turn referred me to Admiral Diesen. Information: There has been an incident. The steamer is safe. There is no more reason for concern. The steamer is covered by Norwegian patrol vessels. I was not given her exact position although I asked for it. I then telephoned to OKM and reported directly to Admiral Schniewind.

Despite Admiral Diesen's assurance that he would keep me informed of any news he should receive, I had no further call, so that it was reasonable to assume that the steamer was safe. Despite the advanced hour of the night, the Minister intervened once more personally and talked with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry. He, too, received reassuring information.

6. *February 17, in the morning:* I telephoned the Admiralty requesting information concerning possible additional news. Embarrassed silence. Admiral Diesen alone could give me the information. Diesen was in the Foreign Ministry. He did not come to the telephone. I asked that he receive me at once.

February 17, 9 a. m.: Lieutenant von Krosigk (OKM) telephoned. A cipher telegram was transmitted reading: News from steamer lacking.

The telegrams of the captain arrived at the Legation giving an account of the attack. The Minister in person energetically took the matter in hand. Then followed the Minister's reports to the Foreign Ministry with the request that they be forwarded to OKM.

February 17, 10:30 a. m.: With the concurrence of the Minister, I called upon the Admiralty where Admiral Diesen at last received me. He was very dejected and upon my request gave the following account:

His statement of the evening of February 15 that the steamer had received authorization to pass the Bergen declared area during the night was correct. He had done even more and had the ship escorted by a Norwegian patrol vessel. This patrol vessel had constantly been with *Altmark*, and was relieved south of Bergen by the Norwegian torpedo boat *Skarv* (an old vessel of 90 tons displacement), which continued to escort *Altmark*. He deplored that *Altmark* had used her radio near Bergen, which was forbidden, and he, Diesen, presumed that the British established her location through the radio signal. (*Altmark* did actually use the radio to send a telegram to

the Legation requesting its intervention to secure the transit permit. When it was indicated to him that the sending of radio signals was forbidden, the captain of *Altmark* apologized to the Admiral in Bergen.) At about 5 p. m. a British cruiser and 5 destroyers hove into sight east of Eigerøy. One of the destroyers tried to stop *Altmark*. The British cruiser sent out a boat. *Altmark* however paid no attention and continued on her course. The Norwegian patrol vessel protested very sharply to the British destroyer against this interference within Norwegian territorial waters. *Altmark* then turned into Jössing Fjord. At that time a second Norwegian torpedo boat joined *Skarv* (following my telephone call to Admiral Diesen concerning protection of *Altmark*). *Altmark* thus was guarded by two Norwegian naval vessels. Nevertheless, two British destroyers also headed into the fjord while the cruiser and two destroyers remained outside. *Skarv* placed herself between *Altmark* and the British and protested once more in the sharpest terms, whereupon the British left. That was the situation at the time when he talked with me on the telephone the night before and he had therefore been justified in stating that all danger was past.

Later in the evening, at about 8 p. m., one destroyer suddenly reappeared, approached *Altmark* and turned searchlights on her. One of the Norwegian torpedo boats again protested. The British replied that they had to take several hundred British prisoners off the ship and boarded *Altmark* without paying any attention to the protest. Shooting was then heard and after a relatively short time the destroyers steamed out again at full speed. When I asked why the Norwegian torpedo boats had not resisted by force of arms this monstrous violation of international law, Admiral Diesen replied in these words: "What is a little torpedo boat with two automatic weapons on board (two 47 mm.) to do against a cruiser? A single salvo would wipe her out. Besides, the ice was so heavy that our small Norwegian boats were in no position to pursue the powerful British destroyers." (Comment by Naval Attaché: According to the captain of *Altmark* the ice was not that heavy.)

When I said that I, as an officer of the German Navy, found it nevertheless impossible to understand and approve the weak attitude of the commander of the Norwegian torpedo boat, he replied only by shrugging his shoulders.

Admiral Diesen continued: The last message he received this morning stated that all of the British ships had steamed out of sight. The coastal patrol posts no longer had contact with the British ships. The wounded had been placed under medical care. He would extend every facility for getting in touch with the captain of *Altmark*. He spoke bitterly, but in very cautious and reserved terms, about the action

of the British. He also added that the crew of *Altmark* had returned the fire. I denied this immediately, stating that *Altmark* was no naval vessel and had no weapons. Reply: "But she does; she has anti-aircraft guns." To this I replied: "That is entirely unknown to me; what has your Navy observed?" Reply: "It has been reported to me that the ship has anti-aircraft guns, but that they are kept below deck." To this I countered: "Which is proof that they cannot be fired."

While I was still with the Admiral, a Norwegian message arrived that *Altmark* was preparing to blow herself up. Admiral Diesen called to my attention that there were important Norwegian industrial plants nearby which might be damaged as a result. I replied that I could not imagine that the captain was planning to blow her up.

I then had a talk with several other officers of the Admiralty, including Commander Gottwald, who said in the presence of two of his fellow officers: "That's just like the British as I know them." I stressed in this talk once more my utter failure to comprehend the attitude of the commanders of the two Norwegian torpedo boats, who could have furnished proof, despite the odds against them, that they could not only talk about neutrality but also die a hero's death for neutrality. The reply was: "They were young officers who naturally did not have the courage to open fire on the British without orders."

I further wish to report that the Naval Press Chief, Captain Steen, with whom I have so far maintained very good and even friendly relations, has unfortunately been taken seriously ill and that his successor did not have the courage to give me the information which Captain Steen would surely have given me.

All that could be done for the protection of *Altmark* by the Legation and by myself since the ship's appearance off Bergen was, I believe, done. The S. S. *Altmark* was actually given the strongest protection ever accorded a German ship by Norway.

7. February 17, 11 a. m.: The Minister ordered that all measures be taken to assure the refloating of the ship and the protection of the crew. The Consul in Stavanger was instructed to go immediately to the location where the incident occurred. Furthermore, Captain Kempf, who is an expert in navigational matters, is being sent up by car to be at the disposal of the captain of *Altmark*. An improvised telephone post has been established near the location, so that the captain can be reached at all times.

The captain reported that all secret materials had been held in readiness in sacks with sufficient weight for throwing overboard and were dropped in 60 to 80 meters of water before the ship was boarded by the British destroyer. He thought it would be impossible to retrieve them. Captain Kempf will look into this once more himself.

Altmark has for the time being declined any assistance by salvage tugs. The diver will go down on February 18 to survey the damage to the stern which has run aground on rock. The captain will then decide what to do. He has reported that so far the losses are six dead; three very seriously wounded, one of whom is expected to die; three seriously wounded who will probably recover; and one missing, who was probably drowned. The British fired indiscriminately into the unarmed crew. The captain of *Altmark* is very critical of the action of the Norwegian torpedo boats. He did not want to be more specific on the telephone.

For the rest I refer to the Minister's extensive telephone reports to the Foreign Ministry, and to my brief interim report telephoned directly to Admiral Fricke.²

SCHREIBER

² On Feb. 18, the Director of the Press Department sent telegraphic instructions (3076/612958-59) for guidance of *Altmark's* captain in dealing with the foreign press. He was to emphasize that she carried only small arms and offered no resistance; that she was an ordinary oil transport with a civilian crew, assigned at the outbreak of war as a supply ship for *Admiral Graf Spee*; that the small naval party aboard did not change *Altmark's* status as an unarmed vessel; and that living conditions were the same for Germans and prisoners. He should avoid mentioning her call at a Mexican port and the particulars of her cooperation with *Graf Spee*.

On Feb. 21, Bräuer reported by telegraph (3076/612975-76) on a conversation that day with Koht who condemned the British action but regarded further violations of Norwegian territorial waters as unlikely. Koht said that his Government contemplated submitting the *Altmark* incident to arbitration to determine not whether Britain had violated international law, which he said was "quite patent," but whether any blame could be attached to Norway. The further disposition of *Altmark* and crew was also discussed in this conversation; then in a memorandum of Feb. 24, Bräuer recorded a conversation of that morning with Secretary General Bull who asked that the ship be removed from Norwegian waters as soon as possible. Bull noted that Halifax had advanced the view that *Altmark's* crew should be interned (see document No. 615, footnote 1). Bräuer opposed this view, pointing out that *Altmark* was in a Norwegian port involuntarily because of damage resulting from a violation of international law and arguing that she was entitled to remain until fully repaired. On Mar. 26, Bräuer telegraphed (3687/EO85578) that *Altmark*, accompanied by a German tug and a Norwegian destroyer, had entered Swedish waters at 7:00 a. m., Mar. 22.

No. 619

3118/641586-88

*The President of the German-Japanese Society*¹ to the State
Secretary

BERLIN, February 17, 1940.

Pol. VIII 242.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday I am sending you in the enclosure the short memorandum for which you asked.

Comradely greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

FOERSTER

¹ Admiral Richard Foerster, (Ret.).

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

February 16, 1940.

Today on the occasion of a luncheon I had a lengthy conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the policy of the United States of America, from which the following ideas may be of interest. The Ambassador expressed himself as follows:

"The Americans have no politicians and diplomats of any stature. They do not pursue a long-range policy; their policy is strongly influenced by personal interests, and at present the presidential election plays an important role. I always tell my American friends that in the present world situation the Americans ought to pursue an absolutely impartial policy; they also ought to avoid committing themselves emotionally on one side or another, so that they are always in a position to play the part of mediator, should the occasion arise."

Since I had the feeling that this recommendation of an impartial policy was supposed also to refer to the attitude of the Americans toward Japan, I went further into this point and said that a partisanship of the Americans for the British in East Asia would only be harmful to them in the long run. They should be encouraged as much as possible to take an economic interest in East Asia; this was not dangerous for Japan, since in my opinion the United States had no power interests in East Asia. On the other hand, economic competition might thereby arise between America and England in East Asia which could only be of advantage to Japan,² since it would greatly weaken the power position of England in East Asia, in the preservation of which England must under all circumstances be interested. A participation of the United States in the European war for the purpose of defeating Germany would have serious results for Japan, since a victorious England supported by America would never permit the new order in East Asia which was desired by Japan. The Ambassador agreed with me.

² Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "To Japan's benefit?"

No. 620

B18/B003398

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Minister in Finland

Telegram

No. 76 of February 19

BERLIN, February 19, 1940.

For the Minister.

With reference to telegraphic report No. 71 of February 17.¹

¹ Document No. 617.

The Foreign Minister requests you to be entirely noncommittal in future talks with Tanner, so as to arouse no false hopes.

(Foreign Minister's Secretariat)

No. 621

124/122669

Minister Zech to State Secretary Weizsäcker

SECRET

THE HAGUE, February 19, 1940.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: The Duke of W., about whom I wrote to you in my letter of the 27th of last month,¹ has said that the Allied War Council devoted an exhaustive discussion at its last meeting to the situation that would arise if Germany invaded Belgium. Reference was made throughout to a German invasion plan said to have been found in an airplane that made a forced landing in Belgium. On the military side, it was held that the best plan would be to make the main resistance effort in the line behind the Belgian-French border, even at the risk that Belgium should be occupied by us. The political authorities are said to have at first opposed this plan: After the humiliation suffered in Poland, it would be impossible to surrender Belgium and the Netherlands also to the Germans. In the end, however, the political authorities became more yielding.

Heil Hitler!

ZECH

¹ Document No. 580.

No. 622

B18/B003405-06

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, February 20, 1940—10:00 p. m.

No. 79 of February 20

Received February 21—3:45 a. m.

The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him today and brought up the subject of our last talk.¹ He opened the conversation by saying that I had told him that there was no prospect of successful mediation at this time and that I had introduced into the discussion as my personal idea the proposal of an exchange of views between emissaries of Finland and Russia in Berlin. He asked if this was not self-contradictory.

Telegram No. 76² having arrived before this conversation took place, I adapted my answers to the instructions contained therein.

¹ See document No. 617.

² Document No. 620.

I replied that mediation by a third power and an exchange of views between two parties were different matters. What held for one, did not necessarily apply to the other.

Tanner then asked whether he could count on the German Government's guaranteeing that the exchange of views would actually take place. I said that I could not answer that question.

Tanner raised the question as to the conditions Russia would make. I stated that I was not in a position to answer that question.

Upon this Tanner wanted to terminate the conversation. I took the opportunity, however, to tell him that information had been received from various quarters indicating that Finland was seeking military assistance from Germany's enemies. I wished to inquire if this was true, Tanner replied that he could not answer that question. By remaining silent for a long while I gave him an opportunity to modify this reply. He made no use of that opportunity, however, and the conversation which he had started on a distinctly friendly note terminated coldly.

I cannot at the moment judge what significance to attach to his not answering my question, in particular whether the Finnish Government will adhere to the policy it has pursued heretofore of keeping out of coalitions with the Great Powers. It is possible that the Government is wavering on a knife edge between trying to reach an understanding and approaching the Western Powers. The decision may come soon, for the pressure on the front is increasing and, with the Baltic Sea ice-bound, German military weight will not be felt in the North for months. Rumors have it that the Foreign Minister and Mannerheim's personal representative, General Walden, will fly to London within the next few days.

BLÜCHER

No. 623

582/241974-77

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, February 20, 1940.

No. 423 of February 20

I. For the purpose of strongly impressing upon the Italian Government once more the special political and military significance attaching to the current trade negotiations I, together with Clodius, today called on Count Ciano and, on the basis of various communications received by the delegation in the last few days appraising the Italian attitude at the trade negotiations, made approximately the following statement:

The view was held in Berlin that in the present situation Italy ought to do her utmost in economic aid to Germany. So far, however, the impression had been that this was not the case. This was especially true with respect to the Italian deliveries of raw materials and the Italian demands for German compensatory deliveries, with respect to the transit question, and, finally, also as regards the Italian attitude toward our demand for at least partial maintenance of the old Czechoslovak treaty duties. We recognized that Ambassador Giannini had tried his best to induce the individual Ministries to adopt a cooperative attitude in the various fields, but we had the impression that there was insufficient recognition of the great military and especially political significance which attaches to satisfactory conclusion of these particular negotiations. In individual instances, where the Duce had intervened in person, e. g., in connection with the increase in mercury deliveries from 30,000 flasks to 40,000 flasks, the results had been favorable, and we were glad to acknowledge this. But in other areas which were of vital importance to us this had not been the case.

Regarding the individual questions, Clodius made the following statement:

1) *Raw material deliveries.* Generally speaking, scarcely any of the earlier promises had been kept, except in the case of mercury. The increase in some products did not make up for the severe shortage in hemp.

2) *German deliveries of strategic materials.* The compensatory deliveries of benzol, toluol and naphthalene demanded by Italy represented a major sacrifice for Germany's wartime armament industry and could be warranted only if Italy in turn made sacrifices and delivered equivalent strategic materials to Germany.

3) *Transit.* Despite repeated protestations of good will, it was evident that the confidential instructions to the Italian authorities concerned had obviously not been emphatic enough. Difficulties were cropping up time and again—especially, for instance, in the refusal to camouflage transit shipments in both directions by handling them as Italian imports. It was therefore absolutely essential that the customs authorities be given appropriate confidential instructions to waive customs formalities.

4) *Italian copper purchases from Yugoslavia.* The fact that Italy appeared as a buyer of copper in Yugoslavia at this very juncture had caused extreme irritation among the interested offices in Berlin. Italy was expected to leave to Germany the few markets for strategic raw materials that were still freely accessible and to cover her own requirements overseas. The question of the Yugoslav copper was of very special importance to us; a similar situation prevailed also as to the purchase of nickel ores from Greece.

5) *The Czechoslovak treaty duties.* Italy's refusal to maintain, partially at least, the old Czechoslovak treaty duties was of special importance for the economy of the Protectorate and thus also for the entire German economy, because this refusal would surely result in a

refusal by the other chief customers of the Protectorate, i. e., Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, to recognize these tariff rates after April 1. We had been advised from Berlin that as a result the question of the incorporation of the Protectorate into the German customs territory would once more be submitted to the Führer. It would naturally be of considerable political significance if the execution of a measure of such economic and political importance, which had already been publicly announced, were thwarted now owing to the attitude of none other than Italy. We believed it our duty to call particular attention to this circumstance. The least that we were entitled to expect was that tariff concessions would be made to us on a scale that would enable us to cite them advantageously in dealing with the other countries. Besides, total or partial maintenance of the old Czechoslovak tariffs in the states of southeastern Europe was of no inconsiderable interest for Italian exports in view of the most-favored-nation clause involved.

6) *The rate of exchange.* In deference to the Duce's personal request that for political and psychological reasons the clearing rate of the lira in relation to the reichsmark should not be changed despite the 4 percent devaluation of the lira, we were willing to accept this arrangement. We had the right to expect, however, that the Italian Government would clearly recognize that no further changes in the exchange rate to the disadvantage of the reichsmark must occur. The Italian proposals at this time were aimed at precisely the opposite.

II. Ciano reiterated the assurance that Italy was willing to go to the utmost limits of her capacity as regards raw materials deliveries from Italy. The Duce's attitude in this respect was unchanged. Nothing could be done about hemp, however, since there actually were no more supplies on hand. Upon my remark that I had construed his latest statements about the Anglo-Italian negotiations to mean that now the trade agreements would all become void and that the shipments of hemp included therein, as he himself had said, would thereby also be canceled and so become available for us, Ciano replied that deliveries of non-war materials from Italy, which were relatively small in value (6 million pounds sterling as compared with 17 million pounds) would be continued on the basis of old treaties. That applied especially to hemp. He readily admitted that we were not incorrect in stating that in this case materials had been sold to England which on the basis of our treaties should have been earmarked for us. However, he would make another close check to determine whether it was not still possible to find some quantities for us.

The copper purchases in Yugoslavia, which in any case were small, were unavoidable in Italy's present situation. Industry was threatened with a standstill because Italy was cut off from overseas imports. At this point Ciano stated with strong feeling that Italy's

attitude toward the entire transit question was closely linked to the status of her relations with England. Italy had only to comply with British wishes on a small scale to gain greater freedom immediately. We surely would be the last in the world, however, to advise Italy to do so. Besides, Italy was resolved, and the Duce had definitely so decided, that her policy and political freedom were not to be sold for copper.

In closing, Ciano promised that he would submit all questions to the Duce again tomorrow morning. The Duce was standing firmly and unalterably by his declarations of August 26¹ and would therefore certainly do everything to exhaust all possibilities.

MACKENSEN

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 301.

No. 624

91/100160

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 96 of February 21

DUBLIN, February 21, 1940.

Received February 21—6:50 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 40 of January 22.¹

Lord Tavistock, now Chairman of the British People's Party, requested an interview with me. I had Thomsen² refuse for me. He repeated emphatically to Thomsen that the strong English peace sentiment could be strengthened decisively by the declaration referred to in telegram No. 40. Halifax apparently had shown Lord Tavistock little interest when he visited him.³

HEMPEL

¹ Document No. 559.

² Henning Thomsen, Secretary of Legation in the German Legation in Eire.

³ In telegram No. 119 of Mar. 1 (91/100164-65), Hempel reported that the morning papers carried a United Press story of an interview with Lord Tavistock concerning alleged discussions with the German Legation about peace terms. Hempel denied that any such discussions had taken place and proposed to issue such a denial to the press.

In telegram No. 137 of Mar. 8 (91/100170), Hempel suggested that the publication of the alleged German peace terms represented a personal publicity effort on the part of those involved, but that provocation by the British Government was also a possibility. Prompt denial both by the Legation and by Berlin had had a good effect, he said.

No. 625

2153/469326-28

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 111 of February 21

ANKARA, February 21, 1940—12 p. m.

Received February 22—6 a. m.

W III c 643.

Reasons for the present disagreements on Schedule II.¹

1. Intensified efforts on the part of the enemy powers to prevent conclusion of a new agreement after conclusion of the first one,² which they considered a defeat.

2. The difficulty experienced by Turkish governmental agencies in reaching agreement regarding the many deliveries desired.

3. The Turkish view that their concessions are too favorable to us and that the goods on Schedule III will not be available in sufficient quantity; hence the request to combine Schedules II and III, to which we agreed, though noting that in this case a basic agreement on the chromium question became a prerequisite.

In my conversation with Numan on this topic today he took his stand on the familiar Turkish argument:

1. Failure to deliver merchant vessels and certain categories of war material to Turkey meant discrimination, because such material was being delivered to other neutral powers in spite of the state of war.

2. The Turkish Government had to manage the limited means of its national production very economically and could give its products only in exchange for deliveries of vital importance to Turkey; this would include heavy armament.

I explained to Numan that we were in an entirely different position following conclusion of the commercial treaty with Russia, so that Turkish products were at most of secondary importance but in no circumstances decisive for German warfare. If in spite of this I continued my efforts to maintain economic relations, I did so primarily for political considerations. My Government was convinced that Turkey had the sincere desire to resist the pressure of the Western Powers and keep out of the war. We wished to support this attitude. Numan replied that the policy of his Government pursued a similar aim. It was merely a question of weighing mutual interests in order to arrive at a commercial exchange. At the same time he reiterated that no commitments had been made to the Western Powers concerning Turkish export products. To confirm this I asked him whether

¹ The files are incomplete on the Schedules referred to in this document. Some relevant material, however, has been filmed in Serials 8489 and 8493.

² See document No. 512.

Turkey would, for instance, be prepared to make deliveries of chromium if Germany would deliver several heavy guns. Numan promised to ask his Government and also to find out whether his Government was in principle still interested in the promised light war material. He suggested that we meanwhile draw up with the Economic Department the joint project for Schedules II and III.

I request instructions:

1. Does the chromium situation demand that we make further concessions, and in that case would there be more prospects of keeping Turkey neutral? On the other hand, is the delivery of some heavy guns possible?

2. Can we dispense with the chromium, thus of course eliminating delivery of any war material?

3. If we are not dependent on chromium, I suggest that Schedules II and III be approved in return for the delivery of corresponding quantities of commercial goods of interest to us as well as the assurance that old agreements will be canceled by mutual agreement.

Unless the negotiations are continued, the amicable settlement concerning cancellation of agreements, which is so urgently needed because of our general situation and its serious economic consequences, appears to be hopeless.

The principal argument for going on with the negotiations seems to me to be the struggle that we must continue with all our means against the ever-increasing British-French efforts to eliminate all German influence in Turkey, while any further agreement in this difficult field would be taken by the enemy to mean that Turkey was moving away from him.

PAPEN

No. 626

4467/E087416-29

*Memorandum by an Official of the Aussempolitisches Amt*¹

BERLIN, February 21, 1940.

SOJOURN IN NORWAY

FROM JANUARY 20 TO FEBRUARY 20, 1940

I. *General feeling in Norway*

Even though there has been no pro-German sentiment in the last few years to speak of, British propaganda in Norway has nevertheless been intensified. I am not certain whether the wherewithal for this propaganda flows directly from England to Norway or

¹ The document is unsigned but was found in a file of reports by Wilhelm Scheidt relating to Norway.

rather whether British propaganda in Norway has become independent and is leading an autonomous existence. This is entirely possible since all Norway is hypnotized into believing that nothing can be undertaken against England and that, in view of the extensive maritime trade carried on by Norway, one is dependent on the British rule of the sea. It would be a grave mistake to assume that Labor is an exception in this respect and that the Anglophile attitude is confined merely to the business world and particularly to the groups interested in maritime shipping. Even the simple worker fears that he would immediately have to lower his tremendously high standard of living by 50 percent if the British should initiate any sort of reprisals. Without knowing the real circumstances, they place the entire blame for the Finnish conflict on Germany and, beyond that, call the attention of all Scandinavia to the dangers involved in having a ruthless neighbor to the East and a neighbor unreliable in its diplomatic alignments to the South. (The following terminology is used in this connection: nonaggression pact with Poland—rape of Poland; constant assurances of having no further claims, but conflicts just the same—Austria, the Sudetenland, Czechia, Danzig and the Corridor.)

The German Legation in Norway has recently protested against the atrocity propaganda against Germany tolerated by official Norwegian circles. No one in Norway speaks of British atrocities. But there are always quite a few people ready uncritically to pass on unverifiable rumors concerning injured seamen. Oslo and other Norwegian cities are full of seamen telling about "their personal experiences." Time and again the story recurs that German naval vessels and planes fired on unarmed seamen who were already in lifeboats. Every steamer that has hit a mine anywhere has been torpedoed. Furthermore, there are always seamen who have seen the submarine. A case related to me on separate occasions in several different places is characteristic; it concerns a former German national who had become a Norwegian citizen. His son, who was a German citizen, had supposedly taken a long trip in September of last year. In his absence his father accepted two letters from Germany addressed to the son but did not open them. Upon the son's return it developed that these letters were orders to report for military service. The father, who was worried, left for Germany with his son. Here the young man placed himself at the disposal of the Wehrmacht authorities and his father heard nothing of him for several days. When he inquired about the son he was told, yes, he could see him, but he would have to step down into the courtyard where his son lay shot dead. Thereupon, the father became insane. There are Germans in Oslo who have offered considerable sums to learn the

name of this man. In no case was that possible. But there are also Germans in Oslo who believe this nonsense. At the same time stories are told of mysterious doings in the German Legation. Persons are said to have been murdered there and shipped to Germany in zinc coffins, and other similar nonsense is spread as rumors. One can, of course, leave these things as they are, but the effect of such atrocity propaganda in a small country and especially in a place as prone to gossip as Oslo should not be underestimated. In any event, the tendency of the Norwegians to accept such atrocity accounts as long as they are spread in connection with Germany or Russia, and the fact that nothing whatsoever is heard of any British doings indicate what this atrocity propaganda is aiming to do. In its present frame of mind the Norwegian public is not open to reasoning that is objective and politically mature. The political thinking of even highly intellectual Norwegian circles is on a level that is shockingly low from our point of view. In this connection, I again wish to call attention to the two periodicals, *Utenriks Chronik* and *Ragnarok*. Of special significance is an article by Hjort, a well-known Norwegian attorney, which appeared in the latter periodical (issue of January-February 1940). This article is entitled "The North in 1940", and its stand is amazingly naive throughout. Intellectual circles that are known to have pro-German leanings and to be close to the nationalist ideas of the twentieth century attach importance to Hjort's opinion. All political editorials have two characteristic traits: first, as previously stated, political naïveté and the inability to grasp the true motives of the political events of our time and, second, a keen business sense by virtue of which the Norwegians are able to look after their business interests with great skill. In my opinion, the official statements of the Norwegian Government should be received with utmost distrust if only for the reason that the extensive anti-German propaganda being carried on in the press as well as by word of mouth cannot be explained in any other way than that the Government not only tolerates but even promotes it. Naturally, the Government can at all times claim that the free press of a "free country" may write what it pleases. Germany, however, must not accept this statement because, after all, it is only an excuse, and in reality the propaganda may well be centrally directed. In this small country all prominent people know one another. They have the most peculiar connections with each other and are somehow also dependent on one another—be it only in their knowledge that nothing binds people more closely together than infamous acts jointly committed. Personal and business interests, tax matters, drinking parties, and all possible family indiscretions play the biggest possible role in this connection.

In regard to the *Altmark* affair, it was of interest to me to obtain reports from my agents on the public discussion of this matter. On Saturday, February 17, the extra release on this affair appeared in the show windows of the Oslo newspaper offices. The fact that England had flagrantly violated neutrality had a surprising but by no means the alarming effect so frequently alleged in other quarters. The mob clustered outside the show windows greeted the fact that five German sailors (this was the number originally published but later changed) were killed in this British surprise attack with cries of "What, only five! why weren't all of them killed!" I was very much interested in finding out whether only a few individuals had said this and whether others had protested, but to my regret I learned that these outcries had evoked a general murmur of approval. During the next 2 days as well, the British act of piracy was characterized as an excellent job² whenever no Germans were in evidence. The attitude of the Norwegian sailors aboard the small torpedo boats which accompanied *Altmark* is likewise significant. One of these Norwegian sailors called to a German sailor who had jumped from *Altmark* into the fjord and was swimming toward the Norwegian naval vessel: "Swim to the British!" I have learned from the German Military Attaché in Oslo that this German sailor, who was, after all, in distress at sea, was not taken aboard the Norwegian torpedo boat.

On Monday, February 19, M. Hagelin was able to be at a tea attended by a number of members of the Norwegian Storting. On that occasion he overheard the conversation of two men, one of whom expressed the opinion that the Norwegians should at least have fired in the air, whereupon the other corrected him saying that this was entirely out of the question since the attitude displayed by the captains of the two torpedo boats, with reference to the British, was after all "a matter of instructions". It was further stated in authoritative Norwegian circles that control of the northern North Sea and the North Atlantic by Germany was extremely problematical. The incident in the Jössing Fjord induced several Norwegians, among them several Norwegian seamen, to remark to me that although this attack was a scandalous encroachment on the part of the British, it nevertheless proved once again the extent of England's supremacy at sea; it had been possible to carry out the entire operation without intervention or interference from the Germans, and not the Germans but the British controlled the North Atlantic and were likewise masters of the northern North Sea. The German contention that the British fleet was hiding in the ports of western England in fear of German planes and submarines was incorrect, as could also be seen from the *Altmark* incident.

² This word appears in English in the text.

II. *The opinion of the German Minister in Oslo*

Upon my return to Norway on January 21, I immediately conferred with Dr. Bräuer, the German Minister. I told him on that occasion that I was warning against an optimistic appraisal of the situation in Norway with respect to the Norwegian-German relationship. In my opinion, it was obvious that—as I had mentioned in my previous report³—Norway, in agreement with England, was doing everything possible to allay the fears of the German official agencies here by official statements. Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, was certainly a gentleman, but by no means an honest broker in relation to the interests of Norway and those of the belligerent countries. He probably has very little to say anyway, but it is certain that he must conduct a seesaw policy, for which no one in Norway envies him. Even at the last moment the Norwegians would protest against alleged violations by England, but they would do so for tactical reasons and not by conviction. They would explain that they could do nothing against a superior enemy anyway and while they would raise a clamor in case of a violation, they would nevertheless display great sympathy. [Our] Minister must have strong reasons to differ with my appraisal of the Norwegian attitude in spite of this, and I am the last person to underestimate his difficult mission in Norway. Nevertheless, I expected that the information I subsequently sent him would, if not convince him, at least give him pause for reflection. During the night of Monday, January 29, I saw (as indicated in the previous report) uniformed members of the British Medical Corps in Oslo for the first time. My report to this effect to the Naval Attaché and the Minister was received very noncommittally. Later, however, the Legation and the Naval Attaché informed me that the Norwegian authorities had admitted the presence of 150 members of the British Medical Corps.⁴ Some time later, I was informed by a supervisor in the Norwegian Telephone and Telegraph Office that she had overheard a telephone conversation between members of the Norwegian delegation engaged in the Norwegian-British economic negotiations, in which it was mentioned that the British had demanded naval bases in Norway and freedom of action in Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian Government had rejected this demand. Thereupon the British had threatened reprisals of an economic nature.

I reported this to the Minister that same day; he made light of the report and tried to explain to me that the British were not in any

³Not printed (4467/E087430-40). A memorandum of Feb. 2 arguing that the German Legation in Oslo was unaware of the real state of Norwegian public opinion—strongly but covertly pro-British—and asking that Scheidt be given some regular position in Norway that would enable him to conduct his liaison and intelligence activities more effectively.

⁴Bräuer informed the Foreign Ministry in a telegram sent Feb. 19 that he had asked Koht about the reported presence of uniformed Britons in Norway, but as instructed, had refrained from comment (22/13818-19).

position to initiate economic reprisals. I tried to verify the report and made inquiries through my contact, Quisling. Quisling told me that he knew nothing of this matter, but would try to obtain more detailed information. He did know, however, that the British had made such a demand about Christmas and that the Norwegian King had at that time approached the British King directly with the request that he prevail upon his Government to withdraw this demand for the time being, as such action was premature. By now, Quisling said, nearly 2 months had passed and the British had very probably reiterated their demand. I asked Quisling from what source he had learned of this matter, and he told me that he had asked a friend of his, an officer in the King's immediate entourage, who had given him this information. This, too, I reported to the Minister. Some time later the German Naval Attaché told me that a German, who had been living in Norway for a long time, had given him the same information, and that this matter was being discussed on the west coast. In my opinion, the fact that such information is being spread about does not necessarily indicate that it is not true, because in this small country even indiscretions that concern confidential matters are passed on. Quisling has now made further inquiries and learned that a secret agreement between the Norwegian Government and England actually exists, by virtue of which the Norwegians are prepared to react to British encroachments merely with paper protests. All this occurred before the *Altmark* affair. The *Altmark* incident itself offers the first evidence that the Norwegian-British agreement is functioning. On Saturday, February 17, I once more spoke with the Minister, and he again expressed the same view, namely that the Norwegians were in no position to take a stand against us. In this connection, the Minister hinted that, especially of late, important Norwegian-German agreements were in process of preparation, and that the Norwegians were attaching increased importance to the ratification of these agreements; in the event these agreements, the details of which I did not learn from him, entered into force, all of Norwegian economic life would be so firmly in our hands that the Norwegians would not be able to make any moves against us at all. I do not know what negotiations are involved, but from the tenor of the entire conversation, I assume that they are connected with the German-Norwegian economic negotiations.⁵ In no circumstances do I think that the Norwegians would feel dependent on us with regard to their attitude, even if the agreements went into force. England always tells Norway that

⁵ Bräuer reported by telegram on Feb. 20 that the German-Norwegian trade agreement for 1940, "which goes far toward meeting our wishes," was initiated that day (3518/E021071). The text of the agreement, which finally bore the date Feb. 23, is not printed (3072/612811-16).

the present blockade line, northern England-Iceland-Greenland, is ineffective, and that this is endangering all of Norway's overseas shipping. If the British could turn the blockade line against Germany 45 degrees to the east and organize it along a much shorter route than heretofore between northern England and southern Norway, all Norwegian overseas shipping could develop completely unrestrictedly behind this blockade, allegedly even protected and favored by England. As indicated above, an incident such as occurred in Jössing Fjord contributes toward convincing the Norwegians once more that the British control the northern North Sea. I do not know what advantages Germany would have to offer Norway in such a case. Naturally, it is not certain whether the Norwegians will turn out to be right. I, personally, am of the opinion that Norway by her actions is plunging into an adventure that will definitely undermine her existence. The Norwegians are not of my opinion, however, and I am inclined to believe that in the end England will take advantage of them as of other small states.

III. *Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling*

As agreed, I have so far given M. Quisling the equivalent of RM 100,000 in British pounds. Quisling has successfully launched his propaganda campaign and trebled the street sales of his periodical in Oslo within 4 weeks. Twenty-five thousand copies are now being sent through the mails. He gives particular attention to seeing that the entire Norwegian officer corps receives this periodical, and on the basis of an extensive mailing list he also supplies them with personal letters and other communications. At my suggestion and at the request of the German Naval Attaché, Quisling is now organizing an intelligence network along the Norwegian coast with the help of the members of his party. The arrangement is such that the country is divided into three major sectors and a party follower of Quisling familiar with maritime shipping is placed in charge of each sector (southern, central, and northern Norway) on a full-time basis. Wherever possible, an effort is made to have an agent on every vessel, who will duly report to Quisling. The questions of interest to us will then be transmitted by Quisling to the German Naval Attaché through me. The German Naval Attaché promises himself a great deal from these facilities, and I agree with him that the old intelligence methods are no longer very useful. Even in the small countries the police are so well acquainted with the modern methods of police work that the traditional secret service methods break down sooner or later. The latest case of this kind in Stockholm has attracted considerable attention in Scandinavia. There the British Intelligence Service worked along conservative lines and failed. The method of hiring agents and supplying them with money is costly and unre-

liable, since only such elements agree to something of this sort as are predisposed by their own inclination. In Norway we have an opportunity to operate through a political movement, the followers of which act by conviction. The German Military Attaché has also asked me to present this view to the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The support of the Quisling party is certainly of great advantage to us for very important reasons. Regardless of the development in the situation in Norway and the means which we may some day employ, we must have in Norway a movement that is as strong as possible and friendly to us. The more we support this movement now, the better it will be for us in the future. The funds hitherto made available are inadequate when compared to the tasks facing Quisling. Even if I deliver RM 100,000 more as agreed, German support cannot stop there.* If, for instance, Quisling wished to turn his weekly periodical into a daily paper (preparations for this have been made), this daily paper would cost him at the outset 1,500 kroner a day, or 45,000 kroner per month. This represents the immediate cost of mailing and printing. The political staff also costs a lot of money. In addition there are the costs of the propaganda and of the constantly growing organization. Quisling is correct, however, in his view that he must make the decision to undertake publication of a daily paper dependent on whether the necessary funds will also be guaranteed in the future. If these funds should cease to be forthcoming sooner or later, then the setback suffered by his party and his own political prestige would be so much the greater. I therefore request that steps be taken to assure the greatest possible security in this respect.

IV. *A daily newspaper*

For the past year, I have been advocating everywhere that the German Government ought to take over a Norwegian daily paper. It would be well to have available a Norwegian newspaper that does not belong to Quisling directly. At one time the newspaper *Tidens Tegn* was for sale. This newspaper could then have been taken over for approximately 400,000 kroner. For reasons not fully known to me this offer was declined at the time by the Germans. In the meantime, the British cleverly took possession of this newspaper (without investing any of their own capital) so that it is today by no means pro-

*On Feb. 24, Rosenberg reminded Ribbentrop that it had been agreed between them to make 200 to 300 thousand RM immediately available to Quisling and that it was urgent for Scheidt to receive the second installment to take back with him to Norway. (*Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvi, document No. 957-PS, Exhibit GB-139, p. 411). In the retrospective memorandum of the Ausserpolitisches Amt of June 15 (*ibid.*, vol. xxv, document No. 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140, p. 29), it is stated that this agreement was made "in January," but no contemporary document giving the exact terms has been found.

German. I was told by the Legation that the *Tidens Tegn* matter was hopeless. An influential Norwegian of my acquaintance, Professor Claus Hansen, the chairman of the Norwegian-German Society, asked me recently whether an attempt could not again be made to interest Germany in the *Tidens Tegn*. I told him that I had nothing to do with these things and for obvious reasons did not care to get involved in such matters. In spite of this statement, I learned from him that he saw a possibility for taking over *Tidens Tegn*, and he wishes to give me exact information in this respect within 2 weeks. When I asked why he did not do this through the Legation, he told me that he did not want to do it through official channels and asked me to inquire here in Berlin whether any interest existed.

V. In my opinion the work undertaken in Norway in connection with the Nasjonal Samling is unfortunately somewhat jeopardized by the fact that too many offices in Germany are handling Scandinavian matters. Aside from the fact that even in peacetime it was often difficult to centralize all the offices interested in Scandinavia, it would be downright disastrous now, during the war, if more offices than absolutely necessary were to deal with Scandinavia. For example, long before the war, I failed to understand why no office of the Reichsbahn was established in Oslo for the Germany tourist trade in Norway. As far as I know, such Reichsbahn offices in London, Paris, and especially in Vienna and Prague, have worked well politically and with respect to intelligence, and it would not have been bad to undertake this work in Norway as well. Now that we have been waging war for 6 months, Herr Winter, the business manager of this organization, has come to Oslo to examine the feasibility of setting up a Reichsbahn office. In Oslo itself, it is now considered clear that Germany intends to set up an espionage center in Norway. This case again demonstrates that an opportunity once passed up can under new and entirely different conditions be a still-born child. I should consider the establishment of such a Reichsbahn office as unobjectionable only if its work were confined exclusively to the tourist trade. I regard all other activity with great suspicion because it will at some point run counter to our work some day and may possibly have very unpleasant consequences for us. It would be advisable to arrange that no German agency whatever, with the exception of the Wehrmacht components and, of course, the Foreign Ministry within the scope of the tasks assigned to it, should deal with Norwegian matters of any kind.⁷

⁷ Rosenberg recorded in his personal diary the following entry for Mar. 3, 1940: "On February 29 I was called to the Führer for a rather long visit. On the basis of Scheidt's memorandum I reported extensively about Norwegian affairs. The Führer naturally is extraordinarily interested, emphasized as before that N[orway]'s and Sw[eden]'s neutrality is desirable, but that in view of British

Footnote (7)—Continued

actions a dramatic climax clearly had to come, and yet that after all we are fully ready. We have abstained from any attempt at an active political action originating in the country [Norway] itself, but at the same time there has been other support on an especially generous scale for the forces favorable to us. The Führer wished to speak to Scheidt personally, but he was already in Oslo again." Rosenberg's diary, Nuremberg document No. 1749-PS, has not been published, but excerpts concerning Norway and Denmark, Jan. 2-May 7, 1940, are published in Walther Hubatsch, *Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940*, pp. 452-456.

No. 627

1848/421151-52

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 429 of February 21

ROME, February 22, 1940.

Received February 22—10:00 a. m.

I. Following the Ambassador's démarche with Ciano yesterday,¹ the Duce had a conference with the Minister of Finance this morning, and another conference with Ciano, Foreign Trade Minister Riccardi, and Ambassador Giannini tonight [February 21]. The Duce made the following decisions there regarding Italy's stand on the several questions discussed with Ciano, which Giannini by direction of the Duce has just communicated to me:

1) *Raw materials.* The Duce is prepared as in the past to go to the utmost limits in delivering Italian raw materials. Inasmuch as there actually is no more hemp on the market, the Duce has ordered the requisitioning of 1,500 tons for Germany. Requisitioning of larger quantities is impossible on account of the extreme scarcity of supplies.

2) *Copper from Yugoslavia.* The Duce stated that inasmuch as Italy was unable to increase her trade with the Western Powers, in view of her consistent policy in accord with Germany and especially her refusal to deliver war materials, and moreover, as we knew, had trouble with the blockade, she had to depend on certain supplies from southeastern Europe. Nevertheless, he intended to help Germany in the vital matter of the copper question. Since Italy could not at the moment spare the 3,500 tons of copper earmarked for immediate shipment from Yugoslavia and since it was to be feared, moreover, that this quantity would not be made available to Germany even if Italy renounced her claim, he was prepared to carry through a very rigorous requisitioning of copper, including house and even church implements, and place 3,500 tons of the proceeds of this requisitioning at the disposal of Germany. The Duce requested that this promise be treated with the strictest secrecy.

¹ See document No. 623.

As to the imports of nickel ore from Greece, there was no possibility at present of replacing them by other imports.

3) *Transit.* The Duce reaffirmed that Italy was willing to help Germany, but it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution and moderation because, with the indiscretions that were to be feared, any excess in these transit transactions was sure to result in Italy's being cut off from all imports. To preclude this was, in the last analysis, as much in Germany's interest as it was in Italy's.

4) *German deliveries of strategic materials.* The Duce requested urgently that the relatively small quantities of benzol, toluol, and naphthalene requested by the Italian delegation be made available. Military considerations of the very first order were involved and he was sure that those responsible in Germany would not leave Italy in the lurch on this.

5) *The former Czechoslovak treaty duties.* Giannini informed the Duce that according to a telephone communication² which I had received from Berlin today the Führer had decided not to put into effect the inclusion of the Protectorate in the German customs territory on April 1. This being so, the Duce declared that the question was no longer a live issue at the moment. Otherwise, however, he would have had to ask Germany to desist from her demand for the maintenance of Czechoslovak treaty duties. The benefits accruing to Germany from the maintenance of these tariffs would be entirely out of proportion to the serious damage which the most-favored-nation clause would thereby inflict on Italian industry.

In conclusion Giannini stated that Count Ciano planned to receive the Ambassador tomorrow in order to give him the reply to his démarche.³

II. The Duce's decision to order requisitions for the delivery of more hemp and particularly the delivery of 3,500 tons of copper—a very considerable quantity of gasoline [*sic*] which Italy urgently needs for her own armaments—constitutes a great sacrifice for Italy. Giannini acknowledged that the Duce had made this decision as a special gesture of friendship toward Germany and hinted that the Duce was very anxious that this gesture should be appreciated accordingly by German leaders.

It is my opinion that in view of this situation the few Italian wishes concerning the delivery of the aforementioned strategic materials must be complied with to a satisfactory degree.

CLODIUS
MACKENSEN

² Not found.

³ This anticipated reply was reported by Mackensen in a telegram of Feb. 23 (1848/421153-54). Ciano had spoken again of Mussolini's desire to do everything possible in economic support, which he said was motivated in part by his wish to express once more his personal friendship for Göring. Ciano had added that the Italians thought it particularly important to stress Italo-German solidarity at this time, and he had ordered a draft prepared of a joint communiqué emphasizing this and particularly Mussolini's personal influence on the negotiations.

No. 628

1822/416878-81

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

No. 563

Kilo, February 22, 1940.

Received February 26,

Pol. VI 519.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The situation in Finland.¹

In the last few days an event occurred in Finland which deeply affects the whole situation here.

The Russians, who until now had nothing but defeats at the front, have for the first time scored a military victory in an important sector. Day after day the Russian Army Command, throwing tremendous quantities of artillery ammunition, tanks, and planes into the battle, hurled its shock troops against the Mannerheim Line at Summa along the highway leading to Viipuri from the south. The Finns fought back with their characteristic tenacity and bravery and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. But the Finnish troops, receiving no relief, eventually were unable, because of sheer exhaustion, to hold the first line against the continuous waves of Russian reinforcements. Field Marshal Mannerheim had to make the decision to withdraw the right wing and take up new positions. The sector affected was the line from Makslahti, on the Gulf of Finland, to Lake Ayräpää. The new positions are laid out so that in the west, where they receded the furthest, they run about 15 kilometers from the original line, again approaching the Mannerheim Line toward the east, where they connect with it at Lake Ayräpää. But the island of Koivisto with its 30.5 cm. battery, which is behind the Russian lines, is still in Finnish hands.

This penetration of the Mannerheim Line must not be looked upon as a breakthrough likely to decide the campaign. On the Karelian Isthmus the Russians will encounter still other fortifications and much resistance before they can attack Viipuri, and after that they will run up against the Saima position, which represents a natural obstacle to invading the interior of the country. Nevertheless this first victory of the Russians has apparently caused concern at Finnish headquarters, and the Field Marshal is reported to show signs of nervousness. The members of the Government also give the impression that they are troubled about the future. However, this is less apparent in the spirit of the broad masses, because victories were scored at the same time at the front north of Lake Ladoga; these have no tactical

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

significance, to be sure, but they brought great booty; besides, the hope for foreign aid constantly feeds the imagination of the people.

Under the impact of the reverse at Summa, the military and political leaders seem to have come to the conclusion that Finland lacks the manpower to withstand the Russian pressure in the long run, and that help from abroad, which up to now has been chiefly in matériel, would have to be activated in some other way. First an attempt was made to bring about intervention by regular Swedish troops. This attempt failed because of the negative attitude of the Stockholm cabinet. It remains to be seen whether the Finns will resign themselves to this. The formation of increasing numbers of volunteer organizations, the mounting deliveries of war material, and related actions automatically tend to draw Sweden more and more into the Russo-Finnish conflict. The view can be heard expressed in Finland that the time is coming when it will be possible to overthrow the present Swedish cabinet and replace it with an activist cabinet.

The aid measures under way in the other Scandinavian countries and in Holland, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, and North America are to be intensified without altering their character. But they are not on a scale that could ever decisively influence the outcome of the war.

The big question now arising is whether Finland is going to ask or has already asked the two Western Powers at war with Germany, which so far have supplied war material only, to assist her with troops.

It is very hard for me to obtain accurate information on that point because at present such matters are carefully kept from me. In a roundabout way I have learned that a French colonel, Ganeval, who is on Gamelin's staff, and an English major have arrived at Mannerheim's headquarters. Rumors have been circulating in Helsinki for the past few days that the Foreign Minister and General Walden, the personal representative of the Field Marshal, were going to fly to London. In newspaper circles the question of Finland's joining the Western Powers is openly discussed. Finally I squarely put the question to the Foreign Minister as to whether Finland was seeking military aid from the Western Powers. The Foreign Minister gave me no reply. This in itself could be construed as an affirmative reply to my question. Yet I instinctively had the impression that the Foreign Minister was still wavering at the time of the conversation as to whether to avail himself of certain possibilities of coming to terms with Russia that I had hinted at, or to decide on approaching the Western Powers. The decision may possibly be made within the next days.

The determining factor in evaluating the decision will be the form in which this aid is planned and carried out and, more particularly,

whether it will go so far as to unite Finland and the Western Powers as allies.

Accepting the hypothesis that France and England will send troops to aid Finland, this could in my opinion be done by three routes: Narvik, Petsamo, and Murmansk. It would probably be the simplest and most effective to land troops at Narvik. That would violate Norway's neutrality, it is true, but since the *Altmark* affair² we need not expect any particular scruples in that respect on the part of the Western Powers. Further, to be sure, the route would have to go through Sweden, whose present government would hardly agree to it; by the time the occasion arises, however, it may possibly have been supplanted by an activist government.

In any case it must be borne in mind that the Western Powers need not during the present season fear any German military opposition to operations in the northern countries. The Baltic Sea, which in normal years would have permitted the German High Command to operate on the inner line, is completely frozen over this year and will for months form a natural obstacle to any German military operations in the North.

Should the suggested possibilities of military intervention on the part of the Western Powers from Narvik materialize, it is doubtful whether this would help Finland; there can be no doubt, however, that the Swedish iron ore mines would come under the control of the Western Powers.

In view of the uncertain basis of these speculations, I shall at present refrain from going into German military counter measures. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that the neatest [*eleganteste*] solution would be to compose the Finnish-Russian conflict before the Western guardian angels have time to arrive and take the Swedish ore, instead of Finland, under their wings.

BLÜCHER

² See documents Nos. 615 and 618.

No. 629

217/147829-30

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

SECRET!

BERLIN, February 22, 1940.

Hauptreferat VI

Colonies

Ka/Hr

For the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Referring to my memorandum of December 2, 1939,¹ in which I proposed that a statement as indicated in the enclosure be sent to the

¹ Not found.

leaders of the South African opposition, I wish to report that, following approval of my suggestion by the Foreign Minister, I sent Frau Maria Radley to South Africa. Frau Radley has meanwhile arrived in Bloemfontein and has sent her husband, as the latter informed me today, a message which, after decoding, reads as follows:

"Delivered in order. Atmosphere healthy. Satisfied with contents. Possibility of being able to show a reaction soon uncertain."

From this it is clear: 1) that the leaders of the opposition, Hertzog and Malan, are familiar with the offer of the German Government and that they know that the means are in their hands to make the offer official; 2) that an immediate decision, particularly on the part of Hertzog, cannot yet be expected. As can be seen from today's DNB reports (No. 53 West, pages 2 and 3), General Hertzog has even made a statement to a special correspondent of the Hague newspaper, *Het Vaderland*, expressing the belief of the South Africans that they would be faced with grave dangers if Germany were eventually to win this war. The transmission of the declaration by Frau Radley therefore came at just the right time to dissipate these foolish fears of Hertzog's and enable the Malan-Rendsburg² group to work upon the old General with sensible arguments.

KARLOWA

[Enclosure]

I. The Government of the German Reich will, upon conclusion of peace with the Union of South Africa, recognize and guarantee its national territory, consisting of the Cape Province, Transvaal, Oranje, and Natal, as well as the three Protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland.

II. The Government of the German Reich will, in case peace is concluded with the Union of South Africa, declare that Germany is disinterested if the Union of South Africa extends its national territory to what is now Southern Rhodesia.

III. The Government of the German Reich is prepared to negotiate a long-term commercial treaty with the Union of South Africa after peace is concluded.

IV. The Government of the German Reich declares that, in demanding the return of her colonies, it is pursuing the aim of broadening the German raw materials base in such a way as to ensure its supply of tropical and sub-tropical raw materials from *Germany's own African colonies*. It is not contemplating, however, the creation of a separate state on African soil and recognizes the Union of South Africa as the leading white state in the South African Lebensraum.

² Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg (Rendsburg), Nationalist leader, former Secretary of State for Justice and Administrator of the Orange Free State, had visited Germany and been received by a number of prominent Germans in 1936.

No. 630

1671/394586-87

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 143 of February 23

Tokyo, February 23, 1940—8:45 a. m.

Received February 23—5:55 p. m.

Pol. VIII 383 g.

For the State Secretary personally.

After my arrival here I found that the Japanese with whom I was already acquainted, such as Oshima, Shiratori, Terauchi, Ishii, etc., had not changed their friendly attitude and were willing to give assistance in every respect. As regards the political situation my impression is as follows:

All groups and parties are primarily occupied with domestic difficulties at present.

With respect to foreign policy, the Government is making an effort not to be drawn into a European combination. The attitude toward England and America is friendly. No important decisions can be expected before the impact of military operations in Europe is felt.

The influence of the Army, which had been weakening since the last summer session, is already growing again. A further increase may be expected. Well-known pro-German officials in the Foreign Ministry and like-minded officers in the General Staff and the War Ministry have for several months been transferred systematically to posts abroad or in China. Every effort is being made here to reverse this measure.

I have got in touch with the circles concerned and arranged for continued work after my return from America.

Popular sentiment is largely pro-German and also anti-British; conditions are thus favorable for our political goals. Public opinion with respect to Court and financial circles is not as yet very greatly aroused. It would be advantageous if Russian willingness to reach a settlement with Japan could be made more evident. Aside from improving the political atmosphere, this might affect favorably the current efforts to improve German-Japanese trade via Siberia.

STAHLER¹

OTT

¹ See document No. 567, footnote 1.

No. 631

F18/068

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM No. 4

BERLIN, February 23, 1940.

Today I received the Hungarian Minister, who made statements to me similar to those he had made to the State Secretary.¹

He informed me that the United States had inquired of the Hungarian Government as to its thoughts on disarmament and economic questions in a future peace settlement. The Hungarian Government had indicated its willingness to cooperate in the solution of all questions of world economy; disarmament, however, could not be considered as long as the question of the Hungarian minorities in Rumania had not been satisfactorily settled.

The Hungarian Minister then broached the subject of the approaching visit of Mr. Sumner Welles. I told him that in view of the British war aim of partitioning Germany, the latter was resolved to wage the war until her enemies were annihilated and begged for peace. I hoped that this would come about more quickly than was thought possible in some quarters today.

R[IBBENTROP]

¹ Memorandum not printed (73/52251).

No. 632

4853/E079928

The Foreign Ministry to the National Socialist War Veterans League

BERLIN, February 21, 1940.

Sent February 24.

Partei 846.

Drafting Officers: Senior Counselor Luther.
Secretary of Legation Dr. Garben.

For attention of Major (ret.) von Rechenberg.

With reference to your letter of February 13, Auslandsabt. IX 55/40.¹

The Foreign Ministry requests that you notify the proper authorities of the National Socialist War Veterans League [*Reichskriegerbund*] and in particular its district headquarters in the city of Aachen that no support must be lent to the efforts of young men from Eupen-Malmédy to evade Belgian military service by flight to Germany.

¹ Not printed (723/264647-53).

The flight to Germany of any considerable number of residents of Eupen-Malmédy would cause an undesirable weakening of the German ethnic element there.

Heil Hitler!

By order:
LU[THEE]

No. 633

173/84215-16

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division II

BERLIN, February 24, 1940.

Secretary of Legation de Beus of the Netherlands Legation today handed me the attached note verbale¹ which made the spotting of seven German planes over Netherlands territory on February 20 the subject of a protest. Upon delivering the note, M. de Beus at once remarked that presumably it was not a case of seven planes but only of two or three, since several of the spotters' reports evidently referred to the same plane.

In reply to the request for information at the end of the note verbale as to whether the planes that had passed over Holland on the night of February 20-21 were German, I at once told M. de Beus that I could tell him immediately that they had been British. Besides, we had again received a great many reports of British planes flying over the Netherlands in the last few days.

M. de Beus also handed me the memorandum, likewise attached hereto,² containing a list of all alleged German flights over Holland observed by the Netherlands military authorities in the period from September 8 to January [February] 3. The Netherlands Legation obviously intends thereby to maintain its previous allegations about German flights over Netherlands territory in the face of our replies, which had been negative for the most part. Accordingly, I immediately told M. de Beus that the list was erroneous; we had long ago stated our position on all these cases in our notes verbales. I would go over the list again and the result would surely be that we would once more demonstrate this error to the Legation.³

¹ Not printed (173/84217-18). The note, which concluded with the request for information as to whether any of the planes which flew over Holland during the night of Feb. 20-21 were German, stated that a similar question had been addressed to the British Government.

² Not printed (173/84219-21).

³ The files contain a considerable number of communications from the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe to the Foreign Ministry indicating that flights by German planes over Netherlands territory had taken place on numerous occasions, e. g., 173/84046, 84056-58, 84065, 84067, etc.

Regarding the case of the flight by a Netherlands plane over Nordhorn on January 14, also referred to in the memorandum, I maintained with respect to the assertion that such a flight was out of the question, that the flight over Nordhorn by a Netherlands plane on the day mentioned was indisputable because it had been observed with absolute certainty.

RINTELEN

No. 634

8339/E590060-65

*German-Italian Commercial Agreement, Signed in Rome,
February 24, 1940¹*

zu W g 1045.²

FOURTH SECRET PROTOCOL³

Pursuant to instructions from their Governments, the chairman of the German governmental committee and the chairman of the Italian governmental committee for the regulation of economic relations between the German Reich and Italy, in consultation with several members of the governmental committees and several experts and on the basis of the agreements reached in the Secret Protocols of May 14, 1937; December 18, 1937; and February 13, 1939, have studied the question of how the German Reich and Italy, in the present abnormal situation, can grant each other special economic assistance over and above what has been done to date.

These discussions have led to the following results:

1. The two Governments will use their best efforts to carry through during the year 1940 the deliveries in both directions provided for in Schedules C and D, attached hereto.

Drafting of Schedules A and B for deliveries in normal times has been waived in view of the present extraordinary situation.

2. The chairmen of the two governmental committees, on the basis of the reports of their respective experts, have carefully studied the

¹ The series of minor agreements (8339/E589998-E590075) which accompanied the signing of the Secret Protocol on Feb. 24 included three secret exchanges of letters. In the first (8339/E590044-45), the German Government agreed to an exchange rate fixed at 7.68 lire to 1 reichsmark for 1940, with provision for modification if price relationships changed. The second (8339/E590054-55) concerned credit arrangements involving the German nationals and Volksdeutsche emigrating from Alto Adige Province to Germany. The third (8339/E590068-69) voided the secret exchange of letters of Feb. 13, 1939, regarding Italo-German tourist traffic (see vol. iv, document No. 451, footnote 1) and established new regulations to apply until the funds involved were liquidated.

² W g 1045: Not found.

³ The original Secret Protocol was signed May 14, 1937 (7199/E529736-41). For text of the Second Secret Protocol, signed Dec. 18, 1937, see vol. i, document No. 84; for the text of the Third Secret Protocol, signed Feb. 13, 1939, see vol. iv, document No. 451.

transport situation and the results of the conference on this subject held during the past months by these experts. They are agreed that the two Governments will use all means at their command to facilitate shipments between the two countries.

3. The chairman of the German governmental committee calls attention to the fact that the assumption of the obligation by the German Government to assure, as far as production is concerned, the delivery of 12 million tons of coal from the German Reich to Italy during 1940, requires an extraordinary effort on the part of the German economy. Transport for this quantity of coal by the land route can be assured, however, only at the rate of 500,000 tons per month, and then only if the Italian railway administration makes 5,000 coal cars available for these shipments at all times. This obligation remains in force even in the event of the elimination of certain rail routes in the German Reich, but with the proviso of forces beyond control, such as, e.g., production or transport difficulties caused by severe frost, floods, or enemy action. Moreover, the German Government will use every means to render possible the shipment of a quantity greater than 500,000 tons, but cannot at this time commit itself to any definite figures in that respect.*

Signed at Rome on February 24, 1940, in the German and the Italian languages, in two originals each.

The Chairman of the German Governmental Committee CARL CLODIUS	The Chairman of the Italian Governmental Committee A. GIANNINI
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* See document No. 669, footnote 12.

[Annex 1]

Schedule C

ITALIAN IMPORTS

Coal	12,000,000 tons
Benzol, unrefined.	10,000 "
Toluol, refined.	1,500 "
Naphthalene.	2,500 "
Aceton	300 "
Magnesium	200 "

[Annex 2]

Schedule D

GERMAN IMPORTS

Rice.	In accordance with the agreements between Ente Risi [Rice Growers Association] and the German Rice Syndicate.
Hemp, hemp-tow and hackled hemp.	25, 000* tons
Tobacco	3, 500, 000 reichsmarks

Cork, raw	1, 500	tons
Tannin	1, 000	"
Cheese	2, 000, 000†	reichsmarks
Hides and skins (cow, lamb, sheep, etc.) . .	—	tons
Sponges	53	"
Bauxite (second grade)	100, 000	"
Zinc ore	35, 000‡	"
Pyrites	50, 000	"
Pyrite roasting residues	50, 000	"
Mercury	40, 000	flasks
Sulphur	70, 000	tons
Boric acid	300	"
Tartar, crude	2, 500	"
Citrus fruit oils	105§	"
Chestnut wood extract	5, 000	"
Sumac extract	300	"
Raw silk, single, double, thrown	700	"
Floss silk	400	"
Floss silk, spun, undyed; single or twisted .	250	"

*Including the 10,000 tons bought during the current crop year. [Footnote in the original.]

†Including: 1,400,000 reichsmarks under German Tariff Schedule No. 135b
200,000 " " " " " 135d
400,000 " " " " " 135e

[Footnote in the original.]

‡Up to 40,000 tons if possible. [Footnote in the original.]

§50 percent lemon, 25 percent bergamot, 10 percent orange, and 15 percent tangerine. [Footnote in the original.]

No. 635

173/84227-28/2

The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

THE HAGUE, February 25, 1940—8:14 p. m.

No. 141 of February 25

Received February 26—1:00 a. m.

Benzler and I¹ conferred with Hirschfeld yesterday on the following questions:

1. *Conduct of naval warfare*: Hirschfeld stated that he had been authorized by the inner Council of Ministers to discuss with us the economic aspect of the torpedoing of Dutch vessels. I assume that he was not only authorized but actually instructed to do so. He stated that the torpedoings of the last few days (*Burgerdijk, den Haag*

¹Felix Benzler, Consul General at Amsterdam, and Dr. Walter, Ministerialdirektor in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who had been engaged in economic negotiations with the Netherlands.

and *Tara*) had aroused alarm in Holland. The Government was sensible and had thus far prevented any violent press campaign. The bad part was that both the *Burgerdijk* and the *Tara* were sunk despite the fact that they were carrying government grain, the *Tara* evidently even without prior warning. He did not wish to go further into the political aspect of the question. A note of protest was being prepared on the *Burgerdijk*,² but it was hoped in Holland that Germany would be willing to offer an explanatory apology, referring to the case as an isolated incident and perhaps offer indemnification even before the arrival of this note. He was not authorized to say anything on this point. At any rate, the situation was extremely grave because the Netherlands Government could not be content with notes of protest. It was consequently more difficult than before to meet Germany's wishes. How was the Netherlands Government to justify to the people the continued exportation of foodstuffs to Germany when Germany was sinking foodstuffs and fodder destined for Holland? Germany's action against Dutch foodstuffs and fodder transports would undoubtedly have a serious effect on the fixing of the quota limits for exports in the future. At the least Holland would not be able to supply any agricultural products dependent on other foreign imports if Germany prevented their importation. He must ask whether Germany was at all prepared to discuss the question of how such torpedoings could be avoided in the future. He could not yet make any specific proposals.

We pointed out that we were not authorized to discuss political and military matters but were prepared to pass his question on.

Comment: The torpedoing of Dutch ships with foodstuffs and fodder destined for Holland produces dangerous sources of conflict, particularly because the Dutch rightly point out that only they, a neutral country, are hurt by it. I believe that the intimation that export of foodstuffs to Germany may be sharply reduced must be taken quite seriously, and I take a grave view of the consequences of such action on the part of the Dutch, especially for the German food situation. Without presuming to be able to judge the political and military situation, I consider it essential that the German Government decide immediately whether it is prepared to discuss with Holland a procedure that would, if possible, preclude such torpedoings in the future. These discussions would have to be conducted through diplomatic channels.

² Weizsäcker recorded in a memorandum of Mar. 18 (173/84255), that the Netherlands Minister presented a note of protest regarding the sinking of the *Burgerdijk*. Weizsäcker replied that the case was then so many weeks old that he could not go into it without further investigation.

2. *Armament deliveries*: Referring to his letter to the Reich Minister of Economics,³ Hirschfeld stressed emphatically that Germany's delay in the execution of the arms contracts which had largely been concluded after the beginning of the war, has caused great annoyance in Holland. The statement of the Minister of Economics that the Führer had approved the delivery of arms to Holland had at the time been noted with satisfaction. It was therefore all the more disappointing now that the promises were not being kept. The Netherlands Minister of War was pressing for an immediate decision so that, if necessary, he could place the orders elsewhere. He, Hirschfeld, was being reproached for having urged so strongly that the contracts be given to Germany. He had of late no longer been able to recommend that his Government place orders in Germany, particularly since difficulties were now also being made in instances where Holland had already supplied the necessary raw materials (for example, refusal of the Atlas Works to deliver ship propellers despite previous delivery of manganese bronze). He was constrained to say that if Germany contemplated soliciting contracts for the three armored cruisers there would be no inclination in Holland to consider German offers so long as the execution of the armament contracts already concluded was not assured.

Nonfulfillment of the armament contracts would undoubtedly discredit the activity of the governmental committees and this would also be bound to have an extremely adverse effect on commercial relations. This applied especially to the delivery of the *Eslandsfontain*, since there was at hand here a written statement by the German chairman dating from the summer of 1938, to the effect that the German Government would place no difficulties in the way of the delivery of this ship. It was precisely the possibility of a war that they had been thinking of at that time.

Comment: If Germany considers it of importance to maintain orderly relations with Holland, the question of the execution of the armament contracts must be solved affirmatively and at once. If they must be rescinded, it would be better to do so immediately and in all frankness.

In the latter case, I consider it necessary to appoint another chairman for the delegation in my place, who would not be handicapped in his activity by the fact that statements made by him on behalf of the German Government cannot be lived up to. It is to be expected in that case that Hirschfeld, too, would then probably resign as head of their delegation, and this would undoubtedly entail serious disadvantages for Germany.

³Not printed (6783/E513744-47).

3. *Conversations regarding England:* A separate telegram will follow on this subject stating my conclusion that Holland's conduct gives us no cause for countermeasures.⁴

4. Continuation of the conversation on the above questions has been agreed with Hirschfeld for Tuesday. I request immediate instructions on points 1 and 2 by Monday evening, if possible.⁵

5. I shall make a separate report on the threatening development in German exports to the Netherlands and the consequences that would result.⁶

WALTER
ZECH

⁴In this telegram No. 142 of Feb. 25 (173/84229-32), Dr. Walter stated that conclusion of British-Dutch economic negotiations might be expected in a few weeks. He reported that German submarine warfare and the delay in armaments deliveries did not seem to have affected the Dutch attitude in the negotiations with Britain thus far, but that there should be continued pressure from Germany to prevent any deterioration of the situation.

⁵The instruction on point 1 was delayed in order to be submitted to the Naval Staff. The Hague was finally informed by telegram No. 172 of Mar. 9 (8373/E590701-02) that nothing was known of the sinking of *den Haag* or the *Tara*, but that the *Burgerdijk* had been sunk in accordance with the rules of the London Declaration. The German Foreign Ministry agreed that the sinking of ships laden with foodstuffs should be avoided, and were willing to discuss the matter with the Netherlands Government, with the guarantee, however, that such shipments did not go to England.

As for arms deliveries, in spite of a recommendation of the Economic Policy Department against further dilatory treatment of the subject, the decision of the Führer on Mar. 4 was that deliveries should not be made and that dilatory treatment should be continued (6783/E513726-28).

⁶This report was made in telegram No. 159 of Mar. 2 (173/84238-40). It noted that the reduced level of German exports was viewed with concern in Holland and suggested that, in view of the importance of maintaining a balance in German-Dutch trade, attention be given to keeping up German exports to Holland, especially of iron and steel products.

No. 636

F18/213-208

Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, February 26, 1940.

W 1027 g. Rs.

RM 9 g. Rs.

THE GERMAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC AGREEMENT SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 11, 1940¹

The Agreement is based on the exchange of letters—mentioned in the preamble—between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, dated September 28, 1939.² The Agreement represents the first great step

¹ Document No. 607.

² Document No. 162.

toward the economic program envisaged by both sides and is to be followed by others.

1. The Agreement covers a period of 27 months, i. e., the Soviet deliveries, which are to be made within 18 months, will be compensated by German deliveries in turn within 27 months. The most difficult point of the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, namely, that the Soviet raw material deliveries are to be compensated by German industrial deliveries over a *more extended period of time*, is thereby settled in accordance with our wishes. This was not possible without a hard fight. Only the personal message of the Reich Foreign Minister to Stalin brought the final settlement.³ The stipulation of 18 and 27 months represents a compromise solution, since at stated intervals—namely, every 6 months—the mutual deliveries of goods must be balanced according to the fixed ratio. If this balance does not exist, i. e., particularly if the German deliveries fall behind the ratio of the Soviet deliveries fixed by the Agreement, the other side is entitled to suspend its deliveries temporarily until the fixed ratio is reestablished. This stipulation is annoying, but could not be eliminated by us, as Stalin himself had adopted it during the final talks.

2. The Soviet deliveries. According to the Agreement, the Soviet Union shall within the first 12 months deliver raw materials in the amount of approximately 500 million RM.

In addition, the Soviets will deliver raw materials, contemplated in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939,⁴ for the same period, in the amount of approximately 100 million RM.

The most important raw materials are the following:

1,000,000 tons of feed grains and legumes worth 120 million RM.

900,000 tons of petroleum worth approximately 115 million RM.

100,000 tons of cotton worth approximately 90 million RM.

500,000 tons of phosphates.

100,000 tons of chromium ores.

500,000 tons of iron ore.

300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron.

2,400 kg. of platinum.

Manganese ore, metals, lumber, and numerous other raw materials.

To this must also be added the Soviet exports to the Protectorate, which are not included in the Agreement, in the amount of about 50 million RM so that the net deliveries of goods from the Soviet Union during the first treaty year amount to a total of 650 million RM.

In addition, there are other important benefits. On the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union had granted us the right of transit to and from Rumania, Iran, and Afghanistan and the countries of the Far East, which is particularly

³ See documents Nos. 594 and 600.

⁴ See vol. VII, document No. 131.

important in view of the German soybean purchases from Manchukuo. The freight rates of the Trans-Siberian Railroad were reduced by 50 percent for soybeans. The transit freight charges are to be settled by a clearing system and amount to approximately 100 million RM.

Adding certain other items (clearing charges in purchase of raw materials by the Soviet Union in third countries), it may be assumed that during the first 12 months Soviet deliveries and services will amount to a total of about 800 million RM.

3. Thus far, only part of the Soviet deliveries has been fixed for the second treaty year. During the first six months of the second treaty year the Soviet Union will deliver to Germany 230 million RM worth of raw materials of the same kind as in the first treaty year. It is contemplated that negotiations will be resumed in good time before the expiration of the first treaty year and the quantities for the exchange of goods for the second treaty year fixed and even increased beyond the volume of the first treaty year.

4. The German deliveries comprise industrial products, industrial processes and installations as well as war material. The Soviet deliveries of the first 12 months are to be compensated by us within 15 months. The Soviet deliveries of the first 6 months of the second treaty year (13th to 18th month) are to be compensated by us within 12 months (from the 16th to the 27th month).

5. Among the Soviet deliveries within the first 18 months are 11,000 tons of copper, 3,000 tons of nickel, 950 tons of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, 500 tons of wolfram, 40 tons of cobalt. These deliveries of metals are intended for the carrying out of the German deliveries to the Soviet Union. Since these metals are not *immediately* available in Germany and will not be delivered until the treaty is in force, it will be necessary to bridge the initial period by using metals from our own stocks for the German deliveries to the Soviet Union and to replace them from the incoming Soviet metal deliveries. Any different arrangement, such as the advance delivery of metals which we demanded at first, could not be achieved.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union declared her willingness to act as buyer of metals and raw materials in third countries. To what degree this promise can be realized in view of the intensified English countermeasures cannot be judged at the present time. Since Stalin himself has repeatedly promised *generous* help in this respect it may be expected that the Soviet Union will make every effort.

6. The negotiations were difficult and lengthy. There were material and psychological reasons for this. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union promised far more deliveries than are defensible from a purely economic point of view, and she must make the deliveries to Germany

partly at the expense of her own supply. On the other hand, it is understandable that the Soviet Government is anxious to receive as compensation those things which the Soviet Union lacks. Since the Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods whatsoever, their wishes concerned exclusively capital goods and war material. Thus, in numerous cases, Soviet bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition. It was not easy to find a compromise between the interests of both sides. Psychologically the ever-present distrust by the Russians was of importance as well as the fear of any responsibility. Even People's Commissar Mikoyan had to refer numerous questions to Stalin personally, since his authority was not sufficient.

Despite all these difficulties, during the long negotiations the desire of the Soviet Government to help Germany and to consolidate firmly the political understanding in economic matters as well, became more and more evident.

The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for us. The raw material purchases from the Soviet Union and from the countries bordering the Soviet Union can still be considerably increased. But it is essential to meet the German commitments to the extent required. In view of the great volume this will require a special effort. If we succeed in extending and expanding exports to the East in the required volume, the effects of the English blockade will be decisively weakened by the incoming raw materials.⁵

SCHENURRE

⁵The reaction in Berlin to the new agreement was described by Ritter in a letter of Mar. 4 to Schulenburg as follows: "Our reception in Berlin was on the whole very good. The Foreign Minister especially received us in a very friendly, almost cordial way. He is very pleased with the outcome. All the offices involved are convinced that the treaty must be conscientiously observed on our part. I am convinced that we can do it, even if it will no doubt often be very difficult." (276/178605-06)

No. 637

66/46595-98

Memorandum by the Führer

DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. SUMNER WELLES

February 29, 1940.

1. In general I request that on the German side reserve be exercised in the conversations, and that as far as possible Mr. Sumner Welles be allowed to do the talking.

2. In regard to Germany's relations with the United States, it may be stressed that the present situation is unsatisfactory to both na-

tions. The Government of the Reich has done nothing for its part to bring about this development in the relations between the two countries; if by sending Mr. Sumner Welles to Berlin the American Government is seeking to bring about a change in this regard, that would doubtless be in the interest of both peoples.

3. Germany's viewpoint with regard to the international situation and the war has been made known to the world through my speeches. In particular, the following points are to be stressed :

Germany did not declare war on the Western Powers, but, on the contrary, they declared war on Germany.

England and France had no justifiable reason at all for a war against Germany. Just as on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine the United States would firmly reject any interference by European governments in Mexican affairs, for example, Germany regards the Eastern European area as her sphere of interest, concerning which she must come to an understanding with Russia alone, but never with England and France. After the end of the Polish campaign, Germany came to terms with Russia on Eastern questions and thus conclusively safeguarded her European position by this revision in the East which had become unavoidable. Then at the beginning of October, I again made one last offer of peace to England and France. Thereupon both these countries committed the biggest blunder they could possibly have made: they considered this offer a sign of weakness and rejected it with scorn.

Germany drew the only possible conclusion from this: she accepted the challenge of England and France.

Since then the war aim of England and France has been revealed more and more clearly. It consists, as is now openly stated, in the destruction of the German state and the dismemberment of the German people under a Versailles system even worse than before. Considering this development, Germany, as a state under attack, has nothing to say on the subject of peace. She is unshakable in her determination once and for all to break the will to annihilate [Germany] which now dominates British and French policy and to utilize the power of her 80 million people to this end. Not until the Anglo-French will to annihilate [Germany] has been broken can a new, really peaceful Europe be built. While in their unprecedented delusion England and France are more and more openly proclaiming as their war aim the annihilation of Germany and a new division of Europe into nations with rights and others without rights, even today Germany does not demand the annihilation of the British Empire and France; rather she regards the satisfaction of the vital interests of the great nations in their natural Lebensraum as a guarantee for the consolidation of Europe, in which there is room for small states which have proved their viability in the course of history as well as

for the large ones. Germany is convinced that this goal can be attained only by a German victory.

4. As regards economic matters, it can be stated that the British blockade is not of decisive importance to Germany. In both food and raw materials Germany can defeat any blockade by her self-sufficient economy and her trade with the European countries, with Russia, and by way of Russia with Japan and a large part of the world.

National Socialist Germany is not at all opposed to a world economy. The trade policy of the world forced upon her the development of her own self-contained economy. Only with its attainment, which is coming ever closer to realization, will Germany be in a position to participate in the world economy again as a sound partner.

5. A discussion of single concrete political questions, such as the question of a future Polish state, is to be avoided as much as possible. In case the other side brings up subjects of this kind, the reply should be that such questions are decided by me. It is self-evident that it is entirely out of the question for Germany to discuss the subject of Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which has constantly been brought up by England and France.

6. Attention may be called to Germany's completely changed international position as compared to 1914. All statements are to be avoided which could be interpreted by the other side to mean that Germany is in any way interested at present in discussing possibilities of peace. I request rather that Mr. Sumner Welles not be given the slightest reason to doubt that Germany is determined to end this war victoriously and that the German people—united today as never before in their thousand year history—and their leadership are unshakable in their confidence in victory.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 638

265/172199

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 136 of March 1

ANKARA, March 1, 1940—1:45 a. m.

Received March 1—4:30 a. m.

Numan, who dined with me this evening, told me that today's speech by the Minister President ¹ was of decisive importance in establishing

¹ On Feb. 29, Minister President Refik Saydam in a radio address to the nation stated that Turkey was ready now for any eventuality but that she would fight only if her national existence or interests were threatened; Turkey's foreign policy and the question of her participation in the war would not be influenced by any outside combination.

Turkey's policy. The intention was to oppose an unmistakable "no" to the pressure exerted by London and Paris for an extension of the theater of war.

This speech thus signified a notable success for our efforts to stiffen Turkey's backbone. It would be very desirable if the effect of the speech in London and Paris could be enhanced by a Russian statement in the sense of my telegram No. 115 of February 22.¹

PAPEN

¹ Not printed (265/172193-94). The reference here is obscure.

No. 639

174/136262

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 169 of March 1

TOKYO, March 1, 1940—10:55 p. m.

Received March 1—8:35 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

My mission¹ has made good progress up to now. My personal reception was splendid. My factual observations confirm the previous impression of the Embassy. It is absolutely necessary for overcoming the existing difficulties here and for the success of my mission that the line of Germany's economic policies coincide with her political line. Adoption of Germany's economic measures toward Japan since the beginning of September and their effects, especially as regards the instruction of December 9² on terms of payment, are contrary to your political aims in Japan. Support by economic policy of the political line is necessary even if Germany makes economic concessions without return for the present. Because Japanese confidence can be restored only by German acts of confidence, and this is a prerequisite for everything else, I believe that our political intentions make it necessary for us to make economic concessions to Japan, especially considering Japan's decided economic difficulties. I should be grateful if the economic policy were coordinated with the political line immediately and should become felt even during my sojourn here. I intend to return at the end of March.

HELFFERICH
OTT

¹ The files contain nothing on the background of Helfferich's mission.

² Not found.

No. 640

F14/353-79

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 7

BERLIN, March 1, 1940.

[Pol. IX 493 g.]¹

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MR. SUMNER WELLES IN THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES KIRK AND MINISTER VON DÖRNBERG

After a few brief words of greeting, Mr. Sumner Welles explained the motives and nature of his mission. Sumner Welles stressed particularly two points in the public announcement made by President Roosevelt shortly before his departure: (1) his mission to report to the President on the actual situation in Europe and, for that purpose, to visit Italy, Germany, France, and Great Britain, without, however, being authorized to make any proposals or commitments in the name of the American Government; and (2) the strictly confidential character of his mission. He would report any information received from foreign statesmen in the course of his trip to President Roosevelt alone.

He had already had a conversation with the Duce and Count Ciano. After completion of his visit to Germany he would go to Paris and London via Switzerland, and return to America by way of Rome, where another conversation was scheduled with the Duce.

Sumner Welles then stated that Germany probably appreciated the fact that the present situation filled the United States with deep concern. President Roosevelt had done everything within his power to avert the disaster of the present war and now had directed him, Sumner Welles, to ascertain the views of the European statesmen regarding the possibilities of establishing a lasting and stable peace in Europe. He added that this peace should be no temporary, improvised settlement but a permanent structure resting on a firm foundation. He had asked to be received by the Reich Foreign Minister in order to ascertain his views regarding the possibilities of such a peace.

Sumner Welles added that the United States Government had publicly declared on various occasions that when and so soon as the time had come for the establishment of such a peace, it would, for its part, take its full share in the measures necessary for disarmament and the establishment of sound economic conditions.

¹The file number appears on another copy (33/25246-60) found in the files of Under State Secretary Woermann. This copy, which was also distributed to the State Secretary, carries the handwritten notation: "long version." The text is the same as that printed here.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he took note of the interest in European questions shown by the President of the United States, as well as of his desire to study the possibilities for bringing about a happier state of affairs "once the moment for it had come." In this connection he felt constrained to express his regret, however, that the United States' desire to change the situation for the better had not been given effect some months ago. It was difficult at the moment, of course, and it would have to be left to future historians to make clear to world opinion the pattern of events which led to the war. He believed, however, that if, to further the above-stated objective of achieving a happier state of affairs, America had used her influence on other countries, especially England, before the war broke out, things might perhaps have taken a different course altogether.

The Reich Foreign Minister then turned to a discussion of German-American relations and stated that in recent years, especially since the [National Socialist] assumption of power, they had developed in a manner unsatisfactory for both peoples. He wished to point out in all frankness that nothing had been done on the part of Germany that could in any way justify the present unsatisfactory state of German-American relations. The recall of American Ambassador Wilson, who enjoyed great esteem in Germany, was also deeply regretted on the part of Germany. Many misunderstandings between the countries, which were due to distortions and propaganda, probably could have been averted if each country had had in the other country an ambassador who could have maintained close relations not only with the Governments but above all with the two leading personalities, the Führer and President Roosevelt. The Reich Foreign Minister said in this connection that he did not know whether Sumner Welles' trip also had the purpose of doing something toward improving German-American relations and restoring the former friendly relations between the two countries. If this was the case, he would for his part welcome it.

If President Roosevelt wished to have a picture of the European situation in general and the war situation in particular, it would be well, in view of the numerous American misunderstandings and misconceptions about the interests and the attitude of Germany, to look back into the past and to clarify the causes of the war.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed especially to Germany's situation resulting from the Versailles Treaty, which for a self-respecting nation was intolerable. Sumner Welles was indeed very well informed on this matter himself for, as the Reich Foreign Minister recalled, he had on several occasions expressed his opposition to the Versailles Treaty. Not only Germans but also statesmen of the Entente countries had criticized in word and print the evils of the Versailles Treaty.

At the very moment when Germany was well on her way toward a settlement with Poland on some of the most oppressive of these evils, outside influences opposing an agreement made themselves felt in Warsaw. It was very well known in Germany today that England and the other countries not only did nothing to ease the tension of the situation in those critical moments, but on the contrary incited Poland against Germany. It was clearly proved today that forces had been at work which took advantage of the Polish question to start a new war against Germany.

The Reich Foreign Minister then turned the conversation to the German sphere of interest, which was as real a fact as was America's Monroe Doctrine, the significance of which he was fully able to appreciate after spending 4 years in the United States and in Canada. Germany, too, had her Monroe Doctrine. Just as America would justifiably oppose any intervention by Germany in Mexican affairs, so Germany would not tolerate interference by other countries in her vital sphere of interest. This stand had been repeatedly affirmed vis-à-vis England, namely, in the case of Austria, in connection with Czechoslovakia, and lastly in the Polish crisis. The German Monroe Doctrine signified that there existed a German sphere of interest in Eastern Europe, which was no concern of England, France, and other Western countries; this was a matter that Germany had to discuss with only one power, Soviet Russia, with which an understanding had already been reached. It was a regrettable atavistic manifestation of Versailles that the world and, in particular, England, by reason of a 14-year-old habit, kept on meddling in all European affairs and treating them as their own interests. A strong Germany would never tolerate that, and England had repeatedly been served notice of this in the most unequivocal manner. Despite the Führer's desire for an understanding with England, which surely must be known to Mr. Sumner Welles, England had blocked Germany's every forward step, because, obsessed by the mentality of Versailles, she believed that she could exercise tutelage over a nation of 80 million people. That had been a bad blunder on the part of England.

Without going into details—since Mr. Sumner Welles could be presumed to have a detailed knowledge of events—the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized the Führer's efforts for an understanding with England and the establishment of a lasting general peace on the basis of such an Anglo-German understanding. England had rejected all offers, some of which had been in very concrete form, and it was to be viewed as a great tragedy in world history that precisely the Führer who, like Cecil Rhodes, had advocated the collaboration of Germany, England, and the United States, should have found so little response in England.

It was thus especially regrettable that Great Britain should have declared war on Germany at the very moment when she had put into effect the last and absolutely necessary revision of the Versailles Treaty and had thereby created the basis for a harmonious life with other nations. The fact must never be forgotten that it was not Germany that had declared war but that England and France had declared war on Germany. No propaganda and no attempt at distortion could nullify that fact. England and France had not had the least reason for going to war against Germany, considering that even politicians in these two countries had characterized the Corridor and Danzig as an "intolerable wrong." And yet they resorted to war against Germany when she took steps to undo that "intolerable wrong." Germany had accepted the challenge and would now fight. Therefore, no study of the possibilities of realizing happier and better conditions should lose sight of the fact that Germany was the party attacked and was conducting a war of defense. Even though these matters might be represented differently in the United States, these were facts which no one could deny.

What, now, had happened since the outbreak of the war? After the termination of the Polish war, the Führer had made one more peace offer to England and France in October, because he was convinced that it was senseless to wage a war of annihilation just because certain intolerable wrongs had been righted. These things had doubtless been closely followed in America. Again Great Britain had made the one blunder she ought not to have made: she had construed the peace offer as a sign of weakness and rejected it with disdain. It was the same blunder into which Great Britain had fallen repeatedly in recent years because she lived in total misapprehension of the Führer's character and philosophy. In any case, the offer was rejected and Germany accepted the consequences of that.

Since then the British and French statesmen had announced their war aims. These amounted to a dismemberment of the German Reich and a return of the German people to the status of Versailles, which was tantamount to its annihilation. Germany, by contrast, had not proclaimed the annihilation of France or the British Empire as her war aim, but was now, as before, pursuing this goal: to build Europe's future on the basis of a rational balancing of interests. To this end the Great Powers would have to define and respect definite spheres of interest. This new Europe would have room also for the smaller states which had given historical proof of their right to existence as independent national communities. This German war aim differed fundamentally from that of the British. Without wishing to anticipate the Führer, who would receive Mr. Sumner Welles tomorrow at 11 o'clock, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his personal convic-

tion that this rational state of affairs in Europe could be realized only through a German victory. Germany was fully determined in any event to crush her enemies' will to destroy and would carry out her resolution. Any study of the possibility of achieving a better future for Europe would of necessity have to take account of the mentality that finds expression in the Allies' war aims. President Roosevelt would then realize the difficulties that would have to be overcome to achieve a reasonable settlement.

That Germany, in contrast to England and France, had not wanted the war, had been demonstrated unmistakably before the whole world not only by the Führer's words but also by his actions and offers. Germany had concluded an agreement with France in December 1938,² which had been broken by France. To England, Germany had made offer after offer, which had been rejected by the British. The Reich Foreign Minister had never been able to understand this British and French attitude, and he believed that its chief cause was the utter lack of outstanding leadership in the two countries in recent years.

Germany, on the other hand, had never throughout her history been so united as today and she was determined to crush once and for all her enemies' will to annihilate. She could look upon her present situation with deep satisfaction. It gave her assurance and confidence. Conditions were basically different from those in 1914. Germany now had the biggest and best equipped army and air force. The Army was determined to win. It had been possible in the span of 18 days to force to its knees a nation of 34 millions, which as late as the end of August had raved about a parade march to Berlin. This victory, incidentally, had been achieved with only a small fraction of the forces now assembled at the West Wall. Mr. Sumner Welles would thus be able to appreciate with what confidence the German people were facing the events to come.

Not much needed to be said about the political situation. Germany was entirely satisfied. She had clear friendships and it was only to be regretted that a similar clear relationship did not also exist to the same extent with the United States.

Economically, Germany was just as invincible as she was militarily. The British blockade was a delusion. Germany's food supplies were assured within her own Lebensraum. Moreover, beyond that, Germany had access to a large portion of Europe, the whole of Russia, and, by way of Russia, to wide areas of the world. As regards raw materials, Germany had by her planning for autarky achieved the greatest possible independence and was broadening this independence every day and every hour. Besides, half the world, if not the whole

² For the text of the Franco-German declaration of Dec. 6, 1938, see vol. iv, document No. 369.

world, was still open to Germany in that respect, and the blockade would turn out to be a failure for England.

The Foreign Minister finally mentioned England's miscalculations about creating disunity among the German people. There was one thing to be borne in mind under all circumstances: No matter how long the war should last, whether 1 year, or 5 or 10 years, the German people never would become disunited. To believe that they would was an utter delusion.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister spoke once more about German-American relations and repeated a statement he once made to American Ambassador Wilson. Nothing whatever could set the German and American nations against each other, if they considered their mutual interests realistically. There were no territorial ambitions to form an obstacle to friendly relations. All Germany wanted was to expand her trade with the United States. The Reich Foreign Minister stressed in this connection that Germany was not opposed to a world economy. If by autarky Germany had succeeded in putting her own economy in order again, the world only had reason to be grateful to her for becoming by this means a sound business partner again. Germany, moreover, had not introduced an autarkic economic system of her own volition, but rather had been forced into it by the economic effects of the Versailles settlement and the unwise trade policies of certain countries. The autarkic measures provided the essential conditions for her joining the world economy again, as a really sound partner. Besides, every big country sooner or later would of itself return to a world economy, and after the conclusion of peace Germany would become one of the most active participants in the world economy.

Upon the Reich Foreign Minister's request that Mr. Sumner Welles should now in turn take a stand on these problems and state President Roosevelt's views, Sumner Welles, promising to speak with equal frankness, began to talk first about German-American relations. He admitted that they were far from satisfactory and said that he regretted this in view of the close and genuine friendship which had linked the two countries for generations. In this connection he also recalled the many contributions which individuals of German descent had made to America's history and culture. He cited two reasons which had led to the estrangement between the two countries:

1. The American attitude toward certain problems was conditioned by sentiment and governed by humanitarian considerations. He granted that propaganda had an effect in America, as it did also in all other countries, and stated that everything possible had to be done to remove misunderstandings.

- [2.] As the second reason for the German-American estrangement Sumner Welles mentioned the events of the last year and a half.

Americans believed in peaceful methods for removing difficulties. They held that the use of force had to be supplanted by peaceful means. Sumner Welles added that when the time should come to make peace—a lasting and just peace—and if Germany did her share in working it out, it was his belief that the friendly sentiments toward Germany in America would assert themselves again.

He would report to President Roosevelt in detail on the Reich Foreign Minister's comments regarding the recall of the American Ambassador. He added that the American Government had the fullest confidence in the present Chargé d'Affaires.

The Reich Foreign Minister in turn expressed confidence in Mr. Kirk and added that Kirk had shown great circumspection in difficult situations and had done his best to improve German-American relations. The comments on the recall of the American Ambassador had no personal implications but were aimed at the principle involved.

Sumner Welles then replied to the Reich Foreign Minister's statements regarding the Monroe Doctrine, saying that to clarify the matter he had to point out the following: The Monroe Doctrine had during some periods of American history been interpreted as a right of the United States to hegemony over the other American states as well as a right to intervene actively in the internal affairs of these states. These times, however, were gone forever. America today was merely one member in a partnership of 21 nations joined in a common effort to prevent any interference in their affairs by non-American countries. Thus the Monroe Doctrine, in its present form, was not something that was imposed upon the American states but something in which they all participated equally.

Sumner Welles then put some questions. He explained that it was not clear to him whether Germany's war aims mentioned by the Reich Foreign Minister (i. e., clearly defined and mutually respected spheres of interest for the Great Powers and room for the smaller countries which had given historical proof of an independent national life) could be attained only after elimination of the opposition's will to annihilate and following a German victory, or were attainable even earlier.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the answer to this question was already anticipated by his statements. In view of the enemy's will to annihilate, which had been expressed again only yesterday in a speech by Eden on the annihilation of Hitlerism, a rational consolidation of Europe could be achieved only through a German victory.

As to the Monroe Doctrine, he was very well aware of the difference as regards European conditions and had merely intended to show by this comparison that Germany, just as much as the United States, had her sphere of interest.

Regarding the American view on substituting peaceful methods for the use of force, he, as the person responsible for carrying out the Führer's foreign policy, could point out that since January 30, 1933, the Führer had not taken a single step toward a revision of intolerable situations without first seeking to obtain such revision by means of negotiations. To that end, in every instance where a revision was at issue in the last 6½ years, he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had first entered into official and unofficial contact with British and French statesmen.

The Reich Foreign Minister moreover recalled the proposals for negotiation of the 200,000 and 300,000-man army and the prohibition of heavy weapons made by the Führer at the time when Germany was still at the Disarmament Conference. In all these instances, as also in connection with the reintroduction of compulsory military service, the occupation of the Rhineland, and in the Austrian and Sudeten-German questions, efforts were always made to the last to reach amicable settlements of these matters through negotiations. Time and again Germany was put off until the Führer was compelled to take matters into his own hands. The achievement of the Führer in carrying out without bloodshed the revisions of the Versailles Treaty essential to the unification of the entire German people, would be recognized by history as a unique achievement. America, too, should be able to appreciate this achievement if she recalled how much blood was spilled before the unification of the American people could be accomplished. Besides, the Führer could not have acted otherwise. The problems in question had to be solved sooner or later since the Germans living outside the borders were pressing for a return to the Reich. Had they not been solved, each one of these problems might eventually have set off a European war. Thus, for instance, England first stiffened Beneš' opposition to Germany and so turned the Sudeten-German problem into a major crisis. Despite that, the Führer had succeeded, up to the time of the Polish war, in completing the process of unifying the German people without spilling a drop of blood. In solving the last and most intolerable burden imposed upon Germany by Versailles, namely, the question of Danzig and the Corridor, it was England again that opposed Germany. England was therefore guilty before history that this question could not also be settled peacefully. In any case, probably never before in history had the unification of a great nation been accomplished with less bloodshed than was the unification of the German people.

Mr. Sumner Welles then set forth what a disaster it would be for the world if the war of annihilation were really to break out in the West. All countries of the world, not only the belligerents, would be affected directly or indirectly by that catastrophe. He would like to

emphasize once more that President Roosevelt had sent him to Europe to see if there was not some possibility of avoiding this last development and perhaps still to find a settlement.

After the Reich Foreign Minister had once more stressed that he had given Mr. Sumner Welles his personal ideas about the developments of recent years and on the question of the present war, and that he did not wish to anticipate the Führer, who was going to receive Mr. Sumner Welles tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock, the American thanked him for the information received and again expressed his hope that a way might yet be found out of all difficulties.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 641

66/46399

Supplement to the Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and Sumner Welles on March 1, 1940

When Sumner Welles mentioned the humanitarian attitude of the Americans as one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of German-American relations, the Foreign Minister interrupted to ask whether this attitude resulted in condemnation of the German [*British*] blockade against German women and children. Sumner Welles replied in the affirmative and stated that for Americans humanitarian values applied to all peoples and races. The Foreign Minister replied that if Mr. Sumner Welles wished to learn something about the human aspect of things, he would do best to stay a short time in Germany; he should come to understand the difference between the Germany of 1918-19, when the British blockade was still continuing despite termination of the war, or between the Germany of 1931-32 and the Germany of today. It was a difference between night and day. While earlier not a single happy face was to be seen in Germany, now there was a nation of 80 millions of enthusiastic, happy human beings; that was the humane work to which the Führer had devoted his life.

No. 642

33/25243-44

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, March 1, 1940.

St.S. No. 203

Mr. Sumner Welles (unaccompanied) called on me for an informal discussion this afternoon. Neither of us made any notes during the conversation. The following remarks by the American are worth noting:

1. If the war should set in with full force, it would lead to economic, financial, and social ruin and to the destruction of all that we cherish and treasure on earth, not only in Europe but also overseas, especially in the USA. The United States could not remain passive in the face of that.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop had outlined the German view for him. If our Government really believed that its objective could be achieved only by a military victory, then his, Welles', trip to Europe was pointless.

He could not verify the will to annihilation which we imputed to England.

3. He planned to be back in Washington on March 26, after talking with Mussolini once more on his return trip via Italy. What Mussolini had already told him was a basis and a hope, a point of departure for constructive proposals.

To be sure, if the war was once fully unleashed that would be the end of any discussion.

4. The United States could not be a party to negotiations, but it could offer assistance. Welles inquired if Roosevelt should act alone or preferably in conjunction with Mussolini, if the occasion should arise.

I rejected having this question put to me; it was not my business to discuss peace actions.

5. Welles made it very clear that he was averse to any public peace action. He is undoubtedly thinking of discreet proposals by the President at the conclusion of his trip.

6. The mistakes of 1918 must by all means be avoided.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 643

33/25245

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 204

BERLIN, March 1, 1940.

Mr. Sumner Welles made the following additional oral statements to me today:

1. In case he saw Field Marshal Göring, he intended to hand him a memorandum on the question of economic relations and disarmament. This memorandum was actually addressed only to the neutrals. However, the belligerents would naturally not be excluded from the discussion suggested in it. Welles described the response to the memorandum by the neutrals as very satisfactory so far.

Welles will have the Embassy transmit a copy of the memorandum directly to the Foreign Ministry.¹

2. Welles wants to see Dr. Schacht. Mr. Hull had asked him to do so because of Minister Schacht's knowledge of economic matters.²

¹ A copy of this memorandum (B21/B005421-22) was handed to Weizsäcker by Kirk on Mar. 5 (B21/B005420). See also document No. 673, footnote 1.

² Welles had a conversation with Schacht on Mar. 3 at the home of the American Chargé d'Affaires, Alexander Kirk. No other mention of this meeting has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Welles made a report to the President, an account of which is published in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952), p. 367.

3. Welles asked what other members of the Government he ought to see. He wants to restrict himself to people in official positions. I reserved the answer to that question for the Foreign Minister.

4. Welles praised the calm, sure way in which Counselor of Embassy Thomsen conducts his affairs in Washington.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 644

8589/E602673-76

Directive by the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, March 1, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

WFA/Abt. L No. 22070/40 g. Kdos. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE FOR *Fall Weserübung*

1. The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the Wehrmacht (*Fall Weserübung*). This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic. Further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Luftwaffe a wider start-line against Britain.

The part which the Navy and the Luftwaffe will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the *Fall Weserübung* will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution.

On principle, we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a *peaceful* occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, naval and air demonstrations will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

2. I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General of Infantry von Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI"). In questions of the conduct of operations, the above-named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all three branches of the Wehrmacht.

The forces which will be selected for the purpose of *Fall Weserübung* will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theaters. The part of the Luftwaffe

detailed for the purpose of the *Weserübung* will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task, they will revert to the command of C.-in-C., Luftwaffe.

The employment of the forces which are under *direct* Naval and Luftwaffe command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the Wehrmacht branches themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

3. The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place *simultaneously*. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own countermeasures. It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken *by surprise* by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind. In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

4. Occupation of Denmark (*Weserübung Süd*).

The Task of Group XXI: occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fyn immediately after occupation of Sjælland.

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible to Skagen and to the east coast of Fyn. In Sjælland bases will be captured early. These will serve as starting points for later occupation.

The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg-Korsør and for swift capture of the Lille-Belt Bridge as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. They will also prepare the defense of the coast.

The Luftwaffe will provide squadrons of which the primary object will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defenses and air defense must be ensured.

5. Occupation of Norway (*Weserübung Nord*).

The task of the Group XXI: capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. They will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea. Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defense in Norway.

The Luftwaffe, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain.

6. Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for *Weserübung* and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: *Wesertag*—the day of the operation. *Weserzeit*—the hour of the operation.¹

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Additional documents from German military records relating to preparations for *Weserübung* are published in several volumes in *Beretning til Folketinget ... vedrørende Forholdene ved Danmarks Besættelse den 9. April 1940* (Copenhagen, 1945-51), and *Innstilling fra Undersøkelser-Kommissionen av 1945* (Oslo, 1946-47), by Danish and Norwegian parliamentary commissions, respectively.

No. 645

124/122472-75

Consul General Krauel to State Secretary Weizsäcker

GENEVA, March 1, 1940.

DEAR MR. STATE SECRETARY: With reference to my last oral report to you and my report (K. No. 394) of February 20¹ concerning the impressions of the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Finland, I am now in a position to inform you that Professor Burckhardt will arrive in Berlin some time next week as the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ostensible occasion for the visit is furnished by the fact that M. Burckhardt is to discuss several Red Cross questions in Berlin; the International Committee shows particular interest in the possibility of establishing contact with Russia to alleviate the condition of the Finnish prisoners in Russia. Apart from this, Professor Burckhardt will be glad to use the opportunity to arrange, especially with you, Mr. State Secretary, a discussion of a general political character. To detail here the questions which are of special interest to M. Burckhardt would be going too far. I should only like to point out that he was recently visited by a Prince Hohenlohe, who apparently came to him on instructions from Field Marshal Göring, in order to discuss with him any possible British peace projects.

In this connection and with reference to my report (K. No. 469—Rumors concerning British-French offensive intentions) of Febru-

¹ Not found.

ary 26;² I should also like to inform you that a few days ago a Czech, coming from London, who formerly played an important role in the Beneš Government (possibly Masaryk), stated the following here concerning the frame of mind in England: The British Government is greatly alarmed over the fact that the repeatedly announced and also actually planned German offensive apparently was not going to come off now. The British had hoped that this German attack on France, with England as its objective, would be launched by the Germans. The British thought that this offensive would result in the depletion of the German matériel reserves in several months, after which the British-French-American superiority in matériel would surely have led to a victory of the Allies. If everything remained quiet on the Rhine, however, and Germany still could not be induced to use up her matériel reserves, the British did not know how they could win the war, because in these circumstances the weapon of the blockade evidently was not sufficient to force Germany to her knees. Since the French evidently could not be induced to launch an attack on the German West Wall on their own, the British considered the war situation pretty much at a deadlock. This feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty concerning the further possibilities of prosecuting the war accounted for the various attempts to "extend the theater of war", either in the North, in conjunction with the Russo-Finnish war, or in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In spite of this, however, one must not deceive oneself as to the fact that the determination of the British Government and the British people to continue the war, no matter what, is growing rather than diminishing, whereas in France, he thought there was undoubtedly a growing disposition to conclude a compromise peace. (In this connection it is perhaps interesting to note that even Massigli, the fanatical enemy of the Germans, on his recent passage through Switzerland en route from Ankara to Paris, told Burckhardt in Geneva that he considered the French war aims widely supported by the public regarding the "dismemberment of Germany" as altogether nonsensical, and that it was merely a question of restoring the status quo in Europe for the purpose of preventing Germany from further expanding her sphere of domination.) But apart from this there is no room for doubt that a German offensive on the Rhine would be keenly welcomed by the British as well as the present French Government. My authority for these reports is the Japanese Consul General, Yanai, who, however, was likewise unable to give me the name of the Czech personage but nevertheless termed these statements absolutely authentic. From another reliable source I have learned that the French Jew, Ganem, who formerly played a decisive role next to Comert in the Information Division of the League of Nations Secretariat and since the outbreak of the war

² Not found.

has been working in the French Propaganda Division at the Quai d'Orsay, came here several days ago in connection with the unsuccessful attempt of Secretary-General Avenol to induce Sumner Welles to come to Geneva, and has had the following conversation with a Swiss officer: First the question was discussed whether the Swiss Army could not see its way to intervene actively in the war against Germany on the side of France and England. The Swiss officer replied that the sympathies of the entire Swiss people were certainly on the side of the French, but in view of the experiences of Czechia, Poland, and Finland the Swiss feared that, despite France's adjacency to Switzerland, French military assistance would probably arrive in Bern after the German troops. Besides, Switzerland was naturally disinclined to let herself become the theater of war for the German and French armies. Ganem then immediately dropped the subject, and the conversation turned to the question of French aid to Finland. In this connection Ganem stated that it had actually been the plan of the French Government to send Chasseurs Alpins to Finland. But this plan was dismissed when France felt herself constrained to provide strong forces again for the French-Italian border because it was feared that the Italians would "at least try some blackmail" (*au moins un chantage*) in the spring. This statement on the part of Ganem is confirmed to the extent that my military agents have within the last 2 weeks brought me information to the effect that extensive troop movements to the Italian border have in fact been observed again. From a conversation with my Italian colleague here I have gathered that if warlike developments should arise in Asia Minor, Italy would regard that as the moment for asserting her claims against England and France.

I hope that Professor Burckhardt will be able to bring you even more detailed and better information concerning the international situation, while he might also be able on his part to tell me something about your views in Berlin concerning the general situation.

In the meantime I remain, with best regards,

Yours, etc.,

KRAUEL

No. 646

174/186264-65

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, March 2, 1940—9:00 a. m.

No. 174 of March 2

Received March 2—6:50 p. m.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to our telegram No. 169 of March 1, Helfferich.¹

¹ Document No. 639.

I consider it necessary in principle for Germany to make economic concessions to Japan, in view of the latest political developments. The Japanese Government is striving for a progressive easing of tension in its relations with England and America in order to weaken the pressure of these powers on its China policy and to alleviate its own economic distress by more stable trade relations. Secret concessions to England can be assumed to exist in certain Chinese questions such as Tientsin silver and North China currency, also in deliveries of raw materials from the Dominions, as for example wool. Also the recovery of Japanese shipping and textiles (group garbled) shares point to this. It is noteworthy that the textile industrialists are beginning to abandon their previous leadership in anti-British activities. In collaboration with England, America has eased the pressure of the embargo for the time being.

The most important thing sought of Japan in return is evidently the breaking off of Japanese-German trade and transit traffic to and from Germany via Japan. Events of the past week which the Reich missions in East Asia have reported by wire show an over-all picture of extensive interruption of transit traffic as the result of measures which probably stem from the Japanese Government. They also point to an increasing number of reports emanating from Hong Kong that control of Russian shipping in the Pacific would be advisable.

At present we still lack effective means of power with which to counter blockade attempts in the Far East so long as compelling German military successes have not been achieved. The anti-British sentiment among the general masses has not yet asserted itself against leading political circles. Even a change in regime would presumably result in an interim cabinet which, confronted with the China problem and economic distress, would remain sensitive to Anglo-American pressure. If we should adopt a threatening attitude, however, this would require strong Russian collaboration and could drive Japan, and particularly the Army, into the arms of the hostile powers.

I therefore propose, despite the exigencies of war for Germany, that we make economic concessions in principle with the aim for the time being of counteracting the blockade trend and making transit business possible. I expect that prior concessions by Germany will create a favorable psychological atmosphere for our further efforts.

The same sort of concessions by Russia in the negotiations pending

in Moscow and in the Siberian railroad question would do much to support our economic policy.² OTT

² Deputy Director Clodius of the Economic Policy Department replied in a telegram of Mar. 8 (2316/485042-43) that Germany was not in a position to make new economic concessions to Japan. Even if credits were granted or terms of payment eased, Germany, because of the war and commitments to her near neighbors, did not have the goods to deliver. He added: "Moreover, the Foreign Minister is of the opinion that, in view of the attitude Japan has taken of late toward Germany, especially with regard to transfer shipments, there is no occasion for special economic concessions, particularly as previous experience indicates that the later Japanese counterfavors anticipated by us would probably not be realized anyway."

No. 647

8338/E589894

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 234 of March 2

[BERLIN], March 2, 1940.
e. o. W III B 1151.

For several days we have received vague British and French press reports that as of March 1 the British Government will begin to confiscate German coal going from Rotterdam to Italy on Italian or other ships. The Italian Government is supposed to have received a communication on this subject from the British Government. For various reasons we are, of course, very much interested in the matter. It is not possible, however, to obtain authentic information here. The German Consul at Rotterdam was only able to learn that the Italian steamer *Fianona* put out to sea the night of February 29 with 7,000 tons of coal and that the *Pozynoldi* was planning to depart on March 1 with 10,000 tons.

Please investigate and wire at once:

1. Whether the Italian Government has received an official communication from the British or the French;
2. If so, the content of the communication;
3. What attitude the Italian Government will adopt in that case.¹

RITTER

¹ See document No. 652.

No. 648

124/122671

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Zech

BY COURIER

BERLIN, March 2, 1940.

DEAR ZECH: I still owe you a reply to your two letters of January 27¹ and February 19² regarding the Duke of W.

¹ Document No. 580.

² Document No. 621.

I submitted both letters to the Foreign Minister; he even showed the second one to the Führer. (However, I had added a marginal note next to the last two lines of your letter of February 19, "Abandoning the coast?"¹)

If you can without inconvenience obtain further information of this nature, I should be grateful if you would pass it on to me; please do so preferably in the form of a report with the outer address directing it to me personally. The Foreign Minister wants it in this form because he does not like private-official letters; in fact, he will soon issue another general directive that nothing is to be handled through the private-official channel unless it pertains to personnel matters and absolutely cannot be fitted into the official reporting.

Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The text of Zech's letter which has been used for document No. 621 is that of a copy made in the Foreign Ministry and it does not contain the marginal note mentioned here. The original has not been found.

No. 649

F14/380-406

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, March 2, 1940.

[Pol. IX 493 g.]¹

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR AND AMERICAN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SUMNER WELLES, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, STATE SECRETARY MEISSNER,² AND AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES KIRK

After a word of thanks for the reception by the Führer, Sumner Welles began with a statement already made at yesterday's conversation with the Foreign Minister regarding the nature of his mission. He explained that the President of the United States had instructed him to go to Italy, Germany, France, and England in order to report to him on the present situation in Europe, and he emphasized, as in yesterday's conversation with the Foreign Minister, that he was not authorized to make any proposals or enter into any commitments in the name of the United States. As in yesterday's conversation, he added that he would consider the statements made to him in the course of his conversations with foreign statesmen as strictly confidential and would use them only for the information of President Roosevelt.

¹ The file number appears on another copy (33/25261-74) found in the files of Under State Secretary Woermann.

² Meissner's correct title was that of State Minister.

President Roosevelt had given him this mission in order to ascertain whether there were any possibilities at all at the present moment for the establishment of a secure and lasting peace in Europe. President Roosevelt was not interested in any temporary, insecure condition of peace. He was of the opinion that a war of annihilation would bring with it a tremendous destruction of life and of everything that our civilization had taught us to prize, and he was aware that such a war of annihilation would affect every country. The United States also, as the largest neutral country, would feel the effects of such a war on her social, economic, financial, and commercial life.

President Roosevelt had in public statements already declared the readiness of the United States, for its part, after the establishment of a secure and lasting peace, to collaborate fully in the limitation and reduction of armaments and the attainment of a sound economic life.

For all these reasons Sumner Welles had asked for an audience with the Führer and would be grateful if the latter would inform him of his views.

The Führer replied that the first statement he had to make related to the fact that it was not Germany which had declared war on England and France, but that the reverse was the case; that it was not Germany which had war aims that were directed against England and France, but that here, too, the reverse was true. The crux of the matter, therefore, was whether England and France would abandon their war aims or not. The enemy's war aims were known to Germany and were such that they could not be discussed at all. Germany did not now believe that England and France would depart from these war aims, and was therefore of the opinion that the conflict would have to be fought to a finish.

The Führer himself, moreover, in his speech of October 6 had expressed his concern over an extension of the conflict. He was in no doubt as to the results of such an extension and had therefore in this speech extended his hand to the enemy once again. He had met with a brusque rejection. Moreover, what the statesmen said officially was perhaps less significant than what the actual moulders of public opinion circulated concerning the enemy's war aims. They plainly revealed the destructive intentions of our foes, and since Germany already had one experience with such war aims she was determined to do away with them. Furthermore, the Führer's last offer had again been construed as weakness, so that there was now really nothing more to be said on the German side. If England desired to destroy Germany's future, the German nation would know how to frustrate this intention.

For the rest, it should be observed that the economic and disarmament problems which President Roosevelt wished to settle after peace

was established had existed for decades. During this long period the other countries had not only not been able to solve any economic or disarmament problem, but had even opposed the sensible proposals that had been made by the Führer for settlements in the disarmament and economic fields.

Only this morning news had come from America that a new boycott had been launched against Germany. Hence it followed that the present atmosphere was not conducive to economic collaboration. In this connection the Führer recalled the boycott movement that started in America when he came to power in a completely democratic way as a result of the German plebiscite and tried, in view of the 7 million unemployed and the collapse of economic life, to expand German trade. Although at that time the German-American trade balance was in America's favor (American sales to Germany of 700 to 900 millions as against German sales of 300 millions to the United States), a boycott movement was at once started against Germany in the United States, and no attempt whatever was made to check it. As it progressed, Germany naturally found herself compelled also to restrict her imports from the United States (namely, to the extent of two-thirds, as compared with a one-third reduction of German sales to America). This reduction could surely not be blamed on the Führer, for Germany's interest had, quite to the contrary, been directed at an extension. In economic matters one should not allow oneself to be swayed by ideological considerations. Germany had carried on trade with the democratic countries just as with Russia, without troubling about the regimes of the trade partners; other countries, however, had allowed themselves to be governed by ideological considerations and had often not wanted to trade with Germany simply because of the difference of the regime and the economic structure. It had often been forgotten in such cases that Germany with its 140 persons to the square kilometer naturally had to have a different economic structure from the United States, in which there were only 13 or 14 persons to the square kilometer. This comparison alone showed that Germany had to produce about 10 times as much per square kilometer as the United States in order to feed herself, etc. And it would have been possible to expand trade but ideological impediments had made this impossible.

The Führer mentioned that he had always respected the manner in which other countries tried to settle their problems, but had failed to find the same respect from others for Germany's efforts. The prerequisite for economic collaboration was, however, respect for the methods that other countries were forced to employ. All attempts that the Führer had made to achieve something by generous proposals with respect to economic matters, armaments, and a political détente

had been repulsed. Shortly before the outbreak of the war the British Ambassador had sat exactly where Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was now sitting, and the Führer had made him the greatest offer of his life. This, too, had not been accepted, and it must not be forgotten that for the Führer, too, the moment had to come in which a further yielding to the others would be a dereliction of his duty to the German people. And if, in addition, sensible proposals such as that made in October were even construed as signs of weakness, then all that Germany could do was to rely on her strength, and the only path then still open was to fight the battle out to a finish—not, indeed, to accomplish war aims of any kind, but to defend herself against the destructive intent of the enemy's war aims. A bloc of 100 million people would not think of allowing itself to be annihilated by other countries, and in Germany further developments were awaited with icy determination.

Sumner Welles replied that his Government had fully recognized the efforts of the Führer to obtain a limitation and reduction of armaments. He was also of the opinion that it must be regarded as a real tragedy for Europe and for the world that the offers the Führer had made in these fields had not been generously examined and put into effect.

Sumner Welles said he was not informed about the boycott against Germany which had broken out in America, according to the latest reports to reach Berlin; he observed that the American Government had at no time promoted or encouraged any sort of boycott movement, since it was one of its fundamental beliefs that no greater harm could be done than by employing economic or financial means for political purposes. The Government of the United States had, therefore, perhaps as the only government in the world, up until very recently sought to lower trade barriers and to remove the artificial obstructions to a free exchange of goods; and it was aware of the fact that nothing was more conducive to a stable condition of peace than a rise in purchasing power and the standard of living and a decrease in unemployment through expansion of world trade.

Sumner Welles stated that he was deeply impressed with the Führer's words and would regret it deeply if he had to feel after this conversation that there was no longer any hope of avoiding the war of annihilation. The American Government took the stand that there was still time to avert this disaster and that certain statesmen could still banish the horrors that threatened the world if a war of annihilation were unleashed. Although the communications that he was receiving from the statesmen had to be treated in confidence, he wanted to say this much about the views of the Duce, that the latter, too, was of the opinion that there was still time to settle the difficulties by peaceful means.

The Führer replied that he had stated at the beginning that this question had nothing to do with Germany, since it was not we who had declared war. If it had been left to Germany absolute peace would now prevail, and if England and France had accepted the Führer's proposal they would probably now for some time have been sitting down together to settle by negotiation the problems still to be solved. Often governments could not act as they wished. Public opinion which was moulded by other elements intervened and often came to dominate the governments.

In principle it was necessary to distinguish three elements:

1. Historical memories, which must not be underestimated;
2. Political interests, which in part were related to security questions and the like;
3. Economic interests.

On the first point the Führer remarked that it was impossible permanently to deny to a great nation the position in the world which was its due by virtue of tradition and history. This applied particularly to Italy and Germany. As much as 500 years before the arrival of the first Europeans in America, half a millennium before Columbus, a great German empire had existed which even then had included all the territories which the Führer had now re-incorporated into the Reich. Perhaps these historical facts receded into the background temporarily for a few hundred years during a period in which these nations slumbered, but, as was plainly shown in the case of Italy and Germany, when the nations regained their strength they immediately reappeared on the surface and asserted themselves.

Second, with regard to the political element the Führer stated that it was an absurdity in the era of nationalism to want to prevent the unification of one people into a great empire. If England or America were split up into different parts, these parts would also strive undeniably to reunite. The same had been evident in the case of Germany and Italy. If now a political coalition had grown accustomed to ignoring such natural tendencies, as in the case of Italy and Germany, it would naturally be awkward if at a certain time these forces became so strong that they could no longer be overlooked. The idea, however, of wanting to prevent the political unification of the German nation, ultimately by war, was simply absurd.

As far as the economic side was concerned, it was simply foolish to want to exclude from raw material sources a people that had to live with 140 persons to the square kilometer. Germany had won her colonies not by conquest and force but by purchase, exchange, and treaty. These colonies had been taken from her without a solution being offered for vital problems connected with this step. Thus a bloc of 80 million people had been plunged into the greatest subsistence

difficulties, and a nation that had been deprived in this way of the bases for its existence could not be expected to be grateful for it in the bargain. It was only natural that as soon as this people was restored to strength it would strive to regain the bases of its existence. Germany also failed to understand the "peace-time blockade," which consisted in the fact that certain countries simply reserved to themselves great areas of the world, as had been done in the Ottawa Agreement.

It must be stated, moreover, that world trade was not the only remedy for economic ills. As an example the Führer cited German-American relations. America was producing a surplus of foods, raw materials, and industrial products. Germany was suffering from a shortage of foods and raw materials, but had a surplus of industrial products. America would surely be glad to place at Germany's disposal the available quantities out of her surplus production of food and raw materials, but could not accept industrial exports Germany thought to give in return because she had a surplus industrial production of her own. Thus it was impossible in this way to supply the Central European Lebensraum with all its needs; therefore this Lebensraum must create within itself the bases for its raw materials and food supplies. If this were not done, the greatest economic difficulties would arise. Either the Central European area would be forced to resort to underbidding and dumping or a dangerous state of tension would develop.

The Führer then pointed out that he had proposed to England and France that they proceed to joint collaboration in the economic field after the return of the German colonies. These proposals had been rejected, however. He was not waging war for its own sake; on the contrary, the war meant for him a loss of time if one considered that he had been given the gigantic task of organizing the Central European Lebensraum of the German people and making it viable. The German people were 100 percent behind him in this endeavor.

In summary, the Führer pointed out that if the economic, political, and historical realities which he had just discussed were disregarded, no really lasting and sound condition of peace could be achieved. Respect for these three elements was the condition for a lasting peace. For the rest, Germany did not desire to penetrate the Lebensraum of other great nations, but only to retain what actually belonged to her. She had effected the unification of all the German people as the most natural requirement of the present. She wanted to secure for herself the economic and spatial foundations necessary for her existence. The immense British world empire with its large, unused tracts of land surely had no use for the German colonies. The military argument, too, was not convincing, since Germany was the only power which had not used her colonies for military purposes. If these views

were not respected, the Führer said in conclusion, there was no other solution than a life-and-death struggle which Germany, however, was facing with complete confidence.

Sumner Welles stated that he personally fully recognized the work of reconstruction performed by the Führer in the 7 years of his government. He had also recognized very well the significance of the historical and political exigencies of which the Führer had spoken to him. The American Government was of the opinion that there could be no greater guarantee of a lasting and sound peace than a unified, contented, and prosperous German nation.

With regard to the statements by the Führer regarding German-American trade and the impossibility of settling all difficulties by world trade only, Sumner Welles remarked that he agreed with this latter opinion, but with the proviso that a more liberal conduct of world trade, although it could not alone resolve all difficulties, was nevertheless one of the greatest and most important means of eliminating them. With respect to German-American trade, Sumner Welles recalled the fact that America, despite her own industrial production, had been very glad to import certain manufactured products from Germany, just as Germany, despite her own agricultural production, also imported agricultural products from America. The remainder of the export surplus simply had to be disposed of through the channels of multilateral trade, and here the liberalization of world trade was of great importance.

Sumner Welles then pointed out that in economic and disarmament questions the German and the American Governments were of the same opinion on many points, and in this connection asked the Führer whether he agreed with the American Government that after the establishment of a lasting and sound peace which gave the German people every security, in accordance with the principles just described by the Führer, the disarmament and economic problems could be solved simultaneously.

The Führer replied that he was personally of the opinion that the armaments burden had to be reduced because it would otherwise lead to the ruin of all nations. It represented not only the greatest impediment to social reconstruction, but also millions of workers were employed for nonproductive purposes who could better be occupied in other fields for increasing the well-being of the people. There were two possibilities for limiting armaments:

1. By international agreements on the basis of which all the nations would disarm simultaneously according to a definite plan by tedious and involved procedures.
2. By the union of a number of peoples that were ready to disarm, who would pool their defense interests and despite their own disarmament would still remain strong enough collectively to prevail against

other nations not willing to disarm; the latter, as a result of the great burden of their armaments, would finally have to collapse. He had made such proposals to England and France, but without success.

Sumner Welles replied that the Government of the United States considered the armaments question one of the most serious problems, just as did the Führer, and agreed with him that it now resulted in diverting the people to work aimed at destruction instead of employing them productively. If rearmament continued, the various countries would be faced with ruin, as the Führer had very correctly observed.

He could not at the moment express himself on the technical procedure for disarmament.

The Führer repeated that the decisive thing was that it was not a matter of the German war aims but the war aims of the others who were seeking the annihilation of Germany. He could assure Mr. Sumner Welles that Germany would never be annihilated. He had been a soldier on the western front for 4 years, and was of the opinion that Germany would not have been defeated then either if there had been another regime at the helm. It was not a question of whether Germany would be annihilated; Germany would know how to defend herself from annihilation, and in the very worst case everyone would be annihilated. Today Germany was in a totally different situation from the last war and he, the Führer, had made all preparations, and made them thoroughly, in order to be able to break the will to annihilation of the others. The German war aim—"peace"—stood opposed to the war aim of the others—"annihilation". The German people, who had learned from the terrible experience of 1918, stood behind him to a man. Anybody who wanted to establish peace had to induce Germany's opponents to abandon their war aims of annihilation. Germany was of the view that America even with the best will in the world—which was recognized by the Germans without question—would find it difficult to attain this goal.

Sumner Welles thanked the Führer for the open and candid way in which he had made his statements. He was deeply impressed with what he had heard and would report it to President Roosevelt as accurately as possible. Responding to a remark by the Führer, Sumner Welles said that the American Government hoped that not only would it be possible to prevent everyone from being destroyed, as the Führer had expressed it, but that not even one of the countries now engaged in the conflict would be destroyed. He took cognizance, moreover, of the fact that the Führer had declared peace to be the German war aim. He would not forget this.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 650

F11/0140-52

Memorandum by the Minister to Norway

TOP SECRET

at present in BERLIN, March 2, 1940.¹

VIOLATION OF NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS

I. *As seen from England.*

Despite the *Altmark* case and despite England's interest in harassing German ore shipments along the Norwegian coast, there are weighty reasons for England to abstain from further violations of international law in this direction.

1) The *Altmark* case is justified by England principally on the ground of the necessity of freeing the prisoners. A new violation of Norwegian territorial waters, particularly a series of such violations, would tear the mask from England's face; there are strong checks operating against such action.

2) England realizes that any actions of this sort would open up the whole Norwegian question, and indeed not only to German counter-actions but also to those of Russia.

3) From this it follows that the harassing maneuver would have to be supported by strong military forces, and they would be exposed to very great danger.

4) The harassing operation would be directed not only against Norway but also against Sweden (Swedish ore).

5) The prospects of success must seem uncertain to England.

6) The Finnish conflict could no longer be made a pretext for intervention because of the present attitude of Sweden and Norway. The landing at and occupation of Norwegian ports, such as Narvik, for example, is indeed entirely out of the question for England.²

II. *As seen from Norway.*

1) Norway is adhering strictly to her neutrality and consequently to the maintenance of her sovereignty in territorial waters.

2) Norwegian territorial waters are especially important for the country. The Norwegian coastline is some 2500 kilometers long; the west coast from the North Cape to Stavanger some 1600 kilometers. When the country is impassable, the territorial waters also serve as a trade route. In view of Norway's thousand years of ocean navigation she is especially sensitive on this score.

¹ In a telegram of Feb. 28 from Ribbentrop's Secretariat, Brüner had been summoned to Berlin for consultation on the situation that had developed in Norway since the *Altmark* incident and the intensification of the Russo-Finnish conflict. The telegram stated that the Foreign Minister "would like in particular to hear your opinion about all the reports you have received regarding a possible intervention by the Western Powers in northern Norway or a contemplated disruption of shipping in Norwegian territorial waters." (22/13846/2)

² Marginal note in bold pencil, probably by Ribbentrop: "?"

3) A pact with England regarding British intervention is out of the question. This would mean a renunciation of Norway's sovereignty. Besides disrupting trade routes, it would also have an unfavorable effect upon trade relations with Germany, which are especially important today in view of the uncertainty of overseas trade.

4) Norway knows that if England invades her territorial waters she will become legitimate prey, not only for Germany, but probably also for Russia as far as northern Norway is concerned.

5) The question of territorial waters is thus extremely vital for Norway. To be sure, the only thing she can do to defend herself is protest.

III. The above statements are naturally to be regarded only as indicative. England's interest in German traffic in Norwegian territorial waters and her vigilance still continue. Since the *Altmark* incident a number of flights by British planes over Norwegian coastal territory and territorial waters have been reported, to which I have directed the attention of the Norwegian Government.

The following changes in the situation might affect the British attitude:

1) A deterioration of the situation for England and a growing realization that the blockade against Germany has loopholes in Scandinavia as well as elsewhere.

2) A German breach of neutrality by military operations against neutral states.

In this case, to be sure, England's forces will automatically be tied down to continental warfare.

3) A great military victory by Russia in Finland. In that event, it will be necessary to see to it that Norway and Sweden are not threatened by Russia's advance.

4) Norwegian shipping losses as a result of German operations which would be contrary to the rules we ourselves have set up. (The sinking of supply ships for Norway, of ships with neutral cargo between neutral ports, etc.)

IV. *Proposals.*

1) There is no occasion at present for preventive action against Norway. If such action is considered, the prospects of success must be very carefully calculated. The protection of the long and jagged coast and of navigation in coastal waters requires special consideration in view of inadequate air bases.

2) If the situation remains the same, the control and strengthening of Norway's existing determination to remain neutral is desirable. Hints should be dropped to the effect that Norway would be gambling with her very existence if something should happen in her coastal waters. It would also be well to continue the policy of close economic relationships

3) Our naval warfare should continue firm on the points established by us. Norway's interests, which in terms of our supply situation are identical with our own, must be given consideration by means of instructions to our forces operating at sea.

4) The Russo-Finnish conflict has a salutary effect upon the Norwegian determination to remain neutral. In the event of a Russian advance, thought will have to be given to the protection of Norway and Sweden.

5) Great vigilance with regard to British operations in the northern part of the North Sea is necessary. Counter-operations by our naval and air forces seem desirable in order to harass England which feels secure north of the Shetland Islands-Bergen line.

BRÄUER

No. 651

B19/B003506-07

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 94 of March 2

HELSINKI, March 3, 1940—1:20 a. m.

Received March 3—6:30 a. m.

Hackzell, the former Finnish Foreign Minister, visited me this evening and informed me confidentially of the following:

The Finnish Government had for several days been negotiating with the Russian Government through the mediation of the Swedish Foreign Minister. The negotiations were progressing favorably and at such a pace that their conclusion might be a matter of days. The Finnish Government was willing to cede not only the islands in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland, but also Hangö, as well as the protruding portion of Karelia approximately where the Russian positions now were. The Russian Government was not interested in Petsamo and other conquests north of Lake Ladoga. The point of disagreement was that the Russian Government was at this time still insisting on Viipuri and the area northwest of Lake Ladoga, including Sortavala.

Hackzell raised the question whether Germany could not use her influence in Moscow to persuade the Russians to give up their demand for Viipuri and the area northwest of Lake Ladoga.

I began by expressing by astonishment to M. Hackzell that this démarche was being made by him as a private individual. M. Hackzell replied that no envoy aside from the Swedish Minister had been informed by the Foreign Minister. He, Hackzell, had, however, wished to acquaint me with these facts as an old friend, particularly since the Finnish Minister in Stockholm was today also going to in-

form Prince Wied. The Finnish Government had a special interest in withholding this information from the governments of the countries whence aid was coming, so that activity to obtain aid would not be hindered. I suggest that the above information be immediately checked by our Ambassador in Moscow and, that if it is correct, we take advantage of the opportunity of entering into the negotiations.¹ It is in Germany's interest that at least Viipuri, as an important port, and the valuable Käkisalme works, owned by Waldhof,² are preserved for Finland's economy.

BLÜCHER

¹ An instruction along these lines was submitted for the approval of the Foreign Minister, who, however, decided that nothing should be done (34/23693).

² The Waldhof cellulose corporation of Mannheim.

No. 652

8838/E589889-90

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 492 of March 3

ROME, March 3, 1940—5:05 p. m.

Received March 3—10:00 p. m.

W III b 1143.

With reference to your telegram No. 234 of March 2.¹

This afternoon I called on Ciano, who had not yet on his own informed me about the developments of the past few days, although we had at least touched on the coal question in every one of our conversations during recent weeks; I asked questions of him in accordance with the instruction mentioned above. It became evident that the British Government (but not the French) had given official notice during the last few days—although Ciano avoided disclosing the exact date—that the delivery of German coal by sea via Holland would no longer be permitted after March 1.² At the same time Ciano showed me the text of a sharp note of protest which will be presented by him to the British Chargé d'Affaires at 1 o'clock this afternoon and is to be published by the Italian press tomorrow morning.³ Since the text of the note of protest was in need of additional minor editing, as Ciano noticed in looking through the copy which he had intended for me, I shall receive the definitive text in approximately an hour and shall then transmit it by teletype.⁴ The note is not limited to the pro-

¹ Document No. 647.

² On Feb. 29, the British Government announced that beginning Mar. 1 German coal exports by sea to Italy, previously allowed to pass despite the Order in Council of Nov. 27, 1939, would be liable to detention.

³ The text of this note was printed in the *New York Times*, Mar. 5, 1940.

⁴ Not printed (8338/E589891-93).

test in the coal-supply question, but objects in its first part to England's arbitrary handling of maritime law in general.

When I asked (on the basis of yesterday's telephone conversation with Clodius⁵) whether the British measures would also affect coal ships that were already en route, Ciano replied that this was not yet clear to the Italians themselves at the moment. According to the text of the note which he showed me, however, it appears that only such ships are to be affected as were still in Dutch harbors after March 1.⁶

Subsequently, I informed Ciano of my telephone conversation with Clodius yesterday on the treatment to be accorded in the German press to the matter concerning which Minister Rocco⁷ had stated—after conferring with Propaganda Minister Pavolini—that its grave political importance should be pointed out, to be sure, but that it might be better to avoid an intensive campaign for the time being. Ciano thanked us for our willingness to coordinate our press approach in this matter; he felt that Rocco was right and said that it would probably be best if the German press would go along with the Italian press, in other words, would not go further in polemics than the latter.

MACKENSEN

⁵ Clodius' memorandum of this conversation contained the information that 26 ships carrying about 200,000 tons of coal were already en route (2060/448107-08).

⁶ On Mar. 11, Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that agreement had been reached on Mar. 9 with the Italian Government regarding 13 coal ships detained by the British after Mar. 1. These ships would be released, but the coal traffic would be discontinued, and it was hoped that this agreement would open the way for a resumption of negotiations "for the furtherance of trade to our mutual advantage." Then on Mar. 20, in a note which was published in the *Times* of London, the British Government replied to the more general aspects of the Italian protest of Mar. 8. The British reply called attention to British belligerent rights but emphasized the fullest regard for neutral rights.

⁷ Guido Rocco, Director General of the Foreign Press section of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

No. 653

66/46573-84

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, March 4, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN FIELD MARSHAL GÖRING AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SUMNER WELLES IN KARINHALL ON MARCH 3, 1940

Sumner Welles opened the conversation, exactly as he had the discussions with the Führer, the Reich Foreign Minister, and the Führer's Deputy,¹ to which he referred briefly, by outlining in almost

¹ Welles had seen Rudolf Hess earlier on Mar. 3. The memorandum of their conversation is not printed (66/46568-72).

the same words the nature and purpose of his mission to Europe. President Roosevelt had instructed him to take a trip to Italy, Germany, France, and England in order to report on the present situation in Europe and any existing possibilities of bringing about a firm and lasting peace in Europe. President Roosevelt had no interest in a temporary or insecure state of peace, but only in a lasting peace which would give all the peoples the security to which they are entitled. Sumner Welles emphasized that he would treat the information given him by the European statesmen as strictly confidential and only for the information of President Roosevelt. Finally, he added that he had not been authorized to make any proposals or suggestions.

He mentioned his long conversation with the Duce in Rome, which he characterized as constructive and helpful. Although because of the previously mentioned confidential nature of his conversations with the European statesmen he could not give any details about his conversation with the Duce, he did want to say this much: that in the opinion of the Duce there was still a possibility of bringing about a firm and lasting peace in Europe. The American Government was of the opinion that if a war of annihilation were let loose, not only would millions of lives be lost, but also the social order as well as the greater part of the material wealth which civilization had amassed in bygone times would be destroyed. For this reason the American Government hoped that there was still time to find ways and means of assuring a just political peace on a firm and lasting basis. If this possibility existed, America would, in accordance with the public pronouncements of President Roosevelt, take over her full share in all plans drawn up for disarmament which at the same time provided for the security needs of the various nations, as well as all measures for improving economic relations, which for their part would also be able to contribute to the security and stability of the world. He had come to Europe in this spirit, and he would now appreciate hearing the Field Marshal's views.

Field Marshal Göring replied that in order to state his views correctly regarding the above-mentioned questions, he would first have to go back a bit and sketch the past development.

When National Socialism came to power and the first principles of foreign policy were formulated, the Führer, as the Field Marshal still remembered very well, had in a conference stressed the two leading principles of German foreign policy which would now be followed: (1) The traditional friendship with Italy; this policy was already being followed, owing to the common ideological background. (2) The closest and most intimate cooperation with the British Empire. This latter principle was to be translated into action as soon as pos-

sible. Now a veritable courtship of England set in, and when on later occasions others expressed the opinion that England could not be trusted and it was better to be careful in dealing with her, the Führer rejected this idea energetically and declared that the pro-British policy must be followed under all circumstances. England had an important task to fulfill in consolidating her Empire, while Germany, for her part, must act as a stabilizing factor on the continent of Europe. Everything possible had been done in order to make cooperation with England a reality. To every one of the leading political personalities from England who subsequently came to Germany in great numbers it was explained that it would be insane and criminal if England and Germany ever went to war against each other again. The World War must be the first and last armed conflict between the two countries, and the interests of both nations were mutual. The Führer even went so far in his desire to cooperate with England that he was prepared to guarantee the continued existence of the British Empire with the aid of German armed might.

The England of MacDonald and later of Baldwin was very reserved in the face of this; one did not seem to understand the German desire for a rapprochement, and it was also pointed out that one had commitments to France. Thereupon the Führer declared that he was willing to come to an agreement with France, too. It had surely been a rather bitter and difficult step for him definitely to renounce Alsace-Lorraine in order to come to a settlement with France and thereby also with England. For France the only condition stipulated was a satisfactory settlement of the Saar question.

In order to clear away further difficulties the Führer made disarmament proposals, which, as was known, provided for an army of 200 to 300 thousand men. At the same time Polish-German relations, which at the time of the assumption of power had been extremely tense, were consolidated.

In connection with the efforts to come to an agreement with England, Herr von Ribbentrop was also called in, since he in particular had excellent connections with England. In order to carry out the task given him by the Führer, he set up an independent office which brought prominent Englishmen to Germany in order to aid the mutual rapprochement in this way.

Germany had only very limited plans: the consolidation of the Reich, abrogation of the Versailles Treaty, and her own security. When Ambassador von Hoesch died, Herr von Ribbentrop was sent to London as Ambassador with express instructions to carry out the German-British rapprochement. Previously he had concluded the Naval Agreement with England, in which the Führer made the great concession that German naval forces should be only 35 percent as

large as the British. Only when one knew how dear to the Führer's heart German naval influence was and how he had always intended to give Germany a strong fleet again could one comprehend what a great personal sacrifice he made to German-British rapprochement in entering into the German-British Naval Agreement.

In England, to be sure, some individuals had shown appreciation of this. But British officialdom and the people who formed public opinion had rejected all these plans for a rapprochement, and this already at a time when there could not yet be any question whatsoever of any sort of aspirations to power on the part of Germany. All of Germany's efforts to come to terms with England had been rejected, and not for any logical reasons. One could perhaps have understood that. But not in a gentlemanly way, either, but with scorn, disdain, and insults to leading German personalities. It had often been difficult for Germany to hold to the pro-British course, and those who worked with the Führer had often been astonished that in spite of everything he adhered to his objective of cooperation with England. Of course, there had been short periods of uncertainty in German-British relations, but each time the Führer had afterwards returned to his old pro-British course.

Field Marshal Göring then began to speak of the later developments in more recent times. He mentioned the occupation of the Rhineland, which only represented the realization of the most primitive right of a people to exercise complete sovereignty over all of its territory. He spoke of Austria, a land which, except for a few Jews, was peopled entirely by Germans. She had desired to return to the Reich and as early as 1918 had made a decision to that effect in her parliament, but was forbidden by the Entente to carry it out. It has therefore a really amusing effect when M. Daladier declares today that the question of Austria will have to be opened again. It is exactly as if one of the states of the USA had been detached from the United States as a result of an unfortunate war and later reincorporated, and then a foreign statesman declared that the condition of separation would have to be restored. One could just as well demand that Bavaria or Württemberg should again be separated from the Reich.

Passing to the Czech question, the Field Marshal remarked that it was a matter of two things here: (1) An ethnic question. Under general pressure the Sudeten-German question had been settled at Munich. There a guarantee of the rump state of Czechoslovakia had been considered. He himself had been present when the Führer had rejected this idea because one ought first to wait for the Czechs to reach a settlement with the Slovaks, Hungarians, and Poles, and should also watch the future internal developments in Czechoslovakia.

Then came the second point regarding Czechoslovakia, the question of security. In order to understand this clearly, Sumner Welles should try cutting the map of the old Czechoslovakia out of an atlas and then placing it somewhere next to the border on a map of the United States, in such a way that it would lie within the U. S. territory. Then he would understand what sort of menace Czechoslovakia as she existed then had been to Germany. She had threatened the heart of Germany like the point of a spear, situated as she was only 20 minutes by air from the capital and the important industrial centers and arteries of traffic. What responsible chief of state would have been able to endure such a state of affairs, especially since this enclave within Germany had a hostile orientation toward the Reich. Czechoslovakia would perhaps still be in existence if this anti-German attitude had not predominated, which in the words of the French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, made her an aircraft carrier directed against Germany. Germany's security was not guaranteed as long as Czechoslovakia was hostile toward us.

After Munich Germany had followed developments in Czechoslovakia very closely. The Führer had uttered repeated warnings. The new Czech President, however, had proved to be too weak. A military clique, embittered by the Munich Agreement, had called for revenge, and the hostility toward Germany had been worse than before Munich. The army had not been reduced, and this was a serious threat to Germany. Czechoslovakia's economy had not been brought into alignment with that of Germany to the extent necessary for salutary living together. The vital security of the German nation necessitated an absolutely clear relationship, however. And so the Protectorate had been set up. This Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was to remain completely independent in its internal administration and its culture, and would even be permitted to maintain a small army. Naturally this could only be considered in time of peace; in wartime there were special laws, of course.

Now after France and England had lost these valuable outposts, they had been terribly indignant. In view of their hostile attitude toward Germany, that was altogether understandable. But it was also understandable that Germany had seized this hostile bastion in the midst of her territory.

Passing on to Poland, the Field Marshal pointed out that here, too, Germany had done everything possible to arrive at a good relationship with this country. Just as Herr von Ribbentrop was supposed to maintain the tie with England, the Field Marshal had been commissioned to take care of that with Poland. He had maintained the very best of relations with numerous Polish personalities, with Pilsudski, Beck, and others, who had been his personal guests. Ger-

many had had no objections to the existence of Poland, but on the contrary, had stressed her interest in a strong Poland. The Poles had also acknowledged that Danzig was German, just as Germany had recognized that Poland had economic interests in Danzig; and therefore one had believed that the Danzig question could best be solved by having Danzig return to Germany, and by not only guaranteeing all of Poland's economic interests there but also granting her a free harbor area. In addition, there was also to be a sort of small corridor in the shape of a highway and a four-track railroad through this corridor to maintain connections with East Prussia. In return the Führer had been prepared to give up once and for all a great German province in which many Germans lived, to guarantee the boundaries of Poland, and to conclude a 25-year nonaggression pact. To judge from his personal acquaintance with Beck and Moscicki, these two statesmen at least would probably have agreed to the German proposals, in spite of the fact that the Poles in their past history had almost always been destroyed because of their own delusions and over-emphasis on prestige.

At this moment England had intervened. When on the day after the Munich Agreement the declaration by the Führer and Chamberlain was signed, according to which there would never be another war between Germany and England, the German people had been very happy. The long-cherished wish of the Führer appeared to have been fulfilled. Consequently, people in Germany had been dumbfounded when a short time thereafter Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Eden, Mr. Duff Cooper, and others stated that Munich was a defeat for England and declared that England would have to rearm to an extraordinary degree so that there could never be a second Munich. This was in a sense the first covert declaration of war against Germany by England. Also the Führer had realized at this moment that the British had agreed to the settlement at Munich only under pressure.

Then England came forward with the Polish guarantee, which Beck wanted to have nothing to do with at first, and which he was more or less forced to accept. As a result the attitude of the Poles stiffened; from day to day they became more rabid and insulting in their utterances, and finally they went so far as to murder and torture members of the German minority. Today there was photographic documentary evidence of the fury of the Polish bands; and the atrocities depicted in these documents appeared to him (the Field Marshal) even to overshadow anything which occurred in the Middle Ages. The German nation could not have permitted this. In a matter such as this, which also touched the national honor most profoundly, no compromise was possible. Thus action had had to be taken against Poland. It must be stressed, however, that England had been assured

by Germany that this was the only question that remained to be settled, and that then the joint settlement of European problems could be begun both with England and with France. In addition to the official negotiations, the Field Marshal's liaison men had also been constantly active in this sense up to the very last moment before the outbreak of the war, in order to point out the absurdity of a European conflict in view of this attitude of Germany's.

Then the unilateral declaration of war by the Western Powers had followed. Germany would never have declared war of her own volition. Moreover, in this connection it should be remarked that the French Foreign Minister plainly indicated to the German Foreign Minister at the time of the latter's visit to Paris in December 1938 that France was no longer interested in the eastern questions.² France would also never have gone to war of her own accord, but England did not want to fail to make use of this pretext for destroying Germany.

Another sure proof that England was the actual instigator of the war was furnished by the fact that Mussolini's compromise proposal, which he made at the last minute to the powers concerned, was accepted by Germany and France.³ Only England rejected it and finally forced France to revise her attitude, too. These were absolute facts, whatever interpretation M. Daladier might choose to give them now.

After the Polish war had been brought to an end within 18 days, the Führer had made one more last offer of peace. Not a single French village or a single piece of British territory had been demanded by Germany. Now that Germany's claims had been met, Germany offered to conclude peace, and the Führer declared that he was even now ready to carry out all of the earlier plans for cooperation. It was hoped in Germany that England would clearly recognize how advantageous such an arrangement would be, providing as it did for the cooperation of the four great European powers. Instead the German peace offer was rejected with scorn, the worst possible blunder was committed—it was interpreted as weakness. That had been very foolish, of course. Anyone who knew the Führer knew that his forbearance and patience were often very great. But when the limit had once been reached, the Führer hardened in iron determination and nothing could deter him from his aim. He had perceived England's intentions of returning Germany to her Versailles Treaty status, that is, in other words, to annihilate her. In spite of the formal qualifications which would perhaps be put forward by the English, all Germans were convinced of their opponent's

² For the German record of the Ribbentrop-Bonnet conversation of Dec. 6, 1938, see vol. IV, document No. 370.

³ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 535, 539, and 554.

intention to annihilate them. The situation was thus clear. Germany desired peace. But rather than permit herself to be destroyed by her enemies she would fight, even if the war lasted 30 years.

Sir John Simon's speech of the previous day, which, by the way, he recommended that Mr. Sumner Welles read very carefully, absolutely corroborated what he had just said. It was harsh, arrogant, and impudent. Whether there had to be any fighting did not depend upon Germany, but upon her opponents. In order to protect herself from annihilation Germany would fight to the last man.

Since Germany had been aware for a considerable length of time of this desire on the part of the other countries to annihilate her, she had made all the preparations in plenty of time to protect herself both materially and psychologically. The morale of the troops, whom he had just visited at the front, was excellent. They were burning with a desire to break the outrageous will to annihilation of the others, and they were firmly convinced that this could only be done by victory over their opponents. Before God and the world he (the Field Marshal) could state that Germany had not desired the war. It had been forced upon her, and the Field Marshal himself had personally done everything he possibly could up to the very last minute to avert it. But what was Germany to do when the others wanted to destroy her? "Hitlerism must be destroyed" was their slogan, and since Hitler was equivalent to Germany, this simply meant the annihilation of the Reich.

Now the British believed that they could achieve their goal without fighting by means of a blockade. In this the Field Marshal could only wish them the best of luck. He was a soldier by profession, but for the last 3½ years he had also concerned himself with economic questions. The shortage of raw materials from which Germany suffered had been met by the use of substitutes for the raw materials which were lacking, and also by accumulating huge stockpiles. Besides, there were many loopholes in the blockade. Germany had also been reproached because of her preparations to defeat the blockade. In this connection the Four Year Plan factories which it had been necessary to erect and which would perhaps not have been necessary if there had been normal commercial relations between all countries, were nothing more than a living testimony of the folly of the world in economic matters.

Germany, however, had two very important raw materials: iron and coal. From coal Germany could manufacture an exceedingly large number of things; even butter could be made from coal. In addition, Germany's agriculture was intact. She had entered the war with 7½ million tons of bread grains as a standing reserve. In addition there were her own current production and also the amounts

imported from southeastern Europe. Thus under no circumstances would there be a famine, for the bread supply was absolutely assured. Many school buildings and assembly halls were filled to the roof with grain. Moreover, the supplies were being properly rationed.

Although Germany suffered from a shortage of fats, the average German got more butter than was distributed in wealthy England. Soldiers and heavy manual workers received three times as much. England had always said that it would be a long war. Consequently, Germany had known what to do and had prepared herself. Whether the war would be short or long, certainly no revolution would occur behind the backs of those fighting at the front.

By way of recapitulation, the Field Marshal declared that it was a great tragedy that a sword should be thrust into the hands of the very man who had done his utmost to bring about a rapprochement with the nation he was to fight, and whose particular aim had always been to reach a settlement with this nation. Fate—or England—had decided otherwise, for after all it took two to make an agreement. Now a real blow would have to be dealt to England's ambition for hegemony. Even today Germany did not want to destroy either England or the Empire; England merely had to be shown that she no longer possessed the hegemony. Germany understood and respected the world-wide interests of the British Empire, but she would not submit to any tutelage.

Mr. Sumner Welles replied that he was deeply impressed by the extraordinarily lucid explanations of the Field Marshal. If the German Government was absolutely convinced that the war was her only possibility of obtaining the security to which the German people were entitled, then of course there was nothing more for him to say; he had to confess, to be sure, that he had fully and completely appreciated the Field Marshal's remarks. If, however, the Germans also thought there was still a possibility of obtaining a lasting peace and some sort of guarantee of security by means of negotiation, then he could report to President Roosevelt with a certain amount of hope, after all.

Sumner Welles declared that he fully understood the desire of the German people for security, and he also comprehended that a proud people such as the Germans, if they were absolutely sure that the other side wished to annihilate them, would oppose this aim with all possible energy. Moreover, he had already observed on other occasions that a lasting peace could only be established on a firm foundation if the German people were unified, happy, and prosperous, and could be convinced that they had the same opportunities as other countries. That was, so to speak, a *sine qua non* for any lasting peace.

With the same frankness with which the Field Marshal had spoken, he would point out several difficulties which the outside world had

experienced in evaluating Germany's statements of what she desired. On repeated occasions it had been stated by responsible Germans that certain measures which had been taken for the unification of the German people or for other purposes were absolutely the last, and that Germany had no further territorial aspirations.

At Munich the Führer had spoken of the vital interests of the Reich. From the Field Marshal's statements it had become more or less clear to him what was meant. He would like to ask the Field Marshal, however, to define these vital interests somewhat more explicitly.

Once again calling attention to the impossibility of bringing about peace through negotiations, if the other side did not desist from its desire to annihilate Germany, Field Marshal Göring replied that under these conditions peace could only be obtained by a victorious passage at arms. Simon's speech yesterday had again confirmed this viewpoint. The vital requirements of Germany were as follows:

1. Absolute security for the German nation united in a Greater Reich, so that the Germans would not be forced to wage a new war every 20 or 30 years;
2. Adequate means of supplying the German economy;
3. The return of the colonies (not for military purposes);
4. The recognition of Germany as a full-fledged member of the international community.

In the further course of the conversation the Field Marshal put in a personal word in regard to German-American relations. He had always spoken in advance to the prominent Germans who visited America and told them that in their contacts with leading Americans they should constantly stress the fact that Germany had nothing against America and only desired increased trade with her. If the people in America objected to some of the German methods, it should be said that these methods suited us and that often things which seemed hard had to be that way in order to provide counterpressure. If Germany had taken measures against the Jews, on racial grounds, then he wanted to point out in that connection the racial feeling of the Americans, on the basis of which colored people were not even allowed to travel in the same railroad cars as the whites.

Here Sumner Welles interjected that this was true only in a small part of America, and that furthermore there was even a colored congressman in the House of Representatives.

Field Marshal Göring went on to say that in America the Germans had been called anti-Christians. The churches were open everywhere in Germany, however, and divine services were held. There had only been the desire to attack a certain political party which had hoped to make a business out of religion, but not religion itself.

Sumner Welles replied that he was very glad that the Field Marshal had brought up the question of German-American relations. For many generations America had not had closer, more friendly or more agreeable relations with anyone than with Germany. He desired in all frankness to call attention to the fact that the question of the treatment of minorities affected all Americans very deeply. The Americans were an idealistic people with deep humanitarian sentiments. Bad treatment of human beings, whether mistreatment of the blacks by the British, or things which occurred in Germany, affected this humanitarian feeling of the Americans very deeply.

A further reason for the unsatisfactory relations between America and Germany was the firm belief of the Americans that international differences of opinion could be settled by peaceful means. In the last few years the use of force, not only by Germany but also in other parts of the world, had been steadily increasing, so that finally only the American hemisphere still remained free from war. This fact of the increasing use of force affected every American directly and personally in his feeling for the safety of his own country. For this reason the trip of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was being followed with extraordinary interest in America, and people hoped, although this hope had already been almost extinguished, that a peaceful solution would still be found after all. America realized that she was no longer separated from Europe by long distances, and knew that her vital interests were intimately affected by what was happening in Europe. If in some way or another the German Government should be able to participate in this last effort to establish a basis for a sound peace in Europe, with consideration being taken of everything the Field Marshal had said, then the close friendly relations between America and Germany could surely also be reestablished.

Sumner Welles added that if the basis for security and for a just political peace were found—in which connection he continually stressed the fact that the German demands would have to be taken into consideration—America was prepared to take part in all efforts which would then doubtless be made to find practical ways and means for armament reduction and for the reestablishment of a freer world trade. The Field Marshal was probably aware that America had already gotten in touch with the neutral countries in order to determine whether it was possible to agree with them on certain general principles for the promotion of world trade. He hoped that the German Government could perhaps also declare its adherence to these principles. Naturally they would not apply in time of war, but only be recognized as a goal to be striven for after the conclusion of peace. He again stressed the fact that without a sound world trade no lasting peace could be established, and following this he presented a

memorandum containing in short general form these principles regarding nondiscrimination, most-favored-nation treatment, etc.*

After the Field Marshal had agreed with these principles of his own accord and had again stressed the fact that Germany would be very glad to return to an economic system without the restrictions which she had only assumed under the force of circumstances, he called attention, with regard to nondiscrimination, to the discriminatory treatment which German exports were subjected to in America.

Sumner Welles expressed his very great satisfaction with the attitude of the Field Marshal toward the American economic proposals, and explained the discrimination against German goods in America as due to a certain automatism in American commercial legislation. He then asked whether the Field Marshal or some prominent personality in Germany might perhaps declare himself publicly in favor of the principles set forth in the American memorandum, and he was extremely pleased when the Field Marshal promised that this would be done.

Sumner Welles finally declared that he was leaving the Field Marshal with the hope that some way could still be found to avoid the tragedy of a war of annihilation. He stated that he would visit the Duce again and that about March 26 he would report personally to President Roosevelt in Washington regarding the impressions he had obtained in Europe. He would be glad if these impressions indicated that there was still some hope of peace.

Sumner Welles said that during his European trip or after his return to America he might have certain information to transmit to the Field Marshal, and he proposed that it be sent directly through Mr. Kirk. The Field Marshal was agreeable to this.

In conclusion the Field Marshal declared that he was happy that Mr. Sumner Welles, as a neutral, clear-thinking and calm observer, had come to Germany to see the situation as it actually was. He (the Field Marshal) had high hopes that much could be accomplished by such a direct exchange of views by leading personalities. Sumner Welles had seen that Germany's war aim was peace. If the desire for annihilation on the part of Germany's enemies should be abandoned—something which he unfortunately could not believe—then peace could be concluded soon. But in this matter Sumner Welles would have a difficult time with Germany's enemies. In any case, he had undertaken one of the greatest and noblest tasks which any man could be given, and if his mission was successful, that would be a wonderful reward for all his efforts.

Mr. Sumner Welles thanked the Field Marshal for his words and said that he was very deeply impressed by what he had learned in

* See document No. 673.

the course of this conversation. He would give President Roosevelt a complete report regarding it. Such a man to man and heart to heart conversation was better calculated to obviate difficulties than the unsuccessful efforts of the past by all too many fourth and fifth rate personalities.

After a tour through Karinhall the conversation, which had lasted almost 3 hours, came to an end.

SCHMIDT

No. 654

F17/431-35

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, March 4, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND SVEN HEDIN IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTER MEISSNER ON MARCH 4, 1940 ¹

After a lengthy conversation on his personal experiences in his travels in Asia, Sven Hedin asked the Führer the same question he had put to the Foreign Minister a few days ago,² namely, whether Germany could not do something to put an end to the Russo-Finnish conflict by mediation between the two belligerent parties.

The Führer replied by first reading an item from the Finnish press which had just come to his attention, approximately to the effect that the Finnish war was beginning to be inconvenient to Stalin and Hitler and that they were therefore seeking to settle the conflict. The Finns, however, had no intention of spontaneously making any sacrifices but would keep on fighting.

The Führer commented that the attitude of the Finns as indicated by this newspaper item was entirely senseless, but also showed how impossible German mediation in the conflict would be. If the Finns themselves rejected mediation, as they did in the newspaper report just cited, and wished to keep on fighting, there was really not the slightest justification for Germany to step in.

Furthermore, Germany had to look after her own interests in the difficult struggle for existence in which she now found herself. An understanding had been reached with Russia on the basis of a clear division of interest in the East. This had freed Germany at the rear, and she could now—in contrast to the World War, where she had had to carry on a war not only on two fronts but on many fronts—concentrate her entire forces in the West. As a result of the new relationship

¹ Hedin's account of this conversation appears in *Sven Hedin's German Diary, 1935-1942*, pp. 73-78.

² Hedin's conversation with Ribbentrop on Feb. 28 was recorded in a memorandum by Paul Otto Schmidt (F18/067-055). Hedin's version appears in his *Diary*, pp. 63-70.

which she had established with Russia her sympathies were naturally also on the side of that country.

Sven Hedin interjected here that some consideration should be given to the Finns, too, who were fighting so bravely. The Führer admitted that the Finns were brave, but their policy had been entirely senseless. It was absolutely sure that they would not stand up against the Russians in the long run. Up to now the bad weather had been extremely advantageous to them. They should never have entered into a conflict with the Russians, for Stalin had after all asked nothing more of them than a secure access to an ice-free sea. Stalin was undergoing a change, anyway. He was no longer the international bolshevist, but showed himself as an absolute Russian nationalist and was in the last analysis following exactly the same natural policy of Russian nationalism as the Tsars. A constant and easily understandable element of this policy had always been the striving for an ice-free port. Otherwise, except for a shifting of the Finnish-Russian border at the Karelian Isthmus—which was necessary for the safety of Leningrad and would even be compensated for by cession of other territory north of Lake Ladoga—Stalin had asked nothing more of the Finns. It would have been the wisest thing for the Finns to make an agreement with the Russians on this basis.

Instead of this they had slipped into a war without exactly knowing why. The only way out was to be sought not in mediation by third parties but in a direct settlement between Finland and Russia.

Sven Hedin then came to speak of the Swedish attitude toward the Finnish conflict and mentioned, as he had already done in his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, the current in Swedish public opinion, constantly growing in strength, which advocated granting the Finns more Swedish aid than heretofore. Officially, Sweden would naturally remain neutral, but the flow of Swedish volunteers to Finland would probably increase to an extraordinary degree in the course of time, especially when the stream of refugees from Finland became much larger. How would Germany feel about this? Would she take steps against Sweden?

The Führer answered in the negative, but pointed out that in his opinion even Swedish help would have no effect on the ultimate outcome of the Finnish-Russian war. The Scandinavian countries ought above all else to beware of intervention by England. The British cared nothing about Finland per se, and when the Finns had played their part in the British plan, the British smiling coldly [*kaltlächelnd*] would drop them. One thing was sure: If England got a foothold anywhere in Scandinavia, then Germany for her part would also intervene at once, since she could not permit such a threat to her flank.

In the further course of the conversation, the Führer tried to dispel certain misgivings of Sven Hedin to the effect that the Russians might possibly advance beyond Finland to Sweden and Norway; Sven Hedin remarked that it could be disagreeable for Germany, too, if Russia gained control of the Swedish iron mines from which Germany obtained a large part of her iron ore.

The Führer stated in this connection that he did not believe that Stalin had such expansionist aspirations; he again stressed Stalin's policy of Russian nationalism with its drive for an ice-free port and emphasized that once this goal had been achieved there need be no fear of further expansion. He was also not concerned about a possible advance by the Russians into the Baltic, which was being discussed so much abroad as an alleged threat to the German position there. In the age of the airplane, the Baltic was no longer an operations area for navies. Even the North Sea had lost this character for the British Navy as a result of German air supremacy in that area.

When Sven Hedin asked once more that something be done for the poor Finns by means of mediation between Finland and Russia, the Führer refused with the observation that he predicted the Finns would certainly not thank him, but at most blame him subsequently for the loss of Hangö or other areas. The Finns had every reason, by the way, to be grateful to Germany, for without the active interference of the German troops in 1918 Finland would never have come into being at all. Now, however, the only solution was a direct agreement with Russia.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 655

33/25282

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

SECRET

BERLIN, March 4, 1940.

Mr. Sumner Welles said in a brief talk with me at the railroad station yesterday evening that he expected his trip to be successful if only Europe remained quiet "in the next four to five weeks." He would be back in Washington on March 26.¹

¹ On Mar. 4 the American Chargé d'Affaires, Kirk, called on Weizsäcker to express his thanks for the smooth course Welles' visit had taken. Weizsäcker noted in his memorandum of the visit (B21/B005419): "In unmistakable terms Kirk stated as his opinion that at the end of Welles' trip some kind of initiative by President Roosevelt could be expected."

A circular telegram of Mar. 4 (33/25286) instructed the Missions not to participate in discussions of the presumed contents of Welles' talks in Berlin, concerning which false speculations had appeared in the foreign press. "For personal information only" it was added: "Sumner Welles was left in no doubt as

Moreover, he expressed himself as very appreciative and grateful that the German press had handled his mission with such calm and reserve; "if only people would keep their mouths shut!"²

Regarding myself he said that he had already told Herr von Mackensen in Rome that he hoped to meet me in Berlin. He was glad to have seen me here and hoped to work with me again in Washington soon. Thomsen was respected everywhere in Washington, but the Ambassador had broader opportunities, after all. In parting he repeated that he hoped to see me in Washington again soon.

He said nothing about Hugh Wilson and the American Embassy here.

DIECKHOFF

to Germany's determination to break her enemies' will to accomplish her destruction."

Ambassador Mackensen at Rome was sent a special instruction on Mar. 7 (2281/480385 87) which conveyed a summary of the position taken by Germany in the talks with Welles. This document was to be handed to Mussolini and Ciano.

² The quoted passage is in English in the original.

No. 656

B21/B005423

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, March 5, 1940.

I talked with Mr. Mooney on March 4, after his reception by the Führer.¹ In his rather verbose statements he seemed to be interested chiefly in the following three points:

1. President Roosevelt's intentions with respect to Germany were considerably more friendly and sympathetic than was generally believed in Berlin.

2. President Roosevelt was prepared to act as "moderator"² (i. e., as honest broker) in bringing together the belligerents, but was not willing to make a decision as an "arbitrator."

¹ James D. Mooney was a vice president of General Motors Corporation. The files contain a memorandum of his conversation with Hitler which is not printed (66/46557 67). It records statements by Mooney similar to those summarized by Dieckhoff in his memorandum. Hitler repeated much the same line he had taken with Welles—Britain and France had declared war and sought Germany's destruction, Germany would not be denied the economic resources due her, the German people were united and determined and 1918 would not repeat itself.

On Mar. 11 the German (Chargé d'Affaires in Washington sent to Berlin a confidential memorandum (2422/511869-72) prepared for him by an unnamed American informant. It stated that Mooney, who was described as "more or less pro-German," had informed President Roosevelt on the basis of an earlier talk with Hitler that the latter "was desirous for peace and wished to prevent the bloodshed of a spring campaign." The memorandum added that "several other important industrialists and bankers who had visited Germany came back with the same story to the President," and that in consequence of these reports he had resolved upon the Welles mission.

² This and the other quoted words appear thus and in English in the original.

3. Future German statements, especially in the German press, ought to stress, in so far as possible, what Germany and America had in common, and not what separated them.

I do not believe that the Mooney initiative has any great importance, particularly since he proceeds from an erroneous, though doubtless sincere, conception, as point 1 shows. We are thoroughly familiar with what President Roosevelt thinks about Germany. It was certainly well to listen to Mr. Mooney politely, but not much can come of the discussion of such "generalities." If any American initiative can lead to results, it is that of Sumner Welles, but not of Mooney.

DIECKHOFF

No. 657

108/112062

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 461 of March 6

Moscow, March 7, 1940—1:10 a. m.

Received March 7—1:30 a. m.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 1856 of February 16.¹

When I asked Molotov whether there was any truth in the rumors concerning an imminent improvement in relations between Italy and the Soviet Union, Molotov answered that such rumors were purposely being spread by the Italians. The Soviet Government was at present little interested in Italy's attitude, which was definitely unfriendly.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (366/206724). In this instruction Schliep sent to the Embassy in Moscow for comment a United Press report of Feb. 8 from Rome to the effect that Italy and the Soviet Union were seeking to improve their relations.

² On Mar. 9, Mackensen reported on a conversation between Kulajenkov, Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Italy, and Graeff, Commercial Attaché of the German Embassy. Kulajenkov denied that any Italo-Soviet economic talks were taking place and said that relations must still be regarded as "strained." Improvement might come when the Finnish war was ended and when Italy understood that the real enemy of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union was Britain. "One must ardently hope the world war will begin in earnest as soon as possible." (366/206726-28)

No. 658

103/112068

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 463 of March 6

Moscow, March 7, 1940—1:10 a. m.

Received March 7—4:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 394 of February 29.¹

In a conversation with Molotov I most emphatically called attention to the intolerable conditions at the German-Soviet border and, pointing to the seriousness of the situation, demanded that they be remedied at once. I also requested an immediate concrete reply to our proposal regarding the provisional settlement of border incidents.

Molotov, who first attempted to defend the Soviet Border Guard, finally declared himself willing to take the measures demanded by us and promised an early reply to our proposal.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (103/112058). An instruction by Woermann to make the representations recorded in the first paragraph of the document printed here. The case involved various incidents of firing by Soviet border patrols upon German customs guards, and Woermann stated that there was considerable demand in Germany for return fire when necessary.

² In a telegram of Mar. 7 (dispatched Mar. 8), Schulenburg reported that after a telephone call from Schlep he had again seen Molotov, this time to transmit a personal request by Ribbentrop that Molotov remedy the "intolerable conditions"; Molotov gave "renewed assurances that he would emphatically repeat his instructions to that effect." (103/112068)

No. 659

B21/B005425

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1940—3:40 p. m.

No. 318 of March 7

Received March 8—5:00 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 209 of March 4 (Pol. IX 422).¹

Following the lengthy and for the most part favorable speculations of the American press on the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Germany and the USA as a result of Welles' visit, at yesterday's press conference Roosevelt dismissed an inquiry on that point rather categorically with the comment that he had not yet given any thought to the question of sending an ambassador to Berlin.

¹ Not printed (33/25288-91).

The President has been informed by Welles of the statements which I made to him orally before his departure, as instructed. Welles will have told him in the meanwhile that the question of ambassadors was not discussed in Berlin. It is my impression that Roosevelt is not disposed to take the first step, because he does not wish to permit us the prestige victory implied. The attitude of the American Government toward us has not improved in any way. Although the President has said that he is willing to receive the Duke of Coburg, there are nevertheless indications that the State Department intends to sabotage the success of the trip. Whereas at first the American Red Cross, both in the capital and in the provinces, showed a cooperative spirit, the contrary is evident now, apparently by direction of the State Department. Large functions which were previously arranged are either being canceled on flimsy excuses or reduced to a smaller scale. Characteristic of Roosevelt's attitude is his officially announced decision to receive Archduke Otto as his house guest.

THOMSEN

No. 660

5556/E395527

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 305 of March 7

BUCHAREST, March 7, 1940—5:20 p. m.

Received March 7—5:00 a. m. [*sic*].

W 1247 g.

With reference to our telegram No. 296 of March 4.¹

An interim agreement² with the Armaments Minister has been signed this evening. We undertake to deliver immediately: 360 anti-tank guns, 10 40-mm antiaircraft guns, 10 20-mm antiaircraft guns, artillery sights, and, when ready for shipment, 80 French field guns.

Beginning March 1, our oil purchases come under the provisional arrangement and will be financed with an initial 600 million lei out of the funds of the Armaments Ministry. Further advances on purchases will be regulated by the volume of our deliveries. I have promised the Armaments Minister that I shall support his forthcoming wishes regarding armaments. On the occasion of the signing the Armaments Minister confirmed in writing the relation in value between war material and petroleum which we proposed and thus

¹ Not printed (5556/E395524-25).

² Not printed (5556/E395528-35).

recognized the basic price of 78.1 reichsmarks per ton weighted average, f. o. b. Constanța, for any new armaments transactions.

Secrecy is requested with respect to the concessions granted to us.³

NEUBACHER
FABRICIUS

³ Marginal note: "For Minister Clodius: Keeping this arrangement secret is inconvenient in as much as Russian oil is reckoned on the basis of the price paid in Rumania. It would be desirable for us to find a way whereby we were allowed to reduce the price of what we import from Russia. Ju[nker] Mar. 3." In a minute of Mar. 13 (5556/E395526), Junker noted that Neubacher had agreed that the details could be made known to the Russians in connection with oil price negotiations.

No. 661

171/134107

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 434 of March 7

BERLIN, March 7, 1940—8:32 p. m.

Received March 8—3:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 455.¹

Please thank M. Molotov on a suitable occasion for the information on the present status of the Finnish question, and in that connection give him an informal account of our own attitude about as follows:

Soon after the outbreak of the conflict it was suggested to us by Finland, as also by other—especially Scandinavian—quarters, to initiate mediation between the two parties in one form or another. In conformity to the Moscow agreements, which placed us on the side of the Soviet Union in the Russo-Finnish conflict, we had in no instance fallen in with such mediation proposals. On the contrary, our replies were always to the effect that we had no reason whatsoever to believe that the Soviet Union wanted German mediation and naturally must decline to undertake any such steps on our own initiative. Even when during the last weeks, under the impression of the victories of the Soviet Army, the Finnish Government and other governments intensified their requests that we open the way for mediation, we maintained complete aloofness to such urgings.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not printed (171/134112-13). This telegram of Mar. 5 described the conversation summarized more fully in the memorandum printed as an enclosure to document No. 664. The telegram also noted that Molotov did not mention the Kuusinen government, the demand for the withdrawal of Tanner and Mannerheim, nor a ban on fortifying the new frontier.

² In a telegram of Mar. 12 (B19/B003551), Schulenburg stated that because of reported new Soviet demands the situation appeared critical. He asked permission to hint to Molotov that Germany would welcome a positive conclusion of the negotiations, but in a marginal note of Mar. 12, Weizsäcker directed Woermann to telephone Schulenburg not to do so.

No. 662

2060/448113-14

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 255

BERLIN, March 7, 1940.
e. o. R 428 g.

I. For the time being, for information only: After the issuance of the British Order in Council of November 27, 1939, against German exports and the corresponding French decree of November 28, 1939,¹ the German Government at that time refrained for several reasons from immediately taking the same measures against British and French exports. The official press statement at that time said only that the German Government took cognizance of this new violation of international law by England and France and "reserved all measures."²

The main reason for not taking immediate steps then was that many neutral states concerned lodged protests with England and France at the time. The German Government did not want to anticipate the results of these protests by immediately taking the same measures against British and French exports. We were especially intent on not giving England any pretext whatever for attacking German coal exports to Italy. For this and other reasons the German order for corresponding countermeasures, which had already been drawn up at that time, was temporarily set aside at the Führer's order.³ The neutral protests, however, did not have any appreciable effect. Rather, after England's present action against German coal exports to Italy, it must be assumed that all hope of any general yielding on this point by England must definitely be abandoned.

Consequently, the German offices participating in the naval measures are planning to promulgate the order now. However, the Führer's final decision has not yet been obtained. We wish to inform the Italian Government of this intention in advance, before the order is published, and also give the additional information that the German naval forces will, of course, be instructed not to molest Italian ships which may wish and be able to continue carrying coal from England in the former quantities. When your démarche is made, it should not

¹ These new British and French measures provided for the seizure and disposition of various categories of goods from ports under enemy control or of enemy origin or ownership. The British and French orders were published in the *Times* (London) and *Le Temps* (Paris), respectively, on Nov. 29, 1939.

² The German press statement of Nov. 29, 1939, is printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 811-812.

³ Not found.

be in the form of a question or of a request for Italian agreement but rather as unilateral advance notification.

II. A further communication will follow concerning the time for carrying out the above démarche.⁴

RITTER

⁴ On Mar. 9, Ritter sent a top secret, special security handling telegram (2281/480394), to be deciphered by Mackensen or his deputy personally, as follows: "The Führer has deferred issuance of the directive until further notice. Thus nothing further is to be done in this matter for the time being."

No. 663

F7/0562-0579

*The Führer and Chancellor to Benito Mussolini*¹

BERLIN, March 8, 1940.

DUCE! Let me introduce my report first of all with a word of thanks for the account in your last letter² of the situation in Italy and the measures you have taken, and for your evaluation of the other general problems.³ The frankness of your statements encourages me, too, to present and describe all matters and problems as I myself see them.

To begin with, Duce, I read in your letter a passage that makes me suspect that you thought my decision to take action against Poland arose entirely from the conviction that England and France would not enter into the war on any account. I should like to call to mind, Duce, my letter of August 26, 1939, which was delivered to you on that day at 4 o'clock in the afternoon by my Ambassador, von Mackensen.⁴ In its closing passage I wrote that since neither France nor England could gain decisive victories in the West, whereas after defeating Poland Germany would be enabled by the agreement with Russia to free all her forces in the East, and with superiority in the air unequivocally on our side, I was not afraid to settle the question in the East, even at the risk of an entanglement in the West. I also wrote the following in my reply to your final statement of your position, which was delivered to you, Duce, on September 28,⁵ 1939: "If, as I have said, a major war should develop, the issue in the East will be decided before the Western Powers can score any success. Then in the winter, at latest in the spring, I shall deploy in the West with forces which will be at least the equal of France and Britain . . ."

¹ Ribbentrop delivered the letter to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See document No. 665.

² See document No. 504.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See vol. VII, document No. 307.

⁵ Actually the letter to which reference is made here was delivered to the Duce early in the morning of Aug. 27, 1939. See vol. VII, document No. 341.

Duce! When I made up my mind last fall to take action against Poland I did so in order to ward off attacks which would have been intolerable for any great power. To be sure, Germany had previously endured these attacks for almost a matter of decades—I admit that; however, in the beginning, she was not the Germany of National Socialism, and later she was a National-Socialist Germany, to be sure, but one that was unarmed and consequently helpless in the face of such developments. A drastic change then took place in recent years. There came a moment when the German people would not have deserved to be regarded as a great nation if they had put up with such treatment any longer. I believe that what we swallowed for months even in the year 1939 can be explained only by the stolid nature of the German temperament. If in a similar situation and with a similar distribution of forces the Italians had had to endure only 5 percent of what the Germans in the territories stolen by Poland had been subjected to for nearly 2 decades there would have been an explosion. Any further toleration of these incidents would not have led to relieving the situation but would have resulted in the severest damage to Germany's prestige as a great power. And the question was not whether the problem might not possibly have been put off, say, another 2, 3, or 4 months, for there is no doubt that considering the intensity of the hate propaganda among the Polish people (which, moreover, was constantly fanned by the British!), incidents would have occurred which would eventually either have forced the German people to act, or else would have brought about an irremediable breach between the people and the Government. In particular, however, Poland would have been able to carry into effect her plan to annex Danzig with much less risk in the winter. Beginning with October, Germany would have been in a difficult position to meet such attempts with the vigor which it was still possible to muster in September. From that season onwards, the climate of eastern Europe precludes any fast-moving tactical operations. In that event, the result might have been just what our Western enemies were hoping for: the prolonged containment of a large number of German divisions in the East, with all the undesirable consequences of a war on two fronts.

Hence there remains only the question whether, in view of the possibility that England and France might enter the war, Germany should have abstained from any reaction, even in the event of an occupation of Danzig by Poland, in order to postpone the big altercation until some later date!

Duce! I have naturally given very thorough thought to these questions. It would have been really impossible to endure patiently these intolerable conditions any longer—and they might have grown even worse—without gravely injuring the prestige of the German Reich

internationally, and above all of its Government at home. And even apart from this an objective consideration of the general situation made it imperative to reject such an alternative.

Duce! From the moment when England discovered during the Ethiopian conflict that Germany is not a vassal state that can be ordered about at will, and especially since the intervention by the Reich in Spain in behalf of the Spanish Nationalist regime, she began to think about and prepare for the conflict with the Reich. With the introduction of universal military service in England, it became clear that the leading British government circles had already made up their minds about the coming war on the totalitarian states. To my mind it seemed rather unimportant against whom the first blow would be directed. The elements behind this decision aimed at the whole, that is, nothing less than the elimination of the regimes which by their very natures represent a threat to the feudalistic-reactionary plutocracies. In this objective all forces inimical to us are agreed. In view of the planned British armaments and the provisions made by England for mobilizing all imaginable auxiliary forces (first of all Poland), I thought that it would be wiser after all not to lose any more time, which would involve a further loss of prestige, but instead to take up the defense at once, even at the risk of setting off 2 or 3 years ahead of schedule the war which was being planned by the West. For how could our armaments have been improved upon in 2 or 3 years, Duce? As far as the relative strength of the German Wehrmacht was concerned, there was scarcely any room for a substantial change in our favor, considering the manner in which England was building up her armament under full steam. In the East, moreover, the situation could only have deteriorated. Thus it has been possible for me in less than a month entirely to eliminate the Polish state as a threat and thereby free Germany in the rear. The losses which we suffered in this campaign—grievous as they are, of course, for the individuals affected and their families—were insignificant on the whole. The number of the dead which I announced at the Reichstag* at the time has been reduced by nearly 2,000, because many of the casualties reported dead by their companies turned out to be in hospitals as wounded; in the final accounting, therefore, the total number of the dead in this campaign is barely 8,400, that of wounded approximately 28,000. To these must be added nearly 3,000 missing, however, who in the light of our experiences must unfortunately be presumed murdered. Our losses in matériel are not worth mentioning. In weapons and ammunition they are offset many times by the booty which fell into our hands. The psychological gains for the German Wehr-

* See Editors' Note, p. 227.

macht (especially for the Luftwaffe and the Army) are immense. The soundness of our tactical training as a whole and in detail was demonstrated as dramatically as was the correctness of our general strategic principles. No additional training of any sort could have taken the place of that combat experience. Tens of thousands of young reserve officers with 3 years of active service behind them—the new Germany has abolished the 1-year volunteer system—now have in addition to their officer training courses the finishing course of combat experience. I myself have had the opportunity to talk with and instruct in their new duties many thousands of these young officers, all of whom possess the Iron Cross or some other decoration. Duce, it is indeed no exaggeration when I assure you here that there can be absolutely no comparison between the present German Army and that of the year 1914. It is the best-trying and best-equipped Wehrmacht that Germany has ever had at her command! Not alone that, but it is also filled with a spirit that could not have been produced by anything but National-Socialist education. But even if we had not succeeded in giving them that education, the idiotic propaganda and the war aims of the British and French would have put the last touches to it. The period of seeming inactivity which the weather imposed upon the fronts was utilized to the utmost for the activation of scheduled and additional units. And wherever the German weapons and ammunition industry had not already reached peak production, it now has achieved its planned wartime capacity.

The sense of superiority over our Western opponents animating both officers and troops is absolute and unqualified! This feeling has been strengthened by the development of the war to date in the West, on the sea and in the air. Nevertheless I fully realize, Duce, that the coming battle will not be a walkover, but the fiercest struggle in Germany's history. The troops, too, are aware of this. They are entering into this struggle with a holy, nay, truly awesome resolution. This realization, Duce, that this is a battle for life or death imposes upon me the imperative necessity to take everything into consideration that might in any way be of benefit to us in this struggle.

In enumerating these factors, Duce, I should like to begin with what for me, through *her people*, her system and especially her leader, has always been our *foremost* friend, and always will remain our *foremost* friend: *Italy!*

I fully understand, Duce, your attitude and your decision in August of last year. Such understanding has been all the easier for me because naturally I, too, am not unfamiliar with the material and personal difficulties attending such decisions. I also share your view, Duce, that under the conditions which then prevailed it was probably even a good thing that Italy was not immediately drawn into the war

on our side. Yet I believe, Duce, that there can be no doubt that the outcome of this war will also decide the future of Italy. If that future is viewed in your country merely as the continued survival of a modest European state, then I am wrong. But if that future is conceived as a guarantee of the existence of the Italian people from the historical, geopolitical, and general moral viewpoints, that is, according to the criteria of your people's right to existence, Duce, then you will some day be confronted by the same opponents who are fighting Germany today. I know full well, Duce, that you yourself do not think differently on the subject. I also know that all your measures to date, the many forms of aid which you have extended to me in the past months, diplomatically through your press, militarily through your mobilization, and in material things, too, are all prompted by this realization. I, too, see the destinies of our two countries, our peoples, our revolutions and our regimes indissolubly joined with each other. It is just because of this feeling that I have decided to direct the German authorities concerned to investigate once more all resources, especially as regards coal, which, if in any way possible, would make you, Duce, independent of the Western democracies. I have a profound belief that men such as we two could not but succeed in finding some way of breaking the world-wide terrorist blockade of these democracies not only by military means but by economic means as well. My Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, into whose hands have already been placed the principal findings of the investigations made here, will present them to you, Duce, to let you decide whether and to what extent you believe the methods proposed afford sufficient guarantees for satisfying your interests.⁷ For I am quite aware, Duce, that without coal it is impossible to sustain a normal economy, let alone a wartime economy. I also realize that the resulting pressures can be very severe, transcending the intentions of a single individual. I should also like to take this occasion to thank you, Duce, for your support during the recent negotiations on our trade agreement,⁸ and wish to assure you that in view of the British action against your coal shipments from Rotterdam,⁹ I have done everything on my part in order—if at all possible, as I hope—to help you.

I also wish to thank you for the military measures taken, which will always afford us relief in one way or another.

Germany's relationship to Russia is the outcome of:

1. An over-all appraisal of the general European development, and
2. Consideration of the special situation in which the Reich finds itself today.

⁷ See document No. 685.

⁸ See document No. 627.

⁹ See documents Nos. 647 and 652.

The appraisal of the general situation gives the following result:

Since Stalin's final victory, Russia has without doubt experienced a modification of the Bolshevik principle in the direction of a nationalist Russian way of life, which is out of the question for us, but which could not be replaced by anything else in Russia herself at the present time. That which made National Socialism the mortal enemy of Communism was the latter's Jewish-international leadership with its avowed goal of destroying the non-Jewish nations or their leading forces. How far-reaching this, to our minds, epochal change in Russia has been is something which the Reich Foreign Minister will be able to describe to you, Duce, from his personal impressions and experience. For my part I merely wish to say that since Litvinov's departure¹⁰ there has unquestionably been a change in Russia's attitude toward Germany. There can be no doubt that the conditions for establishing a reasonable relationship between the two countries exist today. We no longer have any reason for believing that any Russian agency is trying to exert influence on German domestic affairs. I do not have to emphasize, moreover, that National-Socialist Germany is completely immune to any ideological attacks by Bolshevism. Accordingly, nobody here thinks of making concessions. But if Bolshevism in Russia is developing into a Russian national state ideology and economy, it constitutes a reality which we have neither interest nor reason to combat. On the contrary! In our struggle against the blockade of the world by the plutocratic democracies, Duce, we can only welcome every factor and every assistance. Germany and Russia have often lived in peace and friendship for very long periods of time. Our economies complement each other to an extraordinary degree. There is almost no raw material which we need that Russia does not possess or could not make available to us within a reasonable time. And, conversely, there is not a product of German industry which Russia does not either already need or will not need in the foreseeable future. The trade agreement which we have concluded with Russia, Duce, means a great deal in our situation!

Specifically, however, what Germany has done was simply a clear-cut delimitation of zones of interest with respect to Russia, in which nothing will ever change again. I took here only the same step that I took with you earlier, Duce, when I accepted the Brenner as the final line of demarcation between the lives and destinies of our two peoples.¹¹ The emigration of more than 200,000 Germans from Italy will ratify this decision for all time and thus give it final sanction.

¹⁰ Maxim Litvinov was succeeded as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs by V. M. Molotov in May 1939.

¹¹ See Hitler's letter of Mar. 11, 1938, to Mussolini (vol. I, document No. 352).

Finland! Germany, as I have already stressed, Duce, is fighting for her existence. We have been denied the most natural rights to such a degree that we could not today withhold sympathy for the situation of a great power, such as Russia undeniably is, with respect to its access to the seas. I believe that a modicum of reason and objectivity in examining and deciding these problems would have given the Finns better counsel than that of resorting to arms. Russia, I am convinced, never intended to take up this fight, for otherwise she would have chosen a different season of the year; and in that event there is no doubt in my mind that Finnish resistance would have been broken very quickly. The criticisms which have been made of the Russian soldiers in consequence of the operations to date are not borne out, Duce, by reality and the facts. During the World War we fought the Russians so long and so bitterly that we can permit ourselves an opinion on that. Taking into consideration the available supply facilities, no power in the world would have been able, except after the most thoroughgoing preparations, to achieve any other results at 30 to 40 degrees below zero [C] on such terrain than did the Russians at the very first. The scorn heaped upon the Russian troops, however, has in my opinion made it very hard for Stalin to accept, not to speak of to offer, a compromise. But in this instance England has no other aim than to secure a legal basis under the terms of the League of Nations by which other nations could gradually be drawn into the war. We are watching this maneuver, Duce, with calm attention. Besides, Germany has no particular obligations toward Finland. The Finnish state owes its existence entirely to a sea of blood from German soldiers, German regiments and divisions, and its subsequent independence is also due to German units under General von der Goltz.¹² In appreciation of this Finland later took sides against Germany on every occasion, and so far as it was possible took active part in every repressive measure against Germany. This does not imply, Duce, that the German people feel any hatred for the Finnish people; it merely signifies that we have no cause to champion Finland's interests.

Poland! In regard to Poland, Germany has only one outstanding interest, and that is absolute security for the eastern boundary of the Reich. At least during the war we cannot avoid also taking on the ballast of administering the General Government. But there is one fact one must not deceive oneself about: If I had withdrawn the German troops from the General Government at the end of the war, this would not have brought about a pacification of Poland, but a hideous chaos. And the Church would not have been able to exercise

¹² The reference is to the intervention by German troops under General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz in Finland in 1918.

its function in praise of the Lord there, but the priests would have had their heads chopped off, as was done in all places from which the German troops were withdrawn. Moreover, the big Polish land-owners and the Polish intelligentsia would not be in that part of Poland now continuing their rule as of old, that is, mistreating the Polish people, but would now really be sitting in Paris or London, because it is evident they would have lacked the means of brute force to save themselves from the love of their subjects. Apart from all this, Duce, that country would hardly have survived this winter at all if it had not been for our reconstruction effort, especially in the field of transport. For although the Polish soldiers were incapable of checking the advance of the German Army, they destroyed thousands of railroad bridges, crossings, etc., and so caused all traffic to come to a standstill. The achievements in the reconstruction effort accomplished by the German engineers, railroad construction battalions, and the Reich Labor Service cannot find the appreciation abroad that they deserve because they are either unknown or wilfully ignored.

I shall have a copy of the interim report ¹³ on the conditions in that country and the circumstances which compelled us to take action there delivered to you, Duce. That account portrays a mere fraction of what actually happened there. On my travels in Poland, I witnessed such an incident myself in the Tucheler Heath as early as September 4. Twenty minutes before we passed along one of those long forest roads, a German hospital convoy with its entire complement of doctors and medical corps men, together with 80 wounded, was cut down or massacred by a Polish cavalry brigade which was still roaming through that area; only one man escaped who had pretended to be dead and then, covered with blood, made his report directly to me when we reached the scene. But those are only minor matters, Duce. The Poles were lucky indeed that they had the good-natured German people to deal with, and what is more, with the more than restrained German Wehrmacht. When the Commune was crushed in Paris in 1871 it is estimated that the Versailles troops put to death between 30,000 and 50,000 communards. And these men were the most innocent lambs compared with those Polish criminals, and their deeds mere childish pranks measured against the horrifying incidents which occurred in Poland. In all this, Duce, I am naturally speaking only of the fate that overcame the Germans in Poland. But one could go a step further and speak of the fate of the Ruthenians. Even the blood night at Bromberg and the massacres of the Germans in Thorn pale compared to this, it must be admitted. I need not assure you, Duce, that once this war is over we ourselves have only the greatest interest in ridding ourselves of this ballast of administration and responsibility—

¹³ Not found.

provided, however, that every further threat to the eastern boundary of the Reich is precluded.

The Balkans! I was very happy to learn, Duce, that Count Ciano has undertaken to prevail upon the Hungarians to defer their revisionist demands for the time being (regardless of whether or not they are justified). I do not, however, believe, Duce, that any danger will threaten the Balkans from Russia. But I do fear that once someone has tried to realize any revisionist aspirations, he will have set a fire which may become quite general. This is something that would be in the interest of neither Italy nor Germany.

Turkey! The attempt to line up Turkey against Germany, which does not threaten her but which on the contrary cooperates with her economically, can be traced to the desire of the Allies to make sure of a state whose military forces, reinforced by Anglo-French aid, could be committed whenever needed. This is as much a threat to Italy as it is to Russia and—of necessity—also Rumania. That is, with respect to Russia and Rumania, for the purpose of blockading the sources of critical raw materials from the authoritarian states.

Spain! Germany's relations with Nationalist Spain, Duce, are basically normal. I have no cause to complain in any way about the attitude of the Chief of the Spanish State; on the contrary. Besides, I quite understand the desire of that country after years of bloody civil war not to be involved in a new war. Moreover, the material and general military prerequisites would be lacking for Spain's participation in this war, no matter where the sympathies of the Spanish Government and of the Spanish people may lie.

Japan! Germany's relations with Japan continue to be friendly and close. The assistance which Germany receives indirectly from the mere existence of a strong Japan is incontestable.

America! Regarding the visit of Sumner Welles, the American representative, all there is to say is that it contributed no new element for appraising the situation. I have already sent you, Duce, the protocols of the conversations for your information.¹⁴ Whatever may have been intended with this visit, one thing seems to be certain: It cannot bring about any change in the war aims of the British and French, even if this were sincerely intended. Thus any notion of practical results in the sense of advancing the cause of peace is ruled out. On that account I also believe that in such circumstances one should at least listen to the views of those who claim that the only purpose of this intervention is to gain time for the Allies; that is, to paralyze any German intentions for an offensive. I need not assure you, Duce, that quite apart from this, Germany's decisions are governed exclusively by military considerations and therefore cannot be affected in any way by influences of that kind.

¹⁴ See document No. 655, footnote 1.

Germany has absolutely no other war aim than peace! England and France have basically no other war aim than the annihilation of the totalitarian people's states, and thus of Germany. Germany will therefore fight until this plutocratic clique of war criminals is forced to abandon this design once and for all. This resolve cannot be shaken! It can be all the better understood because over and above this task we must in any case settle a chapter of world history which, through fraud on one side and weakness on the other, forced the German people into the most humiliating and frightful period of their entire development.

In summing up, let me thank you once more for your last letter, Duce, and the exposition which you gave me. Let me also ask you to believe that I understand and appreciate your attitude. And, finally, let me assure you that in spite of everything I believe that sooner or later fate will force us after all to fight side by side, that is, that you will likewise not escape this clash of arms, no matter how the individual aspects of the situation may develop today, and that your place will then more than ever be at our side, just as mine will be at yours. I, too, would be glad if a personal meeting could be arranged to talk about the gigantic complex of the general and special problems connected with the situation. There are many things which can be explained only in lengthy discussions. In conclusion, let me hope that it might be possible to strengthen even further the economic relations between our two countries, and just at this time to find a solution for the coal problem, which is perhaps causing you great concern. For anything that helps to make one country stronger is of benefit to both!

In this belief I salute you cordially, with my best wishes for you and your country!

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 664

1908/428438-41

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

No. A 1261

Moscow, March 8, 1940.

Received March 12.

Pol. VI 652.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Finnish-Soviet conflict.

With reference to our telegram No. 455 of March 5, 1940.¹

With reference to the above-mentioned telegram I am sending you for your information the enclosed memorandum concerning my con-

¹ See document No. 661, footnote 1.

versation on March 5, 1940, with Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Foreign Commissar Molotov with regard to the Finnish-Soviet conflict.

COUNT V. D. SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

SECRET

Moscow, March 7, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Finnish-Soviet conflict.

In the conversation between the Ambassador and M. Molotov on March 5, 1940, the Finnish-Soviet conflict was also discussed.

The Ambassador termed the recent great successes of the Red troops an outstanding achievement, on which he congratulated the Soviet Government. Since, as the course of events indicated, the capture of Viipuri by Soviet troops was imminent, the question arose as to what would happen next. He would therefore be grateful if M. Molotov could tell him something about it.

M. Molotov received the above statement with visible pleasure and replied that the Ambassador was unquestionably right in his assumption that Viipuri would fall within the next few days. The Red Army had now shown what it could do and had thereby confuted the estimate of the Red Army which had been assiduously spread all over the world. [Signs of skepticism about the Red Army had appeared even in the German press; the facts, however, had disproved the validity of such a skeptical attitude.

The Ambassador replied that anyone who knew the situation was from the start aware of the capabilities of the Red Army in war. He therefore had to reject the reproach of skepticism for himself and his associates.

M. Molotov said that he could very well imagine a different view of the Red Army; he himself had complete confidence in the capabilities of the German Army, and just as much confidence in the Red Army. The latter had successfully passed its test at the Mannerheim Line.] ²

Passing on to the general political situation, Molotov gave the Ambassador the following information:

Some time ago, the Finnish Government, through the mediation of Sweden, inquired of the Soviet Government whether it was ready for a settlement of the present conflict. The Soviet Government had thereupon agreed to inform the Swedish Government of the conditions under which it thought a cessation of hostilities possible. The

² This passage in brackets appears in the Moscow draft (171/134101-04) but was deleted before dispatch.

Soviet Government held that after so much bloodshed, an agreement such as originally considered was now out of the question. The character and magnitude of the hostilities clearly showed that the Finns had established a well-prepared *place d'armes* against the Soviet Union. In view of this, the Soviet Union had to be especially careful in the future and could not limit itself to the security precautions contemplated originally. An agreement could now only be made on the following basis:

1. The demand for Hangö would be maintained, that is, the Finns would have to lease the whole Hangö peninsula to the Soviet Union for the establishment of a naval base there.

2. The demand for cession of the island group [in the Gulf of Finland] previously stipulated, would of course be maintained.

3. The Soviet Government demands the cession of the whole Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Viipuri and Viipuri Bay, as well as the shoreline of Lake Ladoga up to its northernmost point, including the town of Cortavala.

4. The territorial rectifications at the Karelian border in favor of Finland, originally projected, naturally were in doubt now.

5. The Soviet Union made no claim on the territory around Petsamo, provided that all specifications pertaining to the security of Leningrad were met.

M. Molotov added that the above-mentioned demands held only for the present moment. Should the obstinate, stubborn Finns persist in their thickheadedness, the Soviets would follow these with even harder demands.

[In answer to the Ambassador's question whether the Soviet Government contemplated prohibiting the construction of a new Mannerheim Line by the Finns, M. Molotov said that the old Mannerheim Line no longer existed and that nothing had been said in the meantime about a new one.]³

HILGER

³ This passage in brackets was deleted before dispatch to Berlin.

No. 665

F6/0386-403;
F13/412-23

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 9

ROME, March 10, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUCE,
IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO AND AMBASSADOR VON MACKENSEN,
AT THE PALAZZO VENEZIA, ROME ON MARCH 10, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister, presenting the Führer's most cordial greetings, delivered the reply to the letter which the Duce had ad-

dressed to the latter some time previously.¹ It had taken some time to draft the answer because the Führer, as he had already informed the Duce through Ambassador Attolico, had wished to have a clear picture himself before committing his reply to writing.² This had now been done in the past week. The German position in all its aspects was set forth in the Führer's letter, which contained everything that needed to be said on the important issues at the moment. The Führer had instructed the Foreign Minister to furnish amplifications to the letter if the Duce had any questions to ask, and to underline certain specific points.

Among these points singled out for particular mention, the Foreign Minister brought up the coal question. The Führer was deeply aroused by the latest British measures to block the shipment of coal from Germany to Italy by the sea route. He viewed these measures as an outrageous attempt of the plutocratic democratic states at strangling Italy economically. It went without saying that Germany was able and willing to supply the entire coal requirements of Italy. Minister Clodius, who had accompanied the Foreign Minister, could inform his Italian colleagues of the details of the arrangements contemplated by Germany. He also brought with him proposals for solving the difficult question of transport.

The Duce mentioned in this connection a monthly delivery quota of from 500,000 to 700,000 tons.

The Foreign Minister replied that Minister Clodius was in a position to make proposals for supplying the total requirement of 1 million tons per month. In response to the Duce's reference to the difficult problem of railroad cars, the Foreign Minister stated that Minister Clodius, after negotiations with the military authorities, had now also found a way of obtaining the requisite additional cars and so, through collaboration between Germany and Italy, of guaranteeing the transport of all the coal.³

Upon the Duce's remark that the solution of the coal problem was an absolute necessity for Italy's military plans and that "without coal there could be no cannons," the Foreign Minister stated the Führer held the belief that two men like the Duce and himself would be able to find a solution for this problem, too.

Besides, the coal difficulties in Germany had diminished since the end of the cold season. The hard winter had been a splendid test of the unity of the German people. Although the people in Germany had "shivered like tailors," this did not bring on any discontent, but

¹ See documents Nos. 504 and 663.

² See document No. 583.

³ For the agreement on coal reached by Clodius with the Italians, see document No. 669, footnote 12.

on the contrary everyone had good-naturedly taken the difficulties in his stride.

The Duce commented that this had been a test of the discipline of the German people.

The Foreign Minister added that if there should be any further wishes of an economic nature on the part of Italy, Minister Clodius would gladly discuss them with the Italian officials concerned. Germany was aware of Italy's wishes in that field, and the Führer had instructed him to tell the Duce that Germany would do everything possible in this respect in order to satisfy Italy's wishes.

Passing on to the over-all situation, the Foreign Minister pointed out that the Führer did not believe in any possibility of peace, but was resolved to attack France and England this very year, being fully convinced that he would be able to beat the French Army in the course of the summer, and that the British could be driven out of France before fall. The Führer had made this decision because in consideration of the mentality of the French and British he did not believe in the possibility of any other solution. It was a matter of principle, a contest between two systems.

To illustrate the mentality prevailing on the enemy side, the Foreign Minister then handed the Duce the Polish originals and German translations of reports of the Polish Ambassadors in Washington, Paris, and London to Colonel Beck, which had been found by Germany in the Polish archives.* These reports brought out two things in particular: first, the monstrous war guilt of the United States, and, second, the tremendous hatred of National Socialism together with a boundless will to destroy that regime. This outlook governed all actions of the British, the French, and unfortunately also the American plutocracies.

The Duce remarked here that these documents, while certainly very interesting, offered nothing essentially new, since it had been known all along that France, England, and the United States were opposed to the authoritarian regimes.

The Foreign Minister explained that these documents showed specifically the sinister role of the American Ambassadors Bullitt, Kennedy, and Drexel Biddle who in particular had exerted a decisive influence on the British attitude. They gave an intimation of the machinations of that Jewish-plutocratic clique whose influence,

* Presumably a reference to the documents published as *Auswärtiges Amt 1940 No. 3, Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (Berlin, 1940). An unofficial English translation, *The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents and the Report on American Ambassador Bullitt's War Attitude* (New York, 1940), was also published.

through Morgan and Rockefeller, reached all the way up to Roosevelt.⁵

The Duce noted at this point that this was probably a case of the three hundred rulers of the world, of whom Rathenau had spoken in his time.⁶

Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that Germany was not indulging in any illusions; the will of these elements to destroy was a fact, and everything that happened was done only to conceal this will.

Sumner Welles' visit to Berlin,⁷ as the Führer had already informed the Duce, had not produced any new facts. They were wondering in Germany what Roosevelt had actually intended with this action.

The Duce suggested that it probably had mainly to do with American domestic politics.

In corroboration of this, the Foreign Minister read a report of January 1939⁸ by the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Potocki.

When the Foreign Minister had finished, the Duce remarked that Roosevelt now held different views on many points because the people of the United States were against war and nothing would change that attitude.

The Foreign Minister concurred, referring once more to the interesting revelations contained in the report just read.

Following this, he turned the conversation to Russia. The Führer had already given expression in his letter to Mussolini to everything that needed to be said on the subject. The Foreign Minister added that he was firmly convinced, on the strength of his own experience during his two visits to Moscow, that Stalin had renounced the idea of world revolution.

⁵ On Mar. 29 Secretary Hull made the following statement: "The press this evening carries the report of the issuance by the German Foreign Office of a White Book containing documents alleged to have been found in the archives of the Polish Foreign Office in Warsaw and purporting to contain accounts of conversations held by Polish officials with diplomatic representatives of the United States.

"I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest credence. The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or policy of the American Government." Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 335-336. For additional documents on United States reaction to the German publication, see vol. IX.

⁶ Walther Rathenau, 1867-1922, German industrialist and Foreign Minister (1922).

⁷ See document No. 655, footnote 1.

⁸ Two reports of Jan. 12 and 16, 1939, purportedly by Potocki, appear in the publication cited in footnote 4. A telegram of Mar. 31, 1940, from Thomsen in Washington, which will be published in vol. IX, states "that material for Potocki's report of January, 1939, on the influence of the Jews was placed at the disposal of the specialist at the Polish Embassy at his request in January, 1939, by the specialist in our Embassy" (B21/B005462). Internal evidence suggests that it was Potocki's report of Jan. 12 to which Thomsen refers here, and that this was the report which Ribbentrop read to Mussolini.

"Do you really believe that?" inquired the Duce.

The Foreign Minister gave an affirmative answer and stated that the Spanish adventure had been the last bid for world revolution. At the Duce's query whether the Third International had also given up all thought of a world revolution, the Foreign Minister replied that the Third International, in his opinion, confined itself exclusively to propaganda and informational work. His impression was that Russia was not only in the process of becoming a normal national state, but had even progressed quite far in that direction. There were no more Jews in the central agencies, and even Kaganovich, who had always been said to be of Jewish blood—something which he had no way of checking—looked more like a Georgian. After Litvinov's departure all Jews had left the key positions. On his [Ribbentrop's] second visit to Moscow^{*} he had had the opportunity at a dinner given by Stalin to talk with all of the members of the Politburo. The German party had also included some old National Socialists, like Gauleiter Forster, and it was Forster in particular who had declared after the banquet that it had been just like talking with old party comrades. That had been also his own (the Foreign Minister's) impression. This might perhaps sound a little strange, but to his mind the Russian orientation—which was of course Communistic and therefore unthinkable for a National Socialist—had nothing to do with world revolution any longer. Stalin was seeking to give the Russian empire a centralized organization and had already achieved this goal to a large extent, for nothing happened in Russia any longer without his desire. To this end he had employed methods which had been the order of the day in Russia since time immemorial, and on seeing the picture of Tsar Alexander that was still hanging in the Kremlin one might almost have the illusion, in view of these tendencies, of calling on a Tsar and not on Stalin.

The Duce remarked to this that Stalin actually thought that he was Alexander's successor. The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Politburo consisted of 100 percent Muscovites who no longer had much interest in other countries, but on the contrary had the tendency to isolate their country from the rest of the world. Russia did not constitute either an internal or an external threat to National Socialism or Fascism. As a matter of fact, there was no evidence that the Russians had tried any meddling in Germany's domestic affairs since the conclusion of the Russian pact. The Führer held that there was naturally a clear distinction between Bolshevism and National Socialism, but that a favorable trade agreement could be concluded with Russia just the same; that a sizable number of divisions, which in

^{*} See document No. 152, footnote 3.

different circumstances it would have been necessary to hold in reserve as a covering force against the Russians, had now become available for the West; and that the understanding with Russia had freed Germany at the rear. Russia was going through a change of global proportions. She had dropped the idea of world revolution. The ties with the Third International had, to Germany's knowledge, been loosened, and the Russian figures in the Third International had been largely frozen out.

With her orientation turned entirely inward as a result of the organizational changes which the Bolshevik regime was undergoing, Russia was not contemplating any action in the international field.

The Finnish conflict—Germany had accurate knowledge of this from special sources—was an affair into which Russia had slid without her own doing. The Finnish Foreign Minister, Tanner, a Menshevik, had given his country bad advice, and as a result of English influence a situation had eventually been brought about which had affected Russia's prestige and had left her no choice but to go to war in the middle of winter. Russia's original intention had been to conclude treaties with Finland similar to those concluded with the Baltic States.¹⁰

In these circumstances the Russians were no threat to the Balkans, either. Stalin would, of course, at any time conclude a treaty with Rumania that would give him the whole or part of Bessarabia. But considering the unpredictable repercussions in other countries and the certainty that as a result the war would spread over the entire Orient, he would surely not embark upon a war with Rumania.

The all-important consideration was that the men in the Politburo, such as, for instance, the chief of the GPU,¹¹ with whom the Foreign Minister had had a long talk, were 100 percent Muscovites, who would have nothing to do with Paris, London, and Washington, and were tending toward a Russian—not a Pan-Slavic—nationalism, but also had certain revisionist aspirations.

The Duce conceded that possibly the Third International was actually unable to launch a world revolution any more because the German-Russian agreement has caused a tremendous confusion in the Communist parties of the Western countries, which to him marked the end of the Communist world movement. The Communists in the Western countries believed, moreover, that "Stalin had gone to Berlin," and not vice versa.

In this connection the Foreign Minister underlined the firm attitude of the National-Socialist party comrades in Germany, who, as a result

¹⁰ See Editors' Notes, pp. 160 and 363.

¹¹ Lavrenty Beria, head of the General State Police Administration, the secret police.

of the realistic political thinking which had been gradually developed under National Socialist training, had unreservedly welcomed the German-Russian agreement.

The Duce stated in this connection that he had already written the Führer that he had a full understanding of the political necessity for the agreement, since it spared Germany a second front and guarded her flank. Although Russia was perhaps not quite in top form militarily, yet she was in a position to operate with large masses, and mass always meant strength. On that account it was really foolish of the Western European press to try to make the Russian Army an object of scorn by calling it a "herd," an expression which Herriot had used. This was absolutely false propaganda.

The Foreign Minister concurred and pointed out that the Führer, too, in his letter to the Duce had characterized British propaganda as idiotic. The British always took the wrong line in their propaganda. Thus, for instance, by their recent proclamation of their goal of annihilation they had brought the Germans behind the Führer to the very last man. The Duce said that the operations of the British Ministry of Information were an utter failure [*absolute Katastrophe*].

The British propaganda, the Foreign Minister continued, impeded the conclusion of a peace. In the Finnish conflict, too, England had at first made a great show of indignation over the outbreak of the war. Now she was just as strongly opposed to the conclusion of a peace.

The Duce remarked that England was extremely displeased by the prospect of a peace between Finland and Russia, but Finland had no other choice, for she could count on no help.

The Foreign Minister agreed. Sweden and Norway would do their utmost to remain neutral because they knew that if England and France intervened in Scandinavia, Germany would have to do so also.

At the Duce's question whether he thought there was any prospect of peace, the Foreign Minister said it was difficult to say. If the Finns were wise they would make peace with the Russians now. The Finns had pursued a very bad policy all along. The Foreign Minister had had them advised before the outbreak of the conflict that they should make every effort to reach a peaceable solution.¹² He distinctly recalled that reports of a forthcoming agreement had arrived in Berlin on a certain day from both Helsinki and Moscow.¹³ But at that point Anglo-French influence had been brought to bear on Finland through the former Swedish Foreign Minister, Sandler, which bolstered the position of Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner and so

¹² See, for instance, document No. 221.

¹³ Not found.

brought on the war. Twenty-four hours after the outbreak of hostilities, however, the Finnish Minister to Berlin had told him, the Reich Foreign Minister, that the Finns were prepared to accept all of the Russian demands.¹⁴ All this only went to show how badly Finnish policy had been conducted.

The Foreign Minister next turned to the situation in terms of the German Army. He repeated that the Führer did not believe there were any possibilities of peace. Sumner Welles' mission was easily explained in terms of strictly domestic political issues in America; there were other interpretations which claimed that his actions were a maneuver in collusion with England calculated to cause Germany to defer the execution of certain plans. But even if in view of the anti-war attitude of the American people one did not wish to deny that Sumner Welles' mission had the character of an honest attempt, Germany's enemies had gone too far in committing themselves to the repeatedly proclaimed aim of a war of annihilation to be able to change their goal now. In view of this situation the Führer was determined to break the enemy's will to annihilate and, in order to accomplish this, to attack England and France at the time he considered proper. Playing the prophet was always a dubious business, but he, the Foreign Minister, was in a position to state that Germany hoped that the French Army would be beaten before next fall and that after that the only British soldiers left on the Continent would be prisoners of war.

The Foreign Minister recalled that while he had told Count Ciano at Salzburg that he did not think England and France would necessarily go to Poland's aid, yet he had always reckoned with the possibility of an intervention by the Western Powers.¹⁵ He was now glad that matters had taken such a turn because, *in the first place*, it had always been obvious that the clash would occur sooner or later and that it was inescapable. As to the timing, they on the German side had taken the position, partly in consideration of Italy's preparation, that the conflict would not break out before 2 or 3 years had passed. These had also been the Führer's views. On the other hand, however, he had been aware that it would be desirable to get the conflict over with during the lifetime of the Duce and the Führer. The attempt on the Führer's life at Munich¹⁶ had shown that a statesman's life often hung by a silken thread, and on that account the Führer had sought to bring about a decision while he was still in the prime of life. *Secondly*, from the moment when England introduced universal military service,¹⁷ it was clear that in the long run the ratio of power could not

¹⁴ Not found.

¹⁵ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 43 and 47.

¹⁶ A bomb exploded in the Munich Bürgerbräukeller shortly after Hitler finished a speech there on Nov. 8, 1939.

¹⁷ In April 1939. See vol. VI, document No. 272.

be maintained in Germany's and Italy's favor. This consideration had been a factor in shaping the Führer's decision to solve the Polish question even at the risk of intervention by the Western Powers. The decisive factor, however, had been that a Great Power could not afford to put up with certain things.

The Foreign Minister handed Mussolini the book on the Polish atrocities,¹⁸ with the promise that an Italian translation would follow later. The situation, which had been difficult from the outset, had reached such a point that in recent months Polish chauvinism had almost gone head-over-heels in its ravings about a march on Berlin, while terrorization of the Volksdeutsche continued on an increasing scale. In August the Poles had sent notes to Berlin of such insolence that, had they been published, the cannons might have gone off by themselves, so outraged would the feelings of the German people have been. There were limits to one's forbearance. On top of this, the Polish agreement of 1934 had been concluded only upon the insistence of the Führer, and even so it was very unpopular in Germany.¹⁹ But instead of utilizing this agreement to settle the difficulties between the two countries, the Poles had on the contrary taken advantage of it to maltreat the German minority in an incredible manner. This, of course, became known in Germany, and popular sentiment became inflamed to the extreme, so that last summer the Führer was faced with the question whether to accept a long winter campaign against Poland, as England and France evidently intended, at the same time exposing the Germans in Poland to unbearable abuse during the campaign, or else to strike promptly. In the given circumstances the Führer could not have done anything but choose the second alternative.

"In any case, events proved the Führer to be right," commented the Duce.

The Foreign Minister continued by stressing the German people's unshakable faith in victory. There was not a German soldier who did not believe that victory would be won this year. That, said the Duce, was an extremely interesting remark. What animated the German people was not the flag-waving sort of patriotism [*hurra-Patriotismus*] but a firm purpose. Germany's position was favorable. The blockade had proved ineffective. Germany's food supply was assured with the help of the reconquered former German provinces. It was only in fats that the German people had to accept

¹⁸ See document No. 663.

¹⁹ The German-Polish Agreement of 1934, signed Jan. 26, 1934, by Neurath and Lipski, stated that it was intended "to open up a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland." It pledged the parties to conduct their relations in accordance with the principles of the Pact of Paris, to settle disputes by direct negotiation or other peaceful means, and "in no circumstances to resort to force." For the full text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1934*, vol. cxxxvii, pp. 495-496.

any restrictions, but that could only better their health. Under the trade agreement Germany was to receive from Russia 1 million tons of grain in the first year, and from 1.5 to 2 million tons later. He was able to state confidentially that Russia was very generous in the matter of raw material deliveries and even used her own gold to purchase some of the raw materials destined for Germany. In addition, she gave valuable assistance in respect to transit of goods. Thus large quantities of critical materials were being sent from Manchukuo through Russia. Also the Balkan countries, such as Rumania, had a share in supplying Germany; and Italy was not last in providing valuable economic assistance, for which the Führer had asked him to convey special thanks to the Duce. Thus Germany's supply of food and raw materials would not encounter any difficulties even in the event of a long war.

The Foreign Minister then pointed out that he was very unpopular in England; they always reproached him for having declared that there would never be a war with England. As a matter of fact, he had asked the Führer in 1937 to send him as Ambassador to London, although this had required that a decision already taken be rescinded. He had told the Führer on that occasion that he was certain there would be a war with England and that only King Edward had a slight chance of averting it; he had added immediately, however, that he did not think Edward would be able to prevail. Given this situation, he had told the Führer as early as 1937 that the chances for a war were a hundred to one. If he had been asked at that time what line-up he would like for that war, he would not even in his boldest imagination have been able to think up so favorable a situation as the one in which Germany found herself today.

At the Duce's question, "What program do you have for your stay in Rome, Comrade Ribbentrop?", the Foreign Minister replied that he was entirely at the Duce's disposal. The Duce then proposed having another discussion on Monday afternoon at 5 o'clock. He, the Duce, would then outline the situation from the Italian point of view and deal particularly with the future, adding that he, too, had documents to show.

The Foreign Minister then informed the Duce confidentially that Germany would take the offensive with 205 fully equipped and well-trained divisions. He pointed out that Germany's experience in the West, especially a recent raid on a British outpost, where 16 British soldiers had been captured, showed that the British were miserably trained and poorly equipped, and that the superiority of the German foot soldier over his opponent was equivalent to three to one. The British lacked any training in modern fighting, as needed for bunker warfare, for instance. It was not as simple as all that to put civilians

into uniform, give them a smattering of training and then send them to the front to do the job of full-fledged soldiers.

The Duce estimated the British troops actually at the front at 50,000 to 60,000 (out of a total of 200,000), with the rest occupied in the communications zone.

Next the Foreign Minister talked about the experience of World War I. The British had had very poor leadership in the last war. Some of their crack units had been good, but on the average they had been inferior to the German Army. The French Army, too, was no longer what it had been in 1914, as recent experience in the West had demonstrated.

The Duce commented that the French had a defensive mentality. Everything was all right as long as they were sitting in their pill boxes, but as soon as they had to leave that shelter the consequences of the bad morale in France became evident in the troops, too. When he referred to the Communist movement in France and to the fact that Communist papers were even allowed to continue publication, the Foreign Minister replied laughingly that some of these Communist papers were printed in Germany.

The Duce referred in this context also to the bad morale in England, where an anti-war meeting had recently been held with a large attendance, and the number of conscientious objectors²⁰ had risen to 24,000. Besides, the Foreign Minister added, in a recent by-election a candidate had been elected on an anti-war platform.

The Foreign Minister also stated that the Führer was enjoying the best of health and was very eager for the fray. The Duce added on his part that the Führer was quite right in saying that the German and Italian peoples had a common destiny. The Western democracies made no distinction in their hostility to the two countries.

The Foreign Minister replied that one basic reason for the attitude of the plutocracies was the fear that the leading ideas of Germany and Italy might find their way to the other countries and so put an end to the plutocracies in the United States, England, and France. The Polish documents which he had given the Duce showed that the plutocracies hated the Duce and the Führer from the bottom of their hearts. This was partly explained by their bad consciences and by the fear that the Fascist and National Socialist ideas might find adherents. The Duce interjected that Germany and Italy were the proletarians, as it were, and the other countries the conservatives, and it should be borne in mind that the Western countries would do everything in their power to defend their system to the last. But their morale was low and they had no officers. The Foreign Minister replied that he was fully convinced that the British and French Armies were moving

²⁰ "Conscientious objectors" is in English in the original.

toward the greatest disaster of their histories. Germany was quite aware that the campaign would not be as easy as the one in Poland, but the Führer, who was very cautious in his calculations, was firmly convinced after a careful comparison of the relative merits of the opposing armies and an accurate appraisal of the total situation that England and France would receive a crushing defeat.

In answer to the Duce's question whether Germany believed it was possible to break through the Maginot Line, the Foreign Minister stated that the German General Staff, on the basis of its perhaps somewhat slow but therefore all the more thorough study, had reached the conclusion that the Maginot Line was no longer an insurmountable obstacle. The special tactics in which the German troops had been trained in the last few months, together with their special weapons, would enable them to deal even with the Maginot Line.

At the close of the conversation, the Duce said that he would give thought to all the points raised and added, pointing to the Führer's letter, "I believe the Führer is right."

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 666

B19/B003509

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, March 10, 1940.

The Foreign Minister decided today in the matter enclosed herewith (repatriation of German nationals from Finland to the Reich)¹ as follows: There was no objection to a slow and very cautious return of German nationals from Finland to the Reich, if this action could be carried through without arousing any notice. In no case could any organized action be considered. Foreign policy considerations toward Russia demanded such caution. The Reich Foreign Minister accordingly asks the State Secretary and Chief of the AO to see to it that this project does not develop into any organized action and that nothing appears in the press, especially in Finland. In order to forestall this, no written instructions must be issued, e. g., to the Ortsgruppen. Moreover, it was self-evident that the projected action could extend only to those German nationals who were willing to come to Germany.

Transmitted to State Secretary and Chief of the AO Bohle.

¹ Enclosure not found.

No. 667

F17/278;
F7/0531-0530*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 531 of March 11

ROME, March 11, 1940—8:15 p. m.

Received March 11—8:40 p. m.

Only for the Führer personally.¹

My reception by the Duce and Ciano was especially cordial. In the first conversation I commented to the Duce on the Führer's letter.² I told the Duce on the coal question that Germany was able and willing, with Italy's cooperation, to supply and transport all the coal needed by Italy, and that I had brought along Minister Clodius, who would be at the disposal of the Italian Government at once for settling all details. Any further economic wishes which Italy might have would receive the utmost consideration from us. I further explained in detail that the Führer did not believe in the possibility of peace and in the sense of the disinterestment³ was determined to break the enemy's will to annihilate; I believed that the French Army would be beaten this summer and the British driven out of France.

I handed the Duce seven Polish documents,⁴ of which I read him the last, most interesting one, which is an especially crass documentation of the hatred of the democracies for Italy and Germany, and of America's co-responsibility for the outbreak of the war. The Duce said that he had always thought this was the case and that he would study the documents carefully.

I then explained to the Duce our view of the Russian question on the basis of my personal impressions of Moscow. The Duce interrupted to ask various questions and replied that, in his opinion, world Communism had received a mortal blow as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact.

With reference to the Führer's letter, I then described to the Duce Germany's incomparable economic, political, and military situation, and, referring to the progress of the war so far—specific operations on the Western Front, the recent capture of British soldiers, etc.—I

¹ This document was not circulated outside the Büro St.S. in the Foreign Ministry. The working copy went to Ribbentrop's own office.

² See documents Nos. 663 and 665.

³ "Disinterestment" is presumably a coding error for "letter," the corresponding word in a copy retained in Ribbentrop's file (F7/0529-0526) of the draft prepared at Rome.

⁴ See document No. 665, footnotes 4 and 8. It is not clear which seven documents were meant, for the German publication of Mar. 29, 1940, included 16 documents.

pointed out the vast superiority of the German soldier. The Duce agreed and remarked that, in his opinion, the British had a total of 200,000 troops in France, of which, however, only 50,000 were usable; the rest were in rear areas. He spoke disparagingly about the spirit of the French Army and called it a defensive spirit. The Duce also stated that the British officers and noncommissioned officers were unfit.

In confirmation of the Führer's letter, I then commented in detail on the Führer's satisfaction that things had taken this course; the conflict with England had been unavoidable, and it was therefore well that it had broken out during the lifetime of the Führer and the Duce and before England was fully armed from the standpoint both of men and matériel. I stressed the firm confidence in victory entertained by the German people and the German Army, who felt vastly superior to their foes. The German Army had mustered over 200 divisions of full, wartime strength. The Duce asked whether Germany believed she could break through the Maginot Line, to which I replied that the German General Staff always gave things very careful consideration and that with the tactics and weapons of the modern German Army the Maginot Line no longer represented an insuperable obstacle by any means.

Finally, I spoke again of the irreconcilable difference between the democracies and our two totalitarian countries and referred to the Führer's letter, according to which this was no accidental war but a question of the determination of one system to destroy the other.

The Duce, who asked a number of other questions regarding which I shall report orally, finally said that he wished to think over at leisure the Führer's letter, which I had sent him half an hour before the conversation, and that he was contemplating giving his stand on the questions tomorrow. He was therefore asking me to see him tomorrow, that is, this afternoon at 5 o'clock.⁵ In conclusion, the Duce added that the Führer's letter was very interesting; he believed that the Führer was right and that Germany and Italy had a common destiny.

I have no indications at all at present as to what attitude the Duce will take today. Even at dinner yesterday with Ciano, who was very reserved, perhaps in order not to anticipate the Duce, I obtained no hint as to the Duce's thoughts. We have learned in confidence from Italian Government circles, first, that for the time being Italy would apparently like to continue to import certain amounts of coal from England, particularly in view of the fact that certain portions of her industry are equipped for British coal and, secondly, that, as far as the military situation is concerned, Italy is not yet prepared. Whether and to what extent these reports are correct and, above all,

⁵ See document No. 669.

whether they agree with the Duce's personal views will become evident in the conversation this afternoon.

The conversation with the Pope took the course agreed upon with the Führer. I shall report on it orally. I am leaving tonight at 9:10^a and shall arrive in Berlin sometime Tuesday evening.

RIBBENTROP

^a "9:50" in the draft described in footnote 3.

No. 668

F13/426;
F8/0125-129

Unsigned Memorandum

RAM 10A.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND
THE POPE ON MARCH 11, 1940

After the Foreign Minister had conveyed the Führer's greetings, the Pope opened the conversation by referring to his 17 years of activity in Germany. Those years spent in the orbit of German culture represented perhaps the most delightful period of his life and the Reich Government could be sure that he had a warm heart for Germany and always would have.

After he had emphasized, with the lively assent of the Pope, that he wanted to speak frankly and without diplomatic circumlocution, the Foreign Minister took up the subject of the fundamental relationship between the National Socialist State and the Catholic Church and stated the German position in the following terms:

The Führer was of the opinion that a basic settlement between National Socialism and the Catholic Church was quite possible. There was, however, no point in wanting to settle the relations between these two by raising separate questions of this or that kind or by provisional agreements. Rather, they must come sometime to a comprehensive and, so to speak, secular settlement of their relations; this would then form a really lasting basis for a harmonious cooperation between them. However, the time had not yet arrived for such a settlement. Germany was engaged in a struggle for existence which she would fight, in all circumstances, to a victorious end; naturally, this occupied all her efforts and did not permit the Führer to get interested in other problems. Moreover, it ought to be borne in mind, that an understanding between National Socialism and the Catholic Church depended on one principal preliminary condition, namely, that the Catholic clergy in Germany abandon any kind of political activity and limit itself solely to the care of souls, the only activity which was

within the clergy's province. The recognition of the necessity of such a radical separation, however, could not yet be considered to be the dominant view of Catholic clergymen in Germany. Similar to the manner in which England, in international politics, had claimed the role of a kind of guardian of the continent and the right of intervening in every possible problem of third countries, the Catholic Church had also become accustomed, in the course of events, to intervention in politics. The Catholic Church in Germany had come into the possession of positions and rights of the most various kind which it considered, to be sure, duly acquired, but which were not compatible with the absolutely necessary limitation to its spiritual functions. The Catholic clergy must be imbued with the realization that with National Socialism an entirely new form of political and national life had appeared in the world. Only after this had happened could a fundamental settlement and understanding be approached with any chance for a lasting success. One must not repeat the mistake made with the prematurely concluded concordats (Länder concordats and Reich concordat), which already had to be considered out of date, if only on account of the formal constitutional developments in Germany which had taken place since they were concluded. In the opinion of the Führer, what mattered for the time being was to maintain the existing truce and, if possible, to expand it. In this respect, Germany had made very considerable preliminary concessions. The Führer had quashed no less than 7 thousand indictments of Catholic clergymen. Also, it should not be forgotten that the National Socialist State was spending 1 billion RM annually for the Catholic Church; no other state could boast of such an achievement.

The Pope showed complete understanding toward the Foreign Minister's statements and admitted without qualifications that the concrete facts were as mentioned. True, he attempted to turn the conversation toward certain special problems and complaints of the Curia, but did not insist on going on, when the Foreign Minister once more emphasized the necessity of a fundamental and comprehensive settlement of the whole relationship between Church and State which would be possible only at some later date.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister pointed to the historic fact that never before in history had a revolution as radical as that carried out in the total life of the German people by National Socialism done so little injury to the existence of the Church. On the contrary, it was due, in the last analysis, only to National Socialism that Bolshevik chaos did not break out in Europe and thus destroy church life altogether. On the other hand, however, the Foreign Minister made it clear that the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union was now fundamentally changed. A firm and lasting basis for a posi-

tive relationship between the two countries had been established. This had been made possible for National Socialism by the fact that the German people were now immune to any kind of Communist infection and that the Soviets also had not attempted to gain support for ideas of world revolution in Germany.

In the subsequent conversation between the Foreign Minister and Cardinal State Secretary Maglione, the latter tried to discuss several concrete issues, namely, the problem of confessional schools, the permission for a representative of the Nunciature in Berlin to go to Warsaw and the subsidies sent to Poland by the Curia. The Foreign Minister, however, did not enter into a discussion of the substance of the problem of confessional schools. He called the admission of diplomatic representatives into Warsaw as generally not yet possible, and when the Cardinal State Secretary in this connection spoke of the necessary control over the use of papal money payments he [the Foreign Minister] vigorously rejected the suspicion cast on German authorities which was therein implied, whereupon the Cardinal State Secretary dropped that subject too. With regard to a further question raised by the Cardinal State Secretary, namely, whether it was not possible to prohibit the distribution of certain anti-church books which had been brought out by Ludendorff's publishing firm, the Foreign Minister promised to examine the matter, without, however, giving any positive assurances.

No. 669

66/46522-39

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 10

ROME, March 11, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUCE
IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR VON MACKENSEN AND COUNT CIANO
ON MARCH 11, 1940

At the exchange of greetings the Duce remarked, referring to the Foreign Minister's call on the Pope, that there was little to be gained from having the Catholic Church for a friend, but the enmity of the Pope, even if it was not dangerous, could be quite troublesome, as he knew from personal experience.

In connection with the memorandum¹ on the machinations of Otto von Hapsburg, presented the day before, the Duce commented that just as Emperor Charles had been given the nickname "Charles the

¹ Not found. Archduke Otto had recently arrived in New York, where he had spoken on a plan for a Danubian federation. See the *New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1940. In April he was received by President Roosevelt.

Sudden," so Otto now was dubbed "Otto the Fantastic" for his utterly senseless exertions. Otto's plans could only be described as "the decline of the mind." He was going to have them published in the Italian press, and Gayda,² had already spoken about them in the *Giornale d'Italia*.

Next the Duce thanked the Foreign Minister for the amplifications which he had made to the Führer's letter during yesterday's conversation, and said that he had read the letter over three times. He then proceeded to state his position on the individual problems in the current political situation as follows:

Relative to Russia, he wished to recall that in 1924 the Fascist Government had been the first European Government to recognize the Soviets, and that he himself had concluded a comprehensive pact with Litvinov 10 years later.³ On that occasion the Russians had even been given a banquet, though no toasts had been made. So far everything had been satisfactory. On the Italian side, however, a clear distinction had been drawn between the political and the ideological aspect of this relationship. As regards the ideological aspect, the Duce had remained absolutely intransigent. "I am and always will be anti-Communist," he stressed with vigor, for Communism was incompatible with the historical and economic, that is, the natural foundations of life. The Foreign Minister agreed with him and characterized Communism as being even contrary to nature, to which the Duce added that it was precisely in nature that the principle of inequality was constantly demonstrated to us.

He believed that Russia would refrain from any propaganda work for a while since, as he had said yesterday, a tremendous confusion had broken out among the Communists of all countries as a result of the German-Russian agreement. But once Russia has disposed of these international difficulties, the Bolsheviks were sure to start up their propaganda all over again. Germany had been wise to conclude the pact with Russia, as he had already said in his letter⁴ to the Führer, because the pact gave Germany the assurance that she would have to fight on only one front, which was a factor of capital importance.

Owing to certain issues, a rupture had now occurred between Russia and Italy. The Russians were inclined to exaggerate things in this respect, and they overlooked, for instance, the fact that Count Ciano, in his speech of December 15 [16], had mentioned neither Russia nor Finland.⁵ Very recently the Russians had made inquiries regard-

² Virginio Gayda, editor of the *Giornale d'Italia*.

³ See document No. 504, footnote 12.

⁴ See document No. 504.

⁵ See document No. 478.

ing the possibilities of having ships built in Italy. Incidentally, the world's fastest cruiser, the *Tashkent*, had been built for the Russians in Leghorn. The exchange of views between the Italian and Russian authorities on this subject was still going on. If the Russians wished to resume normal relations he, for his part, was entirely willing. The Foreign Minister stated that it would be of benefit to the Axis if good relations were restored between Italy and Russia.

Regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict the Duce noted that a peace would be entirely advantageous to Germany and Italy. He added that Germany and Italy had an interest in Russia's not taking action against Rumania. Any Russian move against Bessarabia would result in an extremely complicated situation and the entire Danube basin would be in danger of becoming involved in the conflict, which would certainly be against Germany's interests in view of the supply situation. The Foreign Minister stated with emphasis that Germany, too, wanted the Balkans to remain quiet.

The Duce stated further that he had advised the Hungarians to remain quiet and not bring up the question of Transylvania, which, moreover, was highly complicated by reason of the number of different nationalities involved. It was interesting to note that the German minority in Transylvania tended to prefer the Rumanians to the Hungarians. The Foreign Minister confirmed this and added that the German minority in Rumania had not nearly so many grievances as the minority in Hungary.

The Duce inquired if it were not possible for Germany to prevail on Russia to leave the Balkans alone and to confirm this intention by some sort of declaration or gesture. A step of this kind would also provide favorable conditions for the restoration of good relations between Russia and Italy, mainly of an economic but also of a political nature.

Passing on to England, the Duce stated that the British probably did not delude themselves for even a moment that the requests which they had actually made of Italy for the delivery of cannon, armored cars, or bombers would be answered with anything but a categorical no. "They will not get a single nail for military purposes." As regards raw materials such as mercury, sulphur, and hemp, Italy was willing to discuss the matter. Moreover, a written statement on this question had already been communicated to Germany, defining the stand Italy would take up to the moment of the final break with the British and French.*

Going on to Italy's situation, the Duce stated that Italy had not been ready at the outbreak of the war on September 3. He had been

* Presumably the pro memoria contained in document No. 542.

sincerely grateful for the telegram in which the Führer had told him that he would not require Italy's military help in the Polish campaign. Publication of the telegram in Germany would have been desirable,⁷ added the Duce, for they should know there in all circumstances that the hypothesis according to which Italy might fight on the side of France and England was impossible and insulting. The Italy of today was entirely different from the former Italy. The Foreign Minister said with conviction that no one in Germany believed anything different, a statement which the Duce heard with visible satisfaction. The Duce stated in this connection that it was practically impossible for Italy to keep out of the conflict. She would join the war at the proper time and fight at the side of Germany and parallel with her, for Italy, too, had certain problems to solve. Now that the problem of the land boundaries was settled, he had to turn his attention to the sea boundary. Never before had Italy's need for free access to the oceans been demonstrated more clearly than at the present moment. No country was really free unless it had absolutely free access to the oceans. Italy was in a prison, as it were, the bars of which were formed by Corsica, Tunisia, and Malta, and the walls Gibraltar, Suez, and the Dardanelles. Italy was very patient and had to remain so as long as she was not prepared, just as a boxer in the ring had to put up with a great deal at certain moments. This test of patience was nearing its end, however. Italy had made great advances in her rearmament, and he would shortly give the Italian people an opportunity to judge with their own eyes the accomplishments in this field. He had sacrificed almost every aspect of civilian life in order to make progress in rearmament.

The Italian navy would soon be the strongest in heavy battleships, for Italy would have four 35,000 ton vessels, as compared with Britain's two. One hundred and twenty submarines would be available by next May, and 150,000 naval personnel would be mobilized in April.

Italy had made great strides in the air, too. All work in that sector was directly under the Duce, because it had turned out that he had to look after the work even of the technicians.

The ground forces would be 2 million strong by next May; 1 million of them could be rated as highly qualified and well trained, and were imbued with the best fighting spirit of Fascism (the age classes of 1917, 1918, 1919, and 1920).

The Duce had often pondered the question whether the events which had proved the Führer right had not proved him right too. He had to answer this question in the affirmative. If Italy had entered the war

⁷ See document No. 23.

on September 3, she would have had to ask for Germany's help. The Foreign Minister agreed with him and added that the Führer himself had said it was better that Italy had not come into the war at once.

The Duce went on to explain that at home as well as in Libya, the Aegean Sea, Albania, and Africa, Italy would have had to conduct not only a two-front but a multiple-front war. In these circumstances the war would immediately have spread, reaching as far as the Danube basin—especially since the Turkish-French-British pact⁹ was directed against Italy and the Weygand army⁹ was maintained solely for operations against Libya, and for no other purpose. If one asked whether Italy's attitude was true to the spirit of the alliance and was of political and economic advantage to Germany, one could only conclude that Italy's actions were those of a real ally. In the economic field particularly, Italy's assistance in supplying food should be noted, especially those foods which contained the important vitamin C, without which the body could not develop. In the month of February alone, according to his statistics, 9,800 railroad cars loaded with food had gone into Germany, and he hoped to be able to reach as much as 10,000 in the near future. (The Duce handed over a detailed statement.)¹⁰

In the military field, Italy was containing large numbers of Anglo-French home and colonial troops in various parts of Europe and Africa. The Duce presented several maps which showed the exact figures, and repeated that large masses of enemy troops were tied down in this manner. When the Reich Foreign Minister asked how many French divisions were contained at the Franco-Italian border, the Duce answered approximately 10 to 12 divisions, and insisted on this figure in spite of the Foreign Minister's remark that German authorities assumed the figure to be lower; he explained this lower figure by the snow conditions during the severe winter, which made it unnecessary to keep large forces at the border. Their number would be immediately augmented, however, when the weather changed.

Following this the Duce turned to the question of when Italy would be able to enter the war. The question of timing was extremely delicate, for he ought not intervene until all his preparations were completed, so as not to be a burden to his partner. In any event he had to state at this time with all distinctness that Italy was in no position financially to sustain a long war. He could not afford to spend a billion lire a day, as England and France were doing—whose expenditures, indeed, were reported to be even higher. Those coun-

⁹ See document No. 287, footnote 1.

⁹ General Maxime Weygand was commander in chief of the French forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

¹⁰ Not found.

tries, too, would encounter financial difficulties, but Italy would not be able to stand up under anything of that sort.

The Duce said he was convinced that France and England were opposed to Germany and Italy, and that they made no difference between the two countries. Once one was destroyed, it would be the turn of the other, for Fascism and National Socialism were looked upon as the same thing by the Western states, which proved the community of interest between Germany and Italy. Italy represented the reserve that would do its duty when the time came, and wanted to be regarded as such. Germany had as little need for Italy's aid at the moment as she had had in the Polish campaign because, apart from clashes between patrols, the war on the Western front against England and France had not yet started in earnest. From the standpoint of the alliance, Italy's attitude had benefited both Germany and Italy herself, for as a result she had been able to rearm twice as fast as would have been possible otherwise. She was now continuing her armament effort with all of her resources. He was able in all candor to say of the orientation of the Italian people that to claim that they favored France and England was a lie. The Italians despised France and England, and they had not forgotten the sanctions. The Italian people were realistic. The Duce had trained them to view things realistically, and they were fully aware that their problems could be solved only in conjunction with, but never in opposition to, Germany.

The Foreign Minister replied that this showed very realistic thinking and was also his own and the Führer's opinion.

In conclusion the Duce remarked that he wanted to write a short letter in reply to the Führer's latest letter. He judged a man by the facts. The main thing was that he be vindicated by the facts.

The Foreign Minister thanked the Duce for his clear expositions, which he would faithfully report to the Führer, and then asked several more questions. First, referring to a question conveyed by the Prince of Hesse¹¹ and also raised in the Führer's letter, the Foreign Minister inquired what the possibilities were for an early meeting between the Führer and the Duce. The Duce replied without hesitation that he was ready any time to have a talk with the Führer. The Foreign Minister added that since so long a time had passed since their last personal meeting, the Führer wanted to have another talk with the Duce. It was then proposed that the date of the meeting be set for the latter half of March, after the 19th. The Brenner was named as the place for the meeting because, as the Foreign Minister explained, it was not easy for the Führer to leave the country during wartime. Just before his departure the Führer had told him that cer-

¹¹ No record of the Prince of Hesse's communication has been found.

tain thoughts could not be committed to writing, and that a personal exchange of ideas was more suitable in such cases.

In the subsequent course of the conversation, the Foreign Minister recapitulated the statements of the Duce, as follows: If he had understood him correctly, the Duce believed that Italy would join in the war. The conduct of the British, in the words of the Duce, was becoming more and more outrageous. The Führer, on the other hand, did not believe in any possibility of peace, which meant that at the appointed time the opposing armies would clash in the West. The Foreign Minister had no way of knowing when this would come to pass, for the Führer did not disclose the details of his military plans even to his Foreign Minister. At any rate it was the Führer's opinion that the war would be won on the battlefield. In this connection he wanted to ask the Duce how further developments looked to him from the Italian viewpoint. The British had lately been making more and more difficulties. They had attempted to bring economic pressure to bear on Italy to obtain the delivery of war material and, judging from the Foreign Minister's knowledge of them, would continue that game. He therefore asked the Duce what course he thought developments would take in the aforementioned circumstances.

The Duce replied that there were two possibilities: Either the situation would become more strained because of the attitude of England and France, or he would himself bring the entire complex of problems relating to Italy out into the open. In either eventuality the moment would come when a "definition of Italy's relations with France and England," i. e., a break with these countries, would occur. In response to a question of the Foreign Minister, the Duce affirmed that the situation would develop in the same direction in either case.

Following this the coal problem was briefly touched on once more; the Foreign Minister reiterated that Minister Clodius was available to the Italian authorities for the discussion of specific issues, as he had already stated yesterday. It would be a matter of studying in what way the coal question could be settled to Italy's satisfaction through collaboration of the appropriate authorities on both sides. The Duce welcomed the opportunity for discussions between Clodius and Host-Venturi, adding that he would like, if in any way possible, to get the coal "in its totality" from Germany. The Foreign Minister replied that Germany would do everything necessary to make this possible.¹²

¹² On Mar. 13, Clodius and Giannini signed for their two Governments a Secret Supplementary Protocol to the Fourth Secret Protocol of Feb. 24, 1940 (document No. 634). The new agreement, which was to take effect upon signature, called for German deliveries by land of 1 million tons of coal monthly to Italy, with Germany providing 1,500 and Italy 500 coal cars a day (including holidays). Round trips should take no longer than 15 days, German cars should not be sent south of the line Piombino-Florence-Rimini, and contractual and clearing arrangements should be worked out as expeditiously as possible (4535/E144296-98).

The Foreign Minister further stated that he had understood the Duce to say he believed that the relations with France and England would deteriorate. The Duce immediately replied in the affirmative, saying that such a deterioration was "easy to arrange" because the feeling of the Italian people against England and France was very strong. Besides, these two countries were making the worst blunders. Just recently it had been stated in the French press that the neutrals would have to make up their minds whether they wanted to side with England and France or not. So far these two countries alone had had the courage to fight, and therefore they alone would conclude the peace. The neutrals who had been unwilling to make a decision would then be ignored.

The Foreign Minister's comment on this was that the neutrals had lately awakened to the facts and were no longer willing to fight for England. He repeated in this connection his question whether he had correctly understood that the Duce believed there would be a gradual general deterioration of Italy's relations with England and France. This opinion was naturally of great importance to Germany for the moment when the German Army would strike.

The Duce replied that such a deterioration could easily be provoked. To his mind there were two hypotheses: Either Germany's situation would develop favorably, in which case it would naturally be in Italy's interest to join her in battle, or developments would take an adverse turn for Germany—an eventuality which he hastened to describe as purely theoretical in view of what he, too, recognized as the great improvement in the German Army as compared to 1914—in which case Italy would be all the more compelled to step in, because she would then be in great peril herself.

Another question by the Foreign Minister referred to Italo-Russian relations. If he had correctly understood the Duce, there was a possibility that these relations would be improved. That would be very welcome to Germany. The Duce stated that such an improvement was entirely possible and pointed to the anxiety voiced in the press of the Western Powers in connection with the Foreign Minister's visit to Rome, to the effect that it might lead to the formation of a Spanish-Italian-Russian-German-Japanese bloc. And perhaps this was a possibility.

The Foreign Minister also recalled that the Führer had pointed out in his letter to the Duce that a strong Japan would be beneficial to the interests of Italy and Germany, because on the one hand she could keep England under pressure in the Far East, and on the other would constitute a useful counterpoise to America. How true that was could be gathered from the fact that America had intervened actively in the World War only after she had obtained Japan's written assurance

that the latter would engage in no action detrimental to America's interests in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean.¹³ If, in the World War, America had deemed this necessary with respect to a country which after all was at that time an ally, she would be more than ever constrained to take account of Japan in the present circumstances. Accordingly, the German Ambassadors in Moscow and Tokyo had been instructed to work for an understanding between Japan and Russia.¹⁴ Moreover, Stalin, whom the Foreign Minister had approached on that question,¹⁵ had shown a very reasonable attitude, and the Foreign Minister had pointed out in a statement to the press after the conclusion of the German-Russian pact that this pact did not in any way change the German-Japanese friendship.¹⁶

The Foreign Minister then asked the Duce whether he, too, would be willing to give his Ambassadors in Tokyo and Moscow similar instructions to promote an understanding. The freer Japan's hands were with respect to Russia, the more effective would she be in her function of exerting pressure on England and America.

The Duce replied that he had given relatively little attention to Japanese policy in recent times. However, he thought Japan's policies "disastrously slow-moving."

The Foreign Minister commented that this was a result of the party system, the influence exerted by the Army and the Navy, and the lack of any leader.

The Duce stated in conclusion that an understanding between Russia and Japan would be desirable. An Italo-Russian rapprochement, moreover, would make it easier for Italy to work in that direction.

The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection a telegram which he had received from Tokyo, informing him that according to an unofficial informant Japan was ready to associate herself with any action against England's encroachments at sea.¹⁷

In the further course of the conversation the Foreign Minister informed the Duce of the Führer's intention to send several German submarines into the western Mediterranean, exclusively for operations against British and French shipping. In the spirit of German-Italian collaboration he wished to advise the Duce of it beforehand.

The Duce replied that he had already heard of the plan as a result of the contacts between the naval authorities¹⁸ of their respective countries, and he had no objection.

¹³ The basis for this statement by Ribbentrop is not clear.

¹⁴ See documents Nos. 40, 70, and 140.

¹⁵ See vol. VII, document No. 213.

¹⁶ See vol. VII, document No. 234.

¹⁷ On Mar. 9, Ritter forwarded (2060/448116-17) to the Embassy in Rome for Ribbentrop's consideration the text of a telegram to this effect from the Embassy in Tokyo.

¹⁸ This question had been provisionally raised by the German Naval Attaché at the end of February (4450/E086883-87).

At a remark of the Foreign Minister that the Führer would be interested to know something about the situation in Libya, the Duce stated it had greatly improved since last September. A total of 14 divisions was now assembled in Libya. Besides, there was a double line of defense works, and Balbo was confidently prepared to face any eventuality. Whereas Libya had been a very weak point last September, 200,000 men were there now, together with two efficient Arab divisions.

On being asked by the Foreign Minister about the Italian submarines in the Mediterranean, the Duce replied that in this respect Italy ruled the Mediterranean. The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection that the British fleet had disappeared from the North Sea. The British would no longer risk any heavy cruisers there, let alone a dreadnought. The Duce added that the British would disappear from the Mediterranean as soon as a conflict broke out there.

Referring to Italy's repeatedly stated anxiety about the inadequate protection of her industrial areas against aerial attack, the Foreign Minister pointed out Germany's experience with enemy bombers. To this day not one enemy bomber had been over Germany with bombs, except for the attack on the Kiel Canal in the first days of the war, when 32 out of 40 planes were shot down. Germany's enemies dropped no bombs on Germany because they greatly feared German reprisals. Similarly, Italy's enemies would not dare to bomb the Italian industrial centers because they were well aware that Germany would immediately retaliate against England and France in the sharpest manner. The Duce then pointed to the system of Italian bases in the Mediterranean, calling particular attention to the impregnable key position of the island of Pantelleria, which the Foreign Minister characterized as an original military discovery made by the Duce himself.

The Foreign Minister stated that all this led to the conclusion that in the Duce's view there existed a community of destiny between the two countries which sooner or later would bring about Italy's entry into the war. The Duce replied that such a development was inescapable. Germany and Italy represented the new ideology. The other countries, on the other hand, represented the old concepts and ideas. Besides, these old countries had such an increasing population deficit that they could no longer be counted among the European nations proper. British ships were manned with Indians, French ships with Negroes. These countries no longer had any "élan vital", and they looked with jealousy upon the young nations.

The Duce answered in the affirmative the Foreign Minister's question as to whether he thought the French would again concentrate stronger forces on the Italian border. He added that these troops

included many Negroes, who were very impulsive but not good in sustained fighting. No one knew what was really going on in the minds of these African auxiliaries. Among themselves they talked a language which the French did not understand, and their attitude could be a great threat to France in the event of military reverses.

The Foreign Minister asked the Duce if he were correct in understanding him to say that Italy intended to adopt an attitude that would tie up a maximum number of French and British troops. The Duce confirmed this, and remarked regarding America's attitude that a press campaign was the most that was to be expected in reaction to European events. It was his conviction that the United States would never enter the war. In corroboration of this view the Duce read an article in the New York *Daily News*, according to which 90 percent of all Americans wanted to remain neutral and had no inclination to go to war every 20 years in order to preserve England's power position in Europe. It was in America's interest to stay out of the conflict. The Americans, the Duce added, took that attitude because they were doubtful of the success of the Allies and did not want to put their money on a losing horse.

They were quite right about that, said the Foreign Minister. In conclusion he repeated that although he did not know when this would be, it was certain that the German Army would clash with the British and French in the near future. Perhaps Italy would have the opportunity even before this time of taking a demonstrative attitude which would make things easier for Germany from the outset.

In closing, a press communiqué was agreed upon. As he was leaving, the Duce asked the Foreign Minister about his talk with the Pope. The Foreign Minister replied that both the Führer and the Pope were of the opinion that an understanding was possible between the National Socialist State and the Catholic Church. The Führer was thinking of a long-term solution, not a temporary one. The matter was to be discussed further with the Nunciature, the present truce was to be upheld, and, besides, the Führer had quashed 7,000 proceedings against monks. Germany was paying out to the Catholic Church over a billion a year, and had done other things as well for the truce. If the principle "politics to the State, spiritual care to the Church," were strictly observed, an understanding would gradually be achieved. The Führer did not desire, however, to speed these things up in any way and reach a temporary solution which could not last. The main trouble was that the Catholic Church had been

active in German politics for decades and so far had not been able to drop this role completely. Not until these matters had been completely clarified, and the developments clearly showed that the respective spheres of interest were actually beginning to take shape, would the conditions be met for a new constructive effort and the conclusion of an agreement with the Church.

Finally the Duce requested the Foreign Minister to convey his most cordial regards to the Führer.

The atmosphere throughout the conversation was one of marked friendliness and cordiality.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

SCHMIDT

No. 670

F17/277

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 10 of March 12

Foreign Minister's Special Train.

March 12, 1940.

Received March 12—1:20 p. m.

For the Führer only.¹

The second conversation with Mussolini was very cordial.

The Duce shares the Führer's opinion as to the common destiny of Germany and Italy. Italy therefore stands unalterably and firmly on the side of Germany. Any doubt as to this attitude would be an insult to Italy. The Duce said that Italy will enter the war on the side of Germany; if necessary, he would offer provocation. In accordance with the Führer's instructions, I did not for the moment go into the all-important question as to the time of Italy's entry into the war, but reserved this for the Führer's personal conversation with the Duce. This has been set for the Brenner Pass the early part of next week, if the time is agreeable to the Führer. I shall arrive at 6:37 this evening.² I should be grateful if you would let me know whether I am to report this evening or tomorrow morning.

RIBBENTROP

¹The distribution list on this document was crossed out, indicating that it was not to have the normal circulation in the Foreign Ministry.

²Ribbentrop's draft of this telegram (F17/276) gave the time as 10:37 p. m., and Weizsäcker's copy (582/241985) was corrected to read 10:37 p. m.

No. 671

F13/427-436

Memorandum by a Member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, March 12, 1940.

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH HERR COLIN ROSS ON MARCH 12,
1940, FROM 12 NOON TO 1 P. M.

Present: Senior Counselor Hewel.

Colin Ross opened his remarks by telling the Führer that during his recent world travels he had concerned himself mainly with three problems:

- 1) How can the United States of America be kept out of the war?
- 2) How can Japan be kept in our camp, or rather, how can the threat of her entry into the war be turned into a strong political asset for us?
- 3) How can we make the best ideological use of the German-Russian Pact throughout the world?

With regard to this last point he [Colin Ross] then pointed out that heretofore Germany had been looked upon as the bulwark against Bolshevism, that is to say, as defender of the bourgeois world against Bolshevism. Actually, through her pact with Russia, she had neutralized Bolshevism and paved the way to a more understanding attitude on the part of socialist movements in the world.

Upon a request by the Führer, Colin Ross then reported that at the time of the Czech crisis a European war would have been extremely popular in America. There was actual disappointment that France and England had not struck, and hundreds of thousands of Americans would have gladly gone to Europe to take part in the war. But when England and France did not do anything, a feeling of disgust with old Europe developed in America so that there is today a greater lack of interest in Europe than there was a year ago. It was in this atmosphere that he [Colin Ross] undertook his propaganda trip and was able to have success with his lectures. He reported that an imperialist tendency was prevailing today in the United States. To the Führer's question whether this imperialist tendency did not strengthen the desire for the Anschluss of Canada to the United States and thus produce an anti-English attitude, Colin Ross replied that this was not the case, since Canada's Anschluss to the United States was not an acute problem. The American expected that sooner or later the Anschluss would come about automatically, and even today the border between the two countries represented hardly an obstacle. The Americanization of the southern, most important, part of Canada was advanced to such a degree that there was no question of a division

between nationalities [*im völkischen Sinne*] as we in Europe knew it. The greatest technical difficulty in a union of Canada and the USA was raised by the Province of Quebec which had remained completely French in nationality. The Americans feel that in case of a union this could serve as a precedent for the formation of other compact communities, such as a German one. Although the American is gradually abandoning his belief that a national community can be created by education, independent of race and nationality (theory of the melting pot), nevertheless, any organization on the basis of nationality within the great American political community is still repugnant to him.

Colin Ross explained as follows the strange fact that hatred against Germany is so extremely strong in America, even though, for geopolitical reasons, England ought to be considered as the enemy of the United States: For a very long time, America has been governed by a kind of Anglo-Saxon aristocracy which looks upon those of different race—including the Germans—as something inferior and at the same time sinister, and which knows how to keep down always those immigrants of different race. An additional factor is the monstrous power of Jewry, directing with a really fantastic cleverness and organizational skill the struggle against everything German and National Socialist. This organization, the ramifications of which extend into the remotest corner, has succeeded in defaming everything that is "fascist" to such a degree that no one in America dares to defend it openly, although the idea of National Socialism often meets with a distinct sympathy and understanding; that is to say, in public opinion and particularly in society, National Socialism has been branded as culturally destructive, barbaric, and cruel. The American, who essentially has very little *Zivilcourage*, obeys this unwritten law slavishly. Colin Ross cited numerous examples from among his own acquaintances, showing how people with the greatest good will toward us were taking an anti-German position in public, partly because of indolence, partly because of the fear of boycott in business or social life. Even good Germans and people with National Socialist sympathies, for instance, subscribed to the Jewish fund, because they would suffer economic and social defamation if they did not do so. Hatred and fear of everything German was also based on the fact that the Americans knew the English in their good as well as in their bad aspects. They fought against them and the English have lost one position after the other; on the other hand, the Americans have done business with them and are convinced that they do not have to be afraid of England. But they don't know Germany; to them, Germany represents something strange and sinister which they therefore oppose.

Colin Ross then talked about Roosevelt whom he believes to be an enemy of the Führer for reasons of pure personal jealousy and also on account of his personal lust for power. His [Roosevelt's] principal objective is to be re-elected and he employs every possible means for this purpose. After his re-election he would undoubtedly have at his disposal so much power in his country that he then would be able to lead the American people into war, whenever he wanted. He had come to power the same year as the Führer and he had to watch the latter carrying out his great plans, while he, Roosevelt, hemmed in by a tremendous domestic resistance, had not reached his goal. He too had ideas of dictatorship which in some respects were very similar to National Socialist ideas. Yet precisely this realization, namely, that the Führer had attained his goal, while he had not, gave to his pathological ambition the desire to act upon the stage of world history as the Führer's rival.

Colin Ross then attempted to present some ideas in order to familiarize the Führer with those elements in the life of the United States which are good and strong and akin to us. The German share in the life and work of America, as well as the proportion of German blood, is very considerable and can't be disputed away. He then told something about his lectures and characterized them as successful with regard to their effect. He furthermore discussed anti-Semitism which is very strong in America and which is a matter of course in certain circles; again, however, it is balanced by the American's indifference referred to previously.

To exercise influence upon these matters from Germany is hardly possible. To see that as many Jewish emigrants as was possible should get to America was really the best method since opposition against undisputed Jewish domination of the sphere of culture and communications as well as of business was bound to arise sometime or other. In this connection, he spoke of the necessity of coming out with a positive solution of the Jewish question. The moment Germany would promote a constructive solution of this question, as for instance, by assigning a large area for settlement by Jews, anti-Semitism in America would awaken from its dormant stage and the Americans who in their hearts want to get rid of the Jews would support wholeheartedly this attempt to solve the Jewish question. The Führer showed great understanding for this argument, but said the Jewish question really was a space question which was difficult to solve, particularly for him, since he himself had no space at his disposal. Neither would the establishment of a Jewish state around Lublin ever constitute a solution as even there the Jews lived too close together to be able to attain a somewhat satisfactory standard of living. Wherever more than 70 people per one square kilometer were

living together life was difficult and hemmed in, and the world crisis which we were facing today was caused by the urge of nations to pour out of over-populated spaces and into those of sparse population. Since the beginnings of history, those migrations of peoples have been accompanied by great ruthlessness and cruelty which could not be helped. He, too, would welcome a positive solution of the Jewish question, if only he could indicate a solution; this, however, was not possible under present conditions when he had not even sufficient space for his own people.

In conclusion, Colin Ross stated that after long study he had reached the following conclusion. If Germany succeeded in convincing the Americans that it was in accordance with our German and National Socialist principles that the Western Hemisphere belonged to the Americans (since in the contemporary world large spaces were being formed on the basis of geopolitics such as, for example, the Soviet Union as ruler over the western Asiatic space, the union of Chinese and Mongols in East Asia under Japanese leadership, and the union of central Europe under German leadership), then the Americans could develop very much understanding for our struggle since they would, after all, derive a clear profit from it. He had worked out a map on which he had marked in, from north to south, the English spheres of influence against the United States. If an American should see this map and should, moreover, hear that in Germany's view the Western Hemisphere should belong to the Americans, America automatically would take a position directed against England. It was his great desire to be active and to work in this direction and he was waiting for an instruction by the Führer in order to continue his work in this special field of his.

Colin Ross also told of the difficulties he had had in America, of the interpellation made in the House of Representatives and of the sentence passed against him by the Dies Committee at a time when he had already left America. He told the Führer that he was now forced to take up the fight against this, which was also in the interest of the many German friends over there who had suffered defamation at the hands of the same elements in America. He requested the support of the Foreign Ministry in this matter.

The Führer instructed me to tell the Foreign Minister to take steps so that Herr Colin Ross may receive every possible assistance from the Foreign Ministry.

The Führer invited Herr Colin Ross to lunch for Thursday. After Herr Colin Ross had taken his leave, the Führer remarked that Colin Ross was a very intelligent man who certainly had many good ideas.

HEWEL

No. 672

B19/B003562-63

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 120 of March 13, 1940

HELSINKI, March 13, 1940 - 8:10 p. m.

Received March 14—3:30 a. m.

With reference to telegram No. 117 of March 13.¹

The sudden peace [*Blitzfriede*] concluded in Moscow will have far-reaching consequences for Northern Europe:²

1) Russia will in future dominate the Gulf of Finland and the central portion of the Baltic Sea, and has definitely improved her strategic position on land vis-à-vis Finland by taking possession of the Karelian Isthmus, the gateway to Southern Finland, with wide (two groups garbled) and acquiring access to Northern Finland through the Kandalaksha-Kemijärvi railroad.

2) Russia has strengthened her position vis-à-vis Sweden by the annexation of Hangö, which is like a pistol aiming at Stockholm, as well as through the future direct railroad connection between Russian Karelia and Kiruna, which will bring the Swedish ore mines within easy reach at any time.

3) The Scandinavian countries have shown themselves too weak to help Finland in her fight against a great power. In Finnish eyes, orientation toward Scandinavia has thus failed the test of fire.

4) The neutrality of the Scandinavian countries has proved itself, inasmuch as the Western Powers did not dare to violate it by marching through them.

5) The League of Nations has again produced only paper decisions and suffered a defeat in Finland.

6) The Western Powers did not get beyond attempts at military intervention and could not have given decisive help to the Finnish Army. Confidence in the Western Powers, especially England, is shaken.

7) Germany has caused deep disappointment in Finland and incurred hatred in many circles, because of her attitude in the Russo-Finnish conflict, and her press and radio. Political realists, however, are becoming aware that actually only two great powers, Germany and Russia, have any influence in the Baltic region and that a correct orientation toward both is of vital importance to the Finnish nation.

¹ Not printed (B19/B003561).

² A translation from the Russian text of the treaty signed on Mar. 12, 1940, between the USSR and Finland is printed in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 421-424. A translation from the Finnish text is in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents*, pp. 35-38.

8) Since it is not to be expected that the Finns will resign themselves definitely to the new boundary, and since it is uncertain whether the Russians regard the peace as an interim phase or temporary measure, further tension in the Baltic region must be anticipated. But spread of the Great Powers' War into that region has been prevented.

BLÜCHER

No. 673

8051/601196-200

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, March 13, 1940.

e. o. W VIII a 494.

MR. SUMNER WELLES' MEMORANDUM¹

The memorandum contains *only* the already tiresomely familiar general principles of Hull's trade policy and no new constructive ideas. These principles are as follows:

1. An intelligently regulated trade between nations is the indispensable basis not only of economic prosperity but also of international peace.

2. Satisfactory trade between nations presupposes, on the one hand, adequate access for every country to the raw materials of the world, and, on the other, the possibility of exporting the surplus of domestic production at profitable prices and on equal terms for all.

3. Foreign trade is by its nature multilateral, not bilateral. Discriminations, excessive tariffs, quotas, and foreign exchange controls are trade restrictions that are harmful to trade itself and to the living standard and economic well-being of peoples, result in enmity and conflicts, and jeopardize peace among the nations.

4. The reconstruction of a sensible system of trade requires the gradual elimination of these barriers, guarantees against discrimination, the general application of the most-favored-nation principle, and a reform of the monetary and credit systems with a view to restoring the multilateral functioning of trade.

The prospects for the future position of the United States in international trade have deteriorated considerably since the time when these principles, which Hull has restated in countless variations, were discussed with the German Government.²

¹ This is the memorandum handed to Göring by Welles on Mar. 3 (see document No. 653), and to Weizsäcker by Kirk on Mar. 5 (see document No. 643, footnote 1). The text was released to the press on May 3 by the Department of State with the statement that it had appeared in excerpts and variously translated texts in the European press. It is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 461, and is identical with the text found in the German files (B21/B005421-22).

² For earlier German-American exchanges concerning trade relations, see vol. I, documents Nos. 458 and 460; vol. IV, documents Nos. 503 and 511.

1. The efforts to establish a self-sufficient and totalitarian economy will, as a result of the war, receive added impetus in many countries, to the disadvantage of the United States. Simultaneously, progress will be made in "Ersatz" products.

2. In addition to Germany, another large part of the world including England and France has gone over to foreign exchange controls and a controlled economy as a result of the war. There is reason to assume that even those countries, whose experiences with a controlled economy have not yet been as favorable as ours, will have to retain it for a time even after the war. A return to an economy free of foreign exchange controls probably would presuppose that the United States relinquish its gold in some way or other and place a considerable portion of it at the disposal of other countries. It is conceivable that certain countries do not even desire a return to the gold standard.

3. Closed trade areas in which American trade will lose ground stand out more clearly than heretofore: the British Empire with its sterling bloc satellites (such as Argentina and Uruguay); the Far Eastern yen bloc; Germany and the countries with whom she has clearing arrangements, and finally Germany/Russia. Europe as a whole, hitherto the best customer of the United States, will lose its importance as a purchaser with no other countries taking its place. The United States' strenuous efforts to secure the Latin American market—efforts which were resumed at the outbreak of the present war—are circumscribed by the fact that the United States cannot absorb enough goods from those countries. Complaints to that effect were already heard at the Foreign Trade Convention held in New York in December. Firms which had eagerly plunged into the South American market have already withdrawn again. Credit terms, far from becoming easier, have even become more stringent.

Nor has the present war, in contrast with the World War, brought about any increased purchases by England in the United States. On the contrary, England, for financial reasons, has had to restrict in favor of the Empire her purchases of goods which the United States would like to sell. The Anglo-American commercial treaty has for that reason already lost some of its importance. Any considerable decrease in the foreign trade of the United States would be doubly felt in view of the continued difficulties of the domestic economy.

4. The United States is increasingly concerned about its gold holdings; in 1937 they amounted to "only" 50 percent and at the end of 1939 to more than 75 percent of the world gold reserve (17.7 billion dollars). The increase during 1939 amounted to 3.1 billion dollars.

This can be accounted for chiefly—aside from the flight of capital to the United States—by the fact that a large part of the American export surplus had to be paid for in gold: a development which according to Hull's theory of trade is most unsound and undesirable.

American financiers are already resigned to characterizing as insoluble the gold problem with its attendant danger of uncontrollable credit expansion and devaluation of the gold. A reduction of tariffs, if it could be put through at all, would conjure up problems of another kind. A return of the hoarded gold to normal circulation would not improve the position; nor, in all likelihood, would a tax on gold imports. There are at present very few incentives and opportunities for investing American capital in foreign loans. Reducing the price of gold, in itself an effective solution, would be costly, resulting in losses for the Treasury, confusion in the rates of exchange, and impairment of the export trade.

In a speech before the students of Yale University on January 31, 1940, regarding the contribution to be made by the United States in the reconstruction of European economic life, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr. made the following significant statements:³

" . . . we shall be sending goods which we produce in abundance to places where they are needed. We may, and no doubt will, hope that we shall be paid for them sometime; but we will know that, paid or not, human suffering must be relieved. We shall find that the trade by which the world lives has to be reestablished; and if there is no working capital to start it moving again, we shall find ourselves helping to set up a considerable part of the world in business again. . . .

"It seems fantastic today to suggest, for instance, handing over some of our accumulated gold as a free gift to reestablish international currency, to let other nations set their houses in order, and thereby reestablish trade and normal life. But this may not seem nearly so fantastic a few years hence. It seems impossible today to think of using the enormous and yet untapped resources of the Federal Reserve system as a means of rebuilding the shattered life of another continent; but when the time actually comes and we are faced with that contingency, we may find that the idea looks more like an immediate necessity than a fairy tale. . . ."

DAVIDSEN

³The quoted passages which follow are not retranslated from the German but are taken from the original English text of the Berle speech as published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 139-142.

No. 674

265/172206-07

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, March 14, 1940—9:30 p. m.

No. 159 of March 14

Received March 15—4:45 a. m.

In a detailed discussion with the Foreign Minister I stated that in view of the changes in the general situation due to conclusion of the peace¹ it was imperative for Turkey to re-examine her relations with the Reich. For months we had made every effort to improve the political atmosphere, too, by concluding an economic agreement. But under his direction all of the negotiations were being drawn out to an intolerable degree, and so I would have to have recourse to the intervention of the President in order to determine whether Turkey did not have every reason precisely at this time to improve her position with Russia and ourselves if she seriously desired to resist the increasing pressure from the Western Powers.

The intention of the Western Powers to intervene in the Finnish conflict had removed the last doubt that if necessary the Allies would also ruthlessly disregard Turkish interests.

Saracoglu had told me repeatedly that Turkey would deliver chromium only in return for completion of our deliveries of heavy war material. I would ask my Government whether it was not willing to do something in this direction if in return it could receive a formal statement from the Turkish Government to the effect that the latter would defend its neutrality even with force of arms, against the Entente, should the latter attempt to draw it into a conflict against its will.

Saracoglu, very decidedly disturbed by the proposed audience with the President, assured me immediately that the guarantee questions would be discussed at once and that the trade agreement would be settled in principle by the end of this week. As far as the suggested statement was concerned, he could assure me that Turkey would never permit herself to be drawn into a conflict unless her interests were affected in terms of her commitments. Nor was there any secret agreement, as that would be incompatible with the constitution. He therefore saw no difficulty in making such a statement to us, in so far as it would be morally compatible with the friendly relations with the Western Powers.

Since the Minister's position is very insecure today as a result of the development of the situation, he would probably be glad to do everything to improve relations with Russia, in particular. Accord-

¹ See document No. 672.

ingly this would be the moment to place him face to face with definite decisions which, if he should not wish to take them because of his personal ties with the Entente, might perhaps lead to his resignation. On that account I would suggest that I be authorized to pursue the matter, so that he would be compelled to put it before İnönü. In return we might consider delivery of several heavy batteries.

To be sure, Saracoglu denies that pressure by the Western Powers is increasing and that the visit by the air force generals² has any other significance than a departmental conference. But we have every reason to believe that the first point is not true.

PAPEN

² Col. Rohde, the military and air attaché, in a telegram sent Mar. 9 (265/172202), had reported the arrival in Ankara of Gen. Jaunand, French Air Force Chief in Syria, and of Gen. [Air Marshal Sir William] Mitchell, in charge of British air forces in the Near East.

No. 675

103/112073 76

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 476

BERLIN, March 14, 1940.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on M. Molotov and inform him about my trip to Rome, as he requested.¹ I would ask you to tell him approximately the following:

1. I had already informed Ambassador Shkvartsev in a general way on Wednesday evening regarding the purpose and nature of my visit,² but I also wish to inform M. Molotov through you.

¹ On Mar. 11, Schulenburg had sent to the Foreign Ministry the following telegram: "Today Molotov asked me to inform him as soon as possible about the Foreign Minister's trip to Rome." (103/112072)

² An unsigned memorandum of this conversation of Mar. 13 (F13/438-444) gives substantially the same account as paragraphs 2 to 7 of the telegram printed here. In addition it contains the following:

"The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador whether he knew Helphand, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Rome.

"The Ambassador replied that he did not know him personally.

"The Foreign Minister then asked whether the Ambassador knew Gorelkin, the new Soviet Ambassador to Rome, who had returned to Moscow before presenting his credentials.

"The Ambassador in return asked in what connection the Foreign Minister asked his question.

"The Foreign Minister replied that he did not insist on an answer to his question as he was still awaiting some related reports and after a time would speak to the Ambassador about it. The Foreign Minister then emphasized that he would like very much to assist in improving Italo-Russian relations.

"The Ambassador replied that he understood the Foreign Minister very clearly, but that even so he would like to return to his question, i. e., his counterquestion about the connection of the inquiry about Helphand.

2. In view of the close and friendly relations existing between Germany and Italy, it was natural that the statesmen of both countries should from time to time discuss the situation and current problems resulting therefrom. That was the occasion for this meeting also.

3. The result of my conversations with Mussolini and Count Ciano could be briefly summarized by saying that the National Socialist and Fascist Governments were in complete agreement regarding the fact that the Western plutocracies wanted to destroy Germany and Italy, but that the two authoritarian states were firmly determined to combat this will to annihilate. While Germany was now actively waging war, Italy was assisting her with all the resources at her disposal that could be used at present. This kind of cooperation cor-

"The Foreign Minister replied that he did not wish to speak about this at the moment, but that he had not understood why Ambassador Gorelkin had been recalled so quickly, and that in the interests of good Italo-Russian relations he had regretted the recall. But he wished to talk to the Ambassador about this at some later time, for at present, when he had no clear view of the basis for the worsening of relations, it would be unsuitable to discuss it. The Duce desired improved relations and regretted that there was no ambassador in Rome, as he could act differently from a *chargé d'affaires*. The Foreign Minister then said he would also, through Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, inform MM. Stalin and Molotov of the Duce's wishes. The Duce clearly wanted better relations, and surely Russia too would have no fundamental objection. He, the Foreign Minister, would gladly assist in the question of reestablishing relations, if there was anything to be done.

"The Ambassador then returned to the question of Helphand; he believed that he understood it quite clearly.

"The Foreign Minister declared that he would take no position on it at the present moment, but only say it was regrettable that the two States could negotiate in Rome and Moscow not through fully accredited ambassadors but only through *chargés d'affaires*, who did not have the opportunities that were open to ambassadors. Within a reasonable period he would speak to M. Shkvtartsev about it. He hoped it would be possible to clear away the disagreements. The Duce had been the first to recognize the Soviet State. There were no substantial differences between Italy and Russia, but on the contrary, the two States were economically complementary and there were not even any political differences. Germany would be sorry if passing annoyance over an incident could prevent reestablishment of friendly relations.

"The Ambassador declared he had clearly understood all this and would report to his Government about it. To the Foreign Minister's question about Gorelkin, the Ambassador to Rome, he could say that the latter had visited him twice in Berlin, en route to and from Rome.

"To the Foreign Minister's question, whether the occasion for Gorelkin's recall had been the demonstration in Rome for Finland, the Ambassador replied that he could not formulate the answer and would have to obtain clarification by asking Molotov. He could, however, sum up by pointing out that two great questions were involved, the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with Italy and with Japan."

The files also contain an undated draft (F18/223 221) of a "private and confidential" letter by Ribbentrop for Schulenburg regarding Helphand, written as a supplement to the telegram printed. This letter was evidently not sent, for a message to the same effect was included in a telegram of Mar. 21 by Ribbentrop for Schulenburg (see vol. ix).

responded in every respect with the agreements existing between the two countries.

4. A particular point in the discussions had been the question of the Italian coal supply, which, as was known, had entered a new stage as a result of Britain's interference with shipments of German coal by sea. In an agreement with Italy,³ the sea route had now been replaced by the land route.

5. I had also once more explained to the Duce the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union, stating, in fact, that this relationship was fortunately growing closer and closer and that a definitive and firm basis had been created for this both through the political arrangements of last year and the trade agreement of this year.⁴ Mussolini had agreed with these statements of mine in every respect.

6. In this connection I had expressed my regret over the fact that relations between Italy and the Soviet Union had not recently undergone a similar favorable development. Germany regretted this the more since Mussolini on his own initiative, even before our recent arrangements with the Soviet Government, had espoused the view that it would be well to improve relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. I was unable also to detect any real conflict at all between the interests of the two countries that could stand in the way of a restoration of good relations. Mussolini had stated at the time that he would be very happy if Italo-Soviet relations improved again. He had pointed out that Italy had at the time been the first of the former Allied Powers to recognize the Soviet Government, and had stated further that, in accordance with his basic attitude, he had already given instructions that certain economic questions pending between Rome and Moscow should be handled in as positive a sense as possible. At the same time, to be sure, Mussolini had mentioned that it had been the Soviet Government which had unexpectedly recalled its Ambassador from Rome. But from everything the Duce had told me on this subject I had no doubt that Italy was anxious for a restoration of good relations with the Soviet Union and that she was prepared to do her share.

7. I had finally explained our viewpoint on the Finnish question once more to the Italian statesmen in the manner familiar to the Soviet Government, at the same time stressing especially the fact that our attitude on this question had been determined exclusively by German-Soviet friendship.

³ See document No. 689, footnote 12.

⁴ See document No. 607.

8. Regarding my visit to the Pope,⁵ it might be said that this was purely and simply an act of courtesy on which we had resolved after the Curia had at various times expressed to us a desire for greater harmony in our relations. The conversation had not exceeded the bounds of general discussion of the relations between National Socialism and the Catholic Church. I had said in this connection that in principle we considered a settlement and clarification of the relations between Germany and the Curia possible, provided the Catholic Church, in contrast to the present conduct of its clergy in Germany, refrained from every form of political activity. Initiation and preparation of a basic understanding would require considerable time, however, and in the given situation would have to be postponed until later. At the same time I had also taken the opportunity to explain to the Pope our new relations with the Soviet Union. I had left no doubt in the Pope's mind that it was a question of a final reorganization of our relations on a firm basis, and that we hoped to consolidate these relations further. Moreover, both parties were fully agreed that neither would interfere in the internal affairs of the other.

For your information and guidance in your conversations, I am adding the following:

We are, of course, interested in an improvement of Italo-Russian relations. I would therefore ask you to emphasize especially the foregoing statements on this point in my Rome conversations, and at the same time ascertain whether and to what extent a desire of this kind is entertained on the Soviet side also.

A telegraphic report is requested.⁶

The Foreign Minister

⁵ See document No. 668.

⁶ Document No. 684.

No. 676

7883/EE70836

*The International Committee of the Red Cross to the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*

Central Agency for Prisoners of War.

GP 94

GENEVA, March 14, 1940.

For the Casualties and Prisoners of War Branch.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is receiving from various sources, including the Italian Red Cross in Rome, a report to the effect that the camp for Polish prisoners of war at Kozielsk (Smolensk district, USSR) is to be broken up. It is said that the prisoners will be brought to Germany.

No Russian report about this is available at present, and the International Committee of the Red Cross would be grateful if you would kindly state whether the above report corresponds to the facts.¹

Yours, etc.²

¹ This communication was sent to the Foreign Ministry from the OKW on Mar. 26 (7883/E570835/1), and on Apr. 1 a further communication, a telegram of Mar. 28 from the International Red Cross, was similarly transmitted from the OKW (7883/E570837). This telegram stated: "Request information by telegraph concerning Polish prisoner of war camps in Russia—Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostashkov, Shepetovka, and others—whether exchanged to Germany or still existing. We have many letters to transmit." The OKW requested an answer from the Foreign Ministry to both inquiries.

On Apr. 6, the Foreign Ministry sent telegraphic instructions to the Consulate in Geneva to inform the International Red Cross that, so far as was known in Berlin, "the Soviet prisoner of war camps in Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostashkov, Shepetovka, and others still exist." (7883/E570838)

² Signature illegible.

No. 677

8783/E041769 71

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, March 15, 1940.

Representative Babarin today told me the following:

1. Almost 4 weeks have elapsed since the conclusion of the Agreement, but in the armaments field only a few small firms have thus far replied to the inquiries of the Trade Mission. Only a single major item, i.e., five Messerschmitt aircraft, have reached the actual negotiation stage. He requested that some pressure be put on the firms concerned to get them to reply to the offers and be prompt in closing contracts. In this connection he referred to article 6 of the Economic Agreement.¹

I told M. Babarin that I could not take any action upon complaints of a general nature; he should send me a list of the firms in question by Saturday morning. He replied that it would be a very long list if he were to name all the firms concerned, and that he would cite only the principal firms.

2. In the industrial field the chief difficulties were with regard to ships and coal. Negotiations had now been in progress for 5 months regarding the ships, and for 2 months regarding the coal. The pace of the negotiations made a far from favorable impression in Moscow. When he called on the Ministry of Economics, he was told there that action would be taken with respect to the coal firms. And when he conferred with the coal syndicate, he was told that the decision lay with the Ministry of Economics. He would ask us in

¹ Document No. 607.

particular that the coal negotiations be expedited. The Soviet Government had resumed delivery of petroleum products, but it was getting no steel tubes. Thus far not a single ton of coal had been delivered. Moscow wanted to know in particular when the first phosphate ship bound for the Kola Peninsula would bring coal. At the I. G. [Farben] he had been told that the first ship which was to load phosphate had left, but without coal, the reason being that they wanted the ship to sail as quickly as possible and that on that account there had been no time to send it to Rotterdam.

Regarding the question of the ships, I pointed out to Babarin that the Soviet Government itself had repeatedly changed its mind about deliveries, so that the negotiations always had to be started over again. With regard to the coal I pointed out to him that no wishes for large coal shipments had been expressed until the final stage of the negotiations. The first price demands had been made in ignorance of the general price basis. Meanwhile the prices asked by Germany had been reduced. Apart from this, however, I had to call his attention to the interrelation between the petroleum prices demanded by the Soviet and the coal prices demanded by us. If the Soviet Government took no account of our basic schedule when setting the prices for petroleum, neither would we be able to do this for coal. I took the occasion to inform M. Babarin that Rumanian petroleum prices had meanwhile been reduced to one-third of the former rates. If the Soviet Government accepted the former prices as decisive at that time, the present prices would have to be decisive for the new prices now. Babarin tried to extricate himself by saying that he was in a difficult position. The negotiations relative to petroleum were conducted in Moscow, those on coal, here. Regarding petroleum we would have to talk to Moscow. The prices asked by the Soviet Union for petroleum were the same for all countries, namely, the Constanța base rate.

3. With regard to the ships, Babarin gave the following details:

An assurance had been given by the Ministry of Economics with regard to the motor vessel *Memel*, but the North German Lloyd refused to sell the ship. A similar situation existed with regard to the *Palladia* (a sister ship of the *Phönicia*). The ships in both instances were cargo-passenger vessels. The prices asked for them so far were excessive.

Similar difficulties existed with regard to the tanker and the crane ship wanted by the Soviet Union. No offer had as yet been made with regard to the crane ship.

4. Babarin also objected to the excessive prices that had been asked in the negotiations for a buna plant; 85 million reichsmarks were now being asked, not including technical assistance. I told him that I

could not, of course, venture any opinion on this because the price of a plant depended on its capacity. Babarin had no accurate information on this matter, either; he spoke of a capacity of 10,000 tons.

REITER

No. 678

2182/471714-17

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal Göring

BERLIN, March 16, 1940.

DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: In pursuance of our telephone conversation on March 8¹ I have had another detailed report made to me on the progress of the latest discussions with the Rumanian Government concerning the regulation of German-Rumanian economic relations.

Since the promise was obtained from the Rumanian Government in the Agreement of December 21, 1939,² that it would see to it that Germany obtained 130,000 tons of petroleum products a month in any case, at first for a year, the main question at the discussions held at this time was to translate into practice the promise likewise given by the Rumanian Government last December, namely, to deliver the petroleum at "fair prices". This proved to be very difficult, as the Rumanian Government stated at first that it was unable to prevent the entirely disproportionate increase in the petroleum prices. We insisted that the petroleum be made available to us at prewar prices, with at most a small increase; otherwise we would sell a corresponding portion of the German exports which are vital for Rumania with the same large increase in price with which the Rumanian petroleum is now encumbered. On this basis for negotiations an agreement has now been reached according to which petroleum on the one hand and war material on the other will be calculated approximately at prewar prices. So as to guarantee that there is no interruption in deliveries, this agreement has been put into operation first of all for an amount of about 200,000 tons of petroleum, effective from March 1. With this amount the available means of transportation can probably be fully utilized up to about the middle of May. In the meantime a number of other questions, especially with regard to assuring the grain supply, will be dealt with in the new negotiations of the two governmental committees starting on March 18 in Bucharest, and in this connection an agreement will be concluded on the direct exchange of war material for petroleum for an entire year.

¹ No record of this conversation has been found.

² See document No. 502, footnote 2.

Since the petroleum prices in Rumania have risen several hundred percent over the prewar period, the guarantee of the prewar price represents a very considerable gain for the German national economy. Moreover, so far it has always been possible in the negotiations with Rumania to secure as much petroleum as could be removed with the available means of transportation. During the period when the Danube was ice-bound there was still enough available under old contracts for transportation by rail. The arrangement for exchange of petroleum for war material was then reached in time to have sufficient quantities on hand for the greater transportation facilities available after the Danube would be open again. Since there is already fundamental agreement between the German and the Rumanian Governments on a continued exchange of petroleum for war material for the coming year, the supply of petroleum at moderate prices has thereby been assured for a considerable period; especially as the Rumanian Government has given assurance time and again that it will keep its promise to make available up to 130,000 tons of petroleum a month.

The negotiations having proceeded in the manner just described, I believe it must be stated that they turned out entirely satisfactorily and fully safeguard our vital interests in deliveries of petroleum, and that the establishment of the petroleum price on the prewar basis represents another very considerable advance.

The problem of the rate of exchange was of no importance during these negotiations; in particular the fact that in December we requested and obtained at least a partial adjustment of the rate of exchange of the reichsmark did not occasion difficulties of any sort during these negotiations. On the contrary, the gain on the rate of exchange which we obtained benefits us to the full extent precisely when the petroleum prices are established on the prewar basis. I would be particularly grateful to you if you would give an explanation to this effect to the offices which you informed incorrectly in this matter.

A really serious difficulty in assuring our petroleum and grain purchases results from the fact that the value of our increased imports from Rumania, even calculated at prewar prices, is very considerably higher than the value of our exports to Rumania, e. g., in the past year. Since the beginning of the war our negotiators have been trying to bridge this gap with all conceivable means, such as acceptance of advance payments, credit operations, etc. They will try with every possible means to assure our vital imports from Rumania also in the future, without too great additional claims on Germany's productive capacity for purpose of exports.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

VON RIBBENTROP

No. 679

324/194140 44

Memorandum by an Official of the Prussian State Ministry

V. P. 5699/5 g

KARINHALL, March 16, 1940.

CONFERENCE ON SPAIN UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE FIELD
MARSHAL

Present: State Secretary Körner
Under State Secretary von Jagwitz
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat
Herr Bethke
Herr Bernhardt
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Dr. Gritzbach
Ministerialdirigent Marotzke
after 12:45 Minister Dr. Clodius
Ministerialdirigent Nasse

Under State Secretary von Jagwitz gave a brief account of the historical development of Rowak and the subsidiary of the Hisma and Sofindus concern in Spain. Then Under State Secretary von Jagwitz commented on the Protocol and Agreement¹ concluded by Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat, Head of the German Delegation, with the Spanish Government; he regarded it as disadvantageous to Germany in so far as the relative quantities of goods to be traded were scaled to the unfavorable level of German-Spanish trade in 1935, and furthermore because it contained no *binding* and clear-cut arrangements with respect to the volume of trade and the form of the Agreement; on the contrary, owing to the looseness of the Agreement it was left to the discretion of the Spaniards to deliver goods as they saw fit. Moreover, no account had been taken of the wishes of the Reich Ministry of Economics, which were aimed at curtailing deliveries to the enemy powers. The adverse consequences of the loose form of the Agreement had already shown themselves in

1) the failure of the Spaniards to release specific commodities, especially wool, and

2) the conclusion by Spain of a more favorable agreement with France.

Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat replied to this that under the Protocol of December 22, 1939, the present arrangement was intended merely for the duration of the war and was only a transition to the projected comprehensive trade agreement between Germany and

¹ Document No. 482

Spain after the war. Agreements more far-reaching than the present could not be concluded owing to the current conditions of international traffic between Germany and neutral Spain. To extract more was impossible because the war-caused difficulties of delivery and transportation permitted no positive commitments; such commitments, moreover, would also have reacted to Germany's disadvantage since we were likewise unable to make positive promises about deliveries. The Protocol reaffirmed the Secret Agreement concluded in 1937 with the Spanish Nationalist Government; furthermore, the Spanish Government promised to maintain the basic accord of July 1939 together with all obligations arising for the Spanish Government, also in connection with the war debts, until such time as a comprehensive trade agreement is concluded with Germany. Finally, both Governments refer explicitly in the Protocol to the provisions of the Secret Treaty of Friendship under which each contracting party undertakes in the event of warlike involvements with a third power to avoid anything that could redound to the advantage of the enemy or the disadvantage of the other party.

Accordingly, pursuant to the Protocol, all German claims existing prior to the negotiations in the summer of 1939, as well as the results of the negotiations in the summer of 1939, have been assured for the duration of the present war and the period thereafter until conclusion of an economic agreement after the war.

After the end of the present war, negotiations would be entered into with respect to both the volume of trade and the relative proportion of trade in conformity with the schedules of commodities annexed to the Protocol. The commodity schedules represent the wishes of both Spain and Germany. Conclusion of the Agreement was necessary because Spain had previously committed herself to conclude an agreement with Germany first of all. One could not pass up this opportunity. After the end of the civil war it had therefore been necessary last summer to negotiate with the Spaniards. Similarly, we could not have disregarded the Spaniards' wish for negotiations last November. The Spaniards had intended to build up their economy after the civil war in collaboration with Germany, and they adhered to this purpose. If we had not negotiated, it would have given the Spaniards the right to come to terms with other powers. That would have left us the losers. As regards the possibilities of transport during the war, several plans had been elaborated and were now being carried into effect (blockade runners, etc.).

Minister Dr. Clodius confirmed that every possible pressure was being brought to bear also by the Foreign Ministry to obtain the largest possible quantity of commodities from Spain. To the suggestion of the Field Marshal that the Secret Agreements concluded with

Spain during the civil war ought also to be invoked, Minister Dr. Clodius replied that this would be attended to. Pressure would also be exerted to get a Spanish commission to come to Germany now so as to wind up the recognition of debts.

Under State Secretary von Jagwitz thought it was necessary to return the Sofindus concern to Herr Bernhardt's direction as promptly as possible. With his knowledge of Spanish conditions, Bernhardt was to try to get as much as possible out of Spain through the Sofindus organization. The Sofindus concern, by the way, was being run efficiently. The losses suffered by some of the subsidiaries in Spain as a result of bad investments, etc., had been liquidated. An investigation into the efficiency of management of the subsidiaries mentioned had been decided upon by the advisory council of Rowak in which the Reich Finance Minister was also represented.

Ministerialdirigent Nasse stated that according to the latest reports of the trust company the management and accounting of the enterprises in Spain had given no cause for serious complaints. The defects which had become evident in individual companies should be rectified immediately; however, on this point the Reich Finance Minister was also of the opinion that the sound enterprises should be preserved and the unprofitable ones be disposed of as quickly as possible in order to avoid further losses.

Under State Secretary von Jagwitz stressed once more that these questions had already been settled in the advisory council of Rowak, and that he was also in close touch with the Reich Finance Minister in order to assure prompt financial settlement.

In conclusion the Field Marshal gave out the following directives:

1. On the basis of the Agreement concluded by Staatsrat Wohlthat with the Spaniards, with which no fault was to be found, we should get all we can in essential commodities, especially raw materials, e. g., wolfram, tin, mercury, and wool, from Spain. The system for breaking through the blockade must be further developed, as also the possibility of bringing valuable raw materials to Germany by air.

2. The implementation of the commercial policy measures, as decided by the Committee on Commercial Policy, will remain in the hands of the Head of the Delegation, Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat, who will conduct the necessary interdepartmental conferences.

3. The enterprises of the Sofindus concern established in Spain with Reich funds will remain under the supervision of Under State Secretary von Jagwitz in the Economics Ministry under the terms of the powers now vested in him. The enterprises must be examined in order to ascertain whether they can operate profitably in the long run. Under State Secretary von Jagwitz, in cooperation with the advisory council of Rowak-Hisma, especially the Reich Finance Ministry, will accordingly take the necessary steps to liquidate unprofitable enterprises in particular. The enterprises must be operated in accordance

with sound business practices with the object of producing a high rate of profit.

4. Whenever matters which must be dealt with by Staatsrat Wohlthat in implementing the Agreement touch the interests of the Rowak-Hisma-Sofindus concern and where commercial policy interests so require, Staatsrat Wohlthat and Under State Secretary von Jagwitz will adjust in consultation with one another any conflicting views that may arise.

5. Herr Bernhardt will immediately leave for Spain. He will resume direction of the Sofindus concern for the purpose of ensuring the development of this concern in accordance with sound business practices and investigating the profitability of the separate enterprises. He will be subject to the directives of Under State Secretary von Jagwitz in his capacity as chairman of the advisory council of Rowak.

As director of Hisma and the Sofindus concern he must, like any other private businessman, safeguard their economic interests and refrain from any political activity. Representation of Germany's political and commercial interests rests exclusively in the hands of the German Embassy in Madrid.

Bernhardt must keep in close touch with the German Embassy and keep it constantly informed on all basic problems within his field of activity. The German Embassy, by the same token, will extend to Hisma and the Sofindus concern every assistance due it as a firm that is owned by the Reich.

It must be enjoined upon Bernhardt that the German economic positions which have been established in the economic life of Spain and which will be of value also in the future must be maintained and if possible expanded in accordance with the principles of sound business practice.

The special position which the Rowak-Hisma-Sofindus concern has occupied in the past is *not* intended to be permanent. The concern must conduct its business like any other private firm. Herr Bernhardt is charged with putting the enterprises of the Sofindus concern on such a firm basis as to enable them to play a leading part in the Spanish economy of their own accord.

6. Minister Dr. Clodius will direct the issuance of a passport to Herr Bernhardt entitling him to travel to Spain.

MAROTZKE

No. 680

265/172208-09

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

SECRET

No. 140

BERLIN, March 17, 1940.

e. o. Pol. II 531 g.

For the Ambassador personally.

I. What can be put at the disposal of the Embassy in the economic field is not enough to induce Turkey to offer us political concessions

of the kind under consideration in addition to the necessary economic quid pro quo, although it would perhaps suffice for a measure of improvement in the political atmosphere. In particular, it is still impossible to consider the delivery of heavy guns. Delivery of ships, too, is warranted only under special conditions; a separate instruction on this will follow.¹

Furthermore we hardly believe that Turkey is willing to make a formal statement that she would resist if the Western Powers should try to draw her into the conflict against her will.

II. It is also questionable whether we are interested at present in any attempt to dissipate the active distrust of Turkey which continues to exist in Moscow and the distrust of the Soviet Union which exists in Turkey, by actively promoting a direct rapprochement between the two Powers. For the present therefore, the only thing that can be done is to bring about a gradual improvement in German-Turkish relations through economic agreements on a moderate scale, an appropriate press policy, and similar methods.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 681.

No. 681

4531/E144246

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, March 17, 1940.

After the matter had been presented to him on March 16, the Foreign Minister gave his approval for delivery of the three ships to Turkey pursuant to the Führer's directive, provided that Turkey delivered chromium ore in payment of a considerable portion of the equivalent of the ships (that is, not only for the balances still due). It is therefore no longer necessary to approach the Führer again.

I have informed the State Secretary orally.

1. To be submitted to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.
2. To Minister Moraht, with the request that he have corresponding instructions sent to Ankara ¹ with reference to the political telegram of March 16.²

CLODIUS

¹ Telegram No. 155 of Mar. 28 (8493/E597010-11).

² This refers to document No. 680. The change in date is explained in a marginal note on another copy (2121/462373-74) of document No. 674.

No. 682

4083/E067401-04

*The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram ¹

No. 362 of March 17

OSLO, March 17, 1940.

Received March 19—8:00 p. m.

Pol. VI 737.

1) The radio address of Foreign Minister Koht and the speech of Finnish Minister President Ryti before Parliament ² are regarded here as the severest rebuke the small neutral countries ever administered to the Western Powers, particularly England. It is stressed that both statesmen said that the Western Powers, which in the first 3 months of the Russo-Finnish conflict did practically nothing to aid Finland, only started conversations—which were conditional in form and concerned inadequate assistance to boot—at a time when help would in any case have been too late to count for much. According to the statements made by Koht and Ryti, the view prevails here generally that the tactics of the Western Powers in the last 2 weeks before the conclusion of peace amounted to an avoidance of open military intervention in behalf of Finland, at the same time as the press of the two countries, particularly that of France, was loudly proclaiming the readiness of the Western Powers to intervene, and the attempt was also being made to conceal by certain preparations the lack of a will to intervene.

2) The opinion always held by Foreign Minister Koht, which I reported several times, is thereby confirmed; namely, that the Western Powers, and especially England, hardly honestly desired open military intervention in behalf of Finland; mainly because they did not want to get involved in a war with Russia, they avoided an open violation of Sweden's and Norway's neutrality, and regarded landing, transit, and assistance operations as difficult and problematical. It was the desire of the Western Powers until the very last, as Koht indicated, to get Sweden and Norway to intervene in the fight and thus cut off Germany's supplies from both countries.

3) Since the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish conflict, it is no longer assumed here that the question of a landing by England and France in Norway could become acute in the near future. Among other things, the statements of Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 13, to the effect that England had never thought of violating Swedish and Norwegian neutrality, are being cited in support of this view.

¹ Actually sent as a letter.

² Excerpts from these speeches of March 14 and 15, respectively, appear in the *Times* (London), for Mar. 15 and 16.

4) On the other hand, it is recognized here that German ore imports from Sweden and German navigation to Murmansk are still a thorn in the side of the Western Powers, and that the great defeat that England and France suffered as a result of the settlement of the Russo-Finnish conflict, which took place against their will, might be a real factor in causing the Western Powers to close the loophole in the blockade which is represented by our ore transports along the Norwegian coast, and which is of extraordinary importance to Germany. Indications of any kind that the Western Powers are determined to take such measures are as yet lacking, and it is doubted, particularly since the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish conflict, that they will do so. It is pointed out that such measures, even if amounting presumably only to harassment through more or less regular attacks in Norwegian territorial waters from the high seas, represent a clear-cut violation of Norwegian neutrality; this would occasion the greatest hesitation by the Western Powers so long as we ourselves refrain from an open violation of the neutrality of neutral countries. It is pointed out in support of this view that Churchill, and a few days ago Under Secretary of State Butler, both stated in the House of Commons² that England was very much interested in the question of German ore shipments via Narvik, but the study of how to reduce these shipments raised such difficult problems that as yet it had been impossible to do anything in the matter.

5) It may be assumed that Norway will energetically oppose any attempt of the Western Powers to violate her territorial waters or her territory. She is also counting in this case on the moral support of the entire neutral world, including America, and Norway accords all the more importance to this since she, for her part, could probably employ only diplomatic means. Norway considers her absolute neutrality the best defense against attacks by the Great Powers, and she seems determined to preserve it.

BRÄUER

² On Mar. 6 and 13, respectively.

No. 683

B21/B005434- 39

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

No. 377 of March 18

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1940—11:10 a. m.

Received March 19—1:40 p. m.

1. The Duke of Coburg's visit got off to an excellent start, both on his arrival in San Francisco and during the 3 days he spent there.¹

¹ See document No. 510 for the background on the visit of the President of the German Red Cross to the United States.

The San Francisco press carried long friendly articles with the Duke's picture, emphasizing his statement concerning Germany's secure position and confidence in victory. At the steamer's arrival the mayor, the chief of police, and the Red Cross were represented; thereafter the mayor paid the Duke an official visit. The chairman of the San Francisco World Exposition offered the Duke, for the Reich Government, a favorably situated pavilion for the German exhibit free of charge; a separate report² is being made on this.

2. The American Government, Congress, and the American Red Cross maintained cool reserve with reference to the Duke's visit and tried to sabotage it. Nevertheless, it was possible to make the Duke's visit to the Nation's capital a considerable success considering the pro-Allied attitude of wide circles here. The Duke arrived in Washington on March 14. The visit with President Roosevelt, scheduled for the morning of March 15, was canceled because the President was indisposed. In the afternoon a luncheon was held with many influential American newspapermen. In the evening I arranged a banquet with 100 prominent personalities of the Red Cross, the Government, Army, Navy, and the Diplomatic Corps, as well as a reception the next day, which was attended by almost 1000 persons. Consequently, the President of the American Red Cross, Norman Davis, could not avoid giving at least a very small dinner in his own home. On the 17th the Swedish Minister gave a small luncheon, and in the afternoon there were big memorial exercises at the Embassy for the war dead and a reception for the German colony. Shortly before the Duke's departure for New York, President Roosevelt, probably partly as a result of influence exerted by persons confidentially in touch with the Embassy, and also owing to the favorable impression left by the dignified reception accorded Sumner Welles in Berlin, decided to receive the Duke although he was still indisposed. During the visit, which lasted almost half an hour, President Roosevelt and the Duke conversed in a friendly and animated manner about the Duke's trip. Roosevelt showed special interest for the work of the Red Cross and health conditions in the occupied Polish territories. No current political subjects were touched upon. The Washington press reported extensively and objectively on the Duke's entire stay.

In summary it may be said that Roosevelt's parting words: "I am sure that your trip will do a lot of good,"³ accurately characterize the Washington visit. This success is essentially due to the Duke's personality and the humanitarian character of his mission which offered our enemies little chance for attack. The success of the Duke's

² Not found.

³ The quoted passage is in English in the original.

visit to the Nation's capital will contribute toward assuring the success of the further course of the trip as well. In all probability it will be possible to prevent the planned Polish and Czech demonstration of protest.

A written report will follow.⁴

THOMSEN

⁴Not found

No. 684

4459/E086969

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, March 18, 1940—4:30 p. m.

No. 530 of March 18

Received March 18—5:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 476 of March 14.¹

Your instructions have been carried out. Molotov asked me to express his especial thanks to the Foreign Minister for the extraordinarily interesting information which was important for the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government was, of course, keenly interested in being informed regarding the relations between two such large centers of power as Germany and Italy. Molotov then explained that the Soviet Government was not at all to blame for the deterioration in relations with Italy. He commented quite bitterly on the attitude of the Italian Government and the Italian press toward the Soviet Union and closed with the following statement: The Soviet Government was glad that Italy showed understanding for Germany's political attitude and gave Germany her support. Mussolini's words regarding his readiness to work for an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union were encouraging, to be sure, but concrete proof was as yet lacking that Italy was seriously determined to alter her relations with the Soviet Union; consequently the Soviet Government was for the present adopting an attitude of waiting.

Despite the indifference displayed, I have the impression that the Soviet Government will gladly avail itself of any opportunity which may arise to normalize its relations with Italy.²

SCHULENBURG

¹Document No. 675.

²Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Mackensen." Ribbentrop presumably saw Schulenburg's telegram after his return from the Hitler-Mussolini conversations at the Brenner, Mar. 18 (see vol. ix), and ordered that the final paragraph be called to Mackensen's attention. For Mackensen's telegram of Apr. 1 (582/241990-91) on a conversation with Ciano about Italo-Soviet relations, see vol. ix.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

888/281543 54

Under State Secretary Hencke to Helmuth Laux

JANUARY 28, 1941.

DEAR HERR LAUX: I enclose the wretched article. I have tried to meet your wishes, but I don't know if I have succeeded. As a rule I am more inclined to a sober style. Anyhow you will change what doesn't suit you. I am of course ready at any time to take on any further corrections myself. How about the promised pictures?

With cordial greetings and Hell Hitler,

Yours, etc.

HENCKE

[Enclosure]

The Polish State had ceased to exist. Through the decisive German victory and the breaking away of its Ukrainian and White Russian elements this unlucky creature of Versailles had suffered dissolution. In the circumstances it was only natural that the Governments of the two Great Powers on whom had devolved on historic, political, and geographic grounds—responsibility for order in the East wished to concert directly on the political line to be followed. This purpose was served by the second trip of the Foreign Minister to Moscow, which began on September 27, 1939, and was successfully completed only 2 days later.

On September 26, 1939, our Ministerial special train was en route from the Führer Headquarters to Berlin. The immediate staff was well aware that for several days plans had been pending for a trip by the Foreign Minister to Moscow, but beyond this we knew nothing. Just a few hours before arrival in Berlin came the final decision that the very next morning Herr von Ribbentrop would fly to Russia. The question, which of us were designated to accompany him, was soon answered by the fact that an official of the Protocol Department went around in the train and collected the passports of those concerned. I was naturally very pleased when he came to me too. The first flight to Moscow, in August, in which I had participated, was still vivid in my memory as a great experience. I looked forward to a second trip to Russia with quite special excitement.

Immediately, right in the train, there began the by no means simple technical preparations for such a trip. I, for example, received from Under State Secretary Gaus, who—just as in August—was again our "Chief of Staff," instructions to take care of gathering and bringing all files, documents, and maps which might be used during the proceedings. Our comrades in Protocol, among many other things, had to take care of the readiness of the two planes, and, as far as possible, also make arrangements for allotting the Foreign Minister's time in Moscow. The telephone and radio traffic, always lively during moves of the Ministerial train, now reached its peak. From all stations conversations with

939

Berlin and Moscow were held. Even today I marvel that during our short stops our telephone officials always managed to make contact with Moscow.

About 8:30 a. m. on September 27, the first War Sacrifice Sunday, the relatively small band of "Russia-fliers" gathered at Tempelhof airport. Shortly before 9:00 arrived the Foreign Minister, who during the night had held a number of political conversations and consequently had only a very brief rest. A few minutes later the Condor plane, *Grenzmark*, which the Führer had again placed at Herr von Ribbentrop's disposal, took off. The other plane with part of the staff had already left 3 hours earlier. Hardly were we in the air before office routine resumed, just as in the Wilhelmstrasse or the special train. The Foreign Minister worked as usual. He spoke with Shkvtsev, the Soviet Ambassador, who flew with us to Moscow, received reports from his colleagues, and had files brought to him. The typewriters of both the stenographers with us ran almost without cease. *Grenzmark*, in short, was a flying Ministerial secretariat. The weather was good, so that none of the passengers suffered an "occupational accident." Just before 11:00 a. m. we landed in Königsberg, where Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig, joined our delegation. In all haste we had a one-course meal with Gauleiter Koch at the Park Hotel. Here we also received the report of the capitulation of Warsaw, which I translated for the Soviet Ambassador. All of us, Germans as well as Russians, saw in this event a lucky omen for the coming negotiations.

Then at 12:15 p. m. we flew on to Moscow, where in the record time of 3½ hours, i. e., at 3:50 German (5:50 Moscow) time, we landed at historic Chodynka airport. There we met a moving sight. Even the hangars were richly decorated with flags of the German Reich and Soviet state banners. Anyone who had lived as I for over 9 years in the Soviet Union as a German foreign representative must be singularly impressed by this spectacle, for until the August visit of the Foreign Minister the swastika flag had probably never been hoisted on a Soviet building. Until then the Russian people had seen the German colors only occasionally on the automobiles of our representatives and on national holidays on our buildings. When the Foreign Minister left the plane, Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg stepped forward first to greet him. Then People's Commissar Potemkin, Chairman Molotov's first deputy in his capacity as Foreign Commissar, welcomed the German guest. With him appeared a group of other high military and civil personages of the Soviet capital for the reception. On the way from the plane to the airport building a guard of honor of the Soviet air force was drawn up. Their leader saluted Herr von Ribbentrop, who paced off the front of the troops and reviewed their march past. In the car provided by the Soviet Government there was waiting for the Foreign Minister the same Russian colonel who had been assigned to him in August and who now again was to serve as an honorary personal aide.

After the able Embassy official Lamla gave all of us newcomers an envelope, which along with a small sum in rubles contained information on transportation, lodging, and the program for the day, the column of cars drove off. In the twilight we went through thickly-peopled streets to the former Austrian Legation. In the same rooms which 15 years earlier had been a club for foreign diplomats and newsmen, and which later was occupied by the Austrian Mission, the headquarters of the Reich Foreign Minister was now reestablished. When we worked here in August we had interesting neighbors. In the next building was quartered the British Mission, which was then vainly seeking to arouse the Soviet Government into war against Germany. This time the building was empty. After the collapse of their effort the British had hastily left Moscow during the last week of August.

After a few busy hours filled with conversations as well as telephone calls to

Berlin the Foreign Minister drove shortly before 10:00 p. m. to the Kremlin for the first conversation with Stalin and Molotov. No matter how often, there is a unique and mysterious attraction to entering the stronghold of Soviet power, with all its bizarre towers and walls. In the dark of evening and in the expectant mood in which we found ourselves, this had an extraordinarily powerful effect. At the gates of the Kremlin a very strict check was made. No car was admitted whose number had not previously been reported to the Kremlin commandant. Our cars, to be sure, were speedily cleared, but even so they had to stop a moment, so that the officer of the guard could assure himself that all was in order.

We stopped before the building occupied by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. At the entrance stood a colonel, who led the Foreign Minister up a small stairway through long passages to Molotov's own outer office. In the simple bare room whose furnishings consisted basically of a large writing table with a number of telephones and a leather sofa, we were received by the two aides of the Chief of the Soviet Government; we already knew them from August. A few moments later the door to Molotov's office opened. Stalin and Molotov went toward Herr von Ribbentrop and greeted him most cordially.

The conversation, in which the only others participating were the German Ambassador and Counselor of Embassy Hilger as interpreter, lasted 3 hours. We others waited in the aides' room in case we should be needed. Since conversation with the aides did not flow readily, we spent the time reading the latest Russian newspapers, drank "Narsan," an excellent Caucasian mineral water, and smoked many strong Russian cigarettes. When our chief took his leave of Stalin and Molotov, about 1:00 a. m., his expression showed that he was satisfied with the outcome of the conversation. We then drove from the Kremlin back to the Ambassador's residence. Here the Foreign Minister dictated his report to the Führer; about 4:00 a. m. I, as one familiar with the place, took it by car to the code room of the Embassy for forwarding.

The forenoon of September 28 was devoted to preparing for further negotiations. The Foreign Minister did not have time to see the sights of Moscow, much as he would have liked to. There was hardly time for a short drive around the city. The second conversation with the Soviet statesmen began at 3:00 p. m. It dealt mainly with deliberations on the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty. That afternoon we came in a rather large body to the Kremlin, for already the technical work could begin. Near Molotov's office two rooms were set aside as our headquarters; the one, normally used by Soviet functionaries as a dining room, served the cartographers; the other, the stenographers. Between these offices and the conference room there was much coming and going. I personally had to supervise entering the new boundary on the maps and frequently had to fetch new instructions from the Foreign Minister or Under State Secretary Gaus or to aid in interpreting. Molotov's aides always watched us with slightly dubious glances whenever we went through the antechamber into the office of their lofty chief. Obviously this did not conform to the strict rules prevailing otherwise in the Kremlin, especially when it was a matter of access to Stalin or Molotov. In this case, however, in the interest of expeditious performance of our work an exception was made.

In Molotov's large, unpretentious, and simply appointed office beside a long green table covered with maps stood the Foreign Minister, Stalin, and Molotov. The course of the new boundary was agreed upon and in this connection it was thoroughly considered how best to harmonize the interests of the two States with those of the local populations. The boundary, at first sketched in great sweeps, was made more and more precise by use of maps, etc., until finally it was settled. During this time, many changes and consultations were of course

necessary. The draftsmen had no easy time keeping their entries current. The greatest care had to be taken here, for later, in actually marking the boundary on the ground, the slightest error—or even too heavy a line—might be important. When at last full agreement was reached, I presented to the Foreign Minister and Stalin the draft map for initialing. Stalin signed his name in large letters and asked jocularly, "Is my signature clear enough for you?" Later, by the way, this map was placed under glass as valuable archival material by the Soviet Government: it forms the principal and inviolable basis for the practical job of setting the boundary.

The negotiations were interrupted by a state banquet which Molotov gave about 7:00 p. m. in the Foreign Minister's honor in the grand palace of the Kremlin. Here, quite unlike Molotov's sober office building where the conferences took place, there were splendid and majestic halls where once the tsars resided and held their receptions when they were in Moscow. At the palace entrance the Russian Chief of Protocol received the Foreign Minister and conducted him through the Congress Salon into a reception room decorated in red and gold. Here Stalin, wearing his well-known litewka, and Molotov, surrounded by Marshal Voroshilov, Commissar for Internal Affairs Beria, and the other highest dignitaries of Soviet officialdom, awaited the Führer's envoy and the other German guests. After the greeting, the door was opened to an oval room where the table was set. Richly decorated with flowers, set with costly porcelain and gilded cutlery, in the bright light of electric candles it presented a thoroughly festive appearance. The Foreign Minister took his place next to Stalin and across from Molotov. An army of waiters dressed in white served a repast that did full honor to the reputation of Russian hospitality. Those of our comrades who were in Moscow for the first time also learned on this occasion what a real Russian "Sakuska" is. Among the many hors d'œuvres they had of course not forgotten the famous Russian caviar. After the official remarks Molotov addressed to each German and Soviet guest a special toast, in accordance with Russian custom. Each time Stalin himself stood at the place of the person addressed, to drink to his health. Along with the Foreign Minister he too naturally drew various toasts. How pleasant and relaxed the atmosphere was during this state dinner is shown by the following utterance of Stalin, which he gave laughingly when Molotov had repeatedly toasted him: "If Molotov really wants to drink, no one objects, but he really shouldn't use me as an excuse." To us old Moscow hands it was clear that by this performance the Soviet Government wished to pay the Foreign Minister signal honor. This was shown not only by the presence of Stalin, who very seldom participates in state banquets honoring foreign guests, but also by the fact that the celebration took place not, as usual, in the Soviet Government's regular building for receptions, but in the Kremlin itself.

Soon after the dinner, work compelled our departure. Stalin and Molotov had to conduct negotiations with a Latvian deputation, and the German delegation had to prepare for the night session. Herr von Ribbentrop accepted a Government invitation for a short visit to the Grand Opera. He had time only to see one act of Tchaikovsky's "Swan Lake" ballet. Even this brief taste was enough to convey to him an impression of the high quality of the famous Russian art of dancing, which finds especially effective expression in the classic works of the greatest Russian composer.

About midnight we again found ourselves in the Kremlin, where the conferences, in which the chief of the Soviet general staff, Shaposhnikov, also now participated, were concluded. In the course of negotiations the Foreign Minister in the presence of the Soviet statesmen held a telephone conversation at Molotov's desk with the Führer, who was then away from Berlin. This

scene made a lasting impression on me. Things had now gone so far that the document could be prepared. One of us stood at each typewriter dictating the texts, while others collated and revised. Finally about 5 a. m. Minister Schnurre, Senior Counselor Kordt, Counselor of Embassy Hilger, and I were able to give our Foreign Minister and M. Molotov the German draft for signature. Stalin observed this ceremony with obvious satisfaction. Simultaneously with the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty there was signed a joint Peace Appeal of the German and Soviet Governments. The third agreement set forth the mutual obligation once more to develop to the maximum economic relations and trade between the two countries.

After the signature Stalin and Molotov withdrew with cordial words of farewell from the Foreign Minister, whose day's work, however, was not yet done. Waiting for him at the German Ambassador's residence were representatives of the local German colony and members of the Embassy, with whom he remained an hour and a half more. The Germans in Moscow were naturally very proud that they could be the first to congratulate him on the successful outcome of the negotiations. This had created for them too a new basis for their work in the Soviet Union.

The forenoon of September 29 was taken up with receptions. The Foreign Minister saw newsmen among others, and had a conversation with the Italian Ambassador. We all met with Count von der Schulenburg and the members of the Embassy once more before our column of cars left about 12:15 p. m. for the airport. Here we again met People's Commissar Potemkin and leading Soviet personages who had come to see us off. About 12:40 the motors of the two German planes began warming up; a few minutes later Moscow could no longer be seen. With us we took an experience of historical importance, a wealth of interesting impressions!

After a short stop at Königsberg *Grenzmark* landed again at Tempelhof airport about 6 p. m., or after hardly 57 hours' absence. The Foreign Minister's second trip to Moscow was over.

Its effects were not long in coming. In a few months the agreed German-Soviet boundary was laid out on the ground by a mixed German-Soviet commission. In consequence of the exchange of notes on economic questions important economic agreements were reached which were of great value to both sides. If so far the German-Soviet declaration of September 29, which expresses a wish for the end of the war, has not had the desired effect, the blame for this attaches not to the treaty partners, but solely to the rulers in England and France, who do not want peace. The French people have already had to pay for this senseless and deluded attitude of their old government by the greatest defeat in their history. For the first time in nearly a thousand years England experiences war in her own country. The blows she must take will be ever harder, and not too distant is the day when England also will bitterly regret not having accepted the Führer's repeated offers of peace and the German-Soviet Peace Appeal.

Appendix II

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹

DECEMBER 1, 1939

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

von Ribbentrop

(a) Secretariat: Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul)
Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. Sonnleithner

(b) Personal Staff: Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Likus
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Freiherr von Welzsdörfer

Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried
Counselor von Kessel
Amtsrat Reifegerste

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION
IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

State Secretary E. W. Rohle

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

W. Keppler

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

Dr. Ritter²

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben

¹ This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of Dec. 1, 1939, filmed as serial 1767, frames 405690-709. A similar table of organization for Dec. 1, 1937, is printed in vol. i; for June 1, 1938, in vol. ii; for Sept. 1939, in vol. iii; and for Feb. 15, 1939, in vol. iv.

² In a circular of Oct. 9, 1939, Ribbentrop notified the other Reich Ministers in Berlin that he had placed Ambassador Ritter in charge of all Foreign Ministry activities relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany, etc. (1780/406615).

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, decorations:

Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg

Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department:	Ministerialdirektor Kriebel
Deputy Director:	Minister Schroeder
Director for Administration:	Minister Dr. Rohde
Director for Budget and Financial Affairs:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager
Special duties:	Minister Schroetter
Pers. H Organization of the foreign service, training for the foreign service, personal data of higher officials, of honorary consuls, experts, etc., information center:	Minister Schroeder
Pers. M Personal data on other officials and employees, organization and efficiency of the working of the Ministry:	Minister Schroeder
Pers. Geh. Administration of special funds:	Regierungsrat Stempel
Pers. Nachwuchs	Minister Freiherr von Klinger
	Senior Counselor Dr. von Etzdorf

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann

Deputy Director: Under State Secretary Habicht *

Dirigent: Minister Prince von Bismarck

Pol. I League of Nations, military questions, armaments, aviation, defense:	Senior Counselor von Kamphoevener
	Counselor Schultz-Sponholz
	Counselor Dr. Freiherr von der Heyden-Rynsch
	Counselor Count von Hohenenthal
	Counselor von Nostitz
Pol. Ia Special duties:	Consul General (unassigned) Dr. von Luckwald

* By a directive of the Foreign Minister of Nov. 21, 1939, Under State Secretary Habicht, in addition to his duties as Deputy Director of the Political Department, was attached to the Foreign Minister personally for special duties and in that capacity was assigned to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. To insure cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda in the field of foreign propaganda in accordance with the Führer's Directive of Sept. 8, 1939 (Document No. 31), the Information Department and the Radio Section of the Cultural Policy Department were placed under Habicht's supervision (1780/406605).

Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunis—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Senior Counselor von Rintelen Counselor Freiherr Marschall von Biberstein
Pol. IIIa	Spain, Portugal:	Counselor Dr. Schwendemann
Pol. IIIb	Vatican:	Counselor Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IV	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary:	Counselor Dr. Heinburg
	Special duties:	Minister Dr. Eisenlohr
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviet Union):	Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):	Senior Counselor Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Senior Counselor Dr. von Hentig
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Counselor Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America: North America (United States with possessions—except Philippines—Canada, Mexico), Central and South America, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic:	Senior Counselor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa (except Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden
Pol. M. C.	Matters connected with German property seized in the United States, German-American Mixed Claims Commission:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad) acting
Pol. Grenz	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers, which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius

Section for liaison with War

Economy Staff:

Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont

Consul General Doehle

W I General section for questions concerning economics and finance. Commercial and forestry attachés; German customs law, technical preparation of commercial treaties:

W II Western and Southern Europe (except Great Britain and Italy): Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories; France, including colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories; Luxembourg, Netherlands, including colonies:

Senior Counselor Sabbath

Counselor Dr. Baron von Maltzan

Switzerland; Portugal, including colonies; Spain, including colonies:

Counselor Schüller

W IIIa Southeast Europe (except Rumania):

Minister Moraht

Protectorate, Slovakia:

Senior Counselor Dr. Hudeczek

Hungary, Yugoslavia:

Counselor Adamovic-Waagstätten

Bulgaria, Greece:

Counselor Dr. Busse

W IIIb Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia and Albania; Rumania:

Counselor Dr. Junker

W IIIc Near and Middle East (Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen):

Counselor Dr. Ripken

W IV Eastern Europe (Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, former Poland):

Minister Dr. Schnurre

W V Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, economic questions affecting the Antarctic); whaling:

Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg

W VI Great Britain, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions of commercial and economic warfare:

Senior Counselor Rüter

W VII East Asia (China and Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories):

Senior Counselor Dr. Voss

W VIIIa	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti; also Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidson
W VIIIb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Pamperrien
W IX	Shipping (including care of crews and passengers of German ships in neutral countries):	Senior Counselor Dr. Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
W XI	Raw materials, defense industry, liaison for control of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bisse
W XII	Transport (except matters relating to deliveries):	Minister Dr. Martius (directly subordinate to the Director of the Department)

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

R I	1. International law, cooperation in conclusion of treaties. Arbitration, Permanent Court of International Justice: 2. Basic questions on laws of war and neutrality; general questions on sea warfare: 3. Legal questions on offenses against the laws of war; liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross:	Counselor Dr. Lohmann (Johann Georg)
R S	Conduct of the war on merchant shipping:	Counselor Dr. Lohmann (Johann Georg)
R II	Diplomatic law, extraterritorial rights. Customs matters affecting German and foreign diplomats. War damage questions:	Counselor Günther
R III	Nationality. Constitutional and administrative law. Ecclesiastical law. Penal law:	Senior Counselor Dr. Siedler

R IV	1. Compulsory military service. Compulsory labor service: 2. Exemption from military service of Foreign Ministry personnel, replacement personnel: 3. Prisoners of war at home and abroad, interned armed forces personnel, enemy aliens in Ger- many, Germans in enemy coun- tries:	Senior Counselor Dr. Sethe
R V	Labor law. International Labor Office. Police: Passport Office: Visa Office:	Senior Counselor Rödiger (Gustav) Counselor Reimke Consul (unassigned) Dr. Bergfeld
R VI	Consular jurisdiction in matters of civil law:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schwagula (acting)
R VIa	Matters connected with inherit- ance:	Counselor Navé
R VII	Austrian legal matters. Austrian state treaties. Legal questions emanating from the Sudetengau:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schwagula
R VIII	Passports, welfare, refugees, pen- sions. Entry and residence per- mits. Extradition:	Senior Counselor Dr. Kranec
R IX	1. Consular law. Consular trea- ties: 2. International finance: 3. Patent and copyright law: 4. Enemy and neutral property in Germany. German property in enemy and neutral countries: 5. Former Czechoslovak represen- tation in the Reich. Adjust- ment of Czechoslovak state treaties to the German treaty system:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schiffner
Special as- sign- ments	Reform of consular law: Settlement of citizenship ques- tions:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Kraske Consul General (retired) Dr. Vassel

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Rühle

Kult. A	Position of German national groups abroad and of minorities in the Reich:	Senior Counselor Dr. Lorenz
Kult. B	Economic questions relating to nationality. Resettlement of Volksdeutsche:	Senior Counselor Grosskopf

Kult. E (Kult. Nf) (Kult. E. Rf. Zv.)	Emigration and repatriation. Settling abroad. Germans in the Soviet Union:	Counselor Dr. Kundt
Kult. Gen.	General cultural policy:	Counselor Dr. Stolzmann
Kult. H	Financial affairs of the department:	Consul Count von Bethuysen-Hue
Kult. K	International relations in the field of the arts:	Counselor Dr. Kolb
Kult. R	Radio questions:	Senior Counselor Rühle
Kult. S	German educational system abroad. Foreign educational systems:	Counselor Dr. Wolf (Gerhard)
Kult. Spr.	Drive for spreading German language abroad:	Consul Aeldert (acting)
Kult. U	University affairs. Exchanges and guest professorships. Scholarships for foreigners in Germany:	Counselor Dr. Schaefer-Rümelin
Kult. V	Treaties and agreements in the cultural field:	Counselor Dr. Pfeleiderer
Kult. W	General scientific relations with foreign countries and foreign learned organizations. Congresses and exhibitions:	Counselor Dr. Roth

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul)

Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

P gen.	Organizational and administrative questions. Personnel:	Counselor Dr. Krümmner
Special duty	Southeastern questions in general:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Kirchholtes
German press		Attaché Lohse
P I	England, Ireland, South Africa, British possessions not assigned elsewhere, Netherlands, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Wissmann
P II	France and possessions: Belgium, Luxembourg:	Attaché Dr. Achenbach Secretary of Legation Dr. Platzer
P III	Spain, Portugal, Vatican, Italy (Albania, Ethiopia, Libya), Switzerland:	Counselor Zeileissen
P IV	Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel
P V	Eastern Europe (Poland, the Soviet Union):	Counselor Dr. Staudacher

P VI	Scandinavia and the Baltic States:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Schlemann
P VII	Near and Middle East (including British India):	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel
P VIII	East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies, Thailand, Philippines:	Prince von Urach
P IXa	United States, Canada:	Dr. Sallet
P IXb	Central and South America, Pan-American affairs:	Consul General (unassigned) Dr. Soehring
P X	Reading of the foreign and domestic press, archives:	Werthmann (acting)
P XI	Oral and written reporting on the press:	Dr. Schacht
P XII	News service, radio transmission	Referent Kleinlein
	German periodicals:	
P XIII	Foreign journalists:	Senior Counselor Dr. Jahncke
P XIV	German colonies:	Dr. Blohm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (INF.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg

Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

Special section	General planning:	Counselor Dr. Rahn
Inf. I	Procurement and evaluation of reports and other material usable for propaganda (German origin):	Counselor Dr. Kastner
Inf. II	Military reporting and propaganda services:	Consul (unassigned) Baron von Tucher
Inf. III	News release and feature article service (foreign press):	Consul Dr. Seelos
Inf. IV	Mass propaganda:	Consul von der Damerau-Dambrowski
Inf. V	Propaganda direction (Supervision of the propaganda activity of internal German agencies):	Völkens
	Liaison office for radio:	Counselor Dr. Schirmer
	Liaison office with Ministry of Propaganda and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop:	Secretary of Legation Büttner

SPECIAL SECTION FOR GERMANY

Information for foreign missions about important internal political events. Policy toward the Jews. Racial policy. Anti-Comintern questions. International police cooperation. Emigré affairs. Flags. National hymns:

Counselor Dr. Schumburg

SPECIAL PARTY SECTION

Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP (excluding the sphere of the AO and liaison with the Security Service and the Gestapo). The Party Rally. Visits abroad by prominent persons in the State and Party. Senior Counselor Luther

Appendix III

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
22	State Secretary: Norway.
33	Under State Secretary: [Files on Visits of Foreign Statesmen.]
34	State Secretary: Soviet Union. Under State Secretary: Soviet Union.*
43	Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Confidential Reports.
51	Under State Secretary: Naval Warfare.
52	State Secretary: Poland.
54	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Non-Diplomatic Personages.
64	State Secretary: Uruguay; Ecuador; United States of Amer- ica; Brazil.*
66	Secret Files of Paul Schmidt.
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
90	Reich Foreign Minister: Palestine.
91	State Secretary: Elre. Under State Secretary: Elre (Veesenmayer).
96	State Secretary: Turkey.
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen's Papers.
103	State Secretary: Russia.
111	State Secretary: Sino-Japanese War.
115	Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Latvia; Luxembourg; Memel; Austria.*
116	Reich Foreign Minister: Africa; Albania; Danzig; Estonia; Croatia.*

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
119	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Yugoslavia; Italy.*
121	State Secretary: Franco-German Relations.
124	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vols. 7-10 (1940-1941).
127	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Germany.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
143	State Secretary: German-American Consular Exchange; Internment of Ships and Arrest of Seamen by Countries of Central and South America; the same by U. S. A., also Reprisals; South America.*
157	Pol. VIII: Political Relations of Japan with Russia.
166	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of Russia with Manchukuo, Sino-Japanese War. Under State Secretary: Military Putsch in Tokyo, February 1936. German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers (Japan-China-Manchukuo).*
169	State Secretary: Rumania.
171	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
173	State Secretary: Netherlands; Netherlands Indies.*
174	State Secretary: Japan.
175	State Secretary: Rumania.
176	State Secretary: Mexico.
183	State Secretary: Switzerland.
191	State Secretary: China.
198	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Japan, vol. 2.
205	State Secretary: Sweden.
215	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Internal Politics of the Soviet Union (Military, Naval, Air); Political Relations between Germany and England (Encirclement Policy); Political Relations of Germany with the Baltic States; Political Relations of Germany with the Balkan States (Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania) and Turkey; Russian Policy (Emigrants); International Political Problems—Bolshevism, Socialism.
217	Reich Foreign Minister: South Africa.
226	Pol. VIII: China—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
230	State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
233	State Secretary: Argentina.
247	State Secretary: Denmark.
259	State Secretary: Anglo-German Relations.
265	State Secretary: Turkey.
276	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Schulenburg's (personal) Political File.
314	Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Personal Data (Germans).
319	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Sweden, vol. 5.
321	State Secretary: Lithuania.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
322	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain, vol. 8.
323	State Secretary: Latvia.
324	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain, vol. 9.
331	Under State Secretary: Protectorate.
352	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Special Files on Relations of Germany with other Countries; War (War with Poland).
361	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations between the Soviet Union and England (English Encirclement Policy, Guarantees, English-French Negotiations for Treaties with the Soviet Union, Turkey, etc.), vol. 2.
366	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Italy.
388	Pol. V: Political Relations of Russia with Germany.
406	State Secretary: Estonia.
407	Under State Secretary: Occurrences involving the Soviet Union and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
419	State Secretary: Foreign Propaganda—Press.
429	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States—Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Åland Question, Finnish Islands.
449	State Secretary: Greece.
452	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 5 (1939).
456	State Secretary: The War 1939, vol. 4. ¹
463	State Secretary: The War 1939, vol. 5.
472	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 6 (1939).
476	State Secretary: The War 1939, vol. 6.
486	State Secretary: The War 1939, vol. 7 [1940].
495	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 7 (1939).
499	German Embassy in Spain: Reports from Spanish Representatives Abroad.
506	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 8 (1939).
525	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 9 (1940).
540	State Secretary: Africa.
582	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, vol. 2.
583	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, vol. 1.
585	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
591	Pol. IV: Resettlement Question, South Tirol.
617	State Secretary: Afghanistan.
644	Political Department: Treaties, Soviet Union, 1939-1941.

¹ Beginning with Oct. 1, 1939, the "Poland" series in the State Secretary's file was renamed "War." Corresponding to each volume in this "War" series was a supplementary volume of a still more secret classification. These volumes, according to notations on the covers of the regular "War" series, were kept in an iron box (*Kassette*). Neither this box nor its contents have been found. It is known, from cross-references in the files, that the *Kassette* contained papers on peace moves not found elsewhere.

*Film Serial
Numbers**Title of File*

- | | |
|------|---|
| 723 | Referat Partei (Inland I): Western Europe, Political Affairs. |
| 800 | Under State Secretary: Poland-Danzig. |
| 838 | Under State Secretary Hencke: Personal, Moscow 1939-1940. |
| 903 | German Legation in Rumania: Secret Papers - Economic, March 1936-August 1942. |
| 987 | German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers. |
| 1044 | German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers. |
| 1085 | Ministerialdirektor Ritter: Belgium. |
| 1132 | Under State Secretary: Documents on the Outbreak of the War. |
| 1137 | Ambassador Ritter: German-Soviet Economic Agreement—War Material and Secret Matters. |
| 1138 | Ambassador Ritter: Moscow Negotiations December 19, 1939-February 1940; Materials on the German-Soviet Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940. |
| 1205 | Pol. I M: War between Germany and England, France, and Poland, vol. 2. |
| 1228 | Political Department: Political Affairs--Russia. |
| 1308 | German Embassy in Spain: [Economic Files]. |
| 1328 | Pol. V: Political Relations between Poland and Rumania. |
| 1369 | Ambassador Ritter: Moscow, vol. 1. |
| 1370 | Ambassador Ritter: Moscow, vol. 2. |
| 1379 | Supplementary to 127. |
| 1399 | Ambassador Ritter: Czechoslovakia; Subcommittee B on Munich Agreement. |
| 1496 | German Embassy in Belgium: Secret Papers. |
| 1569 | Pol. VI: Baltic States—Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Baltic States. |
| 1570 | State Secretary: Franco-German Relations. |
| 1571 | State Secretary: Italo-German Relations. |
| 1602 | German Embassy in Belgium: Political Relations of Belgium with Germany. |
| 1625 | Pol. II: England's Attempt to Build an Anti-German Group of Powers. |
| 1671 | Political Department: Secret Papers--War between Germany and England, France, and Poland: East Asia. |
| 1703 | Supplementary to 174. |
| 1709 | Pol. I M: Agents and Espionage; Reports; vol. 5. |
| 1719 | Pol. V: Poland, Heads of State and their Families. |
| 1725 | Pol. I M: Agents and Espionage; Reports; vol. 9. |
| 1751 | Pol. VI: Political Relations of Estonia with the Soviet Union. |
| 1764 | Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia. |
| 1779 | Inland II g: Protectorate. |
| 1780 | [Miscellaneous Personnel Records from Various Sources.] |
| 1793 | Pol. VI: Finnish-Russian War, vol. 1. |
| 1795 | Pol. VI: Finnish-Russian War, vol. 1, continued. |
| 1807 | Pol. VI: Political Relations between Latvia and Russia. |
| 1821 | Pol. VI: Finnish-Russian War, vol. 3. |
| 1822 | Pol. VI: Finnish-Russian War, vol. 4. |
| 1848 | State Secretary: Italo-German Relations, vols. 1 and 2. |
| 1859 | Pol. VI: Finnish-Russian War—Positions taken by Neutral and Enemy Powers, vol. 1. |

*Film Serial
Numbers**Title of File*

1880	Pol. VI : Finnish-Russian War—Positions taken by Neutral and Enemy Powers, vol. 2.
1903	Pol. VI : Finnish-Russian War, vol. 5.
1921	Pol. IV : Rumania—Foreign Policy, General.
1982	German Embassy in Italy : Mackensen's Papers.
2000	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : America, vol. 12.
2060	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Italy.
2092	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Russia, vol. 12.
2093	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Russia, vol. 13.
2117	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania, vol. 12.
2121	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Turkey.
2122	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Iran—Statistical Material, Newspaper Clippings.
2131	German Embassy in Italy : Secret Papers.
2140	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Hungary.
2153	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Turkey.
2161	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Iran.
2162	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Yugoslavia.
2165	State Secretary : Correspondence of the State Secretary in Political Matters.
2168	Inland II g : Secret Papers of Kult. B. and Referat Deutschland IX.
2177	Under State Secretary : Peace Moves.
2182	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania, vol. 13.
2185	State Secretary : Memoranda of the State Secretary on Instructions within the Foreign Ministry, Position on Various Questions, and Telephone Messages.
2196	Supplementary to 124, 452, 472.
2277	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Afghanistan.
2281	German Embassy in Italy : Secret Papers.
2290	Supplementary to 2281.
2312	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Yugoslavia.
2316	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Japan, vol. 3.
2401	Under State Secretary : Security Zone.
2418	Under State Secretary : United States of America.
2422	Pol. IX : Political Relations of the United States with Germany.
2426	Pol. V : Russia—Setting the Boundary between Germany and Russia in the Former Polish State, vol. 1.
2427	Pol. V : Russia—Setting the Boundary between Germany and Russia in the Former Polish State, vol. 2.
2431	Pol. IX : United States—Foreign Policy, General.
2601	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Denmark.
2775	Under State Secretary : Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg.
2790	Inland II D : Foreign Banks and Concerns.
2810	Pol. IX : United States—German Communities Abroad.
2823	Pol. II : Belgium—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
2825	Supplementary to 2277.
2845	German Embassy in Belgium : Secret Papers.
2862	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Netherlands.
2871	Political Department : Treaties, 1936-1944.
2872	German Legation in Luxembourg : Ore Deliveries.

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Numbers**Title of File*

2874	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Luxembourg.
2898	Pol. VIII : Political Relations of Japan with Germany.
2901	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Sweden.
2914	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, vol. 2.
2931	Pol. VIII : Political Relations between China and Japan.
2973	German Legation in Norway : Noack.
2993	Pol. IX : United States of America—Questions of Neutrality.
2997	Pol. IX : United States of America—Heads of State and their Families.
3027	German Embassy in Spain : The War.
3028	Pol. IV : Rumania—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties, vol. 5.
3035	Cultural Policy Department : General—Secret Papers.
3051	Supplementary to 2000.
3072	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Norway.
3076	German Legation in Norway : <i>Altmark</i> Affair.
3077	German Legation in Norway : Records on Respecting Norwegian Territorial Waters.
3081	German Legation in Norway : Military Occupation of Norway.
3118	Pol. VIII : Political Relations between Japan and the United States of America.
3447	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Denmark.
3471	Pol. II : French Diplomatic and Consular Representation Abroad (except in Germany), and vice versa.
3518	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Norway.
3537	Supplementary to 1793, 1903.
3687	German Legation in Norway : Secret Papers— <i>Altmark</i> Affair.
3712	German Legation in Rumania : Secret Papers.
3781	Supplementary to 2002.
3782	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Russia, vol. 13.
3783	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Russia, vol. 14.
3868	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Spain.
3882	Supplementary to 322, 324.
4031	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Switzerland.
4041	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Holland.
4063	Supplementary to 1890.
4143	Pol. VI : Political Relations of the Baltic States with Russia.
4191	German Embassy in the Soviet Union : German Internal Policy—Military, Naval, Air Affairs; Military and Labor Service.
4218	German Embassy in Spain : Attitude of the Neutrals.
4353	Inland I Partei : Politics in Western Europe.
4447	Supplementary to 171.
4448	Supplementary to 429.
4457	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Yugoslavia—Treaties, Agreements, Protocols.
4459	German Embassy in Italy : Secret Papers.
4461	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Russia.
4463	Supplementary to 1370.
4467	Aussenpolitisches Amt : Norway, S-Z.
4469	Aussenpolitisches Amt : Norway, M-S.
4475	Economic Policy Department : Treaties—Sweden.

*Film Serial
Numbers*

Title of File

4491	Pol. I M: Agents and Espionage; Reports; vol. 4.
4497	Supplementary to 2401.
4512	Aussenpolitisches Amt: General, 1938-1939.
4531	Supplementary to 2121.
4533	Supplementary to 2153.
4535	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 3, Italy, vol. 1.
4537	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 7.
5234	Economic Policy Department, IVb: Italy, Raw Materials and Goods—Coal, vol. 2.
5556	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Rumania.
5568	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Greece.
5570	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Yugoslavia.
6520	German Legation in Rumania: Rumania, Foreign Policy.
6685	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 1, Afghanistan.
6688	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Afghanistan.
6783	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers—Trade in War Material—Netherlands.
7199	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 1, Italy, vol. 1.
7433	Partei Dienststellen: APA, General, 1935-1942.
7883	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Internment of [Polish] Army Personnel in Neutral Countries in connection with the War of 1939, Russia.
7902	Supplementary to 166.
8107	Supplementary to 2422.
8126	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Neutrality, United States of America.
8127	Economic Policy Department, Iib: Trade, Great Britain—Security of German Exports via Neutral Countries.
8128	Supplementary to 2997.
8129	Supplementary to 2993.
8130	Supplementary to 2810.
8136	Supplementary to 100, 174, 1703.
8137	Supplementary to 226.
8138	Supplementary to 100.
8139	Supplementary to 2898.
8141	Pol. VIII: Japan—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
8142	Pol. VIII: Japan—Ministries.
8280	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Naval Warfare, vol. 3.
8281	Economic Policy Department, VI: Sweden, Trade.
8282	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Rumania.
8283	German Legation in Yugoslavia: Secret Political Papers—Yugoslavia's Attitude toward Germany from Sept. 1, 1939; Deliveries by Both Parties.
8285	German Legation in Luxembourg: Reports.
8302	German Legation in Luxembourg: Secret Diary of Radowitz.
8331	Supplementary to 582, 1571, 1848.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
8332	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers—Ley-Clanetti Meeting.
8333	Pol. I M: War between Germany and England, France, and Poland, vol. 1.
8336	German Embassy in Italy: Propaganda Material.
8337	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): German-Italian Economic Negotiations (Telegraphic Reports).
8338	Economic Policy Department, IVb: Italy, Raw Materials and Goods—Coal, vol. 3.
8339	Supplementary to 4535.
8342	German Embassy in Turkey: Economic Negotiations—Turkish-German Economic Relations.
8344	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Naval Warfare, vol. 4.
8351	Economic Policy Department, IIa: Belgium Trade Treaty Relations with Germany (Belgian Governmental Committees).
8354	Economic Policy Department, IIa: Luxembourg, Financial Matters.
8373	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Naval Warfare, vol. 8.
8374	Economic Policy Department, IIa: Netherland, Trade—Colonies.
8388	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Law of War 17, Greece: Arrest and Sinking of Greek Merchant Ships by Germany.
8429	Economic Policy Department, IIB: Trade 12, Trade Relations between England and Russia.
8434	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Russia, vol. 3.
8435	Supplementary to 1369, 1370, 4463.
8452	Supplementary to 2153, 4533.
8484	Supplementary to 1821, 1822.
8485	Supplementary to 1859, 1860, 4063.
8486	Pol. I: League of Nations—Administrative and Technical Questions, Organization of the League Secretariat.
8487	Pol. I: League of Nations—Twentieth Session.
8488	Supplementary to 1625.
8489	Supplementary to 2121, 4531.
8490	German Embassy in Turkey: Change of German Prize Rules in the European Conflict.
8493	Supplementary to 8342.
8496	Economic Policy Department, IVb: Rumania—Trade 13A, Governmental Committees.
8497	Supplementary to 5556.
8498	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 3, Yugoslavia, Secret, War Materials.
8511	German Legation in Estonia: Political Relations of Estonia with Soviet Russia.
8512	Supplementary to 1751.
8514	Supplementary to 1807.
8517	Supplementary to 2401, 4497.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
8518	Legal Department, Appendix: International Law, Law of War—Law of War 5, German Prize Rules.
8519	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Law of War 4, Naval Warfare (also Prize Law), General and Germany.
8520	Economic Policy Department, IIb: Trade 11A, No. 8, Effect of British Naval Warfare on German Trade, Black List.
8521	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Law of War 8, Neutrality, Uruguay.
8522	Legal Department: International Law, Law of War—Law of War 4, Naval Warfare (also Prize Law), General and Germany, vol. 6.
8523	Supplementary to 1205.
8524	Economic Policy Department, IXb: Trade 11A, Effect of British Naval Warfare on German Trade with South America.
8525	Pol. IX: Ibero-America, Political Relations of Central and South American States with Germany.
8526	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Afghanistan.
8527	Cultural Policy Department, Treaties: Instruction and Graduates of Afghan Schools in Germany.
8528	Cultural Policy Department, Treaties: Arranging for German Instructors for the Technical Institute at Kabul, etc.
8529	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 1, Iran—German-Iranian Trade.
8530	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 5, Afghanistan—Economic Agreements.
8531	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 4, Afghanistan—Construction and Transport.
8532	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 3, Afghanistan (Secret)—Appointment of German Air Instructors and Purchase of Training Planes.
8533	Pol. III: Afghanistan—Personalia, Statesmen, Diplomatic and Consular Representatives Abroad.
8534	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 2, Afghanistan, Trade Agreements.
8535	Supplementary to 2122.
8538	Supplementary to 644.
8589	Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
B18	State Secretary: Finland, vol. 1.
B19	State Secretary: Finland, vol. 2.
F1, F2, F3, F5, F6, F7, F8, F10, F11, F13, F14, F15, F17, F18, F19:	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat. (See the General Introduction to this series which was published in vols. I–IV.)

Appendix IV

LIST OF PERSONS¹

- ABE**, General Nobuyuki, Japanese Prime Minister, August 29, 1939–January 14, 1940, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 23–September 23, 1939.
- ALBA and BEWICK**, Duke of, Jacobo María del Pilar Carlos Manuel Fitz-James Stuart, Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939–1945.
- ALFIERI**, Dino, Italian Minister for Popular Culture, 1936–1939; Ambassador to the Holy See, 1939–1940; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- ALTENBURG**, Günther, Minister, Head of Political Division IVb in the German Foreign Ministry, 1938–1939; Director of Information Department, 1939–1941.
- ANFUSO**, Filippo, chef de cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
- AMANULLAH KHAN**, Amir of Afghanistan, 1919–1929; forced to abdicate; lived in Europe after 1929.
- ARGETOIANU**, Constantin, Rumanian Minister President, September–November 1939.
- ARITA**, Hachiro, Japanese Foreign Minister in the Konoye and Hiranuma Cabinets, October 1938–August 1939, and in Yonai Cabinet, January–July 1940.
- ASCHMANN**, Gottfried, Minister, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1933–1939; on special assignment at The Hague and Brussels, 1939–1940.
- ATTOLICO**, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany, 1935–1940.
- AURITI**, Giacinto, Italian Ambassador in Japan, 1933–1940.
- BABARIN**, Evgeny, Trade Representative in the Soviet Embassy in Germany.
- BADER**, Mahmud, Iranian Minister of Finance.
- BALBO**, Italo, Marshal, Italian Governor General of Libya, 1933–1940.
- BASTIANINI**, Giuseppe, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939–1940.
- BAUMBACH**, Norbert, Captain, German Navy, Naval Attaché in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union, 1933–1941.
- BEAVERBROOK**, William Maxwell Aitken, Baron, British Minister for Aircraft Production, 1940–1941.
- BECK**, Jozef, Polish Foreign Minister, 1932–1939.
- BEHREND**s, Hermann, SS-Oberführer, official of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
- BENEŠ**, Eduard, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1935–1938; President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939–1945.
- BERGEN**, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See, 1920–1943.
- BERGEN**, Emile M. van den, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Belgian General Staff.
- BERNARD**, Hans Albert Wilhelm, German Minister in Slovakia, July 1939–August 1940.
- BERNHARDT**, Johannes, German businessman, active in trade with Spain, organizer and director of the Hisma company.
- BETHKE**, Friedrich, department head in the German Ministry of Economics.

¹ The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BIDDLE, Anthony J. Drexel, American Ambassador in Poland, 1937-1939.
- BISMARCK, Otto Christian, Prince von, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1940; from April 1, 1940, Counselor of Embassy with rank of Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
- BLÜCHER, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland, 1935-1944.
- BOCCHINI, Arturo, Chief of the Italian police.
- BOHLE, Ernst Wilhelm Hans, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi Party, 1933-1945; also State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1941.
- BONNET, Georges, French Foreign Minister in the Daladier Cabinet, April 1938-September 1939; Minister of Justice, September 1939-March 1940.
- BORAH, William, United States Senator from Idaho, 1907-1940.
- BORIS III, King of Bulgaria, 1918-1943.
- BÖTTICHER, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States, 1933-1941.
- BRAUCHITSCH, Walther von, German General, Commander in Chief of the German Army, 1938-1941.
- BRÄUER, Curt, German Minister in Norway, 1939-1940.
- BRÜCKEMEIER, Eduard, Counselor, an official of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1940; a member of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, 1939.
- BULLITT, William C., American Ambassador in France, 1936-1940.
- BÜLOW-SCHWANTE, Vicco von, German Minister in Belgium, July 1938; Ambassador, October 1938-1940.
- BURCKHARDT, Carl J., Swiss professor, League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, 1937-1939; President of International Committee of Red Cross, 1939-1945.
- BÜCKNER, Leopold, Captain, German Navy, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the OKW, 1938-1945.
- BUTLER, Richard Austen, British Conservative M. P. since 1929; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-1941.
- CADOGAN, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-1946.
- CALINESCU, Armand, Rumanian Minister of the Interior, 1937-1939; appointed Minister President, March 1939; assassinated by Iron Guardists, September 21, 1939.
- CANARIS, Wilhelm, German Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
- CAROL II, King of Rumania, 1930-1940.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Neville, British Conservative M. P., 1918-1940; leader of the Conservative Party; Prime Minister, May 1937-May 1940.
- CHAUTEAUMPS, Camille, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Coordination in the Daladier Cabinet, 1938-1939; Minister of State, 1939-1940; Vice President of the Council and Minister for Alsace-Lorraine, March-July 1940.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Commander in Chief of Chinese forces and member of Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
- CIANETTI, Tullio, President of the Fascist Confederation of Labor, 1934-1942; member of the Fascist Grand Council and National Council of Corporations; Under Secretary in Ministry of Corporations, 1939-1940.
- CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Liberal and Conservative M. P. since 1900; First Lord of the Admiralty, September 5, 1939-May 10, 1940.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister, 1936-1943.

- CINCAR-MARKOVICH, Aleksander, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, 1939-1941.
- CLODIUS, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.
- COBURG, Duke of (Leopold Karl Eduard, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha), President of the German Red Cross.
- COOPER, Alfred Duff, British Conservative M. P., 1924-1945; Minister of Information, 1940-1941.
- CRUTZESCU, Radu, Rumanian Minister to Germany, 1939-1940.
- CSÁKY, Count István, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.
- CUDAHY, John, American Minister in Elre, 1937-1940; Ambassador in Belgium from January 1940.
- CVETKOVICH, Dragisha, Yugoslav Minister President, 1939-1941.
- DAHLERUS, Birger, Swedish businessman, friend of Marshal Göring.
- DALADIER, Édouard, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense, April 1939-March 1940, also of War and Foreign Affairs, September 1939-March 1940; Minister of War, March-May 1940.
- DARRÉ, Walther, Reichsleiter, German Minister for Food and Agriculture, 1933-1945, on leave from April 1942; Reich Peasant Leader.
- DAVIES, Joseph E., American Ambassador in Belgium and Minister to Luxembourg, 1938-1940.
- DAVIGNON, Vicomte Jacques, Belgian Minister in Germany, April 30, 1936; Ambassador, November 21, 1938-1940.
- DE VALERA, Eamon, Prime Minister of Eire and Minister for External Affairs, 1937-1948.
- DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938 and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.
- DÖNITZ, Karl, Admiral, Commander in Chief, Submarine Arm, German Navy, 1936-1943.
- DÖRNBERG, Alexander, Freiherr von, Minister, Director of the Protocol Department in the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1945.
- DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany, 1938-1942.
- DUPONG, Pierre, Luxembourg Minister of State, 1937-1954.
- EBERL, Otto, Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Spain, 1939-1943.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Conservative M. P. since 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1939-1940; Secretary of State for War, January-December 1940.
- ERBACH-SCHÖNBERG, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Greece, 1936-1941.
- ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, 1937-1941.
- ERKKO, Juho Elias, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1938-1939; Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden, December 1939-March 1940.
- FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, 1936-1941.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in Spain from October 1936.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French Ambassador in Italy, November 1938-1940.
- FRICK, Wilhelm, German Minister of the Interior, 1933-1943.
- FRICKE, Kurt, Captain (later Admiral), German Navy; Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff.
- FROHWEIN, Hans, German Minister in Estonia, 1936-1940.
- FUNK, Walter, German Minister of Economics, 1937-1945; President of the Reichsbank, 1939-1945.
- GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.

- GAMELIN**, Maurice Gustave, French General, Vice President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, 1935-1940; Allied Commander in Chief, September 1939-May 1940.
- GAUS**, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1943.
- GEER**, Dirk Jan de, Netherlands Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, August 1939-September 1940.
- GEORGE VI**, King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, 1936-1952.
- GEORGES**, Alphonse Jacques, French General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1935-1939; Commander in Chief of the French Armies in the Northeast, 1939-1940.
- GÉRARD**, Max Leo, former Belgian Minister of Finance and economic expert.
- GEREDE**, R. Hülsrev, Turkish Ambassador in Germany, September 27, 1939-1942.
- GIANNINI**, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Foreign Ministry.
- GÖRING**, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag, 1932-1945; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air, 1933-1945; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, 1935-1945; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945.
- GREW**, Joseph Clark, American Ambassador in Japan, 1932-1941.
- GRITZBACH**, Erich, Chief of Staff Office of the Minister President of Prussia (Göring), and head of the Press Department for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945.
- GROBBA**, Fritz, German Minister in Iraq, 1932-September 1939; accredited also to Saudi Arabia, February 1939, on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry, 1939-1942.
- GRUNDHEER**, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI in the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1945.
- GÜNTHER**, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister, 1939-1945.
- GUSTAF V**, King of Sweden, 1907-1950.
- HAARON VII**, King of Norway, 1905—.
- HABICHT**, Theodor, Deputy Director of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry, with title of Under State Secretary, 1939-1940.
- HACHA**, Emil, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, November 30, 1938-March 15, 1939; President of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 1939-1945.
- HAGEN**, Wiljam, Quisling's representative in Germany, 1939-1940.
- HALDER**, Franz, German General, Chief of the Army General Staff, December 1938-October 1942.
- HALIFAX**, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Conservative Party leader; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938-December 1940.
- HANNEKEN**, Hermann von, Major General, Under State Secretary and Chief of Raw Materials Division, German Ministry of Economics, 1938-1942; Plenipotentiary General for Iron and Steel Production and Allocation, Four Year Plan, 1937-1942.
- HASSELL**, Ulrich von, German Ambassador in Italy, 1932-1938, recalled to the Foreign Ministry for special duty to deal with questions of neutrality, August-September 1939.
- HAMBO**, Carl Joachim, Member of Norwegian Storting from 1919; President of the Storting, 1926-1940; President of the League of Nations Assembly, 1939-1940.
- HEDIN**, Sven Anders, Swedish Asiatic explorer.
- HEEREN**, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia, 1933-1941.

- HEMPEL, Eduard, German Minister in Elre, 1937-1945.
- HENCKE, Andor, Senior Counselor, Chairman, German-Delegation, German-Soviet Mixed Commission on Border Questions, October 1939-April 1940.
- HENTIG, Georg Werner Otto, Senior Counselor, Head of Political Division VII in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1939.
- HEETZOG, James Barry M., South African politician and general; Prime Minister, 1924-1939; Minister of External Affairs, 1927-1939; leader United South African National Party until 1939.
- HESS, Rudolf, German National Socialist leader, member of the Nazi Party from 1920; Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party from 1932; Hitler's Deputy, 1933-1941; member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1941.
- HESSE, Prince Philip of, son-in-law of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, employed as a special envoy between Hitler and Mussolini, 1938-1939.
- HEWEL, Walther, Senior Counselor, personal representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer, 1938-1945.
- HEYDEN-RYNSCH, Bernd Otto, Freiherr von der, official in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1940.
- HEYDRICH, Reinhard, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
- HILGER, Gustav, Counselor of Legation, 1923-1939, Counselor of Embassy, 1939-1941, in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich, Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police, 1936-1945; Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community, 1939.
- HIRANUMA, Count Kichiro, Japanese Prime Minister, January 4-August 28, 1939.
- HIESCHFELD, H. M., director of the department of commerce and industry in the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs.
- HITLER, Adolf, Chancellor of the German Reich, January 30, 1933; Führer and Chancellor, 1934-1945; Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, 1938-1945.
- HORE-BELISHA, Leslie, British Liberal and Liberal National M. P., 1923-1945; Secretary of State for War, May 1937-January 1940.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, 1920-1944.
- HOSI VENTURI, Giovanni, Italian Minister of Communications.
- HULL, Cordell, American Secretary of State, 1933-1944.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, President of the Turkish Republic, 1938-1950.
- JAGWITZ, Eberhard von, Official of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP; Under State Secretary and Chief, Foreign Currency Department in the Ministry of Economics; member, General Council, Four Year Plan.
- JESCHONNEK, Hans, General, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, 1939-1943.
- JODL, Alfred, General, Chief of the Operations Office and Operations Staff of the OKW, August 1939-1945.
- KANIN, Kotohito, Prince, Field Marshal, Japanese Army, Chief of Staff, 1931-1940.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm, General, Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.
- KENNEDY, Joseph P., American Ambassador in Great Britain, January 1938-November 1940.
- KILLINGER, Manfred, Freiherr von, Free Corps and SA leader; Head of Division *Personal-Nachschubs* in Personnel and Administrative Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1939-1940; appointed Inspector of German diplomatic missions in the Balkans, December 30, 1939; Minister in Slovakia, 1940.
- KLOSSEYANOV, Georgi, Bulgarian Minister President and Foreign Minister, 1935-1940.
- KIRK, Alexander Comstock, American Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Germany, 1939-1941.

- KLEFFENS**, Eelco Nicolaas van, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1939-1946.
- KLEIST**, Peter, Specialist for Eastern Europe in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
- KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN**, Sir Hughe M., British Ambassador in Turkey, 1939-1944.
- KÖRNER**, Paul, State Secretary and permanent deputy to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945, State Secretary, Prussian State Ministry, 1933-1945.
- KÖSTING**, Ernst, Lieutenant General, Military Attaché, German Embassy in the Soviet Union, 1935-1941.
- KOHT**, Halvdan, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935-1941.
- KONOYE**, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, June 1937-January 1939; Minister of State without Portfolio in Hiranuma Cabinet, January-August 1939.
- KORDT**, Erich, Senior Counselor, Foreign Minister's Secretariat in the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1941.
- KORDT**, Theo, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Great Britain, 1938-1939; in the Legation in Switzerland, 1939-1945.
- KOTZE**, Hans Ulrich von, German Minister in Latvia, 1938-1940.
- KROLL**, Hans Anton, Counselor of the German Embassy in Turkey, 1936-1943.
- KURUSU**, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February 1941.
- KUUVINEN**, Otto, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, 1931-1943; Head of the Finnish People's Government at Terijoki, 1939-1940; Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Finno-Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic and Vice President of the Supreme Council of the USSR, 1940.
- LAMMERS**, Hans, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934-1945, with the rank of State Secretary, 1934-1937, and Reich Minister, 1937-1945; member and Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
- LANSBURY**, George, British Labor M. P. for Bow and Bromley, 1922-1940.
- LANGMANN**, Otto, German Minister in Uruguay, 1938-1942.
- LEOPOLD III**, King of the Belgians, 1934-1951.
- LEY**, Robert, Reichsleiter, Leader of the German Labor Front, 1933-1945; Director of the Party Organization of the NSDAP.
- LEXUS**, Rudolf, of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop from 1935, Counselor, member of the Personal Staff of the Reich Foreign Minister.
- LIPEKI**, Jozef, Polish Ambassador in Germany, 1934-1939.
- LLOYD**, George Ambrose, 1st Baron Lloyd of Dolobran, Chairman of the British Council.
- LLOYD GEORGE**, David, British Liberal and Independent Liberal M. P., 1890-1945; Prime Minister, 1916-1922.
- MACKENSEN**, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy, 1938-1943.
- MAGISTRATI**, Count Massimo, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Germany, 1934; Counselor, 1936-1940; Minister in Bulgaria, 1940-1943.
- MAISKY**, Ivan Mikhailovich, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932-1943.
- MALAN**, Daniel F., South African Nationalist Party leader, member of the South African Parliament.
- MANDEL**, Georges, French Minister of Colonies, Daladier Cabinet, April 1938-March 1940; Reynaud Cabinets, March-June 1940.
- MANNERHEIM**, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish Army.
- MASARYK**, Jan Garrigue, Czechoslovak Minister in Great Britain, 1925-1939.
- MASSIGLI**, René, French Ambassador in Turkey, 1938-1940.

- MAVROUDIS, Nicholas, Under Secretary of State in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1936-1941.
- MEISSNER, Otto, Chief of the German Presidential Chancellery, 1934-1945; State Minister with the rank of Reich Minister, 1937-1945.
- MENEMENCIÖGLU, Numan, Ambassador; Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 1937-1942.
- METAKAS, John, General Greek Minister President, also Foreign Minister and Minister of War, Navy and Air, 1936-1941.
- MIKROYAN, Anastas Ivanovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, 1938-1949; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
- MILCH, Erhard, General, State Secretary in the Reich Air Ministry, 1933-1944; Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, 1936-1945.
- MOER, Otto Carl, Director in the Danish Foreign Ministry.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, 1930-1941; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939-1949.
- MOLTKE, Hans Adolf Helmut von, German Minister in Poland, 1931, Ambassador, 1934-1939; on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry, 1939-1942.
- MONZIE, Anatole de, French Minister of Public Works, 1938-1940; Minister of Public Works and Transport, March-June 1940.
- MOSCICKI, Ignacy, President of Poland, 1926-1939.
- MUNCH, Peter, Danish Foreign Minister, 1929-1940.
- MUNTERS, Vilhelms, Latvian Foreign Minister, 1936-1940.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, founder of the Italian Fascist Party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister, 1922-1943; Commander of the Armed Forces, 1938-1943.
- NEUBACHER, Hermann, leading Austrian National Socialist; Mayor of Vienna after the Anschluss; appointed special representative in charge of economic questions in Southeastern Europe, stationed at Bucharest, January 1940.
- NEUBAUER, Lieutenant Commander, officer of the German Naval Staff.
- NEUHAUS, Hans Joachim von, Counselor of Legation, German Legation in Norway, 1938-1940.
- NEUHAUSEN, Franz, Consul General and Director of the German Travel Office at Belgrade, Special Representative in Yugoslavia for the Four Year Plan.
- NEURATH, Constantin, Freiherr von, Reich Minister and President of the Secret Cabinet Council, February 4, 1938-May 1945; Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, 1939-1943.
- NOACK, Ulrich, German historian attached to the Legation in Norway.
- NOMURA, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Japanese Foreign Minister in cabinet of General Abe, September 1939-January 1940.
- NYE, Gerald P., United States Senator from North Dakota, 1925-1945.
- NYGAARDSVOLD, Johan, Norwegian Prime Minister, 1935-1945.
- OSHIMA, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, November 1938-December 1939, and February 1941-1945.
- OTT, Eugen, German Major General, Military Attaché in Japan, 1934-1938; Ambassador in Japan, 1938-1943.
- OUJANSKY, Constantine Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1939-1941.
- PAASIKIVI, Juho K., Finnish Minister in Sweden, 1936-1940; Chairman of Finnish delegation for negotiations with the USSR, 1939; Minister without Portfolio, 1939-1940; Chairman of Finnish peace delegation in Moscow, 1940.
- PAPEN, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey, 1939-1944.

- PARIANI, Alberto, Italian general, Under Secretary of State for War; Chief of the Italian General Staff, 1936-1939.
- PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934-1941.
- PÉTAÏN, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France, Ambassador in Spain, 1939-1940.
- PIERLOT, Hubert, Belgian Minister President, February 1939-1945; Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 1939-September 1939.
- PITTMAN, Key, United States Senator from Nevada, 1911-1940; Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
- PLESSEN, Johann, Baron von, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Italy, 1935-1943.
- POTEMKIN, Vladimir Petrovich, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1937-1940.
- QUISLING, Vidkun, Norwegian politician and official; leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling party.
- RADOWITZ, Otto von, German Minister in Luxembourg, 1936-1940.
- RAEDER, Erich, Grand Admiral, Commander in Chief of German Navy, 1935-1943.
- RASTIKIS, Stasys, General, Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian Army.
- REICHERT, Hans Joachim, Ritter von, Secretary of Legation in German Embassy in Italy, 1938-1940; Counselor of Legation, 1940-1944.
- RENDEL, George, British Minister in Bulgaria, 1938-1941.
- RENTHE-FINK, Cecil von, German Minister in Denmark, 1936-1942.
- REYNAUD, Paul, French Minister of Finance, November 1938-March 1940; President of the Council of Ministers, March-June 1940; Foreign Minister, March-May 1940.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-1945.
- RICHERT, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany, 1937-1945.
- RICHTHOFEN, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria, 1939-1941.
- RIPKEN, Georg, Counselor, head of Division IIIc in the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- RITTER, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1945.
- RIZA KHAN PAHLEVI, Shah of Iran, 1925-1941.
- RÖSSING, Colonel, German Military Attaché in Finland, Estonia, and Latvia.
- ROJAS Y MORENO, Juan Conte de Casa Rojas, Director General of Political Affairs and Treaties in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1939-1940.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America, March 4, 1933-April 12, 1945.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, 1933-1945; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP, 1934-1945.
- ROSSO, Augusto, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1936-1941.
- RYDZ-SMIGLY. *See* SMIGLY-RYDZ.
- RYTI, Rysto Heikki, Governor of the Bank of Finland, 1923-1945; President of Finland, 1940-1944.
- SARACOLU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.
- SARRAUT, Albert, French Minister of the Interior, April 1938-March 1940.
- SAVCHENKO, G. K., General of Artillery, Soviet Army.
- SAYDAM, Reşit, Minister President of Turkey, 1939-1943.
- SCHACHT, Hjalmar, President of the Reichsbank, 1923-1939, Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1937-1943.
- SCHMIDT, Hans-Wilhelm, director of the department for Northern Europe of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- SCHERPENBERG, Hilger, Freiherr van, Counselor; official in German Foreign Ministry, 1926-1944.

- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1945; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat from 1939.
- SCHNEEWIND, Otto, Vice-Admiral; Chief of German Naval Staff (*Seekeriegsleitung*), 1938-1941.
- SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1940.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1934-1941.
- SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, Lutz, Count, Reich Minister of Finance, 1932-1945.
- SELTZER, Karl, Estonian Foreign Minister, May 1938-October 1939.
- SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, brother-in-law of General Franco, Spanish Minister of the Interior, January 1938-October 1940.
- SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain, 1938-1941.
- SHIRATORI, Toshio, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, December 1938-September 1939.
- SHKVARTSEV, Aleksander A., Soviet Ambassador in Germany, September 1939-November 1940.
- SIEGFRIED, Herbert Ludwig, Counselor, Official of the Secretariat of the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.
- SIMON, Sir John, British Liberal and Liberal National M. P., 1906-1940; Leader of the Liberal National Party, 1931-1940; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937-1940; created Viscount Simon, 1940; Lord Chancellor, 1940-1945.
- ŠKIRPA, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, February 1939-July 1940.
- SMEND, Hans, German Minister in Iran, 1935-1940.
- SMETONA, Antanas, President of Lithuania, 1938-1940.
- SMIGLY-RYDZ, Edward, Marshal of Poland, Inspector General of the Army, 1936-1939.
- SPEAK, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1939-1946.
- STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; member of the Politburo and Orgburo, 1922-1953.
- STAHRER, Heinrich, in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
- STOHRER, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain, 1937-1943.
- STOICA, Basile, Rumanian Ambassador in Turkey, 1937-1940.
- SUETENS, M., Director General for Foreign Commerce in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- SVINHUFVUD, Pehr Evind, Finnish statesman, President of Finland, 1931-1937.
- SZTÓJAY, Döme, Major General, Hungarian Minister in Germany, 1935-1944.
- TANNER, Väinö, Finnish Minister of Finance, 1937-1939, Foreign Minister, December 1939-March 1940.
- TATARESCU, George, Rumanian Ambassador in France, 1938-1939; Minister President, November 1939-July 1940.
- TAVISTOCK, Hastings William Sackville Russell, Marquess of, since 1940 Duke of Bedford.
- TAYLOR, Myron C., American lawyer and businessman, personal representative of President Roosevelt to the Holy See, 1939-1940.
- TELEKI, Count Pál, Hungarian Minister President, February 1939-April 1941.
- TEVOSSYAN, Ivan T., Soviet People's Commissar for Shipbuilding.
- THOMAS, Georg, German General, Head of the War Economy Staff (*Wehrwirtschaftsstab*), later the Military Economy and Armaments Office (*Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt*) of the OKW.
- THOMSEN, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in the United States, July 1936; Minister, December 1940-December 1941; Chargé d'Affaires from November 1938.

- TIPPELSKIRCH, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, 1935-1940; Minister, 1940-1941, in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TOGO, Shigenori, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1938; in the Soviet Union, 1938-1940.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1939; Director, 1939-1943.
- UNDÉN, Östen, Swedish delegate to the League of Nations and advisor on international law to the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- URŠYS, Juozas, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.
- VANDENBERG, Arthur, United States Senator from Michigan, 1928-1951.
- VANSITTART, Sir Robert, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary, 1938-1941.
- VOROSHILOV, Klement Efremovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Defense, 1934-1940; member of the Politburo.
- WALSHE, Joseph Patrick, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs of Eire, 1922-1946.
- WALTER, Ministerialdirektor, in charge of the department of customs and trade policy in the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
- WANG CHING-WEI (1888-1944), Chinese political leader; head of a Chinese Central Government approved by Japan.
- WARLIMONT, Walter, Colonel (later General), Chief of the National Defense Department in the Operations Office and Operations Staff in the OKW, 1938-1944.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.
- WELLES, Sumner, American Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.
- WENNINGER, Ralph, Lieutenant General, Air Attaché in the German Embassy in Belgium, accredited also to the Netherlands.
- WEYGAND, Maxime, General, Commander in Chief of French Forces in the eastern Mediterranean, 1939-1940.
- WIED, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden, 1933-1943.
- WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1944.
- WILHELMINA, Queen of the Netherlands, 1890-1948.
- WILSON, Hugh R., American Ambassador to Germany, 1938-1940, recalled to the United States for report and consultation, November 14, 1938, and did not return to his post.
- WINDSOR, Duke of, Major-General, General Staff British Army in France, 1939-1940.
- WORKMANN, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, 1938-1943.
- WOHLTHAT, Helmut, Prussian State Councilor, Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan, on economic mission in Spain, 1939, and in charge of negotiations for German-Rumanian commercial treaty, 1939.
- WOODRING, Harry Hines, American Secretary of War, 1936-1940.
- WUORIMAA, Aarne, Finnish Minister in Germany, 1933-1940.
- YONAI, Mitsumasa, Japanese Prime Minister, January-July, 1940.
- ZECH-BURKESBODA, Julius von, Count, German Minister in the Netherlands, 1928-1940.
- ZECHLIN, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1938-1940.
- ZIEMKE, Kurt, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, September 1939-January 1941.

Appendix V

GLOSSARY

OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ¹

AA, Auswärtiges Amt
Abwehr, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW
Amtsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service
Angabe (Ang.), additional item in a file
AO, Auslandsorganisation
APA, Aussenpolitisches Amt
Auslands-Institut, see Deutsches Auslandsinstitut
Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the NSDAP concerned with German nationals living abroad
Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the NSDAP; headed by Alfred Rosenberg
Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry
Brigadeführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Brigadier General
Büro RAM, office of the Reich Foreign Minister
Büro St.S., office of the State Secretary
Chefsache, top secret military
Deutsches Auslandsinstitut, German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, for research and propaganda among Auslandsdeutsche (German nationals or persons of German origin residing abroad)
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister

Dirigent der Politischen Abteilung, deputy head of the Political Department
DNR, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro
e. o., ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates a draft for which there are no preceding papers (see zu)
Fall Weserübung, cover name for German operation against Denmark and Norway in April 1940
g., geheim
geheim, secret
geheime Kommandosache, top secret military
geheime Reichssache, top secret
Geheimrat, Privy Councillor, title conferred on high Government officials prior to 1918
g Kdos, geheime Kommandosache
g Ra, geheime Reichssache
Gruppenführer, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General
K, Kulturpolitische Abteilung
Kapitän zur See, German naval rank equivalent to Captain in the Navy
Kulturpolitische Abteilung (Kult.), Cultural Policy Department
Landesgruppe, NSDAP organization for a foreign country, controlled by the Auslandsorganisation, headed by a Landesgruppenleiter
Landesgruppenleiter, leader of an NSDAP Landesgruppe
Marineoberkriegsgerichtsrat, a non-military legal official of the German Navy with equivalent rank corresponding to that of Commander
Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry
Ministerialdirigent, a grade in the Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry

¹ Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

- Ministerialrat**, Ministerial counselor, a grade in the German Civil Service
- Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei**, National Socialist German Workers' Party, the full title of the Nazi Party
- NSDAP**, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
- Obergebietsführer**, Chief District Leader, a rank in the Hitler Youth whose holder might occupy the post of District Leader in the Hitler Youth, or that of Office Director in the Reich Youth Office
- Oberkommando des Heeres**, High Command of the Army
- Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine**, High Command of the Navy
- Oberkommando der Wehrmacht**, High Command of the Wehrmacht
- Oberregierungsrat**, a grade in the German Civil Service
- OKH**, Oberkommando des Heeres
- OKM**, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
- OKW**, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
- Ortsgruppe**, subdivision of an NSDAP Kreis or district, headed by an Ortsgruppenleiter
- Ortsgruppenleiter**, head of an NSDAP Ortsgruppe
- Pers.**, Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung
- Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung**, Personnel and Administrative Department of the Foreign Ministry
- Pol.**, Politische Abteilung
- Politische Abteilung**, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographic areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e. g., Pol. IV (see appendix II)
- R**, Rechtsabteilung
- RAM**, Reichsaussenminister
- Rechtsabteilung (Recht.)**, Legal Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- Referat Deutschland**, also **Sonderreferat Deutschland**, special section for German internal affairs in the Foreign Ministry
- Referent**, drafting officer, expert, specialist, competent official
- Regierungsrat**, a grade in the German Civil Service
- Reichsamtseileiter**, a principal official in the Reich office of an NSDAP organization
- Reichsaussenminister**, Reich Foreign Minister
- Reichsbahn**, the German State Railways
- Reichsbahndirektor**, an official of the German State Railways
- Reichsdeutsche**, Reich Germans, i. e., those Germans who were Reich subjects, used usually with reference to those living outside the frontiers of the Reich (see **Volksdeutsche**)
- Reichsführer SS**, Commander in Chief of the SS
- Reichsgruppe Industrie**, Reich Group Industry, an official organization for the control of German industry
- Reichsleiter**, highest NSDAP rank
- Reichsmark**, the unit of German currency
- Reichsminister**, Reich Minister; any member of the Reich Cabinet but in Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister
- Reichsorganisationsleiter**, director of the Party Organization of the NSDAP (the title of Dr. Ley in the Party organization)
- RM**, Reichsmark; Reichsminister
- SA**, Sturmabteilung
- Schutzstaffel**, elite corps of the NSDAP, used for military and police purposes
- SD**, Sicherheitsdienst
- Sicherheitsdienst**, security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS
- SS**, Schutzstaffel
- Staatssekretär**, the highest career official of a Reich Ministry
- Stabsleitung**, personal staff of the head of a central department in the NSDAP
- St. S.**, Staatssekretär
- Sturmabteilung**, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
- Sturmabteilungsleiter**, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major
- Unterstaatssekretär**, Under State Secretary

U. St. S., Unterstaatssekretär

Vbd., Völkerbund

Völkerbund, League of Nations

Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i. e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects

Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, (VOMI), central agency for problems concerning Volksdeutsche; formed as the Büro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz in 1937; directed covertly the political agitation of German minorities

Volksgruppenführung, leadership of a Volksgruppe or German national group outside the Reich

W, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung

Wehrmachtführungsamt, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the

OKW engaged in operations planning

Wehrwirtschaftsstab, War Economy Staff, a division of OKW, title changed in 1939 to Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, Military Economy and Armaments Office

Weserübung, **Weserübung Süd**, **Weserübung Nord**, cover name for German operation against Denmark and Norway in April 1940. **Weserübung Süd** referred to the occupation of Denmark and **Weserübung Nord** to the attack on Norway

Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry

zu, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number

